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S. HRG。111-351安全许可改革：前进现代化=======================================================================在监督政府管理层之前听到，联邦劳动力和哥伦比亚小组委员会在国土安全和政府事务委员会美国参议院第一百头第一次会议__________ 9月15日__________通过http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html打印用于国土委员会Security and Governmental Affairs U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 53-837 PDF WASHINGTON : 2010 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, Oklahoma THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware JOHN McCAIN, Arizona MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina JON TESTER, Montana ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman CARL LEVIN, Michigan GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado Lisa M. Powell, Staff Director Evan W. Cash, Professional Staff Member Shelley K. Finlayson, Legislative Fellow Jennifer A. Hemingway, Minority Staff Director Tara Shaw, Minority Counsel Benjamin B. Rhodeside, Chief Clerk C O N T E N T S ------ Opening statements: Page Senator Akaka................................................ 1 Senator Voinovich............................................ 2 Senator Burris............................................... 4 WITNESSES Tuesday, September 15, 2009 Hon. Jeffrey D. Zients, Deputy Director for Management and Chief Performance Officer, Office of Management and Budget........... 5 Hon. John Berry, Director, U.S. Office of Personnel Management... 7 Hon. James R. Clapper, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, U.S. Department of Defense....................... 8 David R. Shedd, Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Policy, Plans, and Requirements, Office of the Director of National Intelligence.......................................... 10 Brenda S. Farrell, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office.......................... 11 Alphabetical List of Witnesses Berry, Hon. John: Testimony.................................................... 7 Prepared statement........................................... 35 Clapper, Hon. James R.: Testimony.................................................... 8 Joint prepared statement with Mr. Shedd...................... 41 Farrell, Brenda S.: Testimony.................................................... 11 Prepared statement........................................... 48 Shedd, David R.: Testimony.................................................... 10 Joint prepared statement with Mr. Clapper.................... 41 Zients, Hon. Jeffrey D.: Testimony.................................................... 5 Prepared statement........................................... 29 APPENDIX Background....................................................... 63 Questions and Responses to questions: Mr. Zients with an attachment for question 13................ 70 Mr. Berry.................................................... 83 Mr. Clapper.................................................. 91 SECURITY CLEARANCE REFORM: MOVING FORWARD ON MODERNIZATION ---------- TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 2009 U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Washington, DC. The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Akaka, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. Present: Senators Akaka, Burris, and Voinovich. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA Senator Akaka. Good afternoon. This hearing of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia is called to order. I want to welcome you to our sixth hearing on reforming the security clearance process, which has been on the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) High-Risk List since 2005. Since we began this line of hearings, much progress has been made in laying the groundwork for reform. Now is the time to move forward with modernizing the security clearance process in the Federal Government. When this issue was originally placed on the High-Risk List, it was designated as a problem with the Department of Defense's (DOD) clearance process. However, through our oversight, it has become clear that this problem must be looked at through a government-wide lens and in conjunction with suitability screening. The last Administration, with the support of dedicated career civil servants on the front lines of this issue, worked hard to reduce processing times for security clearances. The backlog of security clearance determinations has all but vanished, but the investigations still rely on outdated, paper-based processes. We must use this opportunity to make fundamental changes to the process to ensure that we do not experience the same problems in the future. Modernizing also will lead to more efficient operations and will help with another key priority of mine, streamlining the Federal hiring process and making it more user friendly. It is also time to further examine the quality of clearance investigations and adjudications. This means creating and implementing meaningful metrics that can be audited so that we know the system is working. The security of our Nation depends on ensuring that security clearance decisions are based on thorough, modern, and risk-based determinations. With metrics in place, it will become clear that one of the biggest barriers to modernizing the clearance system is reinventing and modernizing the information technology (IT) infrastructure at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Department of Defense, and within the intelligence community. I have been concerned for years about the outdated systems in use throughout the clearance process. Some of these systems date back over 20 years. Every change in the Administration brings inevitable delays, as new leaders are put into place and get up to speed. Some of the reforms outlined by the Joint Reform Team made up of government stakeholders involved in issuing clearances and suitability determinations at our hearing last May are behind schedule. It is important, after years of work put into reform, that it continues to move forward in a meaningful way. We must work to modernize the clearance process in order to remove it from the High-Risk List as soon as possible. While progress has been made, with timeliness greatly improved and backlogs reduced, meeting the Intelligence Reform Act's milestones alone should not be the ultimate goal. This will require the buy-in of all stakeholders, a willingness to collaborate, and the knowledge and skills that the reform team has brought to the table. I again want to thank all of our witnesses for appearing today. I also want to recognize the dedicated career professionals, those sitting behind our witnesses, as well as those who are not here today, who have been working on this issue for years. I again want to thank you all for your service. I especially want to thank Kathy Dillaman, who has worked with this Subcommittee for many years and who I understand will be eligible for retirement in the coming years. I also want to thank Senator Voinovich for his continued dedication to this issue. We have worked together on this issue seamlessly, no matter who was the Chairman, and I think we have shown that great progress can be achieved through oversight. I know that Senator Voinovich is anxious to resolve some of these pressing government management problems as he looks forward to retirement, so I would urge you all to work hard on this issue over the next year. With that, I will recognize Senator Voinovich for his statement. Senator Voinovich. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the witnesses for being here today. We are continuing to review the Federal Government's effort to reform the security clearance process. We have worked on this for a long time. This is our sixth hearing. This goes back 5 years--we started in 2005--so if some of our words today are from a little bit of exasperation about things, you will understand, for the newcomers here. More than 4 years after our first hearing, the DOD's security clearance process remains on GAO's High-Risk List and I see little evidence of progress thus far in furtherance of Congressional security clearance reform mandates. I am anxious to hear from our new people about this. Reforming the security clearance process and removing DOD's personal security clearance process from GAO's High-Risk List are priorities for me in, as Senator Akaka said, my final Congress. I have always believed that the Executive Branch could get DOD's clearance process off the High-Risk List, and I want to see that happen. I intend to closely monitor efforts in this regard and have told my staff I want weekly updates on progress made to get DOD's personnel clearance process off the High-Risk List before I leave. There are many reasons this is important, perhaps most notably because of the cost of the security clearance process. Mr. Chairman, I cited this statistic before, but I think it bears repeating. An August 2007, Department of Defense report on security clearance investigations estimated it took an average of 208 days to process ``secret'' clearance requests for industry. For every day a contract employee is on the job without the appropriate clearance, it costs the taxpayer approximately $684 in lost salary and benefits because the contractor is not able to do the job he is being paid to do. Over 208 days, a secret clearance for one person costs more than $140,000, about three times the 2007 median U.S. household income of $50,000. This is pretty serious business. Some real headway has been made to reduce this time. As the Government Accountability Office noted in its May report, Executive Branch agencies responsible for investigating or adjudicating clearances have made significant progress in improving the timeliness in clearance processing. Specifically, in 2004, top secret clearance investigations took almost 400 days and today they take less than 80 days. Similarly, initial secret clearance investigations took about 200 days in 2004, and today they take less than 50. This is significant progress, and I recognize and appreciate that. But it remains to be seen whether the 2009 benchmark for processing clearance requests in 60 days will be met. Additionally, even if that benchmark is met, timeliness is just one aspect of the security clearance reform that Congress called for in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). The law also calls for a number of other actions, including uniform policies regarding the security clearance process, reciprocal recognition of security clearances among agencies, and an evaluation of the use of technology to expedite security clearance processes. Senator Akaka, I think, did a pretty good job of outlining what we need to do there. I am particularly concerned about the lack of progress being made regarding reciprocity. I still consistently hear from individuals who have problems having one agency accept another agency's clearance. I am also concerned about the lack of progress in, as I mentioned, implementing technology. I believe the Executive Branch needs to do more to address these requirements. As GAO noted in May, problems related to the quality of security clearance investigations and adjudication determinations, reciprocity of clearance determinations, and information technology persist. The Joint Security and Suitability Reform Team recognized that more work regarding the security clearance process is needed when, in December 2008, it issued a report with tasks to be achieved during 2009, including implementing a revised electronic questionnaire (e-QIP); deploying an automated records check (ARC), capability in the Department of the Army, and developing a strategy for further ARC use; developing a curriculum for training national security clearance professions; and revising the questionnaire for national security positions. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) tells me it is coordinating interagency review of these and other proposals and I am anxious to hear about the results of that review. I also want to know when that review will be complete and when all of the called-for-reforms will be implemented. To that end, I expect OMB to report to us in writing about any changes that are made to the December 2008 Joint Reform Team Plan, including a specific implementation timeline for each of the initiatives called for in that plan so we know that this is down in writing and there are goals that are being set. I want to thank our witnesses again for their participation. I am confident that if we all work together, we can achieve security clearance that saves the Federal Government time and money. I am particularly glad to have the Government Accountability Office here today, because last year, I expressed concern that the Department of Defense security clearance process, which was added to the GAO's High-Risk List in 2005, would remain on the list in 2009. My prediction proved true. In January, GAO continued the designation of DOD's clearance process on the High-Risk List. As I mentioned earlier, getting DOD's security clearance process off the High- Risk List is a priority for me. Again, I look forward to hearing from you today. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich. It is really a pleasure for me to welcome our witnesses today. But before I introduce our witnesses, let me call on Senator Burris for his opening statement. Senator Burris. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BURRIS Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, to Ranking Member Voinovich and to our distinguished panel. I am very anxious to hear all this great testimony from this distinguished panel. I am aware that this Subcommittee has held several hearings on the topic of security clearance reform. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and discussing ways to further improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the security clearance process. Having been through the security clearance process many years ago, I am interested to see what updates have been made. Considering that the government conducts roughly 800,000 security clearances and investigations each year, I was pleased to learn about the progress we made in cutting down on the investigative time, improving database technology, and bolstering interagency cooperation. Nevertheless, our efforts are far from over. Just recently, as Senator Voinovich mentioned, I had a problem with my own office relating to the reciprocity of one staffer who had a security clearance from a Federal agency which was not reciprocal here in the Senate. I witnessed firsthand the challenges this presented for the staffer as well as the impact it had on the office as a whole. Work was delayed, certain briefings could not be attended, and the questions arose that could have been avoided if ongoing problems surrounding their agency reciprocity security clearance was resolved. So I am eager to learn more about this issue as well as the other obstacles that could be avoided with better oversight and management of our security clearance process. I look forward to working with the entities here today in implementing a proper reform goal needed for improvement. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I will then have some questions. Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Senator Burris. Now I will introduce our witnesses: Jeffrey Zients, Deputy Director for Management and Chief Performance Officer at the Office of Management and Budget; John Berry, Director of the Office of Personnel Management; Lieutenant General James Clapper, Under Secretary for Intelligence at the Department of Defense; David Shedd, Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Policy, Plans, and Requirements for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and Brenda Farrell, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, Government Accountability Office. It is the custom of this Subcommittee to swear in all witnesses, so I ask all of you to stand and raise your right hand. Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give this Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God? Mr. Zients. I do. Mr. Berry. I do. Mr. Clapper. I do. Mr. Shedd. I do. Ms. Farrell. I do. Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. Let the record show that the witnesses answered in the affirmative. Although statements are limited to 5 minutes, I want all of our witnesses to know that their entire statements will be included in the record. Director Zients, will you please proceed with your statement. TESTIMONY OF HON. JEFFREY D. ZIENTS,\1\ DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR MANAGEMENT AND CHIEF PERFORMANCE OFFICER, U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET Mr. Zients. Thank you. Chairman Akaka, Ranking Member Voinovich, and Senator Burris, thank you for inviting me here today. It is my privilege to testify on behalf of the Office of Management and Budget to discuss the Administration's ongoing security clearance reform efforts and the status of implementing those reforms. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Zients appears in the Appendix on page 29. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, challenged the Federal Government to address longstanding problems with the timeliness and the coordination for granting national security clearances. Executive Order 13467 reinforced the goals of IRTPA and recognized OMB as the lead agency to ensure coordination across the Federal Government. OMB, OPM, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), along with the Department of Defense, comprise the Joint Reform Team and together provide leadership regarding reforms to policy, processes, and information technology which affect the approximately 2,000,000 security and suitability determinations conducted by the government each year. Much has been accomplished to reform the process and improve timeliness. Of note, processing times for initial clearance investigations are down sharply since 2004 and the backlog of pending clearance investigations, once over 100,000 cases, is now gone. These accomplishments are significant and testify to the dedication of the staff at the agencies representing the security and suitability community, as well as to your leadership and persistent focus on these issues. However, much remains to be accomplished. By the end of 2009, IRTPA requires that, to the extent practicable, 90 percent of security clearances must be completed within an average of 60 days, providing 40 days, on average, for investigations and 20 days, on average, for adjudications. To achieve this goal with sustainable solutions that also enhance quality, we must continue to reform and modernize existing processes. These ongoing efforts will require focus and execution, but I believe we have a strong plan from which to move forward. Since beginning work at OMB in late June, I have worked with the leadership of the reform effort to finalize the plan updates to the standard forms that support the security and suitability clearance processes. These updates will support better alignment between security and suitability processes and thus drive greater efficiencies and higher quality for both. Upon review, we determined that certain suitability positions would not require investigations as detailed as the security investigations with which they had been aligned under the original plan. As a result of this determination, it is necessary to modify the underlying investigative standards and make the appropriate changes to the appropriate forms, Standard Forms 85 and 86. I am pleased to report that I expect the revised Standard Form 86, which is used in national security investigations, will be available for public comment by the end of this month. And following a review of any comments received, we will make final revisions to the Federal Investigative Standards. We will make any changes to our overall development and implementation schedule as a result of these changes. However, I remain committed and confident that the reforms will be substantially operational across the Federal Government by the end of calendar year 2010. Later this month, in my role as Chairman, I will lead a meeting of the Performance and Accountability Council to underscore the importance of this effort, reinvigorate leadership among participating agencies, and reinforce the close partnership necessary between the executive agents for security and suitability, as well as DOD and OMB. From my experience in the private sector leading transformational projects such as this, the participation of major project champions is essential for success. With this support, the other keys to successfully driving this reform effort include the development of detailed work plans among the Joint Reform Team and all partners; establishing appropriate metrics for the measurement and management of the initiative; identifying problems early and thinking creatively about solutions; and holding people accountable for outcomes. I will ensure all of these elements are in place and will maintain a relentless focus on the overarching goals of improved timeliness, reciprocity, and quality. In summary, our shared goal of improving the suitability and security clearance process is one of tremendous importance to me personally and all the agencies at this table. It will remain a high priority for this Administration. I also want to recognize the important role that the Government Accountability Office plays in the reform initiative. I look forward to working with them toward our common objective of improved performance and toward the goal of removing the DOD security clearance program from their High- Risk List. The advances to date are certainly commendable, but much work remains. With the commitment of this cross-agency team and the continued support of this Subcommittee, I am confident we will meet our goal of improving the timeliness, reciprocity, and quality of clearance decisions for the security of the American people. Senators, we indeed will work very hard. Once again, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today. I would be happy to answer any questions you have. Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Director Zients. Mr. Zients. Thank you. Senator Akaka. Now, we will hear from Director Berry. Will you please proceed? TESTIMONY OF HON. JOHN BERRY,\1\ DIRECTOR, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT Mr. Berry. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you. And Mr. Chairman, I want to echo sentiments that you made in your opening remarks. Ms. Dillaman, who sits behind me, is our career Senior Executive who has been working on this over the years, and all of the good news that I have to report to you today is largely the work from her and her team. She has been a phenomenal leader and I want to thank her for her incredible efforts on this issue and recognize its importance. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Berry appears in the Appendix on page 35. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mr. Chairman, I think it is important to underscore some of the numbers. When OPM took over these investigations 5 years ago, 90 percent of the cases were taking over 300 days per year. In fact, in many cases, approaching 400 days per year. I am very proud to come before this Subcommittee today and tell you that we are ahead of schedule in meeting the December goal. We will reach this year 90 percent of investigations being completed in 40 days or less. That is not due until December, but we are ahead of schedule. So that is significant progress, and that is largely due to Ms. Dillaman's efforts and the efforts of her team and all of the folks at this table. The other thing that is, I think, important to point out is the costs in addressing this over the 5 years have remained within the inflation rate, within 1 percent. So there has not been a significant increase in costs, we have been able to do this responsibly. Senator Voinovich, at my confirmation hearing, I promised you that I would look into these issues. You raised the forms at that point, that there was an issue involving a logjam on these form issues. I have to tell you, it has been an honor and a pleasure working with David Shedd and General Clapper on that issue and I am pleased to report to this Subcommittee today, we have reached consensus on the forms, and those are ready to go. OMB is in their final review, and I think they will be in print and you will see them done. So I am very pleased to report that that logjam has been broken. It doesn't mean we are all the way there, especially on IT and reciprocity, two issues which this Subcommittee has been dogging from the beginning. On the automation efforts, at least on the investigations front, we are well on our way. We are more than halfway there, and we fully expect that we will be on schedule in meeting the objectives of the plan. Obviously, if this is going to work, we have got to be able to make this information accessible electronically, and we will not rest until that is done. But Ms. Dillaman and her team are well on the way. And then the last thing I just want to do is to tip my hat again to Mr. Shedd and General Clapper. They have been at this issue for many years. They have been persistent in wrestling these issues to the ground with us. Our team, working closely with theirs, has developed a great comradeship in this effort. My pledge to you is I will stay engaged and involved with this, with Mr. Zients, General Clapper, and Mr. Shedd, until the job is done. So we won't rest until the GAO can sit at the end of the table and say this has been removed from the high-risk category, and I think that is within striking distance. We aren't at the goal line yet, but we are within 10 yards. So I am very optimistic. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Director Berry. That has been great news. Now, I would like to call on General Clapper for your statement. TESTIMONY OF HON. JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR.,\1\ UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Mr. Clapper. Mr. Chairman, Senator Voinovich, and Senator Burris, the Department of Defense shares the Subcommittee's great interest in and focus on security clearance reform. It is a top transformation priority for the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The joint prepared statement of Mr. Clapper and Mr. Shedd appears in the Appendix on page 41. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- I met with the Secretary yesterday and he specifically asked me to thank you for your sustained support for clearance reform. You can appreciate why we are so vitally interested. Our volume of security clearance cases is approximately 1.2 million at a cost of nearly $1 billion a year. While a lot of progress has been made in reducing the security clearance backlog through Herculean efforts, it is clear that end-to-end transformation of the security clearance process is necessary if we are going to meet, and importantly, sustain, the 2009 goals required by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. In other words, said perhaps more bluntly, I think we pretty much squeezed the blood out of our current turnip and we need to go to a modernized system using modern technology and focused investigations on what actually produces relevant security data. Earlier this year, the Government Accountability Office identified several improvements needed in the adjudication of Department of Defense security clearances, and I wanted to make known that in response, we have taken the following actions. First, the Department's Personal Security Research Center, which I happened to visit last Thursday, worked with select Central Adjudication Facility representatives to develop a formal, professional certification program for adjudicators. The program includes a governing board charter, business rules, and an experience requirements checklist. Second, we developed guidance for documenting adjudicative rationales. This ensures that adjudicators will more thoroughly document relevant information used to make their decisions and help promote consistency among our Central Adjudication Facilities (CAFs). This tool will be fielded by the end of the year. Third, we developed an automated tool that gathers specific information about incomplete security investigations or investigations that do not meet adjudicator needs. By the end of this month, this tool will provide visibility to improve the investigative process. It will also provide an automated request for additional investigative work, which reduces the number of forms adjudicators must complete. We took another significant step in transforming the adjudication process last November when the Army implemented electronic adjudication which applies decision support technology to assist in the processing of secret cases. The e- Adjudication System screens all secret-level cases for military members and automatically mediates so-called clean cases, which are cases with no issues or acceptably minor issues. Since the Army fully implemented e-Adjudication earlier this year, almost 70,000 eligible cases were screened. Nearly one-third of those clean cases were automatically adjudicated. This means these cases required no human review, which results obviously in significant efficiencies. Earlier this month, e-Adjudication was expanded to our industrial cases, which represents almost 180,000 additional cases annually. We expect that a quarter of these will qualify for automatic adjudication, illuminating the need for human intervention. The Department plans to roll out this capability to Air Force and Navy adjudications by the end of the year. We plan to co-locate the Department of Defense adjudication facilities by 2012 as required by Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). As part of that effort and in anticipation of it, we plan to move all adjudicators to a standardized case management system. This will enhance efficiency, enable consistency, and allow for better performance measurement and management. Mr. Chairman, Senator Voinovich, and Senator Burris, thank you again for the opportunity to be here today. This concludes my remarks, and I look forward to addressing your questions. Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, General Clapper, for your part of a joint statement with Mr. Shedd. And now for the other part of the statement, Mr. Shedd. TESTIMONY OF DAVID R. SHEDD,\1\ DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR POLICY, PLANS, AND REQUIREMENTS, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE Mr. Shedd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Voinovich, Senator Burris, for the opportunity to speak to you this afternoon. Let me assure you that the goals of this reform, to transform and demonstrably improve the effectiveness and efficiency of these important processes, remain a high priority for the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and for the intelligence community in which I serve. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The joint prepared statement of Mr. Clapper and Mr. Shedd appears in the Appendix on page 41. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As Director Dan Blair's Deputy for Policy, Plans, and Requirements, the DNI has entrusted in me the implementation of these critical reforms. These improvements are badly needed to put the best skilled and trusted personnel to work in timely fashion in the defense of our Nation, as you have pointed out. Our commitment is evident in our assignment of expert personnel exclusively to this effort, the dedication of other resources, including serving as the host facility for the Joint Reform Team in its efforts since the inception. Each of us understands the role the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 played in establishing the first ever performance goals for this process. I note also that the very same law established the Director of National Intelligence and established the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, so these goals and other organizational changes are linked in fundamental ways. That linkage was enhanced in 2008 when the DNI took on the responsibilities of the security executive agent, consolidating policy and oversight responsibility for clearances in ways both necessary and new. It is this perspective on reform across the Executive Branch that I am pleased to share with you today, along with my colleagues. As Mr. Zients has noted, progress has been made, but work remains to be done. In order to achieve the transformational change we all want, and in order to reach the 2009 IRTPA goals, we need to modernize the underlying security clearance processes across the Executive Branch. This will require an alignment of policies, process, and information technology. To that end, our reform plan's key features are collecting security-relevant information earlier in the process. Second, leveraging the technology to significantly reduce manual activity, as General Clapper has pointed out and is already well underway at the Department of Defense, by using modern data sources, making decisions based on modern analytic methods that manage rather than avoid the risk. Third, tailoring field investigative activity to better focus on the relevant data that has been collected. Fourth, enhancing the alignment of the investigation process in subsequent hiring and clearing decisions, thereby reducing duplicative work. And finally, applying these new capabilities to more frequently assess the risk within the populations that already have a security clearance. The reform plan published in December 2008, Senator Voinovich, that you cited, includes implementation timelines intended to make these changes substantially operational across the Executive Branch by December 2010. While an Administration review of certain elements of the reform plan has resulted in some temporary delays to that time table, we remain committed to that goal and ask your support and attention in helping us achieve it. As the review concludes, we look forward to resuming an ambitious pace of achievement, resuming activity in a number of areas, including additional revisions to the Federal Investigative Standards, continuing the development of automated record check capabilities, changes to the automated systems that will collect the SF-86 forms, information online, changes to the automated systems to streamline management for future investigations and the adjudication processes, and finally, the guidance to enable agencies to execute their own implementation plans as needed. So last, I note that much work has continued even in the Administration's review as it has been undertaken and I highlight the work of all my partners as they pursue improvements to organizational case management systems, online repositories of clearance data, the electronic transmission and adjudication of investigative cases, and the additional meaningful performance measures to the suite of tools the Performance Accountability Council will use to monitor our collective progress. Chairman Akaka, Senator Voinovich, and Senator Burris, this concludes my prepared remarks and I submit this for the Subcommittee's record. Thank you very much. Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your statement, Mr. Shedd. And now, we will receive the testimony of Ms. Farrell. TESTIMONY OF BRENDA S. FARRELL,\1\ DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE Ms. Farrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Voinovich, and Senator Burris, for the opportunity to be here today to discuss DOD's security clearance process and the government- wide reform efforts. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Farrell appears in the Appendix on page 48. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- We have testified on clearance-related issues in five prior hearings that this Subcommittee has held since January 2005, when we first placed DOD's personnel security program, which represents the vast majority of clearances adjudicated, on our list of high-risk government programs. At that time, DOD was experiencing significant backlogs and delays. Over the years, we have conducted a broad body of work on clearance issues that gives us a unique historical perspective. My remarks today draw from two recently issued GAO reports. My main message today is that progress has been made to reduce delays in granting clearances, but further actions are needed to enhance quality and sustain the reform efforts. My written statement is divided into three parts. The first addresses the progress at reducing delays in DOD's clearances. DOD and OPM have made significant and noteworthy progress in reducing delays in making clearance decisions and met statutory timeliness requirements for DOD's initial clearances completed in fiscal year 2008. Currently, 80 percent of initial clearances are to be made within 120 days, on average. We found that OPM and DOD made initial clearance decisions within 87 days, on average. This represents significant progress from our finding in 2007, when we reported that industry personnel waited more than one year, on average, to receive a ``top secret'' clearance. Challenges do lie ahead to meet the requirement that by December 2009, a plan be implemented in which, to the extent practical, 90 percent of initial clearances are made within 60 days, on average. The second part of my statement addresses opportunities for improving the Executive Branch annual reports to Congress. For example, the Executive Branch's 2009 report does not reflect the full range of time it takes to make all initial clearance decisions and has provided little information on quality. Under the current requirements, the Executive Branch can exclude the slowest 20 percent and then report on the average of the remaining differences. Without taking averages or excluding the slowest percentages, we analyzed 100 percent of initial clearances granted in 2008 and found that 39 percent still took more than 120 days. The absence of comprehensive reporting means that Congress does not have the information about remaining delays that continue to exist, or importantly, about the reasons for their occurrences that could help with corrective actions. With respect to quality, the reports to Congress provide little information. However, the most recent report on the reform efforts identified quality measures that the Executive Branch proposes to collect. We have stated that timeliness alone does not provide a complete picture of the clearance process. For example, we recently estimated that with respect to initial ``top secret'' clearances adjudicated in fiscal year 2008, documentation was incomplete for most OPM investigative reports. The third part of my written statement addresses the extent to which the joint reform efforts reflect key factors for reform. For example, initial joint reform efforts reflect key factors for organizational transformation that we have identified, such as having committed leadership and a dedicated implementation team. But the Joint Reform Team's reports do not provide a strategic framework that contains important elements of a successful transformation, including long-term goals with outcome-focused measures, nor do they identify potential obstacles to progress and possible remedies. In the absence of a strategic framework that is outcome-focused with clearly- defined performance measures, the Joint Reform Team is not in a position to demonstrate to decisionmakers the extent of progress it is making toward achieving desired outcomes. Let me conclude by noting we are looking forward to working with OMB's newly-appointed Deputy Director for Management as he oversees the joint reform efforts. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. I will be pleased to take questions when the Subcommittee so desires. Senator Akaka. Thank you. Thank you very much, Ms. Farrell, for your statement. Ms. Farrell, I want to ask you a question that I believe Senator Voinovich asked last year, and I am sure that we are both eager to ask it again, and here is the question: What progress has DOD and other security clearance stakeholders made in getting this issue off the High-Risk List? Ms. Farrell. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The good news is that DOD and others are moving in the right direction, as we have just discussed. Backlogs and delays in granting clearances is what was behind GAO putting DOD on our High-Risk List in 2005, and we do see the numbers have moved in the right direction, and DOD and OPM are meeting statutory time frames. What remains ahead is issues of quality, which we reported in our 2007 and 2009 high-risk reports. The good news is, although there has been little done in terms of defining quality and building that into each step of the security process, the Joint Reform Team Subcommittee on Performance Measurement and Management has identified some metrics that they propose to collect, and those are what we will be watching very carefully. Those have not been finalized. What we would want to see for the personnel security clearance process to get off of the High-Risk List is more defined measures of quality, the correction action plan that identifies the root causes of problems with quality, what steps DOD and the other agencies are going to take to correct those, not just in the investigative phase but the adjudicative phase and the other phases of the clearance process, along with how they plan to measure that effectiveness, and steps toward their own measurement toward meeting that end. Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Ms. Farrell. I would like to direct this next question to Director Zients, though others may want to respond to this question, as well. Director Zients, the Joint Reform Team report issued last December had specific benchmarks and milestone dates, some of which are scheduled for this month. Some delay was no doubt due to the transition and changes in leadership. At this point, after the transition, how many months has the process fallen behind, and when will we see a rebaselining of milestones. Mr. Zients. As to the ultimate goal of being done, or substantially complete by, I guess it is 14\1/2\ months from now, I feel very confident that we are going to make that goal. So as we rebaseline, we will start with the answer that we are going to be done on schedule. And I think that is doable. I think that the place where we need to spend the most time rebaselining is around IT. The milestones for IT were generally spaced throughout 2010, some in the first half, some in the second half, and we are going to have to make sure on the IT front that we set new deadlines that allow us to hit the ultimate end of next year's timeline, but I think we do have some work ahead of us across the next month or two to ensure that we rebaseline the IT piece of it. Overall, I am confident that we will be where we wanted to be at the end of next year. It will be in good shape for your retirement, Senator Voinovich, and for removal from the GAO High-Risk List in January 2011. Senator Akaka. Are there any other comments? Ms. Farrell. Ms. Farrell. We would like to see a strategic framework, as we noted in our May 2009 report, that outlines very clearly what the goal is of the reform effort, along with identifying roles, responsibilities, and how progress will be measured. We found in the course of our work last year that when we asked senior leaders with the reform effort and agency officials involved in the clearance progress that the goals were not clear. Some referred to the IRTPA requirements with reciprocity. Some would refer to timeliness. And I do not mean to imply that there are no goals that the Joint Reform Team has had. We feel that they have a number of reports, the ones that they issued last year, April, as well as in December, as well as the IT strategy and other memorandum that present certain aspects of the goals. But if those goals were brought together, very clearly agreed to, and there was a consensus by those who are at this table, that is the goal of this effort and who is responsible, especially for the IT strategy, that would help sustain the momentum of the reform effort and get it done. Senator Akaka. Director Zients, as I said at your confirmation hearing, security clearance reform has been an important oversight priority for this Subcommittee. Your predecessor, Clay Johnson, made it one of his highest priorities, as well, and your position was designated as head of the Performance Accountability Council (PAC) for reforming clearances. You were just confirmed in June and you have a lot on your plate at OMB, including additional responsibilities as the first Chief Performance Officer for the Federal Government. In your role as head of the PAC, how do you plan to prioritize this important issue and provide sustained leadership to ensure that this effort keeps moving forward? Mr. Zients. This is absolutely a top priority for me. I actually am lucky as to the point in the process that I am coming on board in that this team and the group of career folks behind us have really not only made a ton of progress, but have teed up a plan that I believe is a good plan, a detailed plan, and one that is doable. So having been--as I mentioned in my opening remarks--part of these larger transformational efforts, there is a lot of work ahead, but there is a clear line between where we are today and where we need to be 14\1/2\ month from now, and I pledge to dedicate the time and the resources and the attention to make sure that we get there. But with this team, I feel very confident that we can get it done and I commit to doing so. Senator Akaka. My time has expired. We will have a second round. Senator Voinovich, your questions? Senator Voinovich. First of all, I am really impressed with the testimony that I have heard today. There seems to be an urgency and seriousness about this issue and you seem to portray that. I think it is worthy, again, to thank Ms. Dillaman for the good job that she has done. The folks at the table are only as good as the team that sits behind them, and those of you that have had something to do with this, we appreciate the effort that you have made. One of the questions I was going to ask is what are the largest risks to successfully implementing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act's security clearance reform mandates, and I think, Ms. Farrell, you have kind of laid out in your report some of your concerns about what it is that could stand in the way of moving forward. Is it possible that the team could go through those specific things that have been mentioned in the GAO report and come back to us and let us know, frankly, whether or not you think they are as severe as they have been represented to be and what you intend to do to move on those issues? It certainly would be comforting to know whether you agree with what GAO has said and what priorities you are going to set in order to make sure that those things are taken care of. Do you think you can do that? Mr. Zients. Yes. Senator Voinovich. I would be appreciative. The other question I have, a big question, is about the resources that you have available to you. I am very concerned when you start talking about technology, you are talking about spending some money. And in your respective budgets, has money been allocated--I am on Appropriations now--for you to do that portion of the assignment? Mr. Zients. Why don't I start and then others can fill in. We believe, as an overall effort, yes, that within the OPM budget and the DOD budget, we have sufficient funds in the budget to do the technology piece. We also need to make sure that we are interfacing with the agencies to ensure that they understand the technology implications for their systems and that their systems are modernized and ready to accept, not in any way to underestimate the IT piece, because I do think it is one of the areas we have to pay special attention to. But this is not very difficult, complex IT applications. This is on an IT scale difficult, but not very difficult. So I believe, bottom line, that we have the budgets and the resources, but I will defer to my colleagues, too, if they want to add anything here. Mr. Berry. Our IT piece is really the investigations portion of it, and the good news is we are halfway through that project. We have been through the rate increases and have been accumulating the funds necessary to complete that project. We are at a place where we believe we can do that. We are on a reimbursable basis, if you will, as we do the investigations. And so this year, I am very pleased to announce, and I don't know if Mr. Shedd and General Clapper have heard this yet, but there won't be any rate increase for investigations from OPM this year. So we will be holding our rates at what they were last year, and those levels will allow us to maintain what we need to do to finish the IT upgrades that are necessary on the investigations piece of this. Now, obviously, there is more work on the adjudication side that will have to be done, as well, but I think in terms of the investigations piece, we are well on track. Senator Voinovich. OK. You have got that portion of it. I just assume that the plan to go forward with the IT part of this, the technology you are going to use, you have already identified it, correct? Mr. Berry. Yes. Senator Voinovich. OK. And you have the money to do it. General Clapper, your shop is going to have to interface with OMB and OPM, and the question I have for you is have you been spending the time to talk about how the two of them work together, and do you have the wherewithal to take care of your end of the bargain? Mr. Clapper. Yes, sir, I believe we do. This is not new and unknown. I don't think we have spent a lot of time on research and development (R&D). It is largely a question of executing what we already know we have to do. And I can assure you that, based on the interest of both the Secretary and the Deputy, if we need more money, we can get it, because of their high interest in this. I guess I would be remiss if I didn't take mild exception to Ms. Farrell's commentary. Obviously, where you stand depends on where you sit. But having worked this pretty hard for the time I have been in office since April 2007, I think we have made substantial progress. I do think we have a strategy, as represented by the report that was submitted in December, and I think we are pretty well along it. I tried to outline in my previous remarks some additional things that the Department is doing, even during this pause, to address some of the issues that the GAO has appropriately raised. One of the major things here, of course, to Mr. Berry's comment, is a major feature of what we want to do in the reform effort is not to do so many investigations, which has huge impacts not only on the money that we have to convey to OPM for doing investigations, but in the interest of saving time and efficiency by capitalizing on what is available to us in today's IT. Senator Voinovich. And I assume that there is no problem with human capital? You have the people that you need to get the job done, that is not a problem? Mr. Clapper. I don't think so, sir. That is one thing that DOD has, is lots of people. So yes, sir. Senator Voinovich. Ms. Farrell, would you agree with that? Ms. Farrell. Well, human capital hasn't been identified as an issue right now. It has in the past, as you know, with the investigations, and OPM did make great progress in building up that capacity. But regarding the clear mission and goals, during our review, the last one, looking at the Joint Reform Team's effort and what is the purpose and what are they trying to accomplish, what we found was differences of opinion about the overall mission of improving the security process. We were referred to the report that General Clapper just referred to now. We were also referred to a 2007 memorandum between DOD and ODNI, which is not publicly distributed, in the comments on our report regarding what the mission is of the reform effort. Again, there are aspects and principles in the three key reports that the Joint Reform Team has issued in the last year and a half, as well as other memorandum. So we are not saying that there is not direction. We are saying if there was a very clear road map with a very defined mission and that these principles that are reflected in the other documents were linked to that, it would help move the reform effort forward and it would make it much more easier to tell what progress they have made. Are they halfway there? Are they 75 percent of the way there? Are they 99 percent there? We just can't tell right now without that strategic framework in place. Senator Voinovich. Mr. Chairman, could I just follow up on that? This is kind of repetitious of many of these hearings that we have had over the years. The Government Accountability Office has some ideas, suggestions that aren't acted on. I know we have such a problem with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). If you recall, we are still trying to work out some metrics that we can look at to determine whether or not the changes that are supposed to be made are being made. So I would urge you, again, GAO has made some suggestions and has some criticisms, constructive, and I think that you should all sit down, or have somebody really spend some time on this to work this thing out in terms of the differences of opinion, to see if you can get some kind of consensus because the bottom line is after this is all over and done with, we are going to look to GAO to find out whether or not they think this thing has gotten done. And the sooner you get at it, the better it will be for everyone. So at least you all agree that, pretty much--I mean, I am not saying that there won't be some differences, there certainly will be--but I think, overall, you can agree that these are the metrics that ought to be looked at and this is what we expect to be judged on, and then you carry the ball from there so we don't end up 8 months from now saying, well, that is not what we understood the situation to be. I would be very grateful if you would do that, and I would like to see that within a reasonable time, Mr. Chairman, so that we can see that they have gotten together and they are on relatively the same page. Senator Akaka. Thank you, Senator Voinovich. Senator Burris, your questions. Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would just like to commend the Subcommittee and their staff for bringing good news. I mean, I want to echo what Senator Voinovich has said. In my short time here in the Senate, I hear reports or testimony from witnesses and there are always problems. But I am really impressed with the progress that has been made here, so I urge you to keep up the good work and let us keep moving forward. Ms. Farrell, in your written testimony, you stated that the greater attention to quality would increase the instance of reciprocity, and what circumstances currently allow for interagency reciprocity? I have a couple more questions in that regard, too. What does a process of moving a clearance from one agency to the other agency involve? And second, what factors prevent interagency reciprocity? So you may want to try your best at that, or whoever on the panel can best help me out on this reciprocity question. Ms. Farrell. Certainly. During the course of our body of work on the personal security clearance process, the quality of investigations has arisen as a possible underlying reason for why there is not this sharing of clearances between or among agencies, and there have been steps toward using the same common guidelines for investigations as well as for adjudications to move toward that end. But reciprocity is one of the issues that is listed in the IRTPA that has not been addressed yet. As we talked about, there has been progress with timeliness. There has been progress in other areas. But reciprocity is one that is still under evaluation by the Joint Reform Team and is the type of issue that we would like to see more fully addressed in a strategic framework. Senator Burris. OK. Mr. Berry. Mr. Berry. Thank you, Senator. If I could, I agree with Ms. Farrell, and I think all of us would, that is one of the remaining poles in the tent we have got to get up. I mean, we have to do better on reciprocity, and so we are all wrestling with that as to assuring that gets done. And I think you have hit on the key to that, and that is the quality of the adjudications. One of the things I want to recognize is that we also share GAO's emphasis on this, that this is not one where we can be right 98 percent of the time. We have to be right 100 percent of the time. Senator Burris. Sure. Mr. Berry. One mistake could cause untold damages. And so we have got to nail this. We have put in place some things this year, and I think it is good for the Subcommittee to be aware of this. We have been working with the Performance Accountability Council. One of the things I set up with Ms. Dillaman is a hotline that the adjudicators can use to get their questions resolved. We do the investigations and then it goes to the agencies, and then they have people who take our investigation, look through the information, and decide whether this is the quality person that they want to assign the level of clearance that is being sought, and whether the case has been made that this person is worthy of that. Well, the adjudication is not our call, it is the agency's call. And we have created a hotline so that, if at any point they have any questions about information in the investigation, their call goes directly to Ms. Dillaman's office and they can have direct access to Ms. Dillaman so that we can get to the bottom of this. And, Ms. Farrell, you did identify that there was some missed information in a number of the cases that have been done. I think it is important for the Subcommittee to understand that in context. If somebody, for example, is on military duty in Iraq or one of a subject's references is on duty in Iraq, we would make all due efforts to try to get in touch with that person. But rather than hold up the investigation, we would see if there were other ways that we could verify the information. So, for example, sometimes when one neighbor might not be home, we will see other neighbors, or maybe two other neighbors in order to justify moving forward and establishing a comfort level with that information. And so I don't want to give the impression to the Subcommittee that we do not have a strong emphasis on quality. We do. And in all of the cases that GAO identified where there was missing information, we went back and reinvestigated all of those. None of those resulted in a negative determination through the adjudication process. We do emphasize this. We do try to rate 100 percent. But, as you are working these, there does need to be some flexibility with the investigator. We hire professionals and we do give them some discretion. We allow them to use their judgment. I think as we lift that standard and assure all of the agencies about the quality of the investigation, the goal of reciprocity is going to be reachable, and I think that is where people will start to trust sharing the information across the government. I apologize for the length of that, but I think that was important to clarify. Senator Burris. Mr. Berry, I am sitting here with a little concern in terms of what factors are there to prevent reciprocity from being granted? I mean, is it the level of the position that is being applied for in the agency? If they do the investigation, they do the adjudication, does DOD have a different--I think a ``top secret'' security clearance would be a ``top secret'' security clearance. Mr. Berry. Reciprocity has three levels to it, and I will defer to Mr. Shedd and General Clapper, who have been working on this a lot longer. But sometimes someone will come in for a ``secret'' clearance and then seek an upgrade in the clearance level. Well, you can't give the ``top secret'' clearance based only on the investigation at the ``secret'' level. Senator Burris. That is correct. Mr. Berry. We have to go back and do more rigorous investigation. But what we have been trying to do is to standardize all the questions so that we don't have to go back and do the work that was done on the ``secret clearance.'' We can just do the difference, and that is what we are striving to do, is to achieve a consistency there so that, as people move around the government and as their security clearances change, agencies will recognize the work that has been done beforehand so that we don't have to start over from ground zero every time, as has been the case in the past. Senator Burris. Mr. Clapper, can you comment on that situation? Mr. Clapper. Well, I think one of the things that contributes to obstacles to reciprocity has to do with transparency of the data, whether investigative or adjudicative. So to the extent that we can promote through automation so that appropriate officials either within, in our case, the Department of Defense or with other departments of the government can have access uniformly and consistently to the basic investigative data if they require it or factors used in adjudications, that those who are appropriate for that would have uniform access to it so that if they have a question about someone, they can go to the original source data. Senator Burris. Are you saying there is a privacy question here in reference to the---- Mr. Clapper. Well, I don't think that enters into it necessarily, because once you--if you agree to enter into a position that requires a clearance---- Senator Burris. We have got to know everything about you. Mr. Clapper [continuing]. Then you sort of, having been one of those people for a long time, then you give that up. Senator Burris. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I can stay, I might have a second round. Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your first round questions. Director Berry, the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 requires, and you mentioned this, that OPM conduct 90 percent of its investigations in an average of 40 days by December 2009. According to your testimony, you are on track to meet or exceed this benchmark, and I want to commend you and the agency and all of those who had a part in this for making remarkable progress on completing security clearance investigations as promptly as you have. GAO's written testimony states that in 2008, the slowest 11 percent of initial clearance decisions still took more than 300 days to complete. Can you tell me about why some investigations still take a long time to complete and what is being done to speed the most difficult investigations? Mr. Berry. Mr. Chairman, I think that is a great question, and I think it is one that counsels caution for all of us. I think that is why the Subcommittee, and the GAO, and we use that standard of 90 percent, because we are not giving out drivers' licenses here. As you are well aware, we are giving out, in some cases, the highest security clearances possible. There are some people who will not successfully pass. And if we cannot verify the information, and if we cannot get to the bottom of it, and in some cases it is hard to do that, we can't go forward. Now, recognizing that in some cases that also denies someone a position if they are already in the government, we have got to make every effort. But I think we need to recognize in our performance standards, that if there are problems, we must take the time to do it right. I think we always need to be looking at that pool of cases and making sure that it is legitimate, that the delay is real and justified. But we do need to recognize there will probably always be some pool of cases like that. So I don't want to mislead you. That being said, we still need to watch that very closely, and it has to be, I think, one of the performance metrics that GAO, OMB, and OPM are going to have to watch. Senator Akaka. Are there any other comments? Ms. Farrell. Ms. Farrell. Well, we recognize that some clearances are going to take longer than 120 days, or come December, longer than the 60 days. The reason we were focusing attention on the slowest 10 percent or 20 percent is that there is currently not any reporting of that to monitor to see what is going on with 100 percent of the clearances, not necessarily that 100 percent of the clearances will have been completed in 120 or 60 days, but what is going on with that pool that is not meeting it. And we feel by reporting the total 100 percent, it would bring visibility and thus maybe corrective action, if necessary. Perhaps some of these cases are going to drag on and there will be no clearance granted for the final result. But until you determine what is going on with that population that is taking longer than 120 and whether corrective action be done, it is an unknown. Mr. Berry. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I will pledge that we will report on those cases. I believe it is important. The transparency, as General Clapper has mentioned, is critical, we must be held accountable on this. If we are not reporting already, as the Director of OPM, my pledge to this Subcommittee is that we will report on it. So we will develop the metric necessary to get that job done. Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for that. Director Zients, you testified that the interagency review process determined that few changes would be made in plans for clearance reform. However, you did say that you plan to reexamine overlaps between suitability and security clearance investigations. Can you discuss this further and describe how this is different from the original reform plan? Mr. Zients. Yes. The original reform plan envisioned three tiers of investigation based on increasing levels of risk. So the bottom tier, all exclusively around suitability, is the Form 85, and the topmost tier around national security and the Form 86. It envisioned a middle tier that I think, upon review, was too broad in that it included, as an example, an HR executive at an agency and a Border Patrol who carries a gun all in the same tier. And what we have found is that it probably is better to break that middle tier into two tiers which will allow for a better and more efficient process. And that determination to break the middle tier into two has led to some changes to the Form 86. Senator Voinovich, you had asked about that up front. That will enter a 30-day public comment stage by the end of the month. And therefore, once we incorporate those comments, we should be done with that, certainly by the end of this year. So that we have largely completed the review, it will result in two tiers rather than one in the middle, and I think, ultimately, a more effective and more efficient process that will also allow for better reciprocity across the system. Senator Akaka. Secretary Shedd, last December, ODNI, along with OPM, updated the Federal Investigative Standards for Security Clearance Investigations. These standards had not been updated since 1995 and little has been said about the updates. Can you describe why the update was necessary and how the standards changed? Mr. Shedd. Mr. Chairman, the reason for looking at the standards was to align them into a process or a system of risk management into three tiers, in that the top secret SCI, the ``sensitive compartmented information'' clearance being tier three, the lowest level being tier one for general access, below ``confidential'' level, and the middle level, tier two, being ``confidential secret'' level. This was done in such a way that as we moved forward with an E process (and what I will term to be the flagging of issues of concern that would require additional investigation), the process, of the standards for leading to that built off of the new SF-86, would kick in and be brought to bear on that investigation. As General Clapper has said, one of the big objectives is to lower, or minimize, the amount of time spent on clean cases, those cases where there is no issue that has been identified. At the Top Secret Sensitive Compartmental Information (TS- SCI) level, an interview of that individual, that applicant requiring a TS-SCI will still be required. However, much earlier in the process because of this flagging system off of the E-based identification of the data that is discovered on the individual, you can go to a much more targeted way of doing that investigation and thereby cutting down the number of days that leads to the clearance and the adjudication of that clearance. So that was the purpose behind that. We will now go back to that with whatever realignment occurs with OPM and under OMB's leadership and relook at that if, in fact, it impacts on the standards that were issued in 2008 under Director McConnell. Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. Mr. Shedd. You are welcome. Senator Akaka. Senator Voinovich. Senator Voinovich. Aren't there still some agencies that do their own clearance? Mr. Shedd. Yes, sir. Senator Voinovich. So they are not in this main area? In other words, they are exempt from this whole process. They do their own thing---- Mr. Shedd. No. They fall under the direction of the DNI in terms of the standards for doing it, even though they do their own investigations and don't fall to OPM. So, for example, the National Reconnaissance Office does its own investigations, but they must follow the process laid out---- Senator Voinovich. The guidelines. But the fact of the matter is that in certain areas, they do their own investigations so that---- Mr. Shedd. Correct. Senator Voinovich [continuing]. The kind of investigations that the OPM does--there is a kind of standard investigation of just generally people that want to come into the Federal Government at a certain level of security clearance. Mr. Shedd. That is correct, sir. Senator Voinovich. And there is a consensus about the information that you need to have investigated so that you get to that level. Mr. Shedd. That is correct, and I might add, they rely on the standards for suitability that are published or issued by the Office of Personnel Management, as well. So they don't get to go outside of the suitability part of that security clearance data collection. Mr. Zients. I think we are talking about roughly 10 percent, is that correct? Mr. Shedd. It is closer to 5 to 7 percent, total, for the intelligence community (IC), for about a total of 82,000 cases per year. Senator Voinovich. So the majority of them go through the regular system---- Mr. Shedd. Yes. Correct. Senator Voinovich [continuing]. In terms of the investigation. I recall when we got into this whole investigation that the people that were doing it were doing it on a part-time basis. Obviously, you have got a new system and more trained people so that the quality overall, would you say, General Clapper, is better than what it was 2 or 3 years ago? Mr. Clapper. I think that is a fair statement, yes, sir. Mr. Berry. Senator, if I could, I would just like to point out the scale. As Mr. Shedd mentioned, OPM is doing, in terms of investigations, 2.2 million investigations a year, and that is not just for suitability. We do suitability, secret, top secret, and SCI investigation levels. So we meet that standard throughout. As was mentioned, there is about 8 percent still outside that, but---- Senator Voinovich. You have different standards for investigations depending on what the call for is with the agencies---- Mr. Berry. Yes, sir. Senator Voinovich [continuing]. And you have the people on board that can review those investigations to make sure that they meet high standards, so once you send them over to the agency, the agency doesn't look at them and say, we don't want them. How often, General Clapper, do you have to go back to them and say, you have got to do some more work? Mr. Clapper. I don't know the exact number, but it is relatively small, but I would have to get the exact number of referrals. Mr. Zients. Across the system, it is less than 1 percent. Senator Voinovich. I didn't hear you. Mr. Berry. Less than 1 percent, Senator. Mr. Zients. Less than 1 percent are returned by the agency to the investigative process. And that doesn't mean that there was an error. It might mean that sometimes a return is--you only talked to four neighbors, because this is important---- Senator Voinovich. Oh, I have to tell you, 1 percent, it is amazing. Is this review of the SF-86 that you are doing pretty much over? In other words, the security clearance reform initiative of the former Administration, you have kind of looked that over and you have got some changes that you want to make and now the procedure is you have to send it out for comment? Is that where we are at right now? Mr. Zients. Yes. Senator Voinovich. When do you think that will get done? Mr. Zients. By the end of the month, we hope to have the Form 86 out for public comment. We are going to do a 30-day public comment period, and then we need to absorb those comments, so certainly by the end of the calendar year. Senator Voinovich. Yes. I would be interested, one of the things that many of us were concerned about is whether or not the DNI could reconcile some of the differences between the agencies in terms of reciprocity. Has that been pretty well worked out? Are there any hang-ups yet there? Mr. Shedd. There are some hang-ups because bureaucracies resist being told to accept something that either for them is not transparent: Fully transparent in terms of the reciprocity, the adjudication and so forth. But within the intelligence community, tremendous progress has been made in a system called Scattered Castles, which is a repository, then, of all the security clearances of the individuals. We need to modernize that database with additional information to further increase the level of confidence of the intelligence community's leadership confidence that when they are getting someone who is transferring from one particular agency in the intelligence community to another one, that all the information that General Clapper talked about is available to the receiving end for the individual who doesn't belong to that agency. Senator Voinovich. And that understanding among the agencies is part of this review that you are doing? Mr. Zients. Yes. I believe that the reciprocity issue is around standardization and consistency, and therefore is right at the heart of everything that we are doing here. We are using IT and process reengineering to simplify this process and make it more standard, and that has a big advantage when it comes to reciprocity because of the cultural challenges that Mr. Shedd is outlining. Historically, everybody has done it a different way, and as we get that consistency and standardization, I believe that, coupled with making the information available and transparent, which we are making a lot of progress on, will lead to big gains in reciprocity, because I think so far, we haven't experienced those, but so far, we haven't completed the effort around standardization and consistency. And once we do, reciprocity will follow. Mr. Shedd. Senator, I---- Senator Voinovich. I am sure this is something you are going to--go ahead. Mr. Shedd. I wanted to add one other perspective. Something that is of high concern to the DNI is that the agency heads in the intelligence community not add additional layers that amount to being barriers even beyond the reciprocity on the security clearance basis alone. In other words, standards for the suitability and so forth that don't ultimately act as a deterrent outright from a transfer from one agency to another because they are added on top of the security clearance issue. And so that is preeminent in Director Blair's mind and something that we are addressing by way of policy. Senator Voinovich. OK. So you think you are making progress, and a year from now, when people feel a lot better, with the help of the IT and other things, people will be comforted because of the quality of the information and be much more willing to rely upon it in terms of their concerns? Mr. Shedd. Yes, combined with policies that make it very clear what the terms are under which that transfer occurs, as well. Senator Voinovich. Thank you. Senator Akaka. Thank you. Senator Burris. Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am a little concerned about, are there statistics on how many apply for, let us say, a top secret security clearance and is, in fact, rejected? Now, there is an investigation and then it goes back to the agency for adjudication. Who does the rejection? What, then, is the process of this applicant--is it follow-up steps to attempt to try to correct situations, or what generally happens if there is--how many are rejected and what happens? Mr. Clapper. I, again, don't have the exact number of how many actually fail to get a clearance for one reason or another. I will tell you, though, that either in the case of an initial clearance or it probably happens more often of people who are already cleared and then have an update periodically, the requirement now is at least every 5 years, and if derogatory information turns up in the course of either the initial or a subsequent update, there are appeal processes, at least within the Department of Defense. There is a board that is overseen by the Office of General Counsel that allows due process for such appeals. They can be quite drawn out and quite extensive because there is a balance here between national security and then deference to people's rights. I can get you the numbers, say, for a typical year---- Senator Burris. Just a guesstimate. Mr. Clapper. Well, I would say it is, for the whole Department, which would include the four intelligence agencies that are embedded in the Department and the four services, I would guess on the order of 200 or 300, maybe, and that is out of thousands of---- Senator Burris. Is it a very small number? Mr. Clapper. Yes. An even smaller number that actually goes through an appeal process. Senator Burris. Very good. And this is probably for Mr. Berry. The investigators, in your assignment of their investigating of a person, are they assigned to the same agency or do they do various agencies? And if so, if they do, then why not try to have them to do more than one agency? What is your routine process for an investigator? Mr. Berry. Senator, if I could, we can respond to that in more detail for the record for you, but we have approximately 2,000 Federal Government employees and then a contract force about double that size in terms of investigators who are handling cases. And so it is quite a complicated operation to manage, especially to make sure there is no backlog, which is where we are right now, and to meet these timelines, as you can imagine. Senator Burris. You said you are letting contracts out to private sources to do the investigations? Mr. Berry. Absolutely. Part of this job is managed with private sector employees, and they are--it is something we watch very carefully and we work in hand---- Senator Burris. Are we investigating the investigators in the private sector? Mr. Berry. Absolutely. All of our investigators have to have clearances before they are involved in the investigations. We can get you more information about the details of that---- Senator Burris. Do you get consistency, then, in their reports? I mean, I am seeing that if a person is assigned to do the Defense Department, Health and Human Services (HHS), or the White House, and they know the routine, if you switch them off somewhere else, it might delay the process. Mr. Berry. It goes to both making sure that all of the investigators are trained, that their systems are in place--and the transparency of the data. At the end of the day, the investigation we are providing to the client; OPM makes no determinations on the clearance level. Senator Burris. Right. Mr. Berry. That is done by someone--so, essentially what we are doing is---- Senator Burris. Collecting the data. Mr. Berry [continuing]. Collecting the data and making sure that data is accurate, and then transferring that to the client, who then makes the determination, or adjudication, which is the term of art. So there is that consistency. In other words, the client is used to it and knows what data to expect, and if something, for example, is missing, the explanation is fully transparent and made available so that the client has the ability to say, no, we want you to go back and do something else. Mr. Clapper. Let me just reiterate or emphasize a point made here, is that regardless of who does the investigation, whether it is in the case of the intelligence agencies doing their own or OPM doing the investigations--and by far the lion's share of the investigations particularly for all of the services, are done by OPM--they are operating using the same investigative standards. So there is consistency across the board in terms of how these investigations are done, be they by OPM or one of the agencies, at least the four agencies in DOD. Senator Burris. Ms. Farrell, are there any other agencies that are on your list other than DOD that you are having problems with? Ms. Farrell. Well, when we first put DOD on the list, DOD was responsible for the investigations as well as the adjudications, and I think the Chairman said it best. The personnel security process has to be looked at now through a government-wide lens. There are many players besides DOD. The roles and responsibilities have changed, as evidenced by the Performance Accountability Council's involvement. So it is beyond DOD at this point in terms of the personnel security clearance process. Senator Burris. Well, I was talking about other agencies. Do you have HHS? Ms. Farrell. Are there other agencies that we have concerns about? Senator Burris. Yes. Ms. Farrell. It is more the concern of the roles and responsibilities of who is doing the investigations and who is doing the adjudications. Our focus has been on DOD and the reform efforts. We have met with other agencies, at the Department of Homeland Security, for example, and others that issue clearances and have heard concerns expressed about the sharing of investigations, as well as what we started talking about earlier, the role and the mission of the Joint Reform Team to improve the process. So we have heard from other agencies' concerns, but it is limited. Does that answer your question, sir? Senator Burris. There is a limited number. I mean, you don't have a watch list that you are looking at with reference to some of the other agencies that might not be following through or having a major backlog? Ms. Farrell. We are not aware of backlogs with other agencies, no, sir. Senator Burris. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Senator Burris. I will have a third round here, but thank you for your questions. Director Berry, I want to follow up on some information that Mr. Zients mentioned about SF-85 and 86. While updating the forms is important, the goal is to have applicants use an electronic application, usually e-QIP. Has OPM taken steps to update e-QIP and the Personal Investigations Processing System (PIPS) system to accommodate the new forms as soon as they are finalized? Mr. Berry. Senator, we are at a place now where 97 percent of that 2.2 million investigations are using that electronic system. So we are getting close to the finish line on that. And yes, those forms will be updated once--obviously, not until it has made it through the public process--but we will be ready to adjust and can modify that system to accommodate that once that process is completed. Senator Akaka. General Clapper, you testified that the Department of Defense has begun to use electronic automatic adjudication of some investigation files that were not flagged with any outstanding issues. According to the Joint Reform Team benchmarks, this is set to be more broadly deployed. What quality checks or audits has the Department conducted in order to validate that the electronic adjudications are as reliable as adjudications completed by a DOD employee? Mr. Clapper. I know the research that we have done, which I think is crucial to the whole reform effort, in which we have compared what would be revealed through automatic records checks versus what was on cases that have already been adjudicated under the old system, and there is a very close correlation. In other words, they are congruent. And we believe that the sample used was statistically reliable as done by the Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) to make that case, that we can rely on automatic records checks. And that, of course, is a major feature of what was intended with the overall personnel reform. I am told that we did a 100 percent audit for the Army pilot that was run between November 2008 and February 2009, and we are now doing on a regular basis a 10 percent audit. Of course, I would just repeat what I said earlier in my opening remarks about the tools that we are building, one to assess the completeness and accuracy of investigatory data, a tool called RAISE, and then another one called RADAR, which we are in the process of fielding, which will help assess the quality and rationale for adjudications. Senator Akaka. And I should have mentioned, I guess you can call it clean cases, where there are is no negative investigative information. Mr. Clapper. In the case of the secret clearances done for military personnel. That is right. Senator Akaka. Thank you. Director Berry, the Intelligence Reform Act called on agencies to use an electronic form to apply for a security clearance. I understand that currently e-QIP is the only format OPM will accept from agencies submitting the electronic investigation requests. Would OPM be open to allowing agencies to use third-party electronic applications that conform with OPM submission standards rather than having e-QIP as the sole and only option? Mr. Berry. Senator, I think we need to reach the targets that we have set. I think bringing in new players, new systems at this point in time could greatly complicate the timelines and our ability to reach our goals. I think you always need to be thinking ahead and looking more broadly, but at this point in time, I think we need to maintain that centrality so that we can have the consistency and have the ability to have the transparency that customers should demand and should require. So my sense would be, this is not the time to try to expand that, sir. Mr. Clapper. If I might, Senator, I would just strongly endorse what Mr. Berry just said. From a DOD perspective, as large as we are and as globally deployed as we are, I think it is very important that we hew to the tenet of consistency here in both the applications and all the way through the process. So I would strongly endorse what Mr. Berry said. Senator Akaka. Are there any other comments on this particular question? [No response.] Senator Akaka. I have specific questions about the status of several information technology systems, and I will just tell you that I will submit it for the record to all of you. Your responses have been really helpful and all of you should be commended for the progress that we have made. I want to thank all the witnesses for appearing today. Security clearance reform continues to be a critical issue. I have confidence that progress is being made, but much, as we agree, needs to be done. This will require dedication, commitment, and modernization of existing systems and processes, and I look forward to seeing this issue removed from the GAO's High-Risk List in the near future. Again, I want to thank all of our witnesses for your continued efforts. The hearing record will be open for 2 weeks for additional statements or questions other Members may have pertaining to this hearing. This hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] A P P E N D I X ---------- [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]