[国会记录卷163，数量128（星期五7月28日，2017）] [房屋] [页数H6528-H6531]审议提供H.R. 3180，情报授权ACT财政年度2018;条款6放弃的要求（a）中规则XIII相对于审议报告了的规则委员会提出的某些分辨率中的;以及提供用于PROCEEDINGS 7月31日，2017年，THE PERIOD期间通过2017年9月4日CHENEY女士。议长先生，通过对规则委员会的方向，我打电话议院决议481，并要求其立即审议。秘书宣读了决议如下：H. RES。481 Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to consider in the House the bill (H.R. 3180) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2018 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes. All points of order against consideration of the bill are waived. The amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence now printed in the bill shall be considered as adopted. The bill, as amended, shall be considered as read. All points of order against provisions in the bill, as amended, are waived. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill, as amended, and on any further amendment thereto, to final passage without intervening motion except: (1) one hour of debate equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; and (2) one motion to recommit with or without instructions. Sec. 2. The requirement of clause 6(a) of rule XIII for a two-thirds vote to consider a report from the Committee on Rules on the same day it is presented to the House is waived with respect to any resolution reported through the legislative day of August 1, 2017. Sec. 3. On any legislative day during the period from July 31, 2017, through September 4, 2017-- (a) the Journal of the proceedings of the previous day shall be considered as approved; and (b) the Chair may at any time declare the House adjourned to meet at a date and time, within the limits of clause 4, section 5, article I of the Constitution, to be announced by the Chair in declaring the adjournment. Sec. 4. The Speaker may appoint Members to perform the duties of the Chair for the duration of the period addressed by section 3 of this resolution as though under clause 8(a) of rule I. Sec. 5. Each day during the period addressed by section 3 of this resolution shall not constitute a calendar day for purposes of section 7 of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1546). Sec. 6. Each day during the period addressed by section 3 of this resolution shall not constitute a legislative day for purposes of clause 7 of rule XIII. Sec. 7. Each day during the period addressed by section 3 of this resolution shall not constitute a calendar or legislative day for purposes of clause 7(c)(1) of rule XXII. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Wyoming is recognized for 1 hour. Ms. CHENEY. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings), pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose of debate only. General Leave Ms. CHENEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Wyoming? There was no objection. Ms. CHENEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of House Resolution 481, which provides a closed rule for consideration of H.R. 3180, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018. Mr. Speaker, there is nothing we do in this body that is more important than actions we take for the defense of our Nation. We now face a more complex array of threats than we have at any time since the end of World War II. North Korea continues to test ballistic missiles, has successfully tested an ICBM, and is continuing to move rapidly towards achieving the capability to strike U.S. soil. A resurgent Russia is imposing its will across Europe, occupies Crimea, and is now using its military to support the Assad regime in Syria. China is increasingly belligerent, continues to expand the size of its military and create bases on artificial islands in the South China Sea. And Iran, Mr. Speaker, continues to work on its ballistic missile program and expand its influence as it supports terror across the Mediterranean and the larger Middle East. Terrorist groups like al-Qaida and ISIS continue to carry out attacks across the West and threaten the United States. We have seen a dramatic increase in tensions on the Temple Mount, Mr. Speaker, in just the last few weeks, and we have men and women in uniform deployed around the globe fighting to defend our Nation. Our intelligence community plays a crucial role in ensuring our decision-makers and our warfighters have the information they need to keep our Nation secure. H.R. 3180 provides the intelligence community with the authorization it needs to continue working to protect and defend the United States, supports critical national security programs, such as those protecting Americans against terrorism, cyber attacks, and hostile foreign nations. The bill maintains critical congressional oversight of the activities of the intelligence community, and the bill makes no changes to any surveillance authorities, including those set to expire, which we will take up later this year in legislation separate from this bill. Mr. Speaker, as you know, earlier this week, H.R. 3180 was considered under suspension of the rules, which is not at all uncommon for bills, like this one, that receive unanimous bipartisan support in committee. While the bill received well over 50 percent of the votes of the House, it did not achieve the required two-thirds majority to pass under suspension, which is why we are here today debating this rule. A large portion of this bill, Mr. Speaker, is understandably, as it should be, classified, which requires Members of this body to review the bill in the SCIF. I want to personally thank members of the Intelligence Committee and their staff for facilitating that process and making it so easy for Members of this House to undertake. A bipartisan notice was sent out, provided to Members, informing us of the availability of the text for review. And the text, Mr. Speaker, was available for 10 days, twice as long as last year's bill. My staff simply had to call and inform the committee that I would like to review the bill, and the committee asked when I would be available, and they made sure that a member of the committee staff was also there to answer any questions I had. The process itself was seamless, was very easy, and was facilitated by the members of the Intelligence Committee staff. Mr. Speaker, this is a good and important bill. It supports the men and women in our intelligence community and the work they do to keep us safe. This is not an issue we should politicize or subject to partisan debate. The intelligence community plays a critical role in the defense of our Nation, and we need to support them, Mr. Speaker, by supporting this bill. Therefore, I urge support for the rule to allow consideration of H.R. 3180. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from Wyoming (Ms. Cheney) for yielding me the customary 30 minutes for debate, and I rise to debate the rule for H.R. 3180, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018. I was somewhat dismayed earlier this week when my friends across the aisle attempted to jam today's bill through this body by jettisoning regular order and bringing the bill up under suspension. Luckily, we can add this shortsighted attempt at governing to their long list of legislative failures. And although I may be pleased that their suspension shenanigans failed, my frustration was born anew when we were informed that the bill would come to the floor under yet another closed rule. This is all bad enough, and I will come back to it in a moment, but first we need to discuss the blanket martial law provision that my friends on the other side put into this rule. This move, especially when considered in the context of those mentioned [[Page H6529]] above, truly elevated poor governing to an art form. {time} 0945 I want the American people, Republican and Democrat and Independents alike, to be crystal clear on what is happening here today. By putting a blanket martial law provision into this rule, my friends across the aisle were trying to make it as easy as possible for them to pass a healthcare bill that they had never seen. The bill would have surely ripped healthcare away from millions of Americans and unceremoniously upended one-sixth of our economy. Thankfully, Senators Collins, Murkowski, and McCain, and tens of thousands of regular Americans-turned-activists ensured that this effort failed. Since day one, the approach of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle on healthcare or, for that matter, any number of other important issues has been horrendous. It has been rushed; it has been secretive; it has been chaotic; and it has been inspired by the desire for a cheap win rather than the desire to make our healthcare system stronger and more widely available to all Americans. Truly, whether it is healthcare, veterans, or the authorization of funding for something as important as our intelligence community, the approach leaves some of us bewildered, dismayed, and gravely concerned for the well-being of our country. Indeed, when discussing something as important as the authorization for funding for the intelligence community, we ought to proceed in a manner that allows all Members of this body the opportunity to weigh in with their concerns. This closed process does a disservice not only to those of us who do not sit on the committee of jurisdiction, but also the intelligence community and the American people. As an example, when I did sit on this committee, I was vice chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and I worked diligently to ensure that minorities were given equal opportunity to break into the upper ranks of the intelligence community. Since leaving that committee, I have continued this important work and introduced an amendment to a previous iteration of the underlying bill that called for the Director of National Intelligence to put forth a plan that would encourage diversity hires throughout the intelligence community. Frustratingly, I am stripped of such an opportunity today because of the Republican leadership's unyielding devotion to perpetuating a closed process. Additionally, the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee), my friend, has also offered amendments to the underlying bill in the past that call for an increase in the recruitment and training of minorities as officers and employees of the Central Intelligence Agency. She, like the majority of our colleagues, will not be afforded a similar opportunity this time around. This is troublesome because diversity is a mission imperative for the intelligence community. Not only do we need to see minorities have more opportunities to climb the ranks, but we also need to recruit Americans who will be able to blend in, speak foreign languages, and understand the cultures in countries that are now central to our foreign policy interests. At the end of the day, such diversity is achieved through the hiring process, and, therefore, we need to ensure that we are hiring Arab Americans, Iranian Americans, Pakistani Americans, Chinese Americans, Korean Americans, women, gays, and many other Americans from diverse backgrounds as we confront a myriad of threats and work harder to better understand our adversaries, wherever they may lurk. We do not seek this diversity in the name of political correctness but, rather, in the name of national security. As I have said before, if the intelligence community is to succeed in its global mission, it must have a global face. I have no doubt that scores of Members would like to have offered amendments addressing the issues I have just mentioned as well as many other issues that are of particular concern to them and their constituents. Unfortunately, under this rule, they will not be afforded such an opportunity today. Those who work in the intelligence community serve our country faithfully and bravely, knowing that they will never receive the public recognition they so richly deserve. In fact, they have served and continue to serve knowing that not only will they not receive well- earned accolades, but that they will, upon occasion, have to endure unfounded and offensive statements from this administration. These statements began before the current administration even moved in down Pennsylvania Avenue. I quote the following from the administration's, President's, Twitter account: ``Intelligence agencies should never have allowed this fake news to `leak' into the public. One last shot at me. Are we living in Nazi Germany?'' I find that shameful and absolutely unfounded in making such a statement. Comparing these brave and patriotic Americans to Nazis? You really have to be kidding me. As a former member of HPSCI, I will not sit idly by while anyone maligns the honorable work these proud Americans do day in and day out to protect our country. But it seems that, with this closed process and their continued support of President Donald John Trump, even as he slowly erodes the foundation of our democracy one tweet at a time, is exactly what my friends and the Republican Congress are doing. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. Ms. CHENEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. My colleague from Florida, with whom I have had the privilege of spending many hours in the Rules Committee debating this and a range of other issues, raised a number of points I think that are important to clarify. First of all on the issue of minority recruitment, last night, in the Rules Committee, in open session, Chairman Nunes was asked about this, and he testified very clearly and directly that diversity is very important, that it is mission-critical for the reasons that my colleague from Florida stated. I can report that there are several provisions in the classified annex--I won't go into the details about them--with which my colleague may or may not be familiar that support the whole notion of Centers of Academic Excellence, which are particularly focused on recruiting young people, recruiting minorities and young people across the board for service in the intelligence community. We tend, in these rule discussions, Mr. Speaker, to have a lot of arguments and criticism of procedure. The Democrats this morning seem to be particularly concerned about our same-day authority. But I would just note, Mr. Speaker, I am certainly confident that my constituents who are watching this--and, I would say, probably most Americans watching--would understand the importance of the House of Representatives getting its work done in a timely manner. And certainly, when it comes to healthcare, the arguments and the criticism from the other side of the aisle lose a little bit of their credibility when they simultaneously attack the Republicans for moving too slowly and then also for moving too quickly. What I can tell you is we are debating hugely important issues and hugely important topics. We are absolutely committed to repealing and replacing ObamaCare. It is a system that is collapsing. It is a system that has devastated the lives of people across this country. It is a system that has driven premiums and deductibles through the roof. It has absolutely limited people's choice in terms of insurance plans, in terms of healthcare providers. It is a system that is failing. We have seen the Democrats' fundamental approach was a government mandate and their attempt to force people across this Nation to buy health insurance. They thought that, through a government mandate, they would be able to force young people into these insurance pools and, therefore, drive the cost down. That is not what happened. It didn't work. We know we have got to put in place a system that will be able to provide people the kind of care that they need, access, as well as lowering the cost and increasing availability. So there are a whole range of very important substantive efforts going on. I think that it is clear that the folks on the other side of the aisle don't support the direction we are going in, may [[Page H6530]] not support the policy, but the people across this Nation--certainly, in my home State of Wyoming--spoke very clearly last November that they wanted a change, that they wanted to see the government reduce its role in their lives, and that they wanted to see us begin the process of building our military, rebuilding what has been lost over the course of the last 8 years, as well as rebuilding the facilities and the capabilities of our intelligence community, and that is exactly what this bill does. That is exactly what we are here doing this morning. Mr. Speaker, I think that is why it is so important that my colleagues support this rule, that we provide the authority that the intelligence community needs through this bill to continue to do its important work to keep us safe. I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. The brazen and reckless manner in which this bill was first brought to the floor is evidence that my friends across the aisle have still not figured out how to govern. The learning curve may be steep, but it is not that steep. Quite simply, my friends, it is time for you to start governing responsibly, not with closed rules and martial law, without hearings, and without CBO scores, but through regular order, with an opportunity for all Members and, through them, their constituents to take part in legislating. The White House may be in chaos, but that is no reason for the House to legislate in a similar manner. For the good of the country, we must return to regular order. We must work to ensure that those serving in the intelligence community are able to do their best work, to do it as safely as possible, and to do it knowing that they will receive the respect they deserve from all branches of their government. I worry that they, increasingly, do not receive this respect, and that this disrespect, should it continue, will make it more difficult for us to retain and recruit the talent we so desperately need to protect our national security. Of course, the intelligence community is only one part of our national security apparatus. The men and women in our military are an equally important part of maintaining our national security. And, unfortunately, we learned just yesterday that these brave servicemembers are not immune from baseless attacks from the administration. It was announced, on the 69th anniversary of President Truman's issuing an executive order that desegregated the Armed Forces, that transgender servicemembers would no longer be able to serve in the military. Were these individuals, numbering between 10,000 and 15,000, banned because they are not brave, because they are not patriotic, because they are incapable of meeting the rigorous requirements of being in the military? No, they have been banned because bigotry defeated decency yesterday, and they have been banned because of who they are. As I mentioned the other evening, I had three uncles who were in the Army. They served proudly. They served bravely. They served in a segregated Army. Two of them received purple hearts. {time} 1000 It was a great offense that they had to serve in a segregated Army in which they were made to feel that somehow their bravery, their patriotism, and their devotion to their brothers in arms was somehow less because of the color of their skin. President Truman knew this was wrong, and he ended it. Simply put, President Truman knew then what our current President is incapable of understanding today: the strength of our military is not found in the race or the religion or the creed or the sex or the gender identity of its servicemembers, but rather in the bravery and honor exhibited by these individuals on a daily basis. They, like all of us here today, are proud citizens of this country. They, like all of us here today, are God's children. I thank them for their service to our Nation. Mr. Speaker, I urge a ``no'' vote on the rule, and I yield back the balance of my time. Ms. CHENEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 481 and the underlying bill, H.R. 3180, ensure the men and women of our intelligence community have the tools and the resources they need to continue the vital role they play in helping us address the threats facing our Nation. I do want to point out, Mr. Speaker, my colleague is accusing the Republicans of being brazen and reckless because of our same-day rulemaking authority. I would only note that in the 111th Congress, when they were in the majority, they enacted this process 26 times; in the 110th Congress, 17 times. It is an important ability for us to have when we know we might need to move quickly on something. As a member of the Rules Committee, I am committed to ensuring we do everything possible to make sure that we are able to bring bills to this floor that carry out the kind of changes and improvements that the people of this Nation sent us all here to undertake. I was really disappointed, Mr. Speaker, earlier this week when this bill was defeated under suspension of the rules. There are many things that are partisan issues in this body, and it is too bad when the minority uses the Intelligence Authorization bill as part of a political stunt to make what should be a bipartisan process and a bipartisan committee appear partisan. The bill, H.R. 3108, received unanimous support in committee, and I certainly hope today, Mr. Speaker, that the minority members of that committee, and frankly all on the minority side who understand the importance of the intelligence community in keeping our Nation safe, will put aside the partisanship, will put aside the games that the American people are so tired of, and will join me in supporting a good, effective, and important bill, that, frankly, the minority members in the Intelligence Committee worked very hard to help craft. Mr. Speaker, I urge adoption of both the rule and H.R. 3180. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution. The previous question was ordered. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the resolution. The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it. Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays. The yeas and nays were ordered. The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 224, nays 186, not voting 23, as follows: [Roll No. 436] YEAS--224 Abraham Aderholt Allen Amodei Arrington Babin Bacon Banks (IN) Barletta Barr Barton Bergman Biggs Bilirakis Bishop (MI) Bishop (UT) Black Blackburn Blum Bost Brady (TX) Brat Bridenstine Brooks (AL) Brooks (IN) Buchanan Buck Bucshon Budd Burgess Byrne Calvert Carter (GA) Carter (TX) Chabot Cheney Coffman Cole Collins (GA) Comer Comstock Conaway Cook Costa Cramer Crawford Culberson Curbelo (FL) Davidson Davis, Rodney Denham Dent DeSantis DesJarlais Diaz-Balart Duffy Duncan (SC) Duncan (TN) Dunn Emmer Estes (KS) Farenthold Faso Ferguson Fitzpatrick Fleischmann Flores Fortenberry Foxx Franks (AZ) Frelinghuysen Gaetz Gallagher Garrett Gianforte Gibbs Gohmert Goodlatte Gosar Gowdy Granger Graves (GA) Graves (LA) Griffith Grothman Guthrie Handel Harper Harris Hartzler Hensarling Herrera Beutler Hice, Jody B. Higgins (LA) Hill Holding Hudson Huizenga Hultgren Hurd Issa Jenkins (KS) Jenkins (WV) Johnson (LA) Johnson (OH) Johnson, Sam Jordan Joyce (OH) Katko Kelly (MS) Kelly (PA) King (IA) Kinzinger Knight Kustoff (TN) Labrador LaHood LaMalfa Lamborn Lance Latta Lewis (MN) LoBiondo Long Loudermilk Love Lucas Luetkemeyer MacArthur Marchant Marino Marshall Mast McCarthy McCaul McClintock McHenry McKinley McMorris Rodgers McSally Meadows Meehan Messer Mitchell Moolenaar Mooney (WV) Mullin Murphy (PA) Newhouse Noem Norman Nunes Olson Palazzo Palmer Paulsen Pearce Perry Pittenger Poe (TX) Poliquin Posey Ratcliffe Reed Reichert Renacci Rice (SC) Roby Roe (TN) Rogers (AL) Rogers (KY) Rohrabacher Rokita Rooney, Francis Ros-Lehtinen Ross Rothfus Rouzer Royce (CA) [[Page H6531]] Russell Rutherford Sanford Schweikert Scott, Austin Sensenbrenner Sessions Shimkus Shuster Simpson Smith (MO) Smith (NE) Smith (NJ) Smith (TX) Smucker Stefanik Stewart Stivers Taylor Tenney Thompson (PA) Thornberry Tiberi Tipton Trott Turner Upton Valadao Wagner Walberg Walden Walker Walorski Walters, Mimi Weber (TX) Wenstrup Westerman Williams Wilson (SC) Wittman Womack Woodall Yoder Yoho Young (IA) NAYS--186 Adams Aguilar Amash Barragan Beatty Bera Beyer Bishop (GA) Blumenauer Blunt Rochester Bonamici Boyle, Brendan F. Brady (PA) Brown (MD) Brownley (CA) Bustos Butterfield Capuano Carbajal Cardenas Carson (IN) Cartwright Castor (FL) Castro (TX) Chu, Judy Cicilline Clark (MA) Clarke (NY) Cleaver Clyburn Cohen Connolly Cooper Correa Courtney Crist Crowley Cuellar Davis (CA) Davis, Danny DeFazio DeGette Delaney DeLauro DelBene Demings DeSaulnier Deutch Dingell Doggett Doyle, Michael F. Ellison Eshoo Espaillat Esty (CT) Evans Foster Frankel (FL) Fudge Gabbard Gallego Garamendi Gomez Gonzalez (TX) Gottheimer Green, Al Green, Gene Grijalva Hanabusa Hastings Heck Higgins (NY) Himes Hoyer Huffman Jackson Lee Jayapal Jeffries Johnson (GA) Johnson, E. B. Jones Kaptur Keating Kelly (IL) Kennedy Khanna Kihuen Kildee Kilmer Kind Krishnamoorthi Kuster (NH) Langevin Larsen (WA) Larson (CT) Lawrence Lawson (FL) Lee Levin Lewis (GA) Lieu, Ted Lipinski Loebsack Lofgren Lowenthal Lowey Lujan, Ben Ray Lynch Maloney, Carolyn B. Maloney, Sean Massie Matsui McCollum McEachin McGovern McNerney Meeks Meng Moore Moulton Murphy (FL) Nadler Neal Nolan Norcross O'Halleran O'Rourke Pallone Panetta Pascrell Payne Pelosi Perlmutter Peters Peterson Pingree Pocan Polis Price (NC) Quigley Raskin Rice (NY) Rosen Roybal-Allard Ruiz Ruppersberger Rush Ryan (OH) Sanchez Sarbanes Schakowsky Schiff Schneider Schrader Scott (VA) Scott, David Serrano Sewell (AL) Shea-Porter Sherman Sinema Sires Slaughter Smith (WA) Soto Speier Suozzi Swalwell (CA) Takano Thompson (CA) Thompson (MS) Titus Tonko Torres Tsongas Vargas Veasey Vela Velazquez Visclosky Walz Wasserman Schultz Watson Coleman Welch Wilson (FL) Yarmuth NOT VOTING--23 Bass Clay Collins (NY) Conyers Costello (PA) Cummings Donovan Engel Graves (MO) Gutierrez Hollingsworth Hunter King (NY) Lujan Grisham, M. Napolitano Richmond Rooney, Thomas J. Roskam Scalise Waters, Maxine Webster (FL) Young (AK) Zeldin {time} 1027 Messrs. SUOZZI and HOYER changed their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.'' Mr. FERGUSON changed his vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.'' So the resolution was agreed to. The result of the vote was announced as above recorded. A motion to reconsider was laid on the table. ____________________ [Congressional Record Volume 163, Number 128 (Friday, July 28, 2017)] [House] [Pages H6547-H6557] INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018 Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 481, I call up the bill (H.R. 3180) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2018 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration. The Clerk read the title of the bill. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 481, the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, printed in the bill, shall be considered as adopted, and the bill, as amended, shall be considered read. The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows: H.R. 3180 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. Sec. 2. Definitions. TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations. Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations. Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments. Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account. TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations. Sec. 202. Computation of annuities for employees of the Central Intelligence Agency. TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS Sec. 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities. Sec. 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law. Sec. 303. Congressional oversight of intelligence community contractors. Sec. 304. Enhanced personnel security programs. TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence Sec. 401. Authority for protection of current and former employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Sec. 402. Designation of the program manager-information sharing environment. Sec. 403. Technical correction to the executive schedule. Subtitle B--Other Elements Sec. 411. Requirements relating to appointment of General Counsel of National Security Agency. Sec. 412. Transfer or elimination of certain components and functions of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Sec. 413. Technical amendments related to the Department of Energy. TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES Sec. 501. Assessment of significant Russian influence campaigns directed at foreign elections and referenda. Sec. 502. Foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to Federal election campaigns. Sec. 503. Assessment of threat finance relating to the Russian Federation. TITLE VI--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS Sec. 601. Period of overseas assignments for certain foreign service officers. Sec. 602. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized public disclosures of classified information. Sec. 603. Intelligence community reports on security clearances. Sec. 604. Report on expansion of Security Protective Services jurisdiction. Sec. 605. Report on role of Director of National Intelligence with respect to certain foreign investments. Sec. 606. Report on Cyber Exchange Program. Sec. 607. Review of intelligence community participation in vulnerabilities equities process. Sec. 608. Review of Intelligence Community whistleblower matters. Sec. 609. Sense of Congress on notifications of certain disclosures of classified information. SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. In this Act: (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)). TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2018 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2) The Central Intelligence Agency. (3) The Department of Defense. (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (5) The National Security Agency. (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (7) The Coast Guard. (8) The Department of State. (9) The Department of the Treasury. (10) The Department of Energy. (11) The Department of Justice. (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration. (14) The National Reconnaissance Office. (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (16) The Department of Homeland Security. SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS. (a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2018, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this Act. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.-- (1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President. (2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, within the executive branch. [[Page H6548]] (3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule except-- (A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a)); (B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or (C) as otherwise required by law. SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS. (a) Authority for Increases.--The Director of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2018 by the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such schedule for such element. (b) Treatment of Certain Personnel.--The Director of National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern, for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a), including any exemption from such personnel levels, of employment or assignment in-- (1) a student program, trainee program, or similar program; (2) a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or (3) details, joint duty, or long-term, full-time training. (c) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 days prior to each exercise of an authority described in subsection (a). SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2018 the sum of $526,900,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2019. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence are authorized 804 positions as of September 30, 2018. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2018 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts made available for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2019. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2018, there are authorized such additional personnel for the Community Management Account as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2018 the sum of $514,000,000. SEC. 202. COMPUTATION OF ANNUITIES FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. (a) Computation of Annuities.-- (1) In general.--Section 221 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2031) is amended-- (A) in subsection (a)(3)(B), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``, as determined by using the annual rate of basic pay that would be payable for full-time service in that position.''; (B) in subsection (b)(1)(C)(i), by striking ``12-month'' and inserting ``2-year''; (C) in subsection (f)(2), by striking ``one year'' and inserting ``two years''; (D) in subsection (g)(2), by striking ``one year'' each place such term appears and inserting ``two years''; (E) by redesignating subsections (h), (i), (j), (k), and (l) as subsections (i), (j), (k), (l), and (m), respectively; and (F) by inserting after subsection (g) the following: ``(h) Conditional Election of Insurable Interest Survivor Annuity by Participants Married at the Time of Retirement.-- ``(1) Authority to make designation.--Subject to the rights of former spouses under subsection (b) and section 222, at the time of retirement a married participant found by the Director to be in good health may elect to receive an annuity reduced in accordance with subsection (f)(1)(B) and designate in writing an individual having an insurable interest in the participant to receive an annuity under the system after the participant's death, except that any such election to provide an insurable interest survivor annuity to the participant's spouse shall only be effective if the participant's spouse waives the spousal right to a survivor annuity under this Act. The amount of the annuity shall be equal to 55 percent of the participant's reduced annuity. ``(2) Reduction in participant's annuity.--The annuity payable to the participant making such election shall be reduced by 10 percent of an annuity computed under subsection (a) and by an additional 5 percent for each full 5 years the designated individual is younger than the participant. The total reduction under this subparagraph may not exceed 40 percent. ``(3) Commencement of survivor annuity.--The annuity payable to the designated individual shall begin on the day after the retired participant dies and terminate on the last day of the month before the designated individual dies. ``(4) Recomputation of participant's annuity on death of designated individual.--An annuity which is reduced under this subsection shall, effective the first day of the month following the death of the designated individual, be recomputed and paid as if the annuity had not been so reduced.''. (2) Conforming amendments.-- (A) Central intelligence agency retirement act.--The Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2001 et seq.) is amended-- (i) in section 232(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 2052(b)(1)), by striking ``221(h),'' and inserting ``221(i),''; and (ii) in section 252(h)(4) (50 U.S.C. 2082(h)(4)), by striking ``221(k)'' and inserting ``221(l)''. (B) Central intelligence agency act of 1949.--Subsection (a) of section 14 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3514(a)) is amended by striking ``221(h)(2), 221(i), 221(l),'' and inserting ``221(i)(2), 221(j), 221(m),''. (b) Annuities for Former Spouses.--Subparagraph (B) of section 222(b)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2032(b)(5)(B)) is amended by striking ``one year'' and inserting ``two years''. (c) Prior Service Credit.--Subparagraph (A) of section 252(b)(3) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2082(b)(3)(A)) is amended by striking ``October 1, 1990'' both places that term appears and inserting ``March 31, 1991''. (d) Reemployment Compensation.--Section 273 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2113) is amended-- (1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections (c) and (d), respectively; and (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following: ``(b) Part-time Reemployed Annuitants.--The Director shall have the authority to reemploy an annuitant in a part-time basis in accordance with section 8344(l) of title 5, United States Code.''. (e) Effective Date and Application.--The amendments made by subsection (a)(1)(A) and subsection (c) shall take effect as if enacted on October 28, 2009, and shall apply to computations or participants, respectively, as of such date. TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS SEC. 301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. SEC. 302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW. Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. SEC. 303. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTORS. (a) Oversight by Congress.-- (1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 506J the following new section: ``SEC. 506K. OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTORS. ``Notwithstanding the terms of any contract awarded by the head of an element of the intelligence community, the head may not-- ``(1) prohibit a contractor of such element from contacting or meeting with either of the congressional intelligence committees (including a member or an employee thereof) to discuss matters relating to a contract; ``(2) take any adverse action against a contractor of such element, including by suspending or debarring the contractor or terminating a contract, based on the contractor contacting or meeting with either of the congressional intelligence committees (including a member or an employee thereof) to discuss matters relating to a contract; or ``(3) require the approval of the head before a contractor of such element contacts or meets with either of the congressional intelligence committees (including a member or an employee thereof) to discuss matters relating to a contract.''. (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 506J the following new item: ``Sec. 506K. Oversight of intelligence community contractors.''. [[Page H6549]] (b) Application.--The amendment made by subsection (a)(1) shall apply with respect to a contract awarded by the head of an element of the intelligence community on or after the date of the enactment of this Act. SEC. 304. ENHANCED PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAMS. Section 11001(d) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Audit'' and inserting ``Review''; (2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``audit'' and inserting ``review''; and (3) in paragraph (2), by striking ``audit'' and inserting ``review''. TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence SEC. 401. AUTHORITY FOR PROTECTION OF CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3506(a)(4)) is amended by striking ``such personnel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as the Director of National Intelligence may designate;'' and inserting ``current and former personnel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and their immediate families as the Director of National Intelligence may designate;''. SEC. 402. DESIGNATION OF THE PROGRAM MANAGER-INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT. (a) Information Sharing Environment.--Section 1016(b) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(b)) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``President'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``President'' both places that term appears and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''. (b) Program Manager.--Section 1016(f) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(f)) is amended by striking ``The individual designated as the program manager shall serve as program manager until removed from service or replaced by the President (at the President's sole discretion).'' and inserting ``Beginning on the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, each individual designated as the program manager shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.''. SEC. 403. TECHNICAL CORRECTION TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE. Section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security.''. Subtitle B--Other Elements SEC. 411. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL COUNSEL OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY. (a) In General.--Section 2 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (Public Law 86-36; 50 U.S.C. 3602) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(c)(1) There is a General Counsel of the National Security Agency. ``(2) The General Counsel of the National Security Agency shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.''. (b) Effective Date.--Subsection (c) of section 2 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (Public Law 86-36; 50 U.S.C. 3602) shall apply with respect to any person who is appointed to serve as General Counsel of the National Security Agency on or after January 21, 2021. SEC. 412. TRANSFER OR ELIMINATION OF CERTAIN COMPONENTS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. (a) Information Review Task Force.-- (1) Transfer required.--Effective on the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, there is transferred from the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff all functions performed by the Information Review Task Force and all assigned responsibilities performed by the Information Review Task Force. Upon such transfer, such Task Force shall be designated as a chairman's controlled activity. (2) Transition plan.-- (A) Congressional briefing.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall jointly brief the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees on the plan to carry out the transfer required under paragraph (1). (B) Submittal of formal plan.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees a formal plan for the transfer required under paragraph (1). (3) Limitation on use of funds.--The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any funds authorized to be appropriated for the Information Review Task Force for fiscal year 2018 after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. Any such funds that are unobligated or unexpended as of such date shall be transferred to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (b) Identity Intelligence Project Office.-- (1) Elimination.--Effective on the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall eliminate the Identity Intelligence Project Office, including all functions and assigned responsibilities performed by the Identity Intelligence Project Office. All personnel and assets pertaining to such Office shall be transferred to other elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as determined by the Director. (2) Transition plan.-- (A) Congressional briefing.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall brief the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees on the plan to carry out the elimination required under paragraph (1). (B) Submittal of formal plan.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees a formal plan for the elimination required under paragraph (1). (3) Limitation on use of funds.--The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any funds authorized to be appropriated for the Identity Intelligence Project Office for fiscal year 2018 after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. Any such funds that are unobligated or unexpended as of such date shall be transferred to other elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as determined by the Director. (c) Watchlisting Branch.-- (1) Transfer required.--Effective on the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, there is transferred from the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to the Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff all functions and all assigned responsibilities performed by the Watchlisting Branch. (2) Transition plan.-- (A) Congressional briefing.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff shall jointly brief the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees on the plan to carry out the transfer required under paragraph (1). (B) Submittal of formal plan.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees a formal plan for the transfer required under paragraph (1). (3) Limitation on use of funds.--The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any funds authorized to be appropriated for the Watchlisting Branch for fiscal year 2018 after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. Any such funds that are unobligated or unexpended as of such date shall be transferred to the Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff. (d) Counter-Threat Finance.-- (1) Elimination.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall eliminate the Counter-Threat Finance analysis function of the Defense Intelligence Agency. All personnel and assets pertaining to such function shall be transferred to other elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as determined by the Director. (2) Transition plan.-- (A) Congressional briefing.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall brief the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees on the plan to eliminate the Counter-Threat Finance analysis function under paragraph (1). (B) Submittal of formal plan.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees a formal plan to eliminate such function under paragraph (1). (3) Limitation on use of funds.--The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any funds authorized to be appropriated for the Counter-Threat Finance analysis function for fiscal year 2018 after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. Any such funds that are unobligated or unexpended as of such date shall be transferred to other elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as determined by the Director. (e) National Intelligence University.-- (1) Transfer required.--Effective on October 1, 2020, there is transferred from the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to the Director of National Intelligence all functions and all assigned responsibilities performed by the National Intelligence University. (2) Transition plan.-- (A) Congressional briefing.--Not later than October 1, 2018, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director of National Intelligence shall jointly brief the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees on the plan to carry out the transfer required under paragraph (1). (B) Submittal of formal plan.--Not later than April 1, 2019, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director of National Intelligence shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees a formal plan for the transfer required under paragraph (1). (3) Limitation on use of funds.--The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any funds authorized to be appropriated for the National Intelligence University after October 1, 2020. Any such funds that are unobligated or unexpended as of such [[Page H6550]] date shall be transferred to the Director of National Intelligence. (f) Congressional Notice for Reprogramming.--Not later than 30 days before transferring any funds relating to transferring or eliminating any function under this section, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees notice in writing of such transfer. (g) Treatment of Certain Functions and Responsibilities.-- (1) In general.--In the case of any function or executive agent responsibility that is transferred to the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to this section, the Director of National Intelligence may not delegate such function or responsibility to another element of the intelligence community. (2) Executive agent responsibility.--In this subsection, the term ``executive agent responsibility'' means the specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities assigned by the Director of National Intelligence to the head of an intelligence community element to provide defined levels of support for intelligence operations, or administrative or other designated activities. (h) Deadline for Policy Updates.--Not later than October 1, 2020, the Director of National Intelligence, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall ensure that all relevant policies of the intelligence community and Department of Defense are updated to reflect the transfers required to be made pursuant to this section. (i) Treatment of Transferred Functions.--No transferred functions or assigned responsibility referred to in subsection (a), (c), or (e) shall be considered a new start by the receiving element, including in the case of any lapse of appropriation for such transferred function or assigned responsibility. (j) Reports on Other Elements of Defense Intelligence Agency.-- (1) National center for credibility assessment.-- (A) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (i) the assignment of executive agency for the National Center for Credibility Assessment to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency may be limiting the ability of the Center to effectively serve the Federal customer base of the Center; (ii) the failure of the Director of National Intelligence, in the role of the Director as security executive for the Federal Government, to define in policy the term ``Executive Agent'' may be further limiting the ability of the Center to receive sufficient resources to carry out the critical Federal mission of the Center; and (iii) the evolution of the Center from an organization of the Army to an organization serving 27 departments and agencies and responsible for all Federal credibility assessment training, oversight, and research and development, has resulted in a convoluted oversight structure based on legacy reporting requirements. (B) Report.--Not later than October 1, 2018, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees a report on-- (i) the current and projected missions and functions of the National Center for Credibility Assessment; (ii) the effectiveness of the current organizational assignment of the Center to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; (iii) the effectiveness of the current oversight structure between the Center, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director of National Intelligence; and (iv) the resources and authorities necessary to most effectively execute the missions and functions of the Center. (2) Underground facilities analysis center.-- (A) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (i) the assignment of executive agency for the Underground Facilities Analysis Center to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency may be limiting the ability of the Center to effectively serve the broader intelligence community customer base of the Center; (ii) the failure of the Director of National Intelligence to define in policy the term ``Executive Agent'' may be further limiting the ability of the Center to receive sufficient resources to carry out the critical mission of the Center; and (iii) the requirements of the intelligence community and Department of Defense with respect to underground facilities are not adequately being met given the scale and complexity of the problem set and the relatively small amount of funding currently received by the Center. (B) Report.--Not later than October 1, 2018, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees a report on-- (i) the missions and functions of the Underground Facilities Analysis Center; (ii) the state of the requirements of the intelligence community and Department of Defense with respect to underground facilities and the ability of the Center to meet such requirements; (iii) the effectiveness of the current organizational assignment of the Center to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; (iv) the effectiveness of the current oversight structure between the Center, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence; and (v) the resources and authorities necessary to most effectively execute the missions and functions of the Center. (k) Congressional Defense Committees Defined.--In this section, the term ``congressional defense committees'' means-- (1) the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives; and (2) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives. SEC. 413. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY. (a) Atomic Energy Defense Act.--Section 4524(b)(2) of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2674(b)(2)) is amended by inserting ``Intelligence and'' after ``The Director of''. (b) National Security Act of 1947.--Paragraph (2) of section 106(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3041(b)(2)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (E), by inserting ``and Counterintelligence'' after ``Office of Intelligence''; (2) by striking subparagraph (F); (3) by redesignating subparagraphs (G), (H), and (I) as subparagraphs (F), (G), and (H), respectively; and (4) in subparagraph (H), as redesignated by paragraph (3), by realigning the margin of such subparagraph two ems to the left. TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES SEC. 501. ASSESSMENT OF SIGNIFICANT RUSSIAN INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS DIRECTED AT FOREIGN ELECTIONS AND REFERENDA. (a) Assessment Required.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing an analytical assessment of the most significant Russian influence campaigns, if any, conducted during the 3-year period preceding the date of the enactment of this Act, as well as the most significant current or planned such Russian influence campaigns, if any. Such assessment shall include-- (1) a summary of such significant Russian influence campaigns, including, at a minimum, the specific means by which such campaigns were conducted, are being conducted, or likely will be conducted, as appropriate, and the specific goal of each such campaign; (2) a summary of any defenses against or responses to such Russian influence campaigns by the foreign state holding the elections or referenda; (3) a summary of any relevant activities by elements of the intelligence community undertaken for the purpose of assisting the government of such foreign state in defending against or responding to such Russian influence campaigns; and (4) an assessment of the effectiveness of such defenses and responses described in paragraphs (2) and (3). (b) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form, but if so submitted, shall contain an unclassified summary. (c) Russian Influence Campaign Defined.--In this section, the term ``Russian influence campaign'' means any effort, covert or overt, and by any means, attributable to the Russian Federation directed at an election, referendum, or similar process in a country other than the Russian Federation or the United States. SEC. 502. FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND CYBERSECURITY THREATS TO FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS. (a) Reports Required.-- (1) In general.--As provided in paragraph (2), for each Federal election, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall make publicly available on an internet website an advisory report on foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to election campaigns for Federal offices. Each such report shall include, consistent with the protection of sources and methods, each of the following: (A) A description of foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to election campaigns for Federal offices. (B) A summary of best practices that election campaigns for Federal offices can employ in seeking to counter such threats. (C) An identification of any publicly available resources, including United States Government resources, for countering such threats. (2) Schedule for submittal.--A report under this subsection shall be made available as follows: (A) In the case of a report regarding an election held for the office of Senator or Member of the House of Representatives during 2018, not later than the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (B) In the case of a report regarding an election for a Federal office during any subsequent year, not later than the date that is one year before the date of the election. (3) Information to be included.--A report under this subsection shall reflect the most current information available to the Director of National Intelligence regarding foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats. (b) Treatment of Campaigns Subject to Heightened Threats.-- If the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis jointly determine that an election campaign for Federal office is subject to a heightened foreign counterintelligence or cybersecurity threat, the Director and the Under Secretary, consistent with the protection of sources and methods, may make available additional information to the appropriate representatives of such campaign. SEC. 503. ASSESSMENT OF THREAT FINANCE RELATING TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. (a) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director [[Page H6551]] of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Manager for Threat Finance, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing an assessment of the financing of threat activity by the Russian Federation. (b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) shall include, at a minimum, the following: (1) A summary of leading examples from the 3-year period prior to the date of the report of any threat finance activities conducted by, for the benefit of, or at the behest of officials of the Government of Russia, persons subject to sanctions under any provision of law imposing sanctions with respect to Russia, or Russian nationals subject to sanctions under any other provision of law. (2) An assessment with respect to any trends or patterns in threat finance activities relating to Russia, including common methods of conducting such activities. (3) A summary of engagement and coordination with international partners on threat finance relating to Russia, especially in Europe, including examples of such engagement and coordination. (4) An identification of any resource and collection gaps. (c) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form. (d) Threat Finance Defined.--In this section, the term ``threat finance'' means-- (1) the financing of cyber operations, global influence campaigns, intelligence service activities, proliferation, terrorism, or transnational crime and drug organizations; (2) the methods and entities used to spend, store, move, raise, or conceal money or value on behalf of threat actors; (3) sanctions evasion; or (4) other forms of threat financing domestically or internationally, as defined by the President. TITLE VI--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS SEC. 601. PERIOD OF OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENTS FOR CERTAIN FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS. (a) Length of Period of Assignment.--Subsection (a) of section 502 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3982) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(3) In making assignments under paragraph (1), and in accordance with section 903, and, if applicable, section 503, the Secretary shall assure that a member of the Service may serve at a post for a period of not more than six consecutive years.''. (b) Foreign Language Deployment Requirements.--Section 702 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 4022) is amended by-- (1) redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection: ``(c) Foreign Language Deployment Requirements.-- ``(1) In general.--The Secretary of State, with the assistance of other relevant officials, shall require all members of the Service who receive foreign language training in Arabic, Farsi, Chinese (Mandarin or Cantonese), Turkish, Korean, and Japanese by the institution or otherwise in accordance with subsection (b) to serve three successive tours in positions in which the acquired language is both relevant and determined to be a benefit to the Department. ``(2) Overseas deployments.--In carrying out paragraph (1), at least one of the three successive tours referred to in such paragraph shall be an overseas deployment. ``(3) Waiver.--The Secretary of State may waive the application of paragraph (1) for medical or family hardship or in the interest of national security. ``(4) Congressional notification.--The Secretary of State shall notify the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Relations of the Senate at the end of each fiscal year of any instances during the prior twelve months in which the waiver authority described in paragraph (3) was invoked.''. SEC. 602. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF UNAUTHORIZED PUBLIC DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. (a) In General.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``SEC. 1105. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF UNAUTHORIZED PUBLIC DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. ``(a) In General.--On a semiannual basis, each covered official shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report that includes, with respect to the preceding 6-month period-- ``(1) the number of investigations opened by the covered official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of classified information; ``(2) the number of investigations completed by the covered official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of classified information; and ``(3) of the number of such completed investigations identified under paragraph (2), the number referred to the Attorney General for criminal investigation. ``(b) Definitions.--In this section: ``(1) The term `covered official' means-- ``(A) the heads of each element of the intelligence community; and ``(B) the inspectors general with oversight responsibility for an element of the intelligence community. ``(2) The term `investigation' means any inquiry, whether formal or informal, into the existence of an unauthorized public disclosure of classified information. ``(3) The term `unauthorized public disclosure of classified information' means the unauthorized disclosure of classified information to a journalist or media organization.''. (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1104 the following new item: ``Sec. 1105. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized public disclosures of classified information.''. SEC. 603. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORTS ON SECURITY CLEARANCES. Section 506H of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3104) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(1)-- (A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by inserting ``and'' after the semicolon; (B) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a period; and (C) by striking subparagraph (C); (2) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c); (3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection (b): ``(b) Intelligence Community Reports.--(1) Not later than March 1 of each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the security clearances processed by each element of the intelligence community during the preceding calendar year. Each such report shall separately identify security clearances processed by each such element and shall cover Federal employees and contractor employees. ``(2) Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include each of the following for each element of the intelligence community for the year covered by the report: ``(A) The total number of initial security clearance background investigations opened for new applicants. ``(B) The total number of security clearance periodic re- investigations opened for existing employees. ``(C) The total number of initial security clearance background investigations for new applicants that were finalized and adjudicated with notice of a determination provided to the prospective applicant, including-- ``(i) the total number that were adjudicated favorably and granted access to classified information; and ``(ii) the total number that were adjudicated unfavorably and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance. ``(D) The total number of security clearance periodic background investigations that were finalized and adjudicated with notice of a determination provided to the existing employee, including-- ``(i) the total number that were adjudicated favorably; and ``(ii) the total number that were adjudicated unfavorably and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance. ``(E) The total number of pending security clearance background investigations, including initial applicant investigations and periodic re-investigations, that were not finalized and adjudicated as of the last day of such year and that remained pending as follows: ``(i) For 180 days or less. ``(ii) For 180 days or longer, but less than 12 months. ``(iii) For 12 months or longer, but less than 18 months. ``(iv) For 18 months or longer, but less than 24 months. ``(v) For 24 months or longer. ``(F) In the case of security clearance determinations completed or pending during the year preceding the year for which the report is submitted that have taken longer than 12 months to complete-- ``(i) the cause of the delay for such determinations; and ``(ii) the number of such determinations for which polygraph examinations were required. ``(G) The percentage of security clearance investigations, including initial and periodic re-investigations, that resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance. ``(H) The percentage of security clearance investigations that resulted in incomplete information. ``(I) The percentage of security clearance investigations that did not result in enough information to make a decision on potentially adverse information. ``(3) The report required under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.''; and (4) in subsection (c), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by inserting ``and (b)'' after ``subsection (a)(1)''. SEC. 604. REPORT ON EXPANSION OF SECURITY PROTECTIVE SERVICES JURISDICTION. (a) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the feasibility, justification, costs, and benefits of expanding the jurisdiction of the protective services of the Central Intelligence Agency under section 15(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3515(a)). The report shall include-- (1) an explanation of the need for expanding such jurisdiction beyond the 500-feet limit specified in such section 15(a)(1); and (2) an identification of any comparable departments or agencies of the Federal Government in the Washington metropolitan region (as defined in section 8301 of title 40, United States Code) whose protective services jurisdictions exceed 500 feet. (b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form. [[Page H6552]] SEC. 605. REPORT ON ROLE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN FOREIGN INVESTMENTS. (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community determined appropriate by the Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the role of the Director in preparing analytic materials in connection with the evaluation by the Federal Government of national security risks associated with potential foreign investments into the United States. (b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) shall-- (1) describe the current process for the provision of the analytic materials described in subsection (a); (2) identify the most significant benefits and drawbacks of such process with respect to the role of the Director, including any benefits or drawbacks relating to the time allotted to the Director to prepare such materials; and (3) include recommendations to improve such process. SEC. 606. REPORT ON CYBER EXCHANGE PROGRAM. (a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the potential establishment of a fully voluntary exchange program between elements of the intelligence community and private technology companies under which-- (1) an employee of an element of the intelligence community with demonstrated expertise and work experience in cybersecurity or related disciplines may elect to be temporarily detailed to a private technology company that has elected to receive the detailee; and (2) an employee of a private technology company with demonstrated expertise and work experience in cybersecurity or related disciplines may elect to be temporarily detailed to an element of the intelligence community that has elected to receive the detailee. (b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) shall include the following: (1) The feasibility of establishing the exchange program described in such subsection. (2) Identification of any challenges in establishing the exchange program. (3) An evaluation of the benefits to the intelligence community that would result from the exchange program. SEC. 607. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES PROCESS. (a) Review.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall review, with respect to the 3- year period preceding the date of the review, the roles and responsibilities of the elements of the intelligence community in the process of the Federal Government for determining whether, when, how, and to whom information about a vulnerability that is not publicly known will be shared with or released to a non-Federal entity or the public. (b) Report.-- (1) Submission.--Not later than 240 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the results of the review under subsection (a). (2) Elements.--The report under paragraph (1) shall include the following: (A) A description of the roles and responsibilities of the elements of the intelligence community in the process of determining whether, when, how, and to whom information about a vulnerability that is not publicly known will be shared or released to a non-Federal entity or the public. (B) The criteria used by the Federal Government, including elements of the intelligence community, in making such determination. (C) With respect to the period covered by the review-- (i) a summary of vulnerabilities known to elements of the intelligence community that were reviewed by the Federal Government pursuant to such process, including-- (I) the number of vulnerabilities known to the intelligence community that were reviewed; and (II) of such number of reviewed vulnerabilities, the number for which information was shared with or released to a non- Federal entity or the public; (ii) an assessment of whether there were any vulnerabilities known to elements of the intelligence community that were not reviewed pursuant to such process, and if so, the basis and rationale for not conducting such a review; and (iii) a summary of the most significant incidents in which a vulnerability known to the intelligence community, but not shared with or released to a non-Federal entity or the public, was exploited by an individual, an entity, or a foreign country in the course of carrying out a cyber intrusion. (D) A description of any current mechanisms for overseeing such process. (E) Recommendations to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, and, consistent with national security, transparency of such process. (F) Any other matters the Inspector General determines appropriate. (3) Form.--The report may be submitted in classified form. (c) Vulnerability Defined.--In this section, the term ``vulnerability'' means, with respect to information technology, a design, configuration, or implementation weakness in a technology, product, system, service, or application that can be exploited or triggered to cause unexpected or unintended behavior. SEC. 608. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WHISTLEBLOWER MATTERS. (a) Review of Whistleblower Matters.--The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, in consultation with the inspectors general for the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, shall conduct a review of the authorities, policies, investigatory standards, and other practices and procedures relating to intelligence community whistleblower matters, with respect to such inspectors general. (b) Objective of Review.--The objective of the review required under subsection (a) is to identify any discrepancies, inconsistencies, or other issues, which frustrate the timely and effective reporting of intelligence community whistleblower matters to appropriate inspectors general and to the congressional intelligence committees, and the fair and expeditious investigation and resolution of such matters. (c) Conduct of Review.--The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall take such measures as the Inspector General determines necessary in order to ensure that the review required by subsection (a) is conducted in an independent and objective fashion. (d) Report.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written report containing the results of the review required under subsection (a), along with recommendations to improve the timely and effective reporting of Intelligence Community whistleblower matters to inspectors general and to the congressional intelligence committees and the fair and expeditious investigation and resolution of such matters. SEC. 609. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NOTIFICATIONS OF CERTAIN DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. (a) Findings.--Congress finds that section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3092) requires elements of the intelligence community to keep the congressional intelligence committees ``fully and currently informed'' about all ``intelligence activities'' of the United States, and to ``furnish to the congressional intelligence committees any information or material concerning intelligence activities. . .which is requested by either of the congressional intelligence committees in order to carry out its authorized responsibilities.''. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the authorities described in subsection (a), together with other intelligence community authorities, obligate an element of the intelligence community to submit to the congressional intelligence committees written notification, by not later than 7 days after becoming aware, that an individual in the executive branch has disclosed covered classified information to an official of an adversary foreign government using methods other than established intelligence channels; and (2) each such notification should include-- (A) the date and place of the disclosure of classified information covered by the notification; (B) a description of such classified information; (C) identification of the individual who made such disclosure and the individual to whom such disclosure was made; and (D) a summary of the circumstances of such disclosure. (c) Definitions.--In this section: (1) The term ``adversary foreign government'' means the government of any of the following foreign countries: (A) North Korea. (B) Iran. (C) China. (D) Russia. (E) Cuba. (2) The term ``covered classified information'' means classified information that was-- (A) collected by an element of the intelligence community; or (B) provided by the intelligence service or military of a foreign country to an element of the intelligence community. (3) The term ``established intelligence channels'' means methods to exchange intelligence to coordinate foreign intelligence relationships, as established pursuant to law by the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, or other head of an element of the intelligence community. (4) The term ``individual in the executive branch'' means any officer or employee of the executive branch, including individuals-- (A) occupying a position specified in article II of the Constitution; (B) appointed to a position by an individual described in subparagraph (A); or (C) serving in the civil service or the senior executive service (or similar service for senior executives of particular departments or agencies). The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff) each will control 30 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes). General Leave Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and insert extraneous material in the Record on the bill, H.R. 3180. [[Page H6553]] The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California? There was no objection. Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, this is a good, bipartisan bill that we have worked all year putting together in a bipartisan manner. I thank all of my colleagues not only on the Intelligence Committee, but also those colleagues who came down to review the bill. Hopefully they got all the information from our staff to provide all the answers that they may need so that they understand the classified nature of the bill and the importance of this bill to our Nation's intelligence community and our warfighters. I want to highlight just a few things in the bill, because we did debate this bill on Monday, so I will go through this quickly. The legislation provides the intelligence community authorization needed to protect and defend the United States. It supports critical national security programs, such as those protecting Americans against terrorism, cyber attacks, and hostile foreign nations. The total funding authorized in the bill is slightly below the President's budget request, and is consistent with the House Budget Committee-passed fiscal year 2018 budget resolution. H.R. 3180 enables the intelligence community to carry out its vital work protecting Americans in the most complex threat environment since 9/11. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 is a solid, bipartisan bill, one that garnered unanimous approval in the committee by voice vote. I thank my committee colleagues and the entire HPSCI staff for their collaborative efforts in crafting the measure that we consider here today. In the 114th Congress, this committee worked in a similar bipartisan fashion to pass into law four key pieces of national security legislation. I am proud of our past legislative accomplishments, which testify to the virtues of substantive deliberation and reasoned compromise without needing to compromise the security of the American people or of our brave servicemembers. Reflecting on the past year, on Russia's assault on Western democracies, and on other challenges as well, from everything to include North Korea's unrelenting pursuit of a strategic nuclear capability, we owe the American people a deliberate process. I wish the bill had come to the floor with a rule that allowed Members to offer amendments. That opportunity is commensurate with the importance of the intelligence bill and the need for vigorous oversight of the IC by the whole Congress. Nonetheless, the manifest shortcomings in the process cannot take precedence over the imperative of discharging our duty and authorizing the operations of the intelligence community. On its merits, I urge all Members to vote ``yes'' on H.R. 3180 today. The Intelligence Committee oversees some of the most sensitive and highly classified aspects of U.S. intelligence operations and programs. The annual Intelligence Authorization Act is the primary means by which we can guarantee an appropriate balance between our Nation's national security imperatives and the civil liberties and privacy rights enshrined in the Constitution. H.R. 3180 does just that by funding, equipping, and giving policy direction to the intelligence community and military intelligence elements of the Defense Department. It sustains support for key national security priorities and programs, and represents a slight decrease from the President's budget request from 2018. This bill features a number of provisions championed by my Democratic colleagues, some of which redouble the IC's focus on the scope and nature of the threat, both overt and covert, that Russia poses to our interests and American political institutions. H.R. 3180 also mandates public reporting about counterintelligence and cyber threats against future U.S. elections; bolsters oversight of our policy guiding counterterrorism actions outside of declared areas of hostilities; and seeks more information about the executive branch's process for determining when and to whom to reveal information about vulnerabilities in computers and networks. At the same time, and unlike IAAs of years past, this bill omits problematic language regarding Guantanamo detentions and the role of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. I am less supportive of some elements in this legislation, but the bill's merits outweigh any misgivings I may have, and I was proud to cosponsor the bill along with the chairman. Through it, our committee and the Congress as a whole serves as a guardrail against any excesses, transgressions or abuses. That has always been a solemn obligation, but at this uncertain and unprecedented moment in our national life, it carries even more responsibility for all of us. So, again, I urge my colleagues today to vote with me to advance the Intelligence Authorization Act and see that it is enacted into law. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I have no further speakers, and I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Himes), one of our subcommittee ranking members. Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I thank both the chairman and ranking member for the strong bill that has been offered up today and for the bipartisan manner in which it was developed and enacted and, hopefully, will be passed. I rise in strong support of this bill, but would note for my colleagues that this authorization bill is an odd one. To fully understand it, you need to go deep into the basement of this Capitol and review it behind heavy metal doors. {time} 1200 The bill is full of acronyms and code words and classified information. As such, it can be hard to understand, and things that are hard to understand sometimes cause anxiety and fear. Let me take a moment to describe what this bill does. This bill has the strong bipartisan support of my fellow committee members, liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans alike, because it provides the lifeblood to a truly remarkable group of people who work behind the scenes and in the dark to keep us safe and to keep us free. The unheralded and unacknowledged warriors of the intelligence community never stop in the work that they do around the world. As we speak, North Korea is feverishly working to develop the ability to deliver a nuclear bomb to American shores. Our intelligence community is watching, evaluating, and planning against this mortal threat. As we speak, for the first time in a generation, Iran is not feverishly working to develop the ability to deliver a nuclear bomb to our shores. Our intelligence community is making sure that that stays true. As we speak, Mr. Speaker, for the umpteenth time, terrorists in places like Afghanistan and Libya and Syria are spending their time desperately trying to stay alive instead of spending their time planning to attack our airlines, our cities, and our people. As we speak, Mr. Speaker, Russia lurks, seeking advantage, promoting instability, and working to erode international norms and instability. We should make no mistake about Russia as an adversary, because there is a lot of noise about this. Russia is a country that invades neighboring sovereign countries, it murders political opponents, it bombs Syrian hospitals, and, yes, it conducted an unprecedented attack on the very core of our Democratic system: our free and fair elections. This bill funds the warriors who are watching that, who are standing up against that, in order to keep our system what we all like it to be. Mr. Speaker, because these activities are carried out secretly in the dark of night and usually unacknowledged, there is always the possibility for abuse. These activities, by their nature, run up against the lines of those values that make us Americans. This is surveillance. It is other things that are worthy of debate. The members of this committee spend their days in good argument about what the limits of those [[Page H6554]] activities should be, and we will have additional arguments around things like the reauthorization of the section 702 surveillance programs. These are terrific arguments that we have in a constructive way. These are not arguments that are present in this bill. Just as we did on section 215, we will have a robust discussion of the section 702 international authorities. These are authorities that raise questions and that should be subject to the debate of this Chamber. But this bill, this bill today, is about the lifeblood of a remarkable group of people who don't always get it right any more than we do, but who are patriots, who respect the Constitution, and who need our support in the work that they do to keep us safe and keep us free. I would like to, again, thank the majority, the chairman, the ranking member, and especially the staff who worked diligently to make this a bill that we would unanimously support and suggest to my colleagues in this Chamber that we don't see a lot of bills like this one, but this one is worthy of their support. Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman, Mr. Himes, for his kind comments, and I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi.) Ms. PELOSI. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time, and I join our colleague in saluting the committee for bringing this bipartisan legislation to the floor--so many issues that the committee has to deal with. I know that full well as a previous ranking member. I know that we all agree that every chance we get we want to salute the patriotic men and women of the intelligence community for their ceaseless heroism and unblinking vigilance to keep the American people safe. I thank them for all they do for force protection and conflict prevention. The quiet professionals of the U.S. intelligence community work every day, again, to keep this country safe and our leaders informed. Respect for their work is essential. I thank Ranking Member Schiff and members of the committee--Mr. Schiff, for his leadership, and commend all the members of the committee for their dedication to those same goals. I am sorry that this bill is coming up under a closed rule so that Members cannot offer amendments. One such amendment might be about an independent commission. It is the judgment of the intelligence community, as expressed in the January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment, that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a multifaceted active-measures campaign to sow discord in our political process and help one Presidential candidate and hurt the other. For this reason, we continue to ask for an outside, independent commission to look forward on how to prevent Russia and others from meddling in our election system again. The Swalwell-Cummings legislation to establish that commission has 200 bipartisan cosponsors. I also want to salute our Homeland Security Committee ranking member, Bennie Thompson, for his leadership to strengthen the preparedness of the election infrastructure of the United States to identify and withstand a foreign attack. Our election systems are part of the critical infrastructure of our country, some of the most critical infrastructure of our democracy itself. We must protect it. The United States must reject foreign interference in our elections, no matter which party it helps or which party it hurts. Our oath of office is to protect and defend the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic. Working with the intelligence community to better ensure the integrity of our elections is vital to that goal. Madam Speaker, I urge a ``yes'' vote on this bipartisan legislation and salute the members of the committee. I especially want to acknowledge the tremendous leadership of our ranking member, Mr. Schiff from California. Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time. Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I want to express my agreement with Leader Pelosi's comments on the continuing need for the appointment of an independent commission. An independent commission would have the dedicated focus, the distance from any potential political interference, and the resources to prepare a report of the caliber that we saw of the 9/11 Commission. I think that would be a very sound and important complement to what we are doing in Congress and what Special Counsel Mueller is doing. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Heck), my wonderful colleague on the Intelligence Committee. Mr. HECK. Madam Speaker, I rise to support the 2018 Intelligence Authorization Act, but first I would like to tender a point of personal privilege. Happy birthday, Madam Speaker. This Intelligence Authorization Act has very strong bipartisan language. I just want to highlight two areas where the IAA furthers what I believe to be high priorities for our national security. First, section 605, which I had the honor to author, sets in motion how to change the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, we also call it CFIUS, to better protect our keystone technologies. This IAA provision dovetails with some broader work that we are doing in the Financial Services Committee, in fact, across the aisle with Congressman Pittenger and myself and others. It would modernize the process to better protect and prevent strategic foreign adversaries like China or Russia from taking advantage of our open markets in a way that undermines our national security. America's technological edge is, in fact, a cornerstone of our national security, but our strategic adversaries know that, too. They are increasingly seeking to obtain these critical technologies and resources through commercial transactions, i.e., they are buying them. CFIUS is a place to safeguard us against this risk, but it needs modernization, more resources, and authority and support from the intelligence community. Russian meddling in the 2017 election showed us what happens when an adversary tries to exploit our political openness. Now they are trying to exploit our economic openness. Our intelligence community is vital in protecting against both of those threats. Let me also underscore this point: The fiscal year 2018 IAA takes steps to safeguard our Nation's edge, our advantage in space, which is, I am sorry to say, increasingly threatened by adversary nations. To mitigate that risk, the bill supports some truly cutting-edge space technologies and invests in and oversees programs to ensure the resiliency of overhead architecture. At the same time, it keeps up with the Intelligence Committee's long-running efforts to stimulate innovation. In particular, the committee report accompanying today's legislation asks the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to examine new approaches to public and private sector collaboration, with the goal of fostering the faster, smarter development of automation, artificial intelligence, and similar technologies. Madam Speaker, I am proud to support this legislation. I hope all my colleagues will join me in both wishing the Speaker a happy birthday and in voting ``yes'' on this bill. Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I wasn't aware it is your birthday, but happy birthday, and I continue to reserve the balance of my time. Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, happy birthday. Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Castro), who will now sing Happy Birthday for you. Mr. CASTRO of Texas. Madam Speaker, I will spare you that. Madam Speaker, I voice my support for H.R. 3180, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018. The men and women of America's intelligence community, the best in the world, protect our country every day. They serve beyond the front lines of conflict to collect and analyze intelligence on our adversaries. In addition to being highly effective, America's intelligence community adapts as the threats our country faces shift on a daily basis. Their effectiveness is amplified when they are in close [[Page H6555]] cooperation and coordination with policymakers. I want to thank my fellow members on the committee, especially Ranking Member Schiff and Chairman Nunes, for working with me to add language into this bill requiring the intelligence community to brief Congress on our intelligence capabilities in the South China Sea. Over $5 trillion in ship-borne commerce flows through the region each year, including the vast majority of sea-borne energy imports by close U.S. partners such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The security of the United States and those of these partners is closely linked to the ability of the United States to guarantee the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Our ongoing territorial disputes in the South China Sea threaten the principles of a rules-based order and the security of the United States and our allies. The language in the IAA allows Congress to more effectively understand the needs of the intelligence community. It allows for a two-way conversation so that Congress can act to provide the intelligence community the tools and authorities it needs to inform policymakers. Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time. Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Murphy). Mrs. MURPHY of Florida. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of the Intelligence Authorization Act. Good intelligence safeguards our Nation from adversaries. It is used to support our Armed Forces, our diplomats, and our homeland security professionals. The men and women of the U.S. intelligence community make enormous sacrifices on behalf of our country. While others seek the limelight, they shun publicity and self-promotion. They are silent warriors and quiet heroes. I want to highlight section 609 of this legislation. It is a version of a bill that I authored called the Prevention and Oversight of Intelligence Sharing with Enemies Act, or the POISE Act. I introduced the POISE Act in May after the President disclosed highly sensitive information to senior Russian officials during a White House meeting. This information had been entrusted to the U.S. by key allies. Under Federal law, the executive branch is required to inform the congressional intelligence committees of U.S. intelligence activities. The POISE Act would specify that the executive branch must notify the committees when a member of the executive branch, including the President, intentionally or inadvertently discloses top-secret information to adversary foreign government. {time} 1215 It is dangerous for a U.S. official to share classified information with an adversary, especially outside of established intelligence channels. The adversary could use the information to harm the United States or its allies. Moreover, our partners might decide to stop sharing critical intelligence with us if they lose confidence in our capacity to keep it confidential. The congressional notification requirement in the POISE Act would help deter inappropriate disclosures of classified information to adversaries. Once formally notified of the disclosure, Congress would be in a position to take any appropriate oversight action. I am so pleased that the core of the POISE Act is contained in section 609. I want to thank Chairman Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff for including the provision in the bill, and I urge the bill's swift passage. Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Swalwell). Mr. SWALWELL of California. Madam Speaker, happy birthday to you. Madam Speaker, I would like to thank the ranking member and our chair. I think this IAA represents the best of what we do together in the committee, and I am really just thrilled on behalf of the men and women who serve this country in our military and in our intelligence services that they have an authorization, act, that respects what they do, that enables what they do and understands that we have trying days ahead. Press reports right now are showing that North Korea may have just launched another ballistic missile, and so people who we represent at home are counting on us to do everything we can to protect this great country. It has been a privilege to work with Mr. Schiff and the chairman on this bill. Of particular interest for me is that this bill also has our intelligence agencies report back to Congress just what efforts the Russians are taking not just in America, but across the globe to interfere and meddle in other countries' elections. We have seen an escalating pattern of this over the past few decades, certainly culminating in our recent 2016 election. It is very important that the Congress knows and that the American people and our allies know what continued efforts will look like. So I appreciate the majority's willingness to work with us. We have seen, I think, in just the past few days, a bicameral effort to come together and say that we are not going to tolerate Russia's aggression in the world. The sanctions that were recently passed in this House and across the way in the Senate, I think, showed the world that we are serious, that this is our democracy, and it is still a democracy that is worth protecting. I think part of the IAA reflects that spirit as well. So, again, I thank the chairman for his work. I thank the staff on the majority side and the Members on the majority side, as well as our ranking member and our own staff, for working so hard to put this forward to protect and defend this great country. Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. This year's Intelligence Authorization Act was a bipartisan effort, and I am pleased to vote for it today. With this legislation, we reaffirm that all of our government's activities, including ones that are, by necessity, classified, must be maximally effective and bound by law. I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on this year's IAA. I do want to take this opportunity, also, to commend our committee's outgoing fellow from the Los Alamos National Lab, Phil Tubesing. For 2 years, Phil has worked alongside the entire HPSCI staff, imparting his scientific expertise about nuclear weapons and the other significant national security work that our national labs undertake. Phil, we thank you for your service to the committee and wish you every success in the future. Finally, I want to extend a closing word to all of the men and women of the intelligence community. The work that you do keeps us safe. Your mission is to speak truth to power, to give policymakers objective, rigorously vetted and diligently produced intelligence, and you do that in magnificent fashion. Thank you for your commitment and resolve in the face of a challenging global threat landscape. With this legislation, we believe that we provide you with the adequate tools, authorities, and funding, while making sure that our congressional oversight remains robust. Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Madam Speaker, I want to thank both the majority and minority members of our committee for working in a bipartisan manner this year to complete this bill, which I believe is a really good product and will support the men and women doing very difficult work to protect the American people. I do want to thank the staff not only from the minority side, but also from the majority side, specifically: Shannon Stuart, Nick Ciarlante, Scott Glabe, Bill Flanigan, Allen Souza, Lisa Major, Jacqueline Tame, Mark Stewart, Chelsey Campbell, Andrew House, Marissa Skaggs, Angel Smith, Kash Patel, Doug Presley, Steve Keith, George Pappas, and Jack Langer for helping craft this bill with the minority; as well as the committee-shared staff of Brandon Smith, Kim Kerr, and Kristin Jepson. I would also like to take another moment, as Mr. Schiff just did, our ranking member, and thank our fellow who [[Page H6556]] will be leaving us this year, who has been here a couple of years, Mr. Phil Tubesing, who will be going back and ending his congressional fellowship. We thank him for all of his work. Madam Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to pass this bill and send an overwhelming message to the men and women who protect this country that this Congress stands ready to support them. I yield back the balance of my time. Ms. JACKSON LEE. Madam Speaker, as a senior member of the Homeland Security Committee and vigilant defender of our national security, I rise in support of H.R. 3180, the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018,'' which will provide the Intelligence Community (IC) with the necessary resources and authorities to ensure they remain capable of protecting and defending the United States. Our intelligence community is facing unprecedented threats from our adversaries around the world as this Administration struggles with the basics of leading this great nation. The Obama Administration left the nation with a stable and growing economy; several important international coalition wins that include the Iranian Nuclear Arms Deal; the Russia Sanctions; and the Paris Climate Agreement. The work of our intelligence community is a key asset in our efforts to thwart our adversaries when they seek to do Americans or our interests harm. Following the Election, President-elect Trump was critical of the intelligence community. In December 2016, he attacked the CIA over its assessment that Russian hacks on Democratic political targets were intended to help him win the White House. In January of this year just prior to his inauguration, he compared our intelligence community to Nazi Germany, while making an unfounded accusation that the intelligence community leaked an unconfirmed dossier of sensitive information regarding him compiled by a private investigator. President Trump's disclosure of highly sensitive intelligence to Russian officials during a visit they had in the oval office raises grave concerns among our allies regarding sharing information with our intelligence community and the disclosure threatened to fracture his already-delicate relationship with the intelligence community. The revelation that President Trump met a second time in secret with Russian President Putin was not disclosed to the public, but came to light due to investigative journalism. The New York Times reported that lawyers and aides to President Trump are investigating the investigators hired by special counsel Robert Mueller, by scouring their records for potential conflicts of interest in an attempt to discredit their work. There is a pressing need for not only funding the work of the intelligence community, but to also provide additional protections to guard this national asset from undue interference from an Administration with too many entanglements with the Russian government that are under investigation. This bill authorizes appropriations for Fiscal Year 2018 for vital intelligence activities of the U.S. Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes. H.R. 3180 comes at a critical time in the status of our national security and the IC's ability to protect it. As we continue to face a diverse and growing array of threats from terrorist groups, hostile nation states, and questionable or incompetent figures in the Trump administration, it is crucial that the IC receive all the resources it needs to do its job while Congress has the necessary tools to carry out rigorous oversight of its work. This bill seeks to meet these challenges by supporting critical national security programs, particularly those focused on countering terrorism and cyberattacks. Under H.R. 3180, the Director of National Intelligence will be required to electronically publish an unclassified advisory report on foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to federal elections. It also bolsters intelligence oversight by ensuring that IC contractors can meet freely with Congress. Lastly, this bill improves IC accountability to Congress by requiring the IC to provide reports on: Investigations of leaks of classified information; Security clearance processing timelines; The process for reviewing information about computer vulnerabilities for retention or potential release; And Russian influence campaigns directed at foreign elections and threat finance activities. Madam Speaker, H.R. 3180 is a necessary response to the overwhelming evidence pointing to a carefully planned and executed infiltration of our 2016 Presidential Election by the Russian government and its operatives. The issue of cybersecurity, particularly with regards to our federal election computer system infrastructure, has been of great concern to me and the American public as more and more reports of Russian hacking efforts have come to light. In addition, the provision requiring reports on security clearance processing timelines should shed light on the highly dubious and inscrutable security clearances of Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner. Donald Trump's blatant and irresponsible nepotism towards his daughter and son-in-law have made us all vulnerable to Russian and other foreign influence at the highest levels of our federal government. H.R. 3180 will give the American people what they crave and deserve: clarity and transparency to pierce through the haze of cover-ups and distractions surrounding the Trump Administration. This bill also takes significant, much-needed steps to improve benefits for members of the IC, such as increasing employee compensation and authorizing $514 million in appropriations for the CIA's Retirement and Disability System. Congress must do its part to adequately recompense the patriotic Americans who serve our nation through their work in the IC, especially employees with disabilities, who make up 9 percent of the intelligence workforce. At the same time, we must continue to ensure that Congress can exercise oversight over and maintain transparency for the 17 agencies that comprise the IC. I am heartened that my Republican colleagues in the Intelligence Committee are starting to see the light in recognizing the sinister threat of Russian infiltration and White House collusion, both of which endanger our nation's ability to practice and protect its core democratic values. I look forward to working with all Members of Congress to strengthen our IC, and I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this important legislation. The SPEAKER pro tempore (Ms. Cheney). All time for debate has expired. Pursuant to House Resolution 481, the previous question is ordered on the bill, as amended. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill. The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill. The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it. Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays. The yeas and nays were ordered. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, this 15- minute vote on passage of H.R. 3180 will be followed by a 5-minute vote on passage of S. 114. The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 380, nays 35, not voting 18, as follows: [Roll No. 437] YEAS--380 Abraham Adams Aderholt Aguilar Allen Amodei Arrington Babin Bacon Banks (IN) Barletta Barr Barragan Barton Beatty Bera Bergman Beyer Biggs Bilirakis Bishop (GA) Bishop (MI) Bishop (UT) Black Blackburn Blum Blunt Rochester Bonamici Bost Boyle, Brendan F. Brady (PA) Brady (TX) Brat Bridenstine Brooks (AL) Brooks (IN) Brown (MD) Brownley (CA) Buchanan Buck Bucshon Budd Burgess Bustos Butterfield Byrne Calvert Carbajal Cardenas Carson (IN) Carter (GA) Carter (TX) Cartwright Castor (FL) Castro (TX) Chabot Cheney Cicilline Cleaver Clyburn Coffman Cohen Cole Collins (GA) Comer Comstock Conaway Connolly Cook Cooper Correa Courtney Cramer Crawford Crist Crowley Cuellar Culberson Curbelo (FL) Davidson Davis (CA) Davis, Danny Davis, Rodney DeFazio DeGette Delaney DeLauro Demings Denham Dent DeSantis DeSaulnier DesJarlais Deutch Diaz-Balart Dingell Doggett Doyle, Michael F. Duffy Duncan (SC) Dunn Emmer Engel Eshoo Espaillat Estes (KS) Esty (CT) Evans Farenthold Faso Ferguson Fitzpatrick Fleischmann Flores Fortenberry Foster Foxx Frankel (FL) Franks (AZ) Frelinghuysen Fudge Gaetz Gallagher Gallego Garamendi Garrett Gianforte Gibbs Gohmert Gonzalez (TX) Goodlatte Gosar Gottheimer Gowdy Granger Graves (GA) Graves (LA) Green, Al Green, Gene Griffith Grothman Guthrie [[Page H6557]] Hanabusa Handel Harper Harris Hartzler Hastings Heck Hensarling Herrera Beutler Hice, Jody B. Higgins (LA) Higgins (NY) Hill Himes Holding Hoyer Hudson Huizenga Hultgren Hunter Hurd Issa Jackson Lee Jeffries Jenkins (KS) Jenkins (WV) Johnson (LA) Johnson (OH) Johnson, E. B. Johnson, Sam Jordan Joyce (OH) Kaptur Katko Keating Kelly (IL) Kelly (MS) Kelly (PA) Kennedy Kihuen Kildee Kilmer Kind King (IA) Kinzinger Knight Krishnamoorthi Kuster (NH) Kustoff (TN) LaHood LaMalfa Lamborn Lance Langevin Larsen (WA) Latta Lawrence Lawson (FL) Levin Lewis (MN) Lieu, Ted Lipinski LoBiondo Loebsack Long Loudermilk Love Lowenthal Lowey Lucas Luetkemeyer Lujan, Ben Ray Lynch MacArthur Maloney, Carolyn B. Maloney, Sean Marchant Marino Marshall Mast Matsui McCarthy McCaul McClintock McCollum McEachin McHenry McKinley McMorris Rodgers McNerney McSally Meadows Meehan Meeks Meng Messer Mitchell Moolenaar Mooney (WV) Moore Moulton Mullin Murphy (FL) Murphy (PA) Nadler Neal Newhouse Noem Nolan Norcross Norman Nunes O'Halleran Olson Palazzo Pallone Palmer Panetta Pascrell Paulsen Payne Pearce Pelosi Perlmutter Perry Peters Peterson Pingree Pittenger Poe (TX) Poliquin Posey Price (NC) Quigley Raskin Ratcliffe Reed Reichert Renacci Rice (NY) Rice (SC) Richmond Roby Roe (TN) Rogers (AL) Rogers (KY) Rohrabacher Rokita Rooney, Francis Rooney, Thomas J. Ros-Lehtinen Rosen Ross Rothfus Rouzer Roybal-Allard Royce (CA) Ruiz Ruppersberger Rush Russell Rutherford Ryan (OH) Sanchez Sarbanes Schiff Schneider Schrader Schweikert Scott (VA) Scott, Austin Scott, David Sensenbrenner Serrano Sessions Sewell (AL) Shea-Porter Sherman Shimkus Shuster Simpson Sinema Sires Slaughter Smith (MO) Smith (NE) Smith (NJ) Smith (TX) Smucker Soto Stefanik Stewart Stivers Suozzi Swalwell (CA) Taylor Tenney Thompson (CA) Thompson (MS) Thompson (PA) Thornberry Tiberi Tipton Titus Tonko Torres Trott Tsongas Turner Upton Valadao Vargas Veasey Vela Visclosky Wagner Walberg Walden Walker Walorski Walters, Mimi Walz Wasserman Schultz Watson Coleman Weber (TX) Wenstrup Westerman Williams Wilson (FL) Wilson (SC) Wittman Womack Woodall Yarmuth Yoder Yoho Young (AK) Young (IA) NAYS--35 Amash Bass Blumenauer Capuano Chu, Judy Clark (MA) Clarke (NY) Conyers DelBene Duncan (TN) Ellison Gabbard Gomez Grijalva Gutierrez Huffman Jayapal Johnson (GA) Jones Khanna Labrador Lee Lewis (GA) Lofgren Massie McGovern O'Rourke Pocan Polis Sanford Schakowsky Smith (WA) Takano Velazquez Welch NOT VOTING--18 Clay Collins (NY) Costa Costello (PA) Cummings Donovan Graves (MO) Hollingsworth King (NY) Larson (CT) Lujan Grisham, M. Napolitano Roskam Scalise Speier Waters, Maxine Webster (FL) Zeldin {time} 1245 Mmes. SCHAKOWSKY, VELAZQUEZ, and CLARKE of New York changed their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.'' Ms. ADAMS, Messrs. CROWLEY and KIND changed their vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.'' So the bill was passed. The result of the vote was announced as above recorded. A motion to reconsider was laid on the table. ____________________