[国会记录第159卷，第157号（2013年11月6日星期三）] [参议院] [第S7871-S7873] NSA监督和责任雷利先生。主席先生，我们在智力监督史上的一个流域时刻，就像我教会委员会以来的任何看法。最近的一些启示导致了关于我们国家智力聚集在家的智力的范围的重要国家对话，并更新立法努力重新校准这些当局和相关监督制度。美国吉姆·吉姆·斯敏堡和我上周介绍的美国自由行为与100多名国会成员介绍。然而，重要的是要承认一些泄漏导致我们国家安全的不必要的风险，并威胁着与我们最重要的国际合作伙伴的关系。所有这些都涉及一个名叫Edward Snowden的29岁的承包商。让我再次明确，我不遵守披露了这些高度分类的任何方案的方式。我对我们的智力聚集能力，外国关系和国家安全的潜在损害深感担忧。我也很关心，一个人可以在这么短的时间内造成这种严重破坏。特别是在私人冒犯泄漏之后，我不明白国家安全机构如何允许这种情况发生。 This past weekend, Colbert King wrote in the Washington Post that this damage was, in a sense, self-inflicted. I ask unanimous consent that the King op-ed be printed in the Record. As Mr. King put it, ``I want to know how Snowden got his hands on so much of the nation's most sensitive intelligence and was able to flee the country, all within three months.'' I want to know too. We need to hold people accountable for allowing such a massive leak to occur and we need to change the way we do business to ensure that we prevent this type of breach in the future. In public and in private, I have continued to ask the leaders of the intelligence community to tell me who is being held accountable and what is being done to prevent this from happening again. Without adequate answers to these questions, the American people are rightly concerned that their private information could be swept up into a massive database, and then compromised. The NSA has acknowledged that it is collecting U.S. phone records on an unprecedented scale, and that it is also collecting massive amounts of Internet content against targets abroad, which also includes some communications of law-abiding Americans. And yet the government asks us to trust that it will keep this information safe, and that we should have faith in its internal policies and procedures. This plea comes from the same intelligence community that the FISA [[Page S7872]] court found to have made substantial misrepresentations about the scope of its collection; and the same intelligence community that allowed Edward Snowden to steal such vast amounts of information. And it comes from the same intelligence community whose inspector general just wrote to tell me that he is unable at this time to conduct a communitywide review of government activities conducted under section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. I ask unanimous consent that the September 23, 2013, letter from a bipartisan group of Senate Judiciary Committee members to the inspector general of the intelligence community be printed in the Record, as well as his November 5, 2013, response. The intelligence community faces a trust deficit, and I am particularly concerned that the NSA has strayed and overreached beyond its core missions. One important step toward rebuilding that trust would be for the NSA to spend less of its time collecting data on innocent Americans, and more on keeping our Nation's secrets safe and holding its own accountable. The Senate Judiciary Committee will continue its work on these issues in the next few weeks. On November 13, the Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology, and the Law will hold a hearing on Senator Franken's Surveillance Transparency Act, which I have cosponsored. And on November 20, I have invited back to the committee Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, NSA Director Keith Alexander, and Deputy Attorney General James Cole for another hearing to review the intelligence community's surveillance authorities. [From the Washington Post, Nov. 2, 2013] Latest NSA Spying Revelations Distract From the Real Issues (By Colbert I. King) What's this about governments spying on their closest allies? We called it ``the bubble.'' It was a 12-by-15-foot acoustic conference room made of clear plastic and aluminum. There were at least five inches of space between the walls of the bubble and the walls of the room in which it was located. The bubble's plastic walls, ceiling and floor allowed visual inspection for electronic listening devices, or ``bugs.'' As an extra security measure, a noise-generating machine was installed in the outer room to prevent interception of any discussions of classified information within the bubble. The outer room was secured by a combination lock, the code known only to my office. The first U.S. ``bubble'' was installed after hidden microphones were found in American diplomatic missions in Moscow, Prague and elsewhere in the 1960s. Our bubble, within a room on an upper floor of the U. S. Embassy in Bad Godesberg, West Germany, was a countermeasure against possible technical penetration by the Soviet KGB and the East German Stasi. But Eastern Bloc countries weren't the only concern. Our bubble allowed classified discussions to occur beyond the hearing of our host and ally, the-then Federal Republic of Germany, and our friends down the road in the French and British embassies. That was nearly 50 years ago. This year, in my current capacity, I was sitting in the office of an ambassador in Washington when a member of his staff alerted him to an important call. There was a phone on the ambassador's desk. But he left the room to take the call. It turns out that his prime minister was calling from overseas. The ambassador went to a secure location in the embassy where he could conduct a confidential conversation. True, he was in the capital city of his nation's closest ally. But the matter to be discussed was for the ears of his countrymen only, U. S. friendship notwithstanding. Today, as the United States has been doing for decades, close allies in Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere take similar precautions even when their missions are in friendly countries. Gentlemen may know that it is bad form to read each other's mail or to eavesdrop. But in diplomacy and national security, the desire to know what another country is up to tends to overwhelm any sense of rectitude. Consequently, the European outrage over snooping among friends may be slightly overdone. That is an entirely separate matter from the National Security Agency's (NSA) vacuum-cleanerlike collection of the communication records and metadata of millions of Americans, including private citizens and, apparently, foreign citizens both here and overseas. The scope of that intelligence-collection program, disputed by Gen. Keith Alexander, the director of the NSA, this week is the cause of uproar around the country and in Congress. There is still much to sort out and probably reform. The monitoring of foreign leaders' phone calls, however, is closer to the larger deed of spying on allied governments. Which takes us to an indelicate question: Why is a foreign leader, a repository of a nation's secrets, communicating by text messages and smartphone? The most junior Foreign Service officer or government civil servant entrusted with sensitive information assumes that e- mails and cellphones are susceptible to eavesdropping. What makes a head of state behave as if he or she is immune from monitoring? Which brings up another tactless question: Why haven't the security services of those foreign leaders developed countermeasures to prevent successful spying on personal communications? The danger here isn't simply that the NSA may have overstepped its bounds with respect to U.S. allies. The intelligence services of the foes of Germany, France, Spain, Brazil and the like may have the capacity to listen in on high-level conversations. The naivete of outraged foreign leaders and their vulnerability to spying are nearly--but not totally--as surprising as the scale of NSA snooping. The NSA revelations, meanwhile, should not draw attention away from the revelations' primary source: Edward Joseph Snowden. How in the world is it possible that a high school dropout with a GED, a community college student who didn't graduate, a failed Army recruit and security guard can catapult himself into a CIA information technology job, an overseas posting and subsequently a $200,000-a-year job with a company contracted to do NSA work in Hawaii, where he was able to gain access to the crown jewels of America's secrets? Whistleblower, traitor, patriot: Debate the labels all you want. The government has charged him with espionage. Take it up with Attorney General Eric Holder. I want to know how Snowden got his hands on so much of the nation's most sensitive intelligence and was able to flee the country, all within three months. Damage? Done by the U.S. government to itself. ____2013年9月23日，华盛顿特区，美国参议院司法委员会。尊敬的查尔斯·麦卡洛三世，华盛顿特区国家情报总监办公室情报系统监察长。亲爱的监察长麦卡洛:最近有关政府机密监视活动的披露引发了公众对这些项目广度的重大讨论，其中许多项目是根据《外国情报监视法》(FISA)进行的，需要进行适当的监督和制衡。特别是，人们对根据《美国爱国者法案》第215条和《外国情报监视法》第702条(2008年《外国情报监视法修正案》的一部分)开展的活动感到担忧。最近解密的文件似乎揭示了在执行这些权力过程中许多违反法律和政策的行为，包括FISA法庭对法院的三次“重大虚假陈述”。这些解密文件还表明，这些权力的实施涉及到情报系统(IC)的几个组成部分，包括国家安全局、司法部、联邦调查局、中央情报局和国家情报总监办公室，等等。我们敦促你们对这些权限进行全面审查，并全面说明这些权限在情报界的执行情况。IC监察长就是为此目的于2010年成立的。你们办公室对第215和702条的实施情况进行全面和独立的审查，将发挥关键的监督作用。 Providing a publicly available summary of the findings and conclusions of these reviews will help promote greater oversight, transparency, and public accountability. In conducting such reviews, we encourage you to draw on the excellent work already done by the Inspectors General of several agencies, including the Department of Justice, in reviewing these authorities. But only your office can bring to bear an IC-wide perspective that is critical to effective oversight of these programs. The reviews previously conducted have been more narrowly focused--as might be expected--on a specific agency. In particular, we urge you to review for calendar years 2010 through 2013: The use and implementation of Section 215 and Section 702 authorities, including the manner in which information--and in particular, information about U.S. persons--is collected, retained, analyzed and disseminated; applicable minimization procedures and other relevant procedures and guidelines, including whether they are consistent across agencies and the extent to which they protect the privacy rights of U.S. persons; any improper or illegal use of the authorities or information collected pursuant to them; and an examination of the effectiveness of the authorities as investigative and intelligence tools. We have urged appropriate oversight of these activities long before the problems [[Page S7873]] with the implementation of these FISA authorities became public. We believe it is important for your office to begin this review without further delay. Please proceed to administratively perform reviews of the implementation of Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and Section 702 of FISA, and submit the reports no later than December 31, 2014. Thank you in advance for your efforts to ensure a full accounting of the implementation of these surveillance authorities across the Intelligence Community. Sincerely, Patrick Leahy, Charles Schumer, Sheldon Whitehouse, Christopher Coons, Richard Blumenthal, Chuck Grassley, Ted Cruz, Michael S. Lee, Jeff Flake.____情报界监察长，华盛顿特区，2013年11月5日。备忘录:见分发。主题:对《美国爱国者法案》第215条和《外国情报监视法》第702条的IC IG审查。感谢您2013年9月23日的来信，要求我的办公室审查情报界(IC)对《美国爱国者法》第215条和《外国情报监视法》第702条的使用。目前，我们没有资源在要求的时间框架内进行要求的审查。如你在信中所述，几位IC检查员对IC使用外国电子监控机构进行监督。虽然我的办公室有权使用这些权限对所有集成电路要素进行全面的集成电路审查，但这种审查将涉及持续的监督工作。因此，我一直在与IC检查员总论坛的几位成员进行磋商，以考虑如何完成这样的审查，考虑到对IG资源和正在进行的项目的潜在影响。当我和我的IG同事就是否可能对所要求的主题进行联合审查进行协商时，我会随时通知你和委员会工作人员。再次感谢你们一直以来对IG社区的支持。 If you have any questions regarding this subject, please contact me or my Legislative Counsel, Melissa Wright, at 571-204-8149. Sincerely, I. Charles McCullough, III, Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. ____________________