[国会记录：2008年10月1日（参议院）] [Page S10300-S10302]酷刑FEINDOLS先生。主席先生，自2001年以来，布什政府的顶级官员秘密授权使用虐待审讯技术，即在某些情况下遭受酷刑水平。在这样做时，他们已经向法院展示了公众的忽视，以便由美国批准的条约，以及我们自己的宪法。他们误导了美国人，破坏了我们的价值观，损坏了我们击败的努力。有些人在阿布纳布里布，瓜丹莫湾和其他地方发现了[[页S10301]的滥用治疗被拘留者的滥用治疗[[Page S10301]]被少数流氓低级询问者进行的近距离事件。但事实表明，真正的责任谎言：随着给酷刑的酷刑和司法部所说，这是一个政府的行政责任。没有错误，酷刑是违法的。美国是禁止酷刑公约，日内瓦公约和公民权利和政治权利国际公约的缔约国。The United States Code criminalizes any act ``specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering.'' And in 2005, Congress reiterated in the Detainee Treatment Act that cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment of detainees in U.S. custody is not permitted, no matter where those detainees are held. Notwithstanding these obligations, top administration officials have continuously sought and found ways to disregard the legal and ethical boundaries on acceptable detainee treatment. On January 25, 2002, Alberto Gonzales, in his capacity as counsel to the President, signed a memo arguing that Taliban and al-Qaida detainees were not protected by the Third Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War. He stated that ``[i]n my judgment, this new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its provisions . . .'' On February 2, 2002, the President issued an order determining that al-Qaida and Taliban detainees were entitled to neither prisoner of war protections under the Geneva Conventions nor the protections of Common Article Three. Gonzales also solicited from the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, the now infamous ``Bybee memo,'' issued in August 2002, which in the context of the criminal prohibition on torture defined torture narrowly as the infliction of ``intense pain or suffering of the kind that is equivalent to the pain that would be associated with serious physical injury so severe that death, organ failure, or permanent damage resulting in a loss of significant bodily function will likely result.'' The memo also contained the extreme--and dangerous--legal theory that the President, as commander in chief, could disregard any congressional enactment that interfered with his ability to interrogate enemy combatants. These positions were reiterated in March 2003, when another OLC memo was sent to William J. Haynes, general counsel of the Department of Defense. And the OLC did not stop at general guidance. In a hearing this year before a House subcommittee, Steven Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General at OLC, confirmed that his office had advised the CIA that the regulated use of waterboarding did not constitute torture for purposes of the criminal prohibition against torture. High-level administration officials also have not hesitated to issue policies permitting abusive treatment of detainees. On November 27, 2002, Haynes sent a memo to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that asked him to approve 15 interrogation techniques for use at Guantanamo Bay, including hooding, 20-hour interrogations, isolation, sensory deprivation, forced nudity, threatening detainees with dogs, and putting detainees in ``stress positions'' for up to four hours. Rumsfeld not only approved the techniques, he added a hand-written note: ``I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?'' Rumsfeld later rescinded the authorization of some of these techniques for use at Guantanamo, and reauthorized the use of others. But the consequences of these high-level approvals were far-reaching. A recent report by the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General revealed that techniques authorized by Rumsfeld were used on detainees at Guantanamo Bay, both during the period they were authorized and after they had been rescinded. And such behavior was not limited to Guantanamo Bay. According to the 2004 ``Review of Department of Defense Detention Operations and Detainee Interrogation Techniques,'' known as the Church Report, the Combined Joint Task Force in Afghanistan also developed, authorized and implemented interrogation procedures similar to those Rumsfeld had approved in 2002. The Church Report and the ``Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DOD Detention Operations,'' known as the Schlesinger Report, also document how, in August 2003, MG Geoffrey Miller was sent from Guantanamo Bay to Iraq, and brought with him Guantanamo policies allowing the use of harsher interrogation techniques. Shortly thereafter, LTG Ricardo A. Sanchez, the top military official in Iraq, formally adopted techniques heavily influenced by those in use at Guantanamo, such as stress positions, forced sleep adjustment, and the use of dogs, although some of these were later rescinded. While OLC was issuing memos effectively saying there were no legal restrictions on interrogations and high-level officials were authorizing abusive techniques, there is evidence to suggest that interrogators on the ground were given very little information about exactly what was and was not permitted. During a Judiciary Committee hearing on interrogation policy in June, I asked Department of Justice inspector general Glenn Fine whether he thought that military interrogators had clear guidance on what techniques were permissible, given the administration's shifting policies. He responded that changes in policy ``didn't always get down to the level of the interrogators'' and that, at times, ``they weren't sure or aware of what exactly was authorized.'' Likewise, the Schlesinger Report stated that ``[t]he existence of confusing and inconsistent interrogation technique policies contributed to the belief that additional interrogation techniques were condoned.'' In light of all this, the administration's insistence that low-level interrogators are solely to blame for incidents of detainee abuse simply is not plausible. Many individuals who were aware of what was happening raised concerns. Secretary of State Colin Powell wrote a January 2002 memo that weighed the costs and benefits of trying to evade the Geneva Conventions, noting that to do so would ``reverse over a century of U.S. policy and practice in supporting the Geneva Conventions and undermine the protections of the rule of law for our troops.'' Others raised concerns as well. According to the DOJ inspector general's report on the involvement of the FBI in military interrogations, several FBI agents ``became deeply concerned not only about the efficacy of these techniques but also about their legality.'' In 2002, the FBI Director decided unequivocally that FBI agents would not participate in interrogations that used abusive techniques. In a November 7, 2002, memorandum for the Office of the Army General Counsel, Army COL John Ley stated that he believed that some of the techniques that the Pentagon was considering for use at Guantanamo Bay and that were later approved by Rumsfeld--could violate both the Federal criminal prohibition on torture and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. He expressed concern not only about the legality of the interrogation techniques, but also about eroding public support and losing the moral high ground. And in a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee in June, RADM Jane Dalton, who served as legal adviser to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from June of 2000 until June of 2003, testified that all four of the Armed Services were concerned about authorizing new interrogation techniques. Fortunately, in 2006 after the Detainee Treatment Act became law, the Department of Defense finally agreed it would no longer authorize the use of harsh interrogation techniques by military personnel, and ordered that all personnel follow the interrogation policies laid out in the Army Field Manual. I have strongly supported proposals to require all intelligence agencies--specifically the CIA--to do the same. For far too long, this administration has failed to abide by the law and to protect our values. The use of abusive interrogation techniques is unsupportable on moral, legal or national security grounds. It does not represent who we are as a nation, and it does not make America safer. The responsibility for the use of immoral, illegal and counter- productive interrogation techniques does not stop with the interrogators who employed them. It extends to those in the highest echelons of the Bush administration that sought to encourage these [[Page S10302]] techniques, who confused interrogators with constantly shifting policies, and that ignored the many voices who told them that what they were doing was unlawful and that it was not the American way. And it extends to the President himself, who has acknowledged publicly that in 2003 he approved meetings of his most senior national security officials to consider and sign off on so-called enhanced interrogation techniques. The abuses that have occurred under this administration's watch have constituted one of the darkest episodes in this Nation's recent history. They have fed growing anger at and opposition to U.S. policies, and in the process have undermined our efforts to combat al- Qaida and associated extremist groups. The next administration will have to work long and hard to undo the damage that has been done to our country's reputation and national security and to restore the rule of law. ____________________