[国会记录：2007年5月10日（院）] [第H4779-H4786]审议提供H.R。2082，佛罗里达州的情报授权法案2008财年的黑斯廷斯先生。议长先生，通过对规则委员会的方向，我打电话议院决议388，并要求其立即审议。秘书宣读了决议如下：H. RES。388解决，这在本决议通过后的任何时间的扬声器可依据规则第十八条第2（b）所示，宣布众议院分解为整个房子对国情咨文委员会审议该法案(H.R. 2082) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2008 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes. The first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. All points of order against consideration of the bill are waived except those arising under clause 9 of rule XXI. General debate shall be confined to the bill and shall not exceed one hour equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. After general debate the bill shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the five-minute rule the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence now printed in the bill. The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered as read. All points of order against the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute are waived except those arising under clause 9 of rule XXI. Notwithstanding clause 11 of rule XVIII, no amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be in order except those printed in the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this resolution. Each such amendment may be offered only in the order printed in the report, may be offered only by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered as read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question in the House or in the Committee of the Whole. All points of order against such amendments are waived except those arising under clause 9 or 10 of rule XXI. At the conclusion of consideration of the bill for amendment the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted. Any Member may demand a separate vote in the House on any amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole to the bill or to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit with or without instructions. Sec. 2. During consideration in the House of H.R. 2082 pursuant to this resolution, notwithstanding the operation of the previous question, the Chair may postpone further consideration of the bill to such time as may be designated by the Speaker. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) is recognized for 1 hour. {time} 1330 Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to my friend from Washington (Mr. Hastings). All time yielded during consideration of the rule is for debate only. [[Page H4780]] General Leave Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and insert extraneous materials into the Record. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida? There was no objection. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, as the Clerk just read, House Resolution 388 provides for consideration of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 under a structured rule. The rule makes in order a total of ten amendments, almost half of which will be offered by Members of the minority, including one which will be offered by the ranking member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Representative Hoekstra. The rule also makes in order an amendment that I offered, along with my colleague on the Intelligence Committee, Representative Rogers of Michigan, and our bipartisan amendment is a commonsense solution to holding the Office of National Director of intelligence accountable for its actions. The House will have a chance to debate our amendment later today, and I hope my colleagues will support it. I would like to point out that Members who wish to do so, as the Chair of the Intelligence Committee has pointed out previously, can go to the Intelligence Committee office to examine the classified schedule of authorizations for the programs and activities of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the national and military intelligence programs. The importance of the intelligence community touches all Americans as our Nation's first line of defense against increasing world threats. Effective intelligence is the first method to protect our citizens and prevent debacles like the war in Iraq. The underlying legislation authorizes funding for all United States intelligence agencies, including the national and military intelligence programs. It is the largest intelligence authorization bill ever considered by the House and takes significant steps to eliminate duplication and ineffectiveness in our intelligence agencies. The bill increases funding to improve human intelligence, training and send additional intelligence analysts overseas to maximize their abilities. It also requires additional intelligence reports on North Korea and Iranian efforts to become nuclear capable. We also take significant steps to improve the collecting, deciphering and understanding of intelligence. The effectiveness of our intelligence community is significantly jeopardized when the diversity of the intelligence community does not reflect the diverse world in which we live. Women and minorities continue to be disproportionately underrepresented in the senior ranks and the core mission areas of analysis, human intelligence collection, and science and technology. Simply put, we still do not have an intelligence community that looks like our country or the world. Minorities make up 37 percent of the American population, yet only 21 percent of the intelligence community, and the numbers for African-Americans and Latinos is woefully below that number. This is a problem that is addressed in the underlying bill, which requires the development of a strategic plan to increase diversity within the intelligence community and mandates increased diversity among the rank and file of the community. I am fond of saying in the Intelligence Committee hearings that it doesn't take more degrees than the thermometer to be a spy, but somebody back there decided that that must have been the case. Another significant concern exacerbated by this lack of diversity is a deficiency of linguist abilities in the intelligence community. There are countless stories of intelligence tapes that had piled up in the months leading up to September 11 when the terrorist attacks occurred here. That was done because we didn't have anyone to translate them. Experts and administrators lament the fact that we don't have enough Arabic, Farsi, Urdu or Dari speakers, and we always go in that direction, but we don't have enough Asian language speakers, either, in the intelligence community and the military. How can we expect to completely correct that course without thoroughly modernizing the recruitment, selection and security clearance processes to quickly bring on board people with these critical skills? The underlying bill provides for the commonsense modernization of our security clearance procedures to address this growing problem, requiring that the system make more efficient use of those who are proficient in foreign languages or with cultural, linguistic or other subject matter expertise that is critical to national security. We must make these necessary modernizations to adapt to the ever-changing threats around us. Finally, following the recommendations of 11 three- and four-star generals, the bill requests that the National Intelligence Council produce a National Intelligence Estimate on the national security impact of global climate change. Some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle have expressed discontent with this provision, because they believe that enough research is currently under way about climate change. In doing so, in my judgment, they failed to recognize that climate change is impacting global security. Just look at the Middle East, the battle for scarce resources among those who have been displaced, particularly in Iraq, has the potential to generate sociopolitical environments that foster the creation of terrorist cells. If we can't even agree on the implications of climate change, it is obvious that more research is necessary, especially observing the impact of climate change on the movement of people and resources, and how that connects to terrorism. Footnote right there, I pointed out in the Rules Committee that Iraq would be the classic example of what I am talking about. There are 2 million refugees, and it is almost like it is kind of hidden, that are displaced from their homes in Iraq. There are 400,000 to 500,000 internally displaced in Iraq. Yet, what we find is they are being pushed into Syria, Jordan and Egypt where there are already significant water resource problems. Someone tell me how that doesn't equate to an environment where terrorists will be produced. If we can't agree on this, I can assure you that we are going to have significant problems in the future. Even the National Defense University has recognized these implications by prioritizing response to large-scale national disasters in some of its most recent training simulations. As scientists explore the connection between such disasters and climate change, it is imperative that the national security implications of such events be thoroughly understood. I am glad that our committee addresses this issue in the bill. If we have learned anything from the failures of the war in Iraq, it is that reliable intelligence is critical to ensuring America's national security. I am pleased to support this rule and urge my colleagues to do the same. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. I want to thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) for yielding me the customary 30 minutes, and I yield myself as much time as I may consume. (Mr. HASTINGS of Washington asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to this restrictive rule. The Intelligence Authorization Act generally receives strong bipartisan support. But let me be clear that the underlying bill does contain bipartisan provisions that are important to protecting our national security, make no bones about that. However, the bill also contains a number of provisions that are of concern and could weaken our national security and intelligence capabilities by providing less than adequate resources and placing restrictions on our intelligence operations. I am concerned that the Democratic leadership chose to include section 407 in the underlying bill. My friend from Florida talked at length about that provision, which would require our Nation's intelligence community to direct [[Page H4781]] its limited resources to a National Intelligence Estimate on global climate change. I have to ask, what message are we sending to our allies and our enemies when Congress instructs our intelligence experts to stop what they are doing on issues that threaten American lives and, instead, focus on theoretical risks from global warming. Furthermore, earlier this year, this House created a new Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming to focus on the risks of global warming. This is in addition to several Federal agencies that are already analyzing climate change. Congress should let this panel that was created, and existing Federal agencies, focus on climate change so that our intelligence analysts can focus on materials of classified information and work to prevent threats against American lives. But I am pleased, I have to say, with the Rules Committee last night because they made in order an amendment to be offered by the ranking member, Mr. Hoekstra, of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, that will strike section 407 and allow our spies to be spies. I think we can have a very good debate on that. I think we ought to have that debate. I am pleased that the Rules Committee made that amendment in order. However, the Democratic leadership did deny several thoughtful amendments offered by Mr. Castle, Mr. Flake, Mr. Rogers of Michigan and Mrs. Wilson of New Mexico. I urge my colleagues to oppose this restrictive rule, which only allows 10 out of 433 Members of the House to offer their ideas on how to better strengthen our intelligence community. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. {time} 1345 Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. At this time, I am very pleased to yield 2 minutes to the distinguished chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, my good friend from Texas (Mr. Reyes). Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague and good friend from Florida for yielding me time on this very important rule. I rise in support of this rule. The terrorist plot that was recently uncovered in New Jersey this past week shows that we cannot let our guard down in the effort to learn the plans and intentions of people who would do us grave harm. The underlying bill, H.R. 2082, provides funding for the brave women and men of our intelligence community. I have visited with them in every corner of the world, and I am constantly amazed by their patriotism, their dedication to mission, and their commitment to doing our Nation's most sensitive and dangerous business, often without public acknowledgement or recognition. Today, the United States faces a dynamic set of threats, challenges, and opportunities. We are at war in Iraq and Afghanistan. We face a growing terrorist threat. Countries like Iran and North Korea are working towards a nuclear bomb. And we face a number of other key challenges in Africa, Latin America, and from rising powers like Russia and China. These major challenges require a major effort by our government to collect, to analyze, and to disseminate intelligence, and to do so within the legal bounds of our Constitution and our national values. This bill invests in human intelligence. It invests in analysis and analysts. It funds key counterterrorism operations and sensitive collection programs. And it improves critical oversight in key areas such as the overuse of contractors and the lack of qualified linguists in the intelligence business. This bill was developed on a bipartisan basis. And although there may not be agreement on every single point, there is agreement on all the major points. This rule will allow a full debate on many of the key issues before us, and I, along with my colleagues, should welcome this debate. So I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on the rule. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 6 minutes to the gentlelady from New Mexico, a member of the Intelligence Committee, Mrs. Wilson. (Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.) Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico. Mr. Speaker, I am here to urge my colleagues to oppose the rule and to oppose the previous question on the rule for the Intelligence authorization bill today. I offered an amendment in the Rules Committee that was similar to one that I offered in the Intelligence Committee that would modernize our foreign intelligence surveillance laws so that we can listen to the terrorists trying to kill us, while protecting Americans' civil liberties. Every member of the House Intelligence Committee knows that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is not working, and so does the Speaker of the House. In fact, she has been briefed on this earlier than any of us have, since shortly after 9/11. Last week, in unclassified session in front of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Admiral Mike McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence, urged the Congress to modernize our intelligence surveillance laws. He told us and the world, ``We are actually missing a significant portion of what we should be getting.'' We are missing a significant portion of what we should be getting. In January of this year, the Attorney General of the United States wrote to the Congress and said there were new Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court orders that were innovative, that would put the President's terrorist surveillance program underneath the auspices of a judge in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. They are innovative, because the court is stretching the law like a twin sheet over a king-sized bed. And every member of the Intelligence Committee knows just how fragile the legal framework is in this arrangement. Yet, a single judge in a nonadversarial secret setting has said it is okay to go forward on this basis because it is important to the country, and the Congress has failed to act. Will the next judge go along? Every one of us knows there is a problem. Here is the problem: In 1978, almost all local calls were on wire and almost all long distance calls were transmitted by microwave over the air. The FISA law distinguishes between collection over a wire and collection over the air. You don't need a FISA warrant to collect signals over the air. And that is where long-haul communications were in 1978. Now, in 21st-century communications, the situation is completely reversed. Most long-haul communications are on wire and most local calls are over the air. 230 million Americans have cell phones, but the FISA law we operate under is stuck in the 1970s, while we are trying to protect this country from terrorists who are exploiting the 21st- century technology that was invented by this great country. We are tying the hands of our intelligence agencies while our enemies are using these communication systems to plot to kill Americans. But the rule is even worse than that. The committee has ruled in order an amendment by Mr. Flake and Mr. Schiff that insists, insists that our intelligence agencies must use this outdated 1978 law. What do you think the FISA judges are going to think when they see that pass the House of Representatives? We are actually missing a significant portion of what we should be getting. What did we miss today? What are the terrorists plotting today? What are they talking about that is flowing over the wires that America built today? Who is going to die tomorrow because you won't let our Intelligence Committees listen to the foreign communications on a wire and you will not allow a debate on this floor on this very important issue? I pray to God that we don't need another 9/11 Commission to look at what our failures were in intelligence. Because if we have to look at failures, if we have to look at whether we should have done something when we had a chance, then mark this vote on this day in history, when the Democrat majority in this House chose to tie our hands in the face of a determined enemy. If we defeat the previous question on this rule, we will offer the amendment to modernize our intelligence surveillance laws to update them for 21st-century technology. A vote in favor of the [[Page H4782]] previous question on this rule is a vote to keep the FISA law frozen in time in 1978, while our enemies use 21st-century communications to plot to kill Americans. I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on the previous question and ``no'' on the rule. Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to oppose the Rule for debate and the previous question on the Intelligence Authorization Bill today. This vote is more important than most procedural things we do around here. I offered an amendment in the Rules Committee that would modernize our Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Laws so that we can listen to the terrorists trying to kill us and protect the civil liberties of Americans. Every member of the House Intelligence Committee knows that the FISA law is not working, and so does the Speaker of the House. She has been briefed on these matters since shortly after 9/11--long before any of us were. Last week, in unclassified session in front of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Admiral Mike McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence urged the Congress to modernize this law. He told us and the world, ``We are actually missing a significant portion of what we should be getting.'' In classified session, the details of the problems are even worse. On January 17, 2007 the Attorney General told the Congress that there were new Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court orders that are ``innovative''. They are ``innovative'' because the court is stretching the law like a twin sized sheet to cover a king sized bed. And every member of the Intelligence Committee knows just how fragile this legal arrangement is. Yet, a single judge in a non-adversarial secret session allowed it is important to the security of the country and because the Congress has failed to act. Will the next judge continue to stretch the law? The Problem In 1978 almost all local calls were on wire and almost all long-haul calls were over the air. The FISA law distinguishes between collection on a wire and collection out of the air. You don't need a FISA warrant to collect foreign intelligence over the air. Now, in 21st century communications, the situation is completely reverse. Most long-haul communications are on a wire and local calls are in the air. But the calls we want, for foreign intelligence information, are on the wires and fiber optic cables. The FISA law we operate under is stuck in the 1970s while we are trying to protect this country from enemies that use 21st century communications. We're tying the hands of our intelligence agencies while our enemies are using the communications systems we built to plot to kill us. But It Gets Worse But the rule is even worse than that. The committee has ruled in order an amendment by Mr. Flake and Mr. Schiff that says our agencies must use this outdated 1978 law. The Democrat leadership will insist that we turn our backs on 21st century terrorists, using 21st century communications and pretend we can be frozen in a 1978 world. ``We are actually missing a significant portion of what we should be getting,'' said our Director of National Intelligence. What did we miss today? What are the terrorists plotting today? Who is going to die tomorrow because you won't let our intelligence agencies listen to foreign communications on a wire? I pray to God we never need another ``9/11 Commission'' that looks at how we failed to protect ourselves when we could have done something. If we do, mark this vote, this day in history, when the Democrat majority in this House chose to tie our hands in the face of a determined enemy. A vote in favor of the previous question on this rule is a vote to keep the FISA law frozen in time in 1978 while our enemies use 21st century communications to plot to kill Americans. I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on the previous question and ``no'' on the rule. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from California, my friend Ms. Harman, who is the previous ranking member of the Select Committee on Intelligence, and is a member of the newly appointed Special Intelligence Oversight Panel. Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank Mr. Hastings for yielding to me and commend him for his continued service both on the Intelligence Committee and on the Rules Committee. As you heard, I served the past 8 years on the Intelligence Committee, the last 4 as ranking member. I loved that opportunity, and I remain passionate about the issues. I believe that there is nothing more central to our roles in Congress than to keep our country safe. And that committee has crucial jurisdiction. I would respectfully disagree with the comments of the last speaker, Mrs. Wilson. I have been briefed longer than she has on how the so- called NSA program operates. I believed then and I believe now that it can and must fully comply with FISA, a law that has been modernized 12 times since 9/11 through changes we have made which I supported in the PATRIOT Act. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the rule and of H.R. 2082. In my current role as Chair of the Homeland Security Intelligence Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment Subcommittee, I continue to review intelligence reports and to talk to our key security professionals. And, Mr. Speaker, I am concerned. We have surged our intelligence resources into Iraq, where they are necessarily focused on the tactical needs of warfighters. Meanwhile, al Qaeda has gained strength and is inspiring new cells worldwide. We have taken our eye off the ball. That ball is al Qaeda. Mr. Speaker, we should all be worried that terrorist cells are here in the United States, right now, waiting for the right moment to strike. We have yet to develop a truly effective system for sharing time-sensitive intelligence about terror plots with first responders, whom I would like to believe could be first preventers. Even at the Federal level, a variety of data bases, classifications, and pseudo-classification systems could still, 5\1/2\ years after 9/11, prevent us from connecting the dots. We have yet to develop an adequate strategy to counter radicalization in our prisons and in our communities. The events at Cherry Hill, New Jersey, earlier this week are the latest example. And we have not yet broken into the inner circle of the senior al Qaeda leadership even though we have been at this for more than 5 years. These problems are urgent as we could be attacked at any time. I recently reviewed the classified annex to this bill and continue to pay special attention to our technical satellite programs. Changes to these programs cannot be discussed in an unclassified setting such as this; but I want to reiterate my long-held view that the women and men who build these systems constitute a major strategic asset of the United States. Rocket scientists do not grow on trees, and we must keep them highly trained and highly motivated. Without their help, we could literally lose our ability to see, hear, and communicate. Finally, I strongly support the effort to develop a National Intelligence Estimate on climate change. Changes in our climate will affect critical resources such as water, food, and arable land, as we are seeing now in Darfur and in many parts of Africa. Droughts affect the stability of governments, and the stability of governments is one of the key things we need to know about through our intelligence. This isn't bugs and bunnies, or even Bugs Bunny. It is survival or destruction. And if we make responsible moves now, our grandchildren will benefit. Mr. Speaker, by supporting this legislation, the Congress stands with the extraordinary women and men of our intelligence community who often serve in austere locations on unaccompanied assignments. I am one of the few here who know these people and know where they serve. I say to them, our Nation owes you our gratitude; hopefully, this bill provides the support and tools you need as well as honors your sacrifice. I urge support of the rule. I urge support of the underlying legislation, and I thank the gentleman for yielding to me. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Castle). Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H. Res. 388, the rule for consideration of the fiscal year 2008 Intelligence Authorization Act. [[Page H4783]] As a former member of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, I strongly believe we must enact all of the 9/11 Commission's intelligence recommendations, even those that apply to our own congressional committees. In its final report, the 9/11 Commission concluded that: ``Of all our recommendations, strengthening congressional oversight may be among the most difficult and important. So long as oversight is governed by the current congressional rules and resolutions, we believe the American people will not get the security they want and need.'' The bipartisan 9/11 Commission Report and the subsequent 9/11 Public Disclosure Project recommended three alternatives for reforming congressional oversight of intelligence. These options include: one, establishing a Joint Committee on Intelligence modeled after the old Joint Committee on Atomic Energy; two, establishing House and Senate Committees on Intelligence with authorizing and appropriating authority; or, three, establishes a new Appropriations Subcommittee on Intelligence. {time} 1400 In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 2001, Congress enacted a large majority of the Commission's recommendations. However, as it turns out, it has been those recommendations that apply directly to the tangled rules and procedures here in the United States Congress that have been left unfinished. Earlier this year the Democratic leadership attempted to apply a Band-Aid to this problem by creating a powerless Intelligence Oversight Panel that has very little control over actual funding decisions. This is clearly not what the 9/11 Commission recommended. In fact, its report plainly states that, ``tinkering with the existing committee structure is not sufficient.'' This week I offered a simple amendment to the bill before us, calling for a sense of Congress that this House should act to implement these crucial 9/11 recommendations, but it was denied under this rule. Mr. Speaker, the American people have insisted that we implement all of these important recommendations, even those that are difficult. We will be doing this country a disservice until we put in place an effective committee structure capable of giving our national intelligence agencies the oversight, support and leadership they need. I urge the defeat of the rule. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, would you be so kind as to inform each side of the remaining amount of time? The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida has 14\1/2\ minutes, and the gentleman from Washington has 19 minutes. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased at this time to yield 4 minutes to my good friend from New Jersey, with whom I serve on the Select Committee on Intelligence, and he is the Chair of the Special Intelligence Oversight Panel, Mr. Holt. Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend and colleague from Florida. It is indeed a pleasure and an education to serve with him on the Intelligence Committee. And I rise today in support of this rule and the underlying bill. Although this bill is not the full reform that I think is needed, it does contain many features that, if enacted, will improve the operation and oversight of the intelligence community. I'd like to address one amendment that has been made in order, and I thank the Rules Committee for accepting for consideration an amendment that I offer that seeks to address an issue that's been one of the highest concerns for both this committee and the Congress, and that is, protecting the security and the cover of intelligence officers. This grows out, in part, of the well publicized outing of a former CIA officer. For nearly 4 years, I have led the effort within the committee and in this body to determine the facts surrounding this case, as well as its consequences for the security of our Nation. In previous Congresses, on eight separate occasions, in committee and on this floor, the then majority voted down every effort to obtain information on the matter. As I repeatedly noted at the time, Mr. Fitzgerald's criminal inquiry could never address some of the key questions that we sought to have answers for. For example, how and why did Ms. Plame's cover status become known to those with no legitimate need to know? How much damage was done to our intelligence collection efforts as a result of the outing of Ms. Plame? What measures has the CIA and has the now Director of National Intelligence taken to prevent similar compromises in the future? We still need answers to these and other questions. The amendment I am offering today that I will offer, would require the President, through the Director of National Intelligence, to report annually to the Congress on the need for any modification to the Intelligence Identities Protection Act to improve the legal protections for covert agents. This report, along with other oversight that the committee will undertake, and that I hope to undertake through the Select Intelligence Oversight Panel, will help us establish exactly what measures need to be taken to minimize the chances of such compromises of the identities of covert operatives in the future. These men and women take enormous risks on our behalf. We owe it to them to ensure their identities are protected from the exposure, both from hostile intelligence services but even from those within our own government who would seek to retaliate against them for speaking truth to power. This reporting requirement would be an amended version of what the President is already required to do, but has failed to do every year. We seek to have the President show more diligence in protecting the cover of these employees. Let me reiterate that this amendment represents only one step in the process. The chairman of the committee has assured me that there will be oversight and legislative action on this issue in addition to that which we are taking today. I would also like to comment that it is astonishing in the debates leading up to this in committee and here on the floor today that there would be so much attention being paid to the request for a national intelligence estimate on climate change. A preliminary assessment is already in the works. We should want the intelligence community to be considering everything that affects our national security, be it demographics or climate or droughts. I am astonished that there would be any resistance to having such a national intelligence estimate. So I am pleased that the committee has put that in this bill, and I look forward to its passage. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Weldon). Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I rise to commend the majority for including, under the rule, the amendment that will be offered later by Mr. Hoekstra, the ranking minority member, former chairman of the committee, to strike section 407 of the bill. This is the section of the bill that so many people have commented on so far today that will now task our national intelligence resources to start looking at the issue of climate change. To me there is a great irony in this happening here today because for many years we have heard criticism from Democrats over and over again on the so-called inefficiencies, inadequacies of our national intelligence capabilities, specially as it related to WMD in Iraq and their failure to get an accurate picture of that. And now we see today an expansion of their duties and responsibilities. I believe most Americans look for our intelligence agencies not to be engaged on the issue of climate change but more directly to be involved in the business of protecting American safety and security, protecting our national assets, protecting the American people. Furthermore, one of the other things that strikes me as greatly ironic about this is, we have an extensive array of Federal agencies currently studying this issue. We have NOAA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which has a wide array of satellites and scientists that are constantly studying both short-term and [[Page H4784]] long-term implications of climate change. We have, additionally, NASA engaged on this issue, with three major Earth-observing satellites on orbit studying the issue of the Earth's climate. And as well, there are multiple programs run by the National Science Foundation; they have the Geosciences Directorate (GEO), the Office of Polar Programs (OPP), the Atmospheric Science Subactivity, the ATM. And, ladies and gentlemen, I haven't even touched on the EPA and all the work that they are doing on this issue. To me, this issue is controversial. There is a sizeable number of Americans who feel that the severity of the problem of climate change does not justify some of the extreme actions that many people in the radical environmental community are trying to propose today, and I just can't help but feel this is a political issue to try to hijack our intelligence assets to get them on the global warming bandwagon so we could have draconian changes in American policy that could adversely affect our economy and our Nation. So I thank the majority for putting the Hoekstra amendment in order. Mr. Hoekstra, the former chairman, now ranking member, is very knowledgeable on intelligence policy. I intend on supporting the Hoekstra amendment. I encourage all my colleagues to listen carefully to that debate. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I now yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer). Mr. BLUMENAUER. I appreciate the gentleman's courtesy in extending time. I, too, am perplexed by the debate that is being advanced in terms of being able to focus on the national security implications of the threat of global warming. I sat on the committee, the Special Committee on Global Warming and Energy Independence, as we listened to three and four star admirals and generals, as we listened to the former head of the CIA talking about the defense implications for the United States of Global Warming. These men were not radical environmentalists. These are respected experts who have led a lifetime of service to protecting the integrity, the defense, the security of the United States. They are deeply concerned that our dependence on foreign oil from unstable areas of the world. The overwhelming scientific consensus that climate change, global warming is a reality, led them to argue in the most strong terms that we need to be serious about it. Item after item, about the strategic implications, about what happens to defenses of the United States, to instability around the world of water-stressed areas, to new disease patterns, these are not arcane, philosophical issues. This isn't environmental fringe. This is the nuts, and bolts of the future, of our country. It has already been made clear that we already have a great deal of work that is underway. What this would require is assembling it under the guise and guidance of people who are experts in national security to put it in the national security context. Other major countries around the world are grappling with this. I think the Rules Committee was entirely appropriate to put what I think is a misguided amendment on the floor because I think it is time for people who care about the future of the country, who are looking at the evidence, to have an honest and thoughtful debate. But to somehow dismiss this as the province of radical environmentalism or a detraction from the hard work of planning for America's security future is, I think, sadly misplaced. I appreciate what the Rules Committee has done. I support the rule and look forward to the debate later. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Flake). Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, we have a process here with regard to legislation and how it moves through the Congress. In particular, the rules were changed in January, some very welcome changes to the rules with regard to earmarks. We said that if you are going to have an earmark in a bill, or in a report, that you need to state that you do not have a financial interest in that earmark, and then you need to submit that earmark, or it has to be submitted with the report so that Members can actually see that and see that there is no financial interest, see if it has merit or warrant. This process is not being followed here. We were told initially that there were no earmarks in the bill, and then those of us who went up to view the classified annex did not see a list. There was no list available there. We were told later that it was with the Clerk's Office. Then with the Parliamentarians. It turned out that we finally did get the list, and here it is, 26 earmarks in the bill. But the list was not made public. It was not given to us until 5 hours after the deadline that the Rules Committee had established to submit your amendments. So somebody who wanted to amend the bill or actually challenge or to highlight or to discuss the earmarks that are mentioned here and listed here did not have an opportunity to craft an amendment. Again, this list was received, it was made public 5 hours after the Rules Committee already shut down the amendment process. This rule cannot go forward like this. We cannot continue to do business like this. {time} 1415 We all know the problems that we have had with the appropriations process with the earmarking, the scandals that have gone on. The earmarking process is secretive enough, it seems, in the Congress without adding the layer of the Intelligence Committee. Then there are things that you can't even discuss on the floor, that we can't discuss openly; so it makes it even more difficult. Members need not be reminded that Duke Cunningham now sits in prison because of earmarks he largely got in the intelligence process, in the Intelligence Committee. We cannot allow that to happen again. We have to have a process that makes sure that that cannot happen. And that process is not happening right now, when you don't get lists until long after the process, when you can't challenge them on the floor. And then we have the problem here in open session where you can't even challenge the earmark and talk about what the earmark is actually about because you are in open session and you might be talking about classified things. So for that reason I am announcing now that I will offer a motion to move into secret session after these votes are concluded. Let me just remind the Members, if you want a process where you know what is going on, we have to move into secret session. If you vote against the motion to go into secret session, you are, in essence, saying let's just let it go; I don't care what is in there. I would challenge those who want to see what is going on to go up and view the classified annex. You may or may not be able to find out what these earmarks are about. But with this process, the way it is, we will never know, and we can't continue this. I applauded the majority's move to new earmark rules in January. They were, I felt, stronger than what we did when we were in the majority. I think they should have been stronger, but they were better than what we did, and I said so. But we aren't following those rules. We have already highlighted a few times that if the majority submits a list of earmarks, incomplete or complete, or simply states there are no earmarks in a bill, there is no parliamentary recourse for the minority or for anyone on the floor. We have to accept at face value that there are no earmarks or that the list is complete. That is wrong. That is something that has to change. But when we are dealing with the Intelligence Committee on something this important, we can't let this process go forward without adopting some of the reforms that we have said that we are going to adopt. So for that reason I will offer a motion for a secret session at the appropriate time, and I would urge a vote against this rule. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I say through the Chair to my friend from Washington that I thought that we were having our last speakers [[Page H4785]] but I didn't know the nature and substance of his last speaker's remarks toward that end. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes now to the distinguished Chair of the Select Committee on Intelligence, who has comments regarding Mr. Flake's comments. Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I just wanted to assure my friend and colleague from Arizona that, being sensitive to the issues that he mentioned about one of our former colleagues that, regrettably, now sits in prison, the Intelligence Committee worked very closely with the Parliamentarians, the Committee on Standards and Official Conduct, and other committees of the House on earmark disclosures. I am at a loss as to who informed the gentleman that there would be no earmarks, but I think the gentleman now knows that the Government Printing Office made an error in omitting the earmarks and that is why the delay in putting them up on their Web site. Be that as it may, this committee followed the requirements of the House for each Member receiving an earmark to certify that neither he or she nor his or her spouse would benefit financially from any kind of action. We complied with all the requirements, all the rules, and all the regulations. As I said, we did this in a very transparent and bipartisan way because we did not want to leave any impressions that things were not done according to the rules that had been set out. Everything that we did with this process followed the rules and the process. Where the glitch came was where the printing was done. There was an error committed by the Government Printing Office, and that is why there was a delay in posting the earmarks. Again, I am at a loss as to who informed the gentleman that there were no earmarks, because it certainly wasn't anyone from the committee that I am aware of. Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield? Mr. REYES. I would be glad to yield to the gentleman. Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, I believe the requirement in the House rules is that the report be filed 72 hours before it is brought up. Actually, those of us who went up to view the classified annex, I asked for the list, if there was a list of earmarks, and I was told there was none. Mr. REYES. Reclaiming my time just to explain to you that our process in the committee is that you would be provided support from the Republican staff. If they misinformed the gentleman about the issue of earmarks, I don't know why they would do that because clearly staff on both sides knew that there were earmarks. I will continue to yield. Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. Yes, I reviewed and asked during that time if there were. I would say if it is the case that a computer glitch led to no printing of the list, then you would think that the Rules Committee would say, okay, maybe we should move the process back and allow Members to offer amendments on specific earmarks. Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, it is my understanding that the gentleman was offered an opportunity to do that and rejected it. Mr. FLAKE. An unspecified opportunity. If the gentleman will continue to yield, Mr. Speaker, I actually offered an amendment that was rejected by the Rules Committee just encompassing all earmarks that might be in the bill because I wasn't given a list. I had no idea if there were any earmarks. And that was rejected. The problem we have here in open session and the reason I will be calling to move into secret session is that in open session it is difficult to actually discuss what the earmark might be about. Mr. REYES. I am being again reassured by staff, reclaiming my time, Mr. Speaker, that the gentleman was offered, less than an hour ago, unanimous consent to allow him to have an amendment. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona. Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, what I was offered about 30 minutes ago was an opportunity to offer perhaps a few amendments with regard to specific earmarks. It was never clear how many amendments I would be allowed to offer or on which of these earmarks. Until that is clarified, there is no reason to move forward. And, also, let me point out again unless you are in secret session, you can't discuss exactly what the earmark might be about; so you might run afoul of any statements that you have signed or any confidentiality agreements that we are under in terms of classified information. And when I actually went up with the list to look at the classified annex again and pointed at certain earmarks, I was told that we are not sure what that was about. That was requested by a Member who is not on the committee. We don't know. And until we can have that Member actually stand up and be able to say what that earmark is about, whether it goes to a private company, whether it goes to an agency, we just don't know. Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield? Mr. FLAKE. Yes. Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, let me again reassure the gentleman that every single earmark here followed the House rules. Every Member that has an earmark certified, like every Member is required to in the House, that they had no specific interest, that the spouse had no specific interest with the company or companies where the money was going. Mr. FLAKE. I don't sit on the Intelligence Committee; so there may be some disagreement there about whether the ranking member was informed or not, and I think that will probably come to light later. But in this case, if we had followed the rules, we would have had the list before the Rules Committee shut down the amendment process because you need to be able to offer amendments on specific earmarks. And in this case, unless a Member can go up and view the classified annex and come away with an assurance or some kind of comfort level that the earmark under question is for the intended purpose or it should be in the intelligence bill, then we are at a loss when we come to vote. I think our constituents expect us to be informed, and when we can't even go up and view the classified annex and be informed, then there is a problem. Mr. REYES. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. FLAKE. Yes, I will yield. Mr. REYES. Once again, Mr. Speaker, let me reassure my good friend and colleague from Arizona that the report, along with all the listing of earmarks, was filed appropriately, timely with the Rules Committee. Where the glitch occurred was in the printing. But be that as it may, I want to tell you again, reassure you, that we did not handle the process in the Intelligence Committee any different than any other committee in the House, and I would hope the gentleman would understand that. Mr. FLAKE. My office has a timeline, actually, if anyone is interested, and when we requested the list of earmarks, when we finally got it, what we were told by which office, and I can tell you this is no way to run a process, particularly given the recent history of problems that we have had in this regard. And that is why I am concerned, and that is why I feel we can't do that in an open session like this. We have to go to secret session. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. FLAKE. Yes, I will. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, does the gentleman have now an amendment prepared that he is ready to offer? Perhaps it would be that we could ask unanimous consent that your amendment be allowed to go forward. Mr. FLAKE. Reclaiming my time, I would not, given that I cannot discuss some of what I need to discuss in open session, given what has transpired. I don't think that we can. That is why we need a closed session. I will offer the motion, and if you don't feel that we need to go into closed session, then you can vote against it. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time. Mr. Speaker, I will be asking for a ``no'' vote on the previous question so [[Page H4786]] that I can amend this rule to allow the House to consider an amendment offered by Representative Heather Wilson of New Mexico and provide the appropriate waivers for that amendment. The Wilson amendment would modernize the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to enhance the ability of our Nation to protect itself in times of war and elevated national security threats. And I think that point was made very, very eloquently by the gentlewoman from New Mexico. Yesterday, the Rules Committee met and rejected on a party-line vote the Wilson amendment. Mr. Speaker, I want to advise my friend from Florida that I just got a request for time here, and that is being discussed right now, that I was not aware of. Mr. Speaker, how much time do I have remaining? The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Washington has 7\1/2\ minutes remaining. The gentleman from Florida has 4 minutes remaining. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time. [Congressional Record: May 10, 2007 (House)] [Page H4787-H4794] [[Page H4787]] House of Representatives PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 2082, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008--Continued {time} 1430 Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Let me say, then, Mr. Speaker, I will be asking for my colleagues to defeat the previous question so we will have an opportunity to vote on the merits of this amendment. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to insert the text of the amendment and extraneous material immediately prior to the vote on the previous question. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Washington? There was no objection. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 6 minutes to the ranking member of the Intelligence Committee (Mr. Hoekstra). Mr. HOEKSTRA. I thank the gentleman for yielding. Mr. Speaker, I just need to clarify that the process that was used for the earmarks on this bill did not follow all of the rules that we had agreed upon in the committee and perhaps inconsistent with the Rules of the House. But I do know that they were inconsistent with the agreement that we have in the Intelligence Committee, which is that on a bipartisan basis the chairman and the ranking member would review earmarks, their content, the Member, and would sign off on the appropriateness of each of those earmarks. With the filing of the bill to the Rules Committee, there was at least one earmark that was never brought to my attention and for which I never received a copy of the request from the Member identifying the earmark or a statement from the Member indicating that there was no financial interest along with the earmark. Now, that does not say the earmark is bad. It does not say it was wrong. It is just a process foul in terms of what we had agreed to. Mr. REYES. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. HOEKSTRA. I yield to the chairman. Mr. REYES. I thank you for yielding, because one of the fundamental points I want to make is that we wanted to err on the side of transparency. Staff tells me that the issue of that particular earmark, weeks before we marked up the bill, was fully discussed on a bipartisan basis. I know it was discussed when we marked it up because there were a number of amendments that were brought to the markup. Mr. HOEKSTRA. It is clear that there may be some confusion as to exactly what was or what was not discussed, but the process between staff, the process that is outlined in the committee is clearly that the chairman and the ranking member will go through and review those items that are identified as earmarks, and we will agree on them, and we will agree upon their inclusion in the bill. The bill that was submitted and filed with Rules had at least one, I don't know about the full details, but had at least one earmark that the chairman and myself never discussed and also that, as a ranking member, I had never received what would have been identified as the paperwork that went along with it. The chairman knows that that particular earmark was one that was not discussed as an earmark. I don't think the inclusion and the identification of it as being an earmark in committee when we debated this specific provision was brought up. And so it is a cause of concern. And building on what happened with my colleague from Arizona (Mr. Flake), where the Rules Committee did not identify the earmarks that were part of that bill until 5 hours after the deadline for the Rules Committee, for Members to submit amendments. Mr. REYES. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. HOEKSTRA. I will yield. Mr. REYES. Those are two different issues. The time was an issue of Government Printing Office error. That is a different issue. I would just hope that my good friend and colleague and ranking member would agree that we sat down and agreed to bring transparency so that the issues that came up when the gentleman was the chair of the committee would not recur. Mr. HOEKSTRA. That is exactly the point, that whatever abuses, whatever we wanted transparency, these were guidelines and rules that we agreed upon in the previous Congress, where I am glad that they were carried over into this Congress. I am disappointed that they were not followed the way that they were outlined in the committee process. Mr. REYES. If the gentleman would yield. Mr. HOEKSTRA. I will yield. Mr. REYES. I would just again take issue with that point because we followed the process. Staff consulted on a bipartisan basis. Mr. HOEKSTRA. Reclaiming my time. Mr. Chairman, no, that does not follow. The measure that we had, you and I sat in a conference room; we went through the list with staff discussing specifically each and every earmark. And that earmark was not part of that process. When we got the report that accompanied this bill to the Rules Committee, all of a sudden there was a new earmark that you and I had not gone through. You can talk to staff and those types of things. I was never aware and neither were they that it was an earmark. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I am going to once again urge [[Page H4788]] my colleagues to vote ``no'' on the previous question so the House can consider the amendment that I submitted from Heather Wilson of New Mexico. Mr. Speaker, with that, I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remaining portion of my time. I am fascinated by my colleagues' arguments on the other side. We did have a Rules Committee hearing on this matter, and there are four members of the Rules Committee on the minority, none of whom raised any of the issues that we have heard here today on the floor; understanding full well that Mr. Flake comes now and says that we should have a special session. I also know that here on the floor I offered to Mr. Flake an opportunity, by unanimous consent, to offer any amendment he may have, and he didn't have an amendment at that time. I assume his argument is that we would need to be in what he says a ``secret session.'' But one thing I do know, being one of the few Members that does serve on the Rules Committee and on the Intelligence Committee, and that is that everyone knew the funding level of the issue that is being discussed. Mr. Flake may not have, but I can assure you that the remaining Members on the Intelligence Committee knew that the mark was included in our draft and the Community Management Account making that minority staff certainly aware at the time between the chairman and Mr. Hoekstra. Now, today more than ever, we must make the creation of a strong and flexible intelligence apparatus one of the highest, highest priorities of this body. The terrorist attacks of September 11, combined with the continuing threat of further attacks, underscore the importance of this legislation. When the American people elected Democrats to the majority, they sent a very clear message that ``business as usual'' is no longer accepted. They said to all of us, Republican and Democrat alike, that there are problems in the way we operate, and we need to change how we do business. We must, in my opinion, congratulate our intelligence community for its successes, but we also must hold them accountable for their failures. Rubber-stamping the administration's every action is not acceptable. Democrats are working every day, as are Republicans, to make America a safer place for all. I genuinely urge my colleagues to support this measure. I heard arguments about the climate change requirements put forward for there to be a national intelligence estimate in that regard. And there are arguments against it. I do not quite understand those arguments. We made it clear that much of the information is collectable by analysts at this time and that it would help prevent future terrorist developments. And the way the argument has been couched on the minority is as if this largest ever intelligence budget, largest in the history of the Congress, is not doing everything that is needed to be done because someone requested that there be a national intelligence estimate with reference to climate change. One day, some people in this body are going to get their head out of the sand and understand that something is changing in this climate of ours, in this world and that we all owe it as much as we can afford to make sure that we pass on a safe environment to all our children. With that, Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support the rule. I urge a ``yes'' vote on the previous question. The material previously referred to by Mr. Hastings of Washington is as follows: Amendment to H. Res. 388 Offered by Rep. Hastings of Washington At the end of the resolution, add the following: Sec. 3. Notwithstanding any other provision of this resolution, the amendment printed in section 4 shall be in order as though printed as the last amendment in the report of the Committee on Rules if offered by Representative Wilson of New Mexico or a designee. That amendment shall be debatable for 30 minutes equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent. Sec. 4. The amendment referred to in section 3 is as follows: At the end of the bill, add the following new title: TITLE VI--ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MODERNIZATION SEC. 601. SHORT TITLE. This title may be cited as the ``Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act''. SEC. 602. FISA DEFINITIONS. (a) Agent of a Foreign Power.--Subsection (b)(1) of section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``; or'' and inserting ``;''; and (2) by adding at the end the following: ``(D) is reasonably expected to possess, control, transmit, or receive foreign intelligence information while such person is in the United States, provided that the official making the certification required by section 104(a)(7) deems such foreign intelligence information to be significant; or''. (b) Electronic Surveillance.--Subsection (f) of such section is amended to read as follows: ``(f) `Electronic surveillance' means-- ``(1) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device for acquiring information by intentionally directing surveillance at a particular known person who is reasonably believed to be in the United States under circumstances in which that person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes; or ``(2) the intentional acquisition of the contents of any communication under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes, if both the sender and all intended recipients are reasonably believed to be located within the United States.''. (c) Minimization Procedures.--Subsection (h) of such section is amended-- (1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``importance;'' and inserting ``importance; and''; (2) in paragraph (3), by striking ``; and'' and inserting ``.''; and (3) by striking paragraph (4). (d) Wire Communication and Surveillance Device.--Subsection (l) of such section is amended to read as follows: ``(l) `Surveillance device' is a device that allows surveillance by the Federal Government, but excludes any device that extracts or analyzes information from data that has already been acquired by the Federal Government by lawful means.''. (e) Contents.--Subsection (n) of such section is amended to read as follows: ``(n) `Contents', when used with respect to a communication, includes any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.''. SEC. 603. AUTHORIZATION FOR ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND OTHER ACQUISITIONS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES. (a) In General.--The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is further amended by striking section 102 and inserting the following: ``AUTHORIZATION FOR ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES ``Sec. 102. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other law, the President, acting through the Attorney General, may authorize electronic surveillance without a court order under this title to acquire foreign intelligence information for periods of up to one year if the Attorney General certifies in writing under oath that-- ``(1) the electronic surveillance is directed at-- ``(A) the acquisition of the contents of communications of foreign powers, as defined in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of section 101(a), or an agent of a foreign power, as defined in subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 101(b)(1); or ``(B) the acquisition of technical intelligence, other than the spoken communications of individuals, from property or premises under the open and exclusive control of a foreign power, as defined in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of section 101(a); and ``(2) the proposed minimization procedures with respect to such surveillance meet the definition of minimization procedures under section 101(h); if the Attorney General reports such minimization procedures and any changes thereto to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate at least 30 days prior to the effective date of such minimization procedures, unless the Attorney General determines immediate action is required and notifies the committees immediately of such minimization procedures and the reason for their becoming effective immediately. ``(b) Minimization Procedures.--An electronic surveillance authorized by this subsection may be conducted only in accordance with the Attorney General's certification and the minimization procedures. The Attorney General shall assess compliance with such procedures and shall report such assessments to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate under the provisions of section 108(a). ``(c) Submission of Certification.--The Attorney General shall immediately transmit under seal to the court established under section 103(a) a copy of his certification. Such certification shall be maintained under security measures established by the Chief Justice with the concurrence of the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, and shall remain sealed unless-- [[Page H4789]] ``(1) an application for a court order with respect to the surveillance is made under section 104; or ``(2) the certification is necessary to determine the legality of the surveillance under section 106(f). ``AUTHORIZATION FOR ACQUISITION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ``Sec. 102A. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other law, the President, acting through the Attorney General may, for periods of up to one year, authorize the acquisition of foreign intelligence information concerning a person reasonably believed to be outside the United States if the Attorney General certifies in writing under oath that-- ``(1) the acquisition does not constitute electronic surveillance; ``(2) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign intelligence information from or with the assistance of a wire or electronic communications service provider, custodian, or other person (including any officer, employee, agent, or other specified person of such service provider, custodian, or other person) who has access to wire or electronic communications, either as they are transmitted or while they are stored, or equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store such communications; ``(3) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain foreign intelligence information; and ``(4) the proposed minimization procedures with respect to such acquisition activity meet the definition of minimization procedures under section 101(h). ``(b) Specific Place Not Required.--A certification under subsection (a) is not required to identify the specific facilities, places, premises, or property at which the acquisition of foreign intelligence information will be directed. ``(c) Submission of Certification.--The Attorney General shall immediately transmit under seal to the court established under section 103(a) a copy of a certification made under subsection (a). Such certification shall be maintained under security measures established by the Chief Justice of the United States and the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, and shall remain sealed unless the certification is necessary to determine the legality of the acquisition under section 102B. ``(d) Minimization Procedures.--An acquisition under this section may be conducted only in accordance with the certification of the Attorney General and the minimization procedures adopted by the Attorney General. The Attorney General shall assess compliance with such procedures and shall report such assessments to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate under section 108(a). ``DIRECTIVES RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND OTHER ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ``Sec. 102B. (a) Directive.--With respect to an authorization of electronic surveillance under section 102 or an authorization of an acquisition under section 102A, the Attorney General may direct a person to-- ``(1) immediately provide the Government with all information, facilities, and assistance necessary to accomplish the acquisition of foreign intelligence information in such a manner as will protect the secrecy of the electronic surveillance or acquisition and produce a minimum of interference with the services that such person is providing to the target; and ``(2) maintain under security procedures approved by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence any records concerning the electronic surveillance or acquisition or the aid furnished that such person wishes to maintain. ``(b) Compensation.--The Government shall compensate, at the prevailing rate, a person for providing information, facilities, or assistance pursuant to subsection (a). ``(c) Failure to Comply.--In the case of a failure to comply with a directive issued pursuant to subsection (a), the Attorney General may petition the court established under section 103(a) to compel compliance with the directive. The court shall issue an order requiring the person or entity to comply with the directive if it finds that the directive was issued in accordance with section 102(a) or 102A(a) and is otherwise lawful. Failure to obey an order of the court may be punished by the court as contempt of court. Any process under this section may be served in any judicial district in which the person or entity may be found. ``(d) Review of Petitions.--(1) In General.--(A) Challenge.--A person receiving a directive issued pursuant to subsection (a) may challenge the legality of that directive by filing a petition with the pool established under section 103(e)(1). ``(B) Assignment of Judge.--The presiding judge designated pursuant to section 103(b) shall assign a petition filed under subparagraph (A) to one of the judges serving in the pool established by section 103(e)(1). Not later than 24 hours after the assignment of such petition, the assigned judge shall conduct an initial review of the directive. If the assigned judge determines that the petition is frivolous, the assigned judge shall deny the petition and affirm the directive or any part of the directive that is the subject of the petition. If the assigned judge determines the petition is not frivolous, the assigned judge shall, within 72 hours, consider the petition in accordance with the procedures established under section 103(e)(2) and provide a written statement for the record of the reasons for any determination under this subsection. ``(2) Standard of Review.--A judge considering a petition to modify or set aside a directive may grant such petition only if the judge finds that such directive does not meet the requirements of this section or is otherwise unlawful. If the judge does not modify or set aside the directive, the judge shall affirm such directive, and order the recipient to comply with such directive. ``(3) Directives Not Modified.--Any directive not explicitly modified or set aside under this subsection shall remain in full effect. ``(e) Appeals.--The Government or a person receiving a directive reviewed pursuant to subsection (d) may file a petition with the court of review established under section 103(b) for review of the decision issued pursuant to subsection (d) not later than 7 days after the issuance of such decision. Such court of review shall have jurisdiction to consider such petitions and shall provide for the record a written statement of the reasons for its decision. On petition by the Government or any person receiving such directive for a writ of certiorari, the record shall be transmitted under seal to the Supreme Court, which shall have jurisdiction to review such decision. ``(f) Proceedings.--Judicial proceedings under this section shall be concluded as expeditiously as possible. The record of proceedings, including petitions filed, orders granted, and statements of reasons for decision, shall be maintained under security measures established by the Chief Justice of the United States, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence. ``(g) Sealed Petitions.--All petitions under this section shall be filed under seal. In any proceedings under this section, the court shall, upon request of the Government, review ex parte and in camera any Government submission, or portions of a submission, which may include classified information. ``(h) Liability.--No cause of action shall lie in any court against any person for providing any information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with a directive under this section. ``(i) Use of Information.--Information acquired pursuant to a directive by the Attorney General under this section concerning any United States person may be used and disclosed by Federal officers and employees without the consent of the United States person only in accordance with the minimization procedures required by section 102(a) or 102A(a). No otherwise privileged communication obtained in accordance with, or in violation of, the provisions of this section shall lose its privileged character. No information from an electronic surveillance under section 102 or an acquisition pursuant to section 102A may be used or disclosed by Federal officers or employees except for lawful purposes. ``(j) Use in Law Enforcement.--No information acquired pursuant to this section shall be disclosed for law enforcement purposes unless such disclosure is accompanied by a statement that such information, or any information derived from such information, may only be used in a criminal proceeding with the advance authorization of the Attorney General. ``(k) Disclosure in Trial.--If the Government intends to enter into evidence or otherwise use or disclose in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States, against an aggrieved person, any information obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance conducted under section 102 or an acquisition authorized pursuant to section 102A, the Government shall, prior to the trial, hearing, or other proceeding or at a reasonable time prior to an effort to disclose or use that information or submit it in evidence, notify the aggrieved person and the court or other authority in which the information is to be disclosed or used that the Government intends to disclose or use such information. ``(l) Disclosure in State Trials.--If a State or political subdivision of a State intends to enter into evidence or otherwise use or disclose in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of a State or a political subdivision of a State, against an aggrieved person, any information obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance authorized pursuant to section 102 or an acquisition authorized pursuant to section 102A, the State or political subdivision of such State shall notify the aggrieved person, the court, or other authority in which the information is to be disclosed or used and the Attorney General that the State or political subdivision intends to disclose or use such information. ``(m) Motion to Exclude Evidence.--(1) In General.--Any person against whom evidence obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance authorized pursuant to section 102 or an acquisition authorized pursuant to section 102A is to be, or has been, used or disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, may move to [[Page H4790]] suppress the evidence obtained or derived from such electronic surveillance or such acquisition on the grounds that-- ``(A) the information was unlawfully acquired; or ``(B) the electronic surveillance or acquisition was not properly made in conformity with an authorization under section 102(a) or 102A(a). ``(2) Timing.--A person moving to suppress evidence under paragraph (1) shall make the motion to suppress the evidence before the trial, hearing, or other proceeding unless there was no opportunity to make such a motion or the person was not aware of the grounds of the motion. ``(n) Review of Motions.--If a court or other authority is notified pursuant to subsection (k) or (l), a motion is made pursuant to subsection (m), or a motion or request is made by an aggrieved person pursuant to any other statute or rule of the United States or any State before any court or other authority of the United States or any State-- ``(1) to discover or obtain an Attorney General directive or other materials relating to an electronic surveillance authorized pursuant to section 102 or an acquisition authorized pursuant to section 102A, or ``(2) to discover, obtain, or suppress evidence or information obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance authorized pursuant to section 102 or an acquisition authorized pursuant to section 102A, the United States district court or, where the motion is made before another authority, the United States district court in the same district as the authority, shall, notwithstanding any other law, if the Attorney General files an affidavit under oath that disclosure or an adversary hearing would harm the national security of the United States, review in camera and ex parte the application, order, and such other materials relating to such electronic surveillance or such acquisition as may be necessary to determine whether such electronic surveillance or such acquisition authorized under this section was lawfully authorized and conducted. In making this determination, the court may disclose to the aggrieved person, under appropriate security procedures and protective orders, portions of the directive or other materials relating to the acquisition only where such disclosure is necessary to make an accurate determination of the legality of the acquisition. ``(o) Determinations.--If, pursuant to subsection (n), a United States district court determines that the acquisition authorized under this section was not lawfully authorized or conducted, it shall, in accordance with the requirements of law, suppress the evidence which was unlawfully obtained or derived or otherwise grant the motion of the aggrieved person. If the court determines that such acquisition was lawfully authorized and conducted, it shall deny the motion of the aggrieved person except to the extent that due process requires discovery or disclosure. ``(p) Binding Orders.--Orders granting motions or requests under subsection (m), decisions under this section that an electronic surveillance or an acquisition was not lawfully authorized or conducted, and orders of the United States district court requiring review or granting disclosure of directives, orders, or other materials relating to such acquisition shall be final orders and binding upon all courts of the United States and the several States except a United States court of appeals and the Supreme Court. ``(q) Coordination.--(1) In General.--Federal officers who acquire foreign intelligence information may consult with Federal law enforcement officers or law enforcement personnel of a State or political subdivision of a State, including the chief executive officer of that State or political subdivision who has the authority to appoint or direct the chief law enforcement officer of that State or political subdivision, to coordinate efforts to investigate or protect against-- ``(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; ``(B) sabotage, international terrorism, or the development or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; or ``(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power. ``(2) Certification Required.--Coordination authorized under paragraph (1) shall not preclude the certification required by section 102(a) or 102A(a). ``(r) Retention of Directives and Orders.--A directive made or an order granted under this section shall be retained for a period of not less than 10 years from the date on which such directive or such order is made.''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents in the first section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 102 the following: ``102A. Authorization for acquisition of foreign intelligence information. ``102B. Directives relating to electronic surveillance and other acquisitions of foreign intelligence information.''. SEC. 604. JURISDICTION OF FISA COURT. Section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(g) Applications for a court order under this title are authorized if the President has, by written authorization, empowered the Attorney General to approve applications to the court having jurisdiction under this section, and a judge to whom an application is made may, notwithstanding any other law, grant an order, in conformity with section 105, approving electronic surveillance of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence information.''. SEC. 605. APPLICATIONS FOR COURT ORDERS. Section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) in paragraph (6), by striking ``detailed description'' and inserting ``summary description''; (B) in paragraph (7)-- (i) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ``or officials designated'' and all that follows through ``consent of the Senate'' and inserting ``designated by the President to authorize electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes''; (ii) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``techniques;'' and inserting ``techniques; and''; (iii) by striking subparagraph (D); and (iv) by redesignating subparagraph (E) as subparagraph (D); (C) in paragraph (8), by striking ``a statement of the means'' and inserting ``a summary statement of the means''; (D) in paragraph (9)-- (i) by striking ``a statement'' and inserting ``a summary statement''; and (ii) by striking ``application;'' and inserting ``application; and''; (E) in paragraph (10), by striking ``thereafter; and'' and inserting ``thereafter.''; and (F) by striking paragraph (11). (2) by striking subsection (b); (3) by redesignating subsections (c) through (e) as subsections (b) through (d), respectively; and (4) in paragraph (1)(A) of subsection (d), as redesignated by paragraph (3), by striking ``or the Director of National Intelligence'' and inserting ``the Director of National Intelligence, or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. SEC. 606. ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER. Section 105 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by striking paragraph (1); and (B) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (5) as paragraphs (1) through (4), respectively; (2) in subsection (c)(1)-- (A) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``surveillance;'' and inserting ``surveillance; and''; (B) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``approved; and'' and inserting ``approved.''; and (C) by striking subparagraph (F); (3) by striking subsection (d); (4) by redesignating subsections (e) through (i) as subsections (d) through (h), respectively; (5) in subsection (d), as redesignated by paragraph (4), by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows: ``(2) Extensions of an order issued under this title may be granted on the same basis as an original order upon an application for an extension and new findings made in the same manner as required for an original order and may be for a period not to exceed one year.''; (6) in subsection (e), as redesignated by paragraph (4), to read as follows: ``(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, the Attorney General may authorize the emergency employment of electronic surveillance if the Attorney General-- ``(1) determines that an emergency situation exists with respect to the employment of electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information before an order authorizing such surveillance can with due diligence be obtained; ``(2) determines that the factual basis for issuance of an order under this title to approve such electronic surveillance exists; ``(3) informs a judge having jurisdiction under section 103 at the time of such authorization that the decision has been made to employ emergency electronic surveillance; and ``(4) makes an application in accordance with this title to a judge having jurisdiction under section 103 as soon as practicable, but not more than 168 hours after the Attorney General authorizes such surveillance. If the Attorney General authorizes such emergency employment of electronic surveillance, the Attorney General shall require that the minimization procedures required by this title for the issuance of a judicial order be followed. In the absence of a judicial order approving such electronic surveillance, the surveillance shall terminate when the information sought is obtained, when the application for the order is denied, or after the expiration of 168 hours from the time of authorization by the Attorney General, whichever is earliest. In the event that such application for approval is denied, or in any other case where the electronic surveillance is terminated and no order is issued approving the surveillance, no information obtained or evidence derived from such surveillance shall be received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, [[Page H4791]] office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, and no information concerning any United States person acquired from such surveillance shall subsequently be used or disclosed in any other manner by Federal officers or employees without the consent of such person, except with the approval of the Attorney General if the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person. A denial of the application made under this subsection may be reviewed as provided in section 103.''; (7) in subsection (h), as redesignated by paragraph (4)-- (A) by striking ``a wire or'' and inserting ``an''; and (B) by striking ``physical search'' and inserting ``physical search or in response to a certification by the Attorney General or a designee of the Attorney General seeking information, facilities, or technical assistance from such person under section 102B''; and (8) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(i) In any case in which the Government makes an application to a judge under this title to conduct electronic surveillance involving communications and the judge grants such application, the judge shall also authorize the installation and use of pen registers and trap and trace devices to acquire dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information related to such communications and such dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information shall not be subject to minimization procedures.''. SEC. 607. USE OF INFORMATION. Section 106(i) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1806(i)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``radio communication'' and inserting ``communication''; and (2) by striking ``contents indicates'' and inserting ``contents contain significant foreign intelligence information or indicate''. SEC. 608. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT. (a) Electronic Surveillance Under FISA.--Section 108 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1808) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(2)-- (A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``and'' at the end; (B) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period and inserting ``; and''; and (C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(D) the authority under which the electronic surveillance is conducted.''; and (2) by striking subsection (b) and inserting the following: ``(b) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General additionally shall fully inform the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate on electronic surveillance conducted without a court order.''. (b) Intelligence Activities.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended-- (1) in section 501 (50 U.S.C. 413)-- (A) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g); and (B) by inserting after subsection (e) the following new subsection: ``(f) The Chair of each of the congressional intelligence committees, in consultation with the ranking member of the committee for which the person is Chair, may inform-- ``(1) on a bipartisan basis, all members or any individual members of such committee, and ``(2) any essential staff of such committee, of a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) or subsection (b) as such Chair considers necessary.''; (2) in section 502 (50 U.S.C. 414), by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(d) Informing of Committee Members.--The Chair of each of the congressional intelligence committees, in consultation with the ranking member of the committee for which the person is Chair, may inform-- ``(1) on a bipartisan basis, all members or any individual members of such committee, and ``(2) any essential staff of such committee, of a report submitted under subsection (a) as such Chair considers necessary.''; and (3) in section 503 (50 U.S.C. 415), by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(g) The Chair of each of the congressional intelligence committees, in consultation with the ranking member of the committee for which the person is Chair, may inform-- ``(1) on a bipartisan basis, all members or any individual members of such committee, and ``(2) any essential staff of such committee, of a report submitted under subsection (b), (c), or (d) as such Chair considers necessary.''. SEC. 609. INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT OF TARGETS. (a) Electronic Surveillance.--Section 105(d) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805(d)), as redesignated by section 606(4), is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(4) An order issued under this section shall remain in force during the authorized period of surveillance notwithstanding the absence of the target from the United States, unless the Government files a motion to extinguish the order and the court grants the motion.''. (b) Physical Search.--Section 304(d) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1824(d)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(4) An order issued under this section shall remain in force during the authorized period of surveillance notwithstanding the absence of the target from the United States, unless the Government files a motion to extinguish the order and the court grants the motion.''. SEC. 610. COMPLIANCE WITH COURT ORDERS AND ANTITERRORISM PROGRAMS. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and in addition to the immunities, privileges, and defenses provided by any other provision of law, no action, claim, or proceeding shall lie or be maintained in any court, and no penalty, sanction, or other form of remedy or relief shall be imposed by any court or any other body, against any person for an activity arising from or relating to the provision to an element of the intelligence community of any information (including records or other information pertaining to a customer), facilities, or assistance during the period of time beginning on September 11, 2001, and ending on the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, in connection with any alleged communications intelligence program that the Attorney General or a designee of the Attorney General certifies, in a manner consistent with the protection of State secrets, is, was, or would be intended to protect the United States from a terrorist attack. This section shall apply to all actions, claims, or proceedings pending on or after the effective date of this Act. (b) Jurisdiction.--Any action, claim, or proceeding described in subsection (a) that is brought in a State court shall be deemed to arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States and shall be removable pursuant to section 1441 of title 28, United States Code. (c) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). (2) Person.--The term ``person'' has the meaning given the term in section 2510(6) of title 18, United States Code. SEC. 611. REPORT ON MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES. (a) Report.--Not later than two years after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter until December 31, 2012, the Director of the National Security Agency, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General, shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report on the effectiveness and use of minimization procedures applied to information concerning United States persons acquired during the course of a communications activity conducted by the National Security Agency. (b) Requirements.--A report submitted under subsection (a) shall include-- (1) a description of the implementation, during the course of communications intelligence activities conducted by the National Security Agency, of procedures established to minimize the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of nonpublicly available information concerning United States persons; (2) the number of significant violations, if any, of such minimization procedures during the 18 months following the effective date of this Act; and (3) summary descriptions of such violations. (c) Retention of Information.--Information concerning United States persons shall not be retained solely for the purpose of complying with the reporting requirements of this section. SEC. 612. AUTHORIZATION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE DUE TO IMMINENT THREAT. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is further amended-- (1) by adding at the end of title I the following new section: ``AUTHORIZATION DUE TO IMMINENT THREAT ``Sec. 113. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, but subject to the provisions of this section, the President, acting through the Attorney General, may authorize electronic surveillance without an order under this title to acquire foreign intelligence information for a period not to exceed 90 days if the President submits to the congressional leadership, the congressional intelligence committees, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court a written notification that the President has determined that there exists an imminent threat of attack likely to cause death, serious injury, or substantial economic damage to the United States. Such notification-- ``(1) shall be submitted as soon as practicable, but in no case later than 5 days after the date on which the President authorizes electronic surveillance under this section; ``(2) shall specify the entity responsible for the threat and any affiliates of the entity; ``(3) shall state the reason to believe that the threat of imminent attack exists; ``(4) shall state the reason the President needs broader authority to conduct electronic surveillance in the United States as a result of the threat of imminent attack; ``(5) shall include a description of the foreign intelligence information that will be collected and the means that will be used to [[Page H4792]] collect such foreign intelligence information; and ``(6) may be submitted in classified form. ``(b) Subsequent Certifications.--At the end of the 90-day period described in subsection (a), and every 90 days thereafter, the President may submit a subsequent written notification to the congressional leadership, the congressional intelligence committees, the other relevant committees, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that the circumstances of the threat for which the President submitted a written notification under subsection (a) require the President to continue the authorization of electronic surveillance under this section for an additional 90 days. The President shall be authorized to conduct electronic surveillance under this section for an additional 90 days after each such subsequent written notification. ``(c) Electronic Surveillance of Individuals.--The President, or an official designated by the President to authorize electronic surveillance, may only conduct electronic surveillance of a person under this section if the President or such official determines that-- ``(1) there is a reasonable belief that such person is communicating with an entity or an affiliate of an entity that is reasonably believed to be responsible for imminent threat of attack; and ``(2) the information obtained from the electronic surveillance may be foreign intelligence information. ``(d) Minimization Procedures.--The President may not authorize electronic surveillance under this section until the Attorney General approves minimization procedures for electronic surveillance conducted under this section. ``(e) United States Persons.--Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b), the President may not authorize electronic surveillance of a United States person under this section without an order under this title for a period of more than 60 days unless the President, acting through the Attorney General, submits a certification to the congressional intelligence committees that-- ``(1) the continued electronic surveillance of the United States person is vital to the national security of the United States; ``(2) describes the circumstances that have prevented the Attorney General from obtaining an order under this title for continued surveillance; ``(3) describes the reasons for believing the United States person is affiliated with or in communication with an entity or an affiliate of an entity that is reasonably believed to be responsible for imminent threat of attack; and ``(4) describes the foreign intelligence information derived from the electronic surveillance conducted under this section. ``(f) Use of Information.--Information obtained pursuant to electronic surveillance under this subsection may be used to obtain an order authorizing subsequent electronic surveillance under this title. ``(g) Definitions.--In this section: ``(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term `congressional intelligence committees' means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. ``(2) Congressional leadership.--The term `congressional leadership' means the Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives and the majority leader and minority leader of the Senate. ``(3) Foreign intelligence surveillance court.--The term `Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court' means the court established under section 103(a). ``(4) Other relevant committees.--The term `other relevant committees' means the Committees on Appropriations, the Committees on Armed Services, and the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate.''; and (2) in the table of contents in the first section, by inserting after the item relating to section 111 the following new item: ``Sec. 112. Authorization due to imminent threat.''. SEC. 613. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is further amended-- (1) in section 105(a)(4), as redesignated by section 606(1)(B)-- (A) by striking ``104(a)(7)(E)'' and inserting ``104(a)(7)(D)''; and (B) by striking ``104(d)'' and inserting ``104(c)''; (2) in section 106(j), in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ``105(e)'' and inserting ``105(d)''; and (3) in section 108(a)(2)(C), by striking ``105(f)'' and inserting ``105(e)''. (The information contained herein was provided by Democratic Minority on multiple occasions throughout the 109th Congress.) The Vote on the Previous Question: What It Really Means This vote, the vote on whether to order the previous question on a special rule, is not merely a procedural vote. A vote against ordering the previous question is a vote against the Democratic majority agenda and a vote to allow the opposition, at least for the moment, to offer an alternative plan. It is a vote about what the House should be debating. Mr. Clarence Cannon's Precedents of the House of Representatives, (VI, 308-311) describes the vote on the previous question on the rule as ``a motion to direct or control the consideration of the subject before the House being made by the Member in charge.'' To defeat the previous question is to give the opposition a chance to decide the subject before the House. Cannon cites the Speaker's ruling of January 13, 1920, to the effect that ``the refusal of the House to sustain the demand for the previous question passes the control of the resolution to the opposition'' in order to offer an amendment. On March 15, 1909, a member of the majority party offered a rule resolution. The House defeated the previous question and a member of the opposition rose to a parliamentary inquiry, asking who was entitled to recognition. Speaker Joseph G. Cannon (R-Illinois) said: ``The previous question having been refused, the gentleman from New York, Mr. Fitzgerald, who had asked the gentleman to yield to him for an amendment, is entitled to the first recognition.'' Because the vote today may look bad for the Democratic majority they will say ``the vote on the previous question is simply a vote on whether to proceed to an immediate vote on adopting the resolution . . . [and] has no substantive legislative or policy implications whatsoever.'' But that is not what they have always said. Listen to the definition of the previous question used in the Floor Procedures Manual published by the Rules Committee in the 109th Congress, (page 56). Here's how the Rules Committee described the rule using information from Congressional Quarterly's ``American Congressional Dictionary'': ``If the previous question is defeated, control of debate shifts to the leading opposition member (usually the minority Floor Manager) who then manages an hour of debate and may offer a germane amendment to the pending business.'' Deschler's Procedure in the U.S. House of Representatives, the subchapter titled ``Amending Special Rules'' states: ``a refusal to order the previous question on such a rule [a special rule reported from the Committee on Rules] opens the resolution to amendment and further debate.'' (Chapter 21, section 21.2) Section 21.3 continues: Upon rejection of the motion for the previous question on a resolution reported from the Committee on Rules, control shifts to the Member leading the opposition to the previous question, who may offer a proper amendment or motion and who controls the time for debate thereon.'' Clearly, the vote on the previous question on a rule does have substantive policy implications. It is one of the only available tools for those who oppose the Democratic majority's agenda and allows those with alternative views the opportunity to offer an alternative plan. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on ordering the previous question. The question was taken, and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the noes appeared to have it. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present. The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members. Pursuant to clause 8 and clause 9 of rule XX, this 15-minute vote on ordering the previous question will be followed by 5-minute votes on adopting House Resolution 388, if ordered; ordering the previous question on House Resolution 387; and adopting House Resolution 387, if ordered. The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 223, nays 199, not voting 10, as follows: [Roll No. 324] YEAS--223 Abercrombie Ackerman Allen Altmire Andrews Arcuri Baca Baird Baldwin Bean Becerra Berkley Berman Berry Bishop (GA) Bishop (NY) Blumenauer Boren Boswell Boucher Boyd (FL) Boyda (KS) Braley (IA) Brown, Corrine Butterfield Capps Capuano Cardoza Carnahan Carney Carson Castor Chandler Clarke Clay Cleaver Clyburn Cohen Conyers Cooper Costa Costello Courtney Cramer Crowley Cuellar Cummings Davis (AL) Davis (CA) Davis (IL) Davis, Lincoln DeFazio DeGette Delahunt DeLauro Dicks Dingell Doggett Donnelly Doyle Edwards Ellison Ellsworth Emanuel Eshoo Etheridge Farr Filner Giffords Gillibrand Gonzalez Gordon Green, Al Green, Gene Grijalva Gutierrez Hall (NY) Hare Harman Hastings (FL) Herseth Sandlin Higgins Hill Hinchey Hinojosa Hirono Hodes Holden Holt Honda Hooley Hoyer Inslee Israel Jackson (IL) Jackson-Lee (TX) Jefferson Johnson (GA) Johnson, E. B. Jones (OH) Kagen Kanjorski Kaptur Kennedy [[Page H4793]] Kildee Kilpatrick Kind Klein (FL) Kucinich Lampson Langevin Lantos Larsen (WA) Larson (CT) Lee Levin Lewis (GA) Lipinski Loebsack Lofgren, Zoe Lowey Lynch Mahoney (FL) Maloney (NY) Markey Marshall Matheson Matsui McCarthy (NY) McCollum (MN) McDermott McGovern McIntyre McNerney McNulty Meehan Meek (FL) Meeks (NY) Melancon Michaud Miller (NC) Miller, George Mitchell Mollohan Moore (KS) Moore (WI) Moran (VA) Murphy (CT) Murphy, Patrick Murtha Nadler Napolitano Neal (MA) Oberstar Obey Olver Ortiz Pallone Pascrell Pastor Payne Perlmutter Peterson (MN) Pomeroy Price (NC) Rahall Reyes Rodriguez Ross Rothman Roybal-Allard Ruppersberger Rush Ryan (OH) Salazar Sanchez, Linda T. Sanchez, Loretta Sarbanes Schakowsky Schiff Schwartz Scott (GA) Scott (VA) Serrano Sestak Shea-Porter Sherman Shuler Sires Skelton Slaughter Smith (WA) Snyder Solis Space Spratt Stark Stupak Sutton Tanner Tauscher Taylor Thompson (CA) Thompson (MS) Tierney Towns Udall (CO) Udall (NM) Van Hollen Velazquez Visclosky Walz (MN) Wasserman Schultz Watt Waxman Weiner Welch (VT) Wexler Wilson (OH) Woolsey Wu Wynn Yarmuth NAYS--199 Aderholt Akin Alexander Bachmann Bachus Baker Barrett (SC) Barrow Bartlett (MD) Barton (TX) Biggert Bilbray Bilirakis Bishop (UT) Blackburn Blunt Boehner Bonner Bono Boozman Boustany Brady (TX) Brown (SC) Brown-Waite, Ginny Buchanan Burgess Burton (IN) Buyer Calvert Camp (MI) Campbell (CA) Cannon Cantor Capito Carter Castle Chabot Coble Cole (OK) Conaway Crenshaw Cubin Culberson Davis (KY) Davis, David Davis, Jo Ann Davis, Tom Deal (GA) Dent Diaz-Balart, L. Diaz-Balart, M. Doolittle Drake Dreier Duncan Ehlers Emerson English (PA) Everett Fallin Feeney Ferguson Flake Forbes Fortenberry Fossella Foxx Franks (AZ) Frelinghuysen Gallegly Garrett (NJ) Gerlach Gilchrest Gillmor Gingrey Gohmert Goode Goodlatte Granger Graves Hall (TX) Hastert Hastings (WA) Hayes Heller Hensarling Herger Hobson Hoekstra Hulshof Hunter Inglis (SC) Issa Jindal Johnson (IL) Johnson, Sam Jones (NC) Jordan Keller King (IA) King (NY) Kingston Kirk Kline (MN) Knollenberg Kuhl (NY) LaHood Lamborn Latham LaTourette Lewis (CA) Lewis (KY) Linder LoBiondo Lucas Lungren, Daniel E. Mack Manzullo Marchant McCarthy (CA) McCaul (TX) McCotter McHenry McHugh McKeon Mica Miller (FL) Miller (MI) Miller, Gary Moran (KS) Murphy, Tim Musgrave Myrick Neugebauer Nunes Paul Pearce Pence Peterson (PA) Petri Pickering Pitts Platts Poe Porter Price (GA) Pryce (OH) Putnam Radanovich Ramstad Regula Rehberg Reichert Renzi Reynolds Rogers (AL) Rogers (KY) Rogers (MI) Rohrabacher Ros-Lehtinen Roskam Royce Ryan (WI) Sali Saxton Schmidt Sensenbrenner Sessions Shadegg Shays Shimkus Shuster Simpson Smith (NE) Smith (NJ) Smith (TX) Stearns Sullivan Tancredo Terry Thornberry Tiahrt Tiberi Turner Upton Walberg Walden (OR) Walsh (NY) Wamp Weldon (FL) Weller Westmoreland Whitfield Wicker Wilson (NM) Wilson (SC) Wolf Young (AK) Young (FL) NOT VOTING--10 Brady (PA) Engel Fattah Frank (MA) McCrery McMorris Rodgers Rangel Souder Waters Watson {time} 1506 Mrs. CUBIN changed her vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.'' Mr. CONYERS and Mr. RUSH changed their vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.'' So the previous question was ordered. The result of the vote was announced as above recorded. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the resolution. The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the noes appeared to have it. Recorded Vote Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote. A recorded vote was ordered. The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote. The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 226, noes 198, not voting 8, as follows: [Roll No. 325] AYES--226 Abercrombie Ackerman Allen Altmire Andrews Arcuri Baca Baird Baldwin Barrow Bean Becerra Berkley Berman Berry Bishop (GA) Bishop (NY) Blumenauer Boren Boswell Boucher Boyd (FL) Boyda (KS) Braley (IA) Brown, Corrine Butterfield Capps Capuano Cardoza Carnahan Carney Carson Castor Chandler Clarke Clay Cleaver Clyburn Cohen Conyers Cooper Costa Costello Courtney Cramer Crowley Cuellar Cummings Davis (AL) Davis (CA) Davis (IL) Davis, Lincoln DeFazio DeGette Delahunt DeLauro Dicks Dingell Doggett Donnelly Doyle Edwards Ellison Ellsworth Emanuel Eshoo Etheridge Farr Filner Frank (MA) Giffords Gillibrand Gonzalez Gordon Green, Al Green, Gene Grijalva Gutierrez Hall (NY) Hare Harman Hastings (FL) Herseth Sandlin Higgins Hill Hinchey Hinojosa Hirono Hodes Holden Holt Honda Hooley Hoyer Inslee Israel Jackson (IL) Jackson-Lee (TX) Jefferson Johnson (GA) Johnson, E. B. Jones (OH) Kagen Kanjorski Kaptur Kennedy Kildee Kilpatrick Kind Klein (FL) Kucinich Lampson Langevin Lantos Larsen (WA) Larson (CT) Lee Levin Lewis (GA) Lipinski Loebsack Lofgren, Zoe Lowey Lynch Mahoney (FL) Maloney (NY) Markey Marshall Matheson Matsui McCarthy (NY) McCollum (MN) McDermott McGovern McIntyre McNerney McNulty Meehan Meek (FL) Meeks (NY) Melancon Michaud Miller (NC) Miller, George Mitchell Mollohan Moore (KS) Moore (WI) Moran (VA) Murphy (CT) Murphy, Patrick Murtha Nadler Napolitano Neal (MA) Oberstar Obey Olver Ortiz Pallone Pascrell Pastor Payne Perlmutter Peterson (MN) Pomeroy Price (NC) Rahall Rangel Reyes Rodriguez Ross Rothman Roybal-Allard Ruppersberger Rush Ryan (OH) Salazar Sanchez, Linda T. Sanchez, Loretta Sarbanes Schakowsky Schiff Schwartz Scott (GA) Scott (VA) Serrano Sestak Shea-Porter Sherman Shuler Sires Skelton Slaughter Smith (WA) Snyder Solis Space Spratt Stark Stupak Sutton Tanner Tauscher Taylor Thompson (CA) Thompson (MS) Tierney Towns Udall (CO) Udall (NM) Van Hollen Velazquez Visclosky Walz (MN) Wasserman Schultz Watt Waxman Weiner Welch (VT) Wexler Wilson (OH) Woolsey Wu Wynn Yarmuth NOES--198 Aderholt Akin Alexander Bachmann Bachus Baker Barrett (SC) Bartlett (MD) Barton (TX) Biggert Bilbray Bilirakis Bishop (UT) Blackburn Blunt Boehner Bonner Bono Boozman Boustany Brady (TX) Brown (SC) Brown-Waite, Ginny Buchanan Burgess Burton (IN) Buyer Calvert Camp (MI) Campbell (CA) Cannon Cantor Capito Carter Castle Chabot Coble Cole (OK) Conaway Crenshaw Cubin Culberson Davis (KY) Davis, David Davis, Jo Ann Davis, Tom Deal (GA) Dent Diaz-Balart, L. Diaz-Balart, M. Doolittle Drake Dreier Duncan Ehlers Emerson English (PA) Everett Fallin Feeney Ferguson Flake Forbes Fortenberry Fossella Foxx Franks (AZ) Frelinghuysen Gallegly Garrett (NJ) Gerlach Gilchrest Gillmor Gingrey Gohmert Goode Goodlatte Granger Graves Hall (TX) Hastert Hastings (WA) Hayes Heller Hensarling Herger Hobson Hoekstra Hulshof Hunter Inglis (SC) Issa Jindal Johnson (IL) Johnson, Sam Jones (NC) Jordan Keller King (IA) King (NY) Kingston Kirk Kline (MN) Knollenberg Kuhl (NY) LaHood Lamborn Latham LaTourette Lewis (CA) Lewis (KY) Linder LoBiondo Lucas Lungren, Daniel E. Mack Manzullo Marchant McCarthy (CA) McCaul (TX) McCotter McCrery McHenry McHugh McKeon Mica Miller (FL) Miller (MI) Miller, Gary Moran (KS) Murphy, Tim Musgrave Myrick Neugebauer Nunes Paul Pearce Pence Peterson (PA) Petri Pickering Pitts Platts Poe Porter Price (GA) Pryce (OH) Putnam Radanovich Ramstad Regula Rehberg Reichert Renzi Reynolds Rogers (AL) Rogers (KY) Rogers (MI) Rohrabacher Ros-Lehtinen Roskam Royce Ryan (WI) Sali Saxton Schmidt Sessions Shadegg Shays Shimkus Shuster Simpson Smith (NE) Smith (NJ) Smith (TX) Stearns Sullivan Tancredo Terry Thornberry Tiahrt Tiberi Turner Upton Walberg Walden (OR) Walsh (NY) Wamp Weldon (FL) Weller Westmoreland Whitfield Wicker Wilson (NM) Wilson (SC) Wolf Young (AK) Young (FL) [[Page H4794]] NOT VOTING--8 Brady (PA) Engel Fattah McMorris Rodgers Sensenbrenner Souder Waters Watson Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised 2 minutes remain in this vote. {time} 1518 So the resolution was agreed to. The result of the vote was announced as above recorded. A motion to reconsider was laid on the table. ____________________ [Congressional Record: May 10, 2007 (House)] [Page H4881-H4910] INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 388 and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 2082. {time} 2156 In the Committee of the Whole Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 2082) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2008 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with Mrs. Tauscher in the chair. Mr. McHENRY. Madam Chair, I raise a question of consideration against the legislation before us. The CHAIRMAN. The question of consideration is not available in the Committee of the Whole. Mr. McHENRY. I thank the Chair. The Clerk read the title of the bill. The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the first time. The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) each will control 30 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas. {time} 2200 Mr. REYES. Madam Chairwoman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Intelligence is our Nation's first line of defense. In a world of asymmetrical threats, it is critical that we detect and disrupt the plans and intentions of those who would do us harm. And it is critical that we conduct intelligence operations in a way that conforms to our laws and to our values as a Nation. This bill was the product of bipartisan work, and I am pleased that the ranking member, Mr. Hoekstra, worked with me over the past several weeks and months to draft this bill. We do not agree on every provision in this bill, but we agree on the larger points, and we agree that intelligence officers in the field deserve our support. Let me address up front one area where I think there has been some confusion, and that is section 407 of the bill, which asks for a national intelligence estimate on the national security impact of climate change. We heeded the advice of 11 former 3- and 4-star admirals and generals who have studied this issue and specifically recommended an NIE. They believe that significant changes in global climate may act as a ``threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions of our world.'' The ranking member has argued that this work should not divert resources from higher priority items. Our committee staff has spoken with senior Intelligence Community leaders in the administration, and we have been assured that this will not, I repeat, will not divert resources. The data needed is already available. The administration is already drafting a community assessment on this very issue. And I want to assure the ranking member that we will work with the administration to ensure that nothing will divert resources away from higher priority efforts. But I also want to be clear; targeted discussion on this topic is a distraction from the key points of this bill. This bill provides funding for the men and women in the field. Opposition to this bill sends the wrong signal to them. We are at war, and we face many threats over the horizon. This bill contains robust funding for critical intelligence programs to penetrate the hard targets, such as terrorist networks and countries developing WMD capabilities. We add funds to both CIA and military elements for human intelligence training. We invest in language training for collectors and analysts and in language translation capabilities. We add funding for sending additional analysts overseas, and we strengthen counterintelligence field operations. We have added funds to broaden our view so that we are spending, not just on Iraq, but on some of the other global challenges that we face, such as Iran, Russia, East Africa, Latin America and countries in Asia. We have several provisions that enhance critical oversight. We require quarterly intelligence reports to Congress on the nuclear weapons programs of Iran and North Korea. We also require that the CIA Inspector General conduct an audit of covert activities no less than once every 3 years. And we require the administration to provide the Intelligence Committees with a full list of all special access programs. We also require detailed reports to Congress on the use of contractors in the Intelligence Community because their use has grown without adequate oversight, both by Congress and even by the executive branch. We also require a strategy for implementing a multi-level security clearance system. This will allow patriotic Americans with much needed foreign language skills to serve as translators or linguists in the Intelligence Community. And we also promote diversity in the Intelligence Community by requiring a strategic plan for implementing the recommendations of a highly regarded diversity panel. I am of the strong view that diversity is a major strategic asset of the United States, and we have to leverage that asset to our full advantage. In sum, Madam Chairman, this bill strengthens U.S. intelligence capabilities. This bill, if passed and signed into law, will help the courageous women and men of our Intelligence Community accomplish their mission. They are counting on our support, and tonight I hope we respond. I urge all my colleagues to support this critical legislation. With that, Madam Chairwoman, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairwoman, I would like to yield myself 4 minutes. I would like to begin by thanking my colleague, Chairman Reyes, for the cooperative working relationship that we have had as we have gone through this process and as we have developed and built this bill. There are a number of [[Page H4882]] things in this piece of legislation that I do support, so I appreciate the cooperative working relationship we have had. I appreciate the hard work by the committee on both staffs. You know, it is absolutely important that we provide the Intelligence Community with the information or with the resources, the commitment and the framework with which they can be the tip of the spear to keep us free. We all owe the men and women of the community a deep sense of gratitude for the work that they do each and every day, as they risk their lives to keep us safe. As they well know, let me quote, ``we are in a state of war. And if we have not yet realized that we are in a state of war, when will we realize that''? Some folks may say, well, Pete, what's new? You have been saying that for a long period of time. Actually, I don't believe that, and I don't like to use the term ``war.'' We shouldn't elevate the people that pose this threat to the United States as being soldiers or representing a nation-state. They are thugs. They are murderers, and they are terrorists. These are the words of Ayman al-Zawahiri from an interview that he just gave last week, a video. Those are the words that he says. He says that they are at war. We need to recognize that that is how they view the U.S. and how they view the West. We have continued a number of initiatives that were begun in the last Congress. I feel good about that. Building global collection capabilities, rebuilding HUMINT capabilities, working on the overhaul of the Intelligence Community. But I think we do need to affect and address the weaknesses in this bill. This bill significantly cuts from the President's budget request in a very important area, human intelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency, and cuts that directly affect our efforts in Iraq. I agree with the chairman. Passing the wrong bill sends exactly the wrong message to our troops. Just like saying we are going to pull out of Iraq on a definite date sends the wrong message, sending a bill that cuts the funding for our Intelligence Community in Iraq sends exactly the wrong message. And telling the community that we want to move their priorities from radical Islam, North Korea, Syria, Iran, restructuring the community, rebuilding HUMINT to focusing on a national intelligence estimate on climate change sends exactly the wrong message. As a matter of fact, what the community will tell you is this hearkens back to the exact things that they experienced in the 1990s, a very depressing decade for the Intelligence Community, a dark decade, a decade where budgets were cut, where human intelligence was cut, where we changed rules for human intelligence and said, we are only going to have good-guy spies. It was known as the ``Deutsch doctrine.'' It said, if we have people on the payroll or we are working with people who have human rights records, criminal violations, we are not going to work with them anymore. And the other thing that we did is we did the politically correct thing, is we moved resources to spy on the environment. George Tenet mentions it in his book. He refers to it as those were the days that the community said we were focused on bugs and bunnies. And we are going right back to that. We are doing the politically correct priorities. We are cutting HUMINT, and we are cutting the resources that are directly supporting our efforts in Iraq against a very deadly and a very dangerous enemy. That is the message that we are sending to the agency that says, we are going back to the 1990s. The community doesn't want to go back to the 1990s. They recognize what had happened at that time. Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, it is my privilege to yield to the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), 3 minutes. Mr. SKELTON. Madam Chairman, this evening I rise in strong support of H.R. 2082, the Intelligence Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2008. Let me take this opportunity to thank and congratulate the chairman, the gentleman from Texas, Silver Reyes, on the work that he does. It is especially important, Madam Chairman, that he is a member of the Armed Services Committee, and he is the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, and it is one of those rare moments where the two very important committees are glued together, and he does that. And from our perspective, it is a good, good piece of evidence that he is the chairman and is doing such an excellent job in both respects. Every day American men and women are deployed into harm's way and depend on the military intelligence capabilities authorized by this bill. It is important for them to achieve their missions. And this legislation assures continued delivery of our intelligence to our warfighters. It will lead to important improvements in the future. I am also pleased to report that this bill reflects a new more cooperative relationship, as I mentioned, between the Intelligence Committee and the Armed Services Committee in guiding and overseeing the Nation's military intelligence program. Chairman Reyes and I have been working together to craft common approaches on key issues by our shared jurisdiction. For example, both this bill and the National Defense Authorization bill that we marked up late last night in committee contain provisions requiring reports on the national security implications of global warming. And that is no small thing. And the committees, we are working together on significant changes in key space programs to ensure that both the intelligence analysts and the warfighter receive critical information in a timely manner, and that is so important. Again, let me take this opportunity to congratulate Chairman Reyes for bringing this to the floor. Intelligence is the key to so many areas, in particular the military and security forums of our country. So I congratulate the gentleman from Texas. Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, at this time I would like to yield 3 minutes to a senior member of the committee, Mr. Everett. Mr. EVERETT. Madam Chairman, I thank my ranking member, and I thank the chairman for the work they have done on this bill. And for many years, the chairman of the committee and I have worked closely together. But, regretfully, I rise today in opposition to the Intelligence Authorization bill for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 2082. Actions taken in the bill regarding human operations, the irresponsible use of our intelligence professionals and the short-sighted steps to critical space systems justify a ``no'' vote on this legislation. {time} 2215 The bill slashes funding to HUMINT, or Human Operations, one of our most important intelligence collection functions in the global war on terrorism. Regardless of your position on the war, we cannot cut a primary intelligence function that is critical to protecting our troops in combat. Like many, I have visited the front line, and we owe our brave American military the support they need to be successful in Iraq and Afghanistan. I also note that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence has stated that HUMINT is his number one priority. Remarkably, rather than focus on national security, this bill places an emphasis on global warming. In the middle of a war which has our intelligence community overloaded with real-world intelligence missions, this intelligence authorization bill carves out scarce intelligence resources for an environmental matter that should be the purview of another committee. Madam Chairman, we have already had 13 Federal agencies looking at the effects of climate change. The administration has requested nearly $7.4 billion this year for climate change-related activities. Since 2001 the Federal Government has devoted $37 billion for climate change- related activities. We are in the middle of a war against radical jihadists, and the terrorist plot of the radical Islamists at Fort Dix earlier this week should be a sobering reminder for all of us. It is wrong and misguided for Congress to overburden our highly skilled intelligence professionals by shouldering them with this unnecessary science project. Lastly, this measure gives our strategic threat little attention. While engaging in the global war on terror, the strategic threat has grown. Having the [[Page H4883]] ability to peer into areas that would cause us harm is vital to advanced warning, known as ``Persistent Stare.'' We need to pay more attention to the architecture of ``stare'' and ``persistence''; yet this bill provides inadequate resources. For example, substantial funds have been added to a space-based infrared program, SBIRS, that cannot be wisely used. In fact, if these additional funds were obligated, the program would be sent into procurement before it is ready, likely to cause schedule delays and cost overruns. This funding add was poorly conceived and would cause the Defense Department to literally bite off more than it can chew. I urge a ``no'' vote on the bill. Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, it is now my pleasure to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Cramer), one of our subcommittee Chairs. Mr. CRAMER. Madam Chair, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 2082, and I want to compliment the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, the ranking member of the Intelligence Committee, and my colleagues on both sides of the aisle that I have worked with for a number of years to make sure that we give the intelligence agencies the resources and the balance that they need to do the job that we want them to do. I am sorry that my colleagues from across the aisle can't support this bill. I am proud to represent an area of the country that has given much to the defense of this country including to the intelligence agencies. My district is the home of the Missile and Space Intelligence Center, known as MSIC, and MSIC is a key DIA facility that helps our country understand and prepare against the threat from missiles from foreign nations. Now, this bill today, H.R. 2082, is a well-crafted bill. It strengthens our national security by authorizing the largest amount of funding ever for the intelligence community. Let me say that again. This bill authorizes the largest amount ever for the intelligence community. But it is not just the amount that is important. We have got to make sure that we perform oversight of the agencies that we give these resources to, make sure that the distribution is balanced between the needs to be addressed today and the needs that will be faced in the future. Specifically, this bill provides our intelligence professionals with the resources to deal with the immediate threats that we face in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the emerging challenges from dangerous regimes around the world, particularly in Iran and North Korea. I also support this bill because it recognizes that simply giving the intelligence community considerable resources and hoping for the best is not enough. Congress must conduct effective oversight, and this bill accomplishes that. Now, Chairman Reyes, as you know, we have worked hard to make sure that we continue the bipartisan approach that this committee has a history of being the best at, and I think this bill is a product of a bipartisan effort to fund our intelligence priorities and strengthen our oversight. To the ranking member, in the last Congress, we established, I believe, set up, the Oversight Subcommittee that Mr. Thornberry chaired and I was the ranking member of. I think that subcommittee did an excellent job, drafting reports, holding informal hearings, making visits out in the field both in this country and out of this country, to make sure that together we got off to a better start of performing oversight. And I think this bill today continues with that effort. We drafted a report on the standup of the DNI in the last Congress. We made sure that we let them know that we were there to give them the resources that they needed but to hold them accountable for what they did as well, and I think this bill strikes that appropriate balance between strengthening national security and performing effective oversight. I urge support of the bill. Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, at this time I would like to yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from New Mexico (Mrs. Wilson). Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico. Madam Chair, I would agree with my colleague Mr. Cramer that much of this bill was developed in a bipartisan way. And one of the reasons that I like the Intelligence Committee is we don't have the C-SPAN effect. The cameras are off, and we get down to doing some very serious and important business on behalf of the country. While we fixed a lot of things in the initial draft of the bill in committee, particularly with respect to technical intelligence and overhead systems, there are two very serious concerns that I still have that cause me to stand here today and oppose the bill. The first is that there is a significant reduction in human intelligence in some very important special accounts, and they are reductions that are marked and serious and will impact our ability to conduct human intelligence in an area of the world where it is absolutely critical, not only for current operations but for our long- term security in the region. We can't cut human intelligence. That was one of the number one recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. We have to strengthen human intelligence after a decade of neglect. The second problem is that this bill fails to address in any way one of the most important problems that we face in the intelligence community, and that is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The Director of National Intelligence came to the committee with written recommendations on how we need to update and modernize the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and this bill does nothing. He said to us we are actually missing a significant portion of what we should be getting. Because of the way the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is written, we are not collecting critical intelligence important to this country. We should have addressed that in this bill. The DNI asked us to address that in this bill because we were operating with one hand tied behind our back. That is dangerous for this country and causes me to oppose this bill. Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, I would remind the gentlewoman that we will be having hearings and addressing the issue of FISA in regular order, which is the proper way to handle very serious issues that the American people want us to handle. Madam Chairman, I now yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Anna Eshoo, who chairs our Subcommittee on Intelligence Community Management. Ms. ESHOO. Madam Chairman, I thank the distinguished chairman of the House Intelligence Committee for yielding. I rise in support of H.R. 2082. First, I want to make a comment about a requirement that is in the bill that has been made fun of, made fun of by our friends on the other side of the aisle, and that is that the bill requires a National Intelligence Estimate on the national security implications of global climate change. I take issue with their diminishment of this issue. The American people are ahead of us on this and so are people in the intelligence community, including three and four star admirals and generals who recently issued a report on the national security impacts of global climate change. I will submit their names for the Record. * General Gordon R. Sullivan, USA (Ret.) * Admiral Frank ``Skip'' Bowman, USN (Ret.) * Lieutenant General Lawrence P. Farrell Jr., USAF (Ret.) * Vice Admiral Paul G. Gaffney II, USN (Ret.) * General Paul J. Kern, USA (Ret.) * Admiral T. Joseph Lopez, USN (Ret.) * Admiral Donald L. ``Don'' Pilling, USN (Ret.) * Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, USN (Ret.) * Vice Admiral Richard H. Truly, USN (Ret.) * General Charles F. ``Chuck'' Wald, USAF (Ret.) * General Anthony C. ``Tony'' Zinni, USMC (Ret.) As they noted, the geopolitical effects of global warming are likely to intensify instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world as people fight over access to water and food, creating humanitarian disasters and failed states that facilitate the establishment of terrorist safe havens. The intelligence community agrees, and they are already preparing an assessment on how our enemies could use global climate change to degrade our security interests. This NIE will not divert collection assets from other priorities. That's hogwash. [[Page H4884]] I would also like to note that we have a growing crisis in our overhead architecture. Over the past several years, the intelligence community has chosen to take more risk in its management structures that have failed. The consequences of these failures are extremely serious, threatening our overhead capability and wreaking havoc on the industrial base. Some of these risky decisions were made without the appropriate congressional notification, and now we have to clean up the mess. Finally, last September the President acknowledged that the intelligence community had kept prisoners in undisclosed detention sites and reserved the right to do so in the future. I, as one Member of Congress, strongly object to any policy which does so. Generations of people, Americans, have come to this Nation to escape regimes that make people disappear. We have commitments under the Geneva Conventions, international laws and treaties. If we don't live up to these standards, we weaken protections for U.S. citizens abroad. I think our Nation stands for a higher standard of treatment, and I don't think we should ever engage in such practices. I am proud to support this bill, Madam Chairman. This is the largest single intelligence authorization in the history of our country. And for anyone to say that we are shortchanging the people that are working so hard to protect our national security is simply and plainly wrong. Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, at this time I would like to yield 3 minutes to a gentleman on the committee, Mr. Thornberry from Texas. Mr. THORNBERRY. Madam Chairman, I thank the ranking member for yielding. Madam Chairman, there are many good provisions of this bill, and I appreciate the hard work of the staff and the sincerity of the Members in attempting to tackle complex, vital issues before this committee. And yet I also have concerns with this bill. Last July the Oversight Subcommittee of the Intelligence Committee issued a unanimous report about the progress of implementing the Intelligence Reform Act so far. And what we found was that there was some good, there were some disappointments, but yet there was overall a lack of a sense of appropriate urgency in doing the things that needed to be done to reform intelligence and to make this country safer. And that is kind of the sense I get from this bill. There is a lot of good in it. There are some significant disappointments. But I worry about a lack of urgency in a sense because as 9/11 drifts further in the past, we have to face up to these very serious threats that are before us. And yet in this bill certain efforts and resources are diverted from higher priorities to lower priorities. And I might point out in the case of one particular lower priority that the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Eshoo) mentioned, there has never been a hearing or, as I understand it, even a question at a hearing about intelligence implications of global climate change. And yet it is so important, it is a mandatory item in this bill for the intelligence community. This bill takes significant efforts that the intelligence community is making and cuts back or places restriction on them, and yet it delays making reforms in essential areas as Mrs. Wilson was talking about. So I worry that we are on a path where we will return to mistakes of the past and do so at a time when we face a ruthless, determined, adaptable adversary. {time} 2230 I would like to make one other point. In many respects, I think it is a test for Congress as an institution whether we can pass an intelligence authorization bill. The Intelligence Committees of both Houses were set up in the 1970s as the oversight entities for the broad Intelligence Community. The fact is, if we don't do it in these two committees in the House and the Senate, it will not get done. No one else has insight into the programs. No other committees have the time and resources and expertise to delve down into the many, many activities that the Intelligence Community performs that are essential to our country's security. And yet, if we use these intelligence authorization bills to promote a political agenda, I think it makes the effectiveness of that oversight less so, and particularly if it results in their failure to be a bill. I think we can do better, and I hope we do. Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, I now yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger), who serves as our chairman on the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence. Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chairwoman, I want to first say that I rise in support of H.R. 2082, the Intelligence Authorization Act. Our Nation is at war. We are fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and we are battling terrorists worldwide. We are also witnessing the rise of nuclear powers in Iran and North Korea. We are facing major challenges from China and Russia, who want to gain a technological edge on the United States. America has to stay on the offensive, and the way to do that is with stronger technology. This bill will strengthen our intelligence capabilities and invest much needed resources in new research and development. I am the chairman of the Technical and Tactical Subcommittee, which is responsible for overseeing technical intelligence assets, including the National Security Agency. The subcommittee has been working hard to ensure that this bill provides the necessary resources so that the Intelligence Community has the latest cutting-edge research and technology. This is the foundation for good intelligence. Other countries are gaining the ability to take out intelligence assets, such as orbiting satellites. Al Qaeda is finding innovative ways to communicate over the internet to plan attacks. We need to develop smarter tools to collect this information about threats to the U.S. and our allies. This bill refocuses the Intelligence Community on these new and emerging threats. The number one priority is preserving our technical workforce. This bill invests in our scientists and engineers. This bill also addresses the future of research and development across the Intelligence Community. Let me emphasize; we must invest more heavily in research and development. The committee is looking to the Director of National Intelligence to establish an aggressive R&D investment strategy that promotes cooperation among various agencies while allowing each agency to conduct research that fulfills its specific needs. During this time of growth, we need to maintain the good working relationships the Intelligence Community has with our Nation's research centers. In closing, we need to maintain our technology. We should vote for this bill. I have been on the Intelligence Committee for 4 years. I feel very strongly that this committee should be USA first. What we have to deal with is very important. I am very distressed and concerned that the minority at this point, who I have worked with and are excellent friends and I respect, the first bill that we have coming out of as a majority are voting ``no.'' We need to bring consensus together. We need to work as a team. There are some things that we have and some that we don't, but I hope that we will be able to work together in the future and go beyond this tonight. Mr. HOEKSTRA. At this time, I would like to yield 3 minutes to another member of the committee, Mr. McHugh of New York. Mr. McHUGH. I thank the distinguished ranking member for yielding to me. Madam Chair, I would say that I want to begin by expressing my deep appreciation and great respect to the bipartisan leadership of the committee. To the distinguished ranking member who has provided such a steady hand and, certainly during his time as chair, for great guidance and leadership. And a particular tip of the hat, Madam Chair, to the current chairman. Chairman Reyes I consider to be a personal friend, and he is a man of a good heart and great leadership. I would suggest respectfully through that good heart and great leadership, this bill certainly has some positive aspects. It increases needed counterintelligence assets to protect our Nation's military secrets. As well, it initiates the movement of [[Page H4885]] supplemental funding to the base budget for the better use and planning of those funds. And it establishes the requirement to develop an integrated space-based collection architect. In addition, it places limitation on the termination of the U-2 program. It also gives added emphasis on language training and additional accountability on intelligence contracting. As I said, Madam Chair, these are all very positive steps in improving our intelligence capabilities, and I commend the chairman and Members on both sides of the aisle for working together to make that happen. I have to say, regretfully, however, there is much that distresses me in this bill. Let me just cite a few examples. I am very, very concerned that the legislation before us begins to retrace the failed policies of the 1990s that were based on underfunding and overtasking of our limited intelligence resources. It inadvertently, or not, establishes politically correct restrictions on intelligence operations. Additionally, at least in my judgment, the bill does not adequately support key Intelligence Community activities that directly protect our national security. It calls for cuts to human intelligence programs which is counter to the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. It fails to support the Intelligence Community and our national defense by rejecting an amendment that our side offered to include important legislation to modernize the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, even though this identical language, Madam Chair, was passed unanimously by a bipartisan vote previously last year in the House. There is no question that our Nation is locked in a struggle with radical jihadists and facing continued uncertainty and threats around the globe. As well, there is no question that before us lie critical questions. And we know what is needed right now is a well-trained, well-equipped and capable Intelligence Community. Instead, this bill unnecessarily, again in my judgment, diverts the resources of the Intelligence Community, as we have heard, to produce unnecessary legislation and initiatives. I would hope we could go back, reject this bill and begin anew to work together on a bipartisan basis to produce a better product. Mr. REYES. Could I inquire of the Chair how much time is remaining on both sides? The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas has 13 minutes; the gentleman from Michigan has 15 minutes. Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, it is my pleasure now to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Thompson), who is the chairman of our Subcommittee on Terrorism, Human Intelligence Analysis and Counterintelligence. Mr. THOMPSON of California. I thank the chairman for yielding. Madam Chairman, I am pleased to stand in strong support of this authorization bill tonight. I believe that this bill strengthens our capabilities to recognize and counter threats to the United States, both terrorist threats from groups like al Qaeda and the strategic challenges present in regions all over the world, including the Middle East, Asia and Latin America. This bill ensures that U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan will continue to receive the intelligence support they need to conduct their missions. The bill authorizes the largest intelligence budget ever. It also provides full funding for the intelligence programs related to Afghanistan and for U.S. efforts to counter terrorist threats. Madam Chairman, terrorism and the war in Iraq are critical issues, and they have required intelligence agencies to divert resources away from other strategic challenges. This bill funds initiatives to collect better intelligence on those that pose threats to our country. It also adds funds to enhance coverage of other challenges, such as emerging threats in Africa and Latin America, and to ensure that America is not caught by surprise in the future. The bill makes significant investments to improve the quality of intelligence analysts. It provides resources to send more analysts overseas so they can gain the real world experiences in the countries that they study. It provides funds for expanded foreign language training that we all agree is needed, and the development of advanced technical tools so both analysts and collectors can better do their jobs. The bill makes us safer by adding resources for counterintelligence investigations, and these provisions will help mitigate efforts by our adversaries to steal classified information and advanced technologies, keeping the U.S. policy options open and preserving our military edge. Despite these additions, the bill promotes efficiency and accountability by cutting programs that lack clear objectives and measurable results. It also requires the CIA Inspector General to audit covert action programs, ensuring regular oversight. Madam Chair, this legislation helps us fight terrorists; it supports our troops; and it enhances U.S. intelligence capabilities throughout the world. I support this bill, and I strongly recommend that our colleagues do as well. Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, at this time I would like to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Tiahrt), a member of the committee. Mr. TIAHRT. I thank the gentleman from Michigan. Madam Chairman, this bill reduces our human intelligence capabilities. Human intelligence is one of the primary tools used to keep us informed about the plans and intentions of our adversaries. Human intelligence keeps our families and our military personnel safe. Today, we are faced by many threats around the world, from radical jihadists to the emerging threat from rogue nations. One of our primary ways to combat these threats is with human intelligence, but this bill distracts us from that. And we have been in this predicament before. It is entirely probable that the downsizing of our Intelligence Community, and specifically the Central Intelligence Agency, during the decade of the 1990s contributed to the intelligence breakdown often associated with 9/11. We should have learned that lesson, but instead of putting more resources into human intelligence, this bill redirects resources to a new top priority. The bill requires that the Intelligence Community determine the impacts of global warming. How could we have overlooked this? I thought the enemy was al Qaeda, who claimed responsibility for September 11, 2001. I thought it was Iran, who calls us ``the Great Satan'' and is actively pursuing nuclear weapons. I thought it was the Islamic terrorists that are attacking our young men and women every day. Now we find out it is global warming. Now, I know that the world is warming. Kansas used to be covered by a sheet of ice 14,000 years ago; now it's not. But for the record, I would like to point out that the United States has 13 Federal agencies currently studying the effects of climate change. In fact, the President's 2008 budget request has nearly $7.4 billion associated with studying climate change. And according to the Congressional Research Service, since 2001, the Federal Government has devoted $37 billion to study climate change activities. Why is this an intelligence priority? Is it really responsible to shift our resources, currently focused on North Korea and Iran and other threats, to the impacts of global warming? Madam Chairman, this bill is not the right approach, and it does not provide the tools to protect our Nation's security. Intelligence is the first line of defense. Now is not the time to let down our guard. I urge my colleagues to vote against H.R. 2082. Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, it is now my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to a gentleman from Iowa, an American hero, fellow Vietnam veteran (Mr. Boswell), a member of the committee. (Mr. BOSWELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. BOSWELL. Madam Chairman, I rise in support of this bill. I feel it is a step in the right direction. I have to take note that there is almost a self-righteousness of those that have been in charge for all these years and want to criticize, you have only had the driving of this ship for 4 months. You're doing a good job. Keep your head up and keep going forward and the country will be safer. [[Page H4886]] This bill does a number of things. One thing for sure that we recognize, all of us that have served in this capacity, that the people that go out there and gather intelligence, they put it on the line. The things they do, if the Nation understood the risks they take, the things they will do to try to make us safe, they would be very appreciative. {time} 2245 This bill also recognizes something that we have been overlooking now for several years, that there is a need to increase the gathering of information or opportunities for people to learn languages. Around the world, this world we live in, there is much need to have innovative ways to explore new language opportunities. The need is there. This bill will require that, and that is a good step forward at least. It also recognizes the need to take an aggressive approach to the gaps in our knowledge about Korea and Iran and around the world. We know there is a threat there and we are going to have to do more about it. We have tried before; we are trying again. This bill will do it and require the DNI to report back to us on a quarterly basis so we can assess and give oversight and do a better job of recognizing this need. So, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your hard work. Keep it up. Support the bill. Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to my colleague from the great State of Michigan (Mr. Rogers). Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chairman, I want to congratulate the chairman on mostly good work. And a big budget doesn't necessarily mean a good budget. We have had some great discussions. There are some really good things in this bill. But there are some serious departures on the direction in which we take intelligence that I think are so important that we need to stand up and oppose this bill. This bill jeopardizes our ability to listen to terrorists. It puts it at risk. This bill cuts very specific human intelligence programs. They will get less money this year than they got last year. I just want to talk for a minute about global climate change. As mentioned earlier, the President's budget proposes over $7 billion for climate change activities. This bill should be about securing America. Instead, it is being used to secure a political agenda on these items. Climate change is an important issue, and it should be taken seriously. Thankfully it is. Fourteen Federal agencies already have active climate change programs. Let me go through them: Agriculture, Commerce, State, Health and Human Services, Interior, Transportation, EPA, NASA, NSF, Defense, Treasury, USAID, the Smithsonian, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, DARPA and NASA all have active research, development, testing and evaluation programs. NASA's program already makes satellite images available to government researchers. This legislation assigns intelligence agencies that have limited experience in this area the job of researching climate change. We are going to take analysts away from looking for Osama bin Laden and we are going to put them on the ``March of the Penguins.'' This bill requires intelligence agencies to use intelligence satellites to monitor environmental issues. Many of my colleagues have been in the field. You know that imagery is so important and so high in demand. This is the wrong direction for their mission accomplishment. If you want to break the spirits of our intelligence agencies, if you want to destroy their morale, go ahead and give them this assignment. Tell them they should spend their day watching the grass grow, and see how it works. George Tenet referred to these kinds of assignments as ``bugs and bunnies assignments.'' We are making a mockery of the seriousness of climate change and a mockery of the important work our intelligence agencies do. If you liked building the rain forest in Iowa, you are going to love the Department of Environmental Espionage. Vote against this legislation. The stakes are too high. The people in the field mean too much to us. Their mission is too crucial to have it diverted for a political agenda. Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, sometimes I feel like we are living in a parallel universe here, when I hear the Members of the minority quote the ``slam-dunk expert.'' Madam Chairman, it is my privilege to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt), a member of our committee who serves as the chairman of the Select Intelligence Oversight Panel. Mr. HOLT. Madam Chairman, although the bill before us today does not produce the overhaul of intelligence I seek, it does address a number of critical deficiencies in the operation and oversight of the intelligence community, and I support this important legislation. I commend the committee staff. They do excellent work without help from outside. And I commend the Chair, the gentleman from Texas, for his sensible, considerate approach to his work as Chair. There are several specific provisions in this bill that I would like to highlight. For example, the bill requires the compilation of a comprehensive inventory of special access programs, as well as measures to improve the contracting accountability. These provisions will give the committee additional tools to hold the intelligence community accountable for its actions and the use or misuse of taxpayer funds. Again this year we demand more attention to the foreign language facility of employees in the intelligence community. Of course, we would want the intelligence community to look at international and global issues that affect our national security. And who could oppose the attention to climate change? There are a number of areas where we have had added or reduced resources. Overall, the agencies have ample support, the largest budget ever. By the way, I would say to my colleague from Kansas, there is no reduction in human intelligence collectors. This legislation adds resources for their training, it adds analytic capability, it adds technologies to help them do their job. Let me close by thanking the chairman again for the admirable manner that he shows in running this committee. I support this legislation, and I urge my colleagues to do so. Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to my colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. Issa). Mr. ISSA. Madam Chairman, I thank the ranking member, and I thank the chairman for what we were able to accomplish during the markup. But I come to the House floor knowing that in fact in a few short minutes, an hour or so, our Members will vote not knowing what is in this bill. Oh, they will hear us talking in unclassified terms about the fact that HUMINT, contrary to the last speaker, is being cut in absolute dollars. The eyes and ears of human beings is being cut in this bill. Certainly, with inflation, other things are going up. But as everyone knows that has read the Iraq Study Report or the 9/11 report, it is the absence of the human resources that we have been investing in that led to our vulnerability on 9/11. And I will say that if the people on the other side of the aisle want to say we are losing this war, then they have to be willing to make a much greater commitment in the diplomatic and especially in the human resources and the above-sky resources that allow us to know what our enemy is thinking and planning before he attacks. This bill doesn't do it. This bill does, as many of the speakers have said, deal with ``bugs and bunnies.'' Now, I happen to be an advocate for global warming research. I happen to believe that the Earth is warming, and I happen to believe that CO
     2是我们必须解决的东西。我供职于监督了它的委员会，已经看了一下，已经成本核算它;我将继续这样做。但我无以言表，大怒，说没有新的资金，我们从发现什么不好的人想要做的到我们这里，一个模糊的转移资源，超越模糊，在未来30年开放式的语句是什么全球升温可能会做。这是一个最坏的情况下，所有可能的阴性研究。这将花费十年或数亿美元开始。它将使我们转移卫星做了研究。说实话，中情局不随便扔在一起的报告，特别是当它是这样的含糊其辞。我们敦促委员会，其实他们放到[页H4887]合理的修订本。 We asked something simple: task them with the U.N.'s finding on global warming. Any committee, any group's finding. It is an open-ended go-study report. It is going to cost a lot of money, and it is going to cost American lives. But last but not least, there are unconscionable earmarks in this bill which I three times participated and voted for going to closed session so the Members would understand that pork and ``unfounded'' earmarks are in this bill; that American lives will be lost because we divert needed moneys from the human resources we need to invest in to pork projects and special interests of Members of the majority. Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, so we move from a parallel universe to the Twilight Zone. Madam Chairman, I would like to yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky), a member of our committee. Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Madam Chairman, I rise today to address two matters in the intelligence authorization bill. For too long, the intelligence community has been increasing its use of contractors without internal or congressional oversight. For the first time, the Director of National Intelligence has conducted a contractor survey to begin to get a handle on the situation. A simple survey, however, is not sufficient to understand how we are using contractors and whether the use of such contractors is appropriate. This bill takes an important step towards understanding the use of contractors. It requires the DNI Inspector General to report on intelligence contractors committing waste, fraud or abuse. It also requires a report on contractor accountability and their effect on the workforce, all positive steps toward better oversight. But there is one issue this bill does not address that I firmly believe raises a fundamental question as to who we are as a Nation. The President has acknowledged that the intelligence community kept prisoners in undisclosed detention sites and has reserved the right to do so in the future. We should reject this policy. In Nazi Germany, millions of people were sent to camps, never to be heard from again. During the Cold War, thousands of people disappeared into gulags. Saddam Hussein's secret prisons still strike fear into the hearts of Iraqis. Each time, our Nation stood as a beacon of human rights and strongly objected to those practices. If we endorse any policy that allows undisclosed detention, we undermine our moral authority to stand against such atrocities in the future. The United States should be beyond reproach in its treatment of detainees. In the first Gulf War, the International Committee of the Red Cross called U.S. compliance with the Geneva Conventions the best of any nation in any conflict in the history of the convention. If we lower that standard for how we treat prisoners, we weaken our ability to insist on the highest standards of treatment for our own military personnel and civilians abroad, thus endangering their safety and undermining our standing in the world. More importantly, we sacrifice the principles on which this country is based. I want to thank the chairman for considering all these important matters in the intelligence bill and for his leadership on this good bill. Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I yield 1 minute to my colleague and classmate from the State of Maryland, Mr. Roscoe Bartlett. Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Madam Chairman, I hold here a major study done by the Center for Naval Analysis entitled ``National Security and the Threat of Climate Change.'' Their Military Advisory Board contains five admirals and four generals, including Sullivan, Lopez and Zinni. In their recommendations, ``Recommendation No. 1,'' they say the national security consequences of climate change should be fully integrated with national security and national defense strategies. Two of the specifics of this have been included in the National Defense Authorization Act, including the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review, all of which, they say, should consider climate change. A specific related to the intelligence community should incorporate climate consequences into its National Intelligence Estimate. A letter from the chairman of this board said that ``we made that call because we are concerned that climate change may affect our military.'' This conservative Republican proudly joined Mr. Markey in requesting that this become a part of the base bill; and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for making it so. Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I yield 1 minute to my colleague from the State of Michigan (Mr. Rogers). Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chairman, I just want to quickly respond to my colleague, who I have the greatest amount of respect for. Climate change is an important issue, and I think the point we are trying to make here is that there are 14 agencies, $7 billion already being spent on it. The time to train an analyst and a case officer to their optimum performance level is between 5 and 7 years. Five and 7 years. That is an incredible investment. And I want them looking for Osama bin Laden, for the next nuclear program that we don't know about around the world. It takes a tremendous amount of effort to get them where they need to be. This is the wrong direction for it. We have, I am going to read them again, the Army, Navy, Air Force, DARPA, NASA, EPA, NSF, Defense, Treasury, USAID, the Smithsonian, Transportation, Interior, HHS, State, Energy, Commerce and Agriculture all looking at climate change. Don't waste these very precious resources. Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin), a member of our committee. (Mr. LANGEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) {time} 2300 Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the gentleman for yielding. Madam Chair, I rise in strong support of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2008. I particularly want to commend Chairman Reyes for his outstanding leadership, vision and work on this bill and getting us to where we are today. Equally important, I want to recognize the staff for their hard work as well. Madam Chair, I have always believed that good intelligence is the pointy tip of the spear. This bill provides intelligence support for troops in Iraq and Afghanistan and strengthens information-sharing among Federal, State and local agencies. Most importantly, it enhances the full range of intelligence collection capabilities, tactical and strategic, near term and long term. The United States relies heavily on satellites to gather intelligence. Our intelligence agencies, working with industry, have developed extraordinary capabilities that build upon proven technologies. And to ensure that we maintain our technological edge, this bill refocuses the Intelligence Community on evolving satellite technology while ensuring that our industrial base also remains strong. And because nothing beats having eyes on the ground, this bill strengthens human intelligence collection capabilities by adding funds to both CIA and military collectors to receive training and operational skills in critical foreign languages while providing advanced technological tools that support intelligence collection. This measure further strengthens intelligence analysis by investing in the people of the Intelligence Community. By establishing challenging career paths for intelligence professionals at FBI and DHS, it rewards good work and encourages America's best and brightest to serve. Many of these Americans, because of their personal backgrounds, possess a wealth of expertise on foreign cultures, societies and languages. But for the Intelligence Community to harness their potential, its staff must reflect the myriad experiences, talents and perspectives of the American people. This bill takes important steps to enhance diversity in the Intelligence Community. For example, it requires the DNI to implement a multi-level security clearance system to ensure that Americans who are ineligible for the highest clearances because they have [[Page H4888]] relatives overseas and cannot be investigated, for instance, can still offer expertise in their roles. It is a good bill, and I urge its passage. Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to a former ranking member of this committee, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman). Ms. HARMAN. Madam Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding and commend him for his leadership as chairman of the committee. Madam Chair, I spoke earlier during the rule about the specifics in this bill, a bill I strongly support. But as the debate closes, I thought I might offer just two thoughts from my vantage point as someone who has served on this committee for so long and who passionately cares about the issues. The first is I believe al Qaeda is here and waiting to attack us. I believe America is in danger, and if we don't get our intelligence right both internationally and domestically, we will be attacked. We will fail to prevent or disrupt the harm that is coming our way. That is why it is so critical that we pass the best bill that we can. My second point is that I have never seen, and I have sat through these debates for many years, the kind of partisanship we are now seeing in debate on the intelligence authorization bill. It breaks my heart. And if there is someone out there in an austere, unaccompanied post watching C-SPAN, if C-SPAN is available, and looking at this debate, that person must wonder: Why can't Congress come together and protect America at a time of urgent need? And I have to say, I am wondering, too. It is very disappointing to see the partisanship. It is very disappointing to hear that members I served with are going to oppose this bill. I hope they will reconsider. It is very important to reach consensus and pass the strongest bill possible. Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I yield myself the balance of my time. Madam Chair, I have a great deal of respect for my colleague, but I believe last year, and she can correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe she voted against the bill on the floor. And to characterize our disagreement with this bill as partisan, and to, I assume perhaps in another way, characterize her vote against our base bill last year as something else, her vote as something else, is disappointing. We had a good partnership when I was chairman and you were ranking member. I am disappointed by that. I believe this is a well-founded difference of opinion on the content of this bill. There are clear differences in priorities. As the gentlelady said and others have said, we are a Nation that faces a great threat. We saw earlier this week that threat may have evolved and found its way once again to our shores, in New Jersey. We believe we need to strengthen HUMINT and face the threats that are out there. We believe that we can't be working in the politically correct environment. The message that people are looking for in the field is, what direction is this new majority going to take our Intelligence Community? They are seeing cuts in key activities that support the war, the effort against the threat that we face from radical jihadists, and not applying the resources that we need against targets that we don't know enough about. I think we would all agree on a bipartisan basis, we don't know enough about al Qaeda and how it works and where it is and what its resources are and what its plans and intentions are. We don't know enough about Iran, Syria, North Korea and the people that are proliferating and making this world a much more dangerous place. We will see amendments later on from both sides of the aisle that acknowledge that we are not where we want to be with the reorganization of the Intelligence Community. We have lots of questions about where the DNI, the office of the DNI is headed and whether this structure is going to work the way that some of us worked in a very bipartisan way to reform it with a certain expectation and hope, and what we would get as a result of that: An enhanced Intelligence Community that would be quicker, more nimble and more effective than the threats that we face today. And we need to rebuild HUMINT. And at the same time, we see in this bill a commitment that says we are going to task the Intelligence Community, and the question that has not been answered is what specific skills does the Intelligence Community add to the study of climate change when we are already spending $7 billion projected for the next fiscal year on climate change? What secrets are we going to steal? What are we going to task our HUMINT folks for? What are we going to task our limited resources with spy satellites to do? To assess the political, social, agricultural and economic risk during the 30-year period beginning on date of enactment? And don't say it is not going to take resources. This is a massive undertaking. It is not a throw-away. This is Congress coming and saying the most important national intelligence assessment that the community can complete next year, and you need to do it in 180 days; 180 days with no input from the community on whether they have the resources, the capabilities to carry out this task. We are saying that it needs to be done in 180 days. You need to do it on a global basis, and you need to do it over 30 years, and you need to cover all of these different areas. And by the way, we are not going to give you a benchmark from where to start. Are you going to take the U.N.'s assessment of what may be happening with climate change? Are you going to take a university's assessment on climate change? Where do you start? This is a massive undertaking. It will shift resources because when you tell the Director of National Intelligence Congress wants this done, and Congress we know has been dissatisfied with the national intelligence estimates that we have been given on Iraq and Iran and on a number of other issues, they know they need to get this one right or it better be a very, very good piece of work. They will take this very, very seriously. They will divert resources to get this done, and they will divert resources from the things that we need them to be doing. This bill sends the wrong message to our men and women in the field. I ask my colleagues to vote ``no.'' Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time. Madam Chair, I am very proud of this bill, and I am proud of the work we all put into it. I realize there are some political differences. You have heard the minority go from characterizing bugs and bunnies. Well, I think bogeyman politics doesn't work with the American people. It doesn't work with the challenge that we are facing in Iraq, and it is not going to fly with what we are doing with this intelligence bill. This bill does not make cuts. It adds funds to both CIA and military elements for human intelligence training. It adds funding for sending additional analysts overseas. Yes, I agree with the former ranking member, we should be concerned about al Qaeda. The ranking member mentioned the potential attacks against Fort Dix last week. So this is serious business. We know it is. This is an important piece of legislation that I hope everyone knows it is imperative that they support. The men and women of the Intelligence Community don't care about mischaracterizations. They don't care about talking about slam dunking and bugs and bunnies and all of these other rhetorical phrases that the minority likes to engage in. They care about support from Congress. This bill gives the Intelligence Community the support that they need. All you have to do is travel around the world and listen to them. I am proud of this legislation. By strengthening our Nation's Intelligence Community, we will be able to detect and disrupt the plans of those that are threatening our national security. I urge my colleagues to support this critical piece of legislation. Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Madam Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2082, the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2007. H.R. 2082 authorizes the largest amount for intelligence ever considered in a single bill, which just goes to show you how important intelligence has become to our national security and how serious the new Democratic majority is about protecting the homeland and defending the nation. H.R. 2082 promotes responsible budgeting and oversight by shifting resources from the supplemental to the base budget--allowing officers in the field to plan their operations properly, particularly in the counterterrorism arena, and allowing Congress to review funding requests. [[Page H4889]] The bill makes key investments to strengthen intelligence by adding funds to both CIA and military elements for Human Intelligence (HUMINT) training. We increase our investments in language training for collectors and analysts and in language translation capabilities. We also add funding for sending additional analysts overseas. The bill also strengthens counterintelligence field operations. Madam Chairman, H.R. 2082 promotes efficiency and effectiveness of intelligence programs by streamlining acquisition, trimming the fat from ineffective programs, eliminating redundant activities, requiring greater strategic focus in some key areas. Madam Chairman, this bill does not, as some claim, make deep cuts in any intelligence programs. In one area, related to supplemental funding for Iraq, the bill reflects bipartisan concerns about excessive spending on programs that lack a strategy or metrics for evaluating its effectiveness. These funds are shifted to enhance coverage of other global challenges, such as Iran, Russia, East Africa, and Asia. The bill promotes accountability by requiring quarterly intelligence updates to Congress on nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea. And it requires the CIA Inspector General to conduct an audit of each covert action program not less than once every three years. Finally, Madam, Chairman, H.R. 2082 requires reports to Congress on the use of contractors in the Intelligence Community. It requires a strategy for implementing a multi-level security clearance system--to allow patriotic Americans to serve as translators or linguists in the intelligence community. I think it important also that H.R. 2082 promotes diversity in the intelligence community by requiring a strategic plan for implementing the recommendations of a key diversity panel. Last, the H.R. 2082 follows the recommendations of several former military commanders in requesting that the National Intelligence Council produce a National Intelligence Estimate on national security impact of global climate change. Madam Chairman, I strongly support H.R. 2082 and the rule. Mr. LARSON of Connecticut. Madam Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the amendment offered by Mr. Hoekstra that would strike language requesting an assessment of the national security challenges posed by global warming. As a member of the House Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming and an original cosponsor to H.R. 1961, the Global Climate Change Security Oversight Act, I support the inclusion of this language in the Intelligence Authorization bill. There are serious political, social, economic and national security risks associated with climate change. It is only appropriate that our nation have a National Intelligence Estimate assessing its global warming threat. The National Intelligence Council is already a producing a community assessment on this issue, this provision would simply require that assessment be elevated to a formal National Intelligence Estimate. This type of review is supported by a group of 11 retired three-star and four-star generals and admirals, who on April 16, 2007, issued a report entitled, ``National Security and the Threat of Climate Change.'' This report concludes that global warming presents significant national security challenges the United States. The effects of climate change are projected to have grave consequences for some of the poorest areas of the world--already volatile areas, the instability of these regions would be multiplied. Projected climate change will seriously exacerbate already marginal living standards in many Asian, African, and Middle Eastern nations, causing widespread political instability and the likelihood of failed states. As retired U.S. General Gordon R. Sullivan described before the Select Global Warming Committee, the potential national security threat of global warming in certain regions of the world could potentially be a Petri dish for terror. Climate change is yet another front in the war on terror and now is the time for the United States to fully understand the implications it has on our national security. I urge my colleagues to join me in opposing this amendment. The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired. Pursuant to the rule, the amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in the bill shall be considered as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule and shall be considered read. The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as follows: H.R. 2082 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. Sec. 2. Definitions. TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations. Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations. Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments. Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account. Sec. 105. Incorporation of reporting requirements. TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations. Sec. 202. Technical amendment to mandatory retirement provision. TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROVISIONS Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law. Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities. Sec. 303. Clarification of definition of intelligence community under the National Security Act of 1947. Sec. 304. Extension to the intelligence community of authority to delete information about receipt and disposition of foreign gifts. Sec. 305. Modification of requirements for reprogramming of funds for intelligence activities. Sec. 306. Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for intelligence collection personnel. Sec. 307. Report on proposed pay for performance intelligence community personnel management system. Sec. 308. Plan to increase diversity in the intelligence community. TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence Sec. 401. Clarification of limitation on co-location of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Sec. 402. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the Transportation Security Oversight Board. Sec. 403. Additional duties of the Director of Science and Technology of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Sec. 404. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials. Sec. 405. Eligibility for incentive awards of personnel assigned to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Sec. 406. Multi-level security clearances. Sec. 407. National intelligence estimate on global climate change. Sec. 408. Plan to implement recommendations of the data center efficiency reports. Sec. 409. Comprehensive inventory of special access programs. Sec. 410. Quarterly intelligence reports to Congress on Iran and North Korea. Sec. 411. Accountability in intelligence contracting. Sec. 412. Annual report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence community. Sec. 413. Intelligence community reports on foreign language proficiency. Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency Sec. 421. Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Sec. 422. General authorities of the Central Intelligence Agency. Sec. 423. Review of covert action programs by Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency. Sec. 424. Report on audited financial statements progress. Subtitle C--Other Elements Sec. 431. Clarifying amendments relating to Section 105 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. Sec. 432. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive. Sec. 433. Clarification of inclusion of Coast Guard and Drug Enforcement Administration elements in the intelligence community. TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters Sec. 501. Aerial reconnaissance platforms. Sec. 502. Extension of National Commission for Review of Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community. Subtitle B--Technical Amendments Sec. 511. Technical amendments relating to the multiyear National Intelligence Program. Sec. 512. Technical clarification of certain references to Joint Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities. Sec. 513. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947. Sec. 514. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Sec. 515. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule. [[Page H4890]] Sec. 516. Technical amendments relating to titles of Central Intelligence Agency positions. Sec. 517. Technical amendments relating to redesignation of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. In this Act: (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means-- (A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (B) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2008 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2) The Central Intelligence Agency. (3) The Department of Defense. (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (5) The National Security Agency. (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (7) The Coast Guard. (8) The Department of State. (9) The Department of the Treasury. (10) The Department of Energy. (11) The Department of Justice. (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration. (14) The National Reconnaissance Office. (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (16) The Department of Homeland Security. SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2008, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 2082 of the One Hundred Tenth Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS. (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2008 under section 102 when the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of National Intelligence shall promptly notify the congressional intelligence committees whenever the Director exercises the authority granted by this section. SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2008 the sum of $737,876,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2009. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence are authorized 1035 full-time personnel as of September 30, 2008. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2008 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2009. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2008, there are also authorized such additional personnel for such elements as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2008 any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of National Intelligence. (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.-- (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated in subsection (a), $39,000,000 shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds provided for research, development, testing, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2009, and funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2010. (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of National Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General funds available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the National Drug Intelligence Center. (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug Intelligence Center may not be used for purposes of exercising police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions. (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center. SEC. 105. INCORPORATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. Each requirement to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees that is included in the joint explanatory statement to accompany the conference report on the bill H.R. 2082 of the One Hundred Tenth Congress, or in the classified annex to this Act, is hereby incorporated into this Act, and is hereby made a requirement in law. TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2008 the sum of $262,500,000. SEC. 202. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT TO MANDATORY RETIREMENT PROVISION. Section 235(b)(1)(A) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2055(b)(1)(A)) is amended to read as follows: ``(A) upon reaching age 65, in the case of a participant in the system serving in a position with a Senior Intelligence Service rank of level 4 or above;''. TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROVISIONS SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW. Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. SEC. 303. CLARIFICATION OF DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY UNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947. Subparagraph (L) of section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended by striking ``other'' the second place it appears. SEC. 304. EXTENSION TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OF AUTHORITY TO DELETE INFORMATION ABOUT RECEIPT AND DISPOSITION OF FOREIGN GIFTS. Section 7342(f)(4) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(4) In transmitting such listings for an element of the intelligence community (as such term is defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))), the head of such element of the intelligence community may delete the information described in subparagraphs (A) and (C) of paragraphs (2) and (3) if the head of such element of the intelligence community certifies in writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of such information could adversely affect United States intelligence sources or methods.''. SEC. 305. MODIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR REPROGRAMMING OF FUNDS FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. Section 504(a)(3)(B) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)(B)) is amended to read as follows: ``(B) the activity to be funded supports an emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or increases efficiency; and''. SEC. 306. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR TRAVEL ON COMMON CARRIERS FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PERSONNEL. (a) Delegation of Authority.--Section 116(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``The Director''; (2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``may only delegate'' and all that follows and inserting [[Page H4891]] ``may delegate the authority in subsection (a) to the head of any other element of the intelligence community.''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2) The head of an element of the intelligence community to whom the authority in subsection (a) is delegated pursuant to paragraph (1) may further delegate such authority to such senior officials of such element as are specified in guidelines prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence for purposes of this paragraph.''. (b) Submission of Guidelines to Congress.--Not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe and submit to the congressional intelligence committees the guidelines referred to in paragraph (2) of section 116(b) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a). SEC. 307. REPORT ON PROPOSED PAY FOR PERFORMANCE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. (a) Prohibition on Pay for Performance Until Report.--The Director of National Intelligence and the head of each element of the intelligence community may not implement a plan that provides compensation to personnel of an element of the intelligence community based on performance until the date that is 45 days after the date on which the Director of National Intelligence submits a report under subsection (b). (b) Report.--The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on performance-based compensation for the intelligence community, including-- (1) an implementation time line, by phase and by element of the intelligence community, which includes target dates for completion of-- (A) the development of performance appraisal plans; (B) establishment of oversight and appeal mechanisms; (C) deployment of information technology systems; (D) management training; (E) employee training; (F) compensation transition; and (G) full operational capacity; (2) an estimated budget, by phase of implementation and element of the intelligence community, for the implementation of the performance-based compensation system; (3) an evaluation plan to monitor the implementation of the performance-based compensation system and to improve and modify such system; (4) written standards for measuring the performance of employees; (5) a description of the performance-based compensation system, including budget oversight mechanisms to ensure sufficient funds to pay employees for bonuses; (6) a description of internal and external accountability mechanisms to ensure the fair treatment of employees; (7) a plan for initial and ongoing training for senior executives, managers, and employees; (8) a description of the role of any advisory committee or other mechanism designed to gather the input of employees relating to the creation and implementation of the system; and (9) an assessment of the impact of the performance-based compensation system on women, minorities, persons with disabilities, and veterans. SEC. 308. PLAN TO INCREASE DIVERSITY IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. (a) Strategic Plan Required.--The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a plan to increase diversity across the intelligence community. Such plan shall include-- (1) a description of the long term and short term goals for the intelligence community; (2) a description of how the plan will be implemented by each element of the intelligence community, taking into account the unique nature of individual elements of the intelligence community; (3) training and education programs for senior officials and managers; and (4) performance metrics. (b) Restriction on Community Management Funds Until Submission of Plan.--The Director of National Intelligence may only obligate or expend 80 percent of the funds appropriated to the Intelligence Community Management Account pursuant to section 104(a) until the date on which the report required under subsection (a) is submitted. TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence SEC. 401. CLARIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON CO-LOCATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. Section 103(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(e)) is amended-- (1) in the heading, by striking ``With'' and inserting ``of Headquarters With Headquarters of'' ; (2) by inserting ``the headquarters of'' before ``the Office''; and (3) by inserting ``the headquarters of'' before ``any other element''. SEC. 402. MEMBERSHIP OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT BOARD. Subparagraph (F) of section 115(b)(1) of title 49, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(F) The Director of National Intelligence, or the Director's designee.''. SEC. 403. ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. (a) Coordination and Prioritization of Research Conducted by Elements of Intelligence Community.--Subsection (d) of section 103E of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3e) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (3)(A), by inserting ``and prioritize'' after ``coordinate''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(4) In carrying out paragraph (3)(A), the Committee shall identify basic, advanced, and applied research programs to be executed by elements of the intelligence community.''. (b) Development of Technology Goals.--Such section is further amended-- (1) in subsection (c)-- (A) in paragraph (4), by striking ``and'' at the end; (B) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); and (C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new paragraph: ``(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for the elements of the intelligence community to meet the technology needs of the intelligence community; and''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(e) Goals for Technology Needs of Intelligence Community.--In carrying out subsection (c)(5), the Director of Science and Technology shall-- ``(1) systematically identify and assess the most significant intelligence challenges that require technical solutions; ``(2) examine options to enhance the responsiveness of research programs; and ``(3) ensure that programs are designed to meet the technical requirements of the intelligence community.''. (c) Report.--(1) Not later than June 30, 2008, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report containing a strategy for the development and use of technology in the intelligence community through 2018. (2) The report shall include-- (A) an assessment of the highest priority intelligence gaps across the intelligence community that may be resolved by the use of technology; (B) goals for basic, advanced, and applied research and development and a strategy to achieve such goals; (C) an explanation of how each advanced research and development project funded under the National Intelligence Program addresses an identified intelligence gap; (D) a list of all current and projected research and development projects by research type (basic, advanced, or applied) with estimated funding levels, estimated initiation dates, and estimated completion dates; and (E) a plan to transition technology from research and development projects into National Intelligence Program acquisition programs. (3) The report may be submitted in classified form. SEC. 404. LEADERSHIP AND LOCATION OF CERTAIN OFFICES AND OFFICIALS. (a) National Counter Proliferation Center.--Section 119A(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-1(a)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``Establishment.--Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the'' and inserting ``(1) Establishment.--The''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: ``(2) Director.--The head of the National Counter Proliferation Center shall be the Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center, who shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence. ``(3) Location.--The National Counter Proliferation Center shall be located within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''. (b) Officers.--Section 103(c) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403- 3(c)) is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (13); and (2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new paragraphs: ``(9) The Chief Information Officer of the intelligence community. ``(10) The Inspector General of the intelligence community. ``(11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. ``(12) The Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center.''. SEC. 405. ELIGIBILITY FOR INCENTIVE AWARDS OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 402 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984 (50 U.S.C. 403e-1) is amended to read as follows: ``(a) Authority for Payment of Awards.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence may exercise the authority granted in section 4503 of title 5, United States Code, with respect to Federal employees and members of the Armed Forces detailed or assigned to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in the same manner as such authority may be exercised with respect to personnel of the Office. ``(2) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may exercise the authority granted in section 4503 of title 5, United States Code, with respect to Federal employees and members of the Armed Forces detailed or assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency in the same manner as such authority may be exercised with respect to personnel of the Agency.''. (b) Repeal of Obsolete Authority.--Such section is further amended-- (1) by striking subsection (c); and (2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c). [[Page H4892]] (c) Conforming Amendments.--Such section is further amended-- (1) in subsection (b), by striking ``to the Central Intelligence Agency or to the Intelligence Community Staff'' and inserting ``to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or to the Central Intelligence Agency''; and (2) in subsection (c), as redesignated by subsection (b)(2) of this section, by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence or Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. (d) Technical and Stylistic Amendments.--That section is further amended-- (1) in subsection (b)-- (A) by inserting ``Personnel Eligible for Awards.--'' after ``(b)''; (B) by striking ``subsection (a) of this section'' and inserting ``subsection (a)''; and (C) by striking ``a date five years before the date of enactment of this section'' and inserting ``December 9, 1978''; and (2) in subsection (c), as so redesignated, by inserting ``Payment and Acceptance of Awards.--'' after ``(c)''. SEC. 406. MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY CLEARANCES. (a) In General.--Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(s) Multi-Level Security Clearances.--The Director of National Intelligence shall establish a multi-level security clearance system for the intelligence community to enable the intelligence community to more efficiently make use of persons proficient in foreign languages or with cultural, linguistic, or other subject matter expertise that is critical to national security.''. (b) Establishment Date.--The Director of National Intelligence shall establish a multi-level security clearance system under section 102A(s) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. SEC. 407. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE. (a) National Intelligence Estimate.--Not later than 270 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a national intelligence estimate on the anticipated geopolitical effects of global climate change and the implications of such effects on the national security of the United States. (b) Content.--In preparing the national intelligence estimate required by this section, the Director of National Intelligence shall-- (1) assess the political, social, agricultural, and economic risks during the 30-year period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act posed by global climate change for countries or regions that are-- (A) of strategic national security importance to the United States and at risk of significant impact due to global climate change; or (B) at significant risk of large-scale humanitarian suffering with cross-border implications as predicted on the basis of the assessments; (2) assess the capabilities of the countries or regions described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1) to respond to adverse national security impacts caused by global climate change; (3) assess the strategic challenges and opportunities posed to the United States by the risks described in paragraph (1); and (4) assess the impact of global climate change on the activities of the United States intelligence community throughout the world. (c) Coordination.--In preparing the national intelligence estimate under this section, the Director of National Intelligence shall consult with representatives of the scientific community, and, as appropriate, multilateral institutions and allies of the United States that have conducted significant research on global climate change. (d) Form.--The national intelligence estimate required by this section (including key judgments) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. SEC. 408. PLAN TO IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DATA CENTER EFFICIENCY REPORTS. (a) Plan.--The Director of National Intelligence shall develop a plan to implement the recommendations of the report submitted to Congress under section 1 of the Act entitled ``An Act to study and promote the use of energy efficient computer servers in the United States'' (Public Law 109-431; 120 Stat. 2920) across the intelligence community. (b) Report.-- (1) In general.--Not later then February 1, 2008, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report containing the plan developed under subsection (a). (2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex. SEC. 409. COMPREHENSIVE INVENTORY OF SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS. Not later than January 15, 2008, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a classified report providing a comprehensive inventory of all special access programs under the National Intelligence Program (as defined in section 3(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(6))). SEC. 410. QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON IRAN AND NORTH KOREA. (a) In General.-- (1) Report.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON IRAN AND NORTH KOREA ``Sec. 508. (a) Report.-- ``(1) In general.--On a quarterly basis, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the current intentions and capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) with regard to the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea, respectively, including-- ``(A) an assessment of nuclear weapons programs; ``(B) an evaluation, consistent with existing reporting standards and practices, of the sources upon which the intelligence is based, including the number of sources and the reliability of each source; ``(C) a summary of any new intelligence gathered or developed since the previous report, including intelligence collected from both open and clandestine sources; and ``(D) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in knowledge, or other information that would reduce confidence in the overall assessment. ``(2) Form.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) may be submitted in classified form. ``(b) Access to Report.--Each report submitted under subsection (a)(1) shall be made available to all members of the congressional intelligence committees and to all staff of the congressional intelligence committees with appropriate security clearance. Other members of the Senate or the House of Representatives may review the reports in accordance with security procedures established by each of the congressional intelligence committees.''. (2) Conforming amendment.--The table of contents in the first section of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 507 the following new item: ``Sec. 508. Quarterly intelligence reports to Congress on Iran and North Korea.''. (b) Effective Date.--The first report required to be submitted under section 508(a)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a)(1), shall be submitted not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. SEC. 411. ACCOUNTABILITY IN INTELLIGENCE CONTRACTING. (a) Oversight Report on IC Contractors.-- (1) Report.-- (A) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTORS ``Sec. 509. Not later each year than the date provided in section 507, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on contractors funded under the National Intelligence Program. Such report shall include-- ``(1) a list of all contractors that-- ``(A) have been the subject of an investigation completed by the Inspector General of any element of the intelligence community during the preceding fiscal year, ``(B) are the subject of an investigation by such an Inspector General during the current fiscal year, or ``(C) will be the subject of an investigation that may affect the ability of the contractor to deliver contracted services to the intelligence community by such an Inspector General during the current fiscal year, either as a corporate entity or an individual employee, for financial waste, fraud, abuse of government resources, failure to perform a contract, or criminal violations; and ``(2) the number of contractors performing services for each element of the intelligence community.''. (B) Report date.--Section 507(a)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 415b(a)(1)) is amended by-- (i) redesignating subparagraph (N) as subparagraph (J); (ii) adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(K) The annual report on intelligence community contractors required by section 509.''. (2) Conforming amendment.--The table of contents in the first section of such Act is further amended by inserting after the item relating to section 508, as added by section 410, the following new item: ``Sec. 509. Report on intelligence community contractors.''. (b) Report on Regulations and Accountability Mechanisms Governing Intelligence Community Contractors.-- (1) Report requirement.--Not later than February 1, 2008, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on accountability mechanisms that govern the ongoing performance of contractors for personal services contracts under the National Intelligence Program. (2) Matters covered.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include-- (A) a list of statutes and regulations that govern the ongoing performance of contractors for services contracts entered into by each element of the intelligence community; (B) an analysis of accountability mechanisms within services contracts awarded for intelligence activities by each element of the intelligence community during fiscal years 2006 and 2007; (C) an analysis of procedures in use in the intelligence community for conducting oversight of contractors to ensure identification and prosecution of criminal violations, financial waste, fraud, or other abuses committed by contractors or contract personnel; and (D) an identification of best practices of accountability mechanisms within services contracts. (3) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex. (c) Impact of Contractors on the Intelligence Community Workforce.-- [[Page H4893]] (1) Report requirement.--Not later than March 1, 2008, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the impact of contractors on the intelligence community workforce under the National Intelligence Program. (2) Matters covered.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include-- (A) an identification of contracts where the contractor is providing a substantially similar functions to a government employee; (B) a comparison of the compensation of contract employees and government employees performing substantially similar functions; (C) an analysis of the attrition of government personnel for contractor positions that provide substantially similar functions; and (D) an estimate of the value of the infrastructure provided to contract employees for government furnished equipment, facilities, or other support, by agency and expenditure center. SEC. 412. ANNUAL REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. (a) Report.-- (1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ``Sec. 510. Not later each year than the date provided in section 507, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the foreign language proficiency of each element of the intelligence community, including-- ``(1) the number of positions authorized for such element that require foreign language proficiency and the level of proficiency required; ``(2) the number of positions authorized for such element that require foreign language proficiency that are filled by-- ``(A) military personnel; and ``(B) civilian personnel; ``(3) the number of applicants for positions in such element in the previous fiscal year that indicated foreign language proficiency, including the foreign language indicated and the proficiency level; ``(4) the number of persons hired by such element with foreign language proficiency, including the foreign language and proficiency level; ``(5) the number of personnel of such element currently attending foreign language training, including the provider of such training; ``(6) a description of such element's efforts to recruit, hire, train, and retain personnel that are proficient in a foreign language; and ``(7) an assessment of methods and models for basic, advanced, and intensive foreign language training.''. (2) Report date.--Section 507(a)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 415b(a)(1)) is further amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(L) The annual report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence community required by section 510.''. (b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section of such Act is further amended by inserting after the item relating to section 509, as added by section 411, the following new item: ``Sec. 510. Report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence community.''. SEC. 413. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORTS ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY. (a) Annual Reports.-- (1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``ANNUAL REPORTS ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY ``Sec. 120. (a) In General.--The head of each element of the intelligence community shall annually submit to the Director of National Intelligence a report on the foreign language proficiency of the personnel of such element. ``(b) Contents.-- ``(1) In general.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall include, for each foreign language and, where appropriate, dialect of a foreign language-- ``(A) the number of positions of such element that require proficiency in the foreign language or dialect; ``(B) the number of personnel of such element that are serving in a position that-- ``(i) requires proficiency in the foreign language or dialect to perform the primary duty of the position; and ``(ii) does not require proficiency in the foreign language or dialect to perform the primary duty of the position; ``(C) the number of personnel that are proficient in the foreign language or dialect that-- ``(i) are authorized for the element of the intelligence community for which the report is submitted; and ``(ii) the head of such element considers necessary for such element for each of the five years following the date of the submission of the report; ``(D) the number of personnel of such element rated at each level of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable; ``(E) whether the number of personnel at each level of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable meets the requirements of such element; ``(F) the number of personnel serving or hired to serve as linguists for such element that are not qualified as linguists under the standards of the Interagency Language Roundtable; ``(G) the number of personnel hired to serve as linguists for such element during the preceding calendar year; ``(H) the number of personnel serving as linguists that discontinued serving such element during the preceding calendar year; ``(I) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills that is fulfilled by an ally of the United States; ``(J) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills that is fulfilled by contractors; and ``(K) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills that is fulfilled by members of the Armed Forces. ``(2) Military personnel.--Except as provided in paragraph (1)(K), a report submitted under subsection (a) shall not include personnel that are members of the Armed Forces on active duty assigned to the element for which the report is submitted. ``(c) DNI Report to Congress.--The Director of National Intelligence shall annually submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate a report containing-- ``(1) each report submitted to the Director of National Intelligence for a year under subsection (a); ``(2) an assessment of the foreign language capacity and capabilities of the intelligence community as a whole; and ``(3) recommendations for eliminating required reports relating to foreign-language proficiency that the Director of National Intelligence considers outdated or no longer relevant.''. (2) Table of contents.--Such Act is further amended in the table of contents in the first section by inserting after the item relating to section 119B the following new item: ``Sec. 120. Annual reports on foreign language proficiency.''. (b) Effective Date.-- (1) Report by heads of elements of the intelligence community.--The first report required to be submitted by the head of each element of the intelligence community under section 120(a) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a)(1), shall be submitted not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (2) Report by dni.--The first report required to be submitted by the Director of National Intelligence under section 120(c) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a)(1), shall be submitted not later than 240 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency SEC. 421. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. (a) Establishment and Duties of the Position of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Agency.--(1) Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 104A the following new section: ``DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ``Sec. 104B. (a) Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.--There is a Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. ``(b) Duties.--The Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall-- ``(1) assist the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Director; and ``(2) act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency during the absence or disability of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, or during a vacancy in the position of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (2) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 104A the following new item: ``Sec. 104B. Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (b) Executive Schedule Level III.--Section 5314 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item: ``Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. SEC. 422. GENERAL AUTHORITIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Section 5(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``any of the functions or activities authorized under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 102(a), subsections (c)(7) and (d) of section 103, subsections (a) and (g) of section 104, and section 303 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7), (d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405),'' and inserting ``any functions or activities authorized by law to be conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency''. SEC. 423. REVIEW OF COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS BY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE CIA. (a) In General.--Section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b) is amended by-- (1) redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (g) and transferring such subsection to the end; (2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new subsection: ``(e) Inspector General Audits of Covert Actions.-- ``(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct an audit of each covert action at least every three years. ``(2) Terminated, suspended programs.--The Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency is not required to conduct an audit under paragraph (1) of a covert action [[Page H4894]] that has been terminated or suspended if such covert action was terminated or suspend prior to the last audit of such covert action conducted by the Inspector General and has not been restarted after the date on which such audit was completed. ``(3) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the completion of an audit conducted pursuant to paragraph (1), the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing the results of such audit.''. (b) Conforming Amendments.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended-- (1) in section 501(f) (50 U.S.C. 413(f)), by striking ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)''; (2) in section 502(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 413b(a)(1)), by striking ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)''; and (3) in section 504(c) (50 U.S.C. 414(c)), by striking ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)''. SEC. 424. REPORT ON AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS PROGRESS. Section 114A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404i-1) is amended by striking ``the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,''. Subtitle C--Other Elements SEC. 431. CLARIFYING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO SECTION 105 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004. Section 105(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2603; 31 U.S.C. 311 note) is amended-- (1) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (2) by inserting ``or in section 313 of such title,'' after ``subsection (a)),''. SEC. 432. REPEAL OF CERTAIN AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE. (a) Repeal of Certain Authorities.--Section 904 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended-- (1) by striking subsections (d), (h), (i), and (j); (2) in subsection (g), by striking paragraphs (3) and (4); and (3) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), (k), (l), and (m) as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i), respectively. (b) Conforming Amendments.--That section is further amended-- (1) in subsection (d), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2) of this section, by striking ``subsection (f)'' each place it appears in paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting ``subsection (e)''; and (2) in subsection (e)(2), as so redesignated, by striking ``subsection (e)(2)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''. SEC. 433. CLARIFICATION OF INCLUSION OF COAST GUARD AND DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION ELEMENTS IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. Section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (H)-- (A) by inserting ``the Coast Guard,'' after ``the Marine Corps,''; and (B) by inserting ``the Drug Enforcement Administration,'' after ``the Federal Bureau of Investigation,''; and (2) in subparagraph (K), by striking ``, including the Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard''. TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters SEC. 501. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE PLATFORMS. (a) Limitation on Termination of U-2 Aircraft Program.--The Secretary of Defense may not begin the process to terminate the U-2 aircraft program until the Secretary certifies in accordance with subsection (b) that there would be no loss of national or Department of Defense intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in transitioning from the U-2 aircraft program to the Global Hawk RQ-4 unmanned aerial vehicle platform. (b) Report and Certification.-- (1) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study of aerial reconnaissance platforms to determine whether the Global Hawk RQ-4 unmanned aerial vehicle has reached mission capability and has attained collection capabilities on a par with the collection capabilities of the U-2 Block 20 aircraft program as of April 1, 2006. (2) Report.--The Secretary shall submit to the congressional committees specified in subsection (c) a report containing the results of the study. The Secretary shall include in the report the Secretary's determination as to whether the Global Hawk RQ-4 unmanned aerial vehicle-- (A) has reached mission capability; and (B) has attained collection capabilities on a par with the collection capabilities of the U-2 Block 20 aircraft program as of April 1, 2006. (3) Certification.--The Secretary shall include with the report the Secretary's certification, based on the results of the study, as to whether or not there would be a loss of national or Department of Defense intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities with a transition from the U- 2 aircraft program to the Global Hawk RQ-4 unmanned aerial vehicle platform. (c) Specified Committees.--The congressional committees specified in this subsection are the following: (1) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. (2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. SEC. 502. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR REVIEW OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. (a) Extension.-- (1) In general.--Section 1007(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 401 note) is amended by striking ``September 1, 2004'' and inserting ``September 1, 2008''. (2) Effective date.--The amendment made by subsection (a)(1) shall take effect as if included in the enactment of section 1007 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. (b) Funding.-- (1) In general.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated by this Act for the Intelligence Community Management Account, the Director of National Intelligence shall make $2,000,000 available to the National Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community (in this subsection referred to as the ``Commission'') established under section 1002(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2438; 50 U.S.C. 401 note) to carry out title X of such Act. (2) Availability.--Amounts made available to the Commission under paragraph (1) shall remain available until expended. Subtitle B--Technical Amendments SEC. 511. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO THE MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM. (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (50 U.S.C. 404b) is amended-- (1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Foreign''; and (2) by striking ``foreign'' each place it appears. (b) Responsibility of DNI.--That section is further amended-- (1) in subsections (a) and (c), by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of National Intelligence'' after ``Director''. (c) Conforming Amendment.--The heading of that section is amended to read as follows: ``SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.''. SEC. 512. TECHNICAL CLARIFICATION OF CERTAIN REFERENCES TO JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AND TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES. Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended-- (1) in subsection (c)(3)(A), by striking ``annual budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities'' and inserting ``annual budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor program or programs''; and (2) in subsection (d)(1)(B), by striking ``Joint Military Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``Military Intelligence Program or any successor program or programs''. SEC. 513. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947. The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended-- (1) in section 102A (50 U.S.C. 403-1)-- (A) in subsection (c)(7)(A), by striking ``section'' and inserting ``subsection''; (B) in subsection (d)-- (i) in paragraph (3), by striking ``subparagraph (A)'' in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) and inserting ``paragraph (1)(A)''; and (ii) in paragraph (5)(A), by striking ``or personnel'' in the matter preceding clause (i); (C) in subsection (l)(2)(B), by striking ``section'' and inserting ``paragraph''; and (D) in the heading of subsection (n), by striking ``Acquisition Authorities'' and inserting ``Acquisition and Other Authorities''; and (2) in section 119(c)(2)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404o(c)(2)(B)), by striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)''. SEC. 514. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004. (a) Amendments to National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.--The National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458) is amended as follows: (1) In section 1016(e)(10)(B) (6 U.S.C. 485(e)(10)(B)), by striking ``Attorney General'' the second place it appears and inserting ``Department of Justice''. (2) In section 1061 (5 U.S.C. 601 note)-- (A) in subsection (d)(4)(A), by striking ``National Intelligence Director'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and (B) in subsection (h), by striking ``National Intelligence Director'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''. (3) In section 1071(e), by striking ``(1)''. (4) In section 1072(b), by inserting ``Agency'' after ``Intelligence''. (b) Other Amendments to Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.--The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458) is amended as follows: (1) In section 2001 (28 U.S.C. 532 note)-- (A) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting ``of'' before ``an institutional culture''; (B) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``the National Intelligence Director in a manner consistent with section 112(e)'' and inserting ``the Director of National Intelligence in a manner consistent with applicable law''; and (C) in subsection (f), by striking ``shall,'' in the matter preceding paragraph (1) and inserting ``shall''. (2) In section 2006 (28 U.S.C. 509 note)-- (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the Federal'' and inserting ``Federal''; and (B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the specific'' and inserting ``specific''. [[Page H4895]] SEC. 515. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE. (a) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Director of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item: ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''. (b) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the General Counsel of the Office of the National Intelligence Director and inserting the following new item: ``General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''. SEC. 516. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO TITLES OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY POSITIONS. Section 17(d)(3)(B)(ii) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(3)(B)(ii)) is amended-- (1) in subclause (I), by striking ``Executive Director'' and inserting ``Associate Deputy Director''; (2) in subclause (II), by striking ``Deputy Director for Operations'' and inserting ``Director of the National Clandestine Service''; and (3) in subclause (IV), by striking ``Deputy Director for Administration'' and inserting ``Director for Support''. SEC. 517. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO REDESIGNATION OF THE NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY AS THE NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. (a) Title 5, United States Code.--(1) Title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' each place it appears in a provision as follows and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency'': (A) Section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii). (B) Section 3132(a)(1)(B). (C) Section 4301(1) (in clause (ii)). (D) Section 4701(a)(1)(B). (E) Section 5102(a)(1) (in clause (x)). (F) Section 5342(a)(1)(K). (G) Section 6339(a)(1)(E). (H) Section 7323(b)(2)(B)(i)(XIII). (2) Section 6339(a)(2)(E) of such title is amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Director of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''. (b) Title 44, United States Code.--(1)(A) Section 1336 of title 44, United States Code, is amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' both places it appears and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''. (B) The heading of such section is amended to read as follows: ``Sec. 1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special publications''. (2) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 13 of such title is amended by striking the item relating to section 1336 and inserting the following new item: ``1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special publications.''. (c) Homeland Security Act of 2002.--Section 201(f)(2)(E) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121(f)(2)(E)) is amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''. (d) Inspector General Act of 1978.--Section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' each place it appears and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''. (e) Ethics in Government Act of 1978.--Section 105(a)(1) of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''. (f) Other Acts.--(1) Section 7(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (29 U.S.C. 2006(b)(2)(A)(i)) is amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''. (2) Section 207(a)(2)(B) of the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1993 (44 U.S.C. 501 note) is amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''. The CHAIRMAN. No amendment to the committee amendment is in order except the amendments printed in House Report 110-144. Each amendment may be offered only in the order printed in the report, by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report, equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent of the amendment, shall not be subject to amendment and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in House Report 110-144. Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Hoekstra The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 printed in House Report 110-144. Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment. The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: Amendment No. 2 offered by Mr. Hoekstra: Strike section 407 (page 24, line 17 through page 26, line 8). The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 388, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan. Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I yield myself 2 minutes. As we have already talked about a number of times in general debate, the base bill includes a provision that directs the Director of National Intelligence to complete a national intelligence estimate on climate change where they shall assess the political, social, agricultural and economic risk during the 30-year period beginning at the date of enactment of this act posed by global climate change. This is a global study, 30 years, and it is very clear what we want to do with this amendment. We want to make sure that the Intelligence Community stays focused on its priorities which is the threat from radical jihadists, the proliferation and the threats posed by Iran, Syria, North Korea and other countries that over this 30-year period may participate in proliferation, the restructuring of the Intelligence Community, and the rebuilding of HUMINT. These are the key priorities that the Intelligence Community and the Intelligence Committees have been focused on over the last number of years. We need to continue that focus rebuilding this community, rebuilding the resources and the capabilities while, as it was discussed, the information that is going to be used is public information. The direction in the bill says it will be a public report, so the real question comes: What specific value does the Intelligence Community add to this process that makes it so important that we will divert resources from other key priorities to climate change? {time} 2315 Why can't this be done in other areas of the government where it is already being done, areas that have already been allocated and been spending dollars in these areas over a number of years in what is projected to be over $7 billion of expenditure in these areas in 2008? Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time. Ms. ESHOO. I rise to claim the time in opposition to the amendment. The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from California is recognized for 5 minutes. Ms. ESHOO. Madam Chairman, as I said when I was speaking a little bit ago, and I am going to make some comments about this amendment, I want to set something else down which I think is really important, and that is, that it's not debatable that this is the largest single intelligence authorization in the history of our country. Now, we are hearing a lot from the other side, hearing a lot from the other side, not enough money, not enough money, not enough money. When did you make any amendments to increase anything in this authorization, with the exception of an earmark with three States specified? That's what you offered, and that's the only thing that you offered. So I think it's important for the people of our country to know what's going on. Now, on this amendment that Mr. Hoekstra offers, this is not a study of climate change. This is a directive to the intelligence community to assess the impacts of climate change; and most frankly, I would go with the former Army chief of staff, Retired General Gordon Sullivan, who said the national security consequences of global climate change should be fully integrated into the national security and national defense strategies, including a National Intelligence Estimate. Climate change is a national security issue. Madam Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey). Mr. MARKEY. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentlelady for her leadership on this issue. As the Chairman of the Select Committee on Global Warming, I conducted [[Page H4896]] a hearing 3 weeks ago in which Retired General Gordon Sullivan, speaking for eleven senior retired three- and four-star admirals and generals, released and testified on a report entitled ``National Security and the Threat of Climate Change,'' which called for global warming to be fully integrated into the military and defense planning. Here's what General Sullivan testified to. He said that he was the Army chief of staff when we lost 19 men in Mogadishu. He testified before the Select Committee on Global Warming that with more drought we will see more disasters such as Black Hawk Down. Drought caused famine, famine caused food relief, food relief caused warlords to fight over it, the warlords fighting caused the U.S. to intervene, and 19 U.S. fighting men were killed. He added, and I quote, that the same thing is what is driving Darfur and there has to be some recognition that these issues are at the heart environmentally related. These are men who have dedicated their lives to protecting our country. They are asking us to do a National Intelligence Estimate about what the impact is of climate leading to drought, leading to famine, leading to conflicts, leading to the American military or other of our allies having been dedicated to preserving the peace. That is no small request from 11 retired three-star generals and admirals. Ms. ESHOO. Madam Chairman, I believe our time has expired? The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman has 1\1/2\ minutes remaining. Ms. ESHOO. Madam Chairwoman, let me just close out this very important debate, and it is important to have a debate. It's very important to have a debate. In listening to it, I see two things: one, a rearview mirror, looking to the past, people that are sincere, but nonetheless I think are sticking their heads in the sand. When we see whole populations, massive movement of populations, moving across borders because of drought, moving across borders because of disruption, they cause national security issues. We know that. This debate is about the future, and I understand why some have trouble seeing the future and even embracing it, much less harnessing it. Mr. MARKEY. Madam Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield? Ms. ESHOO. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts. Mr. MARKEY. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentlelady for yielding. It is not inappropriate for the CIA to tell us how the increasing scarcity of water could exacerbate the very failed state conditions which breed terrorism. It is not politically correct to want the military services to know how polar ice melt could alter the patrols of our submarines or how rising sea levels could threaten not only our naval facilities but also our crucial shipbuilding infrastructure. It is not pre-9/11 mindset that wants to study how our ability to project power from the Pacific would be damaged if our crucial air base at Diego Garcia, average elevation 4 feet above sea level, changes from a land-based stationary aircraft carrier to a sub-sea ruin. That is in the interest of the national security of our country. Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time. I think as you listen to the discussion, the question almost answers itself because the primary question hasn't been answered: Exactly what are we going to task our spy satellites to do? Exactly what are we going to task our human collectors to do? The statistics are very, very obvious in terms of climate change, and there's lots of different, competing ones. Exactly what secrets, with limited resources, are we going to task the intelligence community to go out and collect? And precious analysts that are taking a look at northern Africa and trying to determine exactly what the footprint is of al Qaeda in Algeria and Morocco, Nigeria, other parts of Africa, are we going to ask the CIA stations in those areas to take their time and dedicate it to studying climate change for the next 6 months? It's a totally new task. We have a community that at this point is not even a global community. So we are going to dedicate precious resources instead of expanding the reach of our intelligence community into places where we are not at today, the bigger emphasis is going to be giving them a totally new and different assignment? Instead of tasking our satellites to take a look at exactly what the proliferation capabilities are in China or North Korea, we are going to task them to look somewhere else even though that same kind of capabilities may be available from commercial imagery? Exactly what information does the intelligence community, I mean, it's our business to steal secrets, to find out what the plans and intentions are of those who want to attack the United States. This is information. There are hundreds and probably thousands of people that are very skilled at investigating climate change, predicting what may happen in certain regions of the country and certain regions of the planet, and they are not in the intelligence community. These people have their plate full. The threats are real. We should not diminish the threats. The information is in the public. These are two missions that do not come together. Studying climate change can be done by other government agencies. Stealing the secrets of al Qaeda and North Korea, Iran, other parts of the world, that is the job of the intelligence community. Let them focus on the job that we need them to do. Support this amendment and strike this National Intelligence Estimate. The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra). The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes appeared to have it. Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I demand a recorded vote. The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan will be postponed. Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Holt The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 printed in House Report 110-144. Mr. HOLT. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment. The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: Amendment No. 3 offered by Mr. Holt: At the end of title III (page 16, after line 25), add the following new section: SEC. 309. MODIFICATIONS TO ANNUAL REPORT ON PROTECTION OF INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIES. The first sentence of section 603(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 423(a)) is amended by inserting ``, including an assessment of the need for any modification of this title for the purpose of improving legal protections for covert agents'' after ``measures to protect the identities of covert agents''. The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 388, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey. Mr. HOLT. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. The amendment I am offering would require the President, through the Director of National Intelligence, to report annually to Congress on the need for any modification to the Intelligence Identity Protection Act to improve legal protection for covert agents. This report, along with other oversight work the committee will undertake, will help us establish what measures need to be taken to minimize the chances in the future of compromising the identities of covert operatives. These men and women take enormous risks on our behalf. Their covers are their only protection when they are working overseas. We owe them everything we can do to ensure that their identities are protected from exposure both from hostile intelligence services or even from exposure within our own government by those who would seek to retaliate against them for speaking truth to power. This grew out of my consideration, trying to draw lessons from what has become a well-publicized example of the outing of a former CIA officer. In previous Congresses, on eight separate occasions in committees and on this floor, the then-majority voted down every effort to obtain information on this matter; and as I repeatedly noted at those times, Mr. Fitzgerald's criminal inquiry could never address some of the key questions that we sought answers to: How and why did Ms. Valerie [[Page H4897]] Plame's cover status come to be known to those with no legitimate need to know? How much damage was done to our intelligence collection efforts as a result of the outing of Ms. Plame? What measures has the Central Intelligence Agency and now the Director of National Intelligence taken to prevent similar compromises in the future? It appears that nothing has changed. So this sort of thing could happen again. It's important that we take steps to protect, as I say, the only protection that these covert agents have if they are in dangerous positions overseas. So that is the point of this amendment, and I seek the approval of the House. Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent to claim the 5 minutes in opposition to this amendment, although I will not oppose the amendment. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentleman from Michigan is recognized for 5 minutes. There was no objection. Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, as I indicated, I agree with the gentleman's amendment, and I will vote for his amendment. However, I wish that as we were talking about leaks that we were discussing this in a much broader context. The issue of leaks has been something that has been plaguing the community for an extended period of time, so we were not just talking about the leaks of personal identities. We would be talking about the leaks of programs and tactics and strategies that were being used by the intelligence community and used effectively to keep America safe. We have had far too many leaks of highly classified information, and some of us would believe that as you take a look at some of these leaks, some would say that they perhaps have been made for political purposes. The gentleman's focus on the identities of covert CIA officers is commendable, but should include the loss of capabilities because of other leaks as well. {time} 2330 Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. HOLT. Madam Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time. I support the gentleman's amendment. I am glad that we are able to work through this one. I am hoping that, as we move forward into the rest of this year, we will be able to develop a process that will enable us to more effectively go after all of the different kinds of leaks that the community and the country have suffered from over the last number of years. Madam Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt). The amendment was agreed to. Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Thompson of California The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4 printed in House Report 110-144. Mr. THOMPSON of California. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment. The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Thompson of California: At the end of subtitle A of title IV (page 39, after line 16), add the following new section: SEC. 414. REPORT ON PERSONNEL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. (a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing-- (1) the number of intelligence collectors and analysts employed or contracted by each element of the intelligence community; and (2) a plan to maximize the number of intelligence collectors employed or contracted by the intelligence community. (b) Limitation on Personnel.-- (1) Limitation.--Subject to paragraph (2), but notwithstanding any other provision of this Act (including the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a)), the Office of the Director of National Intelligence is authorized not more than-- (A) the number of personnel employed or contracted by such Office as of May 9, 2007; and (B) an additional 15 percent of such number of personnel employed or contracted by such Office as of May 9, 2007. (2) Termination of limitation.--The limitation on the number of personnel authorized for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence under paragraph (1) shall no longer apply on or after the date on which the report required under subsection (a) is submitted. The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 388, the gentleman from California (Mr. Thompson) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California. Mr. THOMPSON of California. Madam Chairman, I yield myself as much time as I may consume. This Congress created the Director of National Intelligence so he and a core staff could manage the activities of the different intelligence agencies. Congress did not intend to create a new bureaucracy. Nevertheless, the office has expanded in size. Many members of the Intelligence Committee, myself included, as well as other colleagues in the House, are concerned that this growth will complicate, rather than streamline, the activities of the intelligence communities. Some Members have proposed limiting the number of people who can work for the DNI in order to stem this growth. But I believe that such a measure, while satisfying on the surface, would have harmful consequences. It would eliminate a large number of analysts and planners, the experts who actually perform the core intelligence functions, not middle managers and bureaucrats. The harshest impact would fall on DNI elements like the National Counterterrorism Center, which analyzes terrorism information and plans counterterrorism operations. This would happen because there are plans in play to shift personnel to this specific task. If this other amendment were to pass, it would truncate these very important efforts. These are the people who play critical roles in our efforts to combat terrorism, and our operators around the world cannot do their jobs without this critical backstopping. Preventing the DNI from adding staff to these missions would gut key counterterrorism capabilities. The real issue, though, is not simply the number of people who appear on the DNI's balance sheet, the challenge is to have fewer people sitting behind desks in Washington and to place more intelligence officers in the field. This is a goal that I think we all share, even those with a competing amendment. They need to be in the field where they can collect needed intelligence and where they can catch terrorists. The Intelligence Authorization Act will fund increases in the number of intelligence collectors at many agencies, but there is still not enough. To push the Intelligence Committee to get its staff out of the office and into the field, the amendment that I am offering would freeze the number of people working for the DNI at the level specified in the fiscal year 2007 Intelligence Authorization Act that was passed by this House. The freeze wouldn't be lifted until the Director of National Intelligence provides the committee, the Intelligence Committees, one, a report on the number of analysts and collectors in each element of the Intelligence Community, and two, a plan to maximize the number of collectors across the community. This plan must be provided within 120 days of enactment. With this information, the Intelligence Committee will be able to work with the DNI to ensure that he has the right mix of collectors, analysts, technical experts and other staff, and we will be able to press the DNI and the individual intelligence agencies to accelerate the recruitment, the training and the deployment of core collectors. This amendment will enhance congressional oversight of intelligence activities and result in improvements to the Intelligence Community's ability to collect critical intelligence. I am willing to work with, and we have worked with my colleague and friend from the committee on this issue. I believe that this amendment is the one that will allow us to best collect the information so we can, in fact, put together the best policy for America. [[Page H4898]] Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chairman, I claim the time in opposition. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Michigan is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I have the utmost respect for the gentleman. We have had long conversations or at least short interrupted conversations over the past several days and in committee. I thought we had a fairly spirited debate in the Intelligence Committee about this very issue. The good thing is we agree this thing has exponentially grown, not the direction Congress intended. It was supposed to be a small, efficient organization that was coordinating and not inhibiting agencies from doing their work. I reluctantly, as we talked earlier, oppose this amendment, because really all it does is say give me another report, and you can grow as much as you want in 2008. This is what the staggering number is here. The number itself is classified, but it is over 37 percent growth from where they are right now to 2008, in headquarters. Now, they are not catching one spy. They are not recruiting one asset. They are not out analyzing any particular image from the sky. They are getting more in boxes. They are getting more in computers. They are getting more bureaucracies and personnel staff and all of the other things that go along with growing your headquarters. That is all happening. When you travel around the world, the folks who are out there at the front end of this store, the analysts and the case officers, will tell you, please, enough already, because they took all of those analysts out of that community. Remember, it takes 5 to 7 years to get somebody to where they are really effective in this community. It's very difficult work. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Would my colleague yield? Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I would gladly yield. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. I thank you, and I have enormous respect for a colleague who has offered an amendment where it appears we are competing. But I agree our amendment, after his, does, I believe, what is necessary, and that is to answer the question that a lot of us have with reference to the efficiency and effectiveness of the National Director of Intelligence. If I could just share one brief anecdote. When the war on poverty began in the area that I live in, I was the attorney and original scrivener of the development of the program. When that program came into existence, within a year they had seven employees. They were extremely effective. They grew in 6 years to 1,500 employees, and they became much less effective, totally disrespected and in disarray. I am fearful that the same thing will happen here. I thank my colleague for yielding. Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Reclaiming my time. I don't know if I can say it any better. I hope to work with the gentleman in committee. I wish you would consider this. One point I think it is very important to make, this does not cut one analyst. They didn't even make all the hires they requested in 2007. Then they came back and asked for a significant increase in 2008, didn't even hire all the people from 2007. So the notion that they put forward that this somehow cuts the analyst doing counterterrorism work is wrong. It scares me more that this bureaucracy is so hell bent on protecting itself that it would make that claim. That's why I think we need to send this message, work with them to make this right sized, so we provide value added to the people risking their lives around the world. Madam Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. THOMPSON of California. Madam Chairman, again, I just want to reiterate the fact that we all share the same goal, and that's to get these folks out from behind the desk and into the field. I have tremendous respect for my colleague and friend, Mr. Rogers. He actually has real time in the field doing this work. He knows how important that is to have folks out in the field. As he and my other good friend and colleague, Mr. Hastings, has said, we all have the same goal, it's just, how do we get there? We believe that by putting this freeze in place, requiring this information be provided to the committee, will allow us to best analyze this, know where these folks are and force the DNI to put them in the right spots. The only other thing I would like to add is that it's important to note that the majority of this growth consists of transferring personnel who already work or should work for the DNI on to their books for better management and oversight. I ask for your support of this amendment. Madam Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. Thompson). The amendment was agreed to. Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Rogers of Michigan The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 printed in House Report 110-144. Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment. The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Rogers of Michigan: Page 5, line 19, strike ``The amounts'' and insert ``Subject to section 106, the amounts''. Page 6, line 9, strike ``With the approval'' and insert ``Subject to section 106, with the approval''. Page 7, line 11, strike ``The elements'' and insert ``Subject to section 106, the elements''. Page 8, line 5, strike ``In addition'' and insert ``Subject to section 106, in addition''. At the end of title I (page 10, after line 2), add the following new section: SEC. 106. LIMITATION ON NUMBER OF PERSONNEL OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence is authorized only the number of personnel as were serving in such Office on May 1, 2007. The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 388, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan. Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time I may consume. I want to thank Mr. Hastings for working with me on this amendment. We have watched this thing for 3 years, and we have watched it pretty closely. We all want it to succeed. There are some really dedicated and committed people really trying to make this thing work. But one thing I have learned here in watching it in Washington, D.C., and going out to the field, where these case officers, the young ones, the middle-ranged ones and the older ones in the field, you can get a lot of insight about what happens between the difference of between there and back here. We have seen, I thought, a very poor performance. I have had this conversation with many of my colleagues here about their briefings, about this increase, and what they really performed, and what their mission set was. There are some things that they do and do well and are value-added. But this exponential growth, at the expense of analysts and officers in the field, I think is the wrong direction. I think it's so important that we make this statement to them that enough is enough. They brought in, remember, everyone of those analysts came from an agency that's doing targeted work, the counterterrorism center at the CIA. They were doing real work, targeting bad guys, identifying, putting them on lists, trying to get our guys to bring them to justice. What happened then is they disrupted some of those operations, brought those people in, and started tasking back to the people in the field. That's not value-added; it's just not. We can live with this if we can work out the kinks. As a matter of fact, Senator McConnell said, he thought the thing was getting a little bit too big. He didn't really influence this budget, 37 percent increase. We must do better [[Page H4899]] by the people in the field, 5 to 7 years to train a case analyst and an officer. Madam Chairman, I yield to my good friend from Florida (Mr. Hastings). Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. I thank my friend from Michigan and am pleased to sponsor this amendment with him. Madam Chairman, when Congress established the National Director of Intelligence, it fulfilled one of the 9/11 Commission recommendations to centralize and concentrate the filtering of intelligence. Since its inception, however, the Office of the Director never realized its potential, growing in size with indication of limited long-term planning. As a result, many of us who are familiar with the office question its efficiency and effectiveness. Capping the size of the ONDI is a responsible manner by which Congress can and should go about holding the administration accountable for its decisions and actions. This is not, as some might suggest, an anti-NDI amendment. On the contrary, my friend, Mr. Rogers, and my amendment, is the much-needed solution for Congress to reassert its oversight authority over the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. For too long, Congress has abdicated its oversight authority and responsibility when it comes to American intelligence. This amendment says to the administration that, while we support your efforts, we will not give you a blank check with which you could continue to grow a new bureaucracy before we know what you are doing with what you already have. A bigger bureaucracy does not make better intelligence. I ask my colleagues for their support of the Rogers-Hastings amendment and ask them to join us in holding America's Intelligence Community accountable for its work. Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Reclaiming my time, I just thank the gentleman for his work and effort on this, and kind of us coming together on this conclusion over the past 3 years watching this process. Again, this is not anti-DNI. We think it serves a valuable purpose, but it is getting too big too fast. Again, this does not cut one analyst from doing work in this country, not one. They couldn't even fill the slots we have for 2007 before they came back and said we have to get even bigger next year. I reserve the balance of my time. {time} 2345 Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I claim the time in opposition to this amendment. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I have tremendous respect for both of my colleagues, and they know that they have my commitment that we will continue to do aggressive oversight, because I do understand the concerns that they have about Office of the DNI and the way that it has grown and become too large. And while I support the goal of the amendment, I don't necessarily think this is the best way to proceed. The amendment, I believe, will have unintended consequences. For example, though the intent of this amendment is to limit the layers of unnecessary bureaucracy, this cap would actually eliminate large numbers of analysts and planners, with the harshest impact falling on the National Counterterrorism Center, which analyzes terrorism information and plans counterterrorism operations. It would also have the unintended consequence that it would eliminate personnel from the National Counterproliferation Center and the Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties. In addition, this amendment would force the DNI to fire anyone hired between May 1 and the date of the enactment of this bill, preventing the DNI from increasing capacity in priority areas. It is important, I believe, to note that this amendment would not cap the number of billets; it would cap the total number of people. Any currently unfilled billets would have to remain unfilled. This could negatively impact the DNI's ability to perform vital functions. Finally, I would ask my colleagues to consider that we do have, as Mr. Rogers said, a new DNI, and he deserves an opportunity to do the kinds of things that he has articulated to our committee. He is reorganizing his office, and I believe that we need to give him the flexibility needed to make those changes, while at the same time aggressively pursuing the oversight that is the responsibility of our committee. So, for those reasons, I reluctantly would oppose this amendment. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. REYES. I yield to the gentleman from Florida. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. I know the chairman knows of my immense respect for his perspective, and I appreciate very much what you have said with regard to how you would carry forth the intent of mine and Mr. Rogers' amendment, as well as Mr. Thompson's, in capping this. What I say to you, Mr. Chairman, is I don't know in all of my experience of any bureaucrat, I respect the new DNI director, but I don't know of any bureaucrat that has ever said, I don't need no more people. And I also know for a fact that, in this particular case, in the standing up of this particular directorate what has happened is it has impacted already the infrastructure by virtue of the persons that have already moved to that agency. The now-CIA Director came from NSA to that deputy position. And I could go on and on and on without giving forth that. And that is what we are trying to stop. What you do when you want to cut bureaucracy is you say to them, stop right where you are. Now, they will be back, and we will then do the oversight necessary in order to give them an opportunity to grow the way that they should rather than the way that they have been exponentially. Mr. REYES. I thank my good friend and colleague. And reclaiming my time, again, we want to accomplish the same goal. We just have a difference of opinion on how we are going to do it. But it will get done, and it will get done by this committee this year. So, again, I have deep respect and admiration for both my colleagues. Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I just want to clarify again, there is no one to be cut, with all due respect to my chairman. What they are talking about is what they have future planned, which would be pulled from the community as it stands now. It would actually allow the DNI to reprioritize the folks that he has in that shop. And many of my colleagues will remember that the number that the DNI gave was lower than the number that is even in Mr. Hastings' and my amendment. He thinks it is too big. So there won't be any cuts, there won't be any jeopardizing of security, there won't be any analysts that get home once they are employed and fully engaged. They may go back to doing counterterrorism work, but they will not be sent home. The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers). The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes appeared to have it. Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chairman, I demand a recorded vote. The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan will be postponed. Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Fossella The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 printed in House Report 110-144. Mr. FOSSELLA. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment. The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: Amendment No. 6 offered by Mr. Fossella: At the end of the bill, add the following new title: TITLE VI--COMMUNICATION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING TERRORIST THREATS SEC. 601. IDENTIFICATION OF BEST PRATICES. (a) Study.--The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence shall conduct jointly, or contract with an entity to conduct, a study of the operations of Federal, State, and local government entities to identify best practices for the communication of information concerning a terrorist threat. (b) Contents.-- (1) Identification of best practices.--The study conducted under this section shall be focused on an analysis and identification of the best practices of the information sharing processes of the following government entities: [[Page H4900]] (A) Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which are operated by the Federal Bureau of Investigations with the participation of local law enforcement agencies. (B) State Homeland Security Fusion Centers, which are established by a State and share information with Federal departments. (C) The Homeland Security Operations Center, which is operated by the Department of Homeland Security for the purposes of coordinating information. (D) State and local law enforcement agencies that collect, utilize, and disseminate information on potential terrorist attacks. (E) The appropriate elements of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))) involved in the sharing of counter- terrorism information. (F) The Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group at the National Counterterrorism Center. (2) Coordination of government entities.--The study conducted under this section shall include an examination of methods for coordinating the activities of Federal, State, and local entities in responding to a terrorist threat, and specifically the communication to the general public of information concerning the threat. The study shall not include an examination of the sources and methods used in the collection of the information. (c) Obtaining Official Data.--In conducting the study, the Secretary, in conjunction with the Director, with due regard for the protection of classified information, may secure directly from any department or agency of the United States information necessary to enable the Secretary to carry out this section. Classified information shall be handled through established methods for controlling such information. (d) Temporary Duty of Federal Personnel.--The Secretary, in conjunction with the Director, may request the head of any department or agency of the United States to detail to temporary duty personnel within the administrative jurisdiction of the head of the department or agency that the Secretary may need to carry out this section, each detail to be without loss of seniority, pay, or other employee status. (e) Report.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in conjunction with the Director, shall submit to Congress a report that contains-- (A) a detailed statement of the findings and conclusions of the study, including identification of the best practices for the processing, analysis, and dissemination of information between the government entities referred to in subsection (b)(1); and (B) recommendations for a formalized process of consultation, communication, and confidentiality between Federal, State, and local governments, incorporating the best practices of the various entities studied, to facilitate communication and help prevent the unauthorized dissemination of information and criticism of decisions concerning terrorist threats. (2) Classified information.--To the extent determined appropriate by the Secretary, in conjunction with the Director, the Secretary may submit a portion of the report in classified form. (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2008. SEC. 602. CENTERS OF BEST PRACTICES. (a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall make grants for the establishment and operation of 3 centers to implement the best practices, identified by the study conducted under section 601, for the processing, analysis, and dissemination of information concerning a terrorist threat (in this section, each referred to as a ``Center''). (b) Location of Centers.--In carrying out subsection (a), the Secretary, in consultation with the Director, shall make grants to-- (1) the State of New York for the establishment of a Center to be located in New York City; (2) the State of Michigan for the establishment of a Center to be located in Detroit; and (3) the State of California for the establishment of a Center to be located in Los Angeles. (c) Purpose of Centers.--Each Center shall-- (1) implement the best practices, identified by the study conducted under section 601, for information sharing concerning a terrorist threat; (2) coordinate the communication of these best practices with other metropolitan areas; (3) coordinate with the Secretary and the Director to develop a training curriculum to implement these best practices; (4) provide funding and technical assistance to other metropolitan areas to assist the metropolitan areas in the implementation of the curriculum developed under paragraph (3); and (5) coordinate with the Secretary and the Director to establish a method to advertise and disseminate these best practices. (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for making grants under this section-- (1) $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2008 for the establishment of the Centers; and (2) $3,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2009 through 2013 for the operation of the Centers. (e) Report to Congress.--Not later than March 31, 2010, the Secretary, in consultation with the Director, shall submit to Congress a report evaluating the operations of the Centers and making recommendations for future funding. The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 388, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Fossella) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York. Mr. FOSSELLA. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume. On October 6, 2005, New York City was once again the site of a potential terrorist attack, an apparent plot to hide bombs in baby strollers, briefcases, and packages and set them off in the city's subways. Unfortunately, New Yorkers who tuned in to the news that day for information received conflicting messages. On one hand, local officials announced that a credible threat was aimed at the city's subway system; on the other hand, Federal officials downplayed the severity of the threat, even describing it as ``specific yet noncredible.'' The incident in New York was not isolated. Just weeks later, Federal officials responded to a bomb threat in the I-95 tunnel in the Baltimore Harbor, a threat that local officials learned about from the news media. The information was either credible or not credible, but it certainly wasn't both. I strongly support efforts by antiterrorism forces at the Federal, State, and local levels; but it disturbed me, and I am sure others, to watch the confusion that unfolded in these situations. Where improvement is needed is how different levels of government interact with each other when terrorist threats are elevated. Everyone needs to be on the same page and, when credible threats occur, the public needs to be informed in a coordinated manner. In short, what is needed is a 911 call center for first responders. To achieve that, my amendment works as follows: authorizing a study to be conducted by the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence to identify the problems and the successes of terrorist threat information sharing among the different levels of government; Recommends a formalized process for that sharing; And authorizes centers of best practices spread throughout the country, and would allow local governments, State and others, to interact and to share that information. Because not every city, as we know, can dedicate resources to developing advanced techniques to fight terrorism, the Centers for Best Practices would be on the front lines providing advice to every city and State in our Nation on the most effective strategies to protect their citizens from new attacks. This amendment would ensure an enhanced level of coordination on communicating terrorist threats to the public. But while it comes to matters of national security, our government must speak with one voice, a knowledgeable voice that can provide accurate information to the American people. Government cannot send conflicting messages at such critical times. Last year during debate of this bill, the House approved this amendment by voice vote; and I notice the gentlelady from California who is here, Ms. Harman, said it probably best. She said at the time, We not only need to share information better horizontally, a point we have been making in this committee and one of the reasons we set up the Director of National Intelligence, but we need to share it better vertically. Some of the best ideas are in our hometowns and some of the best people to try to keep us safe are in our hometowns. I support the Fossella amendment. It will help us through the establishment of Centers of Excellence to develop best practices to share information horizontally and vertically, and give best information to those in our hometowns trying to protect us. Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York. The amendment was agreed to. [[Page H4901]] Amendment No. 7 Offered by Ms. Lee The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7 printed in House Report 110-144. Ms. LEE. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment. The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: Amendment No. 7 offered by Ms. Lee: At the end of subtitle A of title V (page 48, after line 5), add the following new section: SEC. 503. REPORT ON AUTHORIZATION TO OVERTHROW DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENTS. Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report describing any authorization granted during the 10-year period ending on the date of the enactment of this Act to engage in intelligence activities related to the overthrow of a democratically elected government. The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 388, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California. Ms. LEE. Madam Chair, first let me thank the Chair of the Intelligence Committee and my friend from my hometown of El Paso, Texas (Mr. Reyes) for his support of this amendment and also for his tremendous leadership as Chair of this committee. And I know the hour is late, so I will keep this short. Madam Chair, this amendment is simple and noncontroversial. It merely requires the President to submit a report to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees describing any authorization granted over the last 10 years to engage in intelligence activities related to the overthrow of democratically elected governments. We all recognize that democracy promotion is at the top of this administration's agenda; and I believe that there is no question that supporting democracy is and should be a nonpartisan issue that we all can agree on. It is, quite simply, fundamental to who we are as a people and what we stand for as a Nation. But we must be vigilant and safeguard against any actions that would undermine or threaten our abilities to really practice what we preach, and it is clear that actions that undermine democracies also undermine our credibility in the world. Furthermore, it affects our ability to be viewed as a serious and legitimate agent of democracy. So if the support of people seeking democratic governance and democracy is to really remain a critical pillar of our foreign policy, we must ensure that we do not interfere with democratically elected governments. Who will believe us if our actions are inconsistent with our words? And how successful will we be as a Nation in achieving our goals? So tonight I offer this amendment to support and protect our efforts in upholding democracy and to help ensure that our actions are really consistent with our values. Madam Chair, I want to conclude by thanking you again for your support, and I want to strongly urge all of my colleagues here today to continue to stand up for democracy and for transparency by supporting this amendment. Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, while I will not oppose the amendment, I ask unanimous consent to control the 5 minutes in opposition to the amendment. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentleman from Michigan is recognized for 5 minutes. There was no objection. Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I would like to thank my colleague Ms. Lee for working over the last couple of years to get to the point where we have got an amendment that I still have a little bit of unease with, but I will not oppose the amendment, and look forward to continuing to work with her and my colleagues on the other side of the aisle as we do the oversight necessary of what goes on in the intelligence community. Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time. Ms. LEE. Madam Chair, I yield to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes). Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I just want to thank the gentlelady for offering this amendment and offer my support. I think it is an important amendment. Ms. LEE. Madam Chair, if there are no additional speakers, I close by once again thanking all of our leadership on both sides of the aisle. And I want to especially thank Congresswoman Harman for her past leadership and support of these efforts to make sure that we were able to get to this point today. Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee). The amendment was agreed to. Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Price of North Carolina The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 8 printed in House Report 110-144. Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment. The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: Amendment No. 8 offered by Mr. Price of North Carolina: Page 33, after line 13 insert the following new subsections: (d) Use of Contractors for Intelligence Activities.-- (1) Report.--Not later than April 1, 2008, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on personal services activities performed by contractors under the National Intelligence Program and, at the discretion of the Director of National Intelligence, the Military Intelligence Program. Such report shall include-- (A) an inventory of the types of functions and activities performed by contractors in fulfillment of contracts for each element of the intelligence community; (B) a description of any relevant regulations or guidance issued by the Director of National Intelligence or the head of an element of the intelligence community relating to minimum standards required regarding the hiring, training, security clearance, and assignment of contract personnel; (C) an assessment of costs incurred or savings achieved by awarding contracts for the performance of such functions referred to in subparagraph (A) instead of using full-time employees of the elements of the intelligence community to perform such functions; (D) a description of the types of functions or activities that the Director of National Intelligence considers appropriate to be carried out by contractors; (E) a description of the types of functions or activities that the Director of National Intelligence considers inappropriate to be carried out by contractors; (F) an assessment of the appropriateness of using contractors to perform the activities described in paragraph (2); and (G) an estimate of the number of contracts, and the number of personnel working under such contracts, related to the performance of activities described in paragraph (2). (2) Activities.--Activities described in this paragraph are the following: (A) Intelligence collection. (B) Intelligence analysis. (C) Covert actions. (D) Interrogation of a person detained, imprisoned, or otherwise held in the custody or under the control of the United States Government. (E) Support for the detention, imprisonment, or holding of a person under the custody or control of the United States Government, including activities relating to the detention, transfer, or transportation of such person across international borders. (F) Conduct of electronic or physical surveillance or monitoring of United States citizens in the United States. (3) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 388, the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Price) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina. Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Madam Chair, I rise to offer an amendment on behalf of Ms. Schakowsky and myself that would complement the provisions already in this bill related to the use of private contractors by intelligence agencies. I applaud Chairman Reyes for his leadership in addressing many key questions associated with the use of contractors. Last year, I stood at this podium and proposed an amendment that would have required an extensive look at these questions: How extensively are contractors being used? What types of activities are appropriate for contractors? How are they held accountable? Are they achieving savings for the American people? And [[Page H4902]] what are the impacts of contracting on the intelligence workforce? My amendment passed the House, but the other body did not act on the bill. This year, Chairman Reyes has included language in his bill that addresses many of these questions, and I am grateful for his leadership. I also want to acknowledge the efforts of the new Director of National Intelligence, Michael McConnell, who has begun an examination of the questions raised by my amendments last year. He and his staff have just completed a community-wide survey of contracting and are reportedly working on a strategic workforce plan. These efforts are important first steps. Our amendment today focuses on additional aspects of this situation that have not yet been addressed, aspects that are absolutely critical. {time} 0000 There's a legitimate debate in the Intelligence Community about how contractors should be used. Our amendment simply asks the Intelligence Community to respond to three basic questions underlying this debate. First, what functions may contractors appropriately perform for the intelligence communities, and what tasks should be viewed as inherently governmental? For example, should they be involved in intelligence collection? Should they be involved in analysis? What about interrogation? What about covert operations? Are there some activities that are so sensitive that they should only be performed by highly trained Intelligence Community professionals? Secondly, how should contractors be vetted and trained? And thirdly, how can we ensure that contractors are as accountable for their actions as Federal intelligence professionals are? Madam Chairman, service contracts, in some instances, represent an acceptable and efficient use of taxpayer dollars. But a decision to use contractors should be made deliberately based on a careful analysis of the issues raised by this amendment. This is true for any use of private contractors. But it is particularly necessary in the context of sensitive Intelligence Community activities. I urge my colleagues to support our amendment. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my colleague from Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky). Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me, and I thank him for his leadership on this important amendment. After the Cold War, the use of contractors began to grow, and their use exploded after September 11, 2001. Contractors now do more than just build military equipment and satellites. They also provide security, collect and analyze intelligence, provide technical support, and even perform planning and management tasks. Mr. Price's amendment requires a review of what contractors are doing and, importantly, whether contractors are performing inherently governmental functions. There are some activities so sensitive that, if and when they are done, we must determine whether or not it is appropriate to contract these activities out. In some cases, U.S. contractors' actions have caused great controversy. The Lincoln Group's contract to plant positive news stories in Iraq raised questions about manipulation of the Iraqi media. Dave Passaro, a CIA contractor was convicted of four counts of assaulting an Afghan detainee who later died. Contractors were implicated in the detainee abuse cases at Abu Ghraib. These activities are controversial enough on their own, and if the U.S. engages in them, we should do so while accepting full responsibility and not hide behind contractors. The Price-Schakowsky amendment would ask the DNI to review whether it is appropriate for contractors to engage in intelligence collection, analysis, covert actions, interrogations, detentions, rendition or electronic surveillance. This is an important amendment, and I urge its adoption. Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Madam Chairman, I thank my colleague for her leadership on this amendment and on this issue. For a long time now she has helped this House focus on the use of private contractors. Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of our time. Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to the amendment. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Michigan is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. HOEKSTRA. I reluctantly rise in opposition to the amendment, recognizing that it's very similar to an amendment that we actually accepted last year. And the reason we reluctantly accepted it last year, we had a high degree of confidence that if we got into a conference, we would be able to work with the author of the amendment to take a look at it and to make sure that what was finally in a conference report in a bill that we were looking forward to sending to the President would make sure that we took care of some the redundancies and some of the burdensome elements of the amendment. And without necessarily having that same assurance this year, I reluctantly oppose the amendment. I think that it is absolutely critical that we do measure the accountability and the performance of our contractors, but much like last year, we are concerned about the redundancy, the bureaucracy that may result if this amendment becomes law in its present form. It could add significant cost to the contractors as they serve and provide services to the Intelligence Community. So I hope as we go through this process that we will be able to make sure that we work on a bipartisan basis, that we work with the community, that we work with the ODNI to structure this in such a way that both of the requirements are met, that we see and get the performance and, at the same time, that we don't burden contractors or the ODNI with additional bureaucracy. With that, I'll yield back the balance of my time. Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Madam Chairman, as a matter of fact, this amendment is drafted very carefully to avoid redundancy. It's crafted to deal with a separate area, a different area from those areas covered in the bill itself. And it mandates a reporting requirement, not to add work to the Executive Branch; to ensure that we get the information we need to do our job. Surely, no one would argue that Congress shouldn't be able to assess whether our approach to intelligence is effective or to conduct oversight on the way billions of dollars in taxpayer funds are expended each year. We're not establishing new regulations. We are simply requiring contractors to report on their activity. The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Price). The amendment was agreed to. Amendment No. 9 Offered by Ms. Berkley The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 9 printed in House Report 110-144. Ms. BERKLEY. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment. The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: Amendment No. 9 offered by Ms. Berkley: At the end of subtitle A of title IV (page 39, after line 16), add the following new section: SEC. 414. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON RETIREMENT BENEFITS FOR FORMER EMPLOYEES OF AIR AMERICA. (a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the advisability of providing Federal retirement benefits to United States citizens for the service of such citizens before 1977 as employees of Air America or an associated company while such company was owned or controlled by the United States Government and operated or managed by the Central Intelligence Agency. (b) Report Elements.-- (1) In general.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following: (A) The history of Air America and associated companies before 1977, including a description of-- (i) the relationship between such companies and the Central Intelligence Agency and other elements of the United States Government; (ii) the workforce of such companies; (iii) the missions performed by such companies and their employees for the United States; and (iv) the casualties suffered by employees of such companies in the course of their employment with such companies. [[Page H4903]] (B) A description of the retirement benefits contracted for or promised to the employees of such companies before 1977, the contributions made by such employees for such benefits, the retirement benefits actually paid such employees, the entitlement of such employees to the payment of future retirement benefits, and the likelihood that former employees of such companies will receive any future retirement benefits. (C) An assessment of the difference between-- (i) the retirement benefits that former employees of such companies have received or will receive by virtue of their employment with such companies; and (ii) the retirement benefits that such employees would have received and in the future receive if such employees had been, or would now be, treated as employees of the United States whose services while in the employ of such companies had been or would now be credited as Federal service for the purpose of Federal retirement benefits. (D) The recommendations of the Director regarding the advisability of legislative action to treat employment at such companies as Federal service for the purpose of Federal retirement benefits in light of the relationship between such companies and the United States Government and the services and sacrifices of such employees to and for the United States, and if legislative action is considered advisable, a proposal for such action and an assessment of its costs. (2) Views of dcia.--The Director of National Intelligence shall include in the report any views of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency on the matters covered by the report that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency considers appropriate. (c) Assistance of Comptroller General.--The Comptroller General shall, upon the request of the Director of National Intelligence and in a manner consistent with the protection of classified information, assist the Director in the preparation of the report required by subsection (a). (d) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (e) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Air america.--The term ``Air America'' means Air America, Incorporated. (2) Associated company.--The term ``associated company'' means any company associated with or subsidiary to Air America, including Air Asia Company Limited and the Pacific Division of Southern Air Transport, Incorporated. The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 388, the gentlewoman from Nevada (Ms. Berkley) and a Member opposed will each control 5 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Nevada. Ms. BERKLEY. Good morning, Madam Chairman. I rise today in support of an amendment that would require the CIA to issue a report on providing retirement benefits to former employees of Air America. From 1950 to 1976, employees of Air America faithfully served their country doing their part to help win the Cold War. Air America was a government corporation covertly owned and operated by the Central Intelligence Agency. Under the guise of a civilian airline, these pilots conducted flight operations in various countries, including China, Laos, Korea and Vietnam on behalf of the Department of Defense and the CIA. Unfortunately, since it was a closely held secret that Air America was a government-owned corporation, these men and women have never been credited for their government service. That means they can not receive government benefits, retirement benefits for their efforts. The amendment I am offering today would require the Director of National Intelligence to submit a report to Congress on advisability of providing Federal retirement benefits to U.S. citizens employed by Air America while it was covertly owned and operated by the CIA. These brave men and women should receive the long denied benefits they earned for their service to their country. I urge you to support this amendment that will bring attention to the overlooked dilemma of Air America employees. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I thank the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Mr. Reyes. I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to claim the time in opposition to the amendment, although I will not oppose the amendment. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentleman from Michigan is recognized for 5 minutes. There was no objection. Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I will yield myself as much time as I shall consume. There's no doubt that the Air America's personnel deserve the recognition for the service that they provided during these critical times in our country in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam war. But it's very interesting to me that, at this time, as we're considering other amendments, and much of the debate that I hear about contractors and our use of contractors today, contractors are getting hammered each and every day. And then we step back and say, well, you know, we ought to take a look at the contractors of 50 years ago, and we maybe now ought to provide them with government benefits. And I just wonder whether, in 50 years, we'll look back at the service that is being provided by contractors today that in many different areas is not being very well received, and whether we will then recognize the service that they're providing. I hope that we do. But, under this, under the terms of Air America, legally these individuals did not qualify for government benefits. We need to make sure that we deal in a way that is fair, especially to the people that are serving as contractors today. And we need to make sure that we have a consistent pattern of how we deal with contractors in this way, recognizing that their pay comes from a private sector entity, and be very careful about when and where we are going to involve the Federal Government in picking up responsibilities of private corporations. Madam Chairman, I will reserve the balance of my time. Ms. BERKLEY. Madam Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson-Lee. Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Madam Chairman, I thank the sponsor of this legislation. Human resources and human intelligence are a key element to the security of this Nation. Air America employees represent the human resources aspect. This is a thoughtful amendment that suggests that we should study the question of whether or not these individuals in the service of their country should be given these kinds of benefits. From the perspective of the Department of Homeland Security and Homeland Security Committee, human intelligence is important. And I want to thank the Chairperson of the full committee for this very important bill that focuses on funding intelligence and also funding human intelligence. Might I also say in closing, as I support the gentlelady's amendment, I think it would also be important that we look closely at professionals as they leave the CIA, and question whether or not tell- all books are in the best interest of this Nation, whether language such as ``slam dunk'' should be investigated. And I hope, as we pursue the idea of oversight, that we'll look into the utilization of such information in tell-all books that provide such prosperity for people who've been in the service of this country. I hope we will investigate that. But when we have good employees like those of Air America, we should support them. Ms. BERKLEY. In closing, I'd like to once again urge adoption of this amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, just in response to my colleague, if we investigate ``slam dunk,'' I hope we investigate the term ``bugs and bunnies'' as well. I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Nevada (Ms. Berkley). The amendment was agreed to. Amendment No. 10 Offered by Mr. Schiff The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 10 printed in House Report 110-144. Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment. The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: Amendment No. 10 offered by Mr. Schiff: At the end of subtitle A of title V (page 48, after line 5), add the following new section: [[Page H4904]] SEC. 503. REITERATION OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978 AS THE EXCLUSIVE MEANS BY WHICH ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MAY BE CONDUCTED FOR GATHERING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. (a) Exclusive Means.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance may be conducted for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information. (b) Specific Authorization Required for Exception.-- Subsection (a) shall apply until specific statutory authorization for electronic surveillance, other than as an amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), is enacted. Such specific statutory authorization shall be the only exception to subsection (a). (c) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Electronic surveillance.--The term ``electronic surveillance'' has the meaning given the term in section 101(f) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801(f)). (2) Foreign intelligence information.--The term ``foreign intelligence information'' has the meaning given the term in section 101(e) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1801(e)). The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 388, the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California. Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I yield myself 3 minutes. Madam Chair, today I offer an amendment with my Republican colleague Jeff Flake from Arizona that would respond to the President's unilateral assertion of power with regard to the electronic surveillance of Americans on U.S. soil and reassert that our existing statutes govern the operation of such surveillance. Madam Chair, the Federal Government has a duty to pursue al Qaeda and other enemies of the United States with all available tools, including the use of electronic surveillance, to thwart future attacks on the United States and to destroy the enemy. While the President possesses the inherent authority to engage in electronic surveillance of the enemy outside the country, Congress possesses the authority to regulate such surveillance within the United States. When Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, it intended for this statute to provide the sole authority for surveillance of Americans on American soil for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information. Our amendment reiterates this important principle. The President has argued that the authorization for the use of military force provided him with the authority to engage in warrantless electronic surveillance of Americans. {time} 0015 It is hard to believe that any of us contemplated, when we voted to authorize the use of force to root out the terrorists who attacked us on September 11, that we were also voting to nullify FISA. Our amendment makes clear that in the absence of explicit statutory authority, FISA is the exclusive authority for the conduct of domestic electronic surveillance of Americans. While the administration appears to have finally agreed that electronic surveillance occurring as part of the Terrorist Surveillance Program, or TSP, should cease to operate without the approval of the FISA court, the administration has not conceded that it cannot conduct such electronic surveillance of Americans unilaterally outside of FISA with no judicial oversight either now or in the future. While we have been told that surveillance in this program was limited to phone calls where one of the parties is outside of the United States, there appears to be no limiting principle to the Executive's claim of authority provided by the military force resolution. In fact, when we questioned the Attorney General on this point in the last session, he would not rule out the proposition that the Executive has the authority to wiretap purely domestic calls between two Americans without seeking a warrant. No one in Congress would deny the need to tap certain calls under court order, but if the government can tap purely domestic phone calls between Americans without court approval, there is no limit to executive power. Congress cannot be silent in the face of this assertion of authority. In working to meet the real national security needs of the country, we must also ensure that Congress does not abdicate its responsibility to ensure that fundamental liberties are not compromised. Absent congressional action, law-abiding U.S. citizens may continue to have reasonable fear of being the subject of extra-judicial surveillance. Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time. Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico. Madam Chairman, I rise to claim the time in opposition to the amendment. The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman is recognized for 5 minutes. Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. When the President acknowledged the existence of the Terrorist Surveillance Program, he claimed the inherent authority, under article II of the Constitution, as the Commander in Chief to be able to conduct that surveillance. Now, whether you agree or don't agree with his interpretation of the Constitution, this amendment, and a bill with this amendment in it, does not change the Constitution. I will admit to the gentleman from California I personally believe that the legal arguments that were presented in favor of the Terrorist Surveillance Program were not strong. They weren't strong at all. And that is why I demanded more rigorous oversight to the program and proposed legislation to change the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act so that we can listen to our enemies and protect the civil liberties of Americans. The sad thing is that the bipartisan leadership of this body, Democrat and Republican, knew for 5 years this program was going on and did nothing to update the laws or even propose that perhaps this was wrong to do this this way. They remained silent. The failure is in the Congress. We now know that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as it is currently written, is not getting us critical information about our enemies and also, frankly, not protecting the civil liberties of Americans. It is broken and not working. The Director of National Intelligence testified last week in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, saying that we are missing important information because this law is trapped in 1970s technology. In January of this year, the Attorney General wrote to the Congress and said that we now have innovative orders from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. By ``innovative'' what he really meant is that we are on very fragile legal ground. I describe it as putting a twin-size sheet on a king-size bed, and everybody on the Intelligence Committee knows exactly what I mean. We have one judge, in a nonadversarial proceeding, in secret session, who has approved some innovative orders. He is way out on a legal limb. So what will the next judge do? And after this amendment passes saying, by golly, we are determined to stay in the 1970s, the Congress is happy with a 1970s law governing 1970s technology, what is the next judge going to do? And how does that compromise our national security? We have a problem. In 1978 almost all local communications went over a wire and almost all long-haul communications went over the air. The statute sets up different regimes for what to do for over-the-wire communications that you need a warrant for to collect foreign intelligence information. Over the air the sky is the limit. We now, in the 21st century, have things completely reversed. Now almost all local calls are over the air. 230 million Americans have cell phones, and yet almost all long- distance calls are over wires. The information that we critically need is on the wires. This law is outdated, and we are stuck with our heads in the sand in 1970s law. And your amendment insists that we stay there. I will oppose this amendment and urge my colleagues to do the same. Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chairman, as my colleague from California (Ms. Harman) points out, FISA has been amended 12 times, and, moreover, we have proposed to amend FISA to modernize it at present, and Mr. Flake and I propose to amend it as well. The argument of my colleague seems to be that FISA needs to be amended, [[Page H4905]] it hasn't been amended yet; so we should allow the President to simply ignore it. That, I submit, is not constitutional and not desirable. Madam Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to my colleague from Arizona (Mr. Flake). Mr. FLAKE. Madam Chairman, I thank Mr. Schiff for yielding, and I appreciate working with him on this important amendment and on this issue for a long time. Madam Chairman, this amendment would reiterate that FISA is the exclusive means by which domestic electronic surveillance can be conducted for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information. As has been stated before, we have, on the Judiciary Committee, for years been asking the administration what can we not do within FISA, do we need to change FISA in order to be able to conduct surveillance we need within FISA. We have never been given compelling information or evidence why we can't do what we need to do within FISA. As Mr. Schiff mentioned, if we do need to change FISA to update it again, as it has been changed and updated multiple times, then we should do it. However, we simply can't say FISA is insufficient; so go around it, and we don't want to know what goes on outside of it. Go ahead with the Terrorist Surveillance Program. We will have no congressional oversight. That is simply unacceptable. If we do need to change FISA, if we do need to modernize it, let's modernize it again, again, and again. But let's make sure that Congress maintains its prerogative to regulate the surveillance that goes on to make sure that it is done with civil liberties in mind. That is what this amendment seeks to do, and I am pleased to work with Mr. Schiff on it. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California's time has expired. Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico. Madam Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act has been amended since 1978 several times. But what has not changed is the basic structure of the law, that it treats wire communications differently than it treats over-the-air communications. You do not need a warrant to gather foreign intelligence information that is flowing through the air by radio waves or cell tower or microwave or anything else. We do it. You do need it over a wire. The law needs to be technology neutral and it is not. What you are doing by your amendment is reaffirming that this House tonight is determined to stay with the 1970s law and 1970s technology. And this House also rejected an amendment that would have updated these statutes. My colleague from Arizona says do we need to change FISA? We really don't know. We have a written submission from the Director of National Intelligence telling us the changes that need to be made. I urge my colleagues to look to the 21st-century technology to protect this country and reject the gentleman's amendment. The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff). The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes appeared to have it. Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico. Madam Chairman, I demand a recorded vote. The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California will be postponed. Announcement by the Chairman The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, proceedings will now resume on those amendments on which further proceedings were postponed, in the following order: Amendment No. 2 by Mr. Hoekstra of Michigan. Amendment No. 5 by Mr. Rogers of Michigan. Amendment No. 10 by Mr. Schiff of California. The Chair will reduce to 2 minutes the time for any electronic vote after the first vote in this series. Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Hoekstra The CHAIRMAN. The unfinished business is the demand for a recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the noes prevailed by voice vote. The Clerk will redesignate the amendment. The Clerk redesignated the amendment. Recorded Vote The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded. A recorded vote was ordered. The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 185, noes 230, not voting 22, as follows: [Roll No. 337] AYES--185 Aderholt Akin Alexander Bachmann Bachus Baker Barrett (SC) Barton (TX) Bean Biggert Bilbray Bilirakis Bishop (UT) Blackburn Blunt Boehner Bonner Bono Boozman Boren Boustany Brady (TX) Brown (SC) Brown-Waite, Ginny Buchanan Burgess Burton (IN) Buyer Calvert Camp (MI) Campbell (CA) Cannon Cantor Capito Carter Chabot Coble Cole (OK) Conaway Crenshaw Cubin Culberson Davis (KY) Davis, David Deal (GA) Dent Diaz-Balart, L. Diaz-Balart, M. Drake Duncan Emerson English (PA) Everett Fallin Feeney Flake Forbes Fortenberry Fossella Foxx Franks (AZ) Frelinghuysen Gallegly Garrett (NJ) Gerlach Gillmor Gingrey Gohmert Goode Goodlatte Granger Graves Hall (TX) Hastert Hastings (WA) Hayes Heller Hensarling Herger Hobson Hoekstra Hulshof Hunter Inglis (SC) Issa Jindal Johnson, Sam Jones (NC) Jordan Keller King (IA) King (NY) Kingston Kirk Kline (MN) Knollenberg Kuhl (NY) LaHood Lamborn Latham LaTourette Lewis (CA) Lewis (KY) Linder Lucas Lungren, Daniel E. Mack Manzullo Marchant McCarthy (CA) McCaul (TX) McCotter McCrery McHenry McHugh McKeon Melancon Mica Miller (FL) Miller (MI) Miller, Gary Moran (KS) Murphy, Tim Musgrave Myrick Neugebauer Nunes Paul Pearce Pence Petri Pickering Pitts Platts Poe Porter Price (GA) Pryce (OH) Putnam Regula Rehberg Reichert Renzi Reynolds Rogers (AL) Rogers (KY) Rogers (MI) Rohrabacher Ros-Lehtinen Roskam Royce Ryan (WI) Sali Schmidt Sensenbrenner Sessions Shadegg Shimkus Shuster Simpson Smith (NE) Smith (TX) Stearns Sullivan Tancredo Terry Thornberry Tiahrt Tiberi Turner Upton Walberg Walden (OR) Walsh (NY) Wamp Weldon (FL) Weller Westmoreland Whitfield Wicker Wilson (NM) Wilson (SC) Wolf Young (AK) Young (FL) NOES--230 Abercrombie Ackerman Allen Altmire Andrews Arcuri Baca Baird Baldwin Barrow Bartlett (MD) Becerra Berkley Berman Berry Bishop (GA) Bishop (NY) Blumenauer Boswell Boucher Boyd (FL) Boyda (KS) Braley (IA) Brown, Corrine Butterfield Capps Capuano Cardoza Carnahan Carney Castle Castor Chandler Clarke Clay Clyburn Cohen Cooper Costa Costello Courtney Cramer Crowley Cummings Davis (AL) Davis (CA) Davis (IL) Davis, Lincoln Davis, Tom DeFazio DeGette Delahunt DeLauro Dicks Dingell Doggett Donnelly Doyle Edwards Ehlers Ellison Ellsworth Emanuel Eshoo Etheridge Faleomavaega Farr Ferguson Filner Frank (MA) Giffords Gilchrest Gillibrand Gonzalez Gordon Green, Al Green, Gene Gutierrez Hall (NY) Hare Harman Hastings (FL) Herseth Sandlin Higgins Hill Hinchey Hirono Hodes Holden Holt Honda Hooley Hoyer Inslee Israel Jackson (IL) Jackson-Lee (TX) Johnson (GA) Johnson (IL) Johnson, E. B. Jones (OH) Kagen Kanjorski Kaptur Kennedy Kildee Kilpatrick Kind Klein (FL) Kucinich Lampson Langevin Lantos Larsen (WA) Larson (CT) Lee Levin Lewis (GA) Lipinski LoBiondo Loebsack Lofgren, Zoe Lowey Lynch Maloney (NY) Markey Marshall Matheson Matsui McCarthy (NY) McCollum (MN) McDermott McGovern McIntyre McNerney McNulty Meehan Meek (FL) Meeks (NY) Michaud Miller (NC) Miller, George Mitchell Mollohan Moore (KS) Moore (WI) Moran (VA) Murphy (CT) Murphy, Patrick Murtha Nadler Napolitano Neal (MA) Oberstar Obey Olver Ortiz Pallone Pascrell Pastor Payne Perlmutter Peterson (MN) Pomeroy Price (NC) Rahall Ramstad Rangel Reyes Rodriguez Ross Rothman Roybal-Allard Ruppersberger Rush Ryan (OH) Salazar Sanchez, Linda T. Sanchez, Loretta Sarbanes Saxton [[Page H4906]] Schakowsky Schiff Schwartz Scott (GA) Scott (VA) Serrano Sestak Shays Shea-Porter Sherman Shuler Sires Skelton Slaughter Smith (NJ) Smith (WA) Snyder Solis Space Spratt Stark Stupak Sutton Tanner Tauscher Taylor Thompson (CA) Thompson (MS) Tierney Towns Udall (CO) Udall (NM) Van Hollen Velazquez Visclosky Walz (MN) Wasserman Schultz Waters Watson Watt Waxman Weiner Welch (VT) Wexler Wilson (OH) Woolsey Wu Wynn Yarmuth NOT VOTING--22 Bordallo Brady (PA) Carson Christensen Cleaver Conyers Cuellar Davis, Jo Ann Doolittle Dreier Engel Fattah Fortuno Grijalva Hinojosa Jefferson Mahoney (FL) McMorris Rodgers Norton Peterson (PA) Radanovich Souder Announcement by the Chairman The CHAIRMAN (during the vote). Members are advised 2 minutes remain on this vote. {time} 0046 Mrs. LOWEY and Messrs. ELLSWORTH, SHULER and JOHNSON of Illinois changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.'' Mr. McHENRY changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.'' So the amendment was rejected. The result of the vote was announced as above recorded. Stated for: Mr. DREIER. Madam Chairman, on rollcall No. 337 I was inadvertently detained. Had I been present, I would have voted ``aye.'' Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Rogers of Michigan The CHAIRMAN. The unfinished business is the demand for a recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the noes prevailed by voice vote. The Clerk will redesignate the amendment. The Clerk redesignated the amendment. Recorded Vote The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded. A recorded vote was ordered. The CHAIRMAN. This will be a 2-minute vote. The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 297, noes 122, not voting 18, as follows: [Roll No. 338] AYES--297 Ackerman Aderholt Akin Alexander Altmire Andrews Arcuri Baca Bachmann Bachus Baker Barrett (SC) Bartlett (MD) Barton (TX) Bean Berkley Biggert Bilbray Bilirakis Bishop (GA) Bishop (UT) Blackburn Blumenauer Blunt Boehner Bonner Bono Boozman Boren Boucher Boustany Boyd (FL) Brady (TX) Braley (IA) Brown (SC) Brown, Corrine Brown-Waite, Ginny Buchanan Burgess Burton (IN) Butterfield Buyer Calvert Camp (MI) Campbell (CA) Cannon Cantor Capito Carnahan Carney Carson Carter Castle Castor Chabot Clarke Clay Clyburn Coble Cohen Cole (OK) Conaway Conyers Costa Costello Crenshaw Crowley Cubin Cuellar Culberson Cummings Davis (AL) Davis (KY) Davis, David Davis, Lincoln Davis, Tom Deal (GA) DeFazio Delahunt Dent Diaz-Balart, L. Diaz-Balart, M. Dingell Doolittle Drake Dreier Duncan Edwards Ehlers Ellison Emerson English (PA) Everett Faleomavaega Fallin Farr Feeney Ferguson Flake Forbes Fortenberry Fossella Foxx Franks (AZ) Frelinghuysen Gallegly Garrett (NJ) Gerlach Gilchrest Gillmor Gingrey Gohmert Goode Goodlatte Granger Graves Green, Al Grijalva Hall (TX) Hare Hastert Hastings (FL) Hastings (WA) Hayes Heller Hensarling Herger Herseth Sandlin Hill Hobson Hodes Hoekstra Holden Hooley Hulshof Hunter Inglis (SC) Issa Jefferson Jindal Johnson (GA) Johnson (IL) Johnson, E. B. Johnson, Sam Jones (NC) Jones (OH) Jordan Keller Kildee Kilpatrick King (IA) King (NY) Kingston Klein (FL) Kline (MN) Knollenberg Kucinich Kuhl (NY) LaHood Lamborn Latham Lee Levin Lewis (CA) Lewis (KY) Linder LoBiondo Loebsack Lucas Lungren, Daniel E. Lynch Mack Mahoney (FL) Maloney (NY) Manzullo Marchant McCarthy (CA) McCaul (TX) McCotter McCrery McDermott McGovern McHenry McHugh McNerney Meek (FL) Melancon Mica Michaud Miller (FL) Miller (MI) Miller, Gary Mollohan Moore (KS) Moore (WI) Moran (KS) Moran (VA) Murphy, Tim Musgrave Myrick Nadler Napolitano Neugebauer Nunes Obey Paul Payne Pearce Pence Peterson (MN) Petri Pickering Pitts Platts Poe Pomeroy Porter Price (GA) Pryce (OH) Putnam Ramstad Regula Rehberg Reichert Renzi Reynolds Rogers (AL) Rogers (KY) Rogers (MI) Rohrabacher Ros-Lehtinen Roskam Royce Rush Ryan (WI) Sali Sarbanes Saxton Schakowsky Schmidt Scott (GA) Scott (VA) Sensenbrenner Serrano Sessions Shadegg Shays Shea-Porter Sherman Shimkus Shuster Simpson Smith (NE) Smith (NJ) Smith (TX) Solis Space Stark Stearns Stupak Sutton Tancredo Tanner Taylor Terry Thompson (MS) Thornberry Tiahrt Tiberi Tierney Towns Turner Udall (CO) Upton Van Hollen Walberg Walden (OR) Walsh (NY) Wamp Wasserman Schultz Watson Watt Weiner Weldon (FL) Weller Westmoreland Wexler Whitfield Wicker Wilson (NM) Wilson (OH) Wilson (SC) Wolf Wu Wynn Yarmuth Young (FL) NOES--122 Abercrombie Allen Baird Baldwin Barrow Becerra Berman Berry Bishop (NY) Boswell Boyda (KS) Capps Capuano Cardoza Chandler Cooper Courtney Cramer Davis (CA) DeGette DeLauro Dicks Doggett Donnelly Doyle Ellsworth Emanuel Eshoo Etheridge Filner Frank (MA) Giffords Gillibrand Gonzalez Gordon Green, Gene Hall (NY) Harman Higgins Hinchey Hirono Holt Honda Hoyer Inslee Israel Jackson (IL) Jackson-Lee (TX) Kagen Kanjorski Kaptur Kennedy Kind Kirk Lampson Langevin Lantos Larsen (WA) Larson (CT) LaTourette Lewis (GA) Lipinski Lofgren, Zoe Lowey Markey Marshall Matheson Matsui McCarthy (NY) McCollum (MN) McIntyre McNulty Meehan Meeks (NY) Miller (NC) Miller, George Mitchell Murphy (CT) Murphy, Patrick Murtha Neal (MA) Oberstar Olver Ortiz Pallone Pascrell Pastor Perlmutter Price (NC) Rahall Rangel Reyes Rodriguez Ross Rothman Roybal-Allard Ruppersberger Ryan (OH) Salazar Sanchez, Linda T. Sanchez, Loretta Schiff Schwartz Sestak Shuler Sires Skelton Slaughter Smith (WA) Snyder Spratt Tauscher Thompson (CA) Udall (NM) Velazquez Visclosky Walz (MN) Waters Waxman Welch (VT) Woolsey Young (AK) NOT VOTING--18 Bordallo Brady (PA) Christensen Cleaver Davis (IL) Davis, Jo Ann Engel Fattah Fortuno Gutierrez Hinojosa McKeon McMorris Rodgers Norton Peterson (PA) Radanovich Souder Sullivan Announcement by the Chairman The CHAIRMAN (during the vote). Members are advised 1 minute remains on this vote. {time} 0050 So the amendment was agreed to. The result of the vote was announced as above recorded. Amendment No. 10 Offered by Mr. Schiff The CHAIRMAN. The unfinished business is the demand for a recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the ayes prevailed by voice vote. The Clerk will redesignate the amendment. The Clerk redesignated the amendment. Recorded Vote The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded. A recorded vote was ordered. The CHAIRMAN. This will be a 2-minute vote. The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 245, noes 178, not voting 14, as follows: [Roll No. 339] AYES--245 Abercrombie Ackerman Allen Altmire Andrews Arcuri Baca Baird Baldwin Bartlett (MD) Bean Becerra Berkley Berman Berry Bishop (GA) Bishop (NY) Blumenauer Boren Boswell Boucher Boyd (FL) Boyda (KS) Braley (IA) Brown, Corrine Butterfield Capps Capuano Cardoza Carnahan Carney Carson Castor Chandler Clarke Clay Clyburn Cohen Conyers Cooper Costa Costello Courtney Cramer Crowley Cuellar Cummings Davis (AL) Davis (CA) Davis (IL) Davis, David [[Page H4907]] DeFazio DeGette Delahunt DeLauro Dicks Dingell Doggett Donnelly Doyle Duncan Ehlers Ellison Ellsworth Emanuel Eshoo Etheridge Faleomavaega Farr Filner Flake Frank (MA) Giffords Gilchrest Gillibrand Gillmor Gonzalez Gordon Green, Al Green, Gene Grijalva Gutierrez Hall (NY) Hare Harman Hastings (FL) Herseth Sandlin Higgins Hill Hinchey Hirono Hodes Holden Holt Honda Hooley Hoyer Inglis (SC) Inslee Israel Jackson (IL) Jackson-Lee (TX) Jefferson Johnson (GA) Johnson (IL) Johnson, E. B. Jones (NC) Jones (OH) Kagen Kanjorski Kaptur Kennedy Kildee Kilpatrick Kind Kingston Kirk Klein (FL) Kucinich Lampson Langevin Lantos Larsen (WA) Larson (CT) Lee Levin Lewis (GA) Lipinski Loebsack Lofgren, Zoe Lowey Lynch Mack Mahoney (FL) Maloney (NY) Manzullo Marchant Markey Matheson Matsui McCarthy (NY) McCollum (MN) McDermott McGovern McIntyre McNerney McNulty Meehan Meek (FL) Meeks (NY) Michaud Miller (NC) Miller, George Mitchell Mollohan Moore (KS) Moore (WI) Moran (KS) Moran (VA) Murphy (CT) Murphy, Patrick Murtha Nadler Napolitano Neal (MA) Oberstar Obey Olver Ortiz Pallone Pascrell Pastor Paul Payne Perlmutter Peterson (MN) Petri Pomeroy Price (NC) Rahall Rangel Reyes Rodriguez Ross Rothman Roybal-Allard Ruppersberger Rush Ryan (OH) Salazar Sali Sanchez, Linda T. Sanchez, Loretta Sarbanes Schakowsky Schiff Schwartz Scott (GA) Scott (VA) Serrano Sestak Shea-Porter Sherman Shuler Sires Skelton Slaughter Smith (WA) Snyder Solis Space Spratt Stark Stearns Stupak Sutton Tanner Tauscher Taylor Thompson (CA) Thompson (MS) Tierney Towns Udall (CO) Udall (NM) Upton Van Hollen Velazquez Visclosky Walberg Walz (MN) Wamp Wasserman Schultz Waters Watson Watt Waxman Weiner Welch (VT) Wexler Wilson (OH) Woolsey Wu Wynn Yarmuth NOES--178 Aderholt Akin Alexander Bachmann Bachus Baker Barrett (SC) Barrow Barton (TX) Biggert Bilbray Bilirakis Bishop (UT) Blackburn Blunt Boehner Bonner Bono Boozman Boustany Brady (TX) Brown (SC) Brown-Waite, Ginny Buchanan Burgess Burton (IN) Buyer Calvert Camp (MI) Campbell (CA) Cannon Cantor Capito Carter Castle Chabot Coble Cole (OK) Conaway Crenshaw Cubin Culberson Davis (KY) Davis, Lincoln Davis, Tom Deal (GA) Dent Diaz-Balart, L. Diaz-Balart, M. Doolittle Drake Dreier Edwards Emerson English (PA) Everett Fallin Feeney Ferguson Forbes Fortenberry Fossella Foxx Franks (AZ) Frelinghuysen Gallegly Garrett (NJ) Gerlach Gingrey Gohmert Goode Goodlatte Granger Graves Hall (TX) Hastert Hastings (WA) Hayes Heller Hensarling Herger Hobson Hoekstra Hulshof Hunter Issa Jindal Johnson, Sam Jordan Keller King (IA) King (NY) Kline (MN) Knollenberg Kuhl (NY) LaHood Lamborn Latham LaTourette Lewis (CA) Lewis (KY) Linder LoBiondo Lucas Lungren, Daniel E. Marshall McCarthy (CA) McCaul (TX) McCotter McCrery McHenry McHugh McKeon Melancon Mica Miller (FL) Miller (MI) Miller, Gary Murphy, Tim Musgrave Myrick Neugebauer Nunes Pearce Pence Pickering Pitts Platts Poe Porter Price (GA) Pryce (OH) Putnam Ramstad Regula Rehberg Reichert Renzi Reynolds Rogers (AL) Rogers (KY) Rogers (MI) Rohrabacher Ros-Lehtinen Roskam Royce Ryan (WI) Saxton Schmidt Sensenbrenner Sessions Shadegg Shays Shimkus Shuster Simpson Smith (NE) Smith (NJ) Smith (TX) Sullivan Tancredo Terry Thornberry Tiahrt Tiberi Turner Walden (OR) Walsh (NY) Weldon (FL) Weller Westmoreland Whitfield Wicker Wilson (NM) Wilson (SC) Wolf Young (AK) Young (FL) NOT VOTING--14 Bordallo Brady (PA) Christensen Cleaver Davis, Jo Ann Engel Fattah Fortuno Hinojosa McMorris Rodgers Norton Peterson (PA) Radanovich Souder Announcement by the Chairman The CHAIRMAN (during the vote). Members are advised 1 minute remains on this vote. {time} 0055 So the amendment was agreed to. The result of the vote was announced as above recorded. The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended. The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, was agreed to. The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises. Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. Weiner) having assumed the chair, Mrs. Tauscher, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 2082) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2008 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, pursuant to House Resolution 388, she reported the bill back to the House with an amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered. Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the amendment reported from the Committee of the Whole? If not, the question is on the amendment. The amendment was agreed to. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill. The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time. Motion to Recommit Offered by Mr. Rogers of Michigan Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill? Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. In its present form, I am. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to recommit. The Clerk read as follows: Mr. Rogers of Michigan moves to recommit the bill, H.R. 2082, to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence with instructions to report the same back to the House forthwith with the following amendments: Page 8, line 25, strike ``$39,000,000'' and insert ``$16,000,000''. Page 9, after line 20 insert the following new subsection: (f) Human Intelligence Activities of the CIA.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the human intelligence activities of the Central Intelligence Agency under this Act (including those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a)), there is also authorized to be appropriated for the human intelligence activities of the Central Intelligence Agency $23,000,000. At the end of subtitle A of title V (page 48, after line 5), add the following new section: SEC. 503. AUDIT OF THE NATIONAL DRUG INTELLIGENCE CENTER. (a) Audit.--The Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall conduct an audit of the effectiveness and role of the National Drug Intelligence Center, including any problems with duplication of effort and lack of coordination with other intelligence providers and consumers. (b) Requirements.--The audit conducted under subsection (a) shall include-- (1) an examination of whether the National Drug Intelligence Center duplicates functions carried out by the Drug Enforcement Administration, the El Paso Intelligence Center, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or other components of the Department of Justice; (2) an examination of the overall effectiveness of the National Drug Intelligence Center; (3) an examination of whether current activities of the National Drug Intelligence Center dealing with international drug intelligence are consistent with the provisions of the General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan designating it as the principal center for strategic domestic counterdrug intelligence; and (4) an examination of whether the document exploitation functions of the National Drug Intelligence Center could effectively be transferred to a component of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) or the Department of Justice. (c) Submission Date.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary a report containing the results of the audit conducted under subsection (a). Mr. ROGERS of Michigan (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the motion to recommit [[Page H4908]] be considered as read and printed in the Record. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan? There was no objection. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Michigan is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his motion to recommit. Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I know the hour is late, but this is such an important issue. There are some good things in this bill, and my colleagues have rightly said this is the biggest expenditure we have ever seen in a very long time, as a matter of fact, ever, in our intelligence bill. But bigger isn't always better, because the priorities in the bill are what is important. The folks who are on the front lines, our analysts, our case officers, our soldiers who are being protected by the feed of information that flows to them, are incredibly important. And make no doubt about it, my friends, this is a huge shift philosophically from where we have been in the past. Nothing in here, nothing in here fixes the problem that we have today in not being able to listen to certain phone calls that might lead to an attack on the United States of America. Nothing. That lack of urgency should scare us all. The fact that we cut human intelligence programs in this bill, they will get less money this year, some of them very sensitive, very classified, specifically cut out of this bill, jeopardizes soldiers in the field in not getting the proper assistance and information that they need. We also take a political bent. There are also some disturbing things, things that we all sometimes don't like about the House that we serve in. Sometimes it was said because we did things that way for a long time, we should continue to do it. Those are the things that we can change tonight. Those are the things that we can at least tell the American people with this motion to recommit we believe in getting that information, we believe in human intelligence. Certainly the 9/11 Commission did. We believe in regular order and the rules, so that when earmarks go into very sensitive bills like this, and we have seen what happens when we don't follow the rules, it can cause trouble. Think about what we are talking about. Right before Afghanistan, we dropped seven CIA officers in very remote places in a very difficult neighborhood, and on their own they committed to get around with this Northern Alliance that was together, but not really. They had tribal problems. They had cultural problems among themselves. And their duty, these seven CIA officers, was to pull things together. Human intelligence got us where we needed to be. {time} 0100 Many would say it saved thousands and thousands of lives of U.S. soldiers because of their brave actions in the mountains of Afghanistan in very difficult territory because we had human-on-human contact that gave us the information and the operations that we needed to be successful. And in this bill, in this bill, they take away precious resources for those kind of human collection activities. When we have soldiers in the field, that is a philosophical departure from where we have been in the past. We can't stand for that. We can't stand for the fact that we may lose our ears on terrorist activities being planned today. And we also can't take wasteful programming in something that is this important. You know, for a time of war, the priorities of this bill are completely misplaced in critical areas. The motion to recommit would readjust those priorities by increasing human intelligence funding for the Central Intelligence Agency by $23 million. That money would come from an earmark funding for the National Drug Intelligence Center which a formal oversight report of the House Committee said: ``An expensive and duplicative use of scarce Federal drug enforcement resources.'' And the U.S. News & World Report called it a ``boondoggle.'' The motion to recommit would also direct the Department of Justice Inspector General to conduct an audit of the National Drug Intelligence Center to determine if this center was wasteful and duplicative. For all of the talk about reform, the majority has blocked an audit by a party-line vote in committee with no substantive explanation. My amendment requiring the audit also was blocked by the Rules Committee. It shouldn't be controversial that these funds could be put to far better use in human intelligence. In numerous important respects, this bill fails to provide adequate support to the Intelligence Community's activities on the forefront of its ability to protect our national security. In a classified annex, the majority cuts human intelligence programs, counter to the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission; and significantly cuts certain specific initiatives related to American efforts to counter radical jihadists and to support our Nation's objectives in Iraq. A review of just this center, and why this $23 million is so important, it is going to human collection. A review of the NDIC, U.S. News & World Report in 2005 concluded: ``It is a boondoggle,'' and ``rocked by scandal and subject to persistent criticism that it should never have been created at all.'' You know, sometimes, and God love us all, we get pretty myopic on our districts. This is the time that we need to look outward to the rest of the country. We are United States Members of Congress. What is good for our backyard may not be good for the rest of the country. There is a Marine right now that is counting on human intelligence to tell us if there is an IED on the road, if al Qaeda is around the corner. If we don't want to stand up for this motion to recommit, we will endorse the boondoggles of the past at the expense of our soldiers in the field. I would urge support of the motion to recommit. Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the motion to recommit. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I oppose this motion to recommit because it would cut a program that makes valuable contributions to the war on drugs and to homeland security, first and foremost. This motion is also misleading because the underlying bill provides our intelligence officers everything they need. It adds funds to the CIA and Defense Department for human intelligence training so that our operators can be more effective. It invests in language training for case officers so they can operate effectively overseas. My colleague talks about following the rules. One of the premier rules that we have is we never mention a number in classified programs; $23 million telegraphs our enemies what we are doing. The motion to recommit asks for a study. This program has been studied before. I just want to quote the White House drug czar. When the White House drug czar toured the NDIC in 2003, he said: ``The National Drug Intelligence Center provides us with vital information we need to disrupt the market for illegal drugs in America.'' Also, a White House press release asserted that the drug czar's office uses NDIC-produced intelligence to help guide its ongoing counterdrug policy agenda as outlined in the President's national drug control strategy. NDIC information bulletins every day warn law enforcement officers around our country and intelligence agencies around the world of emerging threats in drug trafficking and trends in use. But the motion to recommit would silence this added and vital voice, a voice that the minority was more than happy to fund when they were in charge of this body. The Republican-led Congress appropriated more than $160 million for NDIC over the past 4 years. It funded the National Drug Intelligence Center with $39 million in fiscal years 2005, 2006 and 2007, and more than $44 million in 2004. If it was such a good idea then, if it was such a good idea back when you were in charge, why in the heck is it such a bad idea now when we see the trends we are seeing around the country? Mr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to defeat this motion to recommit. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is ordered on the motion to recommit. There was no objection. [[Page H4909]] The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit. The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the noes appeared to have it. Recorded Vote Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote. A recorded vote was ordered. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, the Chair will reduce to 5 minutes the minimum time for any electronic vote on the question of passing of the bill. The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 181, noes 241, not voting 10, as follows: [Roll No. 340] AYES--181 Aderholt Akin Alexander Bachmann Bachus Baker Barrett (SC) Bartlett (MD) Barton (TX) Biggert Bilbray Bilirakis Bishop (UT) Blackburn Blunt Boehner Bonner Bono Boozman Boustany Brady (TX) Brown (SC) Brown-Waite, Ginny Buchanan Burgess Burton (IN) Buyer Calvert Camp (MI) Campbell (CA) Cannon Cantor Capito Carter Castle Chabot Coble Cole (OK) Conaway Cooper Crenshaw Cubin Culberson Davis (KY) Davis, David Deal (GA) Diaz-Balart, L. Diaz-Balart, M. Doolittle Drake Dreier Duncan Ehlers Emerson Everett Fallin Feeney Ferguson Flake Forbes Fortenberry Fossella Foxx Franks (AZ) Gallegly Garrett (NJ) Gillmor Gingrey Gohmert Goode Goodlatte Granger Graves Hall (TX) Hastert Hastings (WA) Hayes Heller Hensarling Herger Hoekstra Hulshof Hunter Inglis (SC) Issa Jindal Johnson (IL) Johnson, Sam Jordan Keller King (IA) King (NY) Kirk Kline (MN) Knollenberg Kuhl (NY) LaHood Lamborn Latham LaTourette Lewis (CA) Lewis (KY) Linder Lucas Lungren, Daniel E. Mack Manzullo Marchant McCarthy (CA) McCaul (TX) McCotter McCrery McHenry McHugh McKeon Mica Miller (FL) Miller (MI) Miller, Gary Moran (KS) Murphy, Tim Musgrave Myrick Neugebauer Nunes Paul Pearce Pence Petri Pickering Pitts Poe Porter Price (GA) Pryce (OH) Putnam Ramstad Rehberg Reichert Renzi Reynolds Rogers (AL) Rogers (KY) Rogers (MI) Rohrabacher Ros-Lehtinen Roskam Royce Ryan (WI) Sali Schmidt Sensenbrenner Sessions Shadegg Shays Shimkus Simpson Smith (NE) Smith (NJ) Smith (TX) Stearns Sullivan Tancredo Terry Thornberry Tiberi Turner Upton Walberg Walden (OR) Walsh (NY) Wamp Weldon (FL) Weller Westmoreland Whitfield Wicker Wilson (NM) Wilson (SC) Wolf Young (AK) NOES--241 Abercrombie Ackerman Allen Altmire Andrews Arcuri Baca Baird Baldwin Barrow Bean Becerra Berkley Berman Berry Bishop (GA) Bishop (NY) Blumenauer Boren Boswell Boucher Boyd (FL) Boyda (KS) Braley (IA) Brown, Corrine Butterfield Capps Capuano Cardoza Carnahan Carney Carson Castor Chandler Clarke Clay Clyburn Cohen Conyers Costa Costello Courtney Cramer Crowley Cuellar Cummings Davis (AL) Davis (CA) Davis (IL) Davis, Lincoln Davis, Tom DeFazio DeGette Delahunt DeLauro Dent Dicks Dingell Doggett Donnelly Doyle Edwards Ellison Ellsworth Emanuel English (PA) Eshoo Etheridge Farr Filner Frank (MA) Frelinghuysen Gerlach Giffords Gilchrest Gillibrand Gonzalez Gordon Green, Al Green, Gene Grijalva Gutierrez Hall (NY) Hare Harman Hastings (FL) Herseth Sandlin Higgins Hill Hinchey Hirono Hobson Hodes Holden Holt Honda Hooley Hoyer Inslee Israel Jackson (IL) Jackson-Lee (TX) Jefferson Johnson (GA) Johnson, E. B. Jones (NC) Jones (OH) Kagen Kanjorski Kaptur Kennedy Kildee Kilpatrick Kind Kingston Klein (FL) Kucinich Lampson Langevin Lantos Larsen (WA) Larson (CT) Lee Levin Lewis (GA) Lipinski LoBiondo Loebsack Lofgren, Zoe Lowey Lynch Mahoney (FL) Maloney (NY) Markey Marshall Matheson Matsui McCarthy (NY) McCollum (MN) McDermott McGovern McIntyre McNerney McNulty Meehan Meek (FL) Meeks (NY) Melancon Michaud Miller (NC) Miller, George Mitchell Mollohan Moore (KS) Moore (WI) Moran (VA) Murphy (CT) Murphy, Patrick Murtha Nadler Napolitano Neal (MA) Oberstar Obey Olver Ortiz Pallone Pascrell Pastor Payne Perlmutter Peterson (MN) Platts Pomeroy Price (NC) Rahall Rangel Regula Reyes Rodriguez Ross Rothman Roybal-Allard Ruppersberger Rush Ryan (OH) Salazar Sanchez, Linda T. Sanchez, Loretta Sarbanes Saxton Schakowsky Schiff Schwartz Scott (GA) Scott (VA) Serrano Sestak Shea-Porter Sherman Shuler Shuster Sires Skelton Slaughter Smith (WA) Snyder Solis Space Spratt Stark Stupak Sutton Tanner Tauscher Taylor Thompson (CA) Thompson (MS) Tiahrt Tierney Towns Udall (CO) Udall (NM) Van Hollen Velazquez Visclosky Walz (MN) Wasserman Schultz Waters Watson Watt Waxman Weiner Welch (VT) Wexler Wilson (OH) Woolsey Wu Wynn Yarmuth Young (FL) NOT VOTING--10 Brady (PA) Cleaver Davis, Jo Ann Engel Fattah Hinojosa McMorris Rodgers Peterson (PA) Radanovich Souder Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised there are 2 minutes remaining. {time} 0123 So the motion to recommit was rejected. The result of the vote was announced as above recorded. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill. The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the noes appeared to have it. Recorded Vote Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote. A recorded vote was ordered. The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote. The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 225, noes 197, not voting 10, as follows: [Roll No. 341] AYES--225 Abercrombie Ackerman Allen Altmire Andrews Arcuri Baca Baird Baldwin Barrow Bartlett (MD) Bean Becerra Berkley Berman Berry Bishop (GA) Bishop (NY) Blumenauer Boren Boswell Boucher Boyd (FL) Boyda (KS) Braley (IA) Brown, Corrine Butterfield Capps Capuano Cardoza Carnahan Carney Carson Castor Chandler Clarke Clay Clyburn Cohen Conyers Cooper Costa Costello Courtney Cramer Crowley Cuellar Cummings Davis (AL) Davis (CA) Davis (IL) Davis, Lincoln DeFazio DeGette Delahunt DeLauro Dicks Dingell Doggett Donnelly Doyle Edwards Ellison Ellsworth Emanuel Eshoo Etheridge Farr Filner Frank (MA) Giffords Gilchrest Gillibrand Gonzalez Gordon Green, Al Green, Gene Grijalva Gutierrez Hall (NY) Hare Harman Hastings (FL) Herseth Sandlin Higgins Hill Hinchey Hirono Hodes Holden Holt Honda Hooley Hoyer Inslee Israel Jackson (IL) Jackson-Lee (TX) Jefferson Johnson (GA) Johnson (IL) Johnson, E. B. Jones (NC) Jones (OH) Kagen Kanjorski Kaptur Kennedy Kildee Kilpatrick Kind Klein (FL) Lampson Langevin Lantos Larsen (WA) Larson (CT) Levin Lewis (GA) Lipinski Loebsack Lofgren, Zoe Lowey Lynch Mahoney (FL) Maloney (NY) Markey Marshall Matheson Matsui McCarthy (NY) McCollum (MN) McGovern McIntyre McNerney McNulty Meehan Meek (FL) Meeks (NY) Melancon Michaud Miller (NC) Miller, George Mitchell Mollohan Moore (KS) Moore (WI) Moran (VA) Murphy (CT) Murphy, Patrick Murtha Nadler Napolitano Neal (MA) Oberstar Obey Olver Ortiz Pallone Pascrell Pastor Perlmutter Peterson (MN) Pomeroy Porter Price (NC) Rahall Rangel Reyes Rodriguez Ross Rothman Roybal-Allard Ruppersberger Rush Ryan (OH) Salazar Sanchez, Linda T. Sanchez, Loretta Sarbanes Schakowsky Schiff Schwartz Scott (GA) Scott (VA) Serrano Sestak Shea-Porter Sherman Shuler Sires Skelton Slaughter Smith (WA) Snyder Solis Space Spratt Stupak Sutton Tanner Tauscher Taylor Thompson (CA) Thompson (MS) Tierney Towns Udall (CO) Udall (NM) Van Hollen Velazquez Visclosky Walz (MN) Wasserman Schultz Waters Watson Watt Waxman Weiner Welch (VT) Wexler Wilson (OH) Wu Wynn Yarmuth NOES--197 Aderholt Akin Alexander Bachmann Bachus Baker Barrett (SC) Barton (TX) Biggert Bilbray Bilirakis Bishop (UT) Blackburn Blunt Boehner Bonner Bono Boozman Boustany Brady (TX) Brown (SC) Brown-Waite, Ginny Buchanan Burgess Burton (IN) Buyer Calvert Camp (MI) Campbell (CA) [[Page H4910]] Cannon Cantor Capito Carter Castle Chabot Coble Cole (OK) Conaway Crenshaw Cubin Culberson Davis (KY) Davis, David Davis, Tom Deal (GA) Dent Diaz-Balart, L. Diaz-Balart, M. Doolittle Drake Dreier Duncan Ehlers Emerson English (PA) Everett Fallin Feeney Ferguson Flake Forbes Fortenberry Fossella Foxx Franks (AZ) Frelinghuysen Gallegly Garrett (NJ) Gerlach Gillmor Gingrey Gohmert Goode Goodlatte Granger Graves Hall (TX) Hastert Hastings (WA) Hayes Heller Hensarling Herger Hobson Hoekstra Hulshof Hunter Inglis (SC) Issa Jindal Johnson, Sam Jordan Keller King (IA) King (NY) Kingston Kirk Kline (MN) Knollenberg Kucinich Kuhl (NY) LaHood Lamborn Latham LaTourette Lee Lewis (CA) Lewis (KY) Linder LoBiondo Lucas Lungren, Daniel E. Mack Manzullo Marchant McCarthy (CA) McCaul (TX) McCotter McCrery McDermott McHenry McHugh McKeon Mica Miller (FL) Miller (MI) Miller, Gary Moran (KS) Murphy, Tim Musgrave Myrick Neugebauer Nunes Paul Payne Pearce Pence Petri Pickering Pitts Platts Poe Price (GA) Pryce (OH) Putnam Ramstad Regula Rehberg Reichert Renzi Reynolds Rogers (AL) Rogers (KY) Rogers (MI) Rohrabacher Ros-Lehtinen Roskam Royce Ryan (WI) Sali Saxton Schmidt Sensenbrenner Sessions Shadegg Shays Shimkus Shuster Simpson Smith (NE) Smith (NJ) Smith (TX) Stark Stearns Sullivan Tancredo Terry Thornberry Tiahrt Tiberi Turner Upton Walberg Walden (OR) Walsh (NY) Wamp Weldon (FL) Weller Westmoreland Whitfield Wicker Wilson (NM) Wilson (SC) Wolf Woolsey Young (AK) Young (FL) NOT VOTING--10 Brady (PA) Cleaver Davis, Jo Ann Engel Fattah Hinojosa McMorris Rodgers Peterson (PA) Radanovich Souder Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised there are 2 minutes remaining. {time} 0130 So the bill was passed. The result of the vote was announced as above recorded. A motion to reconsider was laid on the table. ____________________