问责制和监督

自1947年以来，情报预算已由行政部门归类。在过去的20年中，是否应该公开披露是一个积极考虑的主题。教会和派克委员会以及洛克菲勒委员会都建议一定程度的披露。自冷战结束以来，该问题几乎每年在国会中进行辩论。

Repeated often, the arguments for and against disclosure are abundantly clear. Those who favor disclosure contend that the public should be permitted to know the amount of federal spending devoted to the intelligence function and that this amount can be disclosed without providing useful information to potential U.S. adversaries. They point out that the budget for intelligence agencies has been disclosed repeatedly in the press-and once inadvertently by a congressional committee-without apparent harm.

Those who oppose disclosure contend that the overall number would be meaningless to the American public, and that, over time, trends could be discerned by potential adversaries that might allow them to draw conclusions about particular programs of activities. They worry that if the overall number is disclosed, there would be demands for further "peeling of the onion."

After weighing the arguments, the Commission concludes that the President should disclose to the public the overall figure for the intelligence budget.The Commission believes this can be done in manner that does not raise a significant security concern. While disclosure would necessarily convey limited information, it would let the American public know what is being spent on intelligence as a proportion of federal spending. This in itself is a worthwhile purpose, and may, to some degree, help restore the confidence of the American people in the intelligence function. A number of foreign governments, including the British and Australian, have disclosed their intelligence budgets to the public without adverse effect. The Commission believes it can be done here as well.

14-2. The Commission recommends that at the beginning of each congressional budget cycle, the President or a designee disclose the total amount of money appropriated for intelligence activities for the current fiscal year (to include NFIP, JMIP, and TIARA) and the total amount being requested for the next fiscal year. Such disclosures could either be made as part of the President's annual budget submission or, separately, in unclassified letters to the congressional intelligence committees. No further disclosures should be authorized.

国会对情报的监督

The oversight committees of the Congress-the Select Committee on Intelligence in the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in the House of Representatives-provide the only routine oversight of intelligence activities outside the Executive branch. As such, they bring a perspective to the oversight function that is not replicated by oversight bodies within the Executive branch. Inasmuch as both committees also authorize appropriations for intelligence activities and have subpoena power, they retain the practical leverage needed to make oversight effective.

此外，法律专门义务总统确保情报机构使委员会“充分并目前了解”其活动，包括所有“重要的预期情报活动”和所有“重要情报失败”，并提供任何信息，并提供任何信息。两个委员会之一。该法律没有定义要报告的信息类别，使情报机构忽略或误解了自己的危险（偶尔会发生）。法律还有义务将所有秘密行动“调查结果”通知情报委员会（或在特殊情况下，在国会领导层），一旦他们得到了总统的批准。委员会无权拒绝这些发现，但可以禁止在随后几年的此类活动中支出资金。因此，实际上，他们对秘密行动计划的看法很大。

大多数情况下，委员会提供严格而密集的监督。他们越来越多地知识渊博，并保持了持怀疑态度。没有其他国家接近提供对其情报服务的立法监督。

情报界向立法监督者提供了大量详细的信息，有些非常敏感的IS。听证会经常举行；每天与工作人员开会。有时会出现争议的访问争议，偶尔的监督过程已经崩溃（例如，伊朗 - 对抗事件），但总的来说，该系统运行良好。随着时间的流逝，这些机构开始欣赏委员会的期望，委员会开始欣赏机构的安全问题，并愿意容纳它们。两个委员会都建立了安全的环境，以讨论和存储机密信息，并在保护与之共享的信息方面保持了良好的记录。

委员会采访的一些人认为，如果将两个监督委员会合并为一个联合委员会，从而减少了获得敏感信息的成员和员工的数量，将进一步提高安全性。委员会考虑了这个想法，但不准备推荐它。建立一个联合委员会将不会大大减少需要获得情报的国会数量，但会降低监督程度。这还将消除主体中委员会固有的支票和余额，分别考虑情报资金。联合委员会将不再处理参议院获得的提名。有单独的委员会工作。改变这种安排的案例尚未提出。

但是，委员会确实确定了可以进行改进的一个领域，而另一个领域，委员会没有建议，但要谨慎。两个委员会的成员均由其各自的国会领导人任命为固定条款，目前在任一个委员会中连续八年都不能任职。该政策的最初理由是，如果成员或多或少地永久地分配了成员，则情报界可能会掌握他们，而监督将受到影响。改革者还认为，允许更多国会议员通过旋转任务制度在委员会任职，这将增加对这两个房屋的情报任务的理解。

然而，现实是，由于固定的任期规则，成员通常在他们开始掌握复杂主题的时候必须旋转委员会。确实，知道自己的任期是有限的，有些人将时间放在其他委员会上。结果，许多委员会证人认为，不幸的是失去了专业知识和连续性，从而削弱了委员会的有效性。

14-3. The Commission recommends that the members of the House and Senate intelligence committees not be limited by fixed term or tenure. Appointments should be made in the same manner as appointments to other committees, with new members being assigned to fill spaces resulting form normal attrition, except that new members should continue to be appointed by the leadership of the House and Senate, rather than by their respective party structures. The respective Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members could be appointed for fixed terms to provide for rotation of the leadership responsibilities. If the House and Senate choose instead to maintain the current policy in order to allow more Members to serve, the Commission suggests that the maximum period of service on the committees be extended to a least ten years.

尽管监督委员会与情报机构之间的关系在实践中效果很好，但许多知情的目击者告诉委员会，国会的监督变得如此沉重和侵入性，以至于它对情报行动产生负面影响。一些人建议，有一天有一天可能会出现情报官员或其主管在委员会面前出现，并根据事后的判断（可能是几年前做出的判断），因为事后看来扼杀了冒险，并鼓励了胆怯。情报官也被视为越来越多地将事情放在纸上，从而为代理商经理造成了问题，并降低了监督者在后来的关头陷入问题的能力。最后，一些人认为，监督委员会的公开报告和声明几乎总是负面的，从而扭曲了公众ReportsReports对情报的看法，在潜在的合作来源中给人留下了不利的印象，并破坏了情报人员的士气。

委员会没有可靠地评估这些问题的手段。毫无疑问，监督有其成本。然而，情报区的国会监督与其他领域的国会监督没有质量不同。没有政府官员喜欢质疑他的判决或批评他的行动。监督的本质是，在执行机构涉及执行机构的情况下，国会报告通常是负面的。ReportsReports

话虽如此，委员会认为，情报监督需要仔细处理国会。情报是政府活动的一个领域，应鼓励在适用的法律和政策的范围内冒险和创新思维。这个领域在很大程度上依赖于其员工的专业判断和坦率。这也是一个高度依赖其他政府和个人的合作的领域。监督委员会的所作所为，尤其是在公共场合，确实超出了特定询问或调查的情况。虽然委员会自然渴望证明其监督是有效的，但他们应该考虑其对他们监督的机构的负面影响。委员会认为，委员会应该确保将平衡的图片呈现给公众，并在应有的情况下给予信誉，并捍卫情报机构的表现不准确，或者他们的正直不公平地受到损害。情报机构不能可靠地捍卫自己。

The Commission makes no specific recommendation here, but emphasizes the need for the oversight committees to balance the various interests at stake in carrying out their crucial responsibilities.

行政部门内的监督安排

Each element of the Intelligence Community falls within the purview of an Inspector General (IG), who typically carries out inspections, investigations, and audits of the intelligence activities under his or her purview. Large intelligence elements have their own IG; smaller ones come under the IG of their parent organization. Several intelligence components of the Department of Defense have their own IG and also are within the purview of the DoD IG. CIA is the only intelligence agency with an internal IG who is presidentially-appointed and Senate-confirmed and who is required by law to make reports directly to the oversight committees. The IGs who are internal to other intelligence components are appointed by the head of the component concerned.

The Department of Defense also has an Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight, who conducts investigations and monitors the activities of IGs internal to DoD intelligence components, principally to ascertain compliance with the rules governing the collection and dissemination of information on Americans.

Within the Executive Office of the President, there is an Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) with jurisdiction extending across the entire Intelligence Community. Currently, the IOB is constituted as a standing committee of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). Four members of the PFIAB serve in a dual capacity as members of the IOB. The IOB reviews the activities of, and receives regular reports from, the agency IGs and other oversight offices. Periodically, it reviews covert action programs and conducts inquiries regarding possible violations of law or Presidential directives at the direction of the President, upon the request of the DCI, or upon its own motion. It reports to the President and refers apparent violations of law to the Attorney General.

委员会没有深入研究这些监督机制的工作。尽管如此，在代理水平上很明显，就专门用于IG功能的资源以及IG对代理运营的影响而存在广泛的差异。一些人建议每个情报机构都具有与CIA相似的独立法定IG。其他人至少建议，除了中央情报局以外，其他情报机构应该从机构外部引入合格的人作为IG，而不是依靠职业员工来扮演这一角色。

14-4。委员会建议，情报监督委员会已经负责监视IG的性能，该委员会对现有的IG框架进行了审查，目的是确保这项重要的监督工具的有效性。委员会还建议，情报监督委员会以更大程度的独立性构成PFIAB，因为其功能在质量上有所不同。

Footnotes