寻找欧洲情报政策

�The spy is as old as history, but intelligence agencies are new。� [1]

��农业也许世界有史以来最奇特的婚姻是圣经和智慧之间。前者是一个基督教和慈善机构的故事，与情报世界繁殖的保密和颠覆领域几乎没有相似之处。然而，智力可以追溯到圣经时代，正是圣经首先提到了被认为是世界上最古老的职业之一。在第13号中，摩西派遣了十二名情报人员执行侦察任务，以``淘汰迦南的土地'' [2]，，，，which lasted for forty days and ended in disagreement of what intelligence assessment to deduce.

Since then, Arabic cipher-breaking; Roman armies; English armies; Renaissance Italy; diplomacy of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and Europe�s military and naval operations of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have all been producers and consumers of intelligence. [3]20世纪，新机构，预算和人员的创建被用来监视第一次世界大战，第二次世界大战，冷战，冷战和其他许多冲突的新机构，预算和人员。但是，在1991年12月25日，米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫（Mikhail Gorbachev）辞去了苏联领导人的职务。铁幕已经掉下来，冷战吸引了一个结束，乔治·布什宣布：``通过上帝的恩典，美国赢得了冷战。'' [4]

二十世纪的一位客户是欧洲情报部门。自第二次世界大战以来，当世界上没有一场战争时，没有一年过去了。二十世纪可能已经完成了战争的挑战，但是随着我们进入二十世纪，智力用途和资源正在萎缩。�fin-de-si�cle� should not mean the end of intelligence.

Today, intelligence agencies still exist all over the world, from the CIA in America to the Research Department for External Intelligence in North Korea; from the Secret Service in South Africa to the Joint Defence Intelligence Service in Norway.豪ver, the intelligence services of the fifteen member states of the European Union [5]must redefine their roles and evaluate grounds for consolidation of policy, personnel and practice if they are to survive and to retain their ability to counter national and international threats.

本文的目的是探讨the opportunities and challenges in creating a common European intelligence policy. This will begin in Chapter One with an examination of the important relationship between defence and intelligence; Chapter Two explores the case for creating a European intelligence policy; Chapter Three scrutinises one of the chief obstacles � the �special relationship� enjoyed by the United Kingdom and the United States; Chapter Four assesses the future for a European intelligence policy and Chapter Five builds a summary of the key points analysed and concludes that a European intelligence policy is necessary but is at the mercy of politicians. But first we must turn to Chapter One, to review the relationship between Defence and intelligence and its implications towards a European intelligence policy.

�I am not protesting against the conduct of war, but against the political errors and insincerities for which the fighting men are being sacrificed。� [6]

��农业情报是unequivocally linked with defence. Simply, changes in defence imply changes in intelligence. Military superiority must be complemented by effective intelligence capabilities in order to prevent conflicts or win battles. The world�s greatest military powers are all dependent on intelligence for making informed evaluations. Therefore intelligence has become an integral part of defence, whether it be in the form of protecting national security, equipping armies with information or identifying prospective hostilities.

Two significant events have recently occurred in the European arena that will have serious implications on the nature of European intelligence. In July 2000, the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company（（EADS) was created, which promotes itself as theworld's first transnational defence and aerospace company. EADS Is an association of regional defence companies, created by three key member states of the European Union：法国Aerospatiale Matra S.A.；西班牙的Construciones Aeron.uticas S.A.和Daimlerchrysler Aerospace AG，德国。尽管英国领先的国防公司BAE Systems坚持认为它将保持独立于新联盟，但其他欧洲国家正在推动其国防行业寻求EAD的成员资格。

��农业The second, crucial event occurred later that year in December 2000, when the European Union defence ministers, Britain included, agreed to create a 60,000-strong military reaction force as a �weapon� for EU countries to use in areas where they share a common interest. This is now routinely referred to as the EU Rapid Reaction force, which will have a permanent headquarters in Brussels. This is regarded by many observers as a political manoeuvre towards a European Army.

然而，最重要的是，EAD的创造和快速反应力都适合欧洲的巩固和结合概念。这不可避免地意味着，情报合作必须随着国防行业和国防政策所做的，必须增加甚至巩固，以最大程度地提高其有效性。欧洲成员的国家年度情报预算是美国情报机构获得的年度280亿美元的一小部分。伯明翰大学的一所学者约翰·罗珀（John Roper）估计，欧洲情报机构的年度预算总计在6-8亿美元之间。 [7]Individually, policies and agencies are overshadowed and intimidated by the shadow of American intelligence. Collectively, Europe has the opportunity to build a strong and effective intelligence policy.

豪ver, intelligence agencies remain conservatively shy organisations which are loyal to their national governments, but their allegiance to a single state raises an important consideration. With the gradual erosion of the state, loyalties are becoming confusing and problematic. In an age when threats transcend national boundaries at lightning speed, a common intelligence policy must exist to adapt to the changing requirements of the decision-makers. Alessandro Politi [8]expands perfectly on this point,

智能服务是最后的代表和体现raison d��tat，如今在西欧，这种说法引出了一个基本问题：哪个州，谁raison d��tat?�

If intelligence services remain bent on waving a flag, perhaps they should raise the blue European flag. This raises the possibility of an intelligence policy for the European Union and is explored in Chapter Two.

Chapter Two:欧洲联盟的案例'机遇和挑战

�The defender cannot be equally strong everywhere. If you try to be strong everywhere, you'll be strong nowhere。�

Michael Herman [9]describes the effects of international intelligence co-operation in his book和平与战争中的智力。这对欧元提供了有趣的对比pean intelligence policy. It begins with descriptions of the evolution of the international dimension between the British liaisons with Hanover in the eighteenth century; the British and French exchanges of information in World War One; European co-operation in World War Two and the development of the British-American relationship. The first raw point to be deduced is that co-operation can be achieved. His comment that the �appetite for information is insatiable� [10]而且，特定机构可以访问人员和其他人的协议的事实开始向读者建议欧洲情报政策，即制定共同的政策是可能且明智的。但是，赫尔曼（Herman）提供了一个警告目录，即为什么应限制情报合作，从自卑感，新风险到信息到信息，以及缺乏对要关注的威胁的同意。这开始了雄心勃勃但谨慎的任务，即分析为什么欧洲应该（也不应该制定情报政策）。

This raises three important questions concerning a European intelligence policy, which deserve analysis:Is it necessary, is it democraticandis it legal?作者坚信欧洲情报政策是necessary。迈克尔·赫尔曼（Michael Herman）确定了中东，海湾，中国，朝鲜，巴基斯坦和印度的情报问题，以及国际恐怖主义，核恐怖主义和经济赎金的威胁。 [11]�There has been a multiplication of rogue states that are equipped with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. Put more succinctly, from the American point of view, �the threat of the dragon has been replaced by a jungle of poisonous snakes.� [12]The world has not been de-ideologised, but re-idelogised.

The increasing number of dangers transcending national boundaries must be reflected in the intelligence policies of the member states and this can be achieved through increasing co-operation. Many contemporary agencies have been accused of �punching above their weight.� Overwhelmed by modern threats and under-resourced with annual budget cuts, this is a logical assumption to make. A European intelligence policy would solve this problem. Perhaps most importantly for politicians, addressing these common threats together can be achieved at lower costs than maintaining independent, sovereign institutions, whilst avoiding unnecessary duplication by other European agencies. It offers to exchange less quantity, with more quality.

情报是democratic。Democracy is a word that haunts the intelligence community, since they are not organisations that have historically admired democratic principles. Yet many of today�s European agencies reside in countries which champion democracy, in an age of �glasnost�正在提高透明度和问责制。他们清楚地认为，民主和情报是两个兼容现象，因为必须保留综合的自由和正义领域。的确，只要以民主的方式执行和维护，才与议会民主兼容。这是由MI5前负责人Stella Rimington在1994年的Richard Dimbleby演讲中重申的

``安全局是捍卫自由社会及其公民自由的重要木板，并且基本价值观与民主国家内的人身自由兼容。它不会与之冲突，但会增强它。 [13]

最后，最重要的是，欧洲情报政策是legal？Indeed surveillance today is no longer simply an infringement of sovereignty, but an infringement of law. But, providing a European policy has the consensus of the European members, they would transfer their existing strategies into a common pool, which is an entirely legal move. However, what would require closer scrutiny would be the transparency and legal accountability of any new policy. They would be legally bound to respect individual human rights too, since the European Convention on Human Rights now applies to all member states. However, although the convention specifies that states must respect individual rights and liberties, it also recognises that states have a duty to protect themselves and, in doing so, may set up a security service. Providing, then, that these three criteria; transparency, accountability and rights are observed, legally an intelligence policy would be challenged by few obstacles.

亚历山德罗·政治 [14]确定三个用于促进欧洲情报政策的模型。第一个提出，自然进化是从成员国之间增加，非正式合作开始的，这将导致更复杂和正式的框架。这可以由会员国悄悄地实现，这是一个完全可行的想法。确实，一个秘密的协会已经存在称为伯尔尼俱乐部，英国MI5，法国的DGSE，德国的BFV等人广泛地分享了信息，但秘密地分享了信息。第二种模型提供了一种更严格，更有条理的方法，由创建三个合作环组成：外环，是对情报感兴趣的政府和非政府政党的年度会众，他们将在中立领土上见面；内环，正式的情报组织集合，负责监督情报要求和第三个最内向的戒指，这将管理情报要求。他认为，最后一个模型将改善跨大西洋的合作。但是，如果美国获得最大的戒指，美国才会发现它们有益。查尔斯·格兰特（Charles Grant） [15]认为美国人应该与EU intelligence unit because of their significant intelligence capabilities. However, it isa wish that many European countries, particularly France, are unlikely to grant.

自然,有重叠的问题police forces and intelligence agencies too. Indeed, the creation of EUROPOL [16]一目了然，似乎与欧洲情报政策竞争。这为我们提供了一个多年生的问题，``当您不把所有这些问题留给警察吗？''劳伦斯·卢斯特加登（Laurence Lustgarten）和伊恩·利（Ian Leigh）宣称，``这个问题在许多方面都是一个特殊的英国人。'' [17]Crime is now multi-faceted and the heroin trade from Turkey; the fraudulent activity of the Italian Mafia in Italy and the �Red Mafia� trade in prostitution and refugees from Eastern Europe should be the concern of everyone. However, there is a difference between the intentions and objectives of criminals and political motivations of terrorists, which separates policing form intelligence. Mark Urban [18]argues that criminal objectives do not fit the definition of traditional �national security.� But traditional roles are impossible to maintain in today�s climate and they must adapt. That is certain. While States are hostile to surrendering their intelligence organisations, offering resources to organisations such as EUROPOL or the Schengen Information System is an opportunity to create closer co-operation.

��农业第二次世界大战的悲剧让后续情况ations determined to create a lasting peace, but the Cold War restricted their achievements. However, the conclusion of the East-West battle at the end of the twentieth century re-energised previously held ambitions to remove national hostilities and create a common defence policy devoid of bitterness and retributions. The Maastricht Treaty seized the opportunity, in 1991, to catalyse this process when they referred to the perspective of a �common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy.� [19]如我们所见，情报是防御的组成层。�1995年11月14日，在马德里进行了评估并做出了承诺，有助于加强欧洲的安全和情报安排，得出的结论是，情报合作的发展对``行动能力很重要''。 [20]Furthermore, in 1998, President Chirac of France categorically stated at the British-French summit in St. Malo that new policies would inevitably create new practices when he said,

�We sketched some plans about the paths that could be taken regarding organisation, i.e. the organisations which need to be created, and now we are going to work with�our European partners.� [21]

This was re-iterated in the Joint Declaration announced at the British-French summit which stated more specifically that intelligence was fundamental to the success of the European Union, and that it �must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication.� [22]This notion was categorically reinforced in the Cologne Declaration of the European Union, as well as the declaration in the Treaty of Amsterdam to create a policy planning and early warning unit. However, a clearly defined intelligence agenda is still absent, despite the overwhelming number of treaties, summits, statements and communiqu�s.

如今，在商定的共同情报政策之前，一个集中式结构正在稳步形成。布鲁塞尔是西欧联盟（WEU）仅永久军事特征的军事人员的所在地。这是在1997年5月在1997年11月举行的部长级会议上做出的决定。规划牢房设有欧盟情报部门，有趣的是，欧洲部长希望找到快速反作用力的总部。西欧联盟的补充Satellite Centre in Torrej�n (Spain) � the �eyes and the ears� of a future policy. In practical terms, both the Intelligence Section and the Satellite Centre have had a number of important successes. However, it is of enormous symbolic value as well to those who support a common agenda. As Fr�d�ric Oberson reveals, this has�在使用技术手段（基于Torrejn的卫星中心）之间建立了``Intelligence triangle''，以收集信息和对情况的多源评估之间的逻辑分工。 [23]其中计划单元是一个不可或缺的部分。这已经达到了每周发行情报报告（INTSUM）的最终导致。ReportsReports这是欧洲成员制定欧洲共同外国和安全政策（CFSP）的更广泛目标的一部分，该政策目前由Javier Solana监督。他管理一个policy unit who �channel confidential material from their own countries to the High Representative.� [24]But it remains a shell and national agencies restrict the amount of sensitive information they are willing to give to Solana and his staff.But, importantly, it is an establishment which the United States supports.

但是，情报部门的维护和发展仍然取决于国家国家合作的意愿。同样，各州可以通过选择他们执行的信息来轻松操纵完成的情报产品，并且不提供情报部分。尽管1998年英国法国峰会的推动力，但Fr'd oberson的观察表明，改革是必要的，

�The Intelligence Section thus receives, more or less frequently documents that states are willing to send. In actual fact only half of the ten full Member states frequently supply useful intelligence.� [25]

Voluntary contributions of material is creating imbalances in participation and a system of compulsory donation of material is likely to discourage state participation. This argument lends further weight to the desire for centralised European intelligence policies and institutions. However, it is dangerous to invest in institutions which still lack an agreed intelligence policy amongst the member states. Parliaments, Prime Ministers and Presidents must rectify this lack of co-ordination between policy and institutions urgently, since policies should drive institutions, not the other way round.

This has generated a body of literature which has reflected on the repercussions of these fundamental changes. Alessandro Politi [26]提出签约``全源评估过程''将提高情报实践的效率，并且未来的欧洲政策是独特的，可以摇篮这种转变。但是，这位作者认为这将是致命的举动。西欧情报组织建立在专业sprit d�corpsand, privatising this, would destroy one of the strong bonds that holds them together. Similarly, subcontracting intelligence work would create opportunities for the bending of rules and increase the disregard for accountability. This is a belief shared by Admiral Pierre Lacoste, the former Chief of French Military Intelligence,

在个人和机构层面上，伦理学仍然是关键词。这就是为什么当我说政府必须强烈抵制将这种责任转移给私营部门时，我如此肯定。 [27]

New agencies should have the ability to make speedy decisions, yet they must resist the temptation to become a vehicle for passing through resolutions that go unchecked. Any new structure should include a Chairman, a rotating position between the member states, who would be the principal point of reference for the President of the European Union. Under the Chairman, would sit a Managing Director of Intelligence, elected for a set period of time, who would oversee the operations of the individual institutions. Similar to the British model, a Parliamentary Committee could act as commentator of the intelligence activities and an Ombudsman could be incorporated to steward and supervise their operations. Although this merely offers a prototype of what could, but is unlikely to be, the Sunday Times made an important revelation when it carried the headline, �Europe plans its own spy agency。� [28]这是在1999年12月在巴黎举行的法国 - 德国峰会之后的，该峰会引导了欧盟建立欧盟情报局，以帮助管理世界危机。但是，任何新的议程都必须由经验丰富的人员管理，因为新政策并不意味着新的质量水平。总是会有智力失败，而新政策的制定不会克服这一点。但是，如果要为目标威胁做出集体努力，将减少重复，并且失败数量可能会大大减少。

The creation of new, centralised agencies offers European states the opportunity to become �collectively more relevant through pragmatic synergies�[rather than]�being constantly dwarfed worldwide.� [29]The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, serious crime, drug trafficking, ecological threats, policing of cyberspace and the threat of rogue states are not exclusive concerns of single member states but serious concerns to all of them. However, serious obstacles remain and perhaps none more so than the special relationship enjoyed between the UK and USA, which is scrutinised in Chapter Three.

Chapter Three:The Special Relationship � The United Kingdom and the United States

The United Kingdom has felt compelled to build an Anglo-American intelligence alliance, which can be traced back to the BRUSA (Britain-USA) agreement, established between the two world wars and which flourished as a joint wartime signals intelligence operation. This has manifested itself in today�s �special relationship�, jealously watched by Continental Europe, who argue that the problem is not us, the problem is the US. However, there are two interesting points that derive from the relationship. The first is the independence that states can still enjoy when part of an alliance and the second, ironically, demonstrates how successful co-operation between the members of the European Union can lead to a common intelligence policy.

豪ver, before the argument proceeds, it is important to consider this �speciality�.Who is it special for？这不是信息的平等交换，而是导致``Questable Result''。 [31]Often the US will use the UK to complete its jigsaw of an intelligence assessment and, in return, either offer it nothing at all, offer it masses of low grade intelligence or a single piece of fairly useful information. Charles Grant highlights this point in the Falklands War. America only offered an intelligence package to the UK, once it realised that Argentina would not conform to its own recommendation. This leads Charles Grant to conclude that it is a one sided relationship,

The UK and USA have created a strong relationship, even if one is more loyal than the other. But they have also created a successful balance between focusing on common threats, such as Iraq, and pooling their intelligence capabilities accordingly, but retaining enough independence to tackle domestic problems and participate in other operations not covered by the alliance. For example, whilst internationally, the Kosovo conflict in 1999 and the Iraqi air strikes of the 1990s have consumed vast quantities of national intelligence resources, British intelligence has played, amongst other things, a pivotal role in sealing the Good Friday agreement in Northern Ireland in 1998 at the same time. Therefore, it is possible to create a common policy and yet still reserve the capability to administer independent affairs. The creation of a European intelligence policy has the opportunity to pursue this. It would not imitate the transatlantic alliance, but strengthen it.

��农业Every member state of the European Union is vulnerable to the threat of domestic terrorism, some to a greater extent than others.The IRA in the United Kingdom; ETA in Spain; the Breton Revolutionary Army in France; the 17 November Revolutionary Organization in Greece and the Red Brigade in Italy are all active and犯有邪恶的``成功''的暴力组织。的确，在1990年代，暴力的生命比冷战和恐怖袭击的44年中以近一天的速度进行。 [33]但是，制定集中的欧洲政策不会破坏国家应对这些国内危险的能力。大卫宪章 [34]remarks that domestic political operations can be successfully accomplished by relying on professional military organisations to undertake paramilitary operations. Therefore, this offers us a realistic possibility of creating a collective European intelligence policy, whilst allowing states to retain control of sovereign paramilitary operations to address their domestic threats.

伯尔尼俱乐部在非正式地将欧洲情报服务联系在一起。但是，其他双边协议也存在，例如，美国和``特殊关系''参与。有证据表明，在福克兰战争期间，英国和法国之间以及在北爱尔兰之间进行了广泛的合作。查尔斯·格兰特（Charles Grant）整齐地捕捉了欧洲合作蓬勃发展的想法

�It is the quantity, rather than the quality of the UK-US trade that is unique. �Personal ties� between the SIS and DGSE are sometimes closer. Ties between the SIS and the [domestic] DST are particularly warm.� [35]

马克·厄本（Mark Urban）几乎很高兴，但严重的是，英国MI6官员对“是否应该开始针对美国人。'' [36]Additionally, MI5 boasts that it has �links with nearly 100 services worldwide� [37]，，，，yet there exist no formal alliances or institutions that link them together and a European intelligence policy has the opportunity to deliver this.

克服跨大西洋英国 - 美国联盟将证明制定欧洲政策是最麻烦的障碍，但这并不是一项不可能的任务。欧盟成员国通过巴黎的西欧联盟之间已经存在一般合作，在西班牙的武士卫星中心和伯尔尼俱乐部内非常秘密的合作。

��农业尽管在起步阶段，联合国情绪中心（联合国国际人员的“国际知名度”在纽约总部表示，可以实现国际情报合作。的确，在冷战的结束之后，有迹象表明[国家]越来越愿意做出回应”。 [38]to calls for co-operation. Tim Trevan makes frequent references to the intelligence sharing that he experienced during his secondment to UNSCOM (UN Special Commission for Iraq), principally between the US, UK, France, Russia and Germany,

�Sitting in a meeting of intelligence analysts was, for me, a surreal experience�The KGB had been the enemy�Nikita Snidovich, who was now my colleague in UNSCOM, had been my principal opponent.� [39]

These are the politics of the �New World Order.� If an international intelligence capability can be constructed, developing a finished, all source intelligence machine at a localised European level would appear to be a smaller and easier task. Indeed, European intelligence sharing can help bring war criminals to trial at the international war crimes tribunal in The Hague. [40]

由于有机会增加欧洲更接近的合作，欧洲是否可以开始为未来制定欧洲情报政策吗？这在第四章中进行了分析。

第四回：Is there a future for a European intelligence policy?

A European intelligence policy is not just necessary, but indispensable。� [41]

Ultimately, the success of a European intelligence policy is at the mercy of politicians. However, the majority of the European Prime Ministers and Presidents harbour European ideals and the creation of an intelligence policy is part of a wider project to increase European co-operation in all areas of political life. The most recent Swedish report covering this issue is very optimistic about the future of co-operation. As a strategic intelligence provider in the Cold War, it is a respected authority in this field and it concludes that it is a necessary step forward,

�The 1999 Report underlines the importance of foreign co-operation in the intelligence field and recommends wider scope for co-operation�It is fair to surmise though that the networks generally speaking will grow rather than be disrupted.� [42]

��农业��The principal consumers of intelligence, Defence Ministries and Foreign Ministries, are consolidating their interests and objectives. This, we have already seen with the amalgamation of European defence industries and policies and the agreements made to construct the CFSP. Traditionally, Foreign Ministries have been the chief architects of intelligence requirements and this is true at the European level too.

然而,外国做保持差异policies of the member states and overcoming these will be a huge task for the CFSP. The most profound example is between the UK and France over the corpse of Iraq. The UK persists with air strikes, yet France is one of three members of the UN Security Council to have broken the air embargo. Similarly, Sierra Leone has become a cornerstone of British foreign policy, whilst other European countries participate in different African agendas. The Intelligence and National Security Committee [43]explicitly reports that intelligence played a key role in the evaluation of Sierra Leone and this could be considered as one of the reasons for British intervention. This information was not shared with Continental allies, which could have generated or modified their interest if it had been. The need to share intelligence information was a conclusion of the House of Commons Defence Committee in their analysis of the Kosovo campaign, which warned that future joint operations will be hampered if there is differential access to intelligence. [44]

豪ver, the CFSP was designed to reconcile these differences and that remains its priority. Indeed, although America might spend more annually on defence, Europe collectively spends much more on �soft security�, in areas such as development aid. [45]A common intelligence policy is fundamental in maximising the success of understanding who and who should not be the recipient of European aid. The Assembly of the WEU has warned that European �security issues�the common foreign and security policy�and the implementation of EU decisions�rely upon a common European intelligence policy.� [46]European states, at least in principle with their support of the CFSP, have the desire to harmonise their differences in orderto create a coherent and co-operative European Foreign Policy. This should be extended to a common intelligence policy.

欧洲有一名对外关系专员，前英国政治家克里斯·格兰特（Chris Pattern）。不可避免的是，情报将在他的办公室参与的条约和协议中发挥作用。第一次稳定与协会协议（欧盟与马其顿前南斯拉夫共和国之间的协议）和MEDA [47]Programme will all have required intelligence assessments during their analyses. Similarly, the European Commissioner for Trade, the former French civil servant Pascal Lamy, as representative of the fifteen member sates, will have considered their economic objectives in presenting a common position at worldwide negotiations, such as the Seattle ministerial conference with the World Trade1999年11月。毫无疑问，这将需要情报评估。尽管提到美国，但阿达·博兹曼（Adda Bozeman）的评论也适用于欧盟，当时她说负责任的组织必须从事``降级可靠的国家共识以支持强大的情报服务。''。 [48]Chris Pattern�s and Pascal Lamy�s offices can be used as a tool for achieving this.

豪ver, whilst it is likely that a European policy is feasible in the short to medium term, it remains merely a fantasy that states will relinquish control of their organisations in favour of a centralised institution. This is taking the discipline to new boundaries that states are unwilling to consider. However, although the creation of a single agency is very unlikely, the installation of EU cells in each strategic sovereign organisation is a viable alternative. This is not fanciful optimism, but a very real opportunity. The 1998 Joint Declaration on European Defence clearly considers this an achievable possibility, when the French and British governments announced the development of �standing arrangements for setting up multinationalised cells within these [national military] Headquarters, including officers from other EU partners.� [49]This demonstrates a genuine consensus to build closer intelligence co-operation in Europe.

Another international obstacle towards a European intelligence policy is NATO. Michael Herman offers a cold warning, but a reason for the creation of European intelligence too,

``对欧盟维度的批评是，它正在破坏北约，但无论如何，北约从来没有在北约理事会一级拥有适当的情报系统；算数的投入都是在绿色baise门后面讨论的canukus。 [50]

An evolving European intelligence policy could better relations between NATO and Continental Europe since the policy offers to reconcile European inferiorities as well as assist NATO in areas where it lacks resources. Since NATO does not have a specific intelligence system, the construction of a European policy would be an enormous asset for the European Union to contribute towards building EU-NATO co-operation. This is the attitude that politicians prefer to present to their audiences. However, realistically, both sides of the Atlantic are re-evaluating the purpose of NATO. Europe is quietly doing this with various consolidations of interest, although argues that it will strengthen the European pillar of NATO, rather than undermine it. And, in America, younger generations are reconsidering the relevance of NATO, as highlighted by a report on the United States and security in Europe,

�Many of these younger members of Congress [186] are questioning the guiding principles which have been the basis of United States foreign policy�Some of them are not even sure about the value of NATO, arguing that its理由�no longer exists.� [51]

There are two final, but serious, difficulties that must be mastered if co-operation is to succeed. The first is the different configuration of intelligence services at the national level, since some of them are dependent on military management, some are dependent on civil management, for example by Ministries of Home Affairs, and others have a combined military and civil structure. The second is the role of intelligence in government policy, which varies significantly amongst the member states, as detected by Charles Grant,

�Anglo-Saxons use intelligence in an empirical way�if the facts are significant, the policies may get changed�The French and other Continentals, being essentially deductive in their thinking�draw on intelligence to support them.� [52]

可以说，英国情报被用作操纵政策的工具，而大陆情报则用于加强政策。但是，有可能克服这些差异。欧洲有一个成员国之间合并差异的历史，最近是随着货币联盟的引入。同样，这些方法在很大程度上是由于历史实践而存在的，而新的情报政策将埋葬这些方法。此外，布鲁塞尔的欧洲军事人员和纽约联合国局势中心的成功创建表明，可以解决对情报的不同态度。但是，在可以得出结论关于欧洲是否可以开始制定情报政策的结论之前，第五章使读者想起了该项目的优势和缺点。

第五章：结论 - 欧洲情报政策的开始？

本文强调了核心问题lems and prospects of a European intelligence policy and before a conclusion is drawn, it is important to remember what these are.

亲欧洲政策训练营提出了令人信服的论点清单。作为地理，经济和政治联盟，欧洲应适应共同的情报公式。整合文化应扩展到情报政策，因为现有的双边关系不足以解决当今的新风险和威胁。同样，如果要成功交付CFSP，则必须制定共同的情报政策作为国防和外交政策不可或缺的一部分。尽管存在一些外交政策差异，但在很大程的领域中，欧洲国家都有一种共同的方法。例如，欧洲对俄罗斯的观点更加敏感，许多成员国正在积极参与改善双边关系。但是，最近的战争，例如科索沃和海湾，强调了由于缺乏中欧情报政策而引起的问题，这将协调国际冲突的共同方法。

Promoters of a European intelligence policy argue that intelligence co-operation is already successfully taking place around the world; in the Western European Union Satellite Centre in Torrej�n; the Situation Centre at the UN in New York and the informal gathering of the Club of Berne, in Switzerland. The last, although a controversial organisation, does demonstrate that significant co-operation between member states of the European Union can occur. After all, knowledge is power; the more knowledge a state has means more power and knowledge is derived from intelligence, a point realised by Woodrow Wilson who remarked in 1919 that, �knowledge must be accompanied by a system of intelligence.� [54]

But the creation of EU intelligence capabilities should not be designed to compete with the United States. Indeed, internationalisation of intelligence is very unlikely to occur whilst the United States remains a hegemonic power, since it will resist all attempts to relinquish control of national intelligence policies. But perhaps regionalism of intelligence is a viable alternative, of which a European intelligence policy would be a key pillar.

In addition, since EU member states are addressing the possibilities of a future European Army, even if it remains simply a peacekeeping facility, it is crucial that an intelligence policy is constructed, since successful armies need to be well informed. A European intelligence policy offers a �load sharing� factor too, i.e. coalition of policies would lead to equal absorption of costs. The peace dividend of the New World Order has tattooed cuts on national intelligence services and their requirements can no longer be matched with fiscal reality. Reduced duplication and closer co-operation offers an opportunity to overcome this. And finally, creating a centralised policy removes the possibility for manipulation and national bias that today�s Western European Union suffers.

豪ver, the anti-European policy camp remain determined that this should not happen. States remain reluctant to create a supranational framework which might undermine or replace traditional作案操作。Similarly, sharing information increases the risk of leakages; secrets will become vulnerable if they are exposed to a wider audience as happened during the bombing raids against Yugoslavia in 1999. [55]这种担忧也是汤姆·金国会议员的观点。ReportsReports

�There is considerable nervousness about undue spreading of intelligence because of the historical problems of leaks within Europe.� [56]

但是，正如英国所说的那样，保密经常出于错误的原因和�the Official Secrets Act is not to protect secrets but to protect officials.� [57]

There is still a large degree of mistrust between European states too and, although they might be allies, they have been caught recently spying on each other. The Sunday Times report, �French spies listen in to British calls� [58] 揭示了对友好国家甚至欧洲盟友之间的广泛间谍活动。该政策的怀疑论认为这一系列ad hoc存在的安排，例如伯尔尼俱乐部，是合作的最佳选择，因为他们不将各州与他们宁愿不符合的义务联系在一起。此外，欧洲公民，主要是英国人 [59]，仍然对更紧密的欧洲融合持怀疑态度。因此，制定政策和机构在道德上是正确的吗？这是必须仔细考虑的重要问题。他们认为，倒倒数时间尚未完成欧洲的建立界限，直到那时，它应该减速创建新计划，这可能被证明是新欧洲参赛者独有的。确实，欧盟扩大的过程于1998年3月30日启动 [60]但是预计许多人不会在可预见的未来加入。最后，但最重要的是，“特殊关系”是他们最宝贵的论点。但是，正如已经分析的那样，他们必须质疑谁特别？

制定欧洲情报政策的力量只能来自政客。正如我们与他们的公开声明所见证的那样，产生一定的同意是有可能的。这可能是欧洲情报政策的开始，但希望不是终点。

词汇表

A European intelligence policy will be indispensable to the Rapid Reaction Force.

A common European intelligence policy would help member states to tackle terrorist attacks that they are all threatened by.

Figure Three��农业��农业��农业��农业��农业��Figure Four

欧盟的时间表

Brussels � Signature of the Brussels Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

��农业��农业�Washington � Signature of the North Atlantic Treaty.

��农业��农业�Paris � the Paris Agreement modifies the Brussels Treaty of 1948.

伦敦 - 创建西欧联盟（总部后来搬到巴黎），并采用了蓝旗，其中有十二个金星作为欧洲的象征。

Rome � WEU Council of Ministers brings together both Foreign and Defence Ministers. WEU take son its present politico-military form.

The Hague � The WEU Council of Ministers agrees on the Platform on European Security Interests.

��农业��农业�Vianden � WEU Satellite Centre established at Torrej�n in Spain.

Brussels � Atlantic Alliance summit. NATO gives full support for development of the European Security and Defence Identity.

��农业��农业�Brussels � Signature of the WEU-NATO Security Agreement.

��农业��农业�Brussels � The Situation Centre becomes operational.

参考书目

Books

Bozeman, Adda.Strategic intelligence and statecraft: selected essays（（Washington: Brassey's 1992).

CASS系列智力研究。认识您的朋友：从1914年到冷战的联盟和联盟内部的情报（伦敦：Frank Cass 1998）。

CASS系列智力研究。不断变化的世界中的安全与情报：1990年代的新观点（（London: Frank Cass 1991).

Charters, David.The role of Intelligence Services in the direction of covert paramilitary operations，，，，inIntelligence: Policy and Process（伦敦：Westview Press 1985）。

Davies, Philip. International Organizations Series. Volume 12。The British Secret Services（（Oxford: ABC-CLIO 1998).

赫尔曼，迈克尔。Intelligence power in peace and war（（Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996).

Hyde-Price, Adrian.European security beyond the cold war: four scenarios for the year 2010（伦敦：皇家国际事务研究所，1991年）。

Lustgarten, Laurence & Leigh, Ian.来自寒冷：国家安全和议会民主（牛津：克拉伦登出版社，1994年）。

奥哈拉，拉里。Turning up the heat: MI5 after the cold war（伦敦：凤凰出版社，1994年）。

舒克曼，哈罗德。Agents for change: intelligence services in the 21st century（（London: St Ermin's 2001).

Smith, Michael.New cloak, old dagger: how Britain's spies came in from the cold（伦敦：Gollancz 1996）。

凝视，保罗。Command performance: the neglected dimension of European security（（Washington D.C: Brookings Institution 1991).

Trevan, Tim.Saddams secrets: the hunt for Iraq�s hidden weapons（（London: Harper Collins 1999).

互联网

Chalmers, Malcolm.跨大西洋新交易（（London: Foreign Policy Centre 2001). Internet link: http://www.fpc.org.uk/reports

Grant, Charles.亲密关系：英国能否在欧洲的防御中发挥领导作用，并保持与美国情报的特殊联系？（（London: Centre for European Reform 2000). Internet link:

Articles

Boren, David.情报界：有多关键？Foreign Affairs. Volume 71. Number3 (Oxford: Pergamon Press).

Goodman，Alan＆Berkowitz，Bruce。没有冷战的情报。Intelligence and National Security. Volume 9. April 1994. Number 2 (Frank Class).

格里斯，大卫。A new look for intelligence。Intelligence and National Security. Volume 10. January 1995. Number One (Frank Class).

Kahn, David. Intelligence and National Security. Volume 9. July 1994. Number Three (Frank Class).

门廊，道格拉斯。法国情报文化：历史和政治观点。Intelligence and National Security. Volume 10. July 1995. Number Three (Frank Class).

特纳，斯坦斯菲尔德。新世界秩序的情报。Foreign Affairs. Volume 70. Number4. (Oxford: Pergamon Press).

文件

Becher, Klaus & Molard, Bernard & Oberson, Fr�d�ric & Politi, Alessandro.采取欧洲情报政策安全研究所(巴黎:1998)。

赫尔曼，迈克尔。British intelligence towards the millennium: issues and opportunities（（London: Centre for Defence Studies 1997).

文件

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Assembly of Western European Union Document 1500.A European Intelligence policy（（Paris: Western European Union 1995).

Assembly of Western European Union Document 1519.美国和欧洲的安全（巴黎：西欧联盟1996年）。

西欧联盟大会文件1551。Reply of the Council to Recommendation 597（巴黎：西欧联盟1996年）。

House of Commons Intelligence and Security Committee.AnnualReport 1999（伦敦：HMSO 1999）。

House of Commons Intelligence and Security Committee.Annual报告2000（（London: HMSO 2000).

House of Commons Intelligence and Security Committee.Interim Report 2000-01（伦敦：HMSO 2001）。

In from the Cold: The Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Future of US intelligence（纽约：二十世纪基金出版社，1996年）。

[1]Knightley, Philip.The second oldest profession�（（London: Deutsch 1986).

[2]Holy Bible New King James Version（（London: Thomas Nelson 1982). Numbers 13 (2).

[3]赫尔曼，迈克尔。Intelligence power in peace and war。Pages 9-15.

[4]Ambrose，Stephen＆Brinkley，Douglas。Rise to globalism: American foreign policy since 1938（伦敦：企鹅1997）。介绍。

[5]The European Union consists ofBelgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourgandthe Netherlands（（who joined in 1951),Denmark，，，，Irelandand英国（1973），，，，希腊（1981），，，，SpainandPortugal (1986)，，，，奥地利，芬兰and瑞典（1995年）。

[6]Siegfried Sassoon,A soldiers declaration。July 1917. From Barker, Pat.Regeneration（伦敦：企鹅1992）。第3页。

[7]罗珀，约翰。Agents for change。Page 187.

[8]Politi, Alessandro.采取欧洲情报政策安全研究所(巴黎:1998)。

[9]赫尔曼，迈克尔。Intelligence power in peace and war。Pages 200-218.

[10]赫尔曼，迈克尔。Intelligence power in peace and war。第204页。

[11]赫尔曼，迈克尔。Intelligence power in peace and war。Page 346.

[12]Richelson, Jeffery.A century of spies。Page 428.

[13]里明顿，斯特拉。安全与民主：是否存在冲突？（伦敦：BBC电视1994）。

[14]Politi, Alessandro.采取欧洲情报政策。

[15]Grant, Charles.Intimate relations。Page 16.

[16]Europol is the European Union law enforcement organisation that handles criminal intelligence.

The establishment of Europol was agreed in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union of 7 February 1992. More information can be found at: http://www.europol.nl

[17]Lustgarten，Laurence和Leigh，Ian。来自寒冷：国家安全和议会民主。Page 368.

[18]Urban, Mark.英国的眼睛Alpha: the inside story of British intelligence（（London: Faber & Faber 1996).

[19]Assembly of Western European Union.A European intelligence policy: Document 1500（（Paris: Western European Union 1995).

[20]Assembly of Western European Union.A European intelligence policy: Document 1500。

[21]President Jacques Chirac. British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, France 4 December 1998. Internet source:http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/newstext.asp?1788

[22]Joint Declaration on Defence. British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, France 4 December 1998. Internet source:http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/newstext.asp?1795

[23]Oberson, Fr�d�ric.采取欧洲情报政策。

[24]Grant, Charles.Intimate relations。Page 15.

[25]Oberson, Fr�d�ric.采取欧洲情报政策。

[26]Politi, Alessandro.采取欧洲情报政策。

[27]海军上将皮埃尔·拉科斯特（Pierre Lacoste）。Agents for change。Page 319.

[28]The Sunday Times.Europe plans its own spy agency。5 December 1999. Page 22.

[29]Politi, Alessandro.采取欧洲情报政策。

[30]Grant, Charles.Intimate relations。第1页。

[31]Urban, Mark.英国的眼睛Alpha。Page 300.

[32]Grant, Charles.Intimate relations。第12页。

[33]里明顿，斯特拉。安全与民主：是否存在冲突？

[34]Charters, David.The role of Intelligence services in the direction of covert paramilitary operations，，，，inIntelligence: Policy and Process。Pages 333-346.

[35]Grant, Charles.Intimate relations。第6页。

[36]Urban, Mark.英国的眼睛Alpha。第301页。

[37]Mi5。互联网source:http://www.mi5.gov.uk/intell11.htm。

[38]Smith, Hugh.Survival。Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping（（London: International Institute for Strategic Studies1994）。第184页。

[39]Trevan, Tim.Saddams secrets。Page 8.

[40]This was confirmed by the Ambassador of Bosnia & Herzegovina Mission to the UK, HE Osman TopCAgiC，，，，in a personal interview with the author.

[41]Politi, Alessandro.采取欧洲情报政策。

[42]Ambassador Par Kettis inAgents for change。Page 94.

[43]House of Commons Intelligence and Security Committee.Interim Report 2000-01（伦敦：HMSO 2001）

[44]House of Commons Defence Committee.科索沃的教训（（London: HMSO 2000).

[45]诺顿 - 泰勒，理查德。Going it alone。守护者。2001年2月28日。

[46]西欧联盟大会建议597（XII）。

[47]The MEDA Programme is the main financial instrument of the EU for the implementation of the Euro Mediterranean Partnership, to accompany the reform of social and economic structures in the Mediterranean non-member countries. Internet source:http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/euro_med_partnership/meda.htm

[48]Bozeman, Adda.Strategic intelligence and statecraft。Page vii.

[49]Joint Declaration by the British and French Governments on European Defence.

[50]迈克尔·赫尔曼。在与作者的个人采访中提出的评论。

[51]Assembly of Western European Union.美国和欧洲安全，文件1519。（巴黎：西欧联盟1996年）。

[52]Grant, Charles.Intimate relations。Page 4.

[53]Urban, Mark.英国的眼睛Alpha。第301页。

[54]Khan, David.Intelligence and National Security。Volume 9. July 1994. Number Three. Page 534.

[55]诺顿 - 泰勒，理查德。�Nato spy leaked bombing raid plans to the Serbs。� 09 March 2000.

[56]汤姆·金在个人采访autho议员r.

[57]是的总理！二十世纪的企鹅词典（（London: Penguin 1995).

[58]The Sunday Times.French spies listen in to British calls。17 October 1999.

[59]这在词汇表中突出显示了图四。

[60]Negotiations are currently being held with twelve applicants: Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

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