[国会记录：2011年4月5日（参议院）][第S2127-S2128页]反对怀登先生的意向通知。主席先生，我想简单谈谈2011财年的情报授权法案，该法案现已通过报道由情报委员会。我向条例草案提出了向委员会报告提出了额外意见，今天我的言论将包括对这些意见的简要摘要。我现在已成为参议院情报委员会的成员，参议员Feinstein，参议员洛克菲勒，我都在2001年初开始在委员会任职，我认为委员会是委员会最长的当前成员。在委员会的时间，我已经熟悉情报授权过程。它现在已经近7年了7年，因为智力授权法案在财政年度签署了法律，仍可覆盖，虽然2011年财政年度现在已经过剩，但大会仍有机会提供有关的有关指导和方向智力支出本财政年度。2011财年智力授权法案是Feinstein董事长和副主席Chambliss以及各自的工作人员，以及各自的工作人员，他们赞扬他们努力并为他们努力提出的两分之一一起。不幸的是，我对本条例草案的一项提供了非常严重的担忧，这就是为什么我上个月在委员会标记期间投票反对。本条例草案第403条将授权国家情报署署长DNI，建立一个行政程序，其中DNI和各种情报机构的主管将有权夺走智力局雇员的养老金福利，或者 former employee, if they ``determine'' that the employee has knowingly violated his or her nondisclosure agreement and disclosed classified information. I share my colleagues' frustration regarding unauthorized disclosures, or ``leaks,'' of classified information. Leaks are a problem that has plagued intelligence agencies throughout modern history--they can undermine intelligence operations, jeopardize intelligence sources and methods, and have a terrible impact on the lives of covert agents who are publicly exposed. Every Member of Congress, myself included, wants to find new ways to identify and appropriately punish individuals who illegally disclose classified information. I personally spent 4 years working on legislation to increase the criminal penalty for people who are convicted of deliberately exposing covert agents. And I am proud to say that with help from a number of my Republican and Democratic colleagues, this legislation was finally signed into law last year. So I don't take a backseat to anybody when it comes to getting tough on leaks. I agree that increasing penalties for particular offenses can sometimes have a deterrent effect on those who might otherwise be tempted to leak, so I support the creation of new consequences for individuals who have been convicted of illegally divulging classified information. But when it comes to leakers, the biggest challenge is not determining how to punish them as much as it is identifying who they are. Given these challenges, my concern is that giving intelligence agency heads the authority to take away the pensions of individuals who haven't been formally convicted of any wrongdoing could pose serious problems for the due process rights of intelligence professionals, and particularly the rights of whistleblowers who report waste, fraud and abuse to Congress or inspectors general. Section 403--as approved by the Select Committee on Intelligence-- gives intelligence agency heads the power to take pension benefits away from any employee that an agency head ``determines'' has knowingly violated their nondisclosure agreement. But as I pointed out to my colleagues during the committee markup of this bill, neither the DNI nor any of the intelligence agency heads have asked Congress for this authority. Moreover, as of today none of the intelligence agencies have officially told Congress how they would interpret this language. It is entirely unclear to me what standard agency heads would use to ``determine'' that a particular employee was guilty of disclosing information. It seems clear that section 403 gives agency heads the power to make this determination themselves, without going to a court of law, but the language of the provision provides virtually no guidance about what standard should be used, or even whether this standard could vary from one agency to the next. And no agency [[Page S2128]] heads have yet told Congress what standard they believe they would be inclined or required to use. This means that if an agency head ``determines'' that a particular individual is responsible for a particular anonymous publication, he or she could conceivably take action to revoke that individual's pension benefits even if the agency does not have enough proof to convict the employee in court. Section 403 states that agency heads must act ``in a manner consistent with the due process and appeal rights otherwise available to an individual who is subject to the same or similar disciplinary action under other law.'' But federal agencies do not normally take away the pension benefits of former employees unless they are convicted of a crime or begin openly working for a foreign government. I do not believe that this ``otherwise available'' language is intended to require the government to get a criminal conviction, but beyond that I am not at all sure what impact this language is supposed to have and I am not sure that the various intelligence agency heads will know what it means either. This only increases my concern that this provision could be used to undermine or violate the due process rights of intelligence agency employees, with a corresponding impact on their family members and dependents. I am also especially troubled that section 403 is silent regarding disclosures to Congress and inspectors general. Everyone hopes that intelligence agency managers and supervisors will act honorably and protect whistleblowers who come forward and go through proper channels to report waste, fraud and abuse in national security agencies, but this is unfortunately not always the reality. There are existing laws in place that are intended to protect whistleblowers who provide information to Congress and inspectors general--and I believe that these laws should be strengthened--but section 403 does not specify whether it would supersede these existing statutes or not. I know that none of my colleagues would deliberately do anything to undermine protections for legitimate whistleblowers, but I think it was a mistake for the Intelligence Committee to report this bill without hearing the intelligence agencies' views on whether or not they believe that section 403 would impact existing whistleblower protections. It is unfortunately entirely plausible to me that a given intelligence agency could conclude that a written submission to the congressional intelligence committees or an agency inspector general is an ``unauthorized publication,'' and that the whistleblower who submitted it is thereby subject to punishment under section 403, especially since there is no explicit language in the bill that contradicts this conclusion. Withholding pension benefits from a legitimate whistleblower would be highly inappropriate, but overzealous and even unscrupulous individuals have served in senior government positions in the past, and will undoubtedly do so again in the future. This is why it is essential to have strong protections for whistleblowers enshrined in law, and this is particularly true for intelligence whistleblowers, since, given the covert nature of intelligence operations and activities, there are limited opportunities for public oversight. But reporting fraud and abuse by one's own colleagues takes courage, and no whistleblowers will come forward if they do not believe that they will be protected from retaliation. Finally, I am somewhat perplexed by the fact that section 403 creates a special avenue of punishment that only applies to accused leakers who have worked directly for an intelligence agency at some point in their careers. There are literally thousands of employees at the Departments of Defense, State and Justice, as well as the White House, who have access to sensitive information. Some of the most serious leaks of the past few decades have undoubtedly been made by individuals working for these organizations. I do not see an obvious justification for singling out intelligence community employees, particularly in the absence of evidence that these employees are responsible for a disproportionate number of leaks. And I am concerned that it will be harder to attract qualified individuals to work for intelligence agencies if Congress creates the perception that intelligence officers have fewer due process rights than other government employees. Withholding pension benefits from individuals who are convicted of disclosing classified information will often be an appropriate punishment. This punishment is already established in existing laws, and I would be inclined to support efforts to clarify or strengthen these laws. But I am not inclined to give agency heads broad authority to take away the pensions of individuals who have not been convicted of wrongdoing, particularly when the agency heads themselves have not even told Congress how they would interpret and implement this authority. This is why I voted against this authorization bill. All of my colleagues and I agree that illegal leaks are a serious problem, but this does not mean that anything at all that is done in the name of stopping leaks is necessarily wise policy. I look forward to working with my colleagues to amend this bill, and I am hopeful that they will be willing to modify or remove section 403 to address the concerns I have raised. In the meantime, I should be clear that it is my intention to object to any request to pass the current version of the bill by unanimous consent. ____________________