| STATEMENT OF KENNETH L. WAINSTEIN 助理检察长 国家安全部 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 关于 THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY OCTOBER 31, 2007 莱希主席,资深成员幽灵和成员s of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify concerning the modernization of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (more commonly referred to as “FISA”). We appreciate the attention that Congress has given to this issue and the process that has led to the thoughtful bipartisan bill voted out of the Intelligence Committee on October 18, 2007, The FISA Amendments Act of 2007 (S. 2248). Introduction As you are aware, the Government’s foreign intelligence surveillance activities are a vital part of its efforts to keep the nation safe from international terrorists and other threats to the national security. These surveillance activities provide critical information regarding the plans and identities of terrorists who conspire to kill Americans at home and abroad, and they allow us to glimpse inside terrorist organizations and obtain information about how those groups function and receive support—information that is key to tracking these organizations and disrupting their operations. In addition, our surveillance activities allow us to collect intelligence on the intentions and capabilities of other foreign adversaries who pose a threat to the United States. Prior to the passage of the Protect America Act of 2007 (PAA) in August, the difficulties we faced with FISA’s outdated provisions—i.e., the extension of FISA’s requirements to surveillance targeting foreign intelligence targets overseas—substantially impeded the Intelligence Community’s ability to collect effectively the foreign intelligence information necessary to protect the Nation. In April of this year, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) submitted to Congress a comprehensive proposal to modernize the statute. The DNI, the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), the general counsels of ODNI and NSA, and I testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence regarding that proposal in May. Recognizing the need to address this issue, Congress passed the Protect America Act, and the President signed the Act on August 5, 2007. The authorities you provided in the Protect America Act have allowed our intelligence agencies to collect vital foreign intelligence information, and the Act already has made the Nation safer by enabling the Intelligence Community to close gaps in our foreign intelligence collection. That Act, however, will expire in three months. To ensure that the Intelligence Community can obtain the information it needs to keep the Nation safe, the Administration strongly supports the reauthorization of the core authorities provided by the Protect America Act. In addition, we urge Congress to enact the other important reforms to FISA contained in the proposal the Administration submitted to Congress in April; in particular, it is imperative that Congress provide liability protection to companies that are alleged to have assisted the nation in the conduct of intelligence activities in the wake of the September 11th attacks. By permanently modernizing and streamlining FISA, we can improve our efforts to gather intelligence on those who seek to harm us, and do so in a manner that protects the civil liberties of Americans. We value the opportunity to work closely with Congress on these important issues. Since the passage of the Protect America Act, Congress has held numerous hearings on the implications of that Act, the scope of the authorities granted by that Act, and other issues related to FISA modernization, and various officials from the Executive Branch have testified repeatedly on the need to reauthorize the Act. Since September, I have testified on this issue before the Senate Intelligence Committee, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the House Judiciary Committee. Officials of the Executive Branch also have participated in numerous other meetings with Members and staff on this important topic. In the Senate, this valuable process has culminated in the strong bipartisan bill referred to this Committee, S. 2248, and we applaud Congress for its initiative on this issue and its willingness to consult with us as it moves forward on FISA modernization. I am happy to be here today to continue the public discussion on this topic, and I look forward to working with this Committee as it considers S. 2248. We still are reviewing S. 2248, which was voted out of committee on a bipartisan 13-2 vote two weeks ago, but we believe it is a balanced bill that includes many sound provisions that would allow our Intelligence Community to continue obtaining the information it needs to protect the nation. We therefore are optimistic that S. 2248 will lead to a bill the President can sign. We do, however, have concerns with certain provisions in S. 2248 and we look forward to working with this Committee and Congress to address those concerns and achieve lasting FISA reform. In my testimony today, I will briefly summarize the primary reasons that FISA needs to be modernized, and I will explain how we have implemented the Protect America Act. I also will discuss our views on certain provisions of The FISA Amendments Act of 2007 (S. 2248) and explain why that bill is superior to H.R. 3773. While we appreciate the work of the House of Representatives in holding hearings and considering the challenges posed by the outdated provisions of FISA, H.R. 3773 is problematic in several respects, and if that bill is presented to the President in its current form, his senior advisers and the DNI will recommend that he veto it. 需要永久性FISA现代化 To understand why FISA needs to be modernized, it is important to understand some of the historical background regarding the statute. Congress enacted FISA in 1978 for the purpose of establishing a “statutory procedure authorizing the use of electronic surveillance in the United States for foreign intelligence purposes.” H.R. Rep. No. 95 1283, pt. 1, at 22 (1978). The law authorized the Attorney General to make an application to a newly established court—the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (or “FISA Court”)—seeking a court order approving the use of “electronic surveillance” against foreign powers or their agents. 外国情报监视法建立的司法审查制度oreign intelligence surveillance activities—but not for all such activities; only for certain of those that most substantially implicated the privacy interests of people in the United States. Congress designed a judicial review process that would apply primarily to surveillance activities within the United States—where privacy interests are the most pronounced—and not to overseas surveillance against foreign intelligence targets—where cognizable privacy interests are minimal or non-existent. The intent of Congress generally to exclude these intelligence activities from FISA’s reach is expressed clearly in the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence’s report, which explained: “[t]he committee has explored the feasibility of broadening this legislation to apply overseas, but has concluded that certain problems and unique characteristics involved in overseas surveillance preclude the simple extension of this bill to overseas surveillances.” Id. at 27. As a result of changes in telecommunications technology since 1978, however, the scope of activities covered by FISA expanded—without any conscious choice by Congress—to cover a wide range of intelligence activities that Congress intended to exclude from FISA in 1978. This unintended expansion of FISA’s scope hampered our intelligence capabilities and caused us to expend resources on obtaining court approval to conduct intelligence activities directed at foreign persons overseas. Prior to the passage of the Protect America Act of 2007, the Government often needed to obtain a court order before intelligence collection could begin against a target located overseas. Thus, considerable resources of the Executive Branch and the FISA Court were being expended on obtaining court orders to monitor the communications of terrorist suspects and other national security threats abroad. This effectively was granting constitutional protections to these foreign terrorist suspects, who frequently are communicating with other persons outside the United States. In certain cases, this requirement of obtaining a court order slowed, and in some cases may have blocked, the Government’s efforts to conduct surveillance of communications that were potentially vital to the national security. This expansion of FISA’s reach also necessarily diverted resources that would have been better spent on protecting the privacy interests of United States persons here in the United States. 2007年《保护美国法》 为了解决这个问题和其他问题,每年s in the FISA statute, the Administration submitted its FISA modernization proposal to Congress this April. Although Congress has yet to conclude its consideration of the Administration’s proposal, you took a significant step in the right direction by passing the Protect America Act in August. By updating the definition of “electronic surveillance” to exclude surveillance directed at persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States, the Protect America Act amended FISA to exclude from its scope those acquisitions directed at foreign intelligence targets located in foreign countries. This law has temporarily restored FISA to its original, core purpose of protecting the rights and liberties of people in the United States, and the Act allows the Government to collect the foreign intelligence information necessary to protect our nation. The passage of the Protect America Act represented the right policy solution—allowing our intelligence agencies to surveil foreign intelligence targets located outside the United States without prior court approval—and one that is consistent with our Constitution. （1）我们使用这个新的权威 Our experience since the passage of the Protect America Act has demonstrated the critical need to reauthorize the Act’s core authorities and we urge Congress to make those provisions permanent. Prior to the passage of the Act, the Director of National Intelligence testified that the Intelligence Community was unable to obtain the foreign intelligence information, including information from terrorist communications, that it needed to collect in a timely manner in order to protect Americans from national security threats. The authority provided by the Protect America Act has allowed us temporarily to close intelligence gaps that were caused by FISA’s outdated provisions. I understand that since the passage of the Act, the Intelligence Community has collected critical intelligence important to preventing terrorist actions and enhancing our national security. The Intelligence Community needs to be able to continue to effectively obtain information of this nature if we are to stay a step ahead of terrorists who want to attack the United States, and Congress should make the core provisions of the Protect America Act permanent. (2) Oversight of the PAA Authority As we explained in a letter we sent the leadership of this Committee on September 5, 2007, we have already established a strong regime of oversight for this authority and have begun our oversight activities. This oversight includes: - 内部合规办公室和其他监督组织的定期审查，例如监察长办公室和总法律顾问办公室，任何行使根据FISA新第105B条的行使授权的机构的机构； - a review by the Department of Justice and ODNI, within fourteen days of the initiation of collection under this new authority, of an agency’s use of the authority to assess compliance with the Act, including with the procedures by which the agency determines that the acquisition of foreign intelligence information concerns persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States and with the applicable minimization procedures; and, - 部门和ODNI的随后评论至少每30天进行一次。 The Department’s compliance reviews are conducted by attorneys of the National Security Division with experience in undertaking reviews of the use of FISA and other national security authorities, in consultation with the Department’s Privacy and Civil Liberties Office, as appropriate, and ODNI’s Civil Liberties Protection Office. Moreover, agencies using this authority are under an ongoing obligation to report promptly to the Department and to ODNI incidents of noncompliance by its personnel. （3）国会关于我们使用PAA管理局的报告 我们还向国会向国会报告了我们对这一新权威的实施和使用，远远超出了该法案所要求的报告。该法案规定，总检察长应每半年一次报告第105B条根据参议院情报委员会，众议院情报情报的常任选择委员会以及参议院和参议院司法委员会和参议院和司法委员会的收购报告。众议院。该报告必须包括与确定某人是否合理地认为位于美国以外的程序的程序，由指令的接收者不遵守的程序以及报告期间发行的证书数量。 Because we appreciate the need for regular and comprehensive reporting during the debate of renewal of this authority, we are committing to substantial reporting beyond that required by the statute. As we explained in our September 5, 2007, letter, we will provide the following reports and briefings to Congress over the course of the six-month renewal period: - we will make ourselves available to brief you and properly cleared staff on the results of our first compliance review and after each subsequent review; - we will make available to you copies of the written reports of those reviews, with redactions as necessary to protect critical intelligence sources and methods; - 我们每月将为您提供有关进一步合规性审查结果的更新简报，并且通常会根据我们根据第105B条对当局的使用；和， - because of the exceptional importance of making the new authority permanent and of enacting the remainder of the Administration’s proposal to modernize FISA, the Department will make appropriately redacted documents (accommodating the Intelligence Community’s need to protect critical intelligence sources and methods) concerning implementation of this new authority available, not only to the Intelligence committees, but also to members of the Judiciary committees and to their staff with the necessary clearances. We already have provided the Committee with documents related to our implementation of this new authority and have briefed appropriately cleared Committee staff members on PAA implementation issues. We also have completed several compliance reviews and are prepared to brief you on those reviews whenever it is convenient for you. Agencies employing this authority also continue to conduct on-site briefings, where Members and appropriately cleared staff have the opportunity to see how the Act has been implemented and to ask questions of those in the front lines of using this authority. 我相信，这种监督和国会报告的制度将表明，我们正在有效地利用这种新的权力来捍卫我们的国家，同时顽强地保护美国人的公民自由和隐私利益。 S. 2248: The FISA Amendments Act of 2007 如您所知，参议院情报选定委员会在两周前在两党支持的情况下投票通过了一项法案，我们正在继续审查该法案2007年的《 FISA修正案法》（S. 2248）。我们认为，该法案通常是一项强大的立法，它包括对FISA的许多重要修订。 (1) Core Collection Authority 首先,像PAA,美国2248年将允许我们的英特尔ligence professionals to collect foreign intelligence against targets located outside the United States without obtaining prior court approval. This represents the same fundamental policy judgment underlying the Protect America Act—that our intelligence agencies should be able to collect foreign intelligence on targets located outside the United States without prior court approval. It has been clear throughout this process that there is a general consensus that the Government should not be required to obtain a court order to acquire foreign intelligence on targets located abroad, and we strongly support reauthorization of the authority to collect intelligence on targets located outside the United States without prior court approval. （2）追溯免疫 Second, section 202 of S. 2248 would afford retroactive immunity from private lawsuits for those companies alleged to have assisted the Government in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks. Electronic communication service providers (“providers”) have faced numerous lawsuits as a result of their alleged activities in support of the Government’s efforts to prevent another terrorist attack. It is imperative that this provision be retained in this bill. We believe that this is a just result. Any company that assisted the Government in defending our national security deserves our gratitude, not an avalanche of lawsuits. As the Senate Intelligence Committee noted in its report, the pending suits “seek hundreds of billions of dollars in damages from electronic communication service providers.” S. Rep. No. 110-209, at 8 (2007) (hereinafter “Sen. Rep.”). Under the proposal, a judge would dismiss a suit only if one of two circumstances is met: (1) the alleged assistance was not provided; or (2) the alleged assistance was in connection with an intelligence activity involving communications that was authorized by the President during the period beginning on September 11, 2001, and ending on January 17, 2007; was designed to detect or prevent a terrorist attack, or activities in preparation for a terrorist attack, against the United States; and was described in a written request or directive from the Attorney General or the head of an element of the intelligence community (or the deputy of such person) to the electronic communication service provider indicating that the activity was authorized by the President and determined to be lawful. S. 2248, § 202. 在审查了相关文件之后，并且在没有确定公司提供援助的特定公司或活动的情况下，情报委员会得出结论认为，提供者已针对书面要求或指令做出了行动，指出这些活动已由总统和总统授权已决定是合法的。参议员众议员，第10页。因为委员会“得出结论是提供者。。。有一个真诚的基础来回应他们收到的援助请求，”同上。委员会在11点结论说，提供者“应有权保护民事诉讼”。ID。委员会的考虑判决反映了普通法中的一项原则，即对公职人员的援助请求的私人公民不应对其行为承担责任。 In addition to being the just outcome, providing this litigation protection is important to the national security. Companies in the future may be less willing to assist the Government if they face litigation each time they are alleged to have provided assistance. As the Intelligence Committee noted in its report, “electronic communication service providers play an important role in assisting intelligence officials in national security activities. Indeed, the intelligence community cannot obtain the intelligence it needs without assistance from these companies.” Id. Because of the need for such cooperation in the future and the extent of the lawsuits that have been filed, that committee concluded that retroactive immunity was a necessity. Given the scope of the civil damages suits, and the current spotlight associated with providing any assistance to the intelligence community, the Committee was concerned that, without retroactive immunity, the private sector might be unwilling to cooperate with lawful Government requests in the future without unnecessary court involvement and protracted litigation. The possible reduction in intelligence that might result from this delay is simply unacceptable for the safety of our Nation. id（添加了强调）。该委员会认识到，我们的认可是为了确保提供者的及时合作是必要的。 Further, allowing continued litigation also risks the disclosure of highly classified information regarding intelligence sources and methods. The Intelligence Committee recognized in its report that this information should not be disclosed publicly. [T]he identities of persons or entities who provide assistance to the U.S. Government are protected as vital sources and methods of intelligence. . . . It would inappropriate to disclose the names of the electronic communication service providers from which assistance was sought, the activities in which the Government was engaged or in which providers assisted, or the details regarding any such assistance. Sen. Rep. at 10. Our adversaries can be expected to use such information to their benefit, and we should not allow them to benefit from this needless litigation. The prevention of such disclosures also is important to the security of the facilities and personnel of relevant electronic communication service providers. The retroactive immunity provision in S. 2248 would ensure that cases against private entities falling within its terms will be dismissed and would help prevent the disclosure of highly classified information. The Intelligence Committee’s decision to provide retroactive immunity to electronic communication service providers also reflects a recognition that indemnification whereby the Government would be responsible for any damages awarded against the providers—is not a workable response to the extensive litigation these companies face. First, even if they receive indemnification, the relevant companies would still face the burden of litigation. After all, they would still be parties to the lawsuits, and all of the potential litigation burdens would still fall on them as parties. Second, even if they would no longer face the possibility of an award of damages, the relevant companies could suffer damage to their business reputations and stock prices as a result of such litigation. Finally, as discussed above, allowing these cases to continue risks the further disclosure of highly classified information regarding intelligence sources and methods. 同样,substitution-whereby政府公司ld litigate in place of the electronic communication service providers—is not a workable solution. Although the providers would no longer be parties to the litigation, in order to prove their claims, the plaintiffs in these cases will certainly continue to seek discovery (through document requests, depositions, and similar means) from the providers. Thus, like indemnification, substitution would still place a burden of discovery on the companies, risk damaging their business reputations and stock prices, and risk the disclosure of highly classified information. Moreover, both indemnification and substitution could result in a tremendous waste of taxpayer resources on these lawsuits. 情报委员会决定在该法案中纳入追溯豁免权，这反映了一种认可，即追溯豁免是解决相关公司面临的广泛诉讼的最佳解决方案。的确，委员会拒绝以12票对3票的投票，包括豁免权的修正案，其中包括免疫规定，因此必须将此规定保留在该法案中。 （3）与诉讼有关的其他规定 第三，该法案包含与诉讼和国家调查有关的其他一些有益规定。S. 2248第203条提供了一种“在被告根据合法法定要求提供援助或没有提供援助时，将来可以使用该程序来寻求诉讼。”参议员众议员，第12页。正如情报委员会指出的那样，被告根据合法的法定要求为政府提供了帮助，但这将损害国家安全的要求或援助，此类程序是逻辑和迅速的方法，将来解雇此类案件。ID。此外，该法案的第204条将抢占州调查或要求对信息披露的披露，这是保护有关机密来源和方法的高度分类信息的另一个重要步骤。 (4) Streamlining Provisions 最后，S。2248的第104至108节将以几种积极的方式简化FISA申请过程。尽管FISA应要求政府在申请FISA法院命令时提供确定可能的原因和其他基本FISA要求所需的信息，但FISA今天要求政府提供这些目标不需要的信息。除其他外，S。2248的相关部分将消除不必要的文书工作，同时确保FISA法院拥有处理申请所需的信息。正如情报委员会在其报告中所说的那样，这些变化通常“旨在提高FISA程序的效率，而无需剥夺外国情报监视法院所需的信息，以提出FISA所需的调查结果。”参议员众议员21岁。 Those sections also would make other improvements to FISA, such as increasing the time the Government has to file an application for a court order after authorizing emergency surveillance. Currently the Executive Branch has 72 hours to obtain court approval after emergency surveillance is initially authorized by the Attorney General. S. 2248 would extend the emergency period to seven days. This change will help ensure that the Executive Branch has sufficient time in an emergency situation to accurately prepare an application, obtain the required approvals of senior officials, apply for a court order, and satisfy the court that the application should be granted. While we are encouraged by the progress that has been made on reauthorization of the Protect America Act authorities, we still have concerns with certain provisions of S. 2248. (5) United States Persons Located Outside the United States First, we strongly oppose proposed subsection 703(c) of that bill, which would introduce a new role for the FISA Court with respect to collecting intelligence from United States persons located outside the United States. 将这一新角色扩展到FISA法院是不明智的。传统上，根据第12333号行政命令，该行政命令对美国海外人员的监视受到监管。该行政命令要求总检察长在政府可以对美国进行外国情报监视之前，对美国进行个性化的可能原因确定海外的人。在授权使用此类技术之前，总检察长必须确定有可能相信被目标的人是“外国权力”或“外国权力的代理人”。这些程序已成功地平衡了美国人的隐私利益与国家安全已有25年以上的时间，这是《保护美国法》没有改变的。 It would be a significant departure to extend the role of the FISA Court and require the Government to obtain the approval of the court to collect foreign intelligence regarding United States persons overseas. The Government is not required to obtain a warrant to collect evidence outside the United States when its purpose is to build a criminal case where the expected end of the investigative process is often the criminal prosecution of that United States person. It makes little sense to create a court approval requirement in the context of foreign intelligence collection—when the objective is the defense of our national security and operational flexibility and speed are critical to achieve that objective. Congress did not create this role for the FISA Court when it enacted FISA in 1978, and it should not extend the court’s role in that regard in this legislation. Subsection 703(c) of S. 2248, which would require the Attorney General to submit an application to the FISA Court to conduct an acquisition targeting a United States person overseas and to obtain a court order approving the acquisition prior to initiating it, also could have unintended consequences. First, unlike the current provisions of FISA governing electronic surveillance and physical searches, subsection 703(c) does not allow acquisitions regarding United States persons overseas to begin before obtaining court approval in emergency situations. Without an emergency provision, this subsection could impede operations and would result in the anomalous situation that it would be more difficult to surveil a United States person outside the country than inside the country. Second, extending this new role to the FISA Court and requiring the court to approve acquisitions abroad could cause that court to feel compelled to analyze questions of foreign law as they relate to acquisitions under subsection 703(c), which could significantly complicate these types of collections and inject unpredictability into the process. We look forward to working with the Congress on this subsection as it considers S. 2248. 6. Sunset Provision We also are opposed to the sunset provision in S. 2248 (section 101(c)), which would cause important provisions of the bill to sunset on December 31, 2013. In certain circumstances, a sunset provision may make sense. Where Congress enacts significant changes to existing legal authorities without the opportunity for sufficient deliberation or fact-finding, a sunset provision can afford Congress the chance to evaluate the effect of certain legislation. For example, the PATRIOT Act, which was enacted very quickly after the September 11th attacks, included sunset provisions and we recognize why Congress chose to include sunset provisions in that legislation. We also understand why Congress chose to include a sunset provision in the Protect America Act, which was similarly passed in response to a compelling and immediate need. 相比之下,一个日落条款不应包括uded in S. 2248, which would reauthorize the core authorities Congress included in the Protect America Act. There has been extensive public discussion and consideration of FISA modernization and the Protect America Act, both before and after passage of that Act in August. There is now a lengthy factual record on the need for FISA modernization, the implementation of the Protect America Act, the implications of the core authorities under the Act, and the appropriate level of Congressional oversight of this authority. Executive Branch officials have testified at numerous hearings over the last two years and conducted countless briefings for Members and staff on the need for FISA modernization and the implementation of the Protect America Act. In addition, the Executive Branch has provided Congress with extensive information regarding the implementation of the Act—information that went well beyond that required by the statute. This has provided a track record of our implementation of the Protect America Act authority and has afforded Congress the opportunity to study this issue extensively. As the Intelligence Committee explained, S. 2248 reflects the culmination of a long process of hearings, classified briefings, and the review of relevant documents. S. Rep. at 2-3. Given the extensive factual record and public debate on these issues, the sunset provision in S. 2248 is not necessary. 我们反对日落的规定，因为它引入了我们情报专业人员所采用的规则，并由我们的私人合作伙伴引入了很大的不确定性。机构开发新的流程和程序并培训员工的效率低下且无法正常工作，只是在几年内将法律变更。当管理我们情报专业人员追踪敌人的能力的规则已建立并且没有持续的疑问时，情报界就更有效地运作。 7. Reporting and Oversight Provisions We are continuing to analyze the increased reporting and oversight requirements in S. 2248 to determine whether they strike a workable balance between Congress’s need for information concerning intelligence activities and the dedication of resources necessary to meet those reporting requirements. We value Congressional oversight of the Protect America Act authorities and we understand that oversight is necessary to demonstrate publicly that we are employing the authorities responsibly, as was made clear by our decision to exceed substantially the Congressional reporting requirements under the Act. 但是，我们对S. 2248的某些规定感到困扰，这可能会对我们的情报机构造成巨大负担。例如，第703（l）小节要求年度审查，以确定“在美国进行通信的人数”。S. 2248，§703（L）。鉴于外国情报收集的零散性质以及有关任何特定截获通讯的可用信息的有限量，我被告知，情报机构可能不可能遵守这一要求。 H.R. 3773 2248年与美国立法in the House of Representatives—H.R. 3773—falls short of providing the Intelligence Community with the tools it needs to collect foreign intelligence effectively from individuals located outside the United States. While we appreciate the efforts of the House to introduce a bill on this topic, we believe H.R. 3773 would be a step backward for national security. As the Administration has stated, if H.R. 3773 is presented in its current form to the President, the Director of National Intelligence and the President’s other senior advisers will recommend that he veto the bill. H.R. 3773is deficient in several respects. First, it would limit the type of foreign intelligence information that could be acquired under its authority. Since 1978, FISA has provided for the collection of foreign intelligence information, and there is no reason to place complex restrictions on the types of intelligence that can be collected from persons outside the United States under this authority. This limitation would serve only to require intelligence analysts to spend valuable time and resources in distinguishing between types of foreign intelligence information being collected. 其次，H.R. 3773不为电子通信服务提供商或联邦对州调查的联邦政府提供追溯责任保护。正如上面讨论并得到参议院情报委员会在其报告中所认可的那样，这些公司在9月11日之后协助政府的那些公司不应就这些事项面临诉讼。此类诉讼可能会披露高度分类的信息，并可能通过阻止公司与政府合作而来导致情报收集能力降低。 Third, in contrast to the Protect America Act and S. 2248, H.R. 3773 would require prior court approval for acquisitions of foreign intelligence information on targets located overseas absent an emergency. This is a significant increase in the role of the FISA Court with respect to the authorities provided by the Act and it could impede the collection of necessary foreign intelligence information. In addition, these provisions would not provide any meaningful increase in the protection of the privacy interests of Americans in the United States. H.R. 3773 also fails explicitly to provide for continued intelligence collection while the Government appeals an order of the FISA Court. Finally, H.R. 3773 would sunset in a little over two years. As discussed above, intelligence agencies need certainty and permanence in the rules they employ for intelligence collection and we oppose any sunset provision. We are strongly opposed to the extremely short sunset provision in H.R. 3773. While we look forward to working with Congress towards the passage of a permanent FISA modernization bill that would strengthen the Nation’s intelligence capabilities while respecting the constitutional rights of Americans, we cannot support H.R. 3773 in its current form. 结论 The Protect America Act has been critical to our efforts to gather the foreign intelligence information necessary to protect the Nation, and it is crucial that its core aspects be made permanent. In addition to making the core provisions of the Protect America Act permanent, Congress should reform FISA in accordance with the other provisions in the proposal that the Administration submitted to the Congress in April. It is especially imperative that Congress provide liability protection to companies that are alleged to have assisted the nation in the conduct of intelligence activities in the wake of the September 11 attacks. These changes would permanently restore FISA to its original focus on the protection of the privacy interests of Americans, improve our intelligence capabilities, and ensure that scarce Executive Branch and judicial resources are devoted to the oversight of intelligence activities that most clearly implicate the interests of Americans. We are encouraged by the progress that has been made on this issue, particularly with respect to many of the provisions in S. 2248, and we look forward to working with Congress and this Committee as it considers S. 2248. 感谢您有机会出现在您面前，并作证支持政府的建议。我期待回答您的问题。 |