这raison d'etreof the Intelligence Community is to provide accurate and meaningful information and insights to consumers in a form they can use at the time they need them. If intelligence fails to do that, it fails altogether. The expense and effort invested in collecting and processing the information have gone for naught.
评估情报界完成这项基本任务的能力是一件复杂的事情。发表了大量分析；它的大部分是及时的，质量很高。情报界有许多分析师在各自领域的公认专家，并且其专业判断受到重视和依赖。显然，情报分析对许多消费者具有重要的价值。
这Commission found especially close ties between the producers and users of military intelligence. Within the military there is a long history of respect for, and reliance upon, intelligence. Intelligence is factored into strategic and tactical planning, is exercised in war gaming, and is integral to operations. As a result, military requirements are better defined, in large part, because of the close and continuing dialogue between intelligence analysts and the military commands they support.
Where policy agencies are concerned, however, consumers more often take a jaundiced view of the analytical support they receive. The President and senior cabinet officials appear to be relatively well served, but many decisionmakers at lower levels find that intelligence analysis comes up short. Often what they receive fails to meet their needs by being too late or too unfocused, or by adding little to what they already know.
In fact, only a small percentage of the resources allocated to intelligence goes to "all- source" analysis. Relatively few resources are devoted to developing and maintaining expertise among the analytical pool. Intelligence lags behind in terms of assimilating open source information into the analytical process, and it continues to struggle with how to avail itself of expertise in the private sector. Analysis that is not responsive to consumer needs continues to be produced.
这Intelligence Communityis not entirely to blame. Consumers have a responsibility not only to engage in the process but, more important, to drive it. Often, they are uncooperative or too busy to engage at all. Since most are political appointees, many enter and leave government never appreciating what intelligence might have done for them. Clearly, consumers need to be better educated about the value of intelligence.
委员会确实发现很多例子there was a close working relationship with policymakers. Intelligence producers were able to focus on issues of significance and to make information available when needed. Analysts understood the consumer's level of knowledge and the issues he or she wanted help on. Their analysis was read and relied upon. The consumer, for his part, developed an understanding of what intelligence could do for him and-equally important-what intelligence could not do. Many considered the support vital to meeting their responsibilities and actively engaged in a dialogue with analysts to refine the support they received. But these instances appear to be the exception rather than the rule.
对于委员会而言，所有这一切都很明确：必须一致努力使情报分析对其所服务的决策者更有用。正如私营部门的要素重新设计了自己以提高产品质量和对客户的响应能力一样，情报机构也必须。在以下各节中，委员会解释了我们如何相信这可以实现。
决策者从各种来源获得支持。中央情报局情报局（DI）以及组成国家情报委员会的国家情报官员都负责向政府提供全源情报分析，并与总统，国家安全顾问和国防秘书一起提供全部源的情报分析并说明是最重要的客户。大多数政策制定者继续将中央情报局视为政府内部杰出的全源分析要素，以免费提供独立的判决，而这些判决没有政策或部门的偏见。
对情报有实质要求的部门和机构还具有内部要素，可利用中央情报局和其他机构提供的其他来源为代理商负责人及其员工提供量身定制的全源分析。在国防部，该职能由国防情报机构执行；在国务院，情报与研究局；在能源，商业和财政部的部门，由小型专用组成部分。这些部门组织还参与了国家情报估算的生产（本章后面讨论）以及在社区主持下进行的其他分析。（有关为军用使用者提供分析支持的机构的描述，请参见第10章。）
In addition, consumers receive "single-source" reports based on data obtained by NSA, CIA, DoD and diplomatic reporting from the Department of State. Such reports are valued by consumers, although they may not provide the context of all-source analysis.
情报生产者以各种方式与客户互动。在频谱的一端，情报分析师可能会被分配给某些消费者的工作人员，并将其纳入其劳动力，参加办公室的实质性工作，参加外国旅行，与外国代表进行讨论。支持的消费者普遍广受赞誉，但是因为assigned analyst is then unavailable to meet the demands of other consumers, such in-house support is at present limited to a small number of senior officials.
Some consumers are supported by detailing intelligence analysts to help with a particular issue or process, for example, to support a treaty negotiation. In other cases, intelligence producers station "liaisons" with their customers, not to provide substantive support, but to serve as a focal point for requests for such support. The CIA, which has a government-wide responsibility, now has over 100 officers in policy agencies or military commands, either providing direct support or in a liaison capacity. DIA and NSA similarly have specialists providing direct support to consumers or in a liaison capacity. In addition to providing benefits to the customer, assignments to policy agencies also benefit the analysts involved by improving their understanding of the policymaking process and customer needs.
Other consumers receive regular briefings, or are briefed when there are developments in their area of interest. Others may simply be introduced to the analystswho cover their subject area and invited to call them as needed. Many other consumers, particularly those down the bureaucratic chain, may receive no special analytical support beyond what is available in the daily publications and intelligence reports. Obviously, the more intensive the support, the more strained the personnel resources of intelligence agencies are to provide it.
委员会发现，那些在员工上有情报助手或收到日常情报简报的消费者倾向于对情报的质量表达更高的满意。在我们看来，应该鼓励这种安排在人力方面昂贵。然而，没有任何单一的关系会“适合所有”。这取决于情报生产者，直接与政策机构中的特定消费者合作，以确定首选的分析支持并尽一切努力提供它。
还需要一种更系统的建立这些关系的方法。目前，内阁级别下方的官员的支持安排似乎在很大程度上出现特别指定而不是故意策略的结果。此外，在特定的消费者（例如，国务院的助理秘书）获得内部组织的分析支持（在这种情况下为情报和研究局）以及中央情报局的分析支持，有时不清楚该部门的位置两个组织之间的责任和贡献的机会被错过了。
8-1. The Commission recommends that each intelligence producer develop a strategic plan for better serving consumers. Relevant customers should be identified by position and consulted with respect to the type of intelligence support they prefer. Senior-level consumers should be strongly encouraged to have intelligence aides assigned to their staffs or to have daily intelligence briefings. As new incumbents are appointed to these senior positions, additional consultations should be arranged to ascertain whether the existing relationship should be changed. Once the customer has indicated a preference, the producer should make every reasonable effort to provide the support requested. Where the consumer receives support from the CIA and also from a departmental organization, representatives of both should participate in these consultations in order to establish clear areas of responsibility.
Many observers have cautioned that in promoting closer relationships with consumers, the chances are increased that intelligence analysis will lose its objectivity. As analysts became aware of their customers' assumptions and policy preferences, they would, consciously or not, produce analysis that conformed to those preferences.
这Commission believes this problem is real, but manageable. The need to present the "unvarnished truth" to policymakers is at the core of every analyst's training and ethos. It is, in a real sense, why intelligence exists. Further, there are checks and balances within the system. Virtually all analysis is reviewed by multiple experts, not all of whom are familiar with the biases of a particular consumer. Some analyses, such as national estimates, are reviewed by interagency boards.
情报分析师的作用是为政策过程提供信息。委员会之前的一位证人表示：“如果情报分析师没有被政治化的危险，他可能不会做他的工作。”委员会同意。更大的危险在于“政治化”，而是与政府进程无关。
无论是在生产者和消费者之间建立关系的理想之选，除非智能方面能够随着时间的流逝证明它为表格带来了价值的东西，否则这种关系无法维持。
这Commission attempted to assess, as a general proposition, what intelligence, in fact, does bring to the table. Put another way, what value, if any, is added by intelligence over information available from open sources or the media? The Commission reviewed prior studies of this issue and conducted its own analysis of two separate international incidents, comparing the information reported by the news media with the information reported by the Intelligence Community. The conclusion reached in each case was that both sources of information had their strengths. The media were faster and did a better job conveying information on an immediate event. But the media lacked staying power, missed essential details, and often did not report what was of interest to policymakers or report in a way that was comprehensible to policymakers. In some cases, the intelligence analysis provided critical information that was not reported by the news media at all. The verdict arising from this sampling was that while the media contributed importantly, there was clear value added by intelligence analysis.
Whatever its past contributions, the quality of intelligence analysis can always be improved. The Intelligence Community has, in fact, made substantial progress in this regard over the last four years. But the Commission believes more could be done.
An intelligence analyst sent to brief a senior policymaker on "country x" faces a daunting situation. The policymaker often issomeone who has lived in, or frequently travels to "country x," has daily contacts with his or her counterparts there and with substantive experts in the United States, and reads the current literature on "country x." The intelligence analyst, on the other hand, may have neither lived in, nor even traveled to, "country x," and his or her contacts with experts in the U.S. and within "country x" itself may be limited. Yet he or she is expected to provide fresh insight to the policymaker.
尽管情报界有高级分析师在各自领域都是知名的专家，但它们是例外而不是规则。认识到这一点，情报社区中的大多数分析元素都旨在为分析师提供可靠表现所需的技能和知识基础。这些计划是有希望的，值得支持，但是它们的范围仍然有限。加剧该问题的是不幸的政府和基金会计划的减少，这些计划曾经是领域，功能和语言的培训理由情报区的专家。
8-2。委员会建议采取多种行动来提高分析质量：
欧盟委员会承认recommendat相似ions have been made in the past but have not been followed up with a sufficient commitment of resources. Considering the importance of this aspect of the intelligence function, however, they must receive a high priority for funding. Personnel shortages and budgetary constraints should not be used to justify a lower level of effort in these areas.
Analysis on topics of significant national interest should be informed by the best expertise this country has to offer, whether that expertise resides within the Intelligence Community or outside it. Intelligence agencies should more often take the initiative to sponsor open conferences on international topics, make direct and regular use of outside consultants, establish regular "peer review" by outside experts for major assessments and estimates, and contract out research on unclassified aspects of analytical problems or the maintenance of reference data bases. Analysts should systematically be able to consult outside experts on particular issues without undue bureaucratic hindrance.
这failure to make greater use of outside expertise at the CIA appears to result in part from a lack of financial resources and in part from onerous security requirements-particularly the polygraph examination and the requirement to submit subsequent publications for review-that discourage some outside experts from participating in intelligence work. The Commission believes that less intrusive measures should be instituted in order for outside experts who will have limited access to intelligence information to obtain a security clearance.
While the use of secret information distinguishes finished intelligence from other analysis, no analyst can base his or her conclusions solely on secret information without considering what is on the public record. Indeed, analysts must have command of all relevant information about their subjects, not simply command of secret information.
随着信息技术革命的“开源”信息的数量和可用性乘以乘以，确定公共记录上可能存在哪些相关信息变得更加困难。仅在中央情报局，在过去四年中，开源信息的数量就增加了十倍。
To cope with this situation, the DCI established a Community Open Source Program Office in 1992 to coordinate the collection, processing, and dissemination of openly available information to CIA and other elements of the Intelligence Community. Two new computer networks have been established: one provides CIA analysts on-line access to over 1200 open source publications; the other provides consumers access not only to the CIA open source data base but also to other unclassified and classified data bases maintained within the Intelligence Community.
尽管开源数据库的开发正在增长，但情报分析师对它们的访问仅限。鉴于公众可以通过计算机网络容易获得的大量开源信息，因此情报界为分析师提供了相关的开源数据库的努力似乎莫名其妙地慢了。
During the course of its inquiry, the Commission conducted an impromptu test to see how readily information could be obtained exclusively from open sources on a subject of current national security interest and how that information compared to what could be obtained from the Intelligence Community. The information obtained from open sources was substantial and on some points more detailed than that provided by the Intelligence Community. On the other hand, the information that came from open sources took longer to produce, required validation, and failed to cover many key aspects of the situation important to policymakers.
无论如何，很明显，开源确实提供了情报分析中使用的信息中的很大一部分。在某些领域，例如经济分析，据估计，现在使用的信息中有95％来自开源。随着越来越多的信息通过电子方式获得，它在智能分析中的使用只会增长。确实，知道什么是公开可用的，可以使智力的生产者和收藏家更好地将他们的精力集中在事物上。对整体情报过程的决心至关重要，委员会发现，尚未更加重视情报界的行动这一方面，这令人惊讶。似乎不存在一个足够的计算机基础架构将情报分析师绑定到开源信息中。委员会认为，创建这样的基础设施应该是DCI的重中之重，并且是资金的重中之重。
直到最近，情报仍以大量情报报告的形式和每日印刷报告的形式以及有关特定问题的分析的每日印刷摘要的形式提供。ReportsReports金博宝正规网址通常，工作人员会分类此材料，然后选择或总结消费者应该阅读的内容。阅读后，材料将被返回或销毁。如果消费者对他或她读过的东西有疑问，或者想在上一份报告中提醒一些东西，他或她可以尝试与准备报告的分析师联系。
这种情况已经开始改变。特别是军方在应用新信息技术方面取得了长足的进步，以促进智力的传播和使用。通过联合可部署情报支持系统（JDISS），世界各地的军事命令不仅可以访问其计算机终端上的开源信息和当前的情报报告，而且能够以电子方式搜索情报机构的档案，以获取相关数据。分类是通过关键字选择来完成的，而不是手动通过堆叠消息和印刷出版物的繁琐过程。金博宝更改账户有问题的用户可以查询以电子方式准备报告的分析师。用户还可以立即评估所提供的内容并根据需要索取其他数据。此外，现在每天通过安全的视频会议提供情报简介，而快速破坏的情报会立即与受影响的消费者进行安全通信相关。
A similar capability known as INTELINK has been developed by the Intelligence Community and is being installed in policy agencies and with military users. While commercial technology has been available for some time to allow the electronic storage, dissemination, and manipulation of intelligence, agencies have faced a considerable problem in doing this securely. Not only do they have to worry about "hackers" gaining access to the system, but also about controlling access. Not all users are necessarily cleared for all levels of intelligence. While these problems are gradually being overcome, they have slowed progress on the civilian side beyond what one might expect, given the rapid development and availability of commercial information systems. When INTELINK is fully deployed to users, some policymakers will in all likelihood continue to rely upon their staffs to utilize the system on their behalf. Nonetheless, their ability to obtain specific intelligence on demand should be greatly improved.
委员会认为，必须尽快完成Intelink的开发和部署。该项目应在情报界获得最高的资金优先级。
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) treat issues of major importance and long-term interest to the United States and are considered by the Intelligence Community to be its most comprehensive and authoritative products. NIEs are produced by the National Intelligence Council (NIC), an organization composed of twelve senior officers called National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), who report directly to the DCI. Each NIE undergoes thorough review and coordination by representatives of the various intelligence agencies and is ultimately approved by a board chaired by the DCI and composed of the heads of these agencies.
NIE旨在帮助决策者和战士通过对国外可能发生的事件及其对美国的影响的前瞻性判断来帮助政策问题。金博宝正规网址然而，委员会发现消费者对尼斯的反应充其量是混合的。一些高级政策制定者自称不知道他们。有些人认为他们既不及时也不相关。其他人则批评他们著名的预测失败或通过导致“最低共同点”结果的机构间协调过程浇水分析。尼斯确实得到了一些决策者的欢迎，但总的来说，反应是负面的。
不管高级决策者如何赞赏NIE，它们似乎都有几种有用的目的。它们是情报界关于重要主题的观点的权威陈述。NIES的发展迫使分析师考虑并测试所有在该问题上提供的证据。没有这样的过程，对重要问题的评估可能不会那么严格或全面。金博宝正规网址看来，尽管高级政策制定者可能不会阅读他们，但他们的员工会这样做，将NIES的信息和判断纳入提供给更高级别的信息。
To improve the usefulness of NIEs, the Commission believes policymakers should be involved more directly and systematically in the estimates process. NIEs should only be prepared at the request of a senior policymaker or where there is senior policymaker interest. These policymakers should be consulted routinely on the terms of reference and timing of estimates affecting their areas of responsibility. Moreover, analysts developing national estimates should routinely solicit the views of pertinent policy officials, to include U.S. Ambassadors, on the subjects concerned, without distorting their analyses to reflect policy preferences.
During the Cold War, the focus of intelligence analysis was on the Soviet Union and other Communist states. Most of the information relating to these countries was secret and could best be obtained, analyzed, and reported by the Intelligence Community. When it came to assessing the significance of the information, it made sense to do that within the Intelligence Community as well.
今天,虽然仍有主题,可以添加ressed adequately only by intelligence means, such as terrorism or weapons proliferation, much of the information on the vast majority of issues of concern to policymakers is openly available. Most of the expert knowledge on these subjects lies outside the Intelligence Community: in the policy agencies, in academia, in "think tanks," in the Library of Congress, in foreign countries, and in the media. While the Intelligence Community may still have an important contribution to make in these areas by providing the "secret piece," the Community will rarely provide the "recognized expert" in the field.
In recognition of these realities, the Commission believes that the NIC should be restructured to become a more open and broadly focused analytic entity. Important as it is to improve the expertise of intelligence analysts, the Commission is persuaded that, with the end of the Cold War, the Government must take better advantage both of openly available information and of the wide range of expertise in the academic and business communities. The wisdom that exists outside the Intelligence Community must be incorporated into the assessment of today's foreign policy issues. An open environment needs to be created where knowledgeable experts on issues of concern to policymakers can be brought together from policy departments, "think tanks," and academia, as well as from the Intelligence Community, to analyze, debate, and assess these new world issues. Although the NIC has increasingly drawn on outside experts in recent years, the Commission believes a more radical approach is required.
8 - 3。欧盟委员会建议国家我ntelligence Council be restructured as a "National Assessments Center." The new entity should continue to produce NIEs requested by policymakers that draw largely or partially on information collected by intelligence agencies. Equally or more important, it should also prepare classified and unclassified "assessments" of issues of concern to policymakers where the intelligence contribution is relatively small. These assessments should include analyses of long-term problems policymakers are unable to address effectively because of their demanding schedules and need to focus on current events. The Commission anticipates that assessments would increasingly be directed by experts-in or out of government-who would manage integrated teams of substantive specialists on rotational assignment from policy departments, academia, think-tanks, and the Intelligence Community. The Center should remain under the purview of the DCI but should be moved out of CIA headquarters to a suitable location in downtown Washington to make it more acceptable and accessible to policymakers and outside experts.
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