[国会纪录：2010年11月18日（参议院）] [Page S8052-S8053]新的开始条约债券先生。主席先生，我今天上升，表示我对政府的新开始条约的强烈反对。我在良好的审议之后和初步倾向之后，支持条约，因为这些类型条约对我们国家的普遍重要性。但是对于我从分类的情报信息中学到的内容，我不能很好地支持这条约。我已经写了一封分类的信，总结了所涉参议院安全的所有成员的观点;我敦促他们阅读它，即使我现在尝试一些未分类的评论来解释我的立场。当政府宣布这一新条约时，我们被告知，其目标是以使美国更安全和提高核稳定的方式来减少战略核力量。这一目标可能是令人钦佩的，但不幸的是，政府与莫斯科击中的交易很短。因此，我相信政府的新开始条约被超越和过度普遍存在。我们所有人都必须了解这条约的第一件事是，它迫使美国单方面减少我们的力量，例如导弹，轰炸机和弹头，以满足条约限制。 On the other hand, the Russians will actually be allowed to increase their deployed forces because they currently fall below the treaty's limits. This raises a crucial question: exactly what does the United States gain from this treaty in exchange for a one-sided reduction in our deployed forces? Defenders of this treaty have argued, first, that the treaty places no limits on America's plans for missile defense systems, and second, that our own military will have the flexibility to deploy our strategic forces, such as bombers, submarines, and missiles, in ways that best meet our security interests. Unfortunately, these explanations simply do not stand up to scrutiny. The United States does not need a treaty with Russia, or any other country, to be free to pursue the missile defense system we need to keep America safe. The United States does not need a treaty to give us the flexibility to deploy our strategic forces as we wish. Interestingly, the administration's justifications completely dismiss the unilateral statement Russia has made to this treaty that claims the right to withdraw if we expand our missile defenses. This Russian statement is pure and simple manipulation. At some point down the road, our Nation will need to expand its missile defenses. Because of this unilateral statement, however, the reaction from some in the administration or in Congress will be to reject any expansion lest we upset the Russians and cause them to pull out of this new Treaty. The Russians surely are counting on this reaction. Yet in all the rhetoric in support of this treaty, I have not heard any reasonable explanation for why we would give Russia this lever to use against our legitimate and necessary right to defend ourselves against ballistic missile attack. For several months, we have listened to the administration's claims that New START will make America more secure by strengthening nuclear stability. In the ``Show Me'' State, where I come from, and I suspect throughout the rest of the country, claims like this need to be backed up by facts. But if we cannot verify that the Russians are complying with each of the treaty's three central limits, then we have no way of knowing whether we are more secure or not. The Select Committee on Intelligence has been looking at this issue closely over the past several months. As the vice chairman of this committee, I have reviewed the key intelligence on our ability to monitor this treaty and heard from our intelligence professionals. There is no doubt in my mind that the United States cannot reliably verify the treaty's 1,550 limit on deployed warheads. As an initial hurdle, the ten annual warhead inspections allowed under the treaty permit us to sample only 2 to 3 percent of the total Russian force. Further, under New START, unlike its predecessor, any given missile can have any number of warheads loaded on it. So even if the Russians fully cooperated in every inspection, these inspections cannot provide conclusive evidence of whether the Russians are complying with the warhead limit. Let's take an example: say that the United States found a missile that was loaded with more warheads than the Russians declared. While this would be a faulty and suspicious declaration by Russia, we could not necessarily infer from it that they had violated the 1,550 warhead limit--especially because the Russians could always make some excuse for a faulty declaration. Compounding this verification gap is the current structure of the treaty's warhead limits which would allow Russia to prepare legally to add very large numbers of warheads to its forces in excess of the treaty's limit. For example, the Russians could deploy a missile with only one warhead, but legally flight-test it with six warheads to gain confidence in the increased capability--a practice they could not employ under the original START. The Russians could then store the five extra warheads for each such missile nearby, ready to mate them to the missile on a moment's notice. All of this would be legal. Further, unlike START, this new treaty places no limit on the number of nondeployed missiles, so the Russians legally could store spare missiles to be mated with the spare warheads. This potential for Russia to ``break-out'' of the treaty in a short period of time--perhaps without adequate warning to the United States--may undermine the very nuclear stability this administration claims this treaty provides. Arguably, it also means that, despite the opportunities to cheat, it may be even easier for Russia to circumvent legally the limits of this treaty. That does not sound to me like a great bargain for the United States. Because the details on verification and breakout of this treaty are classified, I have prepared a full classified assessment that is available to any Senator for review. The key points, however, are not classified and I believe the Senate and the American public need to understand them fully. Common sense suggests that the worse a treaty partner's arms control compliance record with existing and past treaties, the stronger verification must be for any new treaties. So, exactly what is Russia's record? According to the official State Department reports on arms control compliance, published by this administration and the previous administration, the Russians have previously violated, or are still violating, important provisions of most of the key arms control treaties to which they have been a party, including the original START, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and [[Page S8053]] Open Skies. I recommend that my colleagues review the classified versions of these reports before any further Senate action is taken on this treaty. Despite Russia's poor compliance record, the administration has decided that we will rely primarily on good Russian cooperation to verify New START's key 1,550 limit on deployed warheads. This brings to mind the famous adage: fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me. One of the persistent Russian arms control violations of the original START was its illegal obstruction of U.S. on-site inspections of warheads on certain types of missiles. The only reason these Russian violations did not prevent us from verifying START's warhead limits was because START limited the capability to deploy warheads through a ``counting rule'' that could be verified primarily with our own intelligence satellites. Unfortunately, New START has discarded this critical counting rule, designed to work hand-in-glove with our satellites, in favor of reliance on no more than ten sample inspections a year--again, just 2 to 3 percent of Russia's force. The warhead limit in New START is calculated from the actual number of warheads loaded on a missile, and unlike START, this new treaty permits any missile to have any number of warheads loaded on it. But no satellite can tell us how many warheads are loaded on missiles. Therefore, if this treaty is ratified, we will have to rely primarily on on-site inspections to verify actual warhead loadings the very same kind of inspections that the Russians violated in START. If the Russians continue their poor compliance record and obstruct our warhead inspections under New START, the consequences will be much more serious and will substantially degrade verification. The administration is surely aware of these verification and breakout problems as there is no shortage of verification gimmicks in this treaty. But not even all of them together permit us to verify reliably the treaty's warhead limit. So how have treaty enthusiasts responded to these problems? First, they discard the military significance of possible Russian cheating. Our own State Department's verification assessment states that: any Russian cheating under the Treaty would have little if any effect on the assured second-strike capabilities of U.S. strategic forces. In particular, the survivability and response capabilities of [U.S.] strategic submarines and heavy bombers would be unaffected by even large-scale cheating. This is not exactly a ringing endorsement. I think it is pretty clear that a large-scale breakout would have a seismic impact from a geopolitical perspective. It would escalate tensions between the superpowers and lead to extreme strategic instability. Even more fundamentally, the State Department statement raises a pivotal question: If no level of Russian cheating under New START is deemed militarily significant, then what is the value of this treaty in the first place? Second, treaty proponents attempt to draw a parallel to the ``Moscow'' arms control treaty, signed by President Bush and approved 95-0 by the Senate. They argue that this treaty has the same kind of warhead verification difficulties as New START, therefore critics of New START are applying a double-standard. This argument fails on two counts: the first being that the Moscow arms control treaty was placed on top of the verification measures already in effect for START; and second, that the United States had decided unilaterally to move to the limits imposed in the Moscow treaty, whether or not Russia reduced to them. This is simply not the case for New START. Clearly, the two treaties are not comparable from a verification standpoint. The administration also argues that our ability to monitor Russian forces will be greater with the new treaty than without it. As a general proposition, this is true. In actuality, however, the extent of the treaty's monitoring benefits could be insignificant or only modest in some important respects. This disparity between generalization and reality is explained more in my classified paper. The bottom line is this: if the chief benefit of this treaty is that we will know more about what Russia is doing with its nuclear forces, then the same benefit could have been achieved with a much more modest confidence-building protocol, one which would not require unilateral U.S. force reductions, give Russia a vote on our missile defenses, or present impossible verification problems. The administration claims that New START is indispensible to reap the ``Reset'' benefits with Russia. If a fatally flawed arms control agreement is the price of admission to the Reset game, our Nation is better off if we this one out. Similarly, any suggestion by treaty advocates that rejecting the treaty weakens the ``good'' Russian leader, Medvedev, and strengthens the ``bad'' Russian leader, Putin, should be met with healthy skepticism. Now is not the time to fall for a ``good cop--bad cop'' act from Moscow. In many cases, concerns about particular treaties can be solved during the ratification process. I respect my colleagues who are attempting to do so with this treaty. Unfortunately, New START suffers from fundamental flaws that no amount of tinkering around the edges can fix. I believe the better course for our nation, and for global stability, is to put this treaty aside and replace it with a better one. The United States needs, and we in the Senate should demand, a treaty that can be reliably verified by our own intelligence assets without relying on Russia's good graces, not one that requires unilateral reductions or gives Russia a vote on our strategic defenses. I urge my colleagues to reject anything less and to take a strong stand for America's defense and America's future. ____________________