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S. HRG。110-452提名博士。唐纳德·克尔是美国国家情报首席副主任======================================================================= HEARING前精选的委员会在智能美国参议院第一○第十届大会FIRSTSESSION __________ AUGUST 1, 2007 __________ Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/ senate ---------- U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 41-206 PDF WASHINGTON : 2008 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE [Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman CHRISTOPHER BOND, Missouri, Vice Chairman DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California JOHN WARNER, Virginia RON WYDEN, Oregon CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska EVAN BAYH, Indiana SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine BILL NELSON, Florida RICHARD BURR, North Carolina SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio ---------- Andrew W. Johnson, Staff Director Louis B. Tucker, Minority Staff Director Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk CONTENTS ---------- August 1, 2007 Page Hearing held in Washington, DC, August 1, 2007 Statement of: Bond, Hon. Christopher S., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Missouri................................................... 1 Mikulski, Hon. Barbara, a U.S. Senator from Maryland......... 20 Bingaman, Hon. Jeff, a U.S. Senator from New Mexico.......... 2 Warner, Hon. John, a U.S. Senator from Virginia.............. 4 Kerr, Dr. Donald M., Nominee for the position of Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence.................. 6 Supplemental Material: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Questionnaire for completion by Presidential Nominees........................ 28 Pre-Hearing Questions for Donald M. Kerr..................... 54 Glynn, Marilyn L.; General Counsel, Office of Government Ethics Leter to The Honorable John D. Rockefeller, IV...... 96 Financial Disclosure Report of Donald M. Kerr................ 101 Letter to Robert Cusick, Director, Office of Government Ethics from Corin R. Stone, Principal Deputy General Counsel, Office of the Director of National Intelligence... 97 Letter to Corin R. Stone, Designated Agency Ethnics Official, Office of the Director of National Intelligence from Donald M. Kerr.................................................... 100 NOMINATION OF DR. DONALD M. KERR TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ---------- AUGUST 1, 2007 U.S. Senate, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:37 p.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Christopher Bond (Vice Chairman of the Committee) presiding. Present: Senators Bond, Mikulski, Feingold, Nelson of Florida, Whitehouse, Chambliss, Snowe, and Warner. Also present: Senator Bingaman. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, VICE CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI Vice Chairman Bond. This hearing will come to order. Chairman Rockefeller regrettably is unable to be here today due to an unavoidable conflict and he has asked me to preside over the hearing, pursuant to the Committee rules and practice. I ask unanimous consent that any opening statements that Members may have or that the witness may have may be included in the record in full. Hearing no objection, it is so ordered. Dr. Kerr, I welcome you today for the Committee's hearing on your nomination to be the next Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. I appreciate having an opportunity to meet your wife Alison and welcome her and other family members. As we know, in May 2006, General Hayden resigned this position to become Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and since then, in spite of the importance of this Principal Deputy position for the IC, there had not been an urgency to fill this vacancy permanently. Earlier this year the Committee held a hearing on the nomination of Admiral Mike McConnell to be DNI. At that time we asked if he would make finding a new Principal Deputy a priority. We were assured it would be, and Director McConnell has been good to his word. I'm pleased we're finally able to consider Dr. Kerr to fill this key post. While a lot of focus is necessarily placed on the DNI, the role of Principal Deputy is no less essential to the success of the intelligence community and to its continued transformation. I expect that, should Dr. Kerr be confirmed by the Senate, his background in technology and science can be extremely useful. He comes before the Committee having spent most of his professional career in Government service. He has served in various positions at Los Alamos National Laboratory and at the Department of Energy. More recently, he was Assistant Director of the Laboratory Division at the FBI, and then the Deputy Director for Science and Technology at the CIA. For the past 2 years, he has served as Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, which unfortunately is one of the more troubled and poorly performing agencies within the intelligence community. In addition to his Government service, Dr. Kerr has held several executive management positions in the private sector. These experiences collectively and separately give Dr. Kerr a unique perspective in assessing the technology and science challenges lying ahead for the intel community. I would say that one of the most important things he can do is use the best science and technology to engineer an effective structure in the intelligence community. We gave a massive charge to the DNI and did not give him the tools to accomplish that task. So we look to the new Principal Deputy and the Director to give us a road map for next year on how we can assure that the community operates as we expected but regrettably did not give it the tools to do. There are going to be some questions about programmatic decisions Dr. Kerr made as a Director of the NRO, some we consider missteps at the NRO prior to his tenure. That testimony will have to be taken in closed session. But I must say in open forum that there had been a disturbing lack of accountability at the NRO for actions that have resulted in the loss to the taxpayers of, inappropriately enough, an astronomical amount of dollars. The Committee and the full Senate will have to understand the reasons for this lack of accountability, and we look forward to pursuing this in closed session. Before concluding, I add a very special word of thanks for Lieutenant General Ronald Burgess, who has filled in as the Acting Principal Deputy for much of the past year. We are grateful for his service and applaud his continued dedication to the intelligence community. With that, we are pleased to be joined by two distinguished Members of the Senate who are at the table with Dr. Kerr, I assume for the purposes of commenting about Dr. Kerr. And I start over here with a Member of the Committee, Senator Warner. Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that we extend a courtesy to our distinguished colleague so that he can proceed since I will join you for the balance of the hearing? So I'm going to stay. Vice Chairman Bond. Senator Bingaman, equally distinguished Senator from New Mexico. STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF BINGAMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO Senator Bingaman. Thank you very much, Chairman Bond. It's a pleasure to be here to introduce to the Committee and to endorse the nomination of Don Kerr for this important position. I became acquainted with Don when I first was elected to the U.S. Senate and he was the Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, and he remained in that position until 1985. While there, he established a very distinguished record of service. He established a variety of innovative programs, one of which I'll just mention to the Committee--the Laboratory-Directed Research and Development Program, which was and continues to be a mechanism at the laboratory that has allowed for some of the very best of the research that is done at not only Los Alamos but all of our national laboratories to occur. So I admired his work as head of Los Alamos, and I've admired his service to the country in many capacities since then. You went through that list of positions that he has held, some in the private sector, some in the public sector. But I feel strongly that he is extremely well-qualified for this important position. I know that the Committee has a much clearer view than I do as to all the responsibilities that attach to this position that he has been nominated for, but I'm confident that you'll not find anybody who's better qualified by experience or training or capability to do the work. So I would recommend that Don Kerr be approved and recommended to the full Senate for confirmation. Vice Chairman Bond. Well, thank you very much, Senator Bingaman. We will, of course, give your comments and support great weight and we appreciate your taking the time to be with us. Senator Bingaman. Thank you. Vice Chairman Bond. Now I will turn to a fellow Member of our Committee, the other distinguished Senator at the table, Senator Warner from Virginia. Senator Warner. Thank you. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I wonder if you would invite the nominee to introduce his family. Vice Chairman Bond. Please, Dr. Kerr. Dr. Kerr. Well, it will be a very short and brief introduction. My wife, Alison, with whom I've been living, working and doing everything else one can do for the past 46 years, is here behind me. Here she is. Vice Chairman Bond. Welcome, Mrs. Kerr. Senator Warner. That was brief. Dr. Kerr. I'm sorry I couldn't do better, sir. [Laughter.] Senator Warner. Well, my brief sheet says that there's a daughter, Margo, and she's not with us today. Dr. Kerr. Well, we do have a daughter, Margo. She's a practicing veterinarian in Denver and was here just a week or so ago with the two little girls she and her husband are adopting. But now she has to help support them. Senator Warner. I think it's important that the record reflect that family. Mr. Chairman, you've given a very complete briefing on the nominee's distinguished background, as supplemented by our colleague Senator Bingaman. So I just want to add a few words and put my statement into the record. Vice Chairman Bond. Please. STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WARNER, U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA Senator Warner. I always like to start with the law, and that is the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 established the office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the law served as the most dramatic reform of our Nation's intelligence capabilities since Harry S. Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947. The 2004 law provides that the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence-- the nominee now before us--shall assist the Director in carrying out these duties. Together they are the principal advisers to the President of the United States and the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to national security and the head of the United States intelligence community and overseeing and directing the national intelligence program of our Nation. Now, despite what I have to say and what others have to say, the most important endorsement, I think, of this nominee, next to that of the President in selecting him, is that the Director of National Intelligence, Admiral McConnell, has complete confidence in this nominee's abilities to serve as his Principal Deputy. We've all seen Admiral McConnell in action, and yesterday was a clear example of his extraordinary abilities as he appeared here in the Senate on some very important matters. And I can only add to this, Mr. Chairman, that--I added it up here quickly--38 years ago I walked into the Pentagon, in the Navy Under Secretary's office. And I've been dealing with intelligence matters for 38 years. And I don't know that I've ever seen a more qualified individual than Don Kerr to entrust our Nation's intelligence to. Good luck to you. Dr. Kerr. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:] Prepared Statement of Hon. John Warner, U.S. Senator from Virginia Vice Chairman Bond and distinguished colleagues; it is my pleasure to introduce to you today an outstanding intelligence professional, public servant and Virginian--Dr. Donald M. Kerr--who has been nominated to serve as our second Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. family I would like to recognize Don's wife, Alison, who is in attendance today, and to thank her, along with their daughter Margot, for their steadfast support and sacrifice not only in support of Don, but also our nation. role and importance of the dni The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 established the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. This law serves as the most dramatic reform of our nation's intelligence capabilities since President Harry S. Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947, and provides that the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence shall assist the Director of National Intelligence in carrying out his duties as:
美国国家安全委员会和国土安全委员会的主要顾问，负责与国家安全有关的情报事务，是美国情报机构的负责人。
以及监督和指导美国的国家情报项目。国家情报总监麦康奈尔相信唐有能力担任他的首席副手。《2004年法案》还规定，任何被提名为首席副总统的个人必须具有丰富的国家安全和管理经验。唐正是如此，他曾在四个情报机构任职，其中包括:
能源部负责能源技术的副助理部长和负责国防项目的副助理部长。
联邦调查局实验室部主管助理局长。
中央情报局科学技术副局长。
他目前任职的国家侦察办公室主任。1966年，唐在洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室(Los Alamos National Lab)开始了他的政府生涯，在实验室和能源部(Department of Energy)工作，最终在1979年成为洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室(Los Alamos National Lab)主任。唐先生在十多年的私营部门领导和管理经验中取得了同样的成功:
EG&G总裁兼董事。
弗吉尼亚州科学应用国际公司(SAIC)执行副总裁。
信息系统实验室公司的嘉奖和认可除了整个职业生涯中立功赢得无数奖项的执行副总裁，唐被授予中央情报总监令人印象深刻的导演奖，2004年和中央情报局杰出情报勋章于2005年。学历唐获得电子工程和微波电子和等离子体物理康奈尔大学高级学位的本科学位。总结总之，唐纳德·克尔博士服务的长期和杰出记录这个国家的情报任务，而且我非常高兴今天把他介绍给委员会。副主席债券。非常感谢您，参议员华纳。我们非常感谢我们尊敬的同事们加入我们的行列。而现在，在我询问证人一些问题，我想补充，我的同事，什么参议员华纳刚刚描述的跟进，我们不只是这个委员会，而是整个国会的紧急请求。我们一直没能到3个月前作用于DNI的初步建议以现代化的外国情报监视法案。但威胁安装，我们不能离开情报界盲目，或者你可能会说，聋人在一些显著的地区。我已经被排除在许多谈判，大部分已与在这个问题上，政府当局的，但现在我参与了这个问题，并已与DNI交谈，因为我相信它应该是在餐桌上。 And I urge my colleagues to consider a revised proposal that the DNI is making that he says will keep the country safe. I'd be interested if Dr. Kerr has any comments on modernizing FISA. If you were already the Principal Deputy, then you would be spending your days and nights tending the shop while the DNI has been camped out on the Hill on this urgent matter, and as Senator Warner said, doing an excellent job. There are a series of questions that are standard procedure, and let me ask you those. First, as the nominee to be the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, Dr. Kerr, do you agree to appear before the Committee here or in other venues when requested? Dr. Kerr. Yes, I do. Vice Chairman Bond. Do you agree to send officials from the ODNI or the intelligence community to appear before the Committee and designated staff when requested? Dr. Kerr. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Vice Chairman Bond. Do you agree to provide documents and any material requested by the Committee in order for it to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities? Dr. Kerr. Yes, subject only to the caveat, when restricted by law. Vice Chairman Bond. Will you ensure that the ODNI and the intelligence community provide such material to the Committee when requested? Dr. Kerr. Yes. Vice Chairman Bond. All right. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Kerr. Now if you would like to offer your opening statement, we would be happy to receive that. STATEMENT OF DR. DONALD M. KERR, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE-DESIGNATE Dr. Kerr. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you, and with particular thanks to Senator Warner and Senator Bingaman for introducing me. I'm pleased to appear before you to discuss my credentials as the nominee for Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. Indeed, it is an honor to have been selected by the President and Director McConnell, and if I'm confirmed it will be a privilege to serve. Based on the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, and the intelligence community Directive No. 1, as has been pointed out, the duties and responsibilities of the Deputy are substantially the same as for the DNI. However, the DNI, I think, will serve, as he has been, as principal adviser to the President and other senior officials. So I expect the Principal Deputy will be focused as much as possible on coordinating and integrating the activities and products of the 16 organizations that comprise the intelligence community. Over a 40-year career, I have held a number of senior level public and private sector positions and have learned a few things along the way. In five areas, I think I can bring strength and experience to this job, such as an ability to identify and deal effectively with troubled components, which I have done in at least two Government agencies to this point; a strong technical and management background; coalition-building skills; the ability to drive organizational change; and a strongly held belief that an effective planning system, coupled with strong financial management, can achieve superior results. While I learned this latter lesson in the private sector, I've applied the model to all my subsequent Government jobs. I've been both personally and professionally committed to national security throughout my career. I've had direct responsibility for intelligence and defense activities in four different Government agencies--the Department of Energy, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CIA, and the NRO--and I have supported intelligence programs in private industry and as a staff member and later as Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. This has provided me opportunities to work on a wide variety of intelligence issues, including nuclear proliferation, treaty monitoring, nuclear test detection and analysis, and development of future air and space reconnaissance systems. I'm particularly proud of the programs I have led to bring technical solutions to intelligence and law enforcement challenges. My commitment to countering terrorism began with activities in 1978 and 1979 when I was the Department of Energy member of the NSC Executive Committee on Terrorism. This commitment was substantially reinforced by direct responsibilities investigating the East African embassy bombings of 1998 and the attack on the USS COLE in 2000, and certainly refocused tremendously by 9/11 and the efforts of the past 6 years. I'd like to take a minute to talk about my vision for the intelligence community, as well as several goals I believe are critical for more effectively focusing the community in the challenging post-9/11 environment. I'd also like to share my philosophy about the role of intelligence in our national security construct. A popularly held contention is that the role of intelligence is to protect the Nation from all harm. Well, this is a succinct way to talk about an ultimate goal. I think the situation is substantially more complicated than that. One academic I think got it about right, describing the role of intelligence as extracting certainty from uncertainty, and facilitating coherent decisionmaking in an incoherent environment. These are not activities that lend themselves to guarantees or perfect scores as we would like, but they reflect the reality in which we operate. If I were to state what I believe the essence of national intelligence is, I would say that the primary goal is to reduce the risks our Nation faces today and in the future. These challenges not only require our ongoing dedication and commitment to the national intelligence mission but, more importantly, new and innovative approaches to the work we do, the operations we plan and carry out, the collection assets we design, build and operate, the analyses we produce, and the strategic partnerships we make across traditional and nontraditional boundaries. Each era has its seemingly impossible challenges. We all know the future is unpredictable, and trends hard to predict. The elements that could significantly transform the geopolitical landscape include nuclear and biological weapons proliferation, catastrophic terrorism, and even pandemic disease. The intelligence enterprise must think ahead to ensure that the capabilities needed to deal with these challenging and ofttimes explosive issues are available to the analyst, policymaker, operations officer and warfighter when they are needed. This is all the more difficult, because the threat is no longer predictable and confined to specific geographic areas. It is mobile, dispersed, dynamic and distributed. Intelligence problems are also developing at a much more rapid pace than ever before. We need to posture ourselves to deal in that environment. And so a few of the things I think most important are our need to seek global situational awareness to the degree we can. We need to be able to deliver critical information to support timely decisionmaking by both policymakers and our military leadership. We need to be able to anticipate strategic threats, although that may be the hardest thing of all to do. Importantly, as a consequence of intelligence reform, we have to learn to operate as a unified, integrated yet distributed enterprise. We need to adopt technologies and concepts of operations that leverage U.S. advantage. And, finally, we need to maintain appropriate investment levels for future capabilities. To do this, I think three elements need to be in place. First of all, we have the duty to gather critical intelligence, but to do so in a way that complies with the constitutional and other legal requirements that protect the freedoms and liberties of the American people. There must be proper training and oversight mechanisms for the intelligence community to ensure that there are clear rules for their activities. Second, given the non-public nature of most of the intelligence community's work, the DNI and the principal deputy must also ensure that Congress is kept appropriately informed of IC activities to enable Congress to perform its oversight responsibilities. To exercise such oversight, the Committees must understand the intelligence process, its organizations, policies, funding, and activities. The DNI and other members of the community must communicate on a regular and continuing basis to keep the oversight committees fully and currently informed, consistent with the protection of sources and methods. Third, the intelligence community must deliver intelligence information to decisionmakers without bias or prejudice. Intelligence analysis must be held to the highest standards of integrity and objectivity. It must also be rigorous, timely, and independent from political considerations. To position ourselves to meet the analytic challenges of today and tomorrow, we must go beyond simply doing our current jobs better. We must transform the way our analysts do their work. We must more effectively leverage new and emerging technologies and reach out to expertise wherever it resides. Effectively inspiring the expertise and experience of our talented intelligence professionals requires strong and focused leadership. If confirmed, I would bring particular emphasis to a number of areas. I would focus on effective financial management, including reducing the indirect cost burden on mission wherever possible. This effort speaks to Director McConnell's goal of modernizing business practices and developing verifiable metrics. The real challenge is developing the right balance between tighter controls and mission effectiveness, and making financial reporting more useful to those who manage our programs. I believe that continuous improvement in financial management should be an intelligence community priority. If confirmed, I will assist the DNI in moving the intelligence community forward from today's uneven but improving financial management environment to one characterized by common business processes and integrated systems that adhere to recognized best business practices across industry and Government. Accountability is critically important in ensuring that officials are responsible for their actions. Within the intelligence community, accountability ultimately rests with the DNI and the Principal Deputy. However, in a Government based upon checks and balances and collective decisionmaking, determining individual accountability is often very difficult. It has been my experience that most Government employees, regardless of whether they reside in the executive, legislative, or judicial branches, are simply trying to do what is right for the taxpayer. However, there are occasionally egregious exceptions, and when they occur swift and decisive action must be taken. Each and every member of the community is responsible for using the resources entrusted to them judiciously. Additionally, all Government employees are expected to ensure their performance is consistent with the highest standards of professionalism and integrity. One of the first items on my agenda, if confirmed, would be to ensure that each member of the IC is as fully aware of what is expected and required as practical. There has been significant discussion about the role of contractors in the intelligence community lately. There are compelling reasons why we use contractors to perform critical functions within the intelligence community. At the NRO, our industry partners design and build our satellite systems as well as provide 24 by 7 operational and maintenance support. We also rely on contractors to provide the basic services that we generally take for granted in the course of our day. These are services that are more economically outsourced and include everything from network maintenance to janitorial support. There are also certain exigencies that justify an intelligence agency's use of contractors. For example, if an agency has a short- term project or mission that exceeds the capability of its current staff, it is sometimes more appropriate for that agency to use contractors to meet that temporary need than to hire and train permanent Federal civilian employees to perform the work. We also employ contractors or employees of federally funded research and development centers to provide specialized capabilities that we do not find within the Government workforce. My general philosophy is no contractor should perform inherently Government work, under no circumstances should a contractor make policy or investment decisions on behalf of the Government, and the use of contractors must be more cost effective than using Government resources. If confirmed, I will continue to examine the appropriate use of contractors within the intelligence community. I believe that the importance of a highly trained workforce cannot be overstated, either for the NRO or the intelligence community as a whole. While at the NRO I've taken a number of steps to work on that problem, starting with a statement of intent that I signed with the Air Force Chief of Staff more than a year ago that made it very clear that the Air Force and the NRO would work closely together to improve the career development of our shared workforce. We've also teamed with Air Force Space Command to train space professionals across the Government in the new National Security Space Institute at Colorado Springs. I'm working on similar initiatives with the Central Intelligence Agency. Currently, the NRO's Acquisition Center of Excellence is helping our acquisition professionals complete education requirements leading to advanced degrees in public management and engineering administration. We've also partnered with Virginia Tech to provide an engineering administration Master's degree program onsite at the NRO, and we tried to pull together all of the rest of our training in a virtual university construct to benefit all of our employees and our contractors. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting Director McConnell in his efforts to more closely integrate the intelligence community. During my tenure, the NRO has been working toward an integrated mix of overhead and ground-based capabilities tailored to the geographically dispersed and dynamic nature of the current and projected intelligence problems, as well as the diverse needs of our many users. Integration is not only a watchword for technical collection and operations, but it is imperative that we integrate intelligence collection and analysis more effectively. They are symbiotic disciplines. We can only achieve our goals and objectives by coming unified in our commitment to the intelligence community's contribution to the strongest defense possible for our Nation and our people. Thank you for the opportunity to share with the Committee my background and, if confirmed, my vision for my new role and responsibilities. I look forward to answering any questions you may have. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Dr. Kerr follows:] Prepared Statement for Dr. Donald M. Kerr, Director, National Reconnaissance Office and Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence-Designate Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am pleased to appear before you to discuss my credentials as the nominee for Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence--the PDDNI. Indeed, it is an honor to be asked, and if confirmed it will be a privilege to serve. In discussions with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)-- McConnell, we agree that the role of the PDDNI is analogous to that of the chief operating officer of a public company. While the DNI is chief executive officer for the Intelligence Community (IC)--and principal intelligence adviser to the President and other senior leaders, the PDDNI should be focused on coordinating and integrating the day-to-day efforts of the 16 elements that comprise the IC. Before addressing my vision for the IC, allow me to highlight my background that uniquely qualifies me to serve as the PDDNI. Over a 40-year career, I have held a number of senior-level public and private sector positions, and have obtained a number of critical skills and lessons learned. In considering the challenges facing the IC, as well as the responsibilities of the PDDNI, I would ask you to consider five key areas of strength and experience that are applicable to this position: an ability to identify and deal effectively with troubled components; a strong technical background; coalition-building skills; the ability to drive organizational cultural change; and a strongly held belief that an effective planning system coupled with strong financial management can achieve superior results. While I learned this latter lesson in private industry, I have applied this model in all my subsequent Government assignments. I have also learned that the tools and techniques, used to integrate acquired companies, can be effectively applied in the Government environment. As this Committee knows from first-hand experience, I have been both personally and professionally committed to national security throughout my career. I have had direct responsibility for intelligence and defense activities in four different government agencies: the Department of Energy, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, and have supported intelligence programs in private industry, and as a staff member and later as director of a national laboratory. I have had opportunities to work on a wide variety of intelligence issues, including nuclear proliferation, arms control monitoring, nuclear test detection, and the development of future air and space reconnaissance systems. I am particularly proud of the programs I have led to bring technical solutions to intelligence and law enforcement challenges. My commitment to countering terrorism began with activities in 1978-79 as a member of the NSC Executive Committee on Terrorism. This commitment was substantially reinforced by direct responsibilities investigating the East African embassy bombings in 1998 and the attack on the USS Cole in 2000, and refocused by 9/11 and the efforts of the past 5 years. I would like to share my personal vision for the IC, as well as several goals that I believe are critical for more effectively focusing the Community in the challenging, post-9/11 environment. I would also like to share my philosophy about the role of intelligence in our national security construct. A popularly held contention is that the role of intelligence is to protect the Nation from all harm. While this is a succinct way to state the ultimate goal, I think the situation is more complicated than that. One academic described the role of intelligence as extracting certainty from uncertainty and facilitating coherent decisionmaking in an incoherent environment. These are not activities that lend themselves to guarantees or perfect scores as we would like, but they reflect the reality in which we operate. If I were to state what I believe is the essence of national intelligence, I would say that its primary goal is to reduce the risk our Nation faces today and tomorrow. The National Intelligence Estimate, ``The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland,'' makes clear that we will face a persistent and evolving terrorist threat over the next several years--a threat that will challenge our current defensive efforts and tools we use to detect and disrupt plots. My ``philosophy'' is not meant to minimize the critical role each and every one of our intelligence professionals nor the Intelligence Community, as a whole--plays in warning about current and future threats. The challenges we face not only demand our ongoing dedication and commitment to the national intelligence mission, but more importantly new and innovative approaches to the work we do; the operations we plan and carry out; the collection assets we design, build and operate; the analyses we produce; and the strategic partnerships we make across traditional and non-traditional boundaries. Every era has its seemingly impossible challenges. The future is fraught with unpredictable elements and trends. The elements that could significantly transform the geopolitical landscape include nuclear proliferation, catastrophic terrorism and even a pandemic disease. The intelligence enterprise must think ahead to ensure that the capabilities needed to deal with these challenging and oft times explosive issues are available to the analyst, policymaker, operations officer, and warfighter when they are needed. This is all the more difficult, because the threat is no longer predictable and confined to specific geographic areas. It is mobile, dispersed, dynamic, and distributed. Intelligence problems are also developing at a much more rapid pace than ever before. We must posture ourselves to adapt and respond quickly, in an integrated fashion, to evolving problems. To that end, I believe there are a number of goals that capture what we need to excel as a Community in order to grow our comparative advantage and reduce the myriad risks to our nation:
寻求全球态势意识
提供关键信息以支持及时决策
预见战略威胁
作为一个统一的、集成的——但分布式的——企业运行
采用技术和作战理念，使对手以有利于美国的方式作出反应
为未来的能力保持适当的投资水平，以便在实现这些目标的道路上设置情报界，有三个需要到位支持社区的要素。首先，IC致力于收集关键情报，但以符合宪法和其他法律要求的方式来这样做，这些方法可以保护美国人民的自由和自由。必须有适当的培训和监督机制，以确保在本关键领域运营的IC人员有明确的法律规则。鉴于大部分IC工作的非公共性质，DNI还必须确保国会妥善了解IC活动，以使国会能够履行其监督责任。其次，我们有责任为国会提供及时的信息，以支持有效的监督。国会监督在确保智力界正在表现为设想时发挥着关键作用。为了行使这种监督职责，委员会必须了解情报进程，其组织，政策，资金和活动。社区的DNI和其他成员必须以常规和持续的方式沟通，以全面和目前通知监督委员会，符合保护来源和方法。第三，情报界必须向没有偏见或偏见的决策者提供情报信息。智能分析必须持有最高标准的完整性和客观性。 It must also be rigorous, timely and independent from political consideration. To position ourselves to meet the analytic challenges of today and tomorrow, we must go beyond simply doing our current jobs better. We must transform the way our analysts do their work. We must more effectively leverage new and emerging technologies and reach out to expertise wherever it resides. If confirmed, I will strongly support the Intelligence Community's efforts to measure and, track progress in implementing these analytic standards, including the use of alternative analysis. Effectively inspiring the expertise and experience of our talented intelligence professionals requires strong and focused leadership. If confirmed, I would bring particular emphasis to a number of areas. I would look to focus on effective financial management, including reducing the indirect cost burden wherever possible. This effort speaks to Director McConnell's goal of modernizing business practices and developing verifiable metrics. My experience at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is that accountability for funds is effective. Although there are always improvements that can be made, the real challenge is developing the right balance between tighter controls and mission effectiveness and making financial reporting more useful to those who manage our programs. I believe that continuous improvement in financial management should be an Intelligence Community priority. While at the NRO, I have seen first-hand the added-value in establishing more effective financial management processes, procedures and management controls to put us on a path toward an unqualified audit opinion. The DNI recently developed a unified financial management plan for the IC as part of his 100 day plan to modernize business processes. If confirmed, 'I will assist the DNI in moving the Intelligence Community forward from today's uneven, but improving, financial management environment to one characterized by common business processes and integrated systems that adhere to recognized best business practices across industry and government. I strongly support Director McConnell's emphasis in this area. Accountability is critically important in ensuring that officials are responsible for their actions. Within the IC, accountability ultimately rests with the DNI and the PDDNI. However, in a government based upon checks-and-balances and collective decisionmaking, determining individual accountability is often very difficult. It has been my experience that most government employees, regardless of whether they reside in the executive, legislative or judicial branches, are simply trying to do what is right for the taxpayer. However, there are occasionally egregious exceptions, and when they occur, swift and decisive action must be taken. Each and every member of the Intelligence Community is responsible for using the resources entrusted to them judiciously. Additionally, all government employees are expected to ensure their performance is consistent with the highest standards of professionalism and integrity. One of the first items on my agenda, if confirmed, would be to ensure that each member of the IC is fully aware of what is expected and required. I will take decisive action wherever and whenever necessary. There has been much discussion recently about the role of contractors in the Intelligence Community. There are compelling reasons we use contractors to perform critical functions within the IC. In the NRO construct, our industry partners design and build our satellite systems, as well as provide 24/7 operational and maintenance support. We also rely on contractors to provide the basic services that we generally take for granted in the course of our day. These are services that are more economically outsourced and include everything from network maintenance to janitorial support. There are also certain exigencies that justify an intelligence agency's use of contractors. For example, if an agency has a short term project or mission that exceeds the capacity of its current staff, it is sometimes more appropriate for that agency to use contractors to meet that temporary need than to hire and train permanent Federal civilian employees to perform the work. We also employ contractors to provide specialized, niche capabilities that we may not be able to perform with government personnel. In each of these areas, contractors must be used judiciously, with full oversight from the government to ensure that they provide the services we need but do not perform work that is inherently governmental. If confirmed, I will continue to examine the appropriate use of contractors within the Intelligence Community. The key to successful partnership with the contractor community is to view the management of the relationship as an inherently government function. My general philosophy in evaluating the appropriate use of contractor support is: no contractor shall perform work that a government person should be doing; under no circumstance should a contractor make policy or investment decisions on behalf of the government; and the use of contractors must be more cost effective than using government resources. For example, to establish a cadre of government network administrators would be more expensive and possibly less effective than to contract-out with a telecommunications company to provide the service. It is appropriate to use contractors when they offer unique, distinct, or ``surge'' capabilities that may not be available within the government. Most importantly, all contractors and employees of the Federal Government must comply with the Constitution and laws, as well as with the governing regulations of the organization they support. If confirmed, I will continue to examine and enforce the appropriate use of contractors within the IC. I believe that the importance of a highly trained workforce cannot be overstated, both for the NRO and the IC. I have taken a number of steps in this area while at the NRO. First, I signed a Statement of Intent with the Air Force Chief of Staff, which makes clear that the Air Force and NRO will work together to improve the career development of our shared workforce. The NRO has also teamed with Air Force Space Command to train space professionals across the government at the new National Security Space Institute in Colorado Springs. I am working on similar initiatives with the CIA. Currently, the NRO's Acquisition Center of Excellence is helping NRO acquisition professionals complete education requirements leading to advanced degrees in Public Management and Engineering Administration. We have also partnered with Virginia Tech to provide the Engineering Administration degree program onsite at the NRO. In addition, the NRO is also establishing a virtual University that will provide an integrated, career-focused program that combines specialized training provided by the NRO directorate- and office-based schools with an NRO-wide curriculum focused on shared context, values, informational needs, and leadership. These initiatives are in addition to an already robust Systems Engineering Professional Development and Certification program that last year certified 151 systems engineers. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting Director McConnell in his effort to more closely integrate the Intelligence Community. During my tenure, the NRO has been working toward an integrated mix of overhead and ground-based capabilities tailored to the geographically dispersed and dynamic nature of current and projected intelligence problems, as well as the diverse needs of our users. Integration is not only a watchword for technical collection and operations, but it is imperative that we integrate intelligence collection and analysis more effectively--they are symbiotic disciplines. We can only achieve our goals and objectives by becoming unified in our commitment to the Intelligence Community's contribution to the strongest defense possible for our Nation and our people. Thank you for the opportunity to share with the Committee my background and--if confirmed--my vision for my new role and responsibility. I look forward to answering any questions you may have. Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you very much, Dr. Kerr. I was going to ask about your goals and I think you've laid them out and the difficulty of predicting the future. I was reminded of Yogi Berra's admonition. He said, ``Never make predictions, particularly about the future.'' I've always thought that was a sound piece of advice. But there's only 1\1/2\ years left in this Administration. Can you tell us why you took on this job? Dr. Kerr. I thought about it very carefully and had some extensive discussions with Director McConnell, with my wife, and with others whose judgment I respect. At the end of the day, in all honesty, I could not continue to be on the outside expressing views when the proper thing to do was to try to see if, by joining other seasoned professionals in the leadership, both at the Department of Defense and at the DNI--to see if we could make this thing work. That includes the responsibility to respond to the comment you made, which is, the legislation in 2004 was put together, the office of the DNI stood up; and now, with 3 years behind us, there's the opportunity to look back and say, what needs to be changed, either in legislation or in an Executive order, that would make it work better? And I think, between Secretary Gates, Under Secretary Clapper, Director McConnell, General Hayden, and me, we have the potential--for five people who've worked together without friction--to try to make it work and maybe to pass it on to others in a more institutionalized form than it is today. Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you, sir. The next thing I had mentioned, I wanted to find out if you had any comments on the FISA modernization or if you've been involved with the DNI's very excellent efforts to bring the case onto the Hill. What advice you can share with us on that? Dr. Kerr. Well, I've not been directly party to the discussions going on between Director McConnell and the Congress. But that said, I share his view that we do need to do something to modernize FISA. I could speak more extensively in closed session with you, but suffice it to say, 30 years ago there were certain assumptions about the future and certain realities of the context when the original legislation was passed. Those assumptions and realities have changed considerably and, consequently, the legislation needs to be changed to actually deal with the way modern telecommunications systems work and allow the intelligence community to do the things it needs to do to collect foreign intelligence on foreign individuals outside of the United States without a warrant. And, of course, at the same time we should always be in the position of, if the target's within the United States, of seeking a warrant to do that. Those two things are very important, coupled with the concern for those from which we would get information that they not be at risk for cooperating with the Government in this very important endeavor. Vice Chairman Bond. Let me deal with a point of friction for this Committee. This Committee came into possession of a point paper prepared by the NRO relating to commercial imagery. The paper appeared to be written in the fashion of talking points in opposition to commercial imagery. When our staff requested to be briefed on this document, the NRO declined. The NRO Office of Congressional Affairs advised that you had personally denied the Committee's staff access to the requested information. We could find no information in the point paper that would appear to justify refusing to brief Congress on its content. Are you familiar with that action and did you personally deny this request? Or did someone on your Congressional liaison staff misrepresent this? Dr. Kerr. I think it may fall in the latter category. The only paper I know about is one that my former deputy wrote as a personal thing doing a financial analysis based on public sources. It was not an official NRO document. Vice Chairman Bond. No, this was definitely not--I think we may want to explore later who had the authority to deny a request for the information from Congress--who would, down the line, have that authority. Dr. Kerr. Well, I think I can help you by telling you what I've said about this subject. Would that be helpful? Vice Chairman Bond. Sure. Dr. Kerr. I'll give you a quote. I recommended that the Government purchase geospatial products and services from the commercial remote sensing industry, as well as needed imagery ``to ensure this information has the highest flexibility and utility for Government users and to encourage new applications of imagery data from the private sector.'' I signed that in October 2001 in response to tasking from the Secretary of Defense and the then DCI, when I led the remote sensing study panel. Vice Chairman Bond. Well, we will explore with you later the other paper. Dr. Kerr. I don't know what you're referring to, sir. Vice Chairman Bond. We will explore that later. Now for the questions, I turn to Senator Warner. Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In listing the five matters that you felt you had a proficiency in, I would like to suggest a sixth, and that is you have a good grasp of how to work with the Congress. I've had that privilege in the years on the Armed Services Committee where you've testified a number of times before that Committee, and now on my second term in the Intelligence Committee. I'd also like to join the Ranking Member in his commentary with regard to the contribution of General Burgess filling in for this period of time. He's held in very high esteem here in the Congress and we wish him well. Going back to the definition, as I've said, under the law, that you and Admiral McConnell have as adviser to the President, I hope I'm not being presumptuous in saying the following. I think that the intelligence community has got to work with the executive branch, and most particularly the office of the President, in more clearly defining the enemy that faces not only the United States, but much of the free world today. We use the term ``war on terrorism,'' and now that seems to be misunderstood in many parts of the world. Great Britain has ceased to use that term; some of our colleagues in the House have ceased. And I must say, that term is not specific. We talk about ``radical Muslims'' or ``radical jihadists,'' and it's difficult for the general public, which wants to be supportive--and the general public which is deeply concerned after 9/11 about the vulnerability not only here at home, but of our people, hundreds of thousands of them that serve abroad, and most notably those in uniform and members of the intelligence community--the CIA and others, and the embassies. So I would hope that you could provide here this morning, and that you and the Admiral can, in working in briefings, try to more clearly define what that enemy is. In my judgment, it's clearly a global threat; it's not just isolated cells. There is a measure of some coordination. But first, what is the term that you would describe, generically, who the enemy is? And with respect to the Muslim world, that's a long and venerable and proud culture, and it's relatively a small number of those that are within that culture that are perpetrating the evil that's unfortunately spreading into places well beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. Dr. Kerr. I think one of the things I need to do, of course, is immediately recognize that I'm not a political and economic analyst steeped in studying some of these threats around the world. That said, given the responsibility that I may take on, I'm going to have to work very much with a very senior analyst, named Director McConnell, who has been spending his time trying to think about this very problem and how to properly frame the question. I think it's clear at this point that simply using the terms that go with armed conflict--``war'' and others--is an insufficient way to think about the problem. I think we're at a juncture where we have to think about the other instruments of American power and how they join with our incredible military prowess to project what we as Americans want the rest of the world to see, and for them to perhaps move away from thinking that the solution to their problems is simply to damage Americans or do worse. I don't think it's restricted to people of Islamic faith. It's been the history of this country---- Senator Warner. I didn't suggest that, clearly. Dr. Kerr. Yes. Senator Warner. But that seems to be a focal point of much of our attention now in both Iraq and Afghanistan. But what better evidence of that is our own internal bombing of Oklahoma some years ago. Dr. Kerr. Exactly. I think another thing we have to pay a great deal of attention to--and it's been in some of the estimates that you have seen--is that set of countries where the demographics are such that right now half of the population is male, under the age of 15. And in 10 years, they will be in their early twenties, unemployed, perhaps without hope and consequently fodder, if you will, to lash out at America and America's interests. And so I'm greatly concerned about that and what we might be able to do as a country to influence those places in the world and how they develop before it becomes something that we would characterize as a conflict. Senator Warner. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I just simply wish to first compliment you on your statement. I thought it was very comprehensive. But back to my question, I would suggest that I'd invite you to further amplify your thoughts in the record because it would be of importance to us to study precisely what those definitions are--particularly why the term ``global war on terrorism'' is found to be offensive to many people who have the best intentions. One other caution: In this world in which we live, you've got to deal with the split-second answer in today's rapid media and dissemination of information. So we've got to come up with clear, precise definitions and repeat them constantly to the public so they know more precisely. This country's making an enormous sacrifice of life and limb and in every other way to help not only defend ourselves, but other people across this world who stand in fear of the threats that face us today. Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you very much, Senator Warner. You've raised a question that we've debated, both in public and in private hearings, on learning more about the enemy, learning the terminology. And I think I've found a helpful tack, saying that these radicals are not jihadists, which is a holy spiritual journey for a believing Muslim. They are mufsidun committing hirabah and we should not glorify them by calling them jihadists. With that totally useful piece of information, I now turn to Senator Nelson. Senator Nelson. Thank you, Dr. Kerr, for your public service. What would you do as the Deputy Director to get agencies motivated more to invest in research and development? Dr. Kerr. Senator Nelson, thank you for the question. You've struck on a concern that I've had for some time, because I've actually lived in the best of the intelligence community for investing in the future, and I have lived in an agency that, in fact, did it the least. And I think part of what I might be able to contribute to is a more general community view of what appropriate levels of investment are needed for the future of our community and our country. Clearly, there are agencies that require more investment in technology to carry out their mission than others. So it isn't a case of just picking a number across the board, but it is appropriate to say you've got to be investing today for your problems 3, 5, and 10 years out. And I think we have not done that well, particularly with the pressures of the last few years to support current operations. I don't want to take resources from current operations, but if there are ways we can find to manage the resources we have better to make room for some future investment, I sorely want to do that. Senator Nelson. Well, what about the new Intelligence Advanced Research Project Authority--IARPA--which is modeled after DARPA? Dr. Kerr. That, of course, has just stood up. We have yet to see whether it can gain the same sort of stature and visibility in the intelligence community that DARPA has gained with the Department of Defense and the military services. One of the things noteworthy about DARPA and their major programs today is that every one of them is done in alliance with one of the services or other Defense agencies. IARPA has not existed long enough to build those alliances and connections and, to succeed, it will have to. Senator Nelson. Does the DNI support IARPA? Dr. Kerr. Yes, he does. He's testified to that effect. And I think my responsibility will be to work with him so that the actual execution meets his expectations. Senator Nelson. So what would you do to enhance its stature? Dr. Kerr. I think the first thing I would do would be to improve the connections with the agencies and the programs they already have. IARPA has been viewed with suspicion by them, particularly in instances where it appeared that the funds for IARPA were coming out of their normal operating budgets. That's not the way to gain friends. And so somehow there has to be a mechanism that they become partners rather than competitors for the same resources. Senator Nelson. You have been the head of the National Reconnaissance Office. And there have been some big programs that have been sole-sourced instead of competed. And of course, the U.S. policy is that we compete. Can you explain the apparent anti-competition policy? Dr. Kerr. We're really, in some ways, dealing with a part of the economy that is different from what I'll call the competitive private sector. We're dealing with a protected sector of the economy, which has dealt with companies that have chosen to do the majority of their business with the U.S. Government. In some cases, those companies have had substantial investment over the years in particular capabilities that exist only within those companies. And so unless the United States Government is prepared to make comparable investments in prospective competitors, they really don't get to the point of competing in a credible way. So what we have to do, as we look ahead, is ask which parts of the NRO program are most amenable to competition. For example, you might argue certain classes of sensors would be, where you might have three or more competitors available, whereas a certain other specialized capability would need to go to the company that had been the beneficiary of the prior Government investment and had the expertise to do a particular kind of work. Senator Nelson. So you would want to encourage competition where there were several vendors that could do the work. Dr. Kerr. Yes, sir. Senator Nelson. OK. And I realize that you inherited some huge problems when you came in as the head of NRO. This has been a concern of this Committee's, and it's been a concern of the Armed Service Committee as well. There were particularly two huge classified programs within the bosom of this Committee that were canceled, and as a result there's been a lot of money that has gone down the drain. These two programs represented significant new acquisitions undertaken by the NRO and they were touted by the NRO as examples of excellence and industry ingenuity, and both of them failed. Who was held accountable for these failures? Dr. Kerr. Well, let me speak to the first of them, because when I came to the NRO, the so-called red team--the technical review team--had just completed its work with respect to one of those programs. I had been aware of their work, and in fact had been briefed on it along the way. And it was in fact after reviewing their recommendations as well as the work of the staff at the NRO that I went to Director Negroponte and recommended termination of that program. The reason I recommended termination of that program was that I felt there was little to no prospect of that part of the program being successfully completed. We had managed to lay requirements on top of requirements. We had managed to change some direction enough times that we had a system that could not be manufactured by normal human beings. Director Negroponte took that recommendation. He spent time considering it, but within about 3 weeks he directed me to terminate that part of the program, which I did. With regard to how do we protect some of the investment made, we have in fact funded the continued reduction of technical risk in some of the specific new technologies that were part of that program. And they're slated for use in future programs, which I can talk to you about in a classified session. We think we have done about as well we can to recover that part of the investment. That said, we couldn't recover a significant amount of it, as you're well aware. Vice Chairman Bond. Dr. Kerr, we will go into a classified session, and I think Senator Nelson will and I will and others will want to follow up. Thank you. Senator Nelson. Well, Mr. Chairman, the question was, in the public session, who was held accountable? Vice Chairman Bond. I didn't hear anybody. Dr. Kerr. Well, I'll answer that, too. In fact, the program manager was removed from that program, as well as the direct reports. The senior leadership at the prime contractor was changed. The award fees reflected the unhappiness of the Government with their performance, and they have subsequently been put on the contractor responsibility watch list that the NRO has, which means that they can only bid on new work if we grant them a waiver. And they will not come off that list until they start delivering hardware to us. We're not satisfied with just changes in names and particular jobs and reorganization; we want to see the product that we've contracted for. Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, if I don't make it to the classified session, if you would get the details of that, I would appreciate it. Vice Chairman Bond. You can be sure we will. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson. Senator Chambliss. Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And Dr. Kerr, thank you for your service. We appreciate you very much. And, Mr. Chairman, let me just echo the sentiments of you and Senator Warner relative to General Burgess. Boy, I don't know a member of the IC community that has been more direct, more straightforward and given us better briefings over the years than General Burgess. I'm sure glad to see he's going to stay with ODNI. Dr. Kerr, we have a mutual friend, Steve Van Cleve, who certainly gives you a very high recommendation and sends his best wishes. As a Member of the House Intelligence Committee following September 11, we did a significant investigation into the reasons why September 11 happened. And it was pretty obvious to us then, there's been a lot of commentary, a lot written and said about some of the reasons why, but it comes back to one basic reason, and that is there was a total lack of information sharing. Now, you've been in the IC community both at CIA, at the FBI, and now at the NRO, and obviously you're moving into a much different atmosphere of your intelligence employment history here. What I want you to comment on is what you've seen relative to information sharing, what you think may be done or may have been done to improve that. Where do you think we still need some improvement? And in your position as the Deputy Director of the DNI, I want to hear what you think you might be able to accomplish relative to continuing to help the information sharing issue spread. Dr. Kerr. I think this is perhaps one of the issues that's a core issue of the intelligence reform legislation. I think steps have been made to have improved the situation from what it was in 2001 before 9/11. And that said, not enough has been done. And I can simply give you an anecdote to help explain that. And it goes back to General Burgess, for whom we all have high regard. He wanted to send an e-mail to all of the 16 agencies in the community to people by name and found that that was impossible at the present time. And so one of the key things that we have to work on is we have to provide the infrastructure so that information sharing can be done directly and quickly rather than by working around awkward legacy systems from the past. But the infrastructure's only part of it; the attitude is the other part of it. Now when I was at the FBI, we, in fact, had senior CIA personnel assigned there in line jobs. They were very effective at doing it. And there were FBI people assigned to the Counterterrorism Center at CIA. But the simple exchange of people isn't enough either because, the way these organizations work, the connections have to be made not just at the top, not just at certain mid-level functions where they decide that swap of people makes sense, but it has to become a way of doing the work. And I would say that the real test of the leadership for the DNI and his deputy is going to be the degree to which we can change some of the attitudes that don't allow us to have that full connectivity at all levels between the agencies to focus on very hard problems. Senator Chambliss. Well, I think you're exactly right. Those stovepipes that we've talked about so often unfortunately still exist--maybe not to the degree that they did prior to September 11, but certainly there's some still there. And frankly, going back to what Senator Nelson asked you about, I have an appreciation for the fact that you did step into a not- so-good situation at NRO. You made the changes that were necessary. I fully expect you to do the same thing here at ODNI, and I have all great confidence that you will. So thank you for your willingness to continue to serve your country in this capacity, and we look forward to seeing this confirmation concluded. Dr. Kerr. Thank you, Senator Chambliss. Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you very much, Senator Chambliss. Senator Mikulski--OK, she's gone. Senator Burr is gone. [The prepared statement of Senator Mikulski follows:] Prepared Statement of Hon. Barbara A Mikulski, a U.S. Senator from Maryland
很高兴欢迎科尔博士参加这个重要的确认听证会。国家情报副主任这个职位已经空缺太久了，国家情报主任麦康奈尔肯定需要一个常任副主任。
科尔博士，你在情报界有着杰出的职业生涯，在很多地方工作过。这包括能源部，洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室，联邦调查局，中央情报局，现在，目前担任国家侦察办公室主任。
我用五个标准来评估所有行政部门的提名。它们是:(1)能力，(2)正直，(3)独立，(4)对宪法的承诺，和(5)对部门核心使命的承诺
首先，我相信科尔博士有这个重要工作的经验和背景。您在私营部门和情报界都取得了成功——自2005年以来一直担任国家侦察办公室主任。NRO是情报界的一个重要机构。它取得了一些成功，但也出现了一些问题。
Kerr博士也曾担任CIA的科学与技术理事会的副主席。这也突出了他在科学和技术方面的背景，我认为这对一个DDNI来说是一个真正的加分。我们对对手的历史技术优势正在减弱，我们需要在科学技术社区和我们的情报机构之间建立更牢固的联系。
科尔博士，我想你会同意我的观点，我们必须在科学技术上重新获得我们在世界上的技术优势。
虽然我不认识科尔博士本人，但我们确实进行了一次非常愉快的，我认为，坦率的谈话。
科尔博士在情报界内外都很受尊敬我没有理由怀疑他的人品。然而，如往常一样，他的诚信将在他的行动和行为中得到证明，如果他被确认担任DDNI。
对我来说，正直和独立是紧密相连的。在ODNI，我们需要的是独立的声音，而不是政府的拉拉队。我们需要在ODNI的人能够对权力说出真相，无论谁是总统。我们还需要情报界领导层作出承诺，及时、频繁地向情报委员会提供通知。
作为DDNI，科尔医生，你将被迫做出艰难的选择。这包括决定终止有争议的项目，为创新收购项目提供资金。无论任务如何，ODNI需要的是独立的声音，而不是政府政策的橡皮图章。
我非常荣幸地9次宣誓就职。每一次，我都会举起右手，宣誓支持和捍卫美利坚合众国宪法。我们都要宣誓——无论你是在国会、内阁任职，还是身穿制服。然而，这个誓言不是针对一届政府、总统或政党的。宣誓是对宪法的宣誓。
美国目前面临的威胁是真实存在的，而且还在不断演变。世界各地的恐怖分子都有掠夺的意图，想要伤害美国人民。一些旨在保护美国人民安全的项目确实需要保密。但是，这些计划中的每一个都必须尊重宪法及其主张。
现政府只在选择守法的时候才守法。它没有认真对待对宪法的承诺。科尔博士，我们需要你做出真正的承诺来维护宪法。这一承诺包括尊重国会的作用以及有效制衡的必要性。
毫无疑问，科尔博士致力于情报界的使命。他曾担任不同的职务，为社会服务，是一位尽职尽责的公务员。
作为DDNI，科尔博士需要帮助加强该组织。这包括实现情报界需要的集成，并帮助最小化和消除情报界中任何剩余的“火炉管道”。
也会有Kerr博士担任代理国家情报总监的情况。这是一双需要填补的大鞋子，我们都感谢DNI McConnell在过去一年中出色地承担了这一责任。
总之，本委员会对您有很多问题，我期待着您的答案。再次，我感谢您已经向美国提供的服务。我希望我们有坦诚的，坦率地讨论了关于DDNI的未来和您对如何相信该职位在您的方向和领导下发展的看法。参议员白豪斯。参议员白豪斯。谢谢，董事长。Kerr博士，欢迎。我不想在任何方面隐藏球。我此时非常预期为您的提名和支持您的投票，但在公开听证会上，我希望与您触摸基地的一些东西。首先是我在我的立场新的; you're about to be new in yours. We both have a lot of inherited baggage between our organizations. I hope you will understand that when this Committee seems perhaps from your point of view to be unduly determined, unduly persnickety, unduly inquisitive about matters that the recent history has not been very favorable and that our desire to pursue these things and our sense of suspicion, if you will, has been well-earned. I think it can be earned back, a sense of trust can be earned back, but I urge you to bend over backwards to accommodate our concerns and questions as we do our oversight job, bearing in mind that, to a certain extent, here the past is the future. In that regard, the two big issues that I see are, first, the issue of intelligence integrity. There have clearly been episodes in which the intelligence community or elements of the intelligence community have produced the intelligence that principals wanted to support the path that had already been chosen rather than what people might call speaking truth to power. In accounting, people often talk about a plug number that fits between--we don't want plug intelligence around here. In that vein, you have superior scientific credentials. You have superior management credentials. Your analytic credentials are not as strong as your management and scientific credentials, as you alluded to earlier. You are also the Deputy Director, and if the Director is away, you will be the Acting Director. A circumstance could easily emerge in which you are representing the intelligence community with principals in the White House at times of key decisions. What will your process be for making sure that truth is in fact told to power and that the real intelligence is what gets to the decisionmakers, not just what they want to hear? Dr. Kerr. Well, I can tell you first of all that I absolutely support your point that intelligence needs to be provided to policymakers and others who need it without bias, without political consideration, and as well-grounded in fact as possible. With regard to what I would do, while my technical and management credentials are better than my analytic ones, I did, in fact, serve on the nuclear intelligence panel and chair it for a number of years within the community--in fact, from roughly 1979 until 1992. And I've been a senior reviewer of many of the Estimates over the years. So I think what I'm really trying to express is that Director McConnell and I are complementary in a way. He is an analyst by training and by profession, and that's his strongest suit. I have some other experiences that are complementary to his, and I think between us we can make a good team. With regard to how I would deal on the community's behalf in advising the President and others, I've actually had that opportunity in the past on some particular issues. I was even able on at least one occasion to suggest to the President there were laws he could not suspend. These were the laws of physics. But the point is, I think I have a reputation here with the Congress and with the Administration of being straight in what I say and bringing integrity when I come to see you. Senator Whitehouse. The other piece of the problem is on the performance accountability side. In my area, we had the Big Dig which was a tunnel project near Boston that was a huge catastrophic disaster and provided immense news opportunities. When something goes wrong like that in the intelligence community, because it is covert, there are not those immense news opportunities. People don't see how badly things have gone off the rails. And indeed both the contractor who has failed or fouled up the program and their Government managers have every incentive to paper it over and have it go away so that nobody notices. But as you know, there are fantastic, spectacular amounts of money at stake here. Will you be fully supportive of our efforts in oversight in this respect, including the deployment of what we call TAG groups into areas where we are really the only oversight that these programs get? Dr. Kerr. Absolutely. And in fact, in past years I have worked with members of earlier TAG groups. Ofttimes they include people with whom I've had professional experience in the past. I have no problem at all expecting to do that in the future. Senator Whitehouse. I could not agree more with the concerns expressed by Senator Nelson about particular programs that we should probably discuss more in a classified setting. I want you to know that many weeks ago I asked for an explanation of what consequences had been applied in those circumstances. I gather that, because of our recent conversation in our office, I've received a classified letter for the first time this morning. But the question that I asked weeks ago in an open Committee hearing I've never received a response to. So you know, once again, I hope that you--in your role-- when you walk away from a Committee hearing with questions, somebody's actually tasked to get the answer back because this doesn't seem to be a very difficult question. You were actually able to answer it almost spontaneously when we met, and yet for weeks nobody got back to me on this question. And I think this question of performance accountability for contractors in a covert environment where nobody knows and huge amounts of money are being spent and it's only our oversight that provides any check and balance in the system--it is really important that you get back to us. Dr. Kerr. Right. Well, I was glad that you asked me the question. And I, in fact, am responsible for what you received. I didn't know about the earlier request. Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you very much, Senator Whitehouse. Senator Feingold. Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kerr, again, congratulations on your nomination. If you are confirmed you'll be coming to this position at a particularly critical moment. The country needs the DNI to ask hard questions about the value, legality, and morality of our intelligence programs and to ensure that our intelligence is accurate, candid, and free of any politicization, and that's not an easy task at any time, but particularly in this Administration. But that is what is expected of the DNI and his Deputy. Of course, we also expect you to level with the Congress, a topic that you and I discussed yesterday. Let me ask you, Doctor, do you agree that intelligence activities that have implications for our foreign policy must be briefed to the full Committee? Dr. Kerr. Just to recall our conversation of yesterday, Senator Feingold, you made clear your membership here as a crossover member from Foreign Relations, and one of the points I tried to make was that ofttimes one of the foreign policy tools available to the United States is the intelligence community through liaison relationships and other things. My answer to that is I think those responsible for the oversight of U.S. foreign policy need to understand both the front channel and the back channel--what's going in both of them, what's capable of being done--in order to provide proper oversight of our foreign policy execution. Senator Feingold. And in this context you're referring obviously to the full Committee? Dr. Kerr. Correct. Senator Feingold. And so this would be particularly relevant to covert action, wouldn't it? Dr. Kerr. I think it would be applicable to covert action. I think generally the full Committee needs to know about covert action programs, and the only caveat I would add there is that which is present in the law and really refers to those special cases where lives are at risk or other very delicate things are hanging in the balance and where it might be left to the so- called Gang of Eight. Senator Feingold. And in fact, the only provision in the National Security Act that allows for the so-called limited Gang of Eight notifications applies to covert action, and, as you've indicated, that can never be license to limit information that has implications for our foreign policy. So if confirmed will you review covert actions or any other intelligence activities that may have been limited to the Gang of Eight to ensure that the provision is not being abused? Dr. Kerr. I will. Senator Feingold. Doctor, do you believe that the laws that apply to elements of the intelligence community are binding and cannot be overridden by assertions of Article II authority? Dr. Kerr. Article II, as I understand it, refers to the role of the President as Commander-in-Chief and the responsibilities he has for the military services and the Defense Department as a consequence. Some of the intelligence agencies are not, in fact, part of the Defense Department and so they would not fall within the ambit of the Commander-in- Chief designation. They would, in fact, be agencies of the Federal Government and subject to the laws and regulations that apply. Senator Feingold. But in any event do you believe that the laws that apply to the elements of the intelligence community cannot be overridden by assertions of Article II authority? Dr. Kerr. I'm not a constitutional scholar, as I'm sure you recognize, but I don't know of any exceptions to the law that, in fact, any military or civilian employee of the Government is entitled to. Senator Feingold. So can you think of any laws that apply to the intelligence community that you believe intrude on the President's authorities? Dr. Kerr. No, I don't. Senator Feingold. No? Dr. Kerr. I don't know of any. Senator Feingold. Doctor, as Deputy DNI you'll be conducting oversight of an intelligence community whose activities under this Administration have been justified sometimes by what I consider to be and others consider to be outlandish legal theories on issues such as electronic surveillance and interrogation. Even worse, Philip Zelikow, who was counsel to the State Department until last year, has written that those dubious legal theories have substituted for moral and policy deliberations. In other words, what some lawyer says the Administration can do precludes consideration of what it should do. In my view, the DNI, through its oversight role, can help reverse this disastrous practice by insisting that our intelligence activities are truly in America's interest. One such issue is the DNI's oversight of the implementation of the President's new Executive order on interrogations. I have opposed the Administration's policies in this area on legal grounds, but also because they have damaged our long-term efforts to mobilize our friends and isolate our enemies in the fight against al-Qa'ida. Doctor, as Deputy DNI, how will you ensure that these strategic issues are given appropriate weight? Dr. Kerr. I think the fundamental commitment that DNI McConnell and I would both bring to this is that we do understand the responsibilities we have under the Constitution, under the law, and, in fact, the need to secure the liberties for our people. I would, in fact, try to be very diligent in understanding not only the specific legal argument advanced for a course of action, but try to understand it in a broader context of what the likely effect would be of that course of action. Senator Feingold. I think that's terribly important and is exactly what you should be doing because, again, simply because something can be done by the executive branch, even if that's right, does not mean it's in the best interests of this country. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold and Senator Whitehouse. We appreciate very much your staying with us. There are a number of things going on that I believe I and other Members have to attend, so I'm going to propose that the classified questions be submitted in classified form to the witness and ask that he respond to them in a classified manner, and I'd also say you've seen we have some healthy disagreements on policy on this Committee and I would also say that I used to be a lawyer and I don't read the President's Article II powers as confined to the Defense Department, if that was the gist of it. So fortunately, neither one of us is called on to be counsel to advise either the President or this Committee, so we will leave those subjects to perhaps people with more active and current knowledge of the law. With that, I thank the witness and the Members and declare this hearing adjourned. Thank you very much, Doctor. Dr. Kerr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the Committee adjourned.] SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]