[国会纪录卷161，92号（2015年6月10日星期三）] [House] [页面H4127-H4133]国防拨款法案，2016年[...] Massie先生Massie先生提供的修正案。主席先生，我在办公桌上有修正案。代理主席。职员将报告修正案。职员阅读如下：在账单结束时（短标题前），插入以下新部分：秒。__。（a）除（b）款规定外，美国官员或员工没有提供的资金，美国官员或雇员可以查询根据“外国情报监测”第702条收购的外国情报信息集合Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a) using a United States person identifier. (b) Subsection (a) shall not apply to queries for foreign intelligence information authorized under section 105, 304, 703, 704, or 705 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805; 1842; 1881b; 1881c; 1881d), or title 18, United States Code, regardless of under what Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act authority it was collected. (c) Except as provided for in subsection (d), none of the funds made available by this Act may be used by the National Security Agency or the Central Intelligence Agency to mandate or request that a person (as defined in section 101(m) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801(m))) alter its product or service to permit the electronic surveillance (as defined in section 101(f) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1801(f))) of any user of such product or service for such agencies. (d) Subsection (c) shall not apply with respect to mandates or requests authorized under the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (47 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.). Mr. MASSIE (during the reading). Mr. Chair, I ask unanimous consent to dispense with the reading of the amendment. The Acting CHAIR. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kentucky? There was no objection. The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 303, the gentleman from Kentucky and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky. Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Chairman, the American people don't want to be spied on by their own government. Our Founding Fathers included the Fourth Amendment for a reason: to require probable cause and a warrant before the government and government agents can snoop on anyone. During the 113th Congress, the House of Representatives passed the bipartisan amendment I am offering today by a 293-123 vote. This year, our bipartisan group is reuniting once again to shut down unconstitutional surveillance that does not meet the expectations of our constituents or the standards required by our Constitution. Our amendment shuts one form of backdoor surveillance by prohibiting warrantless searches of government databases for information that pertains to U.S. citizens. The Director of National Intelligence has confirmed that the government searches vast amounts of data, including the content of emails and telephone calls without individual suspicion or probable cause. {time} 0120 At this time, I submit for the Record a letter from the Director of National Intelligence, which confirms this warrantless spying. Director of National Intelligence, Washington, DC, March 28, 2014. Hon. Ron Wyden, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. Dear Senator Wyden: During the January 29, 2014, Worldwide Threat hearing, you cited declassified court documents from 2011 indicating that NSA sought and obtained the authority to query information collected under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance Act (FISA), using U.S. person identifiers, and asked whether any such queries had been conducted for the communications of specific Americans. As reflected in the August 2013 Semiannual Assessment of Compliance with Procedures and Guidelines issued Pursuant to Section 702, which we declassified and released on August 21, 2013, there have been queries, using U.S. person identifiers, of communicatons lawfully acquired to obtain foreign intelligence by targeting non U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside the U.S. pursuant to Section 702 of FISA. These queries were performed pursuant to minimization procedures approved by the FISA Court as consistent with the statute and the Fourth Amendment. As you know, when Congress reauthorized Section 702, the proposal to restrict such queries was specifically raised and ultimately not adopted. For further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact Deirdre M. Walsh in the Office of Legislative Affairs. Sincerely, James R. Clapper. Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Chairman, the Director of the FBI has also confirmed that he uses the information to build criminal cases against U.S. persons, but the Director of National Intelligence and the FBI are not above the Fourth Amendment, and this practice should end. At this time, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lofgren), my colleague. Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding in [[Page H4131]] support of the Massie-Lofgren amendment. As mentioned, the declassified FISA court decision has indicated that substantially more warrantless communications are collected through 702 than 215. We had a bill up to recently, the USA FREEDOM Act, that alleged that we were stopping bulk collection, but we didn't. During the markup of that bill in the Judiciary Committee, we offered this amendment; and everyone on the committee, including the chairman of the committee, said they were for this provision, but it wasn't the right time. Well, this is the right time. That is why we have this broad support. It is the Massie-Lofgren- Sensenbrenner-Conyers-Poe-Gabbard-Jordan-O'Rourke. It is broad; it is bipartisan. It is supported by groups like the American Civil Liberties Union, as well as the Campaign for Liberty, Demand Progress, as well as FreedomWorks. This has broad bipartisan support. The American people deserve this. When we have an interest in querying the 702 database for American citizens, get a warrant. That is what the Fourth Amendment requires. Finally, this closes the opportunity to require backdoors on technology. As has been mentioned earlier by technologists and scientists, to do that just opens a door wide open for the bad guys and the hackers to break in. Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Chairman, as my colleague stated, my amendment also prohibits NSA and the CIA from placing backdoors into commercial products. This is important because, in December of 2013, it was reported that a U.S. security company had received $10 million from the NSA to use a flawed encryption method. Our government should strengthen technology that protects our privacy, not take advantage of it. At this time, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition. The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from New Jersey is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, this amendment restricts the use of section 702 of FISA, which is not currently up for reauthorization. The law does not sunset until December of 2017. Any reform to this authority should be fully vetted by the authorizing committees and not inappropriately attached to our spending bill. This amendment would impose greater restrictions on the intelligence community's ability to protect national security and create an impediment to our government's ability to locate threat information already in our government's possession. Such an impediment would potentially put American lives at risk of another terrorist attack. Colleagues, the House recently passed H.R. 3361, the USA FREEDOM Act, with overwhelmingly bipartisan support. It was signed into law last week. This amendment seeks to relitigate an issue fully litigated in the drafting of that legislation. A similar amendment was offered and rejected by the House Judiciary Committee during its markup of that bill. The USA FREEDOM Act does include two reforms related to section 702 collection. These were reforms properly considered during the authorization process, not slapped on an appropriations bill without consideration and deliberation. The first limits the government's use of information about U.S. persons that is obtained under section 702 that the FISA court later determines to be unlawful. The second provision requires the Director of National Intelligence to report annually the number of U.S. person queries under section 702. Under current law, a U.S. person can only be the target of an intelligence gathering under FISA pursuant to an individualized court order based upon probable cause. The intelligence community is allowed to query communications it legally collects from foreigners for information about a U.S. person, so long as the query itself has foreign intelligence value. This is no different from traditional criminal law. If the government has a legal wiretap on a drug dealer's cell phone and records a conversation where a second drug dealer talks about committing a murder, police can use that phone call as evidence against a second drug dealer in a murder trial. What matters is that the initial wiretap--or, here, the initial targeting of the foreign terrorist--was legal. Colleagues, this is an issue critical to our national security, and it is complicated. Any changes to section 702 should be fully evaluated and voted on using the authorization committee process, which is the appropriate channel for considered review and debate on this critical issue. Unfortunately, this amendment has not benefited from the work of the authorization process and would potentially put American lives at greater risk for another terrorist attack. That is not a risk many of us or certainly I am willing to take. For this reason and many others, I strongly oppose this amendment, and I urge my colleagues to do the same. I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have remaining? The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Kentucky has 1\1/2\ minutes remaining. Mr. MASSIE. At this time, I yield 45 seconds to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lofgren). Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. The unclassified FISA court reported that the 702 search had, in fact, scooped up vast amounts of wholly domestic information. How does this work? The upstream communications are tapped into by the NSA. In the digital world, your digital information, your domestic information is stored throughout the world. It is scooped up, and it is used. The FBI has indicated it is used and the DNI has indicated it is used for wholly domestic purposes without a warrant routinely thousands, tens of thousands of times. It is in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and it must stop. I would just say, on the Judiciary Committee, every member of the committee who declined to support this amendment said they were for the amendment and said we should offer it to the DOD appropriations bill. Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Chairman, now, it has been said here tonight that this is not the time or the place to address these problems with 702, but, look, we have a constitutional crisis, and this was the excuse we were given in the Judiciary Committee when my colleague tried to get the amendment allowed there. It was the same excuse I was given in the Rules Committee when we had an opportunity to address this, and I would maintain that 2017, 2 years from now, is too long to go in this constitutional crisis situation where we recognize something that illegal and/or unconstitutional is occurring; yet we don't do anything about it. This is the time to do something about it; this is the place to do something about it. I urge my colleagues to vote for this amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time. The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Massie). The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes appeared to have it. Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote. The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Kentucky will be postponed. [...]