S. HRG。国会委员会第战略态势美国作者：111-218，通过报告=======================================================================的军事委员会美国参议院前一百听证ELEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ MAY 7, 2009 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 54-357 WASHINGTON : 2009 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JACK REED, Rhode Island SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN THUNE, South Dakota E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska MEL MARTINEZ, Florida EVAN BAYH, Indiana ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi JIM WEBB, Virginia RICHARD BURR, North Carolina CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri DAVID VITTER, Louisiana MARK UDALL, Colorado SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina MARK BEGICH, Alaska ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director Joseph W. Bowab, Republican Staff Director (ii) C O N T E N T S __________ CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES The Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States may 7, 2009 Page Perry, Dr. William J., Chairman, Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States......................... 4 Schlesinger, Dr. James R., Vice Chairman, Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States; Accompanied by Senator John Glenn, Dr. Harry Cartland, and Dr. John Foster.................................................... 11 (iii) THE REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES ---------- THURSDAY, MAY 7, 2009 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC. The committee met, pusuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, E. Benjamin Nelson, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Burris, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, Thune, Martinez, and Collins. Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and Paul J. Hubbard, receptionist. Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; and Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member. Minority staff members present: Richard H. Fontaine, Jr., deputy Republican staff director; Michael V. Kostiw, professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; and Dana W. White, professional staff member. Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Mary C. Holloway, Jessica L. Kingston, and Brian F. Sebold. Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite, assistant to Senator Byrd; Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Gerald Thomas, assistant to Senator Burris; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Rob Soofer, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator Sessions; Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez; and Chip Kennett, assistant to Senator Collins. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. First, let me welcome our Commission, Dr. Perry, Dr. Schlesinger, Chairman and Vice Chairman, John Glenn, a dear and old friend of ours, Dr. Foster, Dr. Cartland. We welcome you all. We thank you for your wonderful service. Many of you are old friends and have been before us, served with us, in the case of Senator Glenn for many, many years, and so this is a homecoming in a sense, a little bit of a reunion. I hated to bang the gavel. We're having some reminisces going on. But we must get on with our work because we have a bill on the Senate Floor and that means I'm going to have to leave at 10:30 a.m. I know that Senator McCain probably will want to be there, as well. He's been a total partner on a bill that we have on the Senate floor. This is going to be a bit hurried for the two of us and maybe others, as well, but you're used to that. The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States was established by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 to examine recommendations with respect to the long-term strategic posture of the United States. Over the course of the last several years, there's been much debate and discussion about the future of nuclear weapons but there's been a lack of a coherent plan or policy. For the most part, the debates here in Congress center on specific programs, such as low-yield nuclear weapons, the mini-nukes, the robust nuclear earth-penetrator, the reliable replacement warhead. Then in September 2007, when the Air Force unknowingly flew nuclear weapons across the country and then later on when the Air Force discovered it had unknowingly shipped intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) nose cones to Taiwan, nuclear matters became the source of public discussion again and the cause for dismissal, in fact, of the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Various reviews and reports in the months following those events disclosed additional problems and issues within the nuclear enterprise. The conclusions in these reports demonstrate that the uncertainty and confusion in U.S. nuclear policy was a major source of the chaos in the nuclear enterprise. All of these events led in turn to the erosion of the funding, to conflicting direction, and to the general breakdown of consensus that had generally existed for the first decade of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP). The task before this Commission was to examine all elements of the nuclear enterprise and nuclear policy, to make recommendations as appropriate and to determine where there is and is not consensus on these important matters. The Commission's report contains 11 separate discussion topics and 100 recommendations. Some will have very broad support, such as the conclusion that the United States must lead international efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and reduce the number of nuclear weapons worldwide. Other conclusions will need more discussion and review and have less consensus behind them perhaps. An overarching finding of the report is that the United States has an opportunity and there's urgency to reengage with the international community by seeking international solutions to the problems of nuclear proliferation and nuclear threats. Our committee thanks you all for your extraordinarily hard work. The staff, the working group members, all of you, we're grateful to all of you for this report, and together with the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), this report should help to restore clarity and hopefully consensus to U.S. nuclear policy. Senator McCain. STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to again echo your sentiments about our witnesses today who we've had the opportunity to work with and to serve with for many years and through many contributions to the security of this Nation. Thank you, Dr. Schlesinger, Dr. Perry, Senator Glenn, Dr. Cartland, and Dr. Foster. Thank you all for being here and thank you for this latest contribution you've made in helping us ensure the future security of this Nation. This Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture report both addresses many of the complexities we face in the world today and plays an important role in fostering a national bipartisan discussion on the current state and path forward of our strategic deterrent. This report takes an important look at the steps needed to make sure that our deterrent remains credible and that our nuclear infrastructure remains viable. It addresses missile defense as well as the path forward for reenergizing our nonproliferation efforts. The work of this Commission will likely influence the upcoming NPR as well as congressional consideration of strategic issues over the next few years. It will also play an important role as the United States formulates its approach to discussions about the future of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) which will expire at the end of this year. As we move through these steps, it's imperative that we move to reduce the size of our nuclear arsenal to the lowest levels possible, while at the same time taking the appropriate steps to ensure that our nuclear deterrent remains safe and reliable. In addition, we must maintain our focus on developing a robust missile defense system and superior conventional forces capable of defending both the United States and our allies. As we all know, there are significant hurdles before us, including the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs, ensuring that nuclear weapons remain out of the hands of terrorists, and strengthening the international will of imposed sanctions towards those who seek to proliferate nuclear arms. We should begin a dialogue with China to encourage its conformity with the practices of the other foreign nuclear weapon states recognized in the Nuclear Nonpoliferation Treaty (NPT) and work with Russia to build confidence in our missile defense program. Among the other steps we must take, I agree in principle with a number of the recommendations outlined in the report that we're here today to discuss. Above all, it is imperative that America lead by example. Our leadership on strategic issues is as vital today as it was during the Cold War. Internationally, reports from Pakistan are a major cause for concern. With the Taliban only 60 miles outside of Islamabad, the prospect of an insecure Pakistani nuclear arsenal poses a grave threat to our national security. We must do whatever it takes to ensure that Pakistan is able to secure its nuclear assets, and I look forward to hearing the panel's views on this matter. As for missile defense, early last month Secretary Gates announced the transition in focus to the theater missile threat posed by rogue states. I have some concerns with the proposed $1.4 billion overall reduction in funding and I look forward to hearing from our Commission about Secretary Gates' proposal and how the changes he has outlined could affect the important role missile defense plays in our strategic posture. For too long Congress has avoided serious debate on significant strategic force issues. I thank the members of this Commission for their thoughtful assessments and recommendations and I look forward to today's hearing and working with you to address the future of our strategic posture and our shared desire to reduce the danger of nuclear weapons being used. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I do apologize to the witnesses. We are on the floor at 10:30 a.m. with our first real serious attempt in some time in bringing the cost overruns of our defense systems under control. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain. Dr. Perry, let's start with you. STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM J. PERRY, CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES Dr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Very early in our deliberations, we met with Senator Sessions and he urged us to come up with a consensus report. He said, ``A consensus report would have a much greater weight with the Senate than anything else we'd come up with.'' At the time, I said, ``Easy for you to say.'' [Laughter.] But we gave it our best shot and with one exception this report is a consensus report and that was no small effort to achieve. Chairman Levin. Senator Sessions was right. It does have greater power when you're able to do that and we congratulate you for it. Dr. Perry. We have, as you pointed out, 100 different recommendations in this report. I do not propose to review all those with you. I do have written testimony which I would like to submit for the record. Chairman Levin. It will be part of the record. Dr. Perry. My comments then are going to be focused on briefly relating the major findings in this report. The strategic policies of the administration as it goes into office. These policies will no doubt evolve as the administration does their own NPR, but I'm relating these policies to the going-in policies, articulated by President Obama in his speech in Prague. First of all, he said, ``The nation faces a new threat, nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, but besides that, it needs to hedge against the possible resurgence of the old threat.'' One statement of policy. This Commission agrees with that statement. Second, he had said, ``NPT is critical to dealing with this new threat. The United States should work to strengthen the NPT and, in particular, should commit more resources to the International Atomic Energy Agency.'' This Commission agrees with that finding. Third, he said, ``The success in preventing proliferation will require the effort of all nations, not just the United States, and not just the nuclear powers, and getting cooperation will entail the United States and other nuclear powers making progress in nuclear disarmament.'' I agree fully with this statement. Some of our members think that would be overstated. Others say there's a difference in degree of that issue, but all of us see some coupling between those two areas. Fourth, the President, in his Prague speech, made a very strong statement that ``the United States seeks a world without nuclear weapons and that therefore we should reduce their numbers and their salience,'' but he says, ``As long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States must maintain safe, secure, reliable forces capable of providing deterrence and extended deterrence.'' All of our members agree with the latter part of that statement, mainly the importance of maintaining safe, secure, and reliable deterrent forces. I strongly agree with the full statement. I must say that some of the members do not agree that we should be seeking a world without nuclear weapons, but all of them fully support the view that we should be reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons, if that can be done in a bilateral fashion. The fifth statement of the administration is that ``we should seek new treaties, a new START, a fissile material cut- off treaty, and a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).'' All of our members agree that it's important to seek a new START and a treaty on fissile material cut-off. On the CTBT ratification, our members are divided. We clearly articulate that division in the report and the pros and cons. My own view is that the United States cannot assume leadership in the field of proliferation if we do not ratify the CTBT and so I strongly support that ratification. This is an issue which will be coming before the Senate very shortly. Many of us will no doubt be asked to testify on that matter. I will be testifying in favor of it, some of our members will be testifying against it. So we are divided on that issue. On missile defense, we focused on two different aspects. One, the President said, ``We should move forward on missile defense as long as the Iranian threat persists'' and that ``we should seek to find a way of cooperating with the Russians on this.'' We agree with both of those conclusions. There are real differences among our members on the relative role as well as the importance of missile defense, but on those two issues, we are in agreement. The President has talked about civilian nuclear programs, and we need to get that under control; and we need a new international framework to discourage the spread of enrichment and processing capabilities, and we all agree with that. Finally, the President said, ``We should seek to roll back North Korea's nuclear program and prevent Iran.'' He observed, ``The Six-Party Talks have failed to stop North Korea from going ahead with their nuclear program,'' that ``compliance with the NPT is in tatters and that there must be consequences when nations violate it.'' We agree with all of those conclusions. The question is: how do you do those things? Beyond reporting on these policy issues, we make specific recommendations on how to sustain the deterrent force, particularly in the face of an American policy of no testing, no design of new weapons, and the limited funding that has been put on the program. The key to doing this is maintaining the strength of our weapons laboratories which have outstanding technical staffs. We have had remarkable success to this date in the SSP and the Life Extension Program, but as our weapons age, that success is going to become very much harder to achieve. Given that problem, the government has responded by cutting the staff at the weapons laboratories and we find that inexplicable. We argue that that trend should be reversed and beyond that we suggest that the laboratories should have added responsibilities in other fields besides nuclear weapons. In particular, in civilian energy, nuclear intelligence, and in general research and development. The labs are unique national assets and by giving them this expanded national security role, they can be a great benefit to the Nation. If that were done, they probably should be renamed national security laboratories for the Nation, not just the nuclear weapons labs. If this were done, we should really give them freedom of action appropriate for this mission. In particular, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) should have more autonomy than it now has and we have recommended that it report to the President through the Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE) which is different from present reporting channels. The problem in the past with NNSA was its inability to provide adequate management, because of the bureaucratic staff, mostly in DOE. We need to find a way of getting full engagement of the Secretary of Energy without the burdensome bureaucracy imposed by his staff. I'm going to conclude by observing that we have a world ahead of us which has very imposing dangers. The danger that the non-proliferation regime will collapse is facing us right now. There is also the danger that there will be a cascade of proliferation in the next few years. Both of these increase the risk of nuclear terrorism; and the danger that nuclear powers will reengage in a competition, reminiscent of the Cold War. There is also some hope we can have a brighter future if we can find a way of sustaining the nuclear nonproliferation regime, constraining proliferation, stymieing nuclear terrorism, and that the nuclear powers will find a way of cooperating instead of competing in the nuclear field. The report which we are submitting to you describes the strategy which we think will lead to a more hopeful future rather than the bleak future which I've previously described. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to now turn it over to Dr. Schlesinger. [The prepared statement of Dr. Perry follows:] Prepared Statement by Dr. William J. Perry Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and Members of the Armed Services Committee, it is a pleasure to be here today with my colleague Dr. Schlesinger to present to you the findings and results of the work of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. Last year, Congress appointed our 12-person bipartisan group to conduct this review of U.S. strategic posture, and asked me to serve as Chairman with Jim Schlesinger as Vice Chairman. This Commission has deliberated for the last 11 months and is now prepared to report to the administration, to Congress, and to the American people, and we are here today to do so. We all applaud the wisdom of Congress in setting up this Commission. For too long, there have been unanswered, even unasked, questions about the strategic posture of the United States, especially the nuclear dimensions of that posture. This ``strategic silence'' has not served America well. Continuing questions about our broader strategic posture have gone unaddressed, while the military, geopolitical, and technical needs that underlie these questions have grown ever more insistent. We understood from the outset that the lack of consensus about the future of the U.S. nuclear deterrent was a key motivator in Congress's charge to the Commission. So your tasking last year to the Commission was timely. We hope that our report will be a useful input to the new administration as it prepares to undertake a new nuclear posture review. The Commission has greatly benefited from the input of a number of Members of Congress, outside groups and individuals of every stripe that care deeply about these issues and their country. Likewise we have been enriched in our understanding of these issues by the thoughtful perspectives and advice of nations that are U.S. allies, friends, or fellow nuclear powers. We received unstinting assistance from the executive branch, which has been individually and collectively supportive of the Commission. The United States Institute of Peace, its employees and contractors have provided outstanding support to the Commission, and I thank them. I also want to make special mention of and praise the members of our five Expert Working Groups and their leaders, who have volunteered countless hours of their time in supporting the Commission and its work and provided us with strong intellectual assistance of the highest caliber. While each Commissioner would have written a report that would be worded somewhat differently than our final report, it is most significant that with the exception of parts of the chapter on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), this is a consensus document. Even with CTBT, while we could not agree on common language overall, we did agree on recommendations that would prepare the way for Senate reconsideration of the Treaty. We strove to ensure that the essence of our disagreement was presented as clearly and succinctly as possible so that interested individuals and groups can review the arguments, weigh them carefully, and reach their own conclusions. At the beginning of the Commission's work, I did not imagine that such an ideologically disparate group of senior experts would find so much common ground. The trail we followed to arrive at this document was not always easy for us, logistically, intellectually, or emotionally. But the seriousness of the issues, and the stakes involved for America and the world, called forth the ``better angels'' in all of us Commissioners, producing the largely consensus document you have before you today. We hope that the executive branch and Congress will also face these critical security policy issues in a similar nonpartisan spirit. In conducting its work, the Commission has adopted a broad definition of strategic posture. We defined the scope of our work to include all dimensions of nuclear weapons, including the key infrastructures that support them, and all the major tools to counter the nuclear threat to the United States and its allies, including arms control, missile defense, and countering nuclear proliferation. But we also defined some limits to our inquiry. For example, we chose not to expand our scope of work to address issues associated with all weapons of mass destruction, though we did address the question of whether and how nuclear weapons have a role in deterring attacks with biological weapons. Neither did we examine threats such as cyber attacks and space conflict, though this does not mean we consider them unimportant, and believe they merit serious examination in the near future. Also, our pre-eminent conventional military capabilities are themselves a major strategic force, but we understood Congress was not seeking our advice on these matters. When one considers the destructive power of the nuclear weapons within our strategic posture, which generated important disagreements throughout the Cold War and after, it is not surprising the American nuclear posture has been, and will continue to be, highly controversial on key issues. What was surprising is the extent to which our commission did reach agreement on numerous issues related to our deterrent capabilities, nonproliferation initiatives and arms control strategies--what I believe are the three key components of U.S. strategic posture in the years ahead. The Commission agreed that the Nation must continue to safeguard itself by maintaining a nuclear deterrent appropriate to existing threats until such time as verifiable international agreements are in place that could set the conditions for the final abolition of nuclear weapons. That is, we seek to safeguard our security by supporting military and intelligence programs that maintain our deterrence force. At the same time, we also seek to safeguard our security by supporting largely non-military programs that prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other states, that reduce the number of nuclear weapons worldwide, and that provide better protection for the residual nuclear forces and fissile material. Both approaches are necessary for America's future; each can and should reinforce the other; and neither by itself is sufficient as long as nuclear weapons still exist in the world. Nuclear weapons safeguarded our security for decades during the Cold War by deterring an attack on the U.S. and its allies. We will need them to continue to perform this deterrence role as long as others possess them as well. On the other hand, if nuclear weapons were to fall into the hands of a terror organization, they could pose an extremely serious threat to our security, and one for which traditional forms of deterrence would not be applicable, given the terrorist mindset. We must be mindful that al Qaeda, for example, has declared that obtaining a nuclear weapon is a ``holy duty'' for its members. Preventing nuclear terrorism is closely tied to stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and recent developments in North Korea and Iran suggest that we may be at or near a tipping point in nuclear proliferation. (The urgency of stopping proliferation is articulated compellingly in the recent WMD Commission report: ``World at Risk.'') While the programs that maintain our deterrence force are national, the programs that prevent proliferation and safeguard nuclear weapons and fissile material are both national and international. Indeed, it is clear that we cannot meet our goal of reducing the proliferation threat without substantial international cooperation. We cannot ``go it alone'' on this crucial security issue, nor need we, given that other nations are at risk from nuclear proliferation as much as we. But the international programs that are most effective in containing and rolling back proliferation can sometimes be in conflict with the national programs designed to maintain deterrence. Thus a strategic posture for the U.S. that meets both of these security requirements will necessarily have to make some tradeoffs between these two important security goals when they are in conflict. Some commissioners give a priority to dealing with one threat while others give a priority to dealing with the other threat. But throughout the deliberations of the commission, there was unswerving member loyalty to the importance of assuring U.S. security in the years ahead, and all of our members sought to strike a balance that supports, to reasonable levels, both of these security needs. To a large extent, I am pleased to say, we were able to meet that objective. The need to strike such a balance has been with us at least since the ending of the Cold War. President Clinton's policy on nuclear posture spoke of the need to ``lead but hedge.'' That policy called for the U.S. to lead the world in mutual nuclear arms reductions and to lead in programs to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, while at the same time maintaining a nuclear deterrent force that hedged against adverse geopolitical developments. The leadership aspect of this policy was demonstrated most vividly by a cooperative program with Russia, established under the Nunn-Lugar Program that dismantled more than 4,000 Russian nuclear weapons and assisted Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan in removing all of their nuclear weapons, a signal contribution to a safer world. U.S. leadership was also demonstrated by signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which seeks a permanent end to all nuclear testing, and negotiating with Russia a new arms control treaty for further reductions in nuclear weapons. However, neither treaty was ratified by the Senate. The Bush administration initially took a different view on U.S. strategic posture, but last year Defense Secretary Gates explicitly reaffirmed that the American nuclear posture would be based on the time-tested ``lead but hedge'' strategy. President Obama has moved this strategy forward, stating that the U.S. should work towards the goal of eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons. But he has also said that until that goal is reached, he is committed to maintain a U.S. nuclear deterrent that is safe, secure, and reliable. This is, in a sense, the most recent formulation of the ``lead but hedge'' policy. The Commission believes that reaching the ultimate goal of global nuclear elimination would require a fundamental change in the world geopolitical situation, something that none of us believe is imminent. Senator Sam Nunn, former chairman of this committee, who has espoused the vision of nuclear elimination, has described this vision as the ``top of the mountain,'' which cannot be seen at this time, and the exact path to which is not yet visible. But he argues that we should be heading up the mountain to a ``base camp'' that would be safer than where we are today, and from which the path to the mountaintop becomes clearer. In Nunn's view, getting the international political support to move to this ``base camp'' requires the United States to affirm the vision of global elimination of nuclear weapons. When we reach the base camp, it would:
提供安全，安全的美国核动力，可以可靠地阻止对美国和盟友的攻击;
朝着全球消除核武器的方向前进;和
是稳定的 - 即使在地缘政治条件下的典型波动下，它应该是可持续的。这一阵营的概念是为自己思考我们的战略姿势的组织原则，因为它允许美国在斗争中致力于减少和最终消除核危险;并对这场斗争进行逆转的对冲，为美国的安全提供了一个重要的安全网。尽管一些委员不接受这一观点的大本营作为组织原则的，所有委员接受认为，美国必须支持程序，铅和对冲;也就是说，在两个平行路径中移动的程序 - 通过维持威慑，以及通过减少核武器的危险来保护我们的安全的一条路径。第一条路径（``veterceeng''包括以下组件：
Clarify our policy on use of nuclear weapons to include a statement that our nuclear forces are intended to deter an attack against the U.S. or its allies (extending this security guarantee to our allies is often referred to as ``extended deterrence'') and would be used only as a defensive last resort; at the same time, our policy would reaffirm the security assurances we have made to non-nuclear states that signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
备份我们的威慑和扩展威慑政策，通过确保我们的核力量 - 包括武器本身，他们的交付平台，以及支持它们与国家指挥Authority--的监测，检测，指挥/控制/通信/情报基础设施安全，安全可靠，有足够的数量来执行威慑任务;
只要它是可行的，通过增强的核武器生命延长计划维持核武器储存的安全，安全，可靠性和有效性;但是，确保核武器实验室保持其设计的能力，应该是必要的;
为储存管理计划提供强大的支持，Doe的高度成功计划，以确保国家核库存的安全，安全性和可靠性而无需测试。该计划寻求全面，科学的对核武器系统的理解，并因此需要推动计算和模拟前沿以及确保鲁棒实验室的实验功能。武器实验室取得了卓越的储存管理成功，但最近的人员和资金削减了持续的成功。
与完全支持核武器计划的计划保持所有三种武器实验室，维持其科学和设计活力。除了武器计划外，他们的计划组合应包括基础研究和能源技术以及扩大的国家安全作用，这将使我们面临安全挑战的其他方面。
通过减少和现代化来改造我们的武器生产能力，首先优先于洛杉矶阿拉莫斯钚设施，其次是钚设施勘探后的Y-12位点铀加工设施。目标将是根据需要生产少量核武器以维持核库存可靠性。
提供探索的战略导弹防御，足以限制朝鲜或伊朗提出的有限核武威胁，只要防御足够有效，因为攻击会成功的国家的思想中至少播种了令人疑虑。These defenses should not be so sizable or capable as to sow such doubts in the minds of Russia or China, which could well lead them to take countering actions, increasing the nuclear threat to the U.S. and its allies and friends and undermining efforts to reduce nuclear numbers, and nuclear dangers.
重新规划资金，启动F-35战斗机承包商参与核安全管理局，以确保美国将保持现有的能力，以支持美国的盟友。委员会认识到现代化与不扩散之间的紧张关系。但是，只要现代化在美国现有政策的框架内进行，就应该尽量减少政治上的困难。作为一项政策，美国不生产裂变材料，不进行核爆炸试验，目前也不寻求具有新的军事特征的新武器。在这个框架内，美国应该寻求提高安全、保障和可靠性的所有可能好处。第二种方法是“减少危险”，包括以下内容:
重新激发努力扭转朝鲜核扩散并防止伊朗核扩散。寻求全球合作，应对预期全球核电的全球扩张所产生的其他潜在扩散问题。
谈判与俄罗斯的武器减少条约，使俄罗斯核库存和美国的核库存减少。条约应包括核查程序，并应实际减少，而不仅仅是从部署到预备部队的转移。第一个条约可以将部署的战略弹头减少到低于较低的排序限额（2002年莫斯科条约）的数字，但实际数字可能不如前一项协议的“计数和归属规则”的重要性。奥巴马总统宣布，他宣布宣布他将在开始前往12月份的积极响应之前寻求更替代战略武器协议。后续条约应寻求更深的减少，这需要找到解决困难问题的方法，例如解决“战术”核动力，保护武器，并参与其他核武器。
与俄罗斯寻求更深刻的战略对话，比核条款更广泛，包括平民核能，弹道导弹防御，空间系统，核不扩散步骤以及改进警告系统的方法和提高决策时间。
续签和加强与对战略稳定感兴趣的广义国家的战略对话，包括不仅仅是俄罗斯和北大西洋条约组织盟友，而且还有中国和美国盟友和亚洲的朋友。
增加减少威胁活动的资金，加强对脆弱核设施的控制。防止核恐怖主义的最可靠方法是不让恐怖分子获得核武器或裂变材料。加快行动，尽快关闭或保护世界上最脆弱的核设施，应该是国家的首要任务。这将建立和扩大纳恩-卢格减少威胁合作计划下开始的工作的重要基础。承诺在4年内进行必要的投资，移除或保护世界各地易受攻击地点的所有裂变材料。这一相对较小的投资可能会大大降低恐怖分子获得核武器的可能性。
寻求参议院批准全面的检验禁令条约，并鼓励其他持有的持有。我强烈支持参议院批准“禁核酸条约”，但我希望清楚，我的观点不是由所有专员分享。我相信储存的管理计划，当美国签署了CTBT时确定了作为保障措施，这取得了突出的成功，并且有足够的资金支持，可以继续。美国已经没有测试了17年的核武器，并没有计划将来恢复此类测试。在寻求批准之前，政府应与条约允许的测试，并对哪些测试进行明确的理解，并对十年前预防批准的问题进行仔细分析。金博宝正规网址（所有专员都同意应采取这些前行的步骤，但并非所有专员都支持批准“禁核酸条约”。）
虽然参议院有责任审议批准的批准，但参议院和房屋都应支持奥巴马政府可能提出的任何条约保障的资金，这对批准进程至关重要。
认真准备2010年的《不扩散核武器条约》审议大会。如果我们能够在新的武器削减条约和全面禁止核试验条约(CTBT)批准方面取得进展，这将重申美国的领导地位，并为会议的成功创造有利条件。
由于奥巴马总统呼吁，寻求国际裂变材料截止条约，包括核查程序，加倍国内和国际努力，以确保所有裂变材料股票，这将阻碍核扩散和核恐怖主义。
寻求加强国际原子能机构（原子能机构）的任务，以防止核武器扩散到其他国家和控制裂变材料的访问。特别是，与国际原子能机构合作，促进普遍采用向不扩散核武器条约提出的额外议定书，这将允许额外检查涉嫌核设施以及宣布的设施。
制定和追求推进外层空间稳定的利益以及提高警告和决定时的兴趣。期权可能包括谈判措施的可能性。
续订核战略，帮助铺平了在过去几年两党合作的政策和连续性的方式执行立法对话的做法和精神。为此，我们敦促参议院考虑恢复军备控制观察组，其中担任国家以及过去。在调查六加几十年的核历史，委员会指出，核武器没有被使用，因为1945年显然，反对使用核武器的传统已经站稳了脚跟，这是我们必须努力保持，并敦促所有核-armed国家能够坚持下来。总之，这是一个机遇，但也迫切性。机会出现在新政府在华盛顿的到来和自上而下的重新评估，现在必须开始的美国核武器的目的的国家安全战略和。机会也产生是因为俄罗斯政府已表示愿意承担在战略问题上与美国进行认真对话。金博宝正规网址紧迫性出现的，因为核恐怖主义的紧迫危险，如果我们通过在核扩散引爆点。的紧迫性也产生是因为影响我们的核态势难以决定的积累。委员知道并同意，他们希望看到世界上采取什么样的方向发展。我们反对不扩散制度，核武器扩散到新的国家，在核恐怖主义的风险产生急剧上升的级联崩溃定义的一个未来世界的眼光，大国之间的核优势再度无果而终的竞争。 As pragmatic experts, we embrace a different vision. We see a world where the occasional nonproliferation failure is counter-balanced by the occasional rollback of some and continued restraint by the many. We see a world in which nuclear terrorism risks are steadily reduced through stronger cooperative measures to control terrorist access to materials, technology, and expertise. We see a world of cooperation among the major powers that ensures strategic stability and order, and steadily diminishes reliance on nuclear weapons to preserve world peace, not as a favor to others, but because it is in the best interests of the United States, and the world. We commissioners believe that implementing the strategy our report recommends will help the United States lead the global effort to give fruitful birth to this new world. Chairman Levin. Dr. Perry, thank you so much. Dr. Schlesinger. STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, VICE CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES; ACCOMPANIED BY SENATOR JOHN GLENN, DR. HARRY CARTLAND, AND DR. JOHN FOSTER Dr. Schlesinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congress established the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States in order to provide recommendations regarding the appropriate posture for the United States under the changed conditions of the 21st century. The appointed commissioners represented a wide range of the political spectrum and had quite diverse judgments on these matters. Nonetheless, urged by Members of Congress, including Senator Sessions, the Commission has sought to develop a consensus view. To a large extent and to some an astonishing extent, the Commission has succeeded in that effort. Secretary Perry and I are here to present this consensus to the committee. We are, of course, indebted to the committee for this opportunity to present these recommendations. For over half a century, the U.S. strategic policy has been driven by two critical elements: to maintain a deterrent that prevents attacks on the United States, its interests and, notably, its allies, and to prevent a proliferation of nuclear weapons. Dr. Perry mentioned that nuclear proliferation is a new issue. It is an old issue which is now enhanced by subsequent developments. The end of the Cold War and particularly the collapse of the Soviet Union Warsaw Pact, along with the substantial edge that the United States is developing conventional military capabilities, have permitted this country sharply to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons, radically to reduce our nuclear forces, and to move away from a doctrine of nuclear initiation to a stance of nuclear response only under extreme circumstances of major attack on the United States or its allies. On the other hand, the growing availability of nuclear technology, along with the relaxation of the constraints of the Cold War, have obliged us to turn increasing attention to the problem of non-proliferation and, in particular, the possibility of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States. Secretary Perry has just spoken on the issues of arms control, diplomacy, the problems of proliferation, and the risks of nuclear terrorism. I, for my part, will focus on the need, despite its substantially shrunken role in the post Cold War world, to maintain a deterrent reduced in size, yet nonetheless reliable and secure and sufficiently impressive and visible to provide assurance to the 30-odd nations that are protected under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Since the early days of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States has provided extended deterrence for its allies. That has proved a far more demanding task than the protection of the United States itself. In the past that has required a deterrence sufficiently large and sophisticated to deter a conventional attack by the Soviet Union Warsaw Pact. It also meant that the United States discouraged the development of national nuclear capabilities, particularly during the Kennedy administration, both to prevent proliferation and to avoid the diversion of resources away from the development of conventional allied capabilities. With the end of the Cold War and the achievement of U.S. preponderance and conventional capabilities, the need for so substantial a deterrent largely disappeared. Nonetheless, the requirements for extended deterrence still remain at the heart of the design of the U.S. nuclear posture. Extended deterrence still remains a major barrier to proliferation. Both the size and the specific elements of our forces are driven more by the need to reassure those that we protect under the nuclear umbrella than by U.S. requirements alone. Even though the overall requirements of our nuclear forces have shrunk by some 80 percent since the height of the Cold War, nonetheless, the expansion of NATO and the rise of the Chinese nuclear force is significant, if modest, have altered somewhat the requirements for our own nuclear forces. Two, even though the modest probable source of a weapon landing on American soil, increasingly as that of a terrorist attack, nonetheless, the sizing of our forces, in addition to other elements of our deterrent posture, remains driven in large degree by Russia. Our NATO allies, and most notably the new members of NATO, remain wary of Russia and would eye any sharp reduction of our nuclear forces relative to those of Russia, especially in light of the now greater emphasis by Russia on tactical nuclear weapons. Consequently, the Commission did conclude that we should not engage in unilateral reductions in our nuclear forces and that such reductions should occur only as a result of bilateral negotiations with Russia under a follow-on START agreement. Any such reductions must, of course, be thoroughly discussed with our allies. Three, our East Asian allies also view with great interest our capabilities relative to the slowly-burgeoning Chinese force. Clearly that adds complexities, for example, to the protection of Japan, though that remains a lesser driver with respect to overall numbers. Still, the time has come to engage Japan in more comprehensive discussions akin to those with NATO in the Nuclear Planning Group. It will also augment the credibility of the Pacific extended deterrent. Four, the Commission has been urged to specify the numbers of nuclear weapons the United States should have. That is an understandable question, particularly in light of the demands of the appropriations process in Congress. Nonetheless, it is a mistake to focus unduly on numbers without reference to the overall strategic context. Clearly, it would be illogical to provide a number outside the process of negotiations with Russia, given the need to avoid giving away bargaining leverage. In preparation for the Treaty of Moscow, as with all of its predecessors, the composition for our prospective forces was subject to the most rigorous analysis. Thus, it would seem to be unacceptable to go below the numbers specified in that treaty without a similarly rigorous analysis of the strategic context which has not yet taken place. Moreover, as our Russian friends have repeatedly told us, strategic balance is more important than the numbers themselves. Five, given the existence of other nations' nuclear capabilities and the international role that the United States necessarily plays, the Commission quickly reached the judgment that the United States must maintain a nuclear deterrent for the indefinite future. It must convey not only the capacity but the will to respond in necessity. Some members of the Commission have expressed a hope that at some future date we might see the worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons. The judgment of the Commission, however, has been that attainment of such a goal would require a transformation of world politics. President Obama also has expressed that goal but has added that as long as nuclear weapons exist in the world, the United States must maintain a strong deterrent. We should all bear in mind that the abolition of nuclear weapons will not occur outside the transformation of world politics. Six, we sometimes hear or read the query: why are we investing in these capabilities which will never be used? This is a fallacy. A deterrent, if it is effective, is in use every day. The purpose in sustaining these capabilities is to be sufficiently impressive, sufficiently formidable to avoid their use in the sense of the actual need to deliver weapons to targets. That is the nature of any deterrent but particularly so a nuclear deterrent. It exists to deter major attacks against the United States, its allies, and its interests. Years ago the role and the details of our nuclear deterrent commanded sustained and high-level national interest. Regrettably today, they do so far less than is necessary. Nonetheless, the role of the deterrent remains crucial. Therefore, I and the other members of the Commission thank this committee for its continued attention to these critical questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Dr. Schlesinger follows:] Prepared Statement by Dr. James Schlesinger Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: Congress established the Commission on Strategic Posture in order to provide recommendations regarding the appropriate posture for the United States under the changed conditions of the early 21st century. The appointed Commissioners represent a wide range of the political spectrum and have had quite diverse judgments on these matters. Nonetheless, urged by Members of Congress, the Commission has sought to develop a consensus view. To a large--and, to some, a surprising--extent, the Commission has succeeded in this effort. Secretary Perry and I are here to present that consensus to this committee. We are, of course, indebted to the committee for this opportunity to present these recommendations. For over half a century, the U.S. strategic policy has been driven by two critical elements: to maintain a deterrent that prevents attacks on the United States, its interests, and, notably, its allies--and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The end of the Cold War, and particularly the collapse of the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact, along with the substantial edge that the United States has developed in conventional military capabilities have permitted this country sharply to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons, radically to reduce our nuclear forces, and to move away from a doctrine of nuclear initiation to a stance of nuclear response only under extreme circumstances of major attack on the United States or its allies. On the other hand, the growing availability of nuclear technology, along with the relaxation of the constraints of the Cold War, have obliged us to turn increasing attention to the problem of nonproliferation and, in particular, to the possibility of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States. Secretary Perry has just spoken on the diplomatic issues and the problems of preventing proliferation, and the risks of nuclear terrorism. I, for my part, will focus on the need, despite its substantially shrunken role in the post-Cold War world, to maintain a deterrent reduced in size, yet nonetheless reliable and secure--and sufficiently impressive and visible to provide assurance to the 30-odd nations that are protected under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. 1. Since the early days of NATO, the United States has provided Extended Deterrence for its allies. That has proved a far more demanding task than protection of the United States itself. In the past that has required a deterrent sufficiently large and sophisticated, to deter a conventional attack by the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact. It also meant that the United States discouraged the development of national nuclear capabilities, particularly during the Kennedy administration, both to prevent proliferation and to avoid the diversion of resources away from the development of conventional allied capabilities. With the end of the Cold War and the achievement of U.S. preponderance in conventional capabilities, the need for so substantial a deterrent largely disappeared. Nonetheless, the requirements for Extended Deterrence still remain at the heart of the design of the U.S. nuclear posture. Extended Deterrence still remains a major barrier to proliferation. Both the size and the specific elements of our forces are driven more by the need to reassure those that we protect under the nuclear umbrella than by U.S. requirements alone. Even though the overall requirements of our nuclear forces have shrunk some 80 percent since the height of the Cold War, nonetheless the expansion of NATO and the rise of Chinese nuclear forces, significant if modest, have altered somewhat the requirements for our own nuclear forces. 2. Even though the most probable source of a weapon landing on American soil increasingly is that of a nuclear terrorist attack, nonetheless the sizing of our own nuclear forces (in addition to other elements of our deterrent posture) remains driven in large degree by Russia. Our NATO allies--and most notably the new members of NATO--remain wary of Russia and would eye nervously any sharp reduction of our nuclear forces relative to those of Russia--especially in light of the now greater emphasis by Russia on tactical nuclear weapons. Consequently, the Commission did conclude that we should not engage in unilateral reductions in our nuclear forces and that such reductions should occur only as a result of bilateral negotiations with Russia under a follow-on START Agreement. Any such reductions must, of course, be thoroughly discussed with our allies 3. Our East Asian allies also view with great interest our capabilities relative to the slowly burgeoning Chinese force. Clearly that adds complexities, for example, to the protection of Japan, though that remains a lesser driver with respect to overall numbers. Still, the time has come to engage Japan in more comprehensive discussions--akin to those with NATO in the Nuclear Planning Group. It will also augment the credibility of the Extended Deterrent. 4. The Commission has been urged to specify the number of nuclear weapons the United States should have. That is an understandable question--particularly in light of the demands of the appropriations process in Congress. Nonetheless, it is a mistake to focus unduly on numbers, without reference to the overall strategic context. Clearly, it would be illogical to provide a number outside of the process of negotiation with Russia--given the need to avoid giving away bargaining leverage. In preparation for the Treaty of Moscow, as with all of its predecessors, the composition for our prospective forces was subjected to the most rigorous analyses. Thus, it would seem to be unacceptable to go below the numbers specified in that Treaty without a similarly rigorous analysis of the strategic context--which has not yet taken place. Moreover, as our Russian friends have repeatedly told us: strategic balance is more important than the numbers. 5. Given the existence of other nations' nuclear capabilities and the international role that the United States necessarily plays, the Commission quickly reached the judgment that the United States must maintain a nuclear deterrent for ``the indefinite future.'' It must convey, not only the capacity, but the will to respond--in necessity. Some members of the Commission have expressed a hope that at some future date we might see the worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons. The judgment of the Commission, however, has been that attainment of such a goal would require a ``transformation of world politics.'' President Obama also has expressed that goal, but has added that as long as nuclear weapons exist in the world, the United States must maintain ``a strong deterrent.'' We should all bear in mind that abolition of nuclear weapons will not occur outside that ``transformation of world politics.'' 6. We sometimes hear or read the query: why are we investing in these capabilities which will never be used?'' This is a fallacy. A deterrent, if it is effective, is in ``use'' every day. The purpose in sustaining these capabilities is to be sufficiently impressive to avoid their ``use''--in the sense of the actual need to deliver the weapons to targets. That is the nature of any deterrent, but particularly a nuclear deterrent. It exists to deter major attacks against the United States, its allies, and its interests. Years ago the role and the details of our nuclear deterrent commanded sustained and high-level national attention. Regrettably, today they do so far less than is necessary. Nonetheless, the role of the deterrent remains crucial. Therefore, I thank this committee for its continued attention to these critical questions. Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Dr. Schlesinger. Senator Glenn or other members of the Commission, do you want to add anything at this point? [No response.] Let's try a 6-minute round for our first round. I'd like to focus on one of the many notable provisions of this report and that's the area of missile defense. This report supports a direction for a missile defense program which could help missile defense become a unifying issue instead of a divisive issue. First of all, you provide strong support for missile defense systems against short- to medium-range missiles. There has been a consensus on this committee in support of such missile defenses throughout the history of those defenses, including Patriot and Theatre High Altitude Area Defense and other defenses. As a matter of fact, this committee, I think it's fair to say, has actually led the way in a sense because we have not only supported these efforts, we've added to them significantly in terms of funding over the years. However, we've been not together and whether it's been divisiveness has to do mainly with the ground-based systems they are intended to defend against long-range missiles and there, the Commission is making some points which could unify us in a lot of ways and open and support a direction which a number of us have been exploring. I want to just read a couple paragraphs here. I usually don't do this. I look to the Commission to usually read their own report, but I want to emphasize what you've provided here. ``Further, in terms of these long-range defense interceptors,'' let me read from page 32, ``further development and deployment of these long-range defense interceptors should depend on the results of tests and depend upon developments in the ICBM threats facing the United States and its allies.'' ``For more than a decade,'' you write, ``the development of U.S. Ballistic Missile Defenses (BMDs) has been guided by the principles of protecting against limited strikes while taking into account the legitimate concerns of Russia and China about strategic stability. These remain sound guiding principles. Defenses sufficient to sow doubts in Moscow or Beijing about the viability of their deterrents could lead them to take actions that increase the threat to the United States and its allies and friends. Both Russia and China have expressed concerns. Current U.S. plans for missile defense should not call into question the viability of Russia's nuclear deterrent.'' Then the Commission says the following: ``The Commission supports a substantial role for defenses against short- to medium-range missiles. Defenses against longer-range missiles should be based upon demonstrated effectiveness and the projected threat from North Korea and Iran. Defenses against these limited threats should be designed to avoid giving Russia or China a reason to increase their strategic threat to the United States or its allies but these defenses should become capable against more complex limited threats as they mature. As noted above, this long-range missile defense system is now incapable of defending against complex threats.'' This is the line that I want to focus on after I read it. ``Cooperative missile defense efforts with allies should be strengthened and opportunities for missile defense cooperation with Russia should be further explored.'' Now, three of us recently went to Russia, Poland, and the Czech Republic to explore that possibility, of whether or not we could move to greater cooperation with Russia on missile defense, at the same time maintaining our cooperation obviously with our NATO allies, including Poland and the Czech Republic. I went with, by the way, Senator Bill Nelson and Senator Collins. We spent about 4 days on our trip. From my perspective, and I think the others join in this, one of the reasons for trying to figure out a way to involve Russia in missile defense is the statement that it would make to Iran. It would be a very powerful statement to Iran if Russia joined with us or with NATO in a missile defense program which, from our perspective, would clearly be aimed against an Iranian missile threat. If they moved to the nuclear weapon direction, clearly it will make a statement to them about how the world, including Russia, views that threat, if we were able to work together on a missile defense system. I wanted to ask you--let me start with Dr. Perry--about that recommendation that you're making that we explore opportunities for missile defense cooperation with Russia. Again, I just wanted to add one further thought and that is that there is now in Azerbaijan a Russian radar. It's the Gambala radar, and there's a radar under construction in Southern Russia itself at Armivir and both of these clearly provide coverage of Iran in a way that probably provides better coverage of Iran than any other radars we could locate. So, Dr. Perry, do you believe that that radar-sharing, that information or in other ways that cooperation with Russia on missile defense could be a very useful move? Dr. Perry. I have met with Russians three times this year exploring that and other questions but with a major focus on that question. I met with both technical people and policy people in Russia. It seems clear to me that the Russian view on this issue has been evolving in the last year. It's now possible to do things that it was not possible to do a year ago. First of all, they have today a clear concern for the danger that Iran nuclear missiles pose to Russia. In fact, they think that the potential threat to Russia is greater than the threat to the United States. Second, their best course of action is to try to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons, and I think it's now possible to get cooperation with Russia on that in a way that was not possible a year or 2 ago. Third, if that prevention is not successful, they would like to see a missile defense program to protect them as well as to protect us and Western Europe. They're not only willing but anxious to work with us on a joint missile defense program and that joint missile defense program could include systems based in Russia as well as other countries. The best way of designing that system, I think, is still open. I would think it would involve that Azerbaijan radar which you described, but it could also involve interceptors in Russia. I would recommend that the United States undertake a program for serious discussion with Russia, first of all, at the technical level on what is the best way of designing such a system and that would be done in parallel with the policy efforts we have with them to try to develop a diplomatic approach to prevent nuclear weapons from being developed. I do think that the time is right for some real progress in that area. Chairman Levin. Thank you, and just in conclusion before I turn it over to Senator McCain, I know that President Obama has talked to the Russian president, at least in a general way, about this possibility. I've talked to our Secretary of State as well as to President Obama about this. I've talked to Secretary Gates who, before this committee, has expressed the kind of support for exploring this possibility that the Commission report describes. General Jones, I've also talked to him about this, and so there is, I think, a willingness at the highest levels of this government to further explore this possibility. I'm glad, Dr. Perry, that you mentioned the prevention of Iran getting missiles or nuclear weapons in the first place has to be our Number 1 goal. That has to be the focus and I've also heard from the Russians directly that they do not want Iran to receive or obtain, more accurately, a nuclear weapon. As a matter of fact, former President Gorbachev put it just as succinctly as you did a moment ago, as has the Russian Foreign Minister, that our number one goal should be to prevent Iran from getting that nuclear weapon. Hopefully Russia will join us much more strongly in that effort. If there's a possibility of a joint missile defense system for the reasons that your Commission gives, we want to explore, the three of us and others obviously are exploring, that. It could really be a very strong statement of moral unity against Iran that may give them a wake-up call as to how serious their effort would appear to us and be to us if they decide to move in the nuclear weapon direction. Thank you. Senator McCain. Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Schlesinger, have you detected the same eagerness on the part of Russia to cooperate with us on missile defense and their belief that the Iranian nuclear weapons are a greater threat to them than to us or Israel? I think I pay close attention to events of the day and I haven't detected that same eagerness on the part of the Russians. In fact, I've seen them engage in attempts to reassert their view abroad and breaking an agreement with President Sarkozy concerning the presence of troops in Georgia and many others. Specifically, have you detected this same eagerness that the Chairman and Dr. Perry have detected, which I obviously have missed? Dr. Schlesinger. The Russians, indeed, have a reason to have extended conversations with us in this area. Our relations with Russia are subject to ups and downs, but this is an area of potential cooperation. Senator McCain. I guess my question was, Doctor, have you detected any real moves towards that cooperation, besides rhetoric? Dr. Schlesinger. I think that the conversations that Dr. Perry and others have had in Moscow are suggestive that the proof is in the pudding, as you have suggested. With regard to the Chairman's question, when President Reagan suggested the Strategic Defense Initiative in the 1980s, it was directed against Russia. There have been two developments since that time. First, the threat has, to a substantial extent, disappeared. We do not expect to get engaged in a missile exchange with Russia, and second, defenses can be overwhelmed by offensive capabilities which the Russians have in terms of innumerable warheads and so on. So the interest has shifted to work with the allies. I'd add to what the Chairman said, particularly not just our allies in Europe but in Japan, as well, which has shown a great deal of interest in missile defense vis-a-vis China and North Korea. Only time will tell, Senator McCain, whether or not there's real possibility here for close cooperation with Russia. Senator McCain. Again, I hope that's the case. I've heard conversations and we have a new day. I've not seen any concrete proposals or significant proposals on the part of the Russians. Meanwhile, the Iranians continue inexorably on their path to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The one issue I would ask the witnesses, the one issue where the Commission was unable to reach a consensus was on the CTBT. A few weeks ago during a conference in Rome, former Secretary of State George Schultz urged ratification of the CTBT. With respect to the 1999 vote in the Senate, Secretary Schultz stated that his fellow Republicans may ``have been right in voting against it some years ago but they would be right voting for it now based on new facts.'' Secretary Schultz cites the development over the past decade of a vast global monitoring system of seismic and other technologies dedicated to detecting small and clandestine nuclear tests like that of North Korea's small nuclear blast in 2006. As for the reliability of our nuclear arsenal, Secretary Schultz cited the SSP and the DOE Annual Certification as additional reasons why CTBT should be ratified. I would ask, do you agree with Secretary Schultz's assessment on the notion of detection? Do you believe that, in light of Secretary Gates' assessment, without testing it will ``become impossible to keep extending the life of our arsenal?'' Do you believe that any ratification of the CTBT must be preceded by plans for a new, redesigned and more reliable warhead? Dr. Perry. In our report we state that it is essential to maintain the reliability and security of our warheads for the indefinite future. If that requires new designs, then we would support new designs. To this date that reliability has been achieved without new designs. We do not think we should preclude the laboratory from making new designs, if that's what is required to maintain. On the testing issue, I think it's quite correct that the global monitoring system has improved greatly since the day that the Senate had the vote on the ratification and can be improved more in the future. Nonetheless, I think it would be desirable to have some onsite monitoring systems. For example, to have an agreement with Russia that there would be onsite monitoring systems built in the United States and in Russia to give further confidence in that area. Senator McCain. Thank you. Dr. Schlesinger. Dr. Schlesinger. As Secretary Schultz indicated, the SSP has enhanced our ability to sustain confidence in the stockpile. It is not total confidence and the laboratory directors have testified before the Senate, stating that the uncertainties are growing as the force ages, which raises the question whether it is wise for the United States to surrender the option of testing. We are not going to test in the foreseeable future, but to retain the option is the question that is open. I should point out that the CTBT mechanism for enforcement is quite questionable. An Executive Council was established with 51 members. It requires a vote of 30 members to investigate a presumed violation. The number of Western countries on that Council is limited and there is grave question about whether or not we could ever get an affirmative vote with regard to investigating such a site. Senator McCain. I thank you. Senator Glenn, do you have anything to add to this, given your long involvement in this issue? Senator Glenn. Thank you. I wasn't here when we voted on that before but I was here when we had a lot of the discussion of it before on CTBT. In my view, I would like to have the CTBT, but I'd want to know what we're agreeing to. I don't think it's adequately defined yet. The Soviets or the Russians now define it, their interpretation of it, in a different way than we do, and I think the value of the CTBT is probably not in my mind as great as it was back some 20 years ago or so. At that time we thought that any nation to be a valid nuclear weapons nation, had to have a test. We didn't know that they were going to be a nuclear nation and they didn't know themselves whether their technology was good enough to set the bomb off, so they tested. Now we know that anybody that has the material can have a bomb. The value of CTBT to me is that we retain a leadership position in our own psychological thinking and the way the world looks at us as being an advocate for peace and for a balance and for not going ahead with unbridled weaponry. I would favor CTBT, but I would only vote for it if it had better definition. Right now the Russians do not have an agreement with us, as far as I know, on exactly what it is we're agreeing to. They, for instance, have said that, as I understand it, they can test to smaller levels as long as it's not detectable. To me that's like saying it's okay to rob the bank so long as nobody catches me and it just doesn't fit right. If we're going to agree to this thing and they should agree to it, it becomes an international treaty. A treaty is equal on both parties and right now the Russians do not see it that way, as I understand it. I would want better definition of it and then I'd be for it because I think I would want to see us keep a leadership position in the world's drive toward controlling some of these things. Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses. Chairman Levin. Thank you. Senator Lieberman is next, and I'm going to ask him, and he's more than willing to take the gavel, to keep us going and Senator McCain and I can go to the Senate Floor. We thank you for your really tremendous contribution here. Senator Lieberman. Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Before you go, I do want to thank you and Senator McCain for convening this hearing so that we can hear from the members of the Commission. There's surprisingly little discussion in Congress today of America's strategic nuclear posture. There's somewhat more discussion about BMD which is obviously related and there is a lot of discussion about the Iranian nuclear program. I think too often we've not connected those and I'm going to explore that a bit with you; that is, we haven't connected our own nuclear strategic posture and the set of agreements we've had with the threat of the Iranian nuclear program. I thank all of you. This is a very important piece of work. It's good to see Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger and Senator Glenn again. Senator Glenn did really pioneer work in his time particularly, I say with pride, on what was then the Governmental Affairs Committee as chairman in focusing Congress on some of these issues. It's been my honor to succeed him as chairman of the committee. Dr. Perry, it struck me at one point in your remarks, you said that this is the time of peril but hopefulness. You said there's a possibility of worries, let's put it that way, that the existing nonproliferation regime in the world could collapse. I took that to be a reference to the consequences of an Iranian nuclear program, am I right? Dr. Perry. Yes. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Schlesinger, you talked about the extent to which a smaller but still robust American nuclear capacity is a deterrent to proliferation and I took that to mean, again particularly with reference to the real case of Iran now, that the fact that nations, particularly in the Middle East but even beyond but particularly in the Middle East, certainly Arab countries, are somewhat discouraged from pushing ahead on their own nuclear programs because they know that we have ours, should Iran go nuclear. Am I right in that? Dr. Schlesinger. It is primarily the impact on our allies who are under the nuclear umbrella, and perhaps most notably at this occasion, Japan. Senator Lieberman. Okay. Even more perhaps than in the Middle East? Dr. Schlesinger. Unquestionably, the Iranians recognize that the United States has immense military capabilities and that is going to be a deterrent to any military action on their part. Senator Lieberman. Right. So I just appreciate your answers because it is what I thought I heard you say. When we talk about Iran developing a nuclear weapon, we naturally talk about the consequences that would have most immediately for our allies in the Middle East, Israel and the Arab allies, and ourselves. But it would also have, in a larger strategic context, a very threatening impact on the existing nuclear nonproliferation through the world and that would be a terrible consequence. Dr. Schlesinger. As Dr. Perry indicated, it may be the tipping point. Senator Lieberman. It may be the tipping point. Dr. Schlesinger. We may have an Iranian nuclear weapon before the NPT Review Conference in 2010 that would do significant damage to the possibility of making that stronger. Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that. I agree totally and that's a real concern. Let me go the next step on that, Dr. Perry, if you're able to share with us what some of the discussions were with the Russians, you have very valuable communication access there, about what you think they may be willing to do with us now to prevent the Iranians from obtaining nuclear capacity. Dr. Perry. I look at the history of the negotiations in the past, it's been the Russians and the Europeans with the Iranians and the Americans on the sideline. I think the first step is to get the Americans as a key part of the team that's negotiating so that we--and that involves developing a common strategy with them. I do not believe the Iranians are going to easily give up nuclear weaponry. Senator Lieberman. I agree. Dr. Perry. They see many advantages to having a virtual nuclear weapon capability, to be within a few months of building a bomb. They're not going to give that up very easily. I think it would take coercive diplomacy for that to happen. Setting aside the possibility of a military action, the coercions are going to have to be economic and the nations in a position to apply it--no one nation can apply that economic effectively. It has to be Russia and the United States all agreeing on it. I think that Iran is highly vulnerable to economic pressure, more so than most people realize. As long as Russia or China or some other nation is not going along with that, then there's an easy way out for it. It does require that cooperation and the indication I got in my discussions at least was that the Russians, the Europeans, and the United States could be on a common strategy of that kind of economic pressure. I've not discussed this issue with China, but in my judgment, it would require China to be agreeable to that, also. Senator Lieberman. That makes a lot of sense to me. I agree. I think you spoke with real clarity which is that it's not going to be easy to convince the Iranians to stop the nuclear program. To do so will require not just diplomacy but, I liked your adjective, coercive diplomacy, and probably the most effective thing we can do is to put very strict severe economic sanctions on them or the threat of those. For that to be effective, we have to have support and the Russians can play a very important part in that, if they will cooperate with us. I had somebody say to me, and I think it was consistent with what you've just said, I don't want to put these words in your mouth, but it relates, which is that there's only one thing more important to the Iranian regime right now than the development of nuclear weapons and it is the survival of the regime. If coercive diplomacy could threaten the survival of the regime, then there is a chance that they might negotiate to stop their nuclear weapons. Dr. Perry. I agree with that. Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much. Senator Inhofe. Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm going to go back to the CTBT from a little different perspective. As Senator McCain said, we had a rather impressive vote back in 1999 as to the feelings about the ratification of this treaty and I was pretty active in that debate. I think the first matter any arms control treaties have to address is compliance with its obligations and that it can be verified, as Ronald Reagan said, ``Trust, but verify.'' I think it was found by the Senate to be lacking in this point and as recently as October 2008, Secretary Gates stated, when he made his speech to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ``To be blunt, there's absolutely no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization program.'' Dr. Perry, we talked informally before the meeting about the fact that perhaps the most important part of the job that you had to do was addressing the CTBT. However, you had made the statement that it's impossible to have any kind of consensus. Personally, I'd ask, could you define consensus? Is that a majority or is that 100 percent? Dr. Perry. We're split about evenly on that. Senator Inhofe. Oh, you were? Okay. So if you have consensus, you would actually have--by consensus, I meant everybody. It doesn't mean everybody, it means a majority? Dr. Perry. Yes, it means everybody. Senator Inhofe. It means 100 percent? Dr. Perry. 100 percent. Senator Inhofe. The problem with 100 percent is you have two problems. As we've mentioned, I use the word ``prima donnas'' and I shouldn't have. That has a negative sense. Highly-educated proven authorities in these areas which all 12 were. However, you have that problem, along with the fact that there are 12 and to get consensus in 12 people would be a very difficult thing. Was it pretty well split even in terms of the ratification of the CTBT? Dr. Perry. Yes, it was. Senator Inhofe. Okay. That's interesting to know. Dr. Perry. In our report we gave each side the opportunity to give their reasons. Senator Inhofe. Okay. Let me ask you this. Senator Glenn has already made his comments as to his feelings. Would the rest of you state whether or not you agree with Secretary Gates' statement of October 2008. Dr. Cartland, do you pretty much agree with that? Dr. Cartland. Yes, I agree. Senator Inhofe. Okay. Dr. Perry? Dr. Perry. Yes. Senator Inhofe. Okay. Now, one other thing that is confusing to me because I'm not quite into this as most of the rest of them are, when we talk about numbers, we had our private meeting, Dr. Schlesinger here, and I appreciate that very much. As I understand it now, our number that we're using is a range between 1,700 and 2,200. Obviously there may be something that's classified that would be more specific than that. I won't ask you what that is. But it's also my understanding that the Russians are at about 2,800 now, is that correct? Dr. Schlesinger. They exceed the prospective limit. They have to come down by 2012. Senator Inhofe. Okay. You're anticipating they have to come down a little further than we have to come down if we're going to come to some unknown figure to me anyway by that time? Dr. Schlesinger. The Commission expressed concern about the number of tactical nuclear weapons that they have. Senator Inhofe. All right. That's good. The second thing I'd like to get into is Recommendation 1. The report states that the ``force structure should be sized and shaped to meet a diverse set of national objectives. This requires a high-level assessment of strategic contacts,'' and I agree with that. But this is precisely what the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the NPR would be giving you the information that is in your Recommendation 1. Why is it we can't, since that's starting right now, go ahead and proceed or do away with that decision until we have the results of the QDR and NPR? I know that you have a deadline of the expiration of December 5. I understand that, but I also know that there are provisions by which that deadline can be extended up to 5 years. Is the problem we can't do that mostly that Russia wouldn't do it or would you comment as to any way that we could delay this until we have the information that will be given to us by the NPR and the QDR? Dr. Perry. I think the START follow-on either could be negotiated by the end of the year or, if there are still issues remaining, they could get an extension of the previous START. Senator Inhofe. At that time--so if we have information that you would have--we would have the benefit of into December as a result of our QDR, we might then at that time request an extension? Dr. Perry. I think that's conceivable. Senator Inhofe. Okay. My time's going by fast here and I want to get into missile defense. When the announcement came out as to Secretary Gates and what's going to be the position of the administration, of course, I was stressed over a lot of things you were not addressing in this meeting, such as the F-22, C-17, the Future Combat System, but they do get pretty specific in some of the recommendations in terms of our Missile Defense System. I know you've already addressed this and I'm going a little bit over my time, Mr. Chairman. I'd just like to get your feeling about the recommendation on the Czech Republic and Poland. It would seem to me that that could be pretty well verified that that is to preclude a threat that would emanate from Iran. Yet, I think those parliaments, and I was there and I was told that they were ready to come to the table on that and agree that they could have the radar capability in the Czech Republic and the capability, the launching capability in Poland, except they were waiting to see where this administration was going to be. That was a disappointment to me, the $1.4 billion cut, and I'd just like to have the feeling of the Commission on those particular sites, if that was addressed in your report. Dr. Perry. We do not address that in our report, Senator Inhofe. My own personal view is that if, and it's a big if, we can negotiate an agreement for a site based in Russia, it would be a more effective site against an Iranian missile. If we cannot do that, the sites in Poland and Czechoslovakia could be satisfactory. Senator Inhofe. I like that answer. Do the other members pretty much agree with that answer? All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Schlesinger. This is a political issue, Senator Inhofe. The Russians do not so much object to missile defense in Europe or against Iran. They object to our putting those sites in former satellite territory which they regard as provocative. Senator Inhofe. I understand that, although I think the words that were used were they don't object to doing it against rogue nations and, I think we all have our definition of that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Senator Hagan. Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to welcome all of you here and I am honored to be here listening to you and I applaud you for the work that you've done on this Commission. Senator Glenn actually brought this up, talking about the use of the fissile material, but what I was concerned was with the ongoing nuclear proliferation coupled with the accessibility of information on the Internet that could enable terrorists with the human capital to construct a nuclear weapon, provided that they obtained the required fissile material, to include the highly-enriched uranium. I'm concerned about the civilian nuclear reactor facilities, do they have the capability and the power to protect and safeguard the highly-enriched uranium and other fissile materials onsite at those locations? Could you please provide information on initiatives in place aimed to work with our international partners to safeguard the fissile materials in the civilian nuclear reactor facilities and also perhaps address the security vulnerabilities at these sites? Dr. Perry. We agree that that's a very serious problem. The basic premise is that if a terror group could get their hands on enough highly-enriched uranium they could make a bomb and we agree with that. We think that's one of the most important dangers facing us today. Some of the facilities have highly-enriched uranium, not all of them, because most of reactors operate on low-enriched uranium. The move has been to try to get that highly-enriched uranium under safe control and also have these reactors converted so they can operate into low-enriched uranium. The administration is working on that and we encourage that effort to be accelerated. Senator Hagan. But are there initiatives in place to secure that currently? Dr. Perry. There are initiatives in place. We think they should be accelerated. Senator Hagan. I also was concerned in your opening remarks in the written testimony, there was talk about cyber attacks. You didn't examine threats related to the cyber attacks, and it seems like in any area of the military today that so much of it would be involved with. Dr. Perry. All of the Commission members would agree that cyber attack is potentially very dangerous in the future. We did not go into that in enough detail to represent ourselves and the Commission has no authority on that subject. Senator Hagan. Do you think that's something we should begin the process and examine that in great detail? Dr. Perry. I strongly agree with that. I see it as a very serious potential future problem. Senator Hagan. Also on the proposed cuts by Secretary Gates involving missile defense affect our capability to counter against nuclear threats posed by North Korea and Iran? Dr. Perry. I'm sorry. I didn't understand the question. Senator Hagan. How do the proposed cuts by Secretary Gates involving missile defense affect our capability to counter attacks against the nuclear threats posed by North Korea and Iran? At one point you talked, too, about the number of people that had been cut over the years. Dr. Perry. I think we do not now have the capability against Iran and the question is whether we should continue to put resources into the program established a few years ago based in the Czech Republic or whether we should move towards a program in cooperation with Russia. I think that's an open question right now, and I believe that if it turns out to be possible to have a joint program with the Russians, that's the way I would recommend going. Senator Hagan. Dr. Schlesinger, any other comments? Dr. Schlesinger. With regard to Iran and North Korea, they are not going to be much affected in the short run by anything that we do with regard to missile defense. Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much, Senator Hagan. Senator Sessions. Senator Sessions. Thank you. Senator Lieberman. The consensus builder. Senator Sessions. The issue, the feeling that we had, members of the panel, thank you so much for your service, that two things were happening. One, we were having some divergent ideas about the nuclear posture of the United States, but, two, I think there was a feeling that Congress had not dealt with this issue in a long time. We had not thought about it and the world was going forward. There was even some suggestion that the errors in Minot were all to some degree part of an ignoring of this whole question and putting on the back burner and were such a big deal that we needed to get our graybeards--I don't see any beards out there, but thoughtful people to help us reach a national consensus about where we needed to go. I know Senator Bill Nelson, my colleague on the Strategic Subcommittee, supported this, as have others, and we thank you for your service and the importance of it. A number of questions have been raised. I would just like to point out a few things I think are themes in this report, Mr. Chairman, and make a few comments and also just say how much I appreciate, Senator Lieberman, your depth of understanding of these issues and commitment to them over the years. The report, I think, is pretty clear in saying there is a need to maintain a nuclear deterrent for an indefinite future. In fact, you say nuclear elimination would, ``require a fundamental transformation of the world political order.'' I don't know how many of us have seen those in our lifetime but it is not likely, I think, that we'll be in a world where we can completely eliminate nuclear weapons. So we have to think rationally about what we can do to reduce risk and threats. Non-material. I think the report indicates the importance of extended deterrence to reassure our allies and that that should influence heavily our design and size of our nuclear forces. If it's going to destabilize our allies and cause them to perhaps develop their own nuclear weapon system, then we would have the perverse consequence of maybe reducing our forces to provide world safety and actually creating a proliferation. I think that was reflected to some degree in your report. Nuclear force reductions, you find, must be done bilaterally with Russia and must be based on a rigorous analysis of the strategic context and the current balance in non-strategic forces is a concern, you find: ``Dealing with this imbalance is urgent.'' Now what I understand that to mean is that while we negotiate with Russia to draw down their total nuclear weapons and they're doing so but not as much, nearly as much as have, they have 3,800 tactical nuclear weapons, we have only five and that's not being part of this negotiation or at least we haven't dealt with that with clarity. So that is a matter I think you've put on our plate that we need to and the administration needs to deal with. You deal with the question of force modernization pretty directly, including the weapons complex, which is necessary, you find, to maintain a nuclear deterrent at reduced levels. If we're going to reduce the number continually and go further than we are today, we need to be sure it's modernized and workable. Dr. Foster, you've had some experience in that. Maybe you'd like to share a thought on that. Dr. Foster. I'm sorry, Senator. Would you sharpen the question for me, please? Senator Sessions. Yes. With regard to the modernization of our nuclear weapons, why, based on your experience and expertise in these areas, do you think that is a factor we have to deal with if we reduce the numbers even further? Dr. Foster. As the Secretary has pointed out, we recognize that we have a problem trying to maintain the nuclear stockpile indefinitely and it would be helpful if the laboratories were permitted more freedom to make the necessary adjustments. I believe that there is a more serious problem and that has to do with the tactical nuclear situation, which Dr. Schlesinger has referred to. We had the opportunity to listen to comments by a number of nations who were represented and presented their views to us, in particular their concerns. Those allies that are on the periphery of Russia and those allies that are on the periphery of China are concerned. They are concerned about whether or not the nuclear umbrella will be credible, as they see it, against the statements that have been made by potential adversaries. Now, in particular, the representatives from one of our allies have described in some detail the kind of capabilities that they believe the U.S. nuclear umbrella should possess and so they have talked about capabilities that can be stealthy and they can be transparent and they can be prompt, and then they would like capabilities that can penetrate hard targets with minimum collateral damage and low yield and so on. Now those are not the characteristics that we currently deploy, and so the question is whether or not, in discussions with our allies, we will be able to accommodate their concerns. Now, I believe one cannot answer that question without having the laboratories given the freedom to address whether or not such capabilities might be provided without nuclear testing and with confidence. Does that answer the question? Senator Sessions. Well said, Dr. Foster. I think it was and it just drives home this point of we do need to let our laboratories have some freedom to anticipate future capabilities and make sure our system is modernized. You also support and indicate that BMD supports deterrence and damage limitations. You find that the United States should deploy missile defenses against regional nuclear aggressors, including limited long-range threats, and should ``also develop effective capabilities to defend against increasing complex missile threats,'' and I'm afraid our budget may be being whacked enough there that that may not meet those standards that you've asked for. We've had a major reduction, more than a lot of people realize, in our National Missile Defense Program, but you call for it to not only be in place but to be prepared to deal with increasingly complex threats and, finally, I would note that the United States must take steps to reduce nuclear dangers of proliferation and nuclear terrorism, and I believe that this is the real danger in the 21st century. I would ask just briefly, my time has expired, while it's important for us to deal with, Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, the Russians and to negotiate with them and continue to have more of a partnership relationship and not an adversarial relationship, do you agree that the most likely immediate threat to us would be through a rogue nation or nuclear terrorism rather than---- Dr. Perry. I would agree that the most likely threat would be from nuclear terrorism. My concern with rogue nations is not that they would attack us but that they might let their nuclear fissile material or nuclear bombs out of their hands into the hands of the terrorists. Senator Sessions. Thank you. Dr. Schlesinger. Dr. Schlesinger. The likelihood of a terrorist attack is the most likely, most probable weapon that will last on American soil. As we have discussed, though, it is necessary to deal with a much larger set of issues in constructing our deterrent. The ability of the nuclear deterrent to deter a nuclear terrorist attack is very modest. Senator Sessions. Thank you. Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Sessions. Thanks for your informed leadership on this question which has been unique in the Senate in recent years and therefore all the more important. I think you made a very important point at the end, Dr. Schlesinger, and maybe if I get a second round, I can come back, which is the extent to which our nuclear deterrent can deter nuclear terrorists. Senator Ben Nelson. Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The potential nuclear threats posed by the vulnerabilities in Pakistan's nuclear posture, coupled with the fact that the United States doesn't know where all of Pakistan's nuclear sites are located, clearly leaves us in a position to no longer accept blanket assurances from Pakistan that the weapons are safe. As a matter of fact, in 2002, in a meeting in Islamabad with President Musharraf, I asked him directly the question if he was confident that all of the nuclear armaments were under satisfactory control and were secure and his answer was that he was 95 percent certain. So we have every right to be concerned about that, if his answer was anywhere near correct. I hope that he was on the low side as opposed to the high side. In any event, do you have any recommendations to what might be the nuclear tipping point caused by the ever-emboldened Pakistani insurgency? Dr. Perry. Senator Nelson, I believe you are correct in saying that's the most serious danger we face today. I'm not in the position to make recommendations on how our government should deal with that. I know they're serious about the problem. I know they're working very hard on it, but I don't feel that I'm in a position to recommend what they should do on that. Senator Ben Nelson. Dr. Schlesinger, do you feel emboldened to make a suggestion? Dr. Schlesinger. One of the things that the United States should be a model on is with respect to protecting nuclear weapons. An enterprising journalist from the New York Times interviewed after the Minot incident the general officer in Pakistan who was in charge of safety of nuclear weapons and the New York Times reporter said, ``What help are you getting from the Americans?'' to which the general officer responded, ``Who the hell are the Americans to give us advice with regard to the safety of nuclear weapons? You just took missiles off from Minot Air Force Base, flew them down to Barksdale Air Force Base, and you didn't know what you were doing, and we are supposed to turn to you for advice?'' We have to be credible if we are to be convincing in dealing with countries like Pakistan and the safety issue. Senator Ben Nelson. Senator Glenn, perhaps you have some thoughts, having spent a great deal of time being concerned about these issues. Senator Glenn. I was concerned way back when President Zia was still President of Pakistan, and I made two trips over there when they sat and lied to us about whether they were making nuclear weapons or not. We had very good intelligence information at that time and they just denied they were making any nuclear weapons at all. I've been concerned about this for a long time, about what might happen if al Qaeda, or other sympathetic groups, came into power in Pakistan. The best hope we can have is that I hope they are keeping some of the triggers and things like that of their nuclear weapons separate and in some spread-out area where, if the actual bomb case itself was taken over in a raid by al Qaeda or something like that, that they still wouldn't be able to use a nuclear weapon as such already constructed. The biggest danger to me, I think, that we face right now in this whole field is loose fissile material, because making a nuclear weapon these days is no problem if you have the fissile material. It's fairly simple, and if you have enough of it and know what you're doing, which I think they would have the expertise to do it, why, they would have weapons to use against us. That's my concern in Iran, also. I'm not quite as concerned as some people are about whether in Iran we should put in missile defenses and all for what might be a single shot or even a double shot. If they ever develop nuclear weapons or boosters to that point, but I am concerned in Iran that maybe their control of fissile material might be weak enough that some of the al Qaeda sympathetic people in Iran might be able to get fissile material, and I think any of our negotiations from now on, whether it's START or anything else, should make every effort we can to get fissile material control back and make that the emphasis. Our ability, our controlling this whole thing through the last 60 years or so has been pretty doggone good and I don't look at the use in World War II, like some people do, that was horrible and never should have done it. It saved probably a couple million lives. I was in a squad and getting ready to go back to Japan at that time for the invasion and we saved lives by that. So in that case, I think it was a good use of nuclear weapons to end that war. But do we ever want to repeat that? No, absolutely not, but I think the greatest danger we have now--and the point I'm making is that our agreements so far, the treaties now have been nation state to nation state and so we do that in the international treaties and through the U.N. sanctions and it's dealing with nation states. Now, our threat is not from nation states, as I see. I don't think the likelihood that Russia is going to attack us or China is going to attack us. I think there's a major danger, though, from fissile material running around from people who are not representing nation states. They're representing their own interests, their own whatever interests they have, terrorism, and if they get fissile material, then we have deep trouble, and it's not going to be something that's going to be subject to treaties and things like that. I think that's the biggest danger we have right now and how we control or get a better inventory of all the fissile material in the world, that's a big, big challenge, and I think we should be concentrating a lot more effort on that than we do. Senator Ben Nelson. Even if we get the inventory in the case in Pakistan, it remains that the government could be toppled and these terrorists, these rogue individuals could end up with the whole weapon in their hands and perhaps through some magic or otherwise they could find the detonating capability, as well, and that is a threat. Well, thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Nelson. Interesting questions. Senator Collins, good morning. Senator Collins. Thank you. Good morning. First, let me join in welcoming such a distinguished panel before our committee today. Senator Glenn, it's always wonderful to welcome you back to the Senate. We had the honor of serving together on what was then known as the Governmental Affairs Committee for many years, and I have such respect for all of the members of this panel. Dr. Perry, a couple of years ago Max Kampelman came to see me and he brought with him the Wall Street Journal op-ed that you, George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn authored and it's called ``A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,'' and I must say, as I talked with Mr. Kampelman and read this op-ed, it put forth an inspiring vision, one that I think all of us wish could come about today. When I looked through your report, it seems to reach a different conclusion. Rather than reflecting a plan to go forward to achieve the goal outlined in this op-ed, it says that we need to maintain a reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent. So I wonder if you could talk about the two different visions presented in this op-ed 2 years ago and in your report today. Second, I would be interested in knowing whether the increasing threat from Iran and the North Koreans has altered your view. Dr. Perry. Thank you, Senator Collins. My colleague and your colleague, Sam Nunn, has described this vision in the Wall Street Journal article, in which Max Kampelman was describing as being like the top of a mountain and he says we cannot see the top of the mountain today but we should be moving in that direction. He argues that the immediate goal should be establishing a base camp much higher up the mountain than we are now and at that base camp we should be able to see the top of the mountain and therefore we can plan the final ascent. That base camp has to be safer than we are today, and it has to be stable enough that if we have to stay there for a few years, we can do that. Our immediate goal is moving up the mountain, and I think this report is consistent with moving up the mountain. It makes recommendations for positions which make us safer than we are today which reduces our nuclear weapons and which deals more specifically with the most immediate dangers which are proliferation dangers, the dangers of nuclear terrorism. This report is dealing more with the near future and through the Wall Street Journal op-ed it can be described as a strategy for getting to the base camp, not as a strategy for getting to the top of the mountain. Both Sam Nunn and I have said publicly that this vision, which we call the top of the mountain, is a vision where we cannot even see the top of the mountains now, and that's what we mean when we say it's going to require a change in the geopolitical situation to do that. But we also believe, and I want to make very clear on this point, that this vision helps us get up to the base camp. Without that vision, we feel we're going to slip farther down the mountain. We need the support of nations all over the world to do that. In more practical terms, other nations of the world want to see we're serious about maintaining our commitment under the NPT, of moving towards disarmament. Senator Collins. Thank you. Dr. Schlesinger, the Commission, as I indicated, calls for a continued reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent. Nevertheless, and I do accept that conclusion, should steps be taken to change or reduce the danger of an accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon? I'm talking about the debate of the deployment, the targeting, the hair trigger debate that we've had. Could we and should we be taking steps to help lower tensions by still having that deterrent but perhaps moving back? Dr. Schlesinger. The question has been raised about so- called hair trigger alert and we speak to that at some length in the Commission report. The hair trigger alert problem, I think, is, as we say in the report, substantially exaggerated in that on both sides, there are very careful controls, including electronic controls, coming from the President of the United States or the President of Russia, to prevent the launch of a weapon. Our concern, following this, is that there be enough decision time for the President of the United States, and I think particularly the President of Russia, to examine the evidence before he hypothetically responds, and lengthening that decision time will be helpful. Negotiations with the Russians will, I think, help with regard to the decision time issue, but the question with respect to hair trigger alert is really a question of the past with regard to both U.S. and Russian forces and thus Chinese forces, as well. Senator Collins. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Collins. Senator Udall, welcome back. Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to welcome the panel. It's truly an honor to be able to sit here today and soak up the accumulated wisdom and experience at this table before us. I am a casual mountain climber myself, Secretary Perry. So I find your climbing analogies apt. I wonder what Senator Glenn would utilize, given his experience as a fighter pilot and an astronaut, as the base camp that we need to reach. I don't know if it would be a space station, Senator Glenn, or whether it's a forward operating base, in Marine parlance, but I really appreciate you all and the work you've done. If I might, Secretary Perry, I'd turn a question to you but I'd invite the entire panel to comment. I'm interested in delivery systems, specifically the land- based leg of the Triad or ICBMs, and do you have any views on retaining our current number, which total about 450, or reducing those ICBMs as part of an overall arms agreement? Dr. Perry. In our report we have argued the desirability of maintaining the Triad, even if we reduce the overall number of weapon systems. We think that the Triad is the way to configure those. We would argue for continuing to maintain the land-based ICBMs for the particular advantages that they bring to deterrence, but we could also be open to seeing that number reduced if it's done bilaterally with the Russians. Senator Udall. Dr. Schlesinger, do you have a comment? Dr. Schlesinger. I think Dr. Perry's covered the point. As we come down from the 2,200 level, unavoidably it will have an impact on our missile posture. So some of the ICBMs will be reduced. Some of our sea-based forces will be reduced as we come down. One of the things that I hope that the Senate watches, and we recommend the revival of the Arms Control Observer Group that the Senate has had in the past, needs to watch what is the impact of the reduction in force on the specifics of the composition of our forces and does this weaken our overall deterrence, including extended deterrence? Senator Udall. So in effect, you're saying keep the three legs of the Triad and they may be adjusted but you need all three legs and they're interactive, if you will. They complement each other. Dr. Schlesinger. That was the belief of the Commission. It is not a universal belief. Senator Udall. Other panelists would like to comment on that particular question? Dr. Cartland? Dr. Cartland. No. I agree. I obviously support that position myself, at least with regards to any near-term reductions that might be done in the stockpile. Unfortunately, at some point dollars do matter, and at some point in the future we may have to reconsider this issue again, whether it makes sense to maintain three legs of the Triad. Senator Udall. Senator Glenn. Senator Glenn. I think what you want to do in trying to discourage any potential aggressor that might be wishing us ill, you want to keep them guessing as to what the response may be if they do something dumb and attack us. You have the greatest flexibility there if you have the whole Triad, and that way they can't just defend against submarines, they can't just defend against the ICBM, or just defend against whatever. The Triad is the very thing that gives them the most doubt. It's the most ambiguous thing you can do to keep them guessing and make them less confident in any attack they might consider on us. So I favor, at least for now, until we can maybe some time in this nirvana we're talking about in the future, work our forces down and everybody else works their forces down, that's the time when to consider this but certainly not now. Dr. Perry. The one point we should keep in mind, if I might add, is the impact of the Triad in the Cold War, where the Russians spent an excessive amount, in our judgment, on air defense, and they would not have been spending that money on air defense if we did not have the bomber force; if they had not been spending it on air defense, they would have been spending it on offensive forces that might have been a greater worry to us. Senator Udall. Dr. Foster, did you want to comment, as well? Before I move to a question in the broader sense, Nunn- Lugar and working further with the Russians, I just want to take a minute, Dr. Schlesinger, to commend you for the work you did on the Rudman-Hart Commission and the prescience that the Commission showed. I think the fundamental recommendations that you have about investing in our country, whether it's in the public health system or in a new energy policy and a transformed military, I think the conclusions in that important seminal document are still very, very applicable to this day. I use the wisdom that was put forth in that document on the stump in campaigns and in policy settings and I want to just take a minute to thank you for that. Dr. Schlesinger. Thank you, Senator. Senator Udall. I think it's a document that will live a long time and the template's clear where we need to invest to keep our country strong. If I could, I'd like to throw to the panel, and I see my time's expired, but perhaps a brief comment from one or two of the panelists, some thoughts on why we haven't been able to make, I think, all the strides we could under the umbrella of Nunn-Lugar. Is it the intransigence of the Russians in some cases? Is it clumsiness on our part? Would anybody care to comment briefly on that? Dr. Perry. First of all, I think we've made considerable progress on Nunn-Lugar. During the period I was Secretary of Defense we dismantled 4,000 nuclear weapons which we could not have done without the Nunn-Lugar program. Senator Udall. I stand corrected, Mr. Secretary. Dr. Perry. The program continues to this day. I cannot give you an authoritative current account of what's going on, but I know the program still continues. I think it's been indispensable, though certainly in my role as Secretary of Defense, it was indispensable. Beyond the dismantlement, it provided the safety of many of the facilities in Russia. I think the world is far safer today because of what the Nunn- Lugar program has done. Dr. Schlesinger. I think that DOE is quite satisfied with the achievements in terms of providing security for Soviet nuclear weapons which did not exist in the past. They are less than satisfied with regard to fissile material, but this is an ongoing process and Nunn-Lugar has been an immense success, even though sometimes we get into squabbles with the Russians with regard to security issues. Senator Udall. Thanks again to the panel. Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Udall. Thanks for your interest and good questions. If the panel is prepared, I think Senator Sessions and I would like to do one more round. Let me go back to a question underneath what we've been discussing and you alluded to it in your answer about the nuclear terrorists, which is the question of whether, in the context of the most serious challenges we face today from terrorists, from Iran, and now control, the great country controlled by an extremist Islamist regime, does our nuclear strength actually deter? In other words, as you all know better than I, during the Cold War we reached a point with the Soviet leadership where it was pretty clear that they were not going to die from Marxist- Leninist principles. Maybe they reached the point where they stopped believing them as a matter of fact, but, unfortunately, it's painfully clear post-September 11 that the Islamist terrorists are prepared to die, in fact they yearn for it. Perhaps it's not as clear with regard to the leadership of a country like Iran, although you can find statements from top leaders that seem to be prepared to accept the large loss of life in the interest of the greater cause. Do nuclear weapons still deter? I know that you've thought about that and I invite it. Dr. Schlesinger. I think, unquestionably, our overall military capability, including nuclear, is a substantial deterrent to other nation states, including Iran. Senator Lieberman. Okay. Dr. Schlesinger. Ayatollah Khameni is not about to see the end of Iran or Shiism in order to fulfill the wilder comments of President Ahmadinejad. Senator Lieberman. Right. Dr. Schlesinger. So with regard to nation states, we do quite well, I think, on deterrence, not as well as with the Soviet Union in which their belief was that history was on their side. Senator Lieberman. Right. Dr. Schlesinger. It was an erroneous belief, but they believed it at the time. With regard to the issue of terrorists, if they get ahold of nuclear weapons, it is plain that our forces are not much of a deterrent. What we have to hope is that any nation such as Iran or North Korea will be deterred from turning over weapons or fissile materials to terrorist groups. That is a much more limited deterrent. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Perry, do you have a thought on that? Dr. Perry. I would say the same thing that Dr. Schlesinger said. Senator Lieberman. Okay. Anyone else want to get into that? It does strike me that, to some extent, now this won't work with a nuclear--well, one reaction to the nuclear terrorism and this goes back to the Hart-Rudman report, is that the best defense to nuclear terrorism is homeland security, a robust homeland security. I don't want to dwell on that. Another defense, which perhaps rises to some extent against a country that has leadership that's perhaps less rationale, is a robust BMD, so that at least they know that the prospects of succeeding are reduced by that defense. I want to bounce an idea off of that somebody put to me the other day and in some sense it's kind of an inside Congress/ inside Washington grand bargain. I must say there are parts of the basis of the bargain that are suggested in some of the conclusions or our inability to include in the report. I'm speaking specifically of the CTBT where you had a disagreement. I would say about your BMD sections, I don't mean any disrespect, but they're more summary than some of the other sections. This is what one of the think tankers in town said--who happens, to disclose all the cards, both for the CTBT and a very robust BMD, and he observes that, I'm overstating the case here, but that there's a lot of support on the left in American politics here in Washington for the CTBT. There's less support on the left for BMD, reluctant or limited. On the right, there's a lot of support for the robust BMD but many more questions about the CTBT. So he raises the suggestion about whether there ought to be an inside Washington brand where we agree to support both CTBT and a BMD which in this case would involve restoring some of the funds that the President's budget will apparently cut from the Missile Defense Agency. Insofar as you care as individuals to respond to such a thought, I would welcome it. Anybody so bold? Dr. Schlesinger. It's inside Washington, inside political Washington. Senator Lieberman. Yes. Dr. Schlesinger. We're going to leave it to Congress to work out those kinds of things. Senator Lieberman. Very wise. Dr. Schlesinger. I might throw in that, in addition to BMD, we are concerned about the funding of the laboratories and that would have to be part of it. Senator Lieberman. That's good. That's my last question. Dr. Perry. On CTBT, my support of it is contingent on safeguards and the most important of those safeguards is robust support on the laboratories. That is what gives us our main confidence. Senator Lieberman. Okay. That's very interesting. I have a final question. It seems to me as I read the report, which is an excellent piece of work, that the most comprehensive set of recommendations is not with regard to the sort of flash button--flashier public issues, CTBT, START, BMD. It's about the NNSA, but I think you make a very compelling argument, including the suggestion of some potential legislative action that might make NNSA a separate agency reporting to the President through the Secretary of Energy as opposed to being just within DOE. Do you want to add anything to that, any sort of flesh to what we've said about this part of your report, because ultimately it may be what is really most important in the short term? Dr. Schlesinger. We recognize that NNSA, as designed by Congress and hopefully designed by Congress in 1999, has been a failure and it's been a failure because of the intrusion of other elements of DOE, so that the laboratories and the plants have to get triple approval of anything that they want to achieve. Senator Lieberman. Yes. Dr. Schlesinger. We have models like the Agency for International Development and previously the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the Department of State which were separate. Senator Lieberman. Right. Dr. Schlesinger. Within the DOE, we have the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) which is independent. We also have the Energy Information Administration (EIA) which is independent. Senator Lieberman. Right. Dr. Schlesinger. It does not necessarily, in the case of the EIA, even have to have the approval of the Secretary of Energy, but those are models in which the ability of, say, the General Counsel's Office or the Environmental Health and Safety Group in the DOE cannot come down on the laboratories with additional requirements and, indeed, we have had in the various departments these kinds of arrangements. FERC is not the best example simply because it's a regulatory body and therefore separate from the DOE Secretary. Senator Lieberman. The fact is that, as Senator Glenn well remembers, that creation of NNSA in 1999 came not so much out of concern for the scientific and engineering base as it was a reaction to the Wen Ho Lee case, the scandal, the concern about Chinese interruption or espionage really. You make a very strong point and almost regardless of what side you're on in any of these issues, I suppose unless you're for total nuclear disarmament, this makes a lot of sense and I appreciate it very much. Senator Sessions. Senator Sessions. Dr. Schlesinger, I remember you making a comment once, not too long ago, that when Americans make declarations of policy and set goals, by nature we tend to want to achieve them and that the Europeans are used to living with more ambiguity and internal contradictions than the United States is. You deal with some of those issues, I think, in Chapter 4, the Declarations of Policy. Would you express to us the hesitance of the Commission in not explicitly adopting a goal of a total elimination of nuclear weapons? Dr. Schlesinger. I think that Secretary Perry may have some comments after I'm through. If we look back to the old days, the United States regarded nuclear weapons as this great equalizer in dealing with a possible Soviet Warsaw Pact conventional attack on Western Europe. Other nations think in terms of great equalizers, including Iran, that the Chairman has mentioned, and when one thinks about these other nations, what incentive do they have to give up nuclear weapons? The United States now has conventional superiority and as a consequence of our conventional superiority, we are quite comfortable with a world without nuclear weapons, if we could get there, but for the other nations that have nuclear weapons, Pakistan, India; Pakistan looking across perhaps excessively at now the conventional superiority of India. The North Koreans, their only stake in this world is their nuclear capability which they have exploited politically with great effectiveness. The Russians today, as mentioned in the report, moved towards an emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons. It is not clear which countries we could persuade to give up nuclear weapons. Undoubtedly, the British would be prepared to do so. Perhaps the Chinese, but to find the incentives that will persuade all nuclear powers today and possibly in the future to abandon nuclear weapons is, I think, an uphill fight. Bill, you may want to develop on that. Dr. Perry. I do not disagree with what Dr. Schlesinger said. It is really an uphill fight. I would also point out that during the Cold War, the nuclear weapons protected our security in very important ways. Now with the ending of the Cold War, we see India getting nuclear weapons and Pakistan getting nuclear weapons. Pakistan selling their technology to other countries through A.Q. Khan Network, Iran on the verge of nuclear weapons, and where Iran goes, we see Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia wanting nuclear weapons. Then in the face of all of this proliferation, we now have terrorist groups emerging whose professed goal is to kill large numbers of American civilians. Now we see nuclear weapons today as a danger. If they could be eliminated, the world would be better. I agree with Dr. Schlesinger. I don't see a way to do that today, but that should not stop us from trying to work towards that goal. Senator Sessions. One question, I'll ask if any of you would like to comment on it. The Commission dealt with an issue that we hear about periodically, I don't think from the administration, but we hear sometimes raised that we should renounce first-use capability or policy. You conclude in Chapter 4, the United States ``should not abandon calculated ambiguity by adopting a policy of no first use.'' Would any of you like to comment on that conclusion? Dr. Perry. Besides the danger of nuclear weapons, there's also a danger of biological weapons. We have renounced biological weapons. There's a danger that biological weapons might be used against us and we believe we should use deterrence of biological weapons that are used against us with the threat of nuclear retaliation. We do not have the ability to threaten biological retaliation nor would we want to. We do not want to abandon it for that reason. Dr. Schlesinger. I think, Senator Sessions, that the United States is not going to use nuclear weapons against others, save in extraordinary conditions. The ambiguity to which you refer deals not with a nuclear attack on the United States but with other types of attacks. For example, the possibility--I stress the possibility--of electromagnetic pulse attack, cyber warfare. There is no defense against a sophisticated cyber warfare attack and the Russians and the Chinese and perhaps others have developed cyber offensive capabilities. We may need to use a nuclear response to such things. Biological warfare. The retention of ambiguity there is not to suggest that we are going to use weapons initially. We are prepared not to do so, but that we might have to respond to a non-nuclear attack with the use of nuclear weapons if it is severe enough. Senator Sessions. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and let me thank the panel for helping all of us in Congress and I thank the American people to think through very challenging issues and to get our heads straight as we go forward because there are some actions that Congress needs to take and they will reflect some of the policies and suggestions you've made. Thank you. Senator Lieberman. Thank you again, Senator Sessions. Senator Udall. Senator Udall. I want to thank the panel again and commend you for creating what I think I could characterize as a realistically idealistic approach to a world without nuclear weapons. We have a long ways to go. Thank you. Senator Sessions. I like that phrase. Realistically idealistic. I think that's good. Thank you. Senator Lieberman. The first time either Senator Sessions or I use that phrase, we'll give you credit. After that, it will be ours. [Laughter.] I want to join in thanking the panel and all members of the Commission for what you've done. This has been a very thoughtful and, I'd say, informative exchange we've had this morning. I hope that some folks may be watching on television. We have some significant decisions to make. We've had a change of administrations obviously. There's going to be a renewed focus on START and CTBT and, of course, ongoing discussions about BMD. So you've really given us a primer here, all Members of Congress and the public, to get us ready for these discussions, and I appreciate it very, very much. Almost all the members of the Commission, this is just the latest chapter in a long story of public service by all of you. Dr. Perry. If I may make a final comment? Senator Lieberman. Please. Dr. Perry. When Congress asked me to undertake this as Chairman, I requested that the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) be selected as the administrator of the program and that has happened. I just want to acknowledge the very great support I received from them. Senator Lieberman. I appreciate your doing that and they deserve our thanks, as well. Dr. Schlesinger. May I interrupt there? Senator Lieberman. Please, yes. Dr. Schlesinger. The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) has also cooperated with USIP in providing security for us and providing considerable editorial assistance to USIP. So IDA should also be thanked. Senator Lieberman. Good. We join you in thanking them. Any other members of the panel want to make a final statement? It's the custom here, well, it's the reality, that nongovernmental witnesses, which you're now in that glorious status, are not required to respond to questions for the record. If you're willing, I'd like to keep the record open until next Tuesday for questions from any members, particularly those who were not here, and we'll give you plenty of time to answer them in writing. Is that acceptable? Dr. Perry. Yes. Dr. Schlesinger. Thank you. Senator Lieberman. All right. I appreciate it very much. I thank my colleagues. I thank all of you. The hearing is adjourned. [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin joint u.s.-russia early warning 1. Senator Levin. Dr. Schlesinger, one of the elements in the joint U.S.-Russian initiative is a recommended effort to increase decision time for the Russian President or the U.S. President before launching a retaliatory launch. One of the steps that the Commission recommends taking is to revive the crisis hot line. What is the status of the hot line? Dr. Schlesinger. The Direct Communications Link (DCL) (``hot line'') was established in 1963 in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis to help resolve misunderstandings and thereby help avert the outbreak of nuclear war. It has operated continuously on a 24/7 basis for over 45 years and has been upgraded several times since 1963. We understand that there are several further upgrades being considered now for the DCL that would expand and strengthen its capabilities to ensure continuous service and broaden the kinds of services that can be provided to our leaders. We support improvements to this vitally important capability. 2. Senator Levin. Dr. Schlesinger, a second recommendation is to establish a joint early warning center. There was a previous effort that failed. What steps should be taken this time to ensure a center is successful? Dr. Schlesinger. In June 2000, Presidents Clinton and Putin signed a Memorandum of Understanding to create a Joint Data Exchange Center in Moscow to provide for advance notifications of launchings of spacecraft and ballistic missiles. As we understand it, implementation of that agreement became embroiled in a larger dispute about tax and liability issues for U.S. funded projects in Russia. More recently, continuing disagreements over U.S. planned deployment of ballistic missile defense components in Poland and the Czech Republic have also complicated moving forward. We believe that as part of the process of ``resetting'' U.S.-Russian relations the United States should make renewed efforts to implement the 2000 agreement. 3. Senator Levin. Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, much has been written about the concept of dealerting--removing the U.S. and Russian Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) from ``hair trigger alert.'' The report is pretty clear that the Commission believes that this is an ``erroneous characterization of the issue.'' Could you explain this conclusion and why efforts to insert physical effects or changes to ICBMs, to achieve additional decision time, are not recommended? Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger. The term ``hair trigger'' suggests to many the possibility of accidental or unauthorized launch. We believe this concern to be unfounded. As our report notes, ``The alert postures of both countries are in fact highly stable. They are subject to multiple layers of control, ensuring clear civilian and indeed presidential decisionmaking.'' We note that ICBMs in the United States have been on alert for almost half a century with no suggestion that accidental or unauthorized launch has been a risk. Instead, once again quoting our report, we believe that the real risk is ``the possibility that the president of Russia [or, less likely, the U.S. President] might authorize a launch as a result of a decision made in haste that is deliberate but mistaken. The best approach to this problem has been and remains to improve Russian warning systems. . . .'' Inserting changes in ICBMs that delay implementation of an authorized launch would not increase decision time available to either president. Instead, by shortening the window during which ICBMs could escape destruction such changes would put additional pressure for rapid decision, especially in Russia, which is more dependent on ICBMs than is the United States. While increasing decision time is valuable, until we can devise an effective method for doing so, improving Russian warning systems to avoid bad decisions remains the best approach to reducing the chance of launch through miscalculation. We note that the DCL would play an important role during the decisionmaking process. national nuclear security administration 4. Senator Levin. Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, among the recommendations made by the Commission are changes to the organizational structure of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). One of these is to have the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulate the weapons complex, including the laboratories. Did the Commission members discuss this recommendation with the NRC and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB)? Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger. No, it did not. 5. Senator Levin. Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, do either of you have an assessment of the cost to the NNSA and the delay in new construction a shift to the NRC would entail? Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger. We have no assessment of cost, although we do not believe it would be high. Indeed, some of the experts the Commission consulted believe that the total operations costs for NNSA would probably decrease over time with NRC oversight. The NRC must define their requirements in a public arena, and must measure site performance against those requirements. One of the major problems with existing NNSA oversight is that firm requirements are not defined. Therefore, over time, sites operations are ratcheted up in the level of controls and associated costs. Our proposal was not intended to require a delay in construction of any presently planned facilities. The 3-year transition period the Commission recommends would allow working out of arrangements for regulation of existing facilities. We would include those facilities previously approved for construction in this process. In the 1990s Congress provided a similar period for the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) to come into compliance with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requirements when the Energy Policy Act of 1992 required Department of Energy (DOE) to lease the gaseous diffusion plants to USEC. 6. Senator Levin. Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, does the regulatory approach of the NRC, which is strict compliance, match the needs of the weapons complex? Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger. We believe that it does. Having a civil regulator regulate weapons facilities has been effective in the United Kingdom. Navy fuel production facilities are presently operating satisfactorily under NRC regulation. ``Strict compliance'' is, in theory, the current DOE standard, so the shift should be manageable. 7. Senator Levin. Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, nuclear safety oversight is currently provided by the DNFSB, a small, 100-plus-person, oversight body that makes recommendations to DOE and the NNSA, to ensure the DOE and the NNSA are following their own safety orders and procedures. The DNFSB does not have regulatory authority or shutdown authority as does the NRC. Did you look at changing the nature of the DNFSB to a regulatory body rather than assigning the task to the NRC? Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger. The Commission did not consider this option. Rather, our proposal would permit external regulation by the DNFSB rather than the NRC as the single regulator. The Commission's concern is with multiple levels of regulation. Under the current system, NNSA provides oversight of contractor facilities. DOE provides oversight of that oversight, in practice if not in theory. The DNFSB similarly provides oversight. We believe that regulation by a single entity is preferable to the current system and will allow clarification of roles and responsibilities, reduction in the overall regulatory burden and no diminution of the safety of nuclear operations. Whether the DNFSB or the NRC should be that regulator requires additional analysis. There are several factors to consider. The DNFSB has specialized knowledge the NRC does not possess. The NRC has broader experience, perhaps more standardized rules, and an independent viewpoint developed over the years. The experience and viewpoints of the DNFSB have been developed around the much-criticized (risk averse, uncoordinated) DOE rules. It would be important to evaluate not only which entity has the most detailed immediate expertise, but also which one could best meet the objectives the Commission set forth. The Commission did not perform such an evaluation. 8. Senator Levin. Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, the DNFSB is intimately familiar with all of the operational nuclear safety issues and there are many in the complex. How will the NRC improve operational nuclear safety in older unlicensed facilities? Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger. The Commission proposal is not based on improving operational nuclear safety but on providing equivalent safety in a more effective manner. It is our judgment that NRC oversight would accomplish this. 9. Senator Levin. Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, would design and construction on new facilities, such as the uranium processing facility at the Oak Ridge Site in Tennessee and the chemical and metallurgical facility at the Los Alamos National Laboratory have to stop to allow the NRC to develop standards and a licensing process for the facilities? Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger. Not under the Commission's proposal. Our proposal is not intended to require a delay in construction of any presently planned facilities. 10. Senator Levin. Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, the report appears to conclude that there is too much oversight of the operating contractors by the NNSA and that the contractors should be told what work is expected of them by the NNSA and then the NNSA should get out of the way, letting the contractors implement the direction. This approach to contract management appears to be contradictory to every lesson that the Department of Defense (DOD) has learned in the last decade. Would this approach still produce clear requirements, full and complete cost estimates, comprehensive schedules, and clearly understood milestones? Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger. There is every reason to believe this recommended management approach should safely enhance NNSA safety, effectiveness, and efficiencies, especially for the production facilities. ``Clear requirements, full and complete cost estimates, comprehensive schedules, and clearly understood milestones,'' are an inherent part of specifying what is to be done. We note, however, that scientific projects--as opposed to construction--at the national laboratories are inherently less subject to binding schedules. A good DOD analogue might be operation of shipyards. The government establishes requirements and holds the contractor responsible for meeting those requirements. However, it does not prescribe internal operating procedures. This is the distinction between what to do (a government function) and how to operate (a contractor responsibility) that we seek to reestablish within NNSA. Our report provides an illustration of why we believe this approach will succeed. In 2006 and 2007, NNSA conducted a pilot program exempting the Kansas City Plant from essentially all DOE regulations and making other management changes in oversight. An external audit documented $24 million in first year savings, about 5 percent of the Kansas City annual budget. No problems with schedules or milestones were noted. We note that the traditional government-owned, contractor-operated approach to the national laboratories has been a great success in fostering world-class science and technology. Excessive regulation and micro-management threatens the continuation of this success. Our proposal for OSHA and NRC regulation is intended to avoid this threat while addressing past operational concerns and ensuring future safety. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator John Thune post-strategic arms reduction treaty arms control negotiations 11. Senator Thune. Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, on April 6, 2009, Secretary Gates announced a series of major budget decisions aimed toward reshaping the priorities of the America's defense establishment, and which would profoundly reform how DOD does business. With regard to U.S. nuclear and strategic posture, Secretary Gates said, ``We will examine all of our strategic requirements during the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), and in light of post-Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) arms control negotiations.'' Of particular interest to me is that it appears that Secretary Gates is proposing to suspend development of the Next Generation Bomber until a new START is negotiated. The current START is set to expire on December 5 of this year. To me, this proposal to delay development of the Next Generation Bomber until post-START arms control talks are completed appears problematic. Waiting until a new START is negotiated could literally take years. In fact, the lead START negotiator at the State Department has already indicated that the negotiations for a follow-on START could last beyond December 5, 2009. Secretary Gates himself also voiced concerns during a speech last fall at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace about how long it might take to negotiate a follow-on START. With regard to post-START arms control negotiations, is it realistic to expect that a follow-on START will be negotiated by December 5, 2009, when the current START expires, particularly when the lead START negotiator for the United States is already lowering expectations on that front? Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger. We believe it is possible, although unlikely, that negotiations will be completed by December 2009. Whether they conclude by then will depend heavily on the attitude of the Russian Federation. We believe it is unlikely that negotiations will be completed in time to allow ratification and entry into force of the new treaty before December 2009; therefore, some interim arrangements may be required. 12. Senator Thune. Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, in your view, when do you believe a follow-on START could be successfully concluded? A year from now? Longer? Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger. Assuming a reasonable attitude on the part of the Russian Federation, we believe a new treaty could be concluded by the end of 2009, or more likely, early in 2010. 13. Senator Thune. Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, if negotiations for the follow-on START drag on after December 5, 2009, wouldn't it be problematic for DOD to delay decisions about its strategic requirements until after negotiations for the follow-on START are concluded? Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger. We assume that decisions on strategic requirements will be made during the QDR and NPR, both of which we anticipate will be completed this year and both of which are required by law to be submitted with the fiscal year 2011 budget early next year. While we assume both the QDR and NPR will be informed by the progress of ongoing arms reduction negotiations, we doubt that decisions on either review will be delayed pending completion of START follow-on negotiations. We would oppose such a delay. 14. Senator Thune. Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, the President announced an objective to complete post-START negotiations by the end of this year, which would provide a better idea of strategic requirements by early next year once the QDR and NPR are finished. However, Congress made it pretty clear that any negotiations should be informed by the NPR. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 mandates the review and clearly states, ``It is the sense of Congress that the NPR . . . should be used as a basis for establishing future United States arms control objectives and negotiating positions.'' If the NPR is supposed to inform post-START negotiations, then the President won't be able to complete negotiations by the end of this year. In your opinion, should the administration complete the NPR prior to post-START negotiations in accordance with the wishes of Congress? Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger. We believe the administration should complete the NPR prior to actually signing a post-START. This is consistent with the legislation establishing the NPR, which requires evaluating the ``relationship among United States nuclear deterrence policy, targeting strategy, and arms control objectives.'' Given the importance the Commission attached to continuity in an arms control regime with Russia, we would not favor delaying the beginning of negotiations until completion of the NPR. We would expect the post- START negotiations and the NPR to be closely coordinated. Indeed, the results of the NPR will depend, in part, on the degree to which Russia is interested in an improved strategic relationship. The post-START negotiations should provide insights into this issue and thus improve the quality of the NPR. [The Report ``America's Strategic Posture--The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States'' follows:]
[所以，委员会上午11:39，召开召开。]
