[国会纪录卷164，第15（星期一，2018 1月22日）] [参议院] [页S430-S437] [...]第148节BURR先生。主席先生，美国参议院刚刚做了正确的事情。在几个小时之内，我们希望，决定向政府性基金，并把人们重返工作岗位会发现其对众议院的方式。我相信，它会找到一个快速的协议存在，明天大家会回来到位，众议院和参议院现在可以与2月8日之间的积极合作，以确保这不会再发生，而且我们带来持久性和确定性的资金。[页S434]情报委员会和我的副主席被通报的时候，房子CR似乎有它的语言，这是比以往有所不同。在CR第148条的语言是关注的情报委员会。让我读语言：秒。148.资金由防空导弹失败和国防拨款增强法案，2018（公法115-96的分工B）部门拨款可能有义务和花费，尽管1947年国家安全法第504（A）（1）。这种语言是麻烦的委员会，因为它会授权情报部门花费的资金``尽管'由参议院情报委员会或内务情报委员会需要事先授权法律。 The vice chairman and I were on the floor, I think, last week, and we had a 65-to-34 vote to reauthorize the most significant intelligence tool to keep America safe. In that debate, both Senator Warner and I said to our opposition that we would do everything within the committee's power to make sure we did aggressive, real-time oversight over the entire intelligence community. Sometimes that means that when we see there might be something we are uncomfortable with, we alter the ability to access funds. In congressional terms, we call it fencing off money. But we utilize the tools as an authorizer to affect what, in fact, individuals within the intelligence community can choose to do. When you take away section 504 authorities that the committees have, for the next 3 weeks we will have an inability to exercise, in our estimation, the tools that we might need to keep our commitment to 34 individuals who still voted against us but, more importantly, to the American people, for whom we would do everything to make sure our intelligence communities act in a way that those educated and elected in this body see fit. As a result, this language can erode the powers of the authorizing committee. Effectively, the intelligence community could expend funds as it sees fit without an authorization bill in place and with no statutory direction indicating that an authorization bill for 2018 is forthcoming. Let me just say to my colleagues, a situation like this is untenable. We have worked with our colleagues in HPSCI to develop language to change this. I might say, we have had a couple of opportunities to do it, and we should have done it literally when we changed the date of the CR. When we changed the date from the original date, which I think was the 16th, to the 8th of February, we should have inserted this new language. But because there is a fight between appropriators and the Intelligence Committee in the House, we weren't able to do that. I have a feeling that Senator Warner and I are going to find there is now a fight between the Intelligence Committee and the appropriators in the U.S. Senate because, I fear, someone might object to the unanimous consent request I will ask after Senator Warner speaks. Let me read what the committee has come up with. This is bicameral. The House Select Committee on Intelligence is in agreement. In section 148, it would say: Funds appropriated by the Department of Defense Missile Defeat and Defense Enhancements Appropriations Act, 2018 (division B of Public Law 115-96), for intelligence or intelligence related activities are deemed to be specifically authorized by Congress for purposes of section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414) during fiscal year 2018 until the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2018. The vice chairman is a lawyer; I am not. I really rely upon the legal counsel that we have within the committee to interpret U.S. law. It really doesn't take a law degree to understand that there is a huge difference between ignoring section 504, ``notwithstanding,'' and applying section 504, which our change makes. This isn't really a misinterpretation. This is a question of whether you want to take section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414) and continue to let it apply or whether you are going to provide the intelligence community a waiver that exempts them from having to adhere to a part of U.S. Code. The reason I wanted the opportunity to speak before we ask unanimous consent is, I want my colleagues to understand that we take our oversight role extremely seriously. We want to have every tool in our basket that we can to give the American people the assurance that we know exactly what is going on and that we are at least in agreement that they proceed forward, not that they have free rein only because they have been appropriated a pot of money because an executive request was made. It would be no different under the Obama administration or under the Trump administration. I would encourage my colleagues not to object to it when I ask for the unanimous consent because that is what we are here for. With that, I yield to the vice chairman. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I want to echo a number of the comments my friend, the chairman, the Senator from North Carolina made. Ten days ago, we asked for reauthorization of section 702, and I came to this floor and advocated that this was a critically important tool. Part of the reforms of that legislation would even give us more insight into how that tool was used. We said, at that point, not only to those Members who didn't agree with us on that but to all of the Members--for that matter, the American people--that the Intelligence Committee would continue its vigorous oversight of that program and other programs. Being on the Intelligence Committee, at least until recently, has not been necessarily all that high attention and profile. We spend hundreds and hundreds of hours every month in a SCIF. One of the things I find so rewarding about the Intelligence Committee's work is that on issue after issue, you couldn't tell who is a Democrat and Republican. We all take extraordinarily serious our oversight responsibilities. If this exemption is granted, you could potentially have an administration--any administration--go off and take on covert activities, for example, with no ability for our committee, which spends the time and has the oversight, to say timeout or to say we actually disagree with that policy. I have been very disturbed about the whole process that arose in the House, how it was attempted to get slipped in. I hope, as well as the chairman, that no Member would choose to object. If they do choose to object, I hope they will be able to explain to the American public why they would want to remove the Intelligence Committee's ability to monitor, and then if we make a decision, withdraw funds if we don't agree and have that ongoing tool that is one of the most key components of our oversight responsibility--why they would want to, in effect, give any administration, for that matter, a blank check. Again, my hope is no one will object to this request; that we will continue the policies that existed for as long as I have been on the committee; and that those of us on that committee will continue to take the responsibility of oversight very seriously and will continue to do it in a bipartisan way. With that, I yield back to the chairman. Mr. BURR. Mr. President, I thank the vice chairman of the committee. There are over 30-plus professional staffers who staff both sides of the Intelligence Committee. On each side, there is a staffer designated for each of the intelligence agencies in this country. I would dare say today they know their particular portfolio of intelligence agencies as well as the employees who work inside that agency. They are experts. They are tasked with that degree of knowledge. Layered on top of that are 15 Members of the U.S. Senate whom the leadership on both sides have asked to spend countless hours behind closed doors--as the vice chairman said--typically in a bipartisan fashion to provide for every Member and for the American people our certification that we agree with what the intelligence community is doing; that it lives within the letter of the law; that there is some congressional oversight on a constant basis, in real-time, assuring Members and the American people of that accuracy. Why would you take away the tools we have to actually hold them accountable? I know appropriators believe this hinders their ability to spend money when we are in a continuing resolution [[Page S435]] period because of section 504. I am not sure I interpret it the same way they do. Just because an executive branch has asked for a pot of money, I have never considered that the committee couldn't go in, because of a vehement disagreement with the way some of it is being spent, and alter it. That altering means that on the part of 15 Members we have a hesitancy as to how it is being done. If you neuter the committee, you neuter our oversight. Mr. President, at this time, I ask unanimous consent that the Burr amendment to amendment No. 1917, which is at the desk, be considered and agreed to. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi. Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, the language in section 148 of the continuing resolution is included exactly as requested by the administration. It is consistent with language that has been adopted many times in past continuing resolutions. The appropriation for missile defeat previously approved by Congress is very explicit. Section 2002 of that appropriation provides that the funds ``shall be allocated to programs, projects, and activities in accordance with the detailed congressional budget justifications submitted by the Department of Defense to accompany the Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Amendments requested by the President on November 6, 2017.'' It further provides that ``changes to the allocation of such funds shall be subject to the reprogramming requirements set forth in the annual appropriations Act.'' Section 2002 explicitly protects the oversight prerogatives of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and its role in approving deviations from the Administration's request. I will continue to work with the Senator from North Carolina on his concerns but must object to his request. Mr. President, I object. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard. Mr. BURR. Mr. President, it is my hope that we will come to our senses at some point in this process and that this waiver to U.S. Code will, in fact, not be in place, but I will assure, on behalf of the vice chairman and myself to all our Members, we will, to the best of our ability, given the limitation that is placed on us, hold the intelligence community accountable for everything they do and that we will be much more active in the future relative to the appropriations that find their way there if, in fact, they are not going to provide us the tools to manage, in a constructive way, those things the agencies choose to carry out. If I didn't have the number of individuals in Members and in staff who are experts, I probably wouldn't be as confident, but these folks take it extremely seriously because we know what is at stake--the trust we have with our Members and the trust we have with the American people. With that, Mr. President, I yield back but with great disappointment. I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll. [...]