[国会记录第161卷，第96号（2015年6月16日星期二）] [House] [页面H4389-H4395] {Time} 1230提供了考虑的H.R.2596，2016财政年度乔治亚州柯林斯先生的情报授权法案。扬声器先生，按规则委员会的指示，我致电了315号房屋决议并立即审议。职员阅读分辨率，如下：H. Res。315解决方案，即在通过本决议的任何时候发言人可以根据第十二（b）条第2（b）条，宣布该房屋决定审议该法案的全部房屋委员会（H.R. 2596) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2016 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes. The first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. All points of order against consideration of the bill are waived. General debate shall be confined to the bill and amendments specified in this section and shall not exceed one hour equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. After general debate the bill shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. In lieu of the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence now printed in the bill, it shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the five-minute rule an amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of the text of Rules Committee Print 114-19. That amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered as read. All points of order against that amendment in the nature of a substitute are waived. No amendment to that amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be in order except those printed in the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this resolution. Each such amendment may be offered only in the order printed in the report, may be offered only by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered as read, shall be debatable for the time specified in [[Page H4390]] the report equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question in the House or in the Committee of the Whole. All points of order against such amendments are waived. At the conclusion of consideration of the bill for amendment the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted. Any Member may demand a separate vote in the House on any amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole to the bill or to the amendment in the nature of a substitute made in order as original text. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit with or without instructions. Sec. 2. Notwithstanding clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on the recorded vote ordered on the question of reconsideration of the vote on the question of concurring in the matter comprising the remainder of title II of the Senate amendment to H.R. 1314 may continue to be postponed through the legislative day of Thursday, July 30, 2015. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Georgia is recognized for 1 hour. Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings), pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose of debate only. General Leave Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on House Resolution 315, currently under consideration. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Georgia? There was no objection. Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to bring forward today this rule on behalf of the Rules Committee. This rule provides for a robust amendment debate on a wide variety of issues related to the authorization of funds for 16 intelligence agencies. This rule provides for the consideration of H.R. 2596, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016. The Rules Committee met on this measure yesterday evening and heard testimony from both the chairman of the committee and the ranking member, in addition to receiving amendment testimony from multiple Members. This rule brought forward by the committee is a structured rule. There were 29 amendments in total submitted to the Rules Committee. Of those 29, I am pleased that the full House will debate and vote on 16 of those amendments, over half that were submitted. The majority of the amendments made in order are bipartisan, a fact demonstrating the unity of this body in advancing funds that will go directly to fighting against terrorism proliferation and weapons of mass destruction. ``To provide for the common defense'' is a common phrase to us all, and one that clearly sets forth the more basic responsibility of our government, a responsibility that the members of the Rules Committee, the Intelligence Committee, and, yes, I believe the entire House do not take lightly. This rule provides for 1 hour of general debate equally divided and controlled by the chair and the ranking member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. As most of the intelligence budget involves highly classified programs, all Members were given the opportunity to review the classified annexes to the underlying legislation prior to Rules Committee consideration. Members should also be aware that section 2 of the rule provides that the motion to reconsider the vote on Trade Adjustment Assistance, or title II of the Senate amendment to H.R. 1314, may continue to be postponed through Thursday, July 30, 2015. This postponement was necessary to allow House and Senate leadership, in addition to the President, sufficient time to consider legislative options related to this action on trade promotion authority and Trade Adjustment Assistance. I am proud of the work undertaken by the Intelligence Committee to advance this vitally important legislation whose consideration is provided for by this rule. There are a few key provisions that I want to ensure Members are aware of because I believe they speak to the overwhelming awareness the Intelligence Committee possesses of the responsibility of Congress to protect this Nation from terrorism, and also of our unwavering fidelity to the United States Constitution. First, section 302 of the underlying legislation provides that the authorization of appropriations by this act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Sections 303 and 304 require specific elements of the executive branch to provide Congress with timely notifying requirements on key intelligence activities. Congressional notification requirements generally remain a vitally important mechanism to ensure that Congress is able to conduct robust oversight. Notification requirements specific to the intelligence community are even more essential, given the classified and delicate nature of the situations our intelligence agencies face every day. The classification of documents and the decisionmaking factors that go into such classification have historically been an area of great interest and, at times, concerns by Members of this body and the citizens that we represent. In response to the valid concerns and interest by Members and the public at large, in the Intelligence Committee's report on H.R. 2596, they specifically state that the committee ``seeks to improve its visibility into the classification process and better understand how the intelligence community determines the classification level of especially sensitive reporting and analysis.'' In the underlying legislation, the committee carries out this goal by directing the Director of National Intelligence to provide, within 60 days of the enactment, a report to the congressional intelligence committees outlining each instance in the past 5 years that the Office of Director of National Intelligence or any other entity within the executive branch directed an element of the intelligence community to begin disseminating existing uncompartmented intelligence reporting or analysis through a compartment or subcompartment. This requirement is just one of several additional reporting requirements in the legislation to serve to enhance Congress' role in and understanding of the classification process, again, emphasizing Congress' oversight role. The committee has done a good job in clarifying that. The underlying legislation also directs the Central Intelligence Agency to provide the congressional intelligence committees with all intelligence reports based on the documents collected in the May 1, 2011, raid that killed Osama bin Laden. We live in a dangerous world and face constant and evolving threats from terrorist groups like al Qaeda, Boko Haram, al Shabaab, and ISIS. These groups successfully use the Internet to anonymously build their resources, both human and financial. The United States Government must maintain and enhance their ability to counter extremists online. By understanding how and where terrorist groups operate, we can more effectively fight for freedom at home and abroad. I am pleased to see strong provisions in the legislation that will further this goal. These provisions that I have just spoken of are just a few examples of the thoughtful and difficult work the Intelligence Committee undertook to bring forward this legislation that authorizes critical national security functions while staying within the funding constraints of the Budget Control Act, or BCA. I want to thank the Intelligence Committee and their staff for their hard work on the authorization measure. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume, and I thank the gentleman, my friend from Georgia, for yielding the customary 30 minutes for debate. Mr. Speaker, this rule provides for consideration of H.R. 2596, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, as well as provides that the [[Page H4391]] motion to reconsider the vote on passage of the Trade Adjustment Assistance measure may continue to be postponed until the end of the legislative day on July 30. First, I commend the efforts of Chairman Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff for their effort in crafting a bill with largely bipartisan support that provides our Nation's intelligence community with the resources they need to keep us safe. Our national security relies on the continued strength of our intelligence community. As we face ongoing security challenges both at home and abroad from threats such as ISIL, lone wolf attacks, the emergence of cybercrime, as well as the specter of unknown challenges that may be awaiting us, a strong intelligence apparatus is of the utmost importance. This legislation will do much to meet those challenges. Specifically, this bill supports investments in cutting-edge technology like spy satellites, enhances our Nation's human intelligence capabilities, provides resources to safeguard valuable signals intelligence collection, and partners with our foreign allies to maximize the reach of our intelligence efforts. This investment in our country's intelligence infrastructure comes at a critically important time. As you know, the Office of Personnel Management recently suffered a disastrous breach. Hackers were able to target OPM and gain access to personnel data, including employees' names, addresses, Social Security numbers, and numerous other personal details. Perhaps most disturbing, OPM houses the applications and files submitted by those applying for security clearances, with data going back until 1985. These files were compromised as well, leading some experts to argue that the compromise of these files could have tremendous negative effects for our human intelligence gathering capabilities. These cyber attacks represent a critical threat to our national security. We all love the convenience that technology provides us, but we must also be prepared to invest in technologies that will protect us from those who wish to sabotage our security in the virtual world. It is time for the OPM to implement and abide by best practices so that we never face a data breach like the one we saw last week. To the extent that Congress will play a role in securing our virtual infrastructure, we should work as quickly as possible to ensure that our employees and our most sensitive material are not needlessly exposed to those who wish to do us harm. Mr. Speaker, while I support the strong national security protections this authorization provides, I am extremely disappointed yet again in how my Republican colleagues have skirted the fiscal cuts imposed by sequestration in order to fund the things that they care about, while ignoring the effects such fool-headed cuts have on the vital domestic programs that they don't seem to care about. We have people hurting all over this Nation because of this irresponsible and senseless policy of sequestration. Republicans claim to be using this policy as an important tool to rein in out-of-control government spending; yet, when sequestration affects programs and areas of the budget they care about, they magically get around this dilemma by using accounting gimmicks. That is just what they have done here in this measure. The majority has yet again used the overseas contingency operations account to evade sequestration spending caps. Wouldn't it be nice if Republicans wanted to evade spending caps for the Department of Education so that we can get around sequestration and properly educate our children? Or if they could use accounting tricks to get around sequestration to fully fund and repair our crumbling infrastructure? Or if they were also inclined to use their budgetary magic to get around sequestration caps to properly fund critically important agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency so that our children and grandchildren can continue to have access to clean water and clean air? Alas, all we get from the majority is more of the same budgetary double standard, using tricks to get around spending caps on things you like to spend money on and then cry, ``sequester, sequester,'' on things you don't like to spend money on. {time} 1245 Let's stop pretending. That isn't a plan to rein in government spending. That is just spending taxpayer money on things you deem worthy of unfettered spending and ignoring programs, for political reasons, that you don't even like, even though such programs remain vital to our country's success. Mr. Speaker, many on my side of the aisle have taken issue with the detention facility in Guantanamo Bay since day one; I certainly have. Once again, the Republicans look to continue the operation of this prison, when we should be working to bring about its orderly closure. We are better than this prison. As a country dedicated to the rule of law, as a country that inspires people the world over to work for and even die for the establishment of democratic rule, we are better than this prison. This prison is an exercise in Kafkaesque justice, which has long worked to undermine our standing with our allies and helped terrorist organizations recruit more and more fighters. Look, I don't think that anyone is arguing that, if we close the prison, then the myriad terrorist groups who use it as a recruiting tool will no longer have people joining their ranks, but it would be one less arrow in their quiver. For that reason, we need to work together to close the prison as quickly as possible. In doing so, we will not jeopardize the safety of our country, but will act more fully to reflect our commitment to democracy and the rule of law. We know and I know, having been in the judiciary, that our justice system is more than capable of handling the prosecution of terrorists, no matter where they are, including those held in Guantanamo Bay. We have successfully tried Richard Reid, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, Faisal Shahzad, and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev--the Boston bomber--and we have either sentenced them to death or life imprisonment in our most secure prisons. At last night's Rules Committee meeting, my friends on the other side of the aisle decided to make a last-minute change to today's rule--or, I might add, to further pollute today's rule. That last-minute change allows for the postponement of the motion to reconsider TAA. Over the course of my tenure in Congress, I voted to support thousands of pieces of legislation. In the 20-plus years that I have served in this body, I can think of only three votes which I deeply regret making, and one of those was in support of NAFTA. In the years since, I have seen after NAFTA a decrease in American jobs, a rollback of critical environmental protections here and in Mexico, where I was promised that the environmental circumstances in the maquiladoras would be cleaned up and they were not and a stagnation of wages that has prevented the financial upward mobility of working class and middle class Americans and has ground poor Americans into poverty beyond belief. If we are going to create trade policy that is worthy of future generations, then we must ensure that that policy strengthens, not weakens, labor rights. It must strengthen, not weaken, environmental protections. It must ensure other countries' responsibility to adhere to basic human rights. It must expand and strengthen our middle class, not squeeze hard-working Americans in favor of corporate interests. The legislation included in this rule today is part of a trade package that does nothing to bolster these important priorities. Finally, as I have stated time and again, I take issue with the manner in which these important measures are being considered. Legislation as important as the ones at hand deserve an open and transparent process where Members of both parties and both Houses of Congress may debate and offer amendments as they please. This process, envisioned and designed by our Founding Fathers to serve as a safeguard to democracy, continues to be eroded by the majority's insistence on grouping multiple, unrelated bills together under one rule and limiting the number of amendments that can be made in order, as well as the time available for debate. [[Page H4392]] There were amendments offered last night. For example, Congresswoman Speier offered whistleblower protection, not made in order. My colleague Representative Schweikert from Arizona and I offered a very sensible measure under the intelligence provision to allow for us, as a sense of Congress only, to say that we will participate with Tunisia's intelligence operation in a more pronounced manner--totally innocuous, but at the very same time, helping a country that may very well make the bridge to democracy and certainly has been an ally in intelligence--and a needed one, in light of the number of people that come up from north Africa through Tunisia and wind up fighting in the Middle East. If we are truly to operate as the deliberative body the U.S. House of Representatives was created to function as, we must do more to ensure that our Nation's most critical pieces of legislation are afforded the time and consideration they rightly deserve. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman from Florida. One of the things that I, coming on to the Rules Committee, have found is really the vigorous debates that we do have--and the gentleman from Florida, we have had many of those, and that is a good place for it. It is a good place for it also here on the floor to discuss what really, as was focused on very clearly, is a rule for a bill, and then there is a procedural issue that we are extending the TAA reconsideration until July 30. I am understanding what he is saying, but I do want to make Members clear that is what is happening. We are working on the majority side for a process that is open. Sixteen amendments are going to be made in order, and they are going to be debated right here on the floor of this House and voted. I think that is what the Republican majority is focused on. One of the things that came up--and I want it to be clear, Mr. Speaker, is the gentleman brings up a point. It is about priorities. It is about priorities. When we are dealing with authorizations and spending bills, is what we are dealing with in the majority here, we have made it very clear, I believe, from the Republican majority standpoint, although I personally and others may have discussions on how we use overseas contingency funds, and those have been debated on this floor and should be continued to be debated on this floor. However, one of the things that we are doing, and I believe, from our perspective, is we are putting priorities first--priorities for national defense; securing our national interest; and in light of this bill, making sure that our country is safe, abroad and here, from attacks from people who don't like us. I don't buy the argument--and the debate on Guantanamo is a different issue--but the argument that if we closed it up, it takes away one recruiting piece. I am sorry. Boko Haram, al Qaeda, these others do not hate us only because of a prison; they just hate us because we are free. They hate us because we have a society that is open. I understand the debate that we want to have, but let's make it crystal clear. There was no Guantanamo when they rammed planes into our World Trade Center. There was no Guantanamo at that time. They just don't like us. Let's make that very clear. Funding is appropriate. We will debate those entirely upon this House and continue to. The Republicans will still look out for jobs and those working in the middle class, and those that are trying to find their families' priorities in their own economic sphere and looking at it in a country that is in debt and trying to make sure we make good fiscal decisions. Our priorities are that we help businesses start, we encourage the creation of jobs, not a government strangulation of jobs, and that is what resources do. With this bill, it is very focused, though. This is about our intelligence community. This is a rule that supports an authorization coming from a very difficult community that does a very difficult job. We are supporting a rule that funds those agencies so that it keeps us safe and does the things that keeps America free. That is the continued argument that we will continue to have. I appreciate, Mr. Speaker, the other debates that we want to have here, but let's be focused. This rule is about that. It is also about a policy decision or a procedural decision in this rule. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Speaker, at this time, I am very pleased to yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from Connecticut (Ms. DeLauro). Ms. DeLAURO. Mr. Speaker, the vote on Trade Adjustment Assistance failed in the House of Representatives last Friday by a 3-1 margin; yet this rule today would extend the revote on Trade Adjustment Assistance through the end of July. This is one more attempt to play games with the future of hard-working families. American workers demand and they deserve respect. They deserve a living wage and the right not to have their jobs shipped overseas. That is what we are united in fighting for. A vote for this rule is a vote for fast track. A vote for fast track is a vote against jobs and against wages. United States trade policy has been failing American workers, failing American consumers and families for 20 years. The U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement has already cost up to 75,000 jobs, and it was just passed 3 years ago. Up to 5 million jobs have been destroyed by currency manipulation; and a number of the signatories to this trade agreement, their policy is to manipulate their currency to have their goods sold at a lower price than American goods, putting American workers out of jobs and lowering their wages. Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel Laureate in Economics, has written: ``Inequality is not inevitable. It is a choice that we make with the rules that we create to structure our economy.'' Trade policy is one of those choices. If we approve fast track, we throw away our ability, our constitutional authority to represent the people who sent us here in good faith. We throw away that ability to be able to fix the flaws in the trade agreement, like the Trans-Pacific Partnership, to the detriment of millions of American families. I urge a ``no'' vote on this rule. Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Speaker, at this time, I am very pleased to yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Texas (Mr. Doggett). Mr. DOGGETT. Friday, this House sent a strong message to the Fast- Trackers: Not so fast. Forty-eight hours ago, Republican leaders were telling the world that, at this moment, we would be voting to approve Fast Track; but now, the Fast-Trackers have become backtrackers, pushing back the vote. The only reason that they seek this postponement in this rule of up to 6 weeks is that they do not have the votes to approve Fast Track today, and the only way they can get those votes today is to use this strange shenanigan of connecting it and cloaking it in a rule for the authorization of our intelligence agencies. After Friday's Fast Track vote, one official said those who ``vote against this Trade Adjustment Assistance are adding their names to the death certificate for [it].'' Well, let's play it straight for a change. TAA is not authorized now. It expired last year. Its future depends, not upon this authorization, but upon an adequate level of funding. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act, the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, and many more have not been authorized for years, but they continue to operate perfectly well, based upon appropriated funds. This TAA argument is phony. {time} 1300 Really, it doesn't take much intelligence to see what is happening here. These Fast-Trackers are desperate, and this postponement vote for this extent, of this nature, is unprecedented in the history of this Congress. It has never happened before in American history that someone has asked to postpone a vote for up to 6 weeks. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. HASTINGS. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds. [[Page H4393]] Mr. DOGGETT. And understand what that means. Understand that they are looking for the ideal time--morning, noon, or night--to muscle through a broken trade policy that a majority of this House and of the American people do not want. This rule provides that the Speaker at any time of day can come with no notice, no debate, and say, we are voting to send this bill to the President's desk. What really needs adjusting is not trade assistance but the no- compromise, no-amendment attitude on trade that gives us broken trade policies. This vote wouldn't be so close if this process hadn't been so closed. Reject this rule. Vote for democracy. Don't change the precedents of the House. Don't let this be muscled through. Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Georgia (Mr. David Scott), my good friend. Mr. DAVID SCOTT of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, ladies and gentlemen, what is about to happen on this floor with this rule is a direct violation of the United States Constitution; for in the United States Constitution, it clearly says that the United States Congress shall have the power ``to regulate commerce with foreign nations.'' And in this rule is a clear violation of that. We already voted it down overwhelmingly 302-126, Republicans and Democrats. It was the foremost bipartisan vote in this 21st century, the very thing that the American people are crying for. Now, why did Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson and James Madison all agree? Very strong, very independent minds. Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson could hardly bear to be in the same room with each other, but they agreed on this because they knew that every State had Representatives in Congress to look out for jobs that could be shipped overseas. This is the primary reason, ladies and gentlemen. Look at every trade agreement. This country has lost over 2 million manufacturing jobs to China as a result of the China deal. Over 150,000 jobs to Mexico. Yes, it created jobs--not in the United States. And what kind of jobs? These are jobs that impacted at the lower- and middle-income levels of our economy. It is the middle class that is the heart and the soul of America. Let this Congress stand up and reject this rule. We proved our mettle with that 302 vote. Congress, I am asking you, the American people are asking you: Do what Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson and James Madison asked us to do, and let it be the Congress that regulates commerce with foreign nations. Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I will continue to reserve the balance of my time. Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Speaker, at this time, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman). Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, intelligence is critical to our national security. It should not be besmirched by a controversial and unrelated procedural shenanigan, unprecedented in the annals of the House of Representatives. In the words of the President of the United States, It is time to play it straight. TAA and TPA, that package was voted on. It was defeated. We are done. Play it straight. Write new legislation. Put together a new package. Bring it to the floor of the House. See if it has a majority. That is playing it straight. Instead, in an unprecedented move, a vote we took last week is being held in never-never land to be revoted on as late as the end of July. That is right. Early June votes tabulated in late July. If you are against unprecedented shenanigans, vote ``no'' on the rule. If you are for playing it straight, vote ``no'' on the rule. If you are against TAA, vote ``no'' on the rule. If you are against TPA, if you are against fast track, vote ``no'' on the rule. If you vote for an unprecedented procedural shenanigan, an unprecedented procedural mutation today, you can be sure it will be used against you and your district and your beliefs tomorrow. And if you are not against fast track, you should be because it gives an enormous gift to China, and we get nothing in return. China's number one tactic for running up the largest trade surplus against us in history is currency manipulation. This deal that is put on the fast track enshrines the view that currency manipulation is just fine. Go to it. A giant gift to China. In addition, the rules of origin provisions say that goods that the manufacturer admits are 50 or 60 percent made in China--which means actually 70 or 80 percent made in China--get fast-tracked into the United States. Vote ``no'' on this procedural mutation. Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, just for a moment, let's focus back on the rule and the underlying bill and the procedural issue that has been discussed. It is out in the open. It was not snuck in or anything else. It has been there and has been discussed. But also, I want to get back to the fact of the rule, itself, which is stand alone. We are going to be voting on an intelligence bill. We are going to have a debate on an intelligence bill. And, among other things, I will give us a reminder of what this legislation does: It sustains critical capabilities to fight terrorism and counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. That is a separate bill. This is what we are going to be discussing. It has funds to assist our efforts to recover unauthorized disclosures of intelligence capabilities. It sustains activities in Afghanistan and Iraq to continue the fight against ISIS, al Qaeda, and the Taliban. It invests in the resiliency of our national security space architecture. It provides policy discretion on sensitive intelligence operations. It promotes intelligence integration and sharing through investment in intelligence communitywide information technology enterprises. It enhances investment in military intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft. It funds initiatives to thwart cyber attacks and insider threats. And it requires a report every 60 days on foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. This is the bill, the underlying bill that we are discussing. And I just wanted to make a reminder of that. As we have discussions on different parts of this rule, let's be reminded also that we are dealing with a stand-alone bill that we will work. Mr. HASTINGS. Will the gentleman yield for just a question? Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. I yield to the gentleman from Florida for just a question. Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Speaker, all of the things that the gentleman from Georgia said are in the measure are true. But does he also agree that it is unprecedented that we have included a measure to delay an already-voted-on rule? Never before has that been done. Or to your knowledge, has it been? Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Well, I think it is a fact that it is a part of this rule. The gentleman from Florida states it in whatever adjectival terms he wants to give. But it is in the rule. We have not made it secretive that it is part of this rule. And we can discuss either part. I will just simply focus on the intelligence part. I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Speaker, at this time, I am very pleased to yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee), my good friend. Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the gentleman from Florida for yielding and for the astute question that he asked, which is one that I would like to follow up on. Mr. Speaker, let me say to the gentleman from Georgia that he is quite right. There are very serious and important components of the intelligence bill covered by this rule. As many of us have experienced over the last couple of days, we are in and out of intelligence and security briefings because that is the era in which we live. And in most instances, Members draw their concern from the responsibility they have for protecting the American people. I am on the Homeland Security Committee and have continued on that committee since the tragedy, the heinous act of 9/11, and before, when the [[Page H4394]] select committee was in place. So I have no quarrel with some of the important elements of this legislation. But the gentleman from Georgia should recognize that this is an aberration. There are two or three points that I would like to make: First of all, we are long overdue for getting rid of the sequester. This joke was played on Members and the American people only because of the supercommittee--not because of any individual Members, but there was a supercommittee structure put in place, the time ran out, and they could not come to a budget conclusion. So this was the ultimate end. Members didn't vote on this. They voted on the supercommittee, and then this was the hatchet that fell when the supercommittee did not work. So sequester should be something that Speaker Boehner puts on the floor and immediately gets rid of. And the reason why I say that is because I am going to talk about the shenanigans dealing with the trade bill. But what I am going to say is that the overseas contingency fund is being used to bolster up this bill, the intelligence bill. But I can't get those resources to be utilized for infrastructure or summer jobs or fixing the education system that we have responsibilities for or providing opportunities for young people to finish their education or criminal justice reform. So this is being 43 percent pumped up when used by funds that are not in the stream. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentlewoman has expired. Mr. HASTINGS. I yield the gentlewoman an additional 30 seconds. Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the gentleman. The funding is not in the stream of funding that other appropriators have to utilize. That is wrong. Then I might conclude on the shenanigans of the trade fix, if you will. I am for TAA, the Trade Adjustment Assistance. I want it to be voted on straight up or down, like many Members do, to provide for workers and not have, unfortunately, the addition that was added coming from the other body. So now we know that, whatever shenanigans that will come up, it probably won't be in the way that will help American workers. Mr. Speaker, this rule should be voted down because we need an opportunity to work on behalf of the American workers, to get rid of sequester, and to find a way to move this country forward. Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. HASTINGS. I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, perhaps I should say to the membership of this body that if they vote against this rule, it doesn't mean that we would not have an intelligence authorization. It simply would mean that those of us-- my friend from Georgia and myself--would have to go back to the Rules Committee and fashion a rule that does not include an unprecedented matter that should not be in this Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 in the first place. And toward that end, among the things that were sought to be included, if we were going to include the TAA measure, then the ranking member, Ms. Slaughter, proposed on behalf of the minority that we also include a vote on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, TPP, for the reason, one, TAA was overwhelmingly--3-1--defeated; TPP passed by a very thin margin. So if we are going to twist arms and find methodologies to employ to try to change the minds of Members over a 6-week period of time, then perhaps it would be those of us who are opposed to the measure would have an opportunity to try to persuade some of those people who caused the thin margin of it to pass on TPP. We felt that was a fairness measure. At least if you were going to include it, that should have been included as well. Before proceeding, Mr. Speaker, perhaps I should learn how much time each side has at this time. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida has 4\1/2\ minutes remaining. The gentleman from Georgia has 19\1/2\ minutes remaining. {time} 1315 Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I am prepared to close. Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Speaker, at this time, I am waiting for one additional speaker, but perhaps I can engage in a colloquy with my colleague from Texas. Mr. DOGGETT. Will the gentleman yield for a question? Mr. HASTINGS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas. Mr. DOGGETT. You served both on the Intelligence Committee and on the Rules Committee. There is reason to authorize intelligence, but am I correct it has nothing to do with this sneak attack to put in a postponement that has never been done in American history, where never has anyone sought to delay for 6 weeks the consideration of this bill that we are doing today; isn't that correct? Mr. HASTINGS. I think you are absolutely correct, and it is unprecedented. At the very same time, as my friend from Georgia pointed out, they have done so transparently by putting it here, but that does not mean it would not be used at some point in the future. Mr. DOGGETT. Does this rule provide any notice to Members of the House, or can this be entirely a surprise attack? Can they come out here on the floor at any time, perhaps when the floor is as empty as it is now, and give no notice to the Members of the House that they are about to move to send this bill to the President's desk, have absolutely no debate on that rule, but then have a vote here, perhaps a day when some Members are out on important business in their district, basically picking the best time because they are so desperate to force through a bill that they know a majority of this House does not support and that the American people don't support because it will just foist off on us a broken, failed trade policy that does not respect the interests of the American people? Is that what is happening here? Mr. HASTINGS. That is certainly allowed. Anytime before July 30, the measure could be brought to the floor, and it could be brought to the floor without any notice to the membership because it is a motion to reconsider. It is a part of this particular rule sought by the Speaker of the House, I might add, and therefore it could be brought at any time under the aegis of the Speaker's authority. Mr. DOGGETT. Was the gentleman present in the Rules Committee when every single constructive improvement to this fast-track bill was rejected by the Rules Committee--not with your vote, of course--but a majority of the Rules Committee said ``no'' to telling the Members of this Congress as much about this deal as the Vietnamese Politburo already knows, saying ``no'' to at least meeting the standards on the environment that the Bush administration agreed to, saying ``no'' to putting the foreign corporations on the same level as our American corporations and businesses so that foreign corporations wouldn't have an advantage to come in and attack health, safety, and environmental rules that might be established by the Congress or the State of Florida or a city like San Antonio or Austin? Because under this fast-track bill, we are headed toward jeopardizing those rules, those State laws, and those Federal laws that deal with the needs of the American family and letting these foreign corporations circumvent them as they did in Canada, recently, to demand millions of dollars of taxpayer money for a decision locally to just prevent the expansion of a quarry. We can't have that happen. But the Rules Committee would not allow us to address those problems. Mr. HASTINGS. Many of those measures in a 5\1/2\-hour, into-the-night session that the Rules Committee operated. Mr. DOGGETT. I thank the gentleman. Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time. I would urge that Members understand that we have already voted on this measure, and it was defeated, as I say, 3-1. Robust funding for our intelligence infrastructure is clearly needed and, indeed, welcomed, but enough is enough. It is time for Republicans to stop squeezing important domestic programs through their arbitrary implementation of sequester. We must invest in education in this country; we must invest in our decaying infrastructure; we must invest in a clean environment; and we must invest in a strong middle class. Republicans want to make investments in our intelligence community. [[Page H4395]] Great. So do I. We all do. But at some point, we have to start asking: What is it that that community is protecting? Without investments in education, infrastructure, and our middle class, we risk undermining what makes this country so exceptional and worth protecting in the first place. I urge a ``no'' vote on the rule, and I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time. I appreciate the discussion we have had over the last little bit. I appreciate the gentleman from Florida. Again, although we have some differences--those have been evident today--the rule provides for ample debate on the floor and the opportunity to debate and vote on up to 16 amendments offered by a largely bipartisan group of Members. I look forward to those debates. I look forward to the debate on how best to provide tools for our intelligence community and to combat the dangerous threats that we face while still respecting both the constitutional and budgetary restraints. Those are things that sometimes, I think, in the midst of discussion today, got lost in that this is a separate vote that we are going to be voting on our intelligence bill. There is a procedural issue that is part of this that is, again, not snuck in. It has been posted; it has been online; and it is there for Members to see. When we look at priorities, again, I think, for us, it goes back to, again, in the overall budgetary and authorization process, the Republican majority stands for protecting our national interests, protecting and empowering the voters who actually send us here, not for growing and empowering an ever-encroaching Federal Government. This is what the budgets reflect. This is what the authorizations reflect. These are the priorities of the American people, and these are the priorities of the Republican majority. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution. The previous question was ordered. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the resolution. The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it. Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays. The yeas and nays were ordered. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, this 15- minute vote on adoption of House Resolution 315 will be followed by a 5-minute vote on agreeing to the Speaker's approval of the Journal, if ordered. The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 236, nays 189, not voting 8, as follows: [Roll No. 366] YEAS--236 Abraham Aderholt Allen Amodei Ashford Babin Barletta Barr Benishek Bilirakis Bishop (MI) Bishop (UT) Black Blackburn Blum Bost Boustany Brady (TX) Brat Bridenstine Brooks (IN) Buchanan Buck Bucshon Burgess Calvert Carter (GA) Carter (TX) Chabot Clawson (FL) Coffman Cole Collins (GA) Collins (NY) Comstock Conaway Cook Cooper Costa Costello (PA) Cramer Crawford Crenshaw Culberson Curbelo (FL) Davis, Rodney Denham Dent DeSantis DesJarlais Diaz-Balart Dold Donovan Duffy Duncan (SC) Duncan (TN) Ellmers (NC) Emmer (MN) Farenthold Fincher Fitzpatrick Fleischmann Fleming Flores Forbes Fortenberry Foxx Franks (AZ) Frelinghuysen Garrett Gibbs Gibson Goodlatte Gosar Gowdy Granger Graves (GA) Graves (LA) Graves (MO) Griffith Grothman Guinta Guthrie Hanna Hardy Harper Harris Hartzler Heck (NV) Hensarling Herrera Beutler Hice, Jody B. Hill Holding Hudson Huelskamp Huizenga (MI) Hultgren Hunter Hurd (TX) Hurt (VA) Issa Jenkins (KS) Jenkins (WV) Johnson (OH) Johnson, Sam Jolly Jordan Joyce Katko Kelly (PA) King (IA) Kinzinger (IL) Kline Knight Labrador LaMalfa Lamborn Lance Latta LoBiondo Long Loudermilk Love Lucas Luetkemeyer Lummis MacArthur Marchant Marino McCarthy McCaul McClintock McHenry McKinley McMorris Rodgers McSally Meadows Meehan Messer Mica Miller (FL) Miller (MI) Moolenaar Mooney (WV) Mullin Mulvaney Murphy (PA) Neugebauer Newhouse Noem Nugent Nunes Olson Palazzo Palmer Paulsen Pearce Perry Pittenger Pitts Poe (TX) Poliquin Pompeo Price, Tom Ratcliffe Reichert Renacci Ribble Rice (SC) Rigell Roby Roe (TN) Rogers (AL) Rogers (KY) Rohrabacher Rokita Rooney (FL) Ros-Lehtinen Roskam Ross Rothfus Rouzer Royce Russell Ryan (WI) Salmon Sanford Scalise Schweikert Scott, Austin Sensenbrenner Sessions Shimkus Shuster Simpson Smith (MO) Smith (NE) Smith (NJ) Smith (TX) Stefanik Stewart Stivers Stutzman Thompson (PA) Thornberry Tiberi Tipton Trott Turner Upton Valadao Wagner Walberg Walden Walker Walorski Walters, Mimi Weber (TX) Webster (FL) Wenstrup Westerman Westmoreland Whitfield Williams Wilson (SC) Wittman Womack Woodall Yoder Yoho Young (AK) Young (IA) Young (IN) Zeldin Zinke NAYS--189 Adams Aguilar Amash Bass Beatty Becerra Bera Beyer Bishop (GA) Blumenauer Bonamici Boyle, Brendan F. Brady (PA) Brooks (AL) Brown (FL) Brownley (CA) Bustos Butterfield Capps Capuano Cardenas Carney Carson (IN) Cartwright Castor (FL) Castro (TX) Chu, Judy Cicilline Clark (MA) Clarke (NY) Clay Cleaver Clyburn Cohen Connolly Conyers Courtney Crowley Cuellar Cummings Davis (CA) Davis, Danny DeFazio DeGette Delaney DeLauro DelBene DeSaulnier Deutch Dingell Doggett Doyle, Michael F. Duckworth Edwards Ellison Engel Eshoo Esty Farr Fattah Foster Frankel (FL) Fudge Gabbard Gallego Garamendi Gohmert Graham Grayson Green, Al Green, Gene Grijalva Gutierrez Hahn Hastings Heck (WA) Higgins Himes Hinojosa Honda Hoyer Huffman Israel Jackson Lee Jeffries Johnson (GA) Johnson, E. B. Jones Kaptur Keating Kelly (IL) Kennedy Kildee Kilmer Kind Kirkpatrick Kuster Langevin Larsen (WA) Larson (CT) Lawrence Lee Levin Lewis Lieu, Ted Lipinski Loebsack Lofgren Lowenthal Lowey Lujan Grisham (NM) Lujan, Ben Ray (NM) Lynch Maloney, Carolyn Maloney, Sean Massie Matsui McCollum McDermott McGovern McNerney Meeks Meng Moore Moulton Murphy (FL) Nadler Napolitano Neal Nolan Norcross O'Rourke Pallone Pascrell Payne Pelosi Perlmutter Peters Peterson Pingree Pocan Polis Posey Price (NC) Quigley Rangel Rice (NY) Richmond Roybal-Allard Ruiz Ruppersberger Rush Ryan (OH) Sanchez, Linda T. Sarbanes Schakowsky Schiff Schrader Scott (VA) Scott, David Serrano Sherman Sinema Sires Slaughter Smith (WA) Speier Swalwell (CA) Takai Takano Thompson (CA) Thompson (MS) Titus Tonko Torres Tsongas Van Hollen Vargas Veasey Vela Velazquez Visclosky Walz Wasserman Schultz Waters, Maxine Watson Coleman Welch Wilson (FL) Yarmuth NOT VOTING--8 Barton Byrne Chaffetz Kelly (MS) King (NY) Reed Sanchez, Loretta Sewell (AL) {time} 1356 Mr. BEN RAY LUJAN of New Mexico, Mses. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas, and SINEMA changed their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.'' Mr. ASHFORD changed his vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.'' So the resolution was agreed to. The result of the vote was announced as above recorded. A motion to reconsider was laid on the table. ____________________ [Congressional Record Volume 161, Number 96 (Tuesday, June 16, 2015)] [House] [Pages H4396-H4418] INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 General Leave Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and insert extraneous material on H.R. 2596, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016. The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Holding). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California? There was no objection. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 315 and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 2596. The Chair appoints the gentleman from Utah (Mr. Bishop) to preside over the Committee of the Whole. {time} 1406 In the Committee of the Whole Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 2596) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2016 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States [[Page H4397]] Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with Mr. Bishop of Utah in the chair. The Clerk read the title of the bill. The CHAIR. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the first time. The gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff) each will control 30 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes). Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume. The Intelligence Authorization Act is the annual blueprint for the work of the intelligence community and America's military intelligence efforts. The bill sets priorities for our critical intelligence efforts and the legal framework of guidance and oversight for those efforts. As you may recall, the House has passed intelligence authorization bills with strong bipartisan support in the past several Congresses. The ranking member, Mr. Schiff, and I worked in a bipartisan manner to draft this legislation in front of you today. Passing annual intelligence authorization legislation is the most effective way for Congress to exercise oversight over the executive branch and helps ensure that the country's intelligence agencies have the resources and authorities necessary to keep Americans safe. This legislation passed unanimously out of our committee. As most of the intelligence budget involves highly classified programs, the bulk of the committee's recommendations each year are found in the classified annex of the bill, which has been available for Members to review since June 4. Among other initiatives, the bill provides authorization for critical national security functions, including fighting terrorism, countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, funding efforts to recover from unauthorized disclosures of intelligence capabilities, and investing in the resiliency of our national security space architecture. At an unclassified level, I can report that the annex for fiscal year 2016 authorizes funding that is slightly below the President's budget request level. Its funding levels are in line with the House-passed Defense Appropriations bill for the National Intelligence Program and with the National Defense Authorization Act for the Military Intelligence Program. Overall, this bill sustains today's intelligence capabilities and provides for future capabilities while staying within the funding constraints of the Budget Control Act and the budget resolution. Mr. Chair, we are currently facing one of the most challenging global environments in our Nation's history. Nearly 14 years after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. continues to hunt al Qaeda and its affiliates. We have taken the fight to the enemy and achieved tremendous success. But despite various strategies employed by two administrations to prevent the spread of radical Islam, that threat remains. The Arab Spring civil war in Syria and the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in places such as north Africa highlight only a few of the many events in the past several years that now define U.S. policy failures in the Middle East. In just over a year, ISIL has exploded from a largely localized force in Iraq to seriously challenge al Qaeda as the vanguard of global jihad. Moreover, nation-states like Russia and China continue to expand their spheres of influence and diminish U.S. clout worldwide. Russia has taken advantage of indecisiveness in Europe and exploited uneven leadership in the U.S. to pressure Ukraine and its neighbors on core Russian interests. China bullies its neighbors in the South and East China Sea and, if left unchecked, will likely exercise de facto control over maritime trade in its perceived territorial waters in the next decade. Meanwhile, North Korea and Iran continue to pose significant proliferation risks and remain strategic threats to the U.S. and its allies. State actors can bring a tremendous amount of resources to counter U.S. policy, placing an immense burden on the intelligence community to collect information on and to assess these activities carefully and accurately. Perhaps more troubling, state and nonstate actors alike are developing new ways to project power, particularly in cyberspace. Cyber attacks are becoming so pervasive that network defenders are overwhelmed. Attackers seem to gain access to sensitive systems at will. The most recent attacks on the Office of Personnel Management servers, possibly one of the most significant national security incidents in the past decade, highlight the continued threat to our Nation's infrastructure. Mr. Chair, in this year's intelligence authorization bill, the committee has taken a great deal of care in addressing the wide range of issues described above. This bill is an essential tool in supporting our Nation's efforts to tackle today's challenges while also directing the intelligence community to make strategic investments in the future. In particular, I believe that the bill goes a long way toward encouraging the intelligence community to make much-needed investments, such as recovering from unauthorized disclosures of intelligence capabilities. Additionally, this year's authorization bill comes on the heels of the committee's recent bipartisan successes on key national security issues, like reauthorizing important provisions related to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and overwhelmingly passing bipartisan legislation on cyber threat sharing information. I applaud Ranking Member Schiff for his help on these issues, and I look forward to working together in the future. Finally, I want to thank all the Intelligence Committee staff on both sides of the aisle for their support drafting this bill. The committee staff spent countless hours assisting Members and finalizing the legislation. In particular, I would like to recognize our Sandia National Labs fellow, Mr. Randy Smith. He has been with the committee for almost 2 years and will be leaving us soon to return to Sandia. He has been a tremendous asset to this committee, and I would like to thank him for all his hard work. I would also like to thank the men and women of the intelligence community for all their efforts to continue to protect this Nation. I look forward to passing this legislation. Mr. Chair, the intelligence authorization act is the annual blueprint for the work of the intelligence community and America's military intelligence efforts. The bill sets the priorities for our critical intelligence efforts, and the legal framework of guidance and oversight for those efforts. As you may recall, the House has passed intelligence authorization bills with strong bipartisan support in the past several Congresses. The Ranking Member, Mr. Schiff, and I worked in a bipartisan manner to draft the legislation in front of you today. Passing annual intelligence authorization legislation is the most effective way for Congress to exercise oversight over the executive branch and helps ensure that the country's intelligence agencies have the resources and authorities necessary to keep Americans safe. This legislation passed unanimously out of our Committee. As most of the intelligence budget involves highly classified programs, the bulk of the Committee's recommendations each year are found in the classified annex to the bill, which has been available for Members to review since June 4th. Among other initiatives, the bill provides authorization for critical national security functions, including: fighting terrorism and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, funding efforts to recover from unauthorized disclosures of intelligence capabilities, and investing in the resiliency of our national security space architecture. At an unclassified level, I can report that the annex for Fiscal Year 2016 authorizes funding that is slightly below the President's budget request level. Its funding levels are in line with the House-passed Defense Appropriations bill for the National Intelligence Program and with the National Defense Authorization Act for the Military Intelligence Program. Overall, this bill sustains today's intelligence capabilities and provides for future capabilities while staying within the funding constraints of the Budget Control Act and the Budget Resolution. Mr. Chair, we are currently facing one of the most challenging global environments in our nation's history. Nearly 14 years after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. continues to hunt al-Qa'ida and its affiliates. We have taken the fight to the enemy and achieved tremendous success, but despite various strategies employed by two administrations to prevent the spread of radical Islam, the threat remains. The Arab Spring, civil war in Syria, and the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in places such as Northern Africa highlight only a few of the many events in the past several years that now define U.S. policy failures in the Middle East. In just over a year, ISIL has [[Page H4398]] exploded from a largely localized force in Iraq to seriously challenge al-Qa'ida as the vanguard of the global jihad. Moreover, nation states like Russia and China continue to expand their spheres of influence and diminish U.S. clout worldwide. Russia has taken advantage of indecisiveness in Europe and exploited uneven leadership in the U.S. to pressure Ukraine and its neighbors on core Russian interests. China bullies its neighbors in the South and East China Sea, and if left unchecked, will likely exercise de facto control over maritime trade in its perceived territorial waters in the next decade. Meanwhile, North Korea and Iran continue to pose significant proliferation risks and remain strategic threats to the U.S. and its allies. State actors can bring a tremendous amount of resources to counter U.S. policy, placing an immense burden on the Intelligence Community to collect information on, and assess, these activities carefully and accurately. Perhaps more troubling, state and non-state actors alike are developing new ways to project power, particularly in cyberspace. Cyber attacks are becoming so pervasive that network defenders are overwhelmed; attackers seem to gain access to sensitive systems at will. The most recent attacks on the Office of Personnel Management servers--possibly one of the most significant national security incidents in the past decade--highlight the continued threat to our nation's infrastructure. Mr. Chair, in this year's intelligence authorization bill, this Committee has taken a great deal of care in addressing the wide range of issues described above. This bill is an essential tool in supporting our nation's efforts to tackle today's challenges, while also directing the Intelligence Community to make strategic investments in the future. In particular, I believe that this bill goes a long way toward encouraging the Intelligence Community to make much-needed investments, such as recovering from unauthorized disclosures of intelligence capabilities. Additionally, this year's authorization bill comes on the heels of the Committee's recent bipartisan successes on key national security issues, including reauthorizing important provisions related to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and overwhelmingly passing bipartisan legislation on cyber threat information sharing. I applaud Ranking Member Schiff for his help on these issues and look forward to working together in the future. Finally, I want to thank all the Intelligence Committee staff on both sides of the aisle for their support drafting this bill. The Committee staff spent countless hours assisting Members and finalizing the legislation. In particular, I would like to recognize our Sandia National Labs fellow, Randy Smith. He has been with the Committee for almost two years and will be leaving us soon to return to Sandia. He has been a tremendous asset to this Committee and I thank him for all his hard work. I would also like to thank the men and women of the Intelligence Community for all their efforts protecting this nation. I look forward to passing this legislation. Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. First, I want to say thank you to Chairman Nunes. This Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 is our third major piece of legislation together, and it once again demonstrates the fruits of our commitment to bipartisanship. We also have our difference of opinion from time to time, and on this bill, we have some differences. But I know that as long as we continue to work together, there is no end to the good that we can accomplish. Through our cyber bill and our surveillance reform bill, we have been guided by two core principles: first, that national security is truly the security of the entire Nation and all Americans; second, that national security can and must coexist with privacy and civil liberties. I believe the bill today largely furthers these principles as well. The IAA funds, equips, and sets the priorities for the U.S. intelligence community; and it is a crucial vehicle by which Congress provides oversight of the IC and ensures that U.S. intelligence professionals and intelligence programs have the funds and authorities they need to keep us safe, as well as our allies and partners. As the annual IAA provides hundreds of pages of detailed guidance, strict authorizations, and precise limitations, it is also the single most important means by which Congress conducts its oversight of the intelligence community. {time} 1415 As in past years, this year's IAA is a carefully considered bill and the result of thoughtful oversight. The Fiscal Year 2016 IAA funds the intelligence community at about 1 percent below the President's budget request and about 7 percent above last year's enacted budget level. The bill makes cuts to less-effective programs, adds money to underfunded programs, and requires intelligence agencies to regularly inform Congress of their activities, ensuring funds are spent responsibly and lawfully. Notably, the bill today holds, or ``fences,'' significant amounts of money to make sure Congress' direction is followed to the letter and on time. I want to highlight just a few particular aspects of the bill. It continues the committee's longstanding emphasis on counterintelligence and security reforms. It also continues to support our overhead architecture by funding our most critical space programs, investing in space protection and resiliency, preserving investments in cutting-edge technologies, and enhancing oversight of contracting and procurement practices. It also promotes enhancements to our foreign partner capabilities, which are critical to multiplying the reach and impact of our own intelligence efforts. It enhances human intelligence, or HUMINT, capabilities, which are often the key to understanding and predicting global events. It provides resources to safeguard vulnerable signals intelligence, or SIGINT, collection while enhancing oversight of these and other sources of intelligence. It emphasizes collection to monitor and ensure compliance with treaties and potential international agreements. It greatly enhances oversight of Defense special operation forces activities worldwide. The bill also incorporates some excellent provisions championed by the Democratic members of the Intelligence Committee, as well as the Republican members. In particular, I want to highlight Mr. Himes' provision to enhance the quality of metrics we receive to enable more thorough oversight; Ms. Sewell's multiple provisions to enhance diversity within the intelligence community; Mr. Carson's provisions to better understand FBI resource allocation against domestic and foreign threats and the role of the FBI and DNI in countering violent extremism, particularly in minors; Ms. Speier's provision to provide greater human rights oversight of the IC's relationship with certain foreign partners; Mr. Quigley's provision regarding intelligence support to Ukraine; and Mr. Swalwell's provision to ensure that Department of Energy National Labs can work with State and local government recipients of homeland security grants. All this said, while I believe the bill largely reflects sound choices, I am concerned that it uses the overseas contingency operations--or OCO--funding as a way to evade the sequestration levels mandated by the ill-conceived Budget Control Act. Again, I largely support the funding levels and the programs which the IAA authorizes, but I cannot endorse how it has funded them. We need to be serious and thoughtful about the budget and undo sequestration--not just employ accounting tricks to evade its levels only for defense and national security-related items. Even some domestic programs and agencies that contribute to our homeland security cannot qualify for OCO dollars, while vital programs like our children's education and our social services are left to languish. Instead of arbitrary, across-the-board cuts, let's do what this bill does substantively: make cuts to some areas and add money to others in a deliberate, well thought out manner. It is time to forthrightly deal with sequestration for all of our national priorities, not just for defense. I am also opposed to provisions in this bill which would tie the hands of the administration and prevent the orderly transfer of detainees from the detention center at Guantanamo Bay. These restrictions have never been included in prior versions of the IAA, and there is no reason to introduce them into the IAA process now. The bill goes even further than restricting transfer of detainees to the United States and includes a new provision which restricts transfers to ``combat zones,'' a term that is so [[Page H4399]] broad as to include allies and partners such as Jordan. As I have long said, keeping the Guantanamo prison serves as a recruitment tool for militants, undercuts our relationships with our allies, and undermines our international standing. With that said, the bill, as a whole, is largely a strong product, and I appreciate the close partnership we have enjoyed with the chairman in working on it. But, unfortunately, I cannot support the bill so long as it includes these Guantanamo restrictions and employs the OCO budget gimmick at the expense of our domestic spending priorities. I look forward to a robust amendment process today, and I am committed to working with the chairman, the Senate, the administration, the other committees of jurisdiction, and all Members of Congress to make critical improvements to the bill as it moves forward, and to resolve the issues to keep alive the string of consecutive signed IAAs. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, at this time I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Pittenger). Mr. PITTENGER. I thank the chairman for his vital leadership on the Intelligence Committee. I rise in support of this legislation providing the intelligence community the authorization needed to protect and defend the United States and support critical national security programs protecting Americans from nation states and Islamic terrorists. In December, NSA Director Admiral Rogers warned that China has the capability of shutting down the U.S. electric grid through cyber attack. Homeland security Secretary Johnson has warned about the threat of attacks launched by sleeper cells in most of our States. ISIS continues to expand into new territory, while Americans are more at risk because President Obama has no strategy for defeating ISIS, whom he initially referred to as the JV team. This is not the time to impede our intelligence efforts. America faces grave danger from those who wish to destroy our way of life. Please join me in full bipartisan support of the Intelligence Authorization Act. Let us be united in confronting the perilous threats of our adversaries. Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, at this time I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel), the ranking member on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Mr. ENGEL. I thank my friend for yielding. I want to say that I appreciate the bipartisan, hard work of Chairman Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff, but I want to bring to the House's attention recent reports that this bill makes drastic cuts in our so- called covert support to the moderate Syrian opposition. A headline in the Saturday Washington Post read: ``Secret CIA effort in Syria faces large funding cut.'' If these reports are true, just as the moderate Syrian forces may be starting to make progress, especially in the south, then I am afraid we may be making a big mistake. Unfortunately, most Members of the House don't know for certain if this legislation will reduce our support for the moderate opposition. Those funding decisions are made behind closed doors. And that is why I believe this bill is not the right place for us to be making decisions that have a major impact on our Syria strategy. I have no doubt that Chairman Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff are determined to get the intelligence piece of our Syria response right, but this is not merely an intelligence issue, and our overall strategy in Syria goes far beyond what is included in any covert program. I believe we shouldn't be dealing with this problem in a piecemeal way. As we have been doing in the Foreign Affairs Committee on a bipartisan basis, I urge my colleagues to take a step back, look at the big picture, and address our Syria policy in a way that makes sense and involves all the relevant players. I am troubled if it is true that this bill makes drastic cuts in our so-called covert support to the moderate Syria opposition. And I commend the hard work of our chairman and ranking member. Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I would urge my colleague, the ranking member on the Foreign Affairs Committee, that we shouldn't always believe what is in the newspaper. There have been lots of different reports about lots of different things. I would say that Mr. Schiff and I worked in a bipartisan manner to look at all programs across the spectrum of the 17 agencies. And we would be glad to spend some time with the gentleman from New York down in the committee spaces to raise the concerns that he brought up about a newspaper article. As I said, I think there are a lot of things that we read in the newspaper. I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. The Intelligence Authorization Act is the vehicle by which we ensure that U.S. intelligence professionals and programs have the funds and the authorities that they need. It is the single most important means by which Congress can conduct its oversight. We need to pass this legislation, just as the committee has done over the last several years. It is my hope that as the legislation moves forward, we will be able to dispose of the Guantanamo provisions--I will have an amendment to address that in a few minutes--and that we can also resolve the issues regarding the overseas contingency account. I look forward to working with my colleague as the bill moves forward to address those issues. I want to join the chairman in saluting the members of the intelligence community--the men and women who do such an extraordinary job for us each and every day. They have our sincerest gratitude and full appreciation for their dedication, their patriotism, and their unparalleled skills. I also want to thank again our chairman for his leadership, his commitment to bipartisanship, and his determination to do what is right. I want to thank our colleagues on the committee, who have done an extraordinary job in helping to put this bill together. I also want to join the chairman in thanking our wonderful staff on our side of the aisle. I want to thank Carly Blake, Linda Cohen, Allison Getty, Robert Minehart, Amanda Rogers Thorpe, Rheanne Wirkkala, as well as Patrick Boland and our shared technical and security staff, including Kristin Jepson, Brandon Smith, and Kevin Klein. We have an extraordinary team on the committee. It is a great pleasure to serve and work with each and every one of them. I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I want to thank the ranking member for his continued cooperation to work in a bipartisan fashion. As I think most Americans know, the threats continue to add up every day, and it is up to the men and women in the intelligence community to help keep us safe. I know the ranking member and I are committed to doing just that. With that, I look forward to debate on the amendments and passage of the final underlying bill, and I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIR. All time for general debate has expired. Pursuant to the rule, the bill shall be considered for amendment under the 5-minute rule. In lieu of the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, printed in the bill, it shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule an amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of the text of Rules Committee Print 114-19. That amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered as read. The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as follows: H.R. 2596 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. Sec. 2. Definitions. [[Page H4400]] TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations. Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations. Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments. Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account. TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations. TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS Subtitle A--General Matters Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law. Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities. Sec. 303. Prior congressional notification of initiations of certain new special access programs. Sec. 304. Prior congressional notification of transfers of funds for certain intelligence activities. Sec. 305. Designation of lead intelligence officer for tunnels. Sec. 306. Clarification of authority of Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. Sec. 307. Reporting process required for tracking certain requests for country clearance. Sec. 308. Prohibition on sharing of certain information in response to foreign government inquiries. Sec. 309. National Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center. Sec. 310. Intelligence community business system transformation. Sec. 311. Inclusion of Inspector General of Intelligence Community in Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Sec. 312. Authorities of the Inspector General for the Central Intelligence Agency. Sec. 313. Provision of information and assistance to Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. Sec. 314. Clarification relating to information access by Comptroller General. Sec. 315. Use of homeland security grant funds in conjunction with Department of Energy national laboratories. Sec. 316. Technical amendments relating to pay under title 5, United States Code. Subtitle B--Matters Relating to United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Sec. 321. Prohibition on use of funds for transfer or release of individuals detained at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Sec. 322. Prohibition on use of funds to construct or modify facilities in United States to house detainees transferred from United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Sec. 323. Prohibition on use of funds to transfer or release individuals detained at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to combat zones. Subtitle C--Reports Sec. 331. Reports to Congress on individuals formerly detained at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Sec. 332. Reports on foreign fighters. Sec. 333. Reports on prisoner population at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Sec. 334. Report on use of certain business concerns. Sec. 335. Repeal of certain reporting requirements. SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. In this Act: (a) Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (b) Intelligence Community.--The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)). TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2016 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2) The Central Intelligence Agency. (3) The Department of Defense. (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (5) The National Security Agency. (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (7) The Coast Guard. (8) The Department of State. (9) The Department of the Treasury. (10) The Department of Energy. (11) The Department of Justice. (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration. (14) The National Reconnaissance Office. (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (16) The Department of Homeland Security. SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2016, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 2596 of the One Hundred Fourteenth Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.-- (1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President. (2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedule of Authorizations, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. (3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule except-- (A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a)); (B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or (C) as otherwise required by law. SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS. (a) Authority for Increases.--The Director of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2016 by the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such schedule for such element. (b) Treatment of Certain Personnel.--The Director of National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern, for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a), including any exemption from such personnel levels, of employment or assignment in-- (1) a student program, trainee program, or similar program; (2) a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or (3) details, joint duty, or long-term, full-time training. (c) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 days prior to each exercise of an authority described in subsection (a). SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2016 the sum of $501,850,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2017. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence are authorized 785 positions as of September 30, 2016. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal year 2016 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2017. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2016, there are authorized such additional personnel for the Community Management Account as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2016 the sum of $514,000,000. TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS Subtitle A--General Matters SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW. Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity [[Page H4401]] which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. SEC. 303. PRIOR CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF INITIATIONS OF CERTAIN NEW SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS. (a) Limitation.--Except as provided in subsection (b), none of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for the intelligence community for fiscal year 2016 may be used to initiate any new special access program pertaining to any intelligence or intelligence-related activity or covert action unless the Director of National Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense, as appropriate, submits to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate, by not later than 30 days before initiating such a program, written notification of the intention to initiate the program. (b) Waiver.-- (1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense, as appropriate, may waive subsection (a) with respect to the initiation of a new special access program if the Director or Secretary, as the case may be, determines that an emergency situation makes it impossible or impractical to provide the notice required under such subsection by the date that is 30 days before such initiation. (2) Notice.--If the Director or Secretary issues a waiver under paragraph (1), the Director or Secretary, as the case may be, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate, by not later than 48 hours after the initiation of the new special access program covered by the waiver, written notice of the waiver and a justification for the waiver, including a description of the emergency situation that necessitated the waiver. (c) Special Access Program Defined.--In this section, the term ``special access program'' has the meaning given such term in Executive Order 13526 as in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act. SEC. 304. PRIOR CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS OF FUNDS FOR CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. (a) Limitation.--Except as provided in subsection (b), none of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for the intelligence community for fiscal year 2016 may be used to initiate a transfer of funds from the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund or the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund to be used for intelligence activities unless the Director of National Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense, as appropriate, submits to the congressional intelligence committees, by not later than 30 days before initiating such a transfer, written notice of the transfer. (b) Waiver.-- (1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense, as appropriate, may waive subsection (a) with respect to the initiation of a transfer of funds if the Director or Secretary, as the case may be, determines that an emergency situation makes it impossible or impractical to provide the notice required under such subsection by the date that is 30 days before such initiation. (2) Notice.--If the Director or Secretary issues a waiver under paragraph (1), the Director or Secretary, as the case may be, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, by not later than 48 hours after the initiation of the transfer of funds covered by the waiver, written notice of the waiver and a justification for the waiver, including a description of the emergency situation that necessitated the waiver. SEC. 305. DESIGNATION OF LEAD INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR TUNNELS. The Director of National Intelligence shall designate an official to manage the collection and analysis of intelligence regarding the tactical use of tunnels by state and nonstate actors. SEC. 306. CLARIFICATION OF AUTHORITY OF PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD. Section 1061(g) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee(g)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(5) Limitations.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the Board, or any agent thereof, to gain access to information that an executive branch agency deems related to covert action, as such term is defined in section 503(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3093(e)).''. SEC. 307. REPORTING PROCESS REQUIRED FOR TRACKING CERTAIN REQUESTS FOR COUNTRY CLEARANCE. (a) In General.--By not later than September 30, 2016, the Director of National Intelligence shall establish a formal internal reporting process for tracking requests for country clearance submitted to overseas Director of National Intelligence representatives by departments and agencies of the United States. Such reporting process shall include a mechanism for tracking the department or agency that submits each such request and the date on which each such request is submitted. (b) Congressional Briefing.--By not later than December 31, 2016, the Director of National Intelligence shall brief the congressional intelligence committees on the progress of the Director in establishing the process required under subsection (a). SEC. 308. PROHIBITION ON SHARING OF CERTAIN INFORMATION IN RESPONSE TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INQUIRIES. (a) Prohibition.--None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act for any element of the intelligence community may be used to respond to, share, or authorize the sharing of any non-public information related to intelligence activities carried out by the United States in response to a legislative or judicial inquiry from a foreign government into the intelligence activities of the United States. (b) Congressional Notification.--Not later than 30 days after an element of the intelligence community receives a legislative or judicial inquiry from a foreign government related to intelligence activities carried out by the United States, the element shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees written notification of the inquiry. (c) Clarification Regarding Collaboration With Foreign Partners.--The prohibition under subsection (a) shall not be construed as limiting routine intelligence activities with foreign partners, except in any case in which the central focus of the collaboration with the foreign partner is to obtain information for, or solicit a response to, a legislative or judicial inquiry from a foreign government related to intelligence activities carried out by the United States. SEC. 309. NATIONAL CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE INTEGRATION CENTER. (a) Establishment.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended-- (1) by redesignating section 119B as section 119C; and (2) by inserting after section 119A the following new section: ``SEC. 119B. CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE INTEGRATION CENTER. ``(a) Establishment.--There is within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence a Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center. ``(b) Director.--There is a Director of the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center, who shall be the head of the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center, and who shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence. ``(c) Primary Missions.--The Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center shall-- ``(1) serve as the primary organization within the Federal Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States pertaining to cyber threats; ``(2) ensure that appropriate departments and agencies of the Federal Government have full access to and receive all- source intelligence support needed to execute the cyber threat intelligence activities of such agencies and to perform independent, alternative analyses; ``(3) disseminate cyber threat analysis to the President, the appropriate departments and agencies of the Federal Government, and the appropriate committees of Congress; ``(4) coordinate cyber threat intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Federal Government; and ``(5) conduct strategic cyber threat intelligence planning for the Federal Government. ``(d) Limitations.--The Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center-- ``(1) may not have more than 50 permanent positions; ``(2) in carrying out the primary missions of the Center described in subsection (c), may not augment staffing through detailees, assignees, or core contractor personnel or enter into any personal services contracts to exceed the limitation under paragraph (1); and ``(3) shall be located in a building owned or operated by an element of the intelligence community as of the date of the enactment of this section.''. (b) Table of Contents Amendments.--The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 102 of this title, is further amended by striking the item relating to section 119B and inserting the following new items: ``Sec. 119B. Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center. ``Sec. 119C. National intelligence centers.''. SEC. 310. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BUSINESS SYSTEM TRANSFORMATION. Section 506D of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3100) is amended to read as follows: ``intelligence community business system transformation ``Sec. 506D. (a) Limitation on Obligation of Funds.--(1) Subject to paragraph (3), no funds appropriated to any element of the intelligence community may be obligated for an intelligence community business system transformation that will have a total cost in excess of $3,000,000 unless the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community makes a certification described in paragraph (2) with respect to such intelligence community business system transformation. ``(2) The certification described in this paragraph for an intelligence community business system transformation is a certification made by the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community that the intelligence community business system transformation-- ``(A) complies with the enterprise architecture under subsection (b) and such other policies and standards that the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community considers appropriate; or ``(B) is necessary-- ``(i) to achieve a critical national security capability or address a critical requirement; or ``(ii) to prevent a significant adverse effect on a project that is needed to achieve an essential capability, taking into consideration any alternative solutions for preventing such adverse effect. ``(3) With respect to a fiscal year after fiscal year 2010, the amount referred to in paragraph (1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) shall be equal to the sum of-- ``(A) the amount in effect under such paragraph (1) for the preceding fiscal year (determined after application of this paragraph), plus [[Page H4402]] ``(B) such amount multiplied by the annual percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index (all items; U.S. city average) as of September of the previous fiscal year. ``(b) Enterprise Architecture for Intelligence Community Business Systems.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall develop and implement an enterprise architecture to cover all intelligence community business systems, and the functions and activities supported by such business systems. The enterprise architecture shall be sufficiently defined to effectively guide, constrain, and permit implementation of interoperable intelligence community business system solutions, consistent with applicable policies and procedures established by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. ``(2) The enterprise architecture under paragraph (1) shall include the following: ``(A) An information infrastructure that will enable the intelligence community to-- ``(i) comply with all Federal accounting, financial management, and reporting requirements; ``(ii) routinely produce timely, accurate, and reliable financial information for management purposes; ``(iii) integrate budget, accounting, and program information and systems; and ``(iv) provide for the measurement of performance, including the ability to produce timely, relevant, and reliable cost information. ``(B) Policies, procedures, data standards, and system interface requirements that apply uniformly throughout the intelligence community. ``(c) Responsibilities for Intelligence Community Business System Transformation.--The Director of National Intelligence shall be responsible for the entire life cycle of an intelligence community business system transformation, including review, approval, and oversight of the planning, design, acquisition, deployment, operation, and maintenance of the business system transformation. ``(d) Intelligence Community Business System Investment Review.--(1) The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community shall establish and implement, not later than 60 days after October 7, 2010, an investment review process for the intelligence community business systems for which the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community is responsible. ``(2) The investment review process under paragraph (1) shall-- ``(A) meet the requirements of section 11312 of title 40, United States Code; and ``(B) specifically set forth the responsibilities of the Chief Information Office of the Intelligence Community under such review process. ``(3) The investment review process under paragraph (1) shall include the following elements: ``(A) Review and approval by an investment review board (consisting of appropriate representatives of the intelligence community) of each intelligence community business system as an investment before the obligation of funds for such system. ``(B) Periodic review, but not less often than annually, of every intelligence community business system investment. ``(C) Thresholds for levels of review to ensure appropriate review of intelligence community business system investments depending on the scope, complexity, and cost of the system involved. ``(D) Procedures for making certifications in accordance with the requirements of subsection (a)(2). ``(e) Relation to Annual Registration Requirements.-- Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter the requirements of section 8083 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005 (Public Law 108-287; 118 Stat. 989), with regard to information technology systems (as defined in subsection (d) of such section). ``(f) Relationship to Defense Business Enterprise Architecture.--Intelligence community business system transformations certified under this section shall be deemed to be in compliance with section 2222 of title 10, United States Code. Nothing in this section shall be construed to exempt funds authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense for activities other than an intelligence community business system transformation from the requirements of such section 2222, to the extent that such requirements are otherwise applicable. ``(g) Relation to Clinger-Cohen Act.--(1) Executive agency responsibilities in chapter 113 of title 40, United States Code, for any intelligence community business system transformation shall be exercised jointly by-- ``(A) the Director of National Intelligence and the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community; and ``(B) the head of the executive agency that contains the element of the intelligence community involved and the chief information officer of that executive agency. ``(2) The Director of National Intelligence and the head of the executive agency referred to in paragraph (1)(B) shall enter into a memorandum of understanding to carry out the requirements of this section in a manner that best meets the needs of the intelligence community and the executive agency. ``(h) Definitions.--In this section: ``(1) The term `enterprise architecture' has the meaning given that term in section 3601(4) of title 44, United States Code. ``(2) The terms `information system' and `information technology' have the meanings given those terms in section 11101 of title 40, United States Code. ``(3) The term `intelligence community business system' means an information system, including a national security system, that is operated by, for, or on behalf of an element of the intelligence community, including a financial system, mixed system, financial data feeder system, and the business infrastructure capabilities shared by the systems of the business enterprise architecture, including people, process, and technology, that build upon the core infrastructure used to support business activities, such as acquisition, financial management, logistics, strategic planning and budgeting, installations and environment, and human resource management. ``(4) The term `intelligence community business system transformation' means-- ``(A) the acquisition or development of a new intelligence community business system; or ``(B) any significant modification or enhancement of an existing intelligence community business system (other than necessary to maintain current services). ``(5) The term `national security system' has the meaning given that term in section 3552(b) of title 44, United States Code.''. SEC. 311. INCLUSION OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN COUNCIL OF INSPECTORS GENERAL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY. Section 11(b)(1)(B) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-452; 5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by striking ``the Office of the Director of National Intelligence'' and inserting ``the Intelligence Community''. SEC. 312. AUTHORITIES OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. (a) Information and Assistance.--Paragraph (9) of section 17(e) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(e)(9)) is amended to read as follows: ``(9)(A) The Inspector General may request such information or assistance as may be necessary for carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General provided by this section from any Federal, State, or local governmental agency or unit thereof. ``(B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information or assistance from a department or agency of the Federal Government, the head of the department or agency involved, insofar as practicable and not in contravention of any existing statutory restriction or regulation of such department or agency, shall furnish to the Inspector General, or to an authorized designee, such information or assistance. ``(C) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to provide any new authority to the Central Intelligence Agency to conduct intelligence activity in the United States. ``(D) In this paragraph, the term `State' means each of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any territory or possession of the United States.''. (b) Technical Amendments Relating to Selection of Employees.--Paragraph (7) of such section (50 U.S.C. 3517(e)(7)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(A)'' before ``Subject to applicable law''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(B) Consistent with budgetary and personnel resources allocated by the Director, the Inspector General has final approval of-- ``(i) the selection of internal and external candidates for employment with the Office of Inspector General; and ``(ii) all other personnel decisions concerning personnel permanently assigned to the Office of Inspector General, including selection and appointment to the Senior Intelligence Service, but excluding all security-based determinations that are not within the authority of a head of other Central Intelligence Agency offices.''. SEC. 313. PROVISION OF INFORMATION AND ASSISTANCE TO INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. Section 103H(j)(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``any department, agency, or other element of the United States Government'' and inserting ``any Federal, State (as defined in section 804), or local governmental agency or unit thereof''; and (2) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``from a department, agency, or element of the Federal Government'' before ``under subparagraph (A)''. SEC. 314. CLARIFICATION RELATING TO INFORMATION ACCESS BY COMPTROLLER GENERAL. Section 348(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259; 124 Stat. 2700; 50 U.S.C. 3308) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(4) Requests by certain congressional committees.-- Consistent with the protection of classified information, the directive issued under paragraph (1) shall not prohibit the Comptroller General from obtaining information necessary to carry out the following audits or reviews: ``(A) An audit or review carried out-- ``(i) at the request of the congressional intelligence committees; or ``(ii) pursuant to-- ``(I) an intelligence authorization Act; ``(II) a committee report or joint explanatory statement accompanying an intelligence authorization Act; or ``(III) a classified annex to a committee report or joint explanatory statement accompanying an intelligence authorization Act. ``(B) An audit or review pertaining to intelligence activities of the Department of Defense carried out-- ``(i) at the request of the congressional defense committees (as defined in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code); or ``(ii) pursuant to a national defense authorization Act.''. [[Page H4403]] SEC. 315. USE OF HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT FUNDS IN CONJUNCTION WITH DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL LABORATORIES. Section 2008(a) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 609(a)) is amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by inserting ``including by working in conjunction with a National Laboratory (as defined in section 2(3) of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 15801(3)),'' after ``plans,''. SEC. 316. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO PAY UNDER TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE. Section 5102(a)(1) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in clause (vii), by striking ``or''; (2) by inserting after clause (vii) the following new clause: ``(viii) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence;''; and (3) in clause (x), by striking the period and inserting a semicolon. Subtitle B--Matters Relating to United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba SEC. 321. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR TRANSFER OR RELEASE OF INDIVIDUALS DETAINED AT UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA. No amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available to an element of the intelligence community may be used during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 2016, to transfer, release, or assist in the transfer or release, to or within the United States, its territories, or possessions, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed or any other individual detained at Guantanamo (as such term is defined in section 322(c)). SEC. 322. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO CONSTRUCT OR MODIFY FACILITIES IN UNITED STATES TO HOUSE DETAINEES TRANSFERRED FROM UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA. (a) In General.--No amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available to an element of the intelligence community may be used during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 2016, to construct or modify any facility in the United States, its territories, or possessions to house any individual detained at Guantanamo for the purposes of detention or imprisonment in the custody or under the control of the Department of Defense. (b) Exception.--The prohibition in subsection (a) shall not apply to any modification of facilities at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. (c) Individual Detained at Guantanamo Defined.--In this section, the term ``individual detained at Guantanamo'' means any individual located at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as of October 1, 2009, who-- (1) is not a citizen of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces of the United States; and (2) is-- (A) in the custody or under the control of the Department of Defense; or (B) otherwise under detention at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. SEC. 323. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO TRANSFER OR RELEASE INDIVIDUALS DETAINED AT UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, TO COMBAT ZONES. (a) In General.--No amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available to an element of the intelligence community may be used during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 2016, to transfer, release, or assist in the transfer or release of any individual detained in the custody or under the control of the Department of Defense at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to a combat zone. (b) Combat Zone Defined.--In this section, the term ``combat zone'' means any area designated as a combat zone for purposes of section 112 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 for which the income of a member of the Armed Forces was excluded during 2014, 2015, or 2016 by reason of the member's service on active duty in such area. Subtitle C--Reports SEC. 331. REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON INDIVIDUALS FORMERLY DETAINED AT UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA. (a) Additional Matters for Inclusion in Reports.-- Subsection (c) of section 319 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32; 123 Stat. 1874; 10 U.S.C. 801 note) is amended by adding after paragraph (5) the following new paragraphs: ``(6) A summary of all contact by any means of communication, including telecommunications, electronic or technical means, in person, written communications, or any other means of communication, regardless of content, between any individual formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and any individual known or suspected to be associated with a foreign terrorist group. ``(7) A description of whether any of the contact described in the summary required by paragraph (6) included any information or discussion about hostilities against the United States or its allies or partners. ``(8) For each individual described in paragraph (4), the period of time between the date on which the individual was released or transferred from Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and the date on which it is confirmed that the individual is suspected or confirmed of reengaging in terrorist activities. ``(9) The average period of time described in paragraph (8) for all the individuals described in paragraph (4).''. (b) Form.--Subsection (a) of such section is amended by adding at the end the following: ``The reports may be submitted in classified form.''. (c) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section or the amendments made by this section shall be construed to terminate, alter, modify, override, or otherwise affect any reporting of information required under section 319(c) of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32; 123 Stat. 1874; 10 U.S.C. 801 note), as in effect immediately before the enactment of this section. SEC. 332. REPORTS ON FOREIGN FIGHTERS. (a) Reports Required.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 60 days thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on foreign fighter flows to and from Syria and to and from Iraq. The Director shall define the term ``foreign fighter'' in such reports. (b) Matters To Be Included.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall include each of the following: (1) The total number of foreign fighters who have traveled to Syria or Iraq since January 1, 2011, the total number of foreign fighters in Syria or Iraq as of the date of the submittal of the report, the total number of foreign fighters whose countries of origin have a visa waiver program described in section 217 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1187), the total number of foreign fighters who have left Syria or Iraq, the total number of female foreign fighters, and the total number of deceased foreign fighters. (2) The total number of United States persons who have traveled or attempted to travel to Syria or Iraq since January 1, 2011, the total number of such persons who have arrived in Syria or Iraq since such date, and the total number of such persons who have returned to the United States from Syria or Iraq since such date. (3) The total number of foreign fighters in Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment and the status of each such foreign fighter in that database, the number of such foreign fighters who are on a watchlist, and the number of such foreign fighters who are not on a watchlist. (4) The total number of foreign fighters who have been processed with biometrics, including face images, fingerprints, and iris scans. (5) Any programmatic updates to the foreign fighter report since the last report was issued, including updated analysis on foreign country cooperation, as well as actions taken, such as denying or revoking visas. (6) A worldwide graphic that describes foreign fighters flows to and from Syria, with points of origin by country. (c) Form.--The reports submitted under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form. (d) Termination.--The requirement to submit reports under subsection (a) shall terminate on the date that is three years after the date of the enactment of this Act. SEC. 333. REPORTS ON PRISONER POPULATION AT UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA. (a) Reports Required.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 30 days thereafter, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the Members of Congress specified in subsection (b) a report on the prisoner population at the detention facility at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. (b) Specified Members and Committees of Congress.--The Members of Congress specified in this subsection are the following: (1) The majority leader and minority leader of the Senate. (2) The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. (3) The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. (4) The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. (5) The Speaker of the House of Representatives. (6) The minority leader of the House of Representatives. (7) The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. (8) The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (9) The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. (c) Matters To Be Included.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall include each of the following: (1) The name and country of origin of each prisoner detained at the detention facility at United States Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as of the date of such report. (2) A current summary of the evidence, intelligence, and information used to justify the detention of each prisoner listed under paragraph (1) at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. (3) A current accounting of all the measures taken to transfer each prisoner listed under paragraph (1) to the individual's country of citizenship or another country. (4) A current description of the number of individuals released or transferred from detention at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who are confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorist activities after such release or transfer. (5) An assessment of any efforts by foreign terrorist organizations to recruit individuals released from detention at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. (6) A summary of all contact by any means of communication, including telecommunications, electronic or technical means, in person, written [[Page H4404]] communications, or any other means of communication, regardless of content, between any individual formerly detained at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and any individual known or suspected to be associated with a foreign terrorist group. (7) A description of whether any of the contact described in the summary required by paragraph (6) included any information or discussion about hostilities against the United States or its allies or partners. (8) For each individual described in paragraph (4), the period of time between the date on which the individual was released or transferred from United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and the date on which it is confirmed that the individual is suspected or confirmed of reengaging in terrorist activities. (9) The average period of time described in paragraph (8) for all the individuals described in paragraph (4). SEC. 334. REPORT ON USE OF CERTAIN BUSINESS CONCERNS. (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence communities a report on the representation, as of the date of the report, of covered business concerns among the contractors that are awarded contracts by elements of the intelligence community for goods, equipment, tools, and services. (b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) shall include the following: (1) The representation of covered business concerns as described in subsection (a), including such representation by-- (A) each type of covered business concern; and (B) each element of the intelligence community. (2) If, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director does not record and monitor the statistics required to carry out this section, a description of the actions taken by the Director to ensure that such statistics are recorded and monitored beginning in fiscal year 2016. (3) The actions the Director plans to take during fiscal year 2016 to enhance the awarding of contracts to covered business concerns by elements of the intelligence community. (c) Covered Business Concerns Defined.--In this section, the term ``covered business concerns'' means the following: (1) Minority-owned businesses. (2) Women-owned businesses. (3) Small disadvantaged businesses. (4) Service-disabled veteran-owned businesses. (5) Veteran-owned small businesses. SEC. 335. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. (a) Quadrennial Audit of Positions Requiring Security Clearances.--Section 506H of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3104) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (a); and (2) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections (a) and (b), respectively. (b) Reports on Role of Analysts at FBI and FBI Information Sharing.--Section 2001(g) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3700; 28 U.S.C. 532 note) is amended by striking paragraphs (3) and (4). (c) Report on Outside Employment by Officers and Employees of Intelligence Community.-- (1) In general.--Section 102A(u) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024) is amended-- (A) by striking ``(1) The Director'' and inserting ``The Director''; and (B) by striking paragraph (2). (2) Conforming amendment.--Subsection (a) of section 507 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3106(a)) is amended-- (A) by striking paragraph (5); and (B) by redesignating paragraph (6) as paragraph (5). (3) Technical amendment.--Subsection (c)(1) of such section 507 is amended by striking ``subsection (a)(1)'' and inserting ``subsection (a)''. (d) Reports on Nuclear Aspirations of Non-state Entities.-- Section 1055 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (50 U.S.C. 2371) is repealed. (e) Reports on Espionage by People's Republic of China.-- Section 3151 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (42 U.S.C. 7383e) is repealed. (f) Reports on Security Vulnerabilities of National Laboratory Computers.--Section 4508 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2659) is repealed. The CHAIR. No amendment to the amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be in order except those printed in House Report 114- 155. Each such amendment may be offered only in the order printed in the report, by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question. Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Israel The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in House Report 114-155. Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk. The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: Page 12, line 10, strike ``The Director'' and insert ``(a) In General.--The Director''. Page 12, after line 13, insert the following: (b) Annual Report.--Not later than the date that is 10 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and biennially thereafter until the date that is four years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees (as such term is defined in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code) a report describing-- (1) trends in the use of tunnels by foreign state and nonstate actors; and (2) collaboration efforts between the United States and partner countries to address the use of tunnels by adversaries. The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Israel) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York. Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, I rise to offer an amendment with my very good friend from Colorado (Mr. Lamborn) and my very good friend from Florida (Ms. Graham). This is a bipartisan amendment with respect to tunnels being used as a military tactic, technology, and strategy in asymmetric warfare. Mr. Chairman, almost exactly a year ago, when war broke out in the Middle East and Hamas attacked Israel, I visited Israel and saw for myself the sophistication of the tunnels being dug from Gaza to Israel through which terrorists traveled. They went to the other side of the tunnels, popped up, and tried to kill innocent civilians. These tunnels are not the tunnels that many of us characterize in our own minds. These tunnels are sophisticated. These are expressways underground. It is like the Queens-Midtown Tunnel going from Gaza to Israel. They are ventilated. They are lit. They are massive. They are deep. They are huge. They are impenetrable, and they are very difficult to detect. Mr. Chairman, the FY16 Intelligence Authorization bill properly says that the Director of National Intelligence will designate an official to manage the collection and analysis of intelligence regarding the tactical use of tunnels by state and nonstate actors. {time} 1430 This bipartisan amendment simply asks for accountability. It requires a report from this new lead intelligence officer for tunnels describing the trends in the use of tunnels by foreign state and nonstate actors and collaborative efforts between the United States and partner nations to address the use of tunnels by our adversaries. Mr. Chairman, I talked about tunnels in the Middle East, but in fact, these tunnels are dynamic force multipliers for our enemies and enemies of our allies around the world. They are used for terrorist attacks, but they are also used to smuggle arms and contraband. We have learned that these tunnels are being used well beyond Israel. Korea is another example. Tunnels have been found in North Korea. Here at home, more than 150 tunnels have been found since 2009. Mr. Chairman, we have plenty of enemies today looking for ways to attack the United States and our interests around the globe. This bill recognizes these threats and, very wisely, creates a lead intelligence officer for tunnels. This amendment simply encourages greater oversight by Congress. It allows Congress to make informed decisions on how and where to spend future funds in order to counter this threat and protect U.S. national security interests. Most importantly, Mr. Chairman, these reports will help shape the efforts of the newly created position, making it clear that Congress expects accountability and transparency, and that is something that the American people require. I ask my colleagues to support this bipartisan amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition, although I do not intend to oppose the amendment. The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes. There was no objection. Mr. NUNES. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Lamborn). [[Page H4405]] Mr. LAMBORN. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank Congressman Steve Israel and Congresswoman Gwen Graham for working together with me on this bipartisan effort in the defense bills, as well as now in the Intelligence Authorization Act. I would also like to thank Chairman Nunes and his staff for working together with me on this important issue. Mr. Chairman, as Representative Israel just described, there is a real and growing tunnel threat to American bases and embassies around the world, to our southern border, as well as to our ally Israel, both in Gaza, as well as Israel's northern border. Language I offered in the base intelligence bill, combined with this amendment, will ensure that our intelligence community stays focused on this threat. There will be a dedicated person watching on this issue. Going forward, partnership with Israel is the best way to address this growing threat. As we have seen with Iron Dome and other missile defense efforts, partnering with a vital ally like Israel enables both countries to learn quickly, while sharing costs and new technologies. It is a win-win situation for Israel and the U.S. and, hopefully, a loss situation for the bad guys. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I thank my very good friend from Colorado for his bipartisan support of this bill. I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Florida. (Ms. Graham). Ms. GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of Representative Steve Israel's amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act to provide oversight for the joint U.S.-Israel antitunneling defense project. The joint antitunneling project, which was added to the National Defense Authorization Act in an amendment sponsored by my good friend Representative Lamborn and myself, will help our closest ally in the Middle East, Israel, protect its borders. The terrorist group Hamas has spent years developing a complex network of tunnels under the Gaza Strip and Israel to smuggle weapons, kidnap Israelis, and launch mass murder attacks. This project will develop new technology to detect and destroy these tunnels, and it will send a clear message to our allies and enemies alike. The United States is committed to protecting Israel and to rooting out and destroying the terrorists who wish to do her harm. Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff), the distinguished ranking member of the committee. Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I thank Mr. Israel, Mr. Lamborn, and Ms. Graham for this very important amendment and issue. This will call for a report on our adversaries' use of tunnels and an update on our collaboration with international partners in ways to detect and defeat tunnels. All of us remember the fear that set in, in much of southern Israel last summer, as Hamas militants used a complex network of tunnels to attack Israeli soldiers from the Gaza Strip. This was not the first use of tunnels by Hamas. Cross-border tunnels were used in the capture of IDF soldier Gilad Shalit in 2006. In addition to using them against military targets, Israel has uncovered evidence that the tunnels are being prepared for large-scale attacks against Israeli civilians. Tunnels are not just a problem for Israel. For decades, the North Korean military has also been digging tunnels under the DMZ to facilitate infiltration of South Korea. According to press reports, four tunnels from the north have been found in all, although none since 1990. The South Korean Defense Ministry believes there may be 20 in all, and they could pose a mortal threat to Koreans and American service personnel in the region. I strongly support the amendment and urge my colleagues to do the same. Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to support the amendment. I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, all that I can say is thank you. I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Israel). The amendment was agreed to. Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Israel The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 printed in House Report 114-155. Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk. The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: Page 16, after line 24, insert the following new subsection: ``(e) Reports.--Not later than 10 months after the date of the enactment of this subsection, and annually thereafter for three years, the Director of the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center shall submit a report to Congress that includes the following: ``(1) With respect to the year covered by the report, a detailed description of cyber threat trends, as compiled by the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center. ``(2) With respect to the year covered by the report, a detailed description of the coordination efforts by the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center between departments and agencies of the Federal Government, including the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Homeland Security. ``(3) Recommendations for better collaboration between such departments and agencies of the Federal Government.''. The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Israel) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York. Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I will attempt to continue my winning streak on the floor this morning. I rise to offer an amendment with my distinguished friend and partner from New York (Mr. Hanna). This bipartisan amendment addresses an issue that has concerned many of us for some time, and that is the fact that, when it comes to cyber defense and cyber war, many Federal agencies are doing something; it is just that they may not be aware of what each of them is doing. We need closer coordination and collaboration among all the Federal agencies and entities dealing with cyber war. Mr. Chairman, we recently found out that the United States Office of Personnel Management suffered a cyber attack impacting millions of Federal workers. This attack, in my view, highlights a disconnect between agencies tasked to provide cyber defense, a foreign government hacking into a Federal government system, taking the records of millions of government employees, spanning the jurisdiction of several Federal agencies. It is clear that there is an obvious need for greater collaboration between these agencies to create a credible defense and, if needed, a deterrent to those wishing to attack through the cyber domain. That is why I was very pleased in February of this year when the President directed the DNI to establish the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center, CTIIC. This bill very properly authorizes that position. CTIIC will serve as the primary organization within the Federal Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the U.S. pertaining to cyber threats and coordinate cyber threat intelligence activities. This bipartisan amendment, Mr. Chairman, simply ensures congressional oversight of CTIIC by requiring an annual report detailing three things: number one, cyber attack trends identified by the CTIIC; number two, an assessment of the collaborative efforts between the CTIIC and various Federal agencies tasked to defend this country against cyber attacks; and number three, recommendations for better collaboration between these agencies. Mr. Chairman, we have entered a new era of warfare. Our networks are being attacked daily. We need to do a much better job of coordinating, collaborating, and cooperating at the Federal level. This amendment ensures oversight and accountability. I want to thank my partner on this measure, Mr. Hanna, for his bipartisan assistance and support. I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition, although I do not intend to oppose the amendment. The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes. [[Page H4406]] There was no objection. Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, over the last several years, cyber attacks have become a pressing concern for the United States. The recent breach of the Office of Personnel Management has put the personal information of millions of current and former Federal employees, including many of the men and women of our intelligence community, at risk. Every day, cyber thieves attack private companies, stealing credit card numbers, accessing medical records, leaking proprietary information, and publishing confidential emails, affecting tens of millions of Americans. The intelligence community has worked to improve our cyber defenses by improving information sharing between the private sector and the Federal Government through the support of H.R. 1560, the Protecting Cyber Networks Act. While the Senate has yet to act on this bill, the legislation we consider today will help improve the Federal Government's ability to detect and defeat cyber attacks by creating the new Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center. This thoughtful amendment by Mr. Israel and Mr. Hanna will require that the Center produce a report on cyber threat trends and coordination on cyber threats between different government agencies. I thank the gentlemen from New York for their work on this issue and urge my colleagues to support this amendment. I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff), the ranking member of the committee. Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman, and I thank him for his excellent amendment and support in the intelligence process. With each passing day, we are learning more about the cyber breach at the Office of Personnel Management. The volume of personal information lost during these events is of tremendous concern. Mr. Israel's amendment will help us better inform Congress on the effectiveness of the government's collaborative efforts to defend against future cyber events. I thank my colleagues for their work on it, and I urge support of Mr. Israel's amendment. Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the distinguished chairman for his bipartisan leadership and the distinguished ranking member. I appreciate their support for this amendment. I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Israel). The amendment was agreed to. Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Crowley The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 printed in House Report 114-155. Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk. The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: Page 29, after line 17, insert the following: SEC. 317. INCLUSION OF HISPANIC-SERVING INSTITUTIONS IN GRANT PROGRAM TO ENHANCE RECRUITING OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WORKFORCE. Section 1024 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. ) is amended-- (1) in subsection (c)-- (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``, Hispanic-serving institutions, and'' after ``universities''; and (B) in the subsection heading for such subsection, by striking ``Historically Black'' and inserting ``Certain Minority-serving''; and (2) in subsection (g)-- (A) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); and (B) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new paragraph (5): ``(5) Hispanic-serving institution.--The term `Hispanic- serving institution' has the meaning given that term in section 502(a)(5) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1101a(a)(5)).''. The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Crowley) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York. Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself as much time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, like many of my colleagues, I am focused on growing educational opportunities for young Hispanic Americans, particularly in the areas that will be so critical to our Nation's success in the years ahead. Last month, the House approved a bipartisan amendment to the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act designed to increase opportunities for Latinos in the STEM fields. The amendment I am offering today with my colleagues, Mr. Serrano and Mr. Curbelo, builds upon that effort and would further expand opportunities for Hispanic students. Our proposal would allow the Director of National Intelligence to offer grants to Hispanic-Serving Institutions of higher education for advanced foreign language education programs that are in the immediate interest of the intelligence community. It would also promote study abroad and cultural immersion programs in those areas, which we all know are crucial to truly understanding the intricacies of other languages and other cultures. This is a time when we need to be encouraging more of our young people to enter careers aimed at making our Nation safer. Of the nearly 2 million Latino students enrolled in college today, the majority attend Hispanic-Serving Institutions. With these targeted grants, HSIs would be able to help increase the ranks of Latinos going into the intelligence community, where they are underrepresented today. This amendment would not only promote diversity in national security and intelligence communities, but it would also strengthen our youngest and fastest growing minority, Hispanic Americans. We must ensure that these young people are prepared with the knowledge and skills that will contribute to our Nation's future strength, security, and global leadership because, when education is available to everyone, our entire Nation is a stronger nation. I want to thank my colleagues who have worked with me on this issue, Mr. Serrano and Mr. Curbelo, who have cosponsored this amendment. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition, although I do not intend to oppose the amendment. The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes. There was no objection. Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I thank Mr. Crowley, Mr. Serrano, and Mr. Curbelo for offering this amendment to include Hispanic-Serving Institutions in the grant program to improve recruitment efforts for the intelligence community. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Curbelo). {time} 1445 Mr. CURBELO of Florida. I thank the chairman for yielding. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of this amendment and thank my colleague from New York for allowing me to join in leading on this important issue. This amendment would allow the Director of National Intelligence to provide grants to Hispanic-Serving Institutions of higher education to offer advanced foreign language programs that are important to our intelligence community. These students, in addition to the traditional classroom setting, would also be able to travel and study abroad so they can gain a firsthand perspective of the culture in which they are immersing themselves. Mr. Chairman, the study of Farsi, Middle Eastern, and South Asian dialects is of the utmost importance in developing our country's continued relationships abroad. I am proud to advocate for Hispanic- Serving Institutions, like Florida International University and Miami Dade College in my district, and will strive to provide them the opportunity to train their students so that they can go on to serve our country. I am proud to be working with the gentleman from New York (Mr. Crowley) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Serrano) to provide more opportunities for these young Hispanic students who want to serve their country and to provide our intelligence community this special tool to recruit those who could be useful in advancing the cause of building the relationships that are so critical to our intelligence services operating throughout the world. [[Page H4407]] Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman from Florida's comments on this bill and his support. At this time, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff). Mr. SCHIFF. I thank my colleague from New York (Mr. Crowley) for yielding and for his work on this amendment. I am very happy to support it. Diversity and language skills are critical to national security. Together, they allow the intelligence community to reach its potential and expand its reach, its access, as well as its understanding. This amendment would further both goals by providing better language- learning opportunities to students of Hispanic-Serving Institutions. I am very proud to support this amendment and urge my colleagues to do the same. Again, I thank my friend from New York (Mr. Crowley) as well as my other colleagues who worked with him on this amendment. I urge passage. Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I support the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for his support of this amendment as well as the ranking member, Mr. Schiff, for his support of this amendment, and all the Members who have worked on this amendment. I think the amendment speaks for itself. It is providing a great opportunity for a growing minority community within our country who want to serve our country in this capacity. With that, I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Crowley). The amendment was agreed to. Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Keating The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4 printed in House Report 114-155. Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk. The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: Page 35, after line 17, insert the following new subsection (and redesignate the subsequent subsections accordingly): (c) Additional Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report that includes-- (1) with respect to the travel of foreign fighters to and from Iraq and Syria, a description of the intelligence sharing relationships between the United States and member states of the European Union and member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and (2) an analysis of the challenges impeding such intelligence sharing relationships. Page 35, line 19, insert ``and (c)'' after ``(a)''. The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Keating) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts. Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, I offer this bipartisan amendment with the support of Homeland Security Chairman Michael McCaul and Representatives Katko and Loudermilk to help Congress identify ways to improve intelligence sharing on the flow of foreign fighters around the world--with particular attention to their travel to and from Iraq and Syria. Already, this legislation that we are considering today makes substantial strides in ensuring that intelligence surrounding the flow of foreign fighters is shared with Congress. These continuous reports will shed light on the total number of attempted and successful fighters since the beginning of 2011. My amendment would require the Director of National Intelligence to report to Congress on the intelligence community's progress in forging information-sharing agreements with foreign partners and help Congress identify the challenges impeding coordinated intelligence efforts. Over 20,000 foreign fighters have traveled to join rebel and terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria, including ISIS and al Qaeda affiliates like al-Nusrah. Their movements are proving increasingly difficult to track in our globalized world, particularly given the uneven or nonexistent tracking efforts from some of our foreign partners. As the ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade and as a member of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, I have engaged on the issue of intelligence sharing from two perspectives-- from our efforts to improve the intelligence community's coordination with State, local, and other Federal agencies and from our work to better improve our information-sharing practices with our overseas allies to prevent terrorist attacks and the flow of foreign fighters here at home. While the intelligence community has made improvements to the processes of sharing pertinent information with the relevant Federal, State, and local agencies, there still exists a blind spot in our intelligence-gathering efforts on foreign fighters. That blind spot stems from the failure of some foreign governments to take commonsense information-sharing steps, and it has made the task of tracking foreign fighters even more challenging. The inability or unwillingness of some foreign governments to pass along even the most basic information about these individuals represents a major risk to the safety of the American people. An additional threat looms when some of these individuals return to their homelands from Iraq and Syria, battle-hardened and radicalized. Once back home, some can travel between international borders with relative ease, which makes tracking them a truly difficult feat. This amendment will also provide insight into our current intelligence-sharing relationships and will give Congress the opportunity to highlight best practices while also revealing areas for improvement. I thank Chairman Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff for their cooperation. I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. McCaul). Mr. McCAUL. I thank the gentleman for yielding. Mr. Chair, I rise in strong support of the Keating-McCaul amendment in the Intelligence Authorization Act. If adopted, our amendment would require the Director of National Intelligence to report to Congress on the state of intelligence information sharing with overseas partners to help us identify security gaps so that we can improve international monitoring of foreign fighter travel both in and out of Syria and Iraq. Islamist fanatics from more than 100 countries have traveled overseas to fight with groups like ISIS and al Qaeda. Thousands of the jihadists carry Western passports and can exploit security gaps in places like Europe to return to the West, where they can plot attacks against America and our allies. Last month, I led a congressional delegation to the Middle East to investigate the flow of these foreign fighters. And while progress is being made, I am still troubled by intelligence and screening gaps, especially with our foreign partners. We need to make sure our allies not only share the identities of terrorists and foreign fighters with us but also with each other so that these extremists can be stopped before they cross our borders into the United States. This amendment will provide Congress critical information needed to close these security gaps and improve intelligence information sharing to defend our homeland. I applaud the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Keating) for his hard work on the amendment and for his strong participation in our delegation overseas, where we learned quite a bit. It is not very often you can pass something you think can save American lives, and I think this is one of them. I thank the gentleman again. Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman of Homeland Security for his leadership on this issue. We really have established a very strong bipartisan effort, putting our national security first and realizing what holes there are in our system, in our security for our country. Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 seconds to the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff). Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the work of my colleagues from Massachusetts and from Texas. This is a superb amendment that will help us track foreign fighters, and I am proud to support it. [[Page H4408]] Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Keating). The amendment was agreed to. Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Keating The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 printed in House Report 114-155. Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, I have another amendment at the desk. The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: Page 41, line 8, strike ``paragraphs (3) and (4)'' and insert ``paragraph (3) and redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (3)''. The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Keating) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts. Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, the recent events involving the plan of radicalized individuals in Massachusetts to target law enforcement officials--police, in particular--underscore the truth that protecting America will require the efforts of local, State, and Federal law enforcement. Since the Boston Marathon bombings, the FBI has made great efforts to improve their information-sharing efforts with the Joint Terrorism Task Force and other Federal agencies. With my work and the work of my colleagues on the congressional investigation of the Boston Marathon bombings through the Homeland Security Committee, I can attest to the seriousness in which the Federal Bureau of Investigation has set out to improve their information-sharing practices. However, the FBI's efforts to institutionalize sharing across law enforcement and intelligence are still a work in progress. The current version of this bill eliminates the requirement for the FBI to report to Congress on their progress to implement information- sharing principles. This is a reporting requirement that has kept Congress aware of the FBI's information-sharing practices since 2004, and it has been vital to understand what works and what can be improved. This amendment will reinstate that requirement, with the recognition that the FBI has more work to do on information sharing to better protect the American public. These necessary reforms include re-executing FBI current memorandums of understanding with local partners, improving training and accessibility for the eGuardian platform, and formalizing methods for disseminating intelligence to relevant consumers up- and downstream. Without information on the progress the FBI is making in these reforms, Congress is hindered in taking the critical steps needed to protect the American public. I would like to again thank Chairman Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff. I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff). Mr. SCHIFF. I thank my colleague from Massachusetts, who has been an active and important voice on national security since he joined the Congress several years ago. In particular, he has worked to ensure that we maintain a strong focus on information sharing across agencies. One of the key lessons we learned from 9/11 is the need to tear down stovepipes and to ensure that inappropriate barriers to information sharing across agencies never reappear. The gentleman from Massachusetts' amendment seeks to maintain our vigilance on this issue and would require the FBI to report to Congress on its information-sharing progress. As a fellow native Bostonian, I am very pleased to see my colleague do such great work. I want to thank him for his commitment to the issue. And I am very happy to support the amendment. Mr. KEATING. I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Keating). The amendment was agreed to. Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Schiff The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 printed in House Report 114-155. Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk. The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: Strike sections 321, 322, 323, and 331. The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California. Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, my amendment would strike the sections of the bill which would undermine the administration's ability to close the prison at Guantanamo by transferring the remaining detainees to the United States for further disposition of their cases or to third countries that agree to accept them, secure them, and monitor them. I am grateful that my colleague from Washington, Adam Smith, ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, has joined me in urging the House to make this important change to the bill. Every day that it remains open, the prison at Guantanamo Bay damages the United States. Because there are other, better options for the prosecution and detention of these inmates, we are not safer for Guantanamo's existence. In fact, it makes us more vulnerable by drawing new recruits to the jihad. The Congress, the administration, and the military can work together to find a solution that protects our people even as we maintain our principles and devotion to the rule of law. Under the provisions included in this bill, the administration would be barred from transferring Guantanamo detainees to a ``war zone.'' While I agree that it would be foolhardy to seek to send a detainee to Yemen while that country is immersed in civil war, the definition of ``war zone'' used here is derived from the U.S. Tax Code and is extremely broad, ruling out countries like Jordan, for example, that have either successfully resettled and monitored former detainees or demonstrated a genuine commitment to doing so. These provisions also prevent the administration from transferring Guantanamo detainees to the United States for further proceedings under the military commissions process or for trial in an article III court. {time} 1500 The Department of Justice and our courts have proven themselves time and time again to be more than capable of handling the toughest terrorism cases and doing so in a way that ennobles us and sets an example to the world that a great nation can both safeguard its people and the rule of law. As a practical matter, our civilian courts have proven much more adept at handling these cases than the military commissions process has. In fact, this past Friday, a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, one of the most important appellate courts in the Nation, further struck down the legality of commission charges, so narrowing the jurisdiction of the military commissions themselves that any utility as an alternative to article III courts has been called into further question. And while Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and his fellow Guantanamo terrorists still await their date with justice, a host of others--including Richard Reid, the shoe bomber; and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the underwear bomber; and Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square bomber--have been tried, convicted, and sent to ADX Florence, the toughest prison in America. They are gone, and they are not coming back. The inclusion of these provisions is the first time that restrictions related to Guantanamo have been included in the Intelligence Authorization Act, and I believe that alone sets an unfortunate precedent that could undermine what has been a largely bipartisan effort. These provisions are unnecessary and unwise, and they do not belong in this bill. Mr. Chairman, I urge the House to reconsider these provisions, to trust in American justice, diplomacy, and the best military advice, and to give the administration a means to shutter a prison that both shames us and perpetuates the threat to the Nation. [[Page H4409]] I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment. The CHAIR. The gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, although I appreciate the ranking member's concerns about these provisions, I do remain concerned that further releases from Guantanamo will threaten our national security. Press reports now indicate that the administration intends to transfer up to 10 additional detainees this month. As the committee learned through its many briefings and hearings, the five detainees released to Qatar last May have participated in activities that threaten the United States and its allies and are counter to U.S. national security interests, not unlike their activities before they were detained. No intelligence community element should enable any future transfers that endanger national security. Furthermore, I would note that these provisions are substantively identical to the provisions passed by the House Armed Services Committee as part of the National Defense Authorization Act. Mr. Chairman, 26 of the 27 Democrats on that committee voted to advance an NDAA that contained similar restrictions. The provisions in our bill will complement those restrictions, as well as the restrictions put forward in the defense appropriations bills for several years running and this committee's previous intelligence authorization bills. The ranking member may have forgotten, but in 2012, there were provisions similar to this one that were included in the legislation. In sum, these provisions represent a strong and enduring consensus in Congress that Guantanamo should remain open and that detainees should not be transferred to the U.S. for any reason. As everyone here is aware, several detainees who have been released from Guantanamo have gone back to the fight and killed and wounded Americans. Putting detainees in U.S. prisons, as the administration originally proposed, would be disruptive and potentially disastrous. The threat is real, and Guantanamo is already equipped to handle the detention and military trial of these individuals, as appropriate. For those reasons, I would urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. SCHIFF. I yield myself such time as I may consume. I want to urge support for this amendment. This is one of the few areas of disagreement between the chairman and myself. When we look at how we are progressing or the lack of more progress in our struggle against ISIS and al Qaeda in places like Syria and Iraq, we are often tempted to consider those that we take off the battlefield as a metric of our success--we have eliminated so many combatants from the battlefield. But of course that number in isolation means very little. And the challenge is that with every one we take off the battlefield, there are new foreign fighters coming onto the battlefield. The recruitment of those additional fighters uses a variety of images and issues to attract people to join the jihad. One of the issues that is continually used as recruiting propaganda is the presence of the detention center at Guantanamo Bay. This is a recruitment vehicle for the jihadis. It is a rallying cry for the jihadis. The closure of this prison will not end the threat from ISIS or al Qaeda. There will be other efforts to recruit. But why give them this recruitment tool when there are other, better ways that these people can be incarcerated? Why give them this recruitment vehicle when there are ways that we can secure the people at Guantanamo Bay, prosecute the people at Guantanamo Bay, uphold our highest standards and the rule of law, and remove at least one part the jihadi social media and other propaganda campaign? Mr. Chairman, I think it is in our national security interest to do so. I would urge support for the amendment. I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chair, I know that the gentleman believes every word that he is saying. We have had robust debate in the Intelligence Committee behind closed doors, and we have had robust debate out in open session, and it is a debate I think that will always continue. However, the concern remains from the majority Members of Congress that they would prefer to keep Guantanamo open because no one wants to bring those terrorists to the United States, to their backyard, to try them in their State or their county or their community. So I respect the gentleman's concerns, and we will continue to debate those, but I will continue to oppose closing Guantanamo or having our intelligence community participate in the removal of detainees from Guantanamo. Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff). The question was taken; and the Chair announced that the noes appeared to have it. Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote. The CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California will be postponed. Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Rooney of Florida The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7 printed in House Report 114-155. Mr. ROONEY of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk. The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: At the end of subtitle C of title III, add the following new section: SEC. 3__. REPORT ON HIRING OF GRADUATES OF CYBER CORPS SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM BY INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the National Science Foundation, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the employment by the intelligence community of graduates of the Cyber Corps Scholarship Program. The report shall include the following: (1) The number of graduates of the Cyber Corps Scholarship Program hired by each element of the intelligence community. (2) A description of how each element of the intelligence community recruits graduates of the Cyber Corps Scholar Program. (3) A description of any processes available to the intelligence community to expedite the hiring or processing of security clearances for graduates of the Cyber Corps Scholar Program. (4) Recommendations by the Director to improve the hiring by the intelligence community of graduates of the Cyber Corps Scholarship Program, including any recommendations for legislative action to carry out such improvements. (b) Cyber Corps Scholarship Program Defined.--In this section, the term ``Cyber Corps Scholarship Program'' means the Federal Cyber Scholarship-for-Service Program under section 302 of the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 (15 U.S.C. 7442). The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Rooney) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida. Mr. ROONEY of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, as we debate this bill today, hackers across the world are trying furiously to break into our cyber networks, as we all know. And as we have seen in recent weeks, they are occasionally successful, and the consequences are grave. These cracks in our cyber defense put our security at risk. They also threaten American businesses and the privacy and credit of individuals across this country. For the sake of our national security and our economy, we must work together to improve our cyber capabilities. This requires a stronger, more capable cyber workforce, which our bipartisan amendment will help facilitate. The Federal CyberCorps Scholarship for Service program gives scholarships to students who study in the cybersecurity field. In exchange, those students commit to serving in government cybersecurity positions after graduation. Leaders within the intelligence community and DOD have told us that they need to expand their workforce and want to hire graduates from this program. Unfortunately, outdated personnel rules and insufficient direct hire authority make it extremely difficult for them to do so. As a result, these [[Page H4410]] students aren't able to fulfill their work commitment and we are unable to meet our workforce needs, and our cybersecurity suffers. We believe Congress should help remove those obstacles and make it easier to bring those graduates into the cyber workforce. Our amendment starts that process by requiring a report back to us on how many CyberCorps graduates go to work for the intelligence community and how these agencies recruit them. This information will help us determine how to streamline the hiring process so we are capitalizing on the best cybersecurity talent available. Mr. Chairman, this is a simple, bipartisan amendment, but it will pay dividends to improve and expand our cyber workforce and strengthen our national security. I would like to thank Congresswoman Sewell from Alabama for her assistance in this amendment. With that, Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I rise to claim the time in opposition, even though I am not opposed. The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized. There was no objection. Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I want to thank the gentleman from Florida and the gentlewoman from Alabama, both HPSCI colleagues, for their amendment, and I am happy to support it. This amendment furthers two important goals: first, to ensure that academic programs that should serve as a resource to the government--in this case, the National Science Foundation's CyberCorps Scholarship for Service--actually do result in a good number of students choosing employment within the intelligence community; and second, to deepen the bench of our cyber defenders. As a recent series of serious cyber breaches has demonstrated, it is an imperative for the protection of this Nation's workforce, privacy, and sensitive intelligence that we strengthen the IC's cyber cadre with our best and brightest. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is a fine addition to the gentleman's and the gentlewoman's other initiatives already represented in the bill, particularly those that advance diversity in the intelligence community. Again, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank my colleagues for their work. I urge support for this bipartisan amendment. I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. ROONEY of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. Ms. SEWELL of Alabama. Mr. Chair, I rise today in support of this bipartisan, common sense amendment that seeks to streamline and strengthen our Intelligence Community's (IC) cyber workforce. I am pleased to join my fellow colleague, Rep. Rooney, who shares my deeply held desire to help meet the incredible need to raise the number of professionals in the critically important field of cybersecurity. The recent breach of OPM which compromised the personal information of nearly 4 million federal employees further illustrates our urgent and immediate need to make substantial improvements to our cyber databases and overall cyber infrastructure. Cyberattacks have become increasingly common, and state sponsored bad actors pose a serious threat to our national security. These types of attacks are one of the most urgent modern challenges to our nation. Our government must be poised to do more to prevent future attacks. We must position ourselves to curtail any threat, no matter how great or small. In December 2011, the National Science and Technology Council, in cooperation with the National Science Foundation (NSF), advanced a broad, coordinated federal strategic plan to enhance cybersecurity research and education. As part of this plan, the NSF launched the CyberCorps Scholarship for Service (SFS) program. In an effort to bolster our federal workforce's capacity and advance the nation's economic prosperity and national security, this program provides funding for undergraduate and graduate level scholarships to students interested in cybersecurity. In return, scholarship recipients are required to work for a Federal, State, Local, or Tribal Government organization in a position related to cybersecurity for a period equal to the length of the scholarship. In essence, students receive a scholarship in exchange for their commitment to federal civil service. This program seeks to cultivate pipelines for applicants from undergraduate and graduate programs into federal careers focusing on combatting emerging cyber security threats. Leaders within the Intelligence Community tell me, however, that outdated policies and onerous clearance procedures are inhibiting their ability to fill industry vacancies with young and diverse cybersecurity professionals. Our amendment simply requires the Intelligence Community to report to Congress on how many CyberCorps graduates actually go to work for the IC and how IC agencies recruit these CyberCorps graduates. This information will help Congress determine how we can best improve the hiring process. I strongly believe that Congress should be facilitating ways to help the Intelligence Community hire these critically important CyberCorps graduates and create a pipeline directly into our cyber workforce. I encourage my colleagues to vote yes on this amendment. The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Rooney). The amendment was agreed to. Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Moulton The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 8 printed in House Report 114-155. Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk. The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: At the end of subtitle C of title III, add the following new section: SEC. 3__. REPORT ON EFFECTS OF DATA BREACH OF OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT. (a) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the data breach of the Office of Personnel Management disclosed in June 2015. (b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) shall include the following: (1) The effects, if any, of the data breach on the operations of the intelligence community abroad, including the types of operations, if any, that have been negatively affected or entirely suspended or terminated as a result of the data breach. (2) An assessment of the effects of the data breach to each element of the intelligence community. (3) An assessment of how foreign persons, groups, or countries may use the data collected by the data breach (particularly regarding information included in background investigations for security clearances), including with respect to-- (A) recruiting intelligence assets; (B) influencing decision-making processes within the Federal Government, including regarding foreign policy decisions; and (C) compromising employees of the Federal Government and friends and families of such employees for the purpose of gaining access to sensitive national security and economic information. (4) An assessment of which departments or agencies of the Federal Government use the best practices to protect sensitive data, including a summary of any such best practices that were not used by the Office of Personnel Management. (5) An assessment of the best practices used by the departments or agencies identified under paragraph (4) to identify and fix potential vulnerabilities in the systems of the department or agency. (c) Briefing.--The Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees an interim briefing on the report under subsection (a), including a discussion of proposals and options for responding to cyber attacks. (d) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Moulton) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts. Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, recently, the Office of Personnel Management disclosed a massive security breach that may have exposed personal information of millions of current and former Federal employees, including those who work in sensitive national security positions. Simply put, this cyber breach is unacceptable and breaks faith with those dedicated military and civilian personnel who commit their lives to keeping our country safe. Although responsibility has not yet been officially confirmed, many observers believe that individuals in China, who may have been acting on orders of the Chinese Government, were responsible for hacking into OPM databases. Two things are clear, Mr. Chairman. First, we must ensure this does not [[Page H4411]] happen again; we must protect our Federal employees--our foreign service officers, State Department staff, members of the intelligence community, and many others. Second, we must make clear to the rest of the world that these attacks will not be tolerated and that there will be consequences. Mr. Chairman, that is why my amendment takes the first of many critical steps to respond to this breach. My amendment starts the process of holding OPM accountable. It makes sure we leverage the best data security practices that our intelligence agencies use to protect sensitive personal information about our military and civilian personnel who work day in and day out to keep our country safe. Finally, my amendment ensures that the United States Congress can play a constructive role in developing a meaningful, forceful response to cyber attacks--especially attacks aimed at our Nation's security. We must stop these attacks and protect those who commit their lives to our safety. This amendment is an important first step in doing just that. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, we are prepared to accept the amendment. The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes. There was no objection. Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, the Intelligence Committee, I think, in a bipartisan manner, has the same concerns as the gentleman. I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff). Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman for yielding. We expect timely briefs on all major cyber attacks, but in this case, I agree, we need to require specific reporting and briefing on the impacts of the recent OPM breach. We need to learn far more about how hackers accessed the systems, what they obtained, and how we can prevent this from happening again. In addition, this will help us understand the impact to the intelligence community. Mr. Chairman, as I have said before, our public and private networks are not sufficiently secure, and they are a regular target for cyber attacks. We must do everything we can to shore them up, and we must do so now. I want to thank my colleague for his work, and I urge support of his amendment. Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Moulton). The amendment was agreed to. Amendment No. 9 Offered by Mr. Turner The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 9 printed in House Report 114-155. Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk. The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: At the end of subtitle C of title III, add the following: SEC. 3__. ASSESSMENT ON FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an intelligence community assessment on the funding of political parties and nongovernmental organizations in former Soviet states and countries in Europe by the Russian Federation and the security and intelligence services of the Russian Federation since January 1, 2006. Such assessment shall include the following: (1) The country involved, the entity funded, the security service involved, and the intended effect of the funding. (2) An evaluation of such intended effects, including with respect to-- (A) undermining the political cohesion of the country involved; (B) undermining the missile defense of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and (C) undermining energy projects that could provide an alternative to Russian energy. (b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the following: (1) The congressional intelligence communities. (2) The Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate. (3) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Turner) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio. {time} 1515 Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, my bipartisan amendment requires the Director of National Intelligence to submit a report to Congress on the funding of political parties and NGOs in former Soviet states by the Russian Federation and its associated security and intelligence services. As Congress well knows, a resurgent Russia, led by President Vladimir Putin, is once again determined to destabilize the West and various Euro-Atlantic institutions such as NATO. While we have seen the blatant use of military force both in Georgia and Ukraine, Russia has employed a variety of nontraditional methods to disrupt the West. These methods include the use of propaganda through state-owned media outlets such as Russia Today, manipulation of European natural gas markets, and the use of money to influence political parties and nongovernmental organizations throughout Europe. In a recent New York Times article, authors Peter Baker and Steven Erlanger highlight a series of instances in which the Russian Federation covertly funneled money to political organizations in Europe in order to influence various decisionmakers and parties. While their ultimate goal remains the fragmentation of institutions such as the EU and NATO, Russia hopes to achieve incremental victories like influencing the EU's upcoming decision on whether or not to renew sanctions against them. As president of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and chair of the Assembly's U.S. delegation, I have had the opportunity to meet frequently with my European counterparts to discuss this issue. In all instances, Assembly members continue to validate and echo the concerns discussed here today. Only through an increased understanding can we begin to effectively plan and combat President Putin and a resurging Russia. I ask all of my colleagues to rise in support of this bipartisan amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition, even though I am not opposed. The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes. There was no objection. Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentlemen from Ohio, Alabama, and New York for their amendment, which I am proud to support. This amendment requires the Director of National Intelligence to provide an assessment on funding of political parties and NGOs in the former Soviet states and countries in Europe by the Russian Federation and its security and intelligence services. Over the past few years, we have witnessed a number of highly visible, aggressive actions by Russia, particularly in Ukraine; but Moscow's efforts to destabilize its neighbors are also subtler and more nefarious. Russia is sponsoring and funding political parties to groom the next generation of puppets which they can control from Moscow. We must better understand what they are doing, even if what they are doing is very deep behind the scenes; so long as sources and methods are properly protected, I support this effort. Again, I want to thank my colleagues for their work, and I urge support of the amendment. I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, as the chairman well remembers, with the cold war, there was a time when the conflict between the United States and Russia was very tense. This amendment will help us bring to bear light on the actions of Russia so that we can make certain our policies reflect the new aggressiveness of the Russian Federation. Mr. NUNES. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. TURNER. I yield to the gentleman from California. [[Page H4412]] Mr. NUNES. I really appreciate the gentleman. He is one of the most involved Members of Congress with NATO, so I know that his concerns are valid. I, too, share those concerns and would urge my colleagues to support the amendment. Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Turner). The amendment was agreed to. Amendment No. 10 Offered by Mr. Farr The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 10 printed in House Report 114-155. Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk. The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: At the end of subtitle C of title III, add the following new section: SEC. 3__. REPORT ON CONTINUOUS EVALUATION OF SECURITY CLEARANCES. Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees (as defined in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code) a report on the continuous evaluation of security clearances of employees, officers, and contractors of the intelligence community. The report shall include the following: (1) The status of the continuous evaluation program of the intelligence community, including a timeline for the implementation of such program. (2) A comparison of such program to the automated continuous evaluation system of the Department of Defense. (3) Identification of any possible efficiencies that could be achieved by the intelligence community leveraging the automated continuous evaluation system of the Department of Defense. The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from California (Mr. Farr) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California. Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, today, I rise to offer an amendment which strengthens the process for granting security clearances to those working in the intelligence community through a continuous evaluation process. This amendment directs the National Intelligence Director to provide the intelligence and defense committees a report on the status of its current efforts for continuous evaluation of security clearance holders, including a timeline for its rollout. The report will also provide a cost-benefit analysis of DNI's efforts to similar efforts that are being carried on in the Department of Defense. We learned, after the tragic shooting in the Navy Yard in September 2013, the DOD should continuously evaluate these personnel, rather than do it every once every 5 years. Clearance starts by an initial vetting that determines a person's suitability and eligibility to have access to classified material by examining the person's past and making a judgment on future reliability. Now, once cleared, a continuous evaluation process is designed to examine a person's behavior to ensure its continued reliability. Congress directed the DOD to create a process that would be a governmentwide solution for continuous personnel security evaluations. This solution is called ACES, Automated Continuous Evaluation System. Now, the Director of National Intelligence is also seeking its own capability for continuous evaluation. While I support the intelligence community's requirement, their efforts may be redundant. DOD's system already has measurable successes. Their system is also flexible enough to be tailored to meet any specific requirements that the intelligence community may need. My amendment simply assures that the DNI does not work towards a continuous evaluation system in a vacuum. By working together to share lessons learned or build a common evaluation system, the DNI and the DOD can build a better program that ensures our national security and uses taxpayer dollars effectively. As we have all seen recently, the insider threat to our national security is real. We must continue to ensure that we remain secure by only granting security clearances to those who are suitable and reliable. I ask for an ``aye'' vote on the amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition, although I am not opposed. The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes. There was no objection. Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to accept the amendment. I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff), my colleague, the ranking member of the Intelligence Committee. Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman and my good friend from California for his amendment, which I am very happy to support. An important role of Congress and of this bill is to ensure that our intelligence agencies protect sensitive information and protect taxpayer dollars. This amendment supports both of these goals by requiring that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence report to Congress on its continuous evaluation process for security clearances and to compare those processes to those the Department of Defense uses. This comparative study will help identify places where we may be able to make improvements and save money. I want to thank Mr. Farr for his amendment and his diligence. Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. Farr). The amendment was agreed to. amendment no. 11 offered by ms. sinema The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 11 printed in House Report 114-155. Ms. SINEMA. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk, and I offer that amendment at this time. The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: Page 42, after line 12, insert the following: SEC. 336. REPORT ON STRATEGY, EFFORTS, AND RESOURCES TO DETECT, DETER, AND DEGRADE ISLAMIC STATE REVENUE MECHANISMS. (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the intelligence community should dedicate necessary resources to defeating the revenue mechanisms of the Islamic State. (b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the intelligence committees a report on the strategy, efforts, and resources of the intelligence community that are necessary to detect, deter, and degrade the revenue mechanisms of the Islamic State. The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentlewoman from Arizona (Ms. Sinema) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Arizona. Ms. SINEMA. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I want to say thank you to Mr. Fitzpatrick for cosponsoring this amendment and for his leadership as the chairman of the Task Force to Investigate Terrorism Financing. Thank you also to Chairman Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff for supporting this important amendment. The purpose of the bipartisan Sinema-Fitzpatrick amendment is to choke off the Islamic State's revenue stream. Our amendment directs the intelligence community to detect, deter, and degrade Islamic State's revenue sources and to report on the strategy and resources needed for success. The Islamic State is one of the world's most violent and dangerous terrorist groups. Its goals to build a caliphate in the Middle East and encourage attacks in Europe and the United States represent a new threat to our country and to global stability. ISIL is also believed to be the richest terrorist organization in history, controlling a huge territory in Iraq and Syria containing significant oil resources. In 2014, the Islamic State generated approximately $1 million per day through the sale of smuggled oil, extortion, and kidnapping for ransom. U.S. strikes have reportedly diminished ISIL's oil revenues, but the breadth of this terrorist organization's [[Page H4413]] funding sources represents a serious challenge to our national security. A February report by the Financial Action Task Force estimated that ISIL now largely finances itself through extortion in the territory it controls, and another study places this extortion revenue at $360 million per year. In Iraq, ISIL levies a 5 percent tax on all withdrawals from banks, and the organization also gains tens of millions of dollars from kidnapping on an annual basis. To defeat ISIL and protect our country, we must cut off the Islamic State's diverse and substantial sources of revenue. I encourage my colleagues to support this commonsense bipartisan amendment. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition, although I do not intend to oppose the amendment. The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes. There was no objection. Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Fitzpatrick). Mr. FITZPATRICK. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman, and I thank my colleague Ms. Sinema for her work on this important amendment and for her work as well on the task force established to investigate terrorism financing. Today, the terror threat faced by our Nation and our intelligence community is more diverse and sophisticated than it has ever been before. Organizations like Hezbollah, ISIS, and Boko Haram can no longer simply be considered terrorist groups. They have grown into much more dangerous entities, ones with the abilities to self-finance their actions through means far beyond traditional methods, from illicit oil sales and human trafficking to regional taxation and antiquity dealing. In order to effectively combat such evolved threats, U.S. policy must also evolve. As chair of the bipartisan Task Force to Investigate Terrorism Financing, established by the Committee on Financial Services, I have worked with lawmakers and policy experts to guarantee the U.S. response to terror's new revenue streams are quickly and effectively choked out. This amendment is important to ensure each level of our government, from Congress to the intelligence community, has identified the problem, as well as potential weaknesses, and is ready to address the threats that we face. By both expressing the sense of Congress that our intelligence agencies must dedicate resources to eradicate terror revenue mechanisms, as well as report to relevant committees on their strategies, this amendment strengthens the underlying bill and Congress' understanding of our global response to terrorism. The threat to freedom and democracy posed by the Islamic State and groups like it circles the globe, and the United States can ill afford to combat these enemies on the battlefield alone. Any strategy against terror groups worldwide must attack not only militarily, but at their funding source. Organizations, no matter how complex, cannot effectively function without requisite resources. Mr. Chairman, our intelligence community is second to none, and I am certain that, together, we can formulate and carry out long-term solutions to combat terror financing. I thank the chairman for his leadership on this issue and Ms. Sinema for offering this amendment. Ms. SINEMA. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California, Ranking Member Schiff, and thank him for his leadership on national security issues. Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentlewoman from Arizona for her amendment, as well as the gentleman from Pennsylvania. I am proud to support it. Behind ISIL's rapid and dangerous rise are its many sources of illicit funding. This amendment expresses the conviction of Congress that the intelligence community should dedicate resources to finding and eliminating those revenue sources and that the IC must report on its effort to do so. Again, I want to thank both of my colleagues for their leadership on this issue, and I urge strong support of their amendment. Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Pittenger). Mr. PITTENGER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment and congratulate Ms. Sinema and Mr. Fitzpatrick, the chairman of the committee. This will help our terrorism task force efforts undermine the funding of ISIS. Terrorism experts concur that ISIS is the most well-funded terrorist threat that we have ever faced. Through the illicit sale of stolen oil and antiquities, kidnapping for ransom, extortion, bank robberies, and usurious taxation, ISIS continues to amass tens of millions of dollars. Stopping this flow of money to terrorists must be a top priority if we are to defeat ISIS. Unfortunately, earlier this month, the President admitted he does not have a comprehensive strategy to defeat ISIS. This amendment will require the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress the current efforts they use to undermine the funding of ISIS, increasing our ability to ensure these efforts are a priority. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. I will look forward to the continued bipartisan support of the Financial Services Task Force to Investigate Terrorism Financing. {time} 1530 Ms. SINEMA. Mr. Chair, as a member of the Task Force to Investigate Terrorism Financing, I am working with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to keep money out of the hands of terrorists and to find solutions like this amendment, which strengthens America's security. Again, I would like to thank Mr. Fitzpatrick for his partnership and leadership on this issue. I also thank Chairman Nunes, Ranking Member Schiff, and Mr. Pittenger for their work on this important legislation. I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, we are prepared to support the amendment. I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Arizona (Ms. Sinema). The amendment was agreed to. Amendment No. 12 Offered by Mr. Crowley The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 12 printed in House Report 114-155. Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk. The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: Page 42, after line 12, insert the following: SEC. 336. REPORT ON NATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN UNITED STATES, INDIA, AND ISRAEL. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on possibilities for growing national security cooperation between the United States, India, and Israel. The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Crowley) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York. Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I rise today to urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan amendment. I appreciate the support of my colleagues from California, Ohio, North Carolina, Arizona, and New York, who are coleaders on this effort. They are Mr. Bera, Mr. Engel, Mr. Nadler, Mr. Chabot, Mr. Schweikert, and Mr. Holding. I also thank the chairman and ranking member of the Intelligence Committee for their support of this amendment. This amendment is about expanding the cooperation between the world's oldest democracy, the world's largest democracy, and a true democracy within the Middle East. That is the United States, India, and Israel. In recent years, the United States has expanded relations with Israel, as well as with India, in a number of areas. We have also seen India and Israel work more and more together on a bilateral basis. Of course, that is because a lot of their interests overlap, but it is [[Page H4414]] also because many of our values overlap. There is so much that our three countries can be doing together in the realm of scientific cooperation, research, best practices, national security implementation, defense, and much, much more. There is also a lot that we can learn from each other, whether it is about drip irrigation to build food supplies, desalinization to address water shortages, or refrigeration practices to prevent the kind of food spoilage that leads to hunger, not to mention how much potential there is in technological research and economic development. This amendment, of course, just deals with a narrow portion of these areas because the underlying bill is limited to security issues, but it is a needed start. I truly believe that the United States-India relationship has the potential to be the world's most important ``big country'' relationship in the 21st century. As our ties with India grow, it is important to see the India-Israel ties increasing as well. Here in the United States, as a former co-chair of the Congressional Caucus on India and Indian Americans, I have met with many members of the Indian American community, and I have consistently heard from visiting members of India's Government that there is a genuine desire to expand relations between India and Israel now and in the future. In fact, it has already been reported that, in the coming months, India's Prime Minister will become the first-ever Indian Prime Minister to travel to Israel. We are going to see the leader of what will be the world's most populous nation visiting and engaging with one of the smallest nations. The sky is really the limit on this effort going forward, and that is why the amendment asks the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress a plan on how to grow the U.S.-India-Israel national security relationship. This is a real possibility, and I hope the DNI can identify a solid number of ways to work together even more in the future. I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition, although I do not intend to oppose the amendment. The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes. There was no objection. Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, Mr. Holding was just here, but unfortunately, he got called away to another meeting because I know he worked closely with Mr. Crowley and others as chair of the India Caucus, and he wanted me to express his strong support for this amendment. I also urge my colleagues to support the amendment. I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff). Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman for yielding. Mr. Chair, working with international partners is an essential element of the IC's mission to understand the global threat environment, as well as the political, social, and economic trends around the world. For nearly 70 years, Israel has been a close friend and ally, as well as a vital source of intelligence about the world's most volatile region. In recent years, India, the world's largest democracy, has upgraded its bilateral relationships with both the United States and Israel. Given India's complex relationship with both Pakistan and China, exploring the potential for enhanced trilateral intelligence cooperation is very much in our interest. Mr. Crowley's amendment to direct the DNI to report to Congress on the potential for intelligence sharing is timely, and I urge the House to support it. Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, again, let me thank Mr. Nunes, the chair of the committee, as well as the ranking member, Mr. Schiff, for their support of this valuable amendment. I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Crowley). The amendment was agreed to. Amendment No. 13 Offered by Mr. Wilson of South Carolina The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 13 printed in House Report 114-155. Mr. WILSON of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk. The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: Page 42, after line 12, insert the following: SEC. 336. CYBER ATTACK STANDARDS OF MEASUREMENT STUDY. (a) Study Required.--The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretary of Defense, shall carry out a study to determine appropriate standards that-- (1) can be used to measure the damage of cyber incidents for the purposes of determining the response to such incidents; and (2) include a method for quantifying the damage caused to affected computers, systems, and devices. (b) Reports to Congress.-- (1) Preliminary findings.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives the initial findings of the study required under subsection (a). (2) Report.--Not later than 360 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report containing the complete findings of such study. (3) Form of report.--The report required by paragraph (2) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex. The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Wilson) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina. Mr. WILSON of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for Chairman Nunes and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for their leadership on this important legislation. I am particularly grateful that I was here to hear the presentation by Congressman Joe Crowley relative to promoting a better relationship with the world's largest democracy, India, by the world's oldest democracy, the United States. He and I have served as the past co-chairs of the Caucus of India and Indian Americans, and I know of his commitment to promoting a better relationship between India and the United States. Last week, the Office of Personnel Management revealed they were the targets of an extended cyber attack on Federal employee personnel records. These attacks stole personal data, such as Social Security numbers, financial information, and security clearance documents, putting the personal and financial security of our citizens at risk. This cyber attack was not a novelty. Recently, we have seen a growing number of cyber attacks on government Web sites, national retailers, and small businesses. Indeed, according to Symantec, most businesses reported a completed or an attempted cyber attack in the last year, and 60 percent of those facing an attack were small- or medium-sized businesses. These cyber attacks are a sober reminder to Congress that all government agencies need to work together to better protect their public and private networks. After each of these attacks, we have had a number of questions: Who is behind it? Is it an agent of a foreign government or a nonstate actor? How many records were affected? What kind of information was accessed? As of now, we gather this information through various government agencies, and each uses a different measure to assess and quantify the damage of the attack, so we waste valuable time and resources when trying to piece together a response. We need a clear, unified system of measurement for cyber attacks that can be used across all government agencies and military branches. By putting government agencies and branches of the military on the same [[Page H4415]] page, we can have an effective and rapid response. This amendment directs the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the FBI, and the Secretary of Defense, to conduct a study to define a method of measuring a cyber incident so we can determine an appropriate response. As chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, it is apparent that cyber is a new domain of warfare. This amendment is a critical first step in building a more comprehensive cyber defense system. I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition even though I am not opposed. The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes. There was no objection. Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the gentleman from South Carolina for his important amendment. There is a limit to how effective a defensive cyber strategy can be because, while we have to defend everything at all times, our adversaries get to attack everywhere and need to be successful only once, so we need to create a more effective deterrent, which this amendment will help further. It would require that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence report to Congress on how we measure cyber attacks so that we can know how best to respond once we are attacked or to communicate in advance how we would respond if we were attacked. Measuring the scale and effects of cyber attacks is no easy task, especially as we must factor in second and third order effects. I want to thank Mr. Wilson for his amendment. I am proud to support it. I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Wilson). The amendment was agreed to. Amendment No. 14 Offered by Mr. Poe of Texas The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 14 printed in House Report 114-155. Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk. The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: Page 42, after line 12, insert the following: SEC. 336. REPORT ON WILDLIFE TRAFFICKING. (a) Reports Required.--Not later than 365 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional committees specified in subsection (b) a report on wildlife trafficking. (b) Specified Members and Committees of Congress.--The congressional committees specified in this subsection are the following: (1) Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. (2) Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. (3) Committee on Environment and Public Works of the Senate. (4) Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (5) Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. (6) Committee on Natural Resources of the House of Representatives. (c) Matters to Be Included.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall include each of the following: (1) An assessment of the major source, transit, and destination countries for wildlife trafficking products or their derivatives and how such products or derivatives are trafficked. (2) An assessment of the efforts of those countries identified as major source, transit, and destination countries to counter wildlife trafficking and to adhere to their international treaty obligations relating to endangered or threatened species. (3) An assessment of critical vulnerabilities that can be used to counter wildlife trafficking. (4) An assessment of the extent of involvement of designated foreign terrorist organizations and transnational criminal organizations in wildlife trafficking. (5) An assessment of key actors and facilitators, including government officials, that are supporting wildlife trafficking. (6) An assessment of the annual net worth of wildlife trafficking globally and the financial flows that enables wildlife trafficking. (7) An assessment of the impact of wildlife trafficking on key wildlife populations. (8) An assessment of the effectiveness of efforts taken to date to counter wildlife trafficking. (9) An assessment of the effectiveness of capacity-building efforts by the United States Government. (10) An assessment of the impact of wildlife trafficking on the national security of the United States. (11) An assessment of the level of coordination between United States intelligence and law enforcement agencies on intelligence related to wildlife trafficking, the capacity of those agencies to process and act on that intelligence effectively, existing barriers to effective coordination, and the degree to which relevant intelligence is shared with and acted upon by bilateral and multilateral law enforcement partners. (12) An assessment of the gaps in intelligence capabilities to assess transnational wildlife trafficking networks and steps currently being taken, in line with the Implementation Plan to the National Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking, to remedy such information gaps. (d) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Poe) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas. Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. This amendment, cosponsored by the ranking member on the Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee, Mr. Keating from Massachusetts, requires the Director of National Intelligence to produce a report on wildlife trafficking, how terrorist organizations are involved, how they are making money off of wildlife trafficking, and the impact it has on U.S. national security. During our Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee hearing on this very issue in February, we learned that rhinos and elephants are on the path to extinction. For example, back in the seventies, there were approximately 65,000 rhinos in Africa. Since then, about 1,000 a year have been killed, and now, there are only 5,000 left in Africa. That is a 94 percent drop in those rhinos. There are only five white rhinos in the whole world. Elephants are not faring much better. From 2002 to 2010, the elephant population across Africa dropped 66 percent. Back in the thirties and forties, Mr. Chairman, there were approximately 5 million African elephants. Now there are about a half a million African elephants. One of the most famous was Satao in this photograph that was taken last year. He was, presumably, the oldest elephant that was in existence in Africa. He was killed last year for his tusks, which almost touched the ground. In fact, National Geographic, a year ago today, did an article on him and how he was killed for his tusks and how other elephants are being killed for their tusks. He was about 46 years old when he was killed for those tusks. The reason that poaching seems to be on the increase over the last few years is that there is a low risk of apprehension, and it is easy to commit these crimes. Also, even when someone is captured, penalties for wildlife trafficking are far less than for drug trafficking. Who uses these tusks? Who uses these rhino horns? The number one country in the world that is the consumer of the illegal ivory trade is China. Vietnam is the number one country in the world that uses the illegal trade of rhino horns. This is where these tusks and these rhino horns go, and it brings in a lot of money. For example, a kilogram of rhino horns--if I remember my math correctly, that is 2.2 pounds--sells for $60,000. So there is a lot more money involved in the sale of rhino horns and of elephant tusks than even of gold and platinum. Overall, the illegal wildlife trade is about $10 billion to $20 billion a year. It should come as no surprise that terrorist organizations are also involved in this criminal enterprise, like al Qaeda's affiliate al Shabaab and like Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army. They are cashing in on the illegal wildlife trafficking. It is getting so bad that the poachers have become very sophisticated in the sense that they no longer just shoot elephants, for example, because that makes a noise, that warns them. They are even being poisoned. An elephant is poisoned, and the elephant dies. Then, when people approach the elephant, they not only see the dead elephant, but they see other animals that [[Page H4416]] were feeding on the carcass of the elephant, and they are all dead, too, so that the poachers can get those tusks. They have become very innovative. {time} 1545 Local park rangers are underresourced; they are ill-equipped; and some of them are corrupt as well. So we can't fight what we don't know. There is a lot about this issue--and terrorist involvement in wildlife trafficking--that is murky, so we need to find out, for example: How much money do terrorists get from wildlife trafficking? Who are the key facilitators of the trade? What government officials are complicit? What impact does this have on the U.S. national security? This amendment requires the Director of National Intelligence to report to Congress on these and other questions. The better we understand the threat, the better we understand what is happening and how terrorists are involved in the illegal killing of rhinos and elephants, the more effective we can be against fighting those terrorists. And that is just the way it is. I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition, even though I am not opposed. The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes. There was no objection. Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentlemen from Texas and Massachusetts for their amendment, which I am proud to support. The trafficking of wildlife by terrorist organizations is an important issue, not only because it threatens to wipe out elephants, rhinos, and tigers, but also because it could threaten our national security. The World Wildlife Fund estimates that the amount of money generated by wildlife trafficking trade reaches into the hundreds of millions of dollars, and much of this goes to fund terrorists, including The Lord's Resistance Army, al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram. That is money going into the coffers of those who every day seek to harm us and others. We must put our intelligence professionals to the task. We must understand from beginning to end how terrorists acquire, transfer, and profit from wildlife trafficking. This is the first step to putting an end to it. Again, I want to thank my colleagues for offering this amendment. I urge support. I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. POE of Texas. I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Poe). The amendment was agreed to. Amendment No. 15 Offered by Mr. Poe of Texas The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 15 printed in House Report 114-155. Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk. The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: Page 42, after line 12, insert the following: SEC. 336. REPORT ON TERRORIST USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA. (a) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional committees specified in subsection (b) a report that represents the coordinated assessment of the intelligence community on terrorist use of social media. (b) Specified Members and Committees of Congress.--The congressional committees specified in this subsection are the following: (1) Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. (2) Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. (3) Committee on Judiciary of the Senate. (4) Committee on Homeland and Government Affairs of the Senate. (5) Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (6) Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. (7) Committee on Judiciary of the House of Representatives. (8) Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives. (c) Matters to Be Included.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall include each of the following: (1) An assessment of what role social media plays in radicalization in the United States and elsewhere. (2) An assessment of how terrorists and terrorist organizations are using social media, including trends. (3) An assessment of the intelligence value of social media posts by terrorists and terrorist organizations. (4) An assessment of the impact on the national security of the United States of the public availability of terrorist content on social media for fundraising, radicalization, and recruitment. (d) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Poe) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas. Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, terrorists' use of social media has exploded over the past several years. A recent study by The Brookings Institution found that ISIS had over 40,000 Twitter accounts. Terrorist groups from ISIS to the Taliban use social media platforms to recruit, to radicalize, to spread propaganda, and to raise money. I have seen fan pages for the Khorasan Group, an online press conference held on Twitter by the al Qaeda branch in Yemen, and we all remember al-Shabaab live tweeting the murder of 72 people in Kenya. All terrorist groups. The benefits of social media are clear. Social media is easy to use, it is free, and it reaches huge audiences across the world. We need to better understand why terrorists' use of social media is effective and what impact it is having on the world. This bipartisan amendment is cosponsored by the ranking member on our Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, Mr. Keating from Massachusetts. This amendment requires the Director of National Intelligence to assess four parts of the social media problem: First, what role does social media play in radicalizing people in the United States and abroad? The rise of the lone wolf terrorism in recent years has been fueled, in part, by terrorists' use of social media. Just recently, in Garland, Texas, two individuals claiming ISIS connections were killed while they were attacking an assembly on free speech and peaceable assembly of religion. Evidence shows that they had some social connection, social media connection with ISIS. The Boston bombers made two pressure cooker bombs. The recipes for those bombs were published before the attack in al Qaeda's Inspire magazine. That magazine was released and promoted on social media. Second, how exactly are terrorists using social media? Social media is constantly evolving, just like terrorists' use of social media platforms. Following online trends is an essential element in putting resources where they have the most impact. We need to make fast-paced improvements in this area as new trends and platforms emerge. Third, what is the real intelligence value of terrorists' posts? In 2012, a number of my colleagues and I sent a letter to the FBI asking, What intelligence value is terrorists' use of social media? The FBI has not come up with an answer. We need a detailed understanding from the whole intelligence community on just how valuable the intelligence is that we are getting from terrorists' use of social media. Finally, how does online fundraising, radicalization, and recruitment by terrorists impact U.S. national security? We know social media is a valuable tool to the terrorists just by how often they use it. Unfortunately, the United States is way behind on countering terrorists' use of social media, so we should do more. Terrorists like ISIS are out to destroy us. We have to fight to defeat them on every battlefield, and that includes in social media. I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition, even though I am not opposed. The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes. There was no objection. Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, social media, like any other form of communication, can be exploited by bad actors for nefarious purposes. While we are lucky to live in a time of remarkable innovation that brings us closer to [[Page H4417]] one another no matter what our geographical distance may be, our adversaries use the same tools to spread hateful and dangerous messages across the globe. I, therefore, support this amendment that calls on the intelligence community to provide Congress with greater information about how terrorist organizations use social media for fundraising, radicalization, and recruitment. Armed with that knowledge, we are more capable of stopping them. I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. POE of Texas. I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Poe). The amendment was agreed to. Amendment No. 16 Offered by Mr. Poe of Texas The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 16 printed in House Report 114-155. Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk. The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: Page 42, after line 12, insert the following: SEC. 336. REPORT ON UNITED STATES COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY TO DISRUPT, DISMANTLE, AND DEFEAT ISIL, AL- QAEDA, AND THEIR AFFILIATED GROUPS, ASSOCIATED GROUPS, AND ADHERENTS. (a) Report.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a comprehensive report on the United States counterterrorism strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), al-Qaeda, and their affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents. (2) Coordination.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Defense, and the head of any other department or agency of the United States Government that has responsibility for activities directed at combating ISIL, al- Qaeda, and their affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents. (3) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall include each of the following: (A) A definition of-- (i) al-Qaeda core, including a list of which known individuals constitute al-Qaeda core; (ii) ISIL, including a list of which known individuals constitute ISIL leadership; (iii) an affiliated group of ISIL or al-Qaeda, including a list of which known groups constitute an affiliate group of ISIL or al-Qaeda; (iv) an associated group of ISIL or al-Qaeda, including a list of which known groups constitute an associated group of ISIL or al-Qaeda; (v) an adherent of ISIL or al-Qaeda, including a list of which known groups constitute an adherent of ISIL or al- Qaeda; and (vi) a group aligned with ISIL or al-Qaeda, including a description of what actions a group takes or statements it makes that qualify it as a group aligned with ISIL or al- Qaeda. (B) An assessment of the relationship between all identified ISIL or al-Qaeda affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents with ISIL leadership or al-Qaeda core. (C) An assessment of the strengthening or weakening of ISIL or al-Qaeda, its affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents, from January 1, 2010, to the present, including a description of the metrics that are used to assess strengthening or weakening and an assessment of the relative increase or decrease in violent attacks attributed to such entities. (D) An assessment of whether or not an individual can be a member of al-Qaeda core if such individual is not located in Afghanistan or Pakistan. (E) An assessment of whether or not an individual can be a member of al-Qaeda core as well as a member of an al-Qaeda affiliated group, associated group, or adherent. (F) A definition of defeat of ISIL or core al-Qaeda. (G) An assessment of the extent or coordination, command, and control between ISIL or core al-Qaeda and their affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents, specifically addressing each such entity. (H) An assessment of the effectiveness of counterterrorism operations against ISIL or core al-Qaeda, their affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents, and whether such operations have had a sustained impact on the capabilities and effectiveness of ISIL or core al-Qaeda, their affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents. (4) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (b) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 315, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Poe) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas. Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, this amendment requires a strategy to defeat ISIS and other like-minded groups. It is incredible that after 4 years of the rise of ISIS, we still have to talk about needing a strategy, but here we are. Four years, Mr. Chairman, what is that? Well, in 4 years the United States mobilized the whole country and had to fight two wars--one in the Pacific and one in Europe--during World War II, and we were successful in protecting the United States, but here after 4 years of the rise of ISIS, we are not sure even what our strategy is. One thing we do know: controlling land is a top priority for ISIS. Its own credibility is wrapped up in the idea of establishing a caliphate. Without land, ISIS has no caliphate. Without a caliphate, ISIS loses its legitimacy among its hardcore fighters. Controlling land is also how ISIS makes a lot of its money. See, ISIS extorts the people that it controls. It also taxes them. ISIS is still bringing in millions of dollars a day by other illegal activities. The only way to stop that source of money is by taking back land that ISIS controls. Because ISIS is embedded in civilian populations, U.S. airstrikes are not enough to take the land back. The Iraqi Army is still too unprofessional to show that they are up to the job, and we have all seen ourselves how the Iraqis have dropped American weapons and run. We have yet to give the Kurds the weapons they need to fight for themselves, and we don't expect the dictator Assad to get the job done. The problem of ISIS is only getting bigger. Thousands of foreign fighters are still streaming into Iraq and Syria from other countries. Outside of Iraq and Syria, ISIS still has 10 networks, not including Iraq and Syria. There are three in Libya, two in Saudi Arabia, and one each in the Sinai, Nigeria, Yemen, Algeria, and one in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia is known for its strong government control, but the ISIS affiliate in Saudi Arabia recently pulled off two successful suicide attack bombings in 2 weeks. Its affiliate in Yemen has taken advantage of the fall of the government to take over more land. The ISIS affiliate in Libya is running free in a lawless area throughout the same country that killed our Ambassador and three other Americans. All of ISIS' 10 networks are growing stronger, not weaker, by the day. The President said last year that the United States would defeat and dismantle ISIS. Well, here we are a year later; we still do not have that strategy. That is at least according to the President himself last week when he was meeting with the world leaders at the G7 summit. He said: We do not yet have a complete strategy against ISIS. This amendment requires the Director of National Intelligence to report to Congress within 6 months a complete strategy to defeat ISIS and other groups like it. The same amendment did pass unanimously last year with this committee's support. So I ask Members to support it once again this year and make it become the law of the land. Today's terrorists control more land than they have at anytime since World War II. We need a strategy; we need a plan; and we need it soon. I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment. The CHAIR. The gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, it is critical that the United States continue to refine and implement a comprehensive and aggressive strategy to counter ISIL, al Qaeda, and their affiliates, but that responsibility does not lie with the Director of National Intelligence. The DNI's job is to ensure that our national leadership, who do generate our counterterrorism strategy, have the timeliest, most germane, and detailed information to be sure our strategy will be successful. Mr. Poe's amendment misclassifies that responsibility and misconstrues [[Page H4418]] the important role of the Director of National Intelligence. Our intelligence community must be free to collect and assess intelligence outside of the scope of political decisions to be sure their analysis remains impartial and objective. So, reluctantly, I must oppose this amendment and urge my colleagues to do the same. I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. POE of Texas. The amendment does state that the Director of National Intelligence will work with other appropriate agencies. Mr. Chairman, it is hard to fathom that this Nation does not have a plan to deal with ISIS. This amendment says Congress will move forward and expect and put into law that we will have a plan; we will have a strategy; and if the Director of National Intelligence is not an individual who is supposed to help form that plan, then I don't know who would be. I would ask that this amendment be adopted. I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, with respect to my colleague, we have a strategy with respect to defeating al Qaeda and ISIL, with respect to the war in Syria and Iraq. It is a comprehensive strategy and, frankly, it is a difficult strategy to implement. It is a strategy that involves cutting off terrorism financing. It is a strategy that involves cutting off the flow of foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq. It is a strategy that involves drying up the resources, the propaganda, the attacking of the recruitment mechanism of ISIS. It is a strategy that involves enlisting the support of our partners in the region and within the Islamic world to combat the perversion of their faith that is used to recruit people to this jihad. It is a strategy that is also military in character, that employs our air assets, that seeks to train and assist Iraqi forces. So we have a strategy. It is comprehensive, and it is tough. While I recognize that there is frustration that many of my colleagues have that our strategy has thus far not borne more success-- and I share that frustration--I have yet to hear any of my colleagues offer an alternative. It is one thing to bash the administration because you don't like the strategy; it is another to ignore the fact that we have a strategy or to propose improvements to it. But the subject matter of this amendment is whether the top intelligence official in the country should be charged with the responsibility of developing the policy to defeat ISIS, and I think it is rather his responsibility to make sure that the policymakers in Congress and the administration have the very best intelligence to inform those decisions. We see, frankly, this misunderstanding of the role of the intelligence community many times even in our committee when committee members will ask witnesses from the intelligence community to state policy positions on how they think certain policies should be implemented when that is really not their responsibility. Here, much as I concur with the need to perfect our strategy, improve our strategy, and the execution of that strategy, I don't believe that this is something that we should lay at the feet of the Director of National Intelligence. I urge a ``no'' vote on the amendment. I yield back the balance of my time. {time} 1600 Mr. POE of Texas. I don't have anything to say, believe it or not, Mr. Chairman, so I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Poe). The amendment was agreed to. Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I move that the Committee do now rise. The motion was agreed to. Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. Poe of Texas) having assumed the chair, Mr. Bishop of Utah, Chair of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 2596) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2016 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon. ____________________ [Congressional Record Volume 161, Number 96 (Tuesday, June 16, 2015)] [House] [Pages H4418-H4421] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov] INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 315 and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, H.R. 2596. Will the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Poe) kindly take the chair. {time} 1701 In the Committee of the Whole Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H.R. 2596) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2016 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with Mr. Poe of Texas (Acting Chair) in the chair. The Clerk read the title of the bill. The Acting CHAIR. When the Committee of the Whole rose earlier today, amendment No. 16 printed in House Report 114-155 offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Poe) had been disposed of. Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Schiff The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, the unfinished business is the demand for a recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the noes prevailed by voice vote. The Clerk will redesignate the amendment. The Clerk redesignated the amendment. Recorded Vote The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded. A recorded vote was ordered. The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 176, noes 246, not voting 11, as follows: [Roll No. 367] AYES--176 Adams Amash Ashford Bass Beatty Becerra Bera Beyer Bishop (GA) Blumenauer Bonamici Brady (PA) Brown (FL) Bustos Butterfield Capps Capuano Cardenas Carney Carson (IN) Cartwright Castor (FL) Castro (TX) Chu, Judy Cicilline Clark (MA) Clarke (NY) Clay Cleaver Clyburn Cohen Connolly Conyers Cooper Costa Courtney Crowley Cummings Davis (CA) Davis, Danny DeFazio DeGette Delaney DeLauro DelBene Deutch Dingell Doggett Doyle, Michael F. Duckworth Duncan (TN) Edwards Ellison Engel Eshoo Esty Farr Foster Frankel (FL) Fudge Gabbard Gallego Garamendi Grayson Green, Al Grijalva Gutierrez Hahn Hastings Heck (WA) Higgins Himes Hinojosa Honda Hoyer Huffman Israel Jackson Lee Jeffries Johnson (GA) Johnson, E. B. Jones Kaptur Keating Kelly (IL) Kennedy Kildee Kilmer Kind Kuster Langevin Larsen (WA) Larson (CT) Lawrence Lee Levin Lewis Lieu, Ted Loebsack Lofgren Lowenthal Lowey Lujan Grisham (NM) Lujan, Ben Ray (NM) Lynch Maloney, Carolyn Massie Matsui McCollum McDermott McGovern McNerney Meeks Meng Moore Moulton Murphy (FL) Nadler Napolitano Neal Nolan Norcross O'Rourke Pallone Pascrell Payne Pelosi Perlmutter Peters Peterson Pingree Pocan Polis Price (NC) Quigley Rangel Rice (NY) Richmond Roybal-Allard Rush [[Page H4419]] Ryan (OH) Sanchez, Linda T. Sanford Sarbanes Schakowsky Schiff Schrader Scott (VA) Scott, David Serrano Sherman Sires Slaughter Smith (WA) Speier Swalwell (CA) Takai Takano Thompson (CA) Thompson (MS) Titus Tonko Torres Tsongas Van Hollen Vargas Veasey Vela Velazquez Visclosky Walz Wasserman Schultz Waters, Maxine Watson Coleman Wilson (FL) Yarmuth NOES--246 Abraham Aderholt Aguilar Allen Amodei Babin Barletta Barr Barton Benishek Bilirakis Bishop (MI) Bishop (UT) Black Blackburn Blum Bost Boustany Brady (TX) Brat Bridenstine Brooks (AL) Brooks (IN) Brownley (CA) Buchanan Buck Bucshon Burgess Calvert Carter (GA) Carter (TX) Chabot Chaffetz Clawson (FL) Coffman Cole Collins (GA) Collins (NY) Comstock Conaway Cook Costello (PA) Cramer Crawford Crenshaw Cuellar Culberson Curbelo (FL) Davis, Rodney Denham Dent DeSantis DesJarlais Diaz-Balart Dold Donovan Duffy Duncan (SC) Ellmers (NC) Emmer (MN) Farenthold Fincher Fitzpatrick Fleischmann Fleming Flores Forbes Fortenberry Foxx Franks (AZ) Frelinghuysen Garrett Gibbs Gibson Gohmert Goodlatte Gosar Gowdy Graham Granger Graves (GA) Graves (LA) Graves (MO) Green, Gene Grothman Guinta Guthrie Hanna Hardy Harper Harris Hartzler Heck (NV) Hensarling Herrera Beutler Hice, Jody B. Hill Holding Hudson Huelskamp Huizenga (MI) Hultgren Hunter Hurd (TX) Hurt (VA) Issa Jenkins (KS) Jenkins (WV) Johnson (OH) Johnson, Sam Jolly Jordan Joyce Katko Kelly (PA) King (IA) King (NY) Kinzinger (IL) Kirkpatrick Kline Knight Labrador LaMalfa Lamborn Lance Latta Lipinski LoBiondo Long Loudermilk Love Lucas Luetkemeyer Lummis MacArthur Maloney, Sean Marchant Marino McCarthy McCaul McClintock McKinley McMorris Rodgers McSally Meadows Meehan Messer Mica Miller (FL) Miller (MI) Moolenaar Mooney (WV) Mullin Mulvaney Murphy (PA) Neugebauer Newhouse Noem Nugent Nunes Olson Palazzo Palmer Paulsen Pearce Perry Pittenger Pitts Poe (TX) Poliquin Pompeo Posey Price, Tom Ratcliffe Reed Reichert Renacci Ribble Rice (SC) Rigell Roby Roe (TN) Rogers (AL) Rogers (KY) Rohrabacher Rokita Rooney (FL) Ros-Lehtinen Roskam Ross Rothfus Rouzer Royce Ruiz Ruppersberger Russell Ryan (WI) Salmon Scalise Schweikert Scott, Austin Sensenbrenner Shimkus Shuster Simpson Sinema Smith (MO) Smith (NE) Smith (NJ) Smith (TX) Stefanik Stewart Stivers Stutzman Thompson (PA) Thornberry Tiberi Tipton Trott Turner Upton Valadao Wagner Walberg Walden Walker Walorski Walters, Mimi Weber (TX) Webster (FL) Wenstrup Westerman Westmoreland Whitfield Williams Wilson (SC) Wittman Womack Woodall Yoder Yoho Young (AK) Young (IA) Young (IN) Zeldin Zinke NOT VOTING--11 Boyle, Brendan F. Byrne DeSaulnier Fattah Griffith Kelly (MS) McHenry Sanchez, Loretta Sessions Sewell (AL) Welch {time} 1730 Mrs. NOEM, Messrs. POMPEO, WITTMAN, JOYCE, and DeSANTIS changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.'' Mr. BEYER, Ms. McCOLLUM, Messrs. COHEN and MASSIE changed their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.'' So the amendment was rejected. The result of the vote was announced as above recorded. The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended. The amendment was agreed to. The Acting CHAIR. Under the rule, the Committee rises. Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. Collins of Georgia) having assumed the chair, Mr. Poe of Texas, Acting Chair of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 2596) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2016 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, and, pursuant to House Resolution 315, he reported the bill back to the House with an amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered. Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the amendment reported from the Committee of the Whole? If not, the question is on the amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended. The amendment was agreed to. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill. The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time. Motion to Recommit Mrs. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I have a motion to recommit at the desk. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentlewoman opposed to the bill? Mrs. DINGELL. I am opposed to it in its current form. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to recommit. The Clerk read as follows: Mrs. Dingell moves to recommit the bill H.R. 2596 to the Select Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select) with instructions to report the same back to the House forthwith, with the following amendment: Page 29, after line 11, insert the following: SEC. 317. PROTECTING UNITED STATES PERSONS WHO TRAVEL. To maximize the security of United States civilian aviation, the Director of National Intelligence shall identify and share with all appropriate Federal departments and agencies, including the Transportation Security Administration-- (1) all information on new and constantly changing threats used by terrorists to evade airport screening operations; and (2) updated terrorist watch list information for the purpose of properly vetting employees at commercial airports. SEC. 318. PROTECTING PRIVATE PERSONAL INFORMATION FROM CYBER ATTACKS BY CHINA, RUSSIA, AND OTHER STATE- SPONSORED COMPUTER HACKERS. The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of each element of the intelligence community, shall prioritize efforts and dedicate sufficient resources to uncover and to foil attempts to steal the private personal information of United States persons, including Social Security numbers, dates of birth, employment information, and health records, insofar as-- (1) up to 4,000,000 records of Federal employees under the control of the Office of Personnel Management were stolen; (2) the information of 80,000,000 Americans was compromised by the attacks on Anthem Health Insurance and CareFirst BlueCross BlueShield; (3) the health records of more than 29,000,000 Americans were compromised in data breaches between 2010 and 2013; and (4) the personnel records of millions of Federal employees were compromised by a series of recently discovered attacks against the Office of Personnel Management, including records related to the background investigations of current, former, and prospective Federal employees. Mrs. DINGELL (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to dispense with the reading. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Michigan? There was no objection. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Michigan is recognized for 5 minutes. Mrs. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, this is the final amendment to the bill, which will not kill the bill or send it back to committee. If adopted, the bill will immediately proceed to final passage, as amended. Mr. Speaker, it is very timely that we are considering the intelligence authorization bill today, as there have been several troubling incidents in the last few weeks that require an immediate response by the Congress. I know that Members on both sides of the aisle care deeply about airport security and cybersecurity, and we agree that Congress must do everything possible to keep the American people safe. Last week, we learned that there were 73 people employed at airports across the country that should have been disqualified for employment because they are on a terrorist watch list. The American people deserve the highest level of security at our airports, and, quite frankly, I believe for all of us the status quo is unacceptable. While it is easy for us to blame the TSA for this lapse in security, it is shocking that the TSA does not have access and that the current policy does not authorize them to have access to the information that they need so that [[Page H4420]] they can keep us safe, nor do other appropriate agencies. As much as we agree that reforms are needed at TSA, we should all agree that they should have all the information they need to do their jobs. It is critical that our intelligence and security agencies are sharing information with each other because they have the same mission--keeping the American people safe. This motion to recommit simply states that the Director of National Intelligence must provide all information on new and changing terrorist threats and the updated terrorist watch list information to TSA and to anybody else in the government that needs to have it. In addition, to improve information sharing, I think everybody in this Chamber knows that we must address cybersecurity. Cyber attacks are becoming a routine event in the United States today, and it demands an immediate response and investigation. Americans deserve the peace of mind in knowing that their personal information is secure and not vulnerable to hacking by cyber criminals, yet there is a growing list of recent incidents that continues to put the privacy of everyday Americans, our constituents, at risk. The recent breach of over 4 million records of Federal employees at the Office of Personnel Management and a hack of 80 million records at Anthem Health Insurance and CareFirst BlueCross BlueShield are just a few of the prominent examples of this growing threat. And who is paying the price? Working families. For each cyber attack that you read about in the newspapers, there are many more that are going unreported or, worse, undetected. In fact, some security experts are concerned that China is now building a massive database with the personal information of many, many American citizens. Furthermore, American companies are increasingly becoming targets of cyber attacks. With a recent report estimating that this is costing our economy more than $445 billion, we simply cannot wait any longer to protect the privacy of everyday Americans from hackers and cyber criminals in Russia and China. This motion to recommit simply requires the Director of National Intelligence to prioritize efforts to uncover and foil attempts to steal the private, personal information of Americans. This is the least we can do to respond to the attacks on the privacy of the American people. Let's show the American people that Congress is listening. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentlewoman has expired. Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose the motion. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, this motion to recommit is nothing more than a poison pill designed to destroy the hard work that has gone into crafting this legislation. This bill already does exactly what the motion to recommit proposes. It helps the Federal Government, including the patriotic men and women of our intelligence community, address the critical national security issues facing this country. As anyone who worked on it in the committee or took the time to come down and read the annex knows, this bill already funds intelligence community personnel who protect our networks. While we stand here, the intelligence community is wrestling with some of the greatest national security threats in our country's history. I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on the motion to recommit and ``yes'' on final passage. I yield back the balance of my time. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is ordered on the motion to recommit. There was no objection. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit. The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the noes appeared to have it. Recorded Vote Mrs. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote. A recorded vote was ordered. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, this 5- minute vote on the motion to recommit will be followed by a 5-minute vote on the passage of the bill, if ordered. The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 183, noes 240, not voting 10, as follows: [Roll No. 368] AYES--183 Adams Aguilar Ashford Bass Beatty Becerra Bera Beyer Bishop (GA) Blumenauer Bonamici Boyle, Brendan F. Brady (PA) Brown (FL) Brownley (CA) Bustos Butterfield Capps Capuano Cardenas Carney Carson (IN) Cartwright Castor (FL) Castro (TX) Chu, Judy Clark (MA) Clarke (NY) Clay Cleaver Clyburn Cohen Connolly Conyers Cooper Costa Courtney Crowley Cuellar Cummings Davis (CA) Davis, Danny DeFazio DeGette Delaney DeLauro DelBene DeSaulnier Deutch Dingell Doggett Doyle, Michael F. Duckworth Edwards Ellison Engel Eshoo Esty Farr Foster Frankel (FL) Fudge Gabbard Gallego Garamendi Graham Grayson Green, Al Green, Gene Grijalva Gutierrez Hahn Hastings Heck (WA) Higgins Himes Hinojosa Honda Hoyer Huffman Israel Jackson Lee Jeffries Johnson (GA) Johnson, E. B. Kaptur Keating Kelly (IL) Kennedy Kildee Kilmer Kind Kirkpatrick Kuster Langevin Larsen (WA) Larson (CT) Lawrence Lee Levin Lewis Lieu, Ted Lipinski Loebsack Lofgren Lowenthal Lowey Lujan Grisham (NM) Lujan, Ben Ray (NM) Lynch Maloney, Carolyn Maloney, Sean Matsui McCollum McDermott McNerney Meeks Meng Moore Moulton Murphy (FL) Nadler Napolitano Neal Nolan Norcross O'Rourke Pallone Pascrell Payne Pelosi Perlmutter Peters Peterson Pingree Pocan Polis Price (NC) Quigley Rangel Rice (NY) Richmond Roybal-Allard Ruiz Ruppersberger Rush Ryan (OH) Sanchez, Linda T. Sarbanes Schakowsky Schiff Schrader Scott (VA) Scott, David Serrano Sherman Sinema Sires Slaughter Smith (WA) Speier Swalwell (CA) Takai Takano Thompson (CA) Thompson (MS) Titus Tonko Torres Tsongas Van Hollen Vargas Veasey Vela Velazquez Visclosky Walz Wasserman Schultz Waters, Maxine Watson Coleman Welch Wilson (FL) Yarmuth NOES--240 Abraham Aderholt Allen Amash Amodei Babin Barletta Barr Barton Benishek Bilirakis Bishop (MI) Bishop (UT) Black Blackburn Blum Bost Boustany Brady (TX) Brat Bridenstine Brooks (AL) Brooks (IN) Buchanan Buck Bucshon Burgess Calvert Carter (GA) Carter (TX) Chabot Chaffetz Clawson (FL) Coffman Cole Collins (GA) Collins (NY) Comstock Conaway Cook Costello (PA) Cramer Crawford Crenshaw Culberson Curbelo (FL) Davis, Rodney Denham Dent DeSantis DesJarlais Diaz-Balart Dold Donovan Duffy Duncan (SC) Duncan (TN) Ellmers (NC) Emmer (MN) Farenthold Fincher Fitzpatrick Fleischmann Fleming Flores Forbes Fortenberry Foxx Franks (AZ) Frelinghuysen Garrett Gibbs Gohmert Goodlatte Gosar Gowdy Granger Graves (GA) Graves (LA) Graves (MO) Griffith Grothman Guinta Guthrie Hanna Hardy Harper Harris Hartzler Heck (NV) Hensarling Herrera Beutler Hice, Jody B. Hill Holding Hudson Huelskamp Huizenga (MI) Hultgren Hunter Hurd (TX) Hurt (VA) Issa Jenkins (KS) Jenkins (WV) Johnson (OH) Johnson, Sam Jolly Jones Jordan Joyce Katko Kelly (PA) King (IA) King (NY) Kinzinger (IL) Kline Knight Labrador LaMalfa Lamborn Lance Latta LoBiondo Long Loudermilk Love Lucas Luetkemeyer Lummis MacArthur Marchant Marino Massie McCarthy McCaul McClintock McKinley McMorris Rodgers McSally Meadows Meehan Messer Mica Miller (FL) Miller (MI) Moolenaar Mooney (WV) Mullin Mulvaney Murphy (PA) Neugebauer Newhouse Noem Nugent Nunes Olson Palazzo Palmer Paulsen Pearce Perry Pittenger Pitts Poe (TX) Poliquin Pompeo Posey Price, Tom Ratcliffe Reichert Renacci Ribble Rice (SC) Rigell Roby Roe (TN) Rogers (AL) Rogers (KY) Rohrabacher Rokita Rooney (FL) Ros-Lehtinen Roskam Ross Rothfus Rouzer Royce Russell Ryan (WI) Salmon Sanford Scalise Schweikert Scott, Austin Sensenbrenner Sessions Shimkus Shuster Simpson Smith (MO) Smith (NE) Smith (NJ) Smith (TX) Stefanik Stewart Stivers Stutzman Thompson (PA) Thornberry Tiberi Tipton Trott Turner Upton Valadao Wagner Walberg [[Page H4421]] Walden Walker Walorski Walters, Mimi Weber (TX) Webster (FL) Wenstrup Westerman Westmoreland Whitfield Williams Wilson (SC) Wittman Womack Woodall Yoder Yoho Young (AK) Young (IA) Young (IN) Zeldin Zinke NOT VOTING--10 Byrne Cicilline Fattah Gibson Kelly (MS) McGovern McHenry Reed Sanchez, Loretta Sewell (AL) Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). There are 2 minutes remaining. {time} 1746 So the motion to recommit was rejected. The result of the vote was announced as above recorded. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill. The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it. Recorded Vote Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote. A recorded vote was ordered. The SPEAKER pro tempore. This is a 5-minute vote. The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 247, noes 178, not voting 8, as follows: [Roll No. 369] AYES--247 Abraham Aguilar Allen Amodei Ashford Babin Barletta Barr Barton Benishek Bera Bilirakis Bishop (GA) Bishop (MI) Bishop (UT) Black Blackburn Blum Bost Boustany Brady (TX) Brat Bridenstine Brooks (AL) Brooks (IN) Brownley (CA) Buchanan Buck Bucshon Burgess Bustos Calvert Carter (GA) Carter (TX) Chabot Chaffetz Clay Coffman Cole Collins (GA) Collins (NY) Comstock Conaway Cook Cooper Costa Costello (PA) Cramer Crawford Crenshaw Cuellar Culberson Curbelo (FL) Davis, Rodney Delaney Denham Dent DeSantis Diaz-Balart Dold Donovan Duckworth Duffy Ellmers (NC) Emmer (MN) Farenthold Fincher Fitzpatrick Fleischmann Fleming Flores Forbes Fortenberry Foxx Franks (AZ) Frelinghuysen Gibbs Goodlatte Gowdy Graham Granger Graves (GA) Graves (LA) Graves (MO) Grothman Guinta Guthrie Hanna Hardy Harper Hartzler Heck (NV) Heck (WA) Hensarling Herrera Beutler Hice, Jody B. Hill Holding Hudson Huizenga (MI) Hultgren Hunter Hurd (TX) Hurt (VA) Jenkins (KS) Jenkins (WV) Johnson (OH) Johnson, Sam Jolly Joyce Katko Keating Kelly (PA) King (IA) King (NY) Kinzinger (IL) Kirkpatrick Kline Knight Kuster LaMalfa Lamborn Lance Langevin Latta Lipinski LoBiondo Long Loudermilk Love Lucas Luetkemeyer Lujan Grisham (NM) MacArthur Maloney, Sean Marchant Marino McCarthy McCaul McClintock McKinley McMorris Rodgers McSally Meadows Meehan Messer Mica Miller (FL) Miller (MI) Moolenaar Mullin Murphy (FL) Murphy (PA) Neugebauer Newhouse Noem Norcross Nunes Olson Palazzo Palmer Paulsen Pearce Peters Peterson Pittenger Pitts Poe (TX) Poliquin Pompeo Posey Price, Tom Ratcliffe Reed Reichert Renacci Ribble Rice (NY) Rice (SC) Rigell Roby Roe (TN) Rogers (AL) Rogers (KY) Rohrabacher Rokita Rooney (FL) Ros-Lehtinen Roskam Ross Rothfus Rouzer Royce Ruiz Ruppersberger Russell Ryan (WI) Scalise Schweikert Scott, Austin Sensenbrenner Sessions Shimkus Shuster Simpson Sinema Smith (MO) Smith (NE) Smith (NJ) Smith (TX) Stefanik Stewart Stivers Stutzman Thompson (PA) Thornberry Tiberi Tipton Trott Turner Upton Valadao Veasey Wagner Walberg Walden Walker Walorski Walters, Mimi Walz Weber (TX) Webster (FL) Wenstrup Westerman Westmoreland Whitfield Williams Wilson (SC) Wittman Womack Woodall Yoder Young (AK) Young (IA) Young (IN) Zeldin Zinke NOES--178 Adams Amash Bass Beatty Becerra Beyer Blumenauer Bonamici Boyle, Brendan F. Brady (PA) Brown (FL) Butterfield Capps Capuano Cardenas Carney Carson (IN) Cartwright Castor (FL) Castro (TX) Chu, Judy Cicilline Clark (MA) Clarke (NY) Clawson (FL) Cleaver Clyburn Cohen Connolly Conyers Courtney Crowley Cummings Davis (CA) Davis, Danny DeFazio DeGette DeLauro DelBene DeSaulnier DesJarlais Deutch Dingell Doggett Doyle, Michael F. Duncan (SC) Duncan (TN) Edwards Ellison Engel Eshoo Esty Farr Foster Frankel (FL) Fudge Gabbard Gallego Garamendi Garrett Gibson Gohmert Gosar Grayson Green, Al Green, Gene Griffith Grijalva Gutierrez Hahn Harris Hastings Higgins Himes Hinojosa Honda Hoyer Huelskamp Huffman Israel Issa Jackson Lee Jeffries Johnson (GA) Johnson, E. B. Jones Jordan Kaptur Kelly (IL) Kennedy Kildee Kilmer Kind Labrador Larsen (WA) Larson (CT) Lawrence Lee Levin Lewis Lieu, Ted Loebsack Lofgren Lowenthal Lowey Lujan, Ben Ray (NM) Lummis Lynch Maloney, Carolyn Massie Matsui McCollum McDermott McNerney Meeks Meng Mooney (WV) Moore Moulton Mulvaney Nadler Napolitano Neal Nolan Nugent O'Rourke Pallone Pascrell Payne Pelosi Perlmutter Perry Pingree Pocan Polis Price (NC) Quigley Rangel Richmond Roybal-Allard Rush Ryan (OH) Salmon Sanchez, Linda T. Sanford Sarbanes Schakowsky Schiff Schrader Scott (VA) Scott, David Serrano Sherman Sires Slaughter Smith (WA) Speier Swalwell (CA) Takai Takano Thompson (CA) Thompson (MS) Titus Tonko Torres Tsongas Van Hollen Vargas Vela Velazquez Visclosky Wasserman Schultz Waters, Maxine Watson Coleman Welch Wilson (FL) Yarmuth Yoho NOT VOTING--8 Aderholt Byrne Fattah Kelly (MS) McGovern McHenry Sanchez, Loretta Sewell (AL) {time} 1753 So the bill was passed. The result of the vote was announced as above recorded. A motion to reconsider was laid on the table. personal explanation Ms. SEWELL of Alabama. Madam Speaker, during the votes today I was inescapably detained and away handling important matters related to my District and the State of Alabama. If I had been present, I would have voted: ``no'' on H. Res. 315; ``no'' on the Schiff/Smith (WA) Amendment to H.R. 2596; ``yes'' on the Democratic Motion to Recommit H.R. 2596; and ``no'' on final passage of H.R. 2596. ____________________