FAS注意：S.2453于2006年9月13日修订并报告了参议院司法委员会。已发送给参议院的经修订的条例草案的案文是这里．
国会纪录：2006年3月16日（参议院）Page S2340-S2344关于引入举报的账单和幽灵先生的陈述：S. 2453.一项规定审查电子监禁计划程序的条例草案;向司法委员会委员会。幽灵先生。主席先生，我今天寻求承认，介绍一项规定旨在为国家安全目的收集情报的电子监禁计划的条例草案。2005年12月16日星期五，纽约时报报道称，2001年底，布什总统签署了一项高度分类的指令，授权国家安全局在美国和恐怖主义嫌疑人内拦截贸易局。所以辩论开始了。总统是否有权授权该计划？它是否违反了外国情报监测法 - 或FISA？大会独立授予主席这个权威吗？他是否根据“宪法”拥有这些内在的权力？ Lawyers and laymen throughout our country have debated the issue. The Senate Judiciary Committee initiated two hearings on the legality of the NSA program and, pursuant to our oversight function, brought in Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and seven leading scholars and experts to testify. After questioning General Gonzales for some 7 hours, and the panel of scholars for hours more, we were still left troubled by two competing concerns. On the one hand, we are a Nation at war. On September 11 we suffered the worst attack on civilians in our country's history by an enemy like none we had faced before. The more we learn about this enemy, the more we learn about a cruel and brutal opponent who will stop at nothing to terrorize and harm our country. This is an enemy that knows no honor. It seeks to inflict ever-escalating violence on defenseless civilians. This is an enemy that knows no mercy. It beheads innocent aid workers and journalists and proudly broadcasts these murders for the world to see. This is an enemy that knows no bounds of decency. It recruits women and children to strap bombs to their bodies and blow themselves up, knowing that American soldiers are likely to come close to help them. This is an enemy that is patient. It infiltrates our borders and waits quietly for an opportunity to attack. Most frighteningly, this is an enemy that is capable. It roams the globe, organizing terrorist cells along its path. It has the ability to master and exploit modem technology and organize attacks on America from anywhere on the globe. On the other hand, we are a Nation that believes in the rule of law. We are a people that hold dear the rights and liberties enshrined in our Constitution. Although we recognize the threat we face, we are not willing to sacrifice our rights and live in a state of perpetual fear. Our enemy is the enemy of freedom, and we will not give that enemy the satisfaction of making us give up the very freedom we cherish. The question remains, what is a society like ours to do? I do not agree with those who contend that the current FISA law is just fine. When the FISA bill was enacted in 1978, we faced a very different enemy. That enemy did not attack on our soil; that enemy was organized into nation states that we could negotiate with; that enemy did not use terrorist tactics on our civilian population. And in 1978, we were grappling with very different technologies. We were worried about telephone and telegraphs, not e-mail, cell phones, handheld computers, and Internet chat rooms. Accordingly, the Congress passed a law in 1978 that required case-by-case warrants; warrants that identified individual persons and places; warrants a lot like those a prosecutor would seek in a routine criminal investigation. These case- by-case warrants, however, simply may not be sufficient today, when we are in a time of war and we need to track an amorphous enemy that moves quickly and is often able to evade detection. At the same time, I do not agree with those who insist that we are facing an entirely new situation, and that the checks and balances our nation has long embraced are now outdated. I think these advocates are wrong when they insist that the best we can do is to give the Executive Branch a blank check and hope that it will do the right thing. I believe that there is a middle ground. I believe it is possible to provide the President with the flexibility and secrecy he needs to track terrorists, while providing for meaningful supervision outside of the Executive Branch. It may be surprising to some, but I think we can get some insight from, of all places, a Senate hearing. Let's step back and survey the situation. The country had recently discovered that the NSA had secretly worked with major communication companies for years. We learned that initially the program focused on certain foreign targets, but it grew to cover communications from U.S. citizens. Amid accusations that the President had violated the Constitution and Federal statute, a Senate Committee called the Attorney General to testify and address the ``serious legal and constitutional questions . . . raised by the program.'' If this sounds familiar, it should. It is what took place in November 1975, when the nation discovered a secret NSA program to monitor telegraph messages, and a special Senate Committee called Attorney General Edward Levi to testify. That hearing, like the hearing the Senate Judiciary Committee held last week, elicited discussions on the importance of preserving civil liberties and upholding the Bill of Rights, and the need to protect national security and preserve secrecy in foreign intelligence. That hearing also elicited a possible solution. During his testimony to the Church Committee on U.S. Intelligence Activities, Attorney General Levi suggested that one method for granting the President the needed flexibility, while maintaining supervision by the courts, was to give a special court the power to issue broader, program-wide warrants. Attorney General Levi reasoned that for programs ``designed to gather foreign-intelligence information essential to the security of the Nation,'' the court should have the power to approve [[Page S2341]] a ``program of surveillance.'' He explained that the traditional warrant procedure works only when surveillance ``involves a particular target location or individual at a specific time.'' While this procedure was fine for routine, criminal investigations, the Nation needed a different solution for enemies that require ``virtually continuous surveillance, which by its nature does not have specifically predetermined targets.'' Attorney General Levi suggested that in approving a surveillance plan, the court should determine whether the program ``strikes a reasonable balance between the government's need for the information and the protection of individuals' rights.'' Unfortunately, we did not follow Attorney General Levi's suggestion. It is not too late to do so, however. The National Security Surveillance Act of 2006 seeks to pick up where the Congress of 1978 left off. I believe that the National Security Surveillance Act sets forth workable and effective procedures for the FISA Court to evaluate surveillance programs. Its procedures, in fact, are very similar to those Attorney General Levi advocated thirty years ago. First, in order to continue the NSA program, or any similar programs, the Attorney General must apply to the FISA court for permission to initiate a surveillance program and then seek re-authorization of that program every 45 days. The Attorney General must explain his legal basis for concluding that the surveillance program is constitutional. He must also provide a good deal of information to the court. He must: identify or describe the foreign country or terrorist group he seeks to monitor; provide enough facts to indicate one of the parties on the line is a member of that foreign country or terrorist group or has had communications with it; identify the steps he is taking to make sure that innocent Americans are not being swept into the surveillance program; determine that at least one of the parties is in the U. S.; estimate the number of communications to be monitored; and provide data so the FISA court can evaluate the program, including information on how long the program has existed and what type of intelligence it has uncovered. The Attorney General should feel no concern in sharing information about the program with the FISA court. The FISA court has proven that it is capable of maintaining the secrecy with which it has been charged and that it possesses the requisite expertise and discretion for adjudicating sensitive issues of national security. The FISA court must then determine whether approving the program is consistent with the U.S. Constitution. It must also balance the interests at stake and decide whether to approve the program. Specifically, the court must: determine whether probable cause exists to authorize the surveillance; evaluate whether historically the government has implemented the electronic surveillance program in accordance with its proposals; determine that at least one of the participants to the electronic communication is a member of the foreign country or terrorist group that the Attorney General has identified; consider the privacy costs of the program as measured by the number of communications subjected to the electronic surveillance program, the length of time the electronic surveillance program has been in existence, and the effectiveness of the minimization procedures; and consider the benefits of the program as measured by the intelligence information obtained or the number of plots uncovered or cells disrupted. The Attorney General must resubmit the program to the FISA court every 45 days. In the event the FISA court refuses to approve the electronic surveillance program, that does not end the matter. The Attorney General may modify the program and then submit a new application, until the FISA court concludes that the program satisfies the Constitution and the standards set forth in this bill. In the alternative, the Attorney General may conclude that implementing an amended program is inappropriate in light of the FISA court's concerns. The FISA court would itself be required to notify Congress of its decision with respect to the proffered program's constitutionality. Finally, the bill requires the Attorney General to submit information on the program's scope and effectiveness to the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees every 6 months. In the case at hand, the Attorney General would be required to justify the NSA surveillance program to the FISA court, which would, in turn, determine whether the program met all constitutional and legal requirements. The court would be required to consider, for example, whether members of Al Qaeda were appropriately targeted, whether proper minimization techniques were being followed, and whether the program satisfied the demands of the Fourth Amendment. There are those who will say that we should not act. That currently, things are fine. I would remind my colleagues that our enemies are not so content to sit still. A country that does not understand that our enemy has changed since the 1970s will come to regret it. And a Congress that pauses when it should act, denies its duty to adapt to the enemy we currently face. But, ultimately, the enemies of democracy win when civil liberties are lost. We must maintain our democracy and defeat our enemies. This legislation does both and I urge my colleagues to support it. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: S. 2453 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``National Security Surveillance Act of 2006''. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. Congress finds the following: (1) After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush authorized the National Security Agency to intercept communications between people inside the United States, including American citizens, and terrorism suspects overseas. (2) One of the lessons learned from September 11, 2001, is that the enemies who seek to greatly harm and terrorize our Nation utilize technologies and techniques that defy conventional law enforcement practices. (3) The Commander in Chief requires the ability and means to detect and track an enemy that can master and exploit modern technology. (4) Although it is essential that the President have all necessary means to protect us against our enemies, it is equally essential that, in doing so, the President does not compromise the very civil liberties that the President seeks to safeguard. As Justice Hugo Black observed, ``The President's power, if any, to issue [an] order must stem either from an Act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.''. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952) (opinion by Black, J.). (5) In 2004, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor explained in her plurality opinion for the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld: ``We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens. Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S., at 587, 72 S.Ct. 863. Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake.''. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (citations omitted). (6) Similarly, as Justice Jackson famously observed in his Youngstown concurrence: ``When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate . . . . When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility . . . When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.''. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). (7) The Constitution provides Congress with broad powers of oversight over national security and foreign policy, under article I, section 8 of the Constitution of the United States, which confers on Congress numerous powers, including the powers-- (A) ``To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water''; [[Page S2342]] (B) ``To raise and support Armies''; (C) ``To provide and maintain a Navy''; (D) ``To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces''; (E) ``To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions''; and (F) ``To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States''. (8) It is in our Nation's best interest for Congress to use its oversight power to establish a system to ensure that electronic surveillance programs do not infringe on the constitutional rights of Americans, while at the same time making sure that the President has all the powers and means necessary to detect and track our enemies. (9) While Attorney General Alberto Gonzales explained that the executive branch reviews the electronic surveillance program of the National Security Agency every 45 days to ensure that the program is not overly broad, it is the belief of Congress that approval and supervision of electronic surveillance programs should be conducted outside of the executive branch, by the Article III court established under section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803). It is also the belief of Congress that it is appropriate for an Article III court to pass upon the constitutionality of electronic surveillance programs that may implicate the rights of Americans. (10) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is the proper court to approve and supervise classified electronic surveillance programs because it is adept at maintaining the secrecy with which it was charged and it possesses the requisite expertise and discretion for adjudicating sensitive issues of national security. (11) In 1975, then-Attorney General Edward Levi, a strong defender of executive authority, testified that in times of conflict, the President needs the power to conduct long-range electronic surveillance and that a foreign intelligence surveillance court should be empowered to issue special warrants in these circumstances. (12) This Act clarifies and definitively establishes that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court has the authority to review electronic surveillance programs and pass upon their constitutionality. Such authority is consistent with well-established, longstanding practices. (13) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court already has broad authority to approve surveillance of members of international conspiracies, in addition to granting warrants for surveillance of a particular individual under sections 104, 105, and 402 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804, 1805, and 1842). (14) Prosecutors have significant flexibility in investigating domestic conspiracy cases. Courts have held that flexible warrants comply with the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States when they relate to complex, far reaching, and multi-faceted criminal enterprises like drug conspiracies and money laundering rings. The courts recognize that applications for search warrants must be judged in a common sense and realistic fashion, and the courts permit broad warrant language where, due to the nature and circumstances of the investigation and the criminal organization, more precise descriptions are not feasible. (15) Federal agents investigating international terrorism by foreign enemies are entitled to tools at least as broad as those used by Federal agents investigating domestic crimes by United States citizens. The Supreme Court, in the ``Keith Case'', United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), recognized that the standards and procedures used to fight ordinary crime may not be applicable to cases involving national security. The Court recognized that national ``security surveillance may involve different policy and practical considerations from the surveillance of ordinary crime'' and that courts should be more flexible in issuing warrants in national security cases. United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 407 U.S. 297, 322 (1972). (16) By authorizing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to review electronic surveillance programs, Congress preserves the ability of the Commander in Chief to use the necessary means to guard our national security, while also protecting the civil liberties and constitutional rights that we cherish. SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended-- (1) by redesignating title VII as title VIII; (2) by redesignating section 701 as section 801; and (3) by inserting after title VI the following: ``TITLE VII--ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE ``SEC. 701. DEFINITIONS. ``As used in this title-- ``(1) the terms `agent of a foreign power', `Attorney General', `foreign intelligence information' ,`foreign power', `international terrorism', `minimization procedures', `person', `United States', and `United States person' have the same meaning as in section 101; ``(2) the term `congressional intelligence committees' means the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; ``(3) the term `electronic communication' means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system, cable, or other like connection furnished or operated by any person engaged as a common carrier in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of communications; ``(4) the term `electronic surveillance' means the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the substance of any electronic communication sent by, received by, or intended to be received by a person who is in the United States, where there is a reasonable possibility that the surveillance will intercept communication in which a person in the United States participating in the communication has a reasonable expectation of privacy; ``(5) the term `electronic surveillance program' means a program to engage in electronic surveillance-- ``(A) to gather foreign intelligence information or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities by obtaining the substance of or information regarding electronic communications sent by, received by, or intended to be received by a foreign power, an agent or agents of a foreign power, or a person or persons who have had communication with a foreign power seeking to commit an act of international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities against the United States; ``(B) where it is not feasible to name every person or address every location to be subjected to electronic surveillance; and ``(C) where effective gathering of foreign intelligence information requires an extended period of electronic surveillance; ``(6) the term `Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court' means the court, sitting en banc, established under section 103(a); ``(7) the term `Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of review' means the court established under section 103(b); (8) the term `intercept' means the acquisition of the substance of any electronic communication by a person through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device; and ``(9) the term `substance' means any information concerning the words, purport, or meaning of a communication, and does not include information identifying the sender, origin, or recipient of the communication or the date or time of its transmission.''. SEC. 4. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT JURISDICTION TO REVIEW ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS. Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by section 3, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``SEC. 702. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT JURISDICTION TO REVIEW ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS. ``(a) In General.--The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court shall have jurisdiction to issue an order under this title, lasting not longer than 45 days, that authorizes an electronic surveillance program to obtain foreign intelligence information or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities. ``(b) Reauthorization.--In order to continue an electronic surveillance program after the time period described in subsection (a), the Attorney General shall submit a new application under section 703. There shall be no limit on the number of times the Attorney General may seek approval of an electronic surveillance program. ``(c) Modifications and Appeal in Event Application Is Denied.-- ``(1) In general.--In the event that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court refuses to approve an application under subsection (a), the court shall state its reasons in a written opinion. ``(2) Opinion.--The court shall submit a written opinion described in paragraph (1) to the Attorney General and to each member of the congressional intelligence committees (or any subcommittee thereof designated for oversight of electronic surveillance programs under this title). ``(3) Resubmission or appeal.--The Attorney General shall be permitted to submit a new application under section 703 for the electronic surveillance program, reflecting modifications to address the concerns set forth in the written opinion of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. There shall be no limit on the number of times the Attorney General may seek approval of an electronic surveillance program. Alternatively, the Attorney General shall be permitted to appeal the decision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review. ``(d) Communications Subject to This Title.-- ``(1) In general.--The provisions of this title requiring authorization by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court apply only to interception of the substance of electronic communications sent by, received by, or intended to be received by a person who is in the United States, where there is a reasonable possibility that a participant in the communication has a reasonable expectation of privacy. ``(2) Exclusion.--The provisions of this title requiring authorization by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court do not apply [[Page S2343]] to information identifying the sender, origin, or recipient of the electronic communication or the date or time of its transmission that is obtained without review of the substance of the electronic communication. ``(e) Existing Programs Subject to This Title.-- ``(1) In general.--The Attorney General shall submit an application to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for any electronic surveillance program to obtain foreign intelligence information or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities. ``(2) Existing programs.--Not later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this title, the Attorney General shall submit an application under this title for approval of the electronic surveillance program sometimes referred to as the `Terrorist Surveillance Program' and discussed by the Attorney General before the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate on February 6, 2006. Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of this title, the Attorney General shall submit applications under this title for approval of any other electronic surveillance program in existence on the date of enactment of this title that has not been submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.''. SEC. 5. APPLICATIONS FOR APPROVAL OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS. Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by section 4, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``SEC. 703. APPLICATIONS FOR APPROVAL OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS. ``(a) In General.--Each application for approval of an electronic surveillance program under this title shall-- ``(1) be made by the Attorney General; ``(2) include a statement of the authority conferred on the Attorney General by the President of the United States; ``(3) include a statement setting forth the legal basis for the conclusion by the Attorney General that the electronic surveillance program is consistent with the requirements of the Constitution of the United States; ``(4) certify that the information sought cannot reasonably be obtained by conventional investigative techniques or through an application under section 104; ``(5) include the name, if known, identity, or description of the foreign power or agent of a foreign power seeking to commit an act of international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities against the United States that the electronic surveillance program seeks to monitor or detect; ``(6) include a statement of the means and operational procedures by which the surveillance will be executed and effected; ``(7) include a statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the Attorney General to justify the belief that at least 1 of the participants in the communications to be intercepted by the electronic surveillance program will be the foreign power or agent of a foreign power that is specified under paragraph (5), or a person who has had communication with the foreign power or agent of a foreign power that is specified under paragraph (5), and is seeking to commit an act of international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities against the United States; ``(8) include a statement of the proposed minimization procedures; ``(9) include a detailed description of the nature of the information sought and the type of communication to be intercepted by the electronic surveillance program; ``(10) include an estimate of the number of communications to be intercepted by the electronic surveillance program during the requested authorization period; ``(11) specify the date that the electronic surveillance program that is the subject of the application was initiated, if it was initiated before submission of the application; ``(12) certify that any electronic surveillance of a person in the United States under this title shall cease 45 days after the date of the authorization, unless the Government has obtained judicial authorization for continued surveillance of the person in the United States under section 104 or another Federal statute; ``(13) include a statement of the facts concerning all previous applications that have been made to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court under this title involving the electronic surveillance program in the application, including the minimization procedures and the means and operational procedures proposed, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's decision on each previous application; and ``(14) include a statement of the facts concerning the implementation of the electronic surveillance program described in the application, including, for any period of operation of the program authorized at least 45 days prior to the date of submission of the application-- ``(A) the minimization procedures implemented; ``(B) the means and operational procedures by which the surveillance was executed and effected; ``(C) the number of communications subjected to the electronic surveillance program; ``(D) the identity, if known, or a description of any United States person whose communications sent or received in the United States were intercepted by the electronic surveillance program; and ``(E) a description of the foreign intelligence information obtained through the electronic surveillance program. ``(b) Additional Information.--The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court may require the Attorney General to furnish such other information as may be necessary to make a determination under section 704.''. SEC. 6. APPROVAL OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS. Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by section 5, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``SEC. 704. APPROVAL OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS. ``(a) Necessary Findings.--Upon receipt of an application under section 703, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court shall enter an ex parte order as requested, or as modified, approving the electronic surveillance program if it finds that-- ``(1) the President has authorized the Attorney General to make the application for electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence information; ``(2) approval of the electronic surveillance program in the application is consistent with the duty of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to uphold the Constitution of the United States; ``(3) there is probable cause to believe that the electronic surveillance program will intercept communications of the foreign power or agent of a foreign power specified in the application, or a person who has had communication with the foreign power or agent of a foreign power that is specified in the application and is seeking to commit an act of international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities against the United States; ``(4) the proposed minimization procedures meet the definition of minimization procedures under section 101 (h); ``(5) the application contains all statements and certifications required by section 703; and ``(6) an evaluation of the implementation of the electronic surveillance program, as described in subsection (b), supports approval of the application. ``(b) Evaluation of the Implementation of the Electronic Surveillance Program.--In determining whether the implementation of the electronic surveillance program supports approval of the application for purposes of subsection (a)(6), the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court shall consider the performance of the electronic surveillance program for at least 3 previously authorized periods, to the extent such information is available, and shall-- ``(1) evaluate whether the electronic surveillance program has been implemented in accordance with the proposal by the Federal Government by comparing-- ``(A) the minimization procedures proposed with the minimization procedures implemented; ``(B) the nature of the information sought with the nature of the information obtained; and ``(C) the means and operational procedures proposed with the means and operational procedures implemented; ``(2) consider the number of communications intercepted by the electronic surveillance program and the length of time the electronic surveillance program has been in existence; and ``(3) consider the effectiveness of the electronic surveillance program, as reflected by the foreign intelligence information obtained.''. SEC. 7. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT. Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by section 6, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``SEC. 705. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT. ``(a) In Genera1.--The President shall submit to each member of the congressional , intelligence committees (or any subcommittee thereof designated for oversight of electronic surveillance programs under this title) a report on the management and operational details of the electronic surveillance program generally and on any specific surveillance conducted under the electronic surveillance program whenever requested by either of the committees, or any such subcommittee, as applicable. ``(b) Semi-Annual Reports.-- ``(1) In general.--In addition to any reports required under subsection (a), the President shall, not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act and every 6 months thereafter, fully inform each member of the congressional intelligence committees (or any subcommittee thereof designated for oversight of electronic surveillance programs under this title) on all electronic surveillance conducted under the electronic surveillance program. ``(2) Contents.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall include the following: ``(A) A complete discussion of the management, operational details, effectiveness, and necessity of the electronic surveillance program generally, and of the management, operational details, effectiveness, and necessity of all electronic surveillance conducted under the program, during the 6-month period ending on the date of such report. ``(B) The total number of targets of electronic surveillance commenced or continued under the electronic surveillance program. ``(C) The total number of United States persons targeted for electronic surveillance under the electronic surveillance program. ``(D) The total number of targets of electronic surveillance under the electronic surveillance program for which an application [[Page S2344]] was submitted under section 104 for an order under section 105 approving electronic surveillance, and, of such applications, the total number either granted, modified, or denied. ``(E) Any other information specified, in writing, to be included in such report by the congressional intelligence committees or any subcommittees thereof designated for oversight of the electronic surveillance program. ``(F) A description of the nature of the information sought under the electronic surveillance program, the types of communications subjected to such program, and whether the information sought under such program could be reasonably obtained by less intrusive investigative techniques in a timely and effective manner. ``(c) Form of Reports.--Any report or information submitted under this section shall be submitted in classified form.''. SEC. 8. EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATION. Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by section 6, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``SEC. 706. EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATION. ``Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President, through the Attorney General, may authorize electronic surveillance without a court order under this title to acquire foreign intelligence information for a period not to exceed 45 days following a declaration of war by Congress.''. SEC. 9. CONFORMING AMENDMENT. The table of contents for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 is amended I by striking the items related to title VII and section 701 and inserting the following: ``TITLE VII--ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE ``Sec. 701. Definitions. ``Sec. 702. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court jurisdiction to review electronic surveillance programs. ``Sec. 703. Applications for approval of electronic surveillance programs. ``Sec. 704. Approval of electronic surveillance programs. ``Sec. 705. Congressional oversight. ``Sec. 706. Emergency Authorization. ``TITLE VIII--EFFECTIVE DATE ``Sec. 801. Effective date.''. ______

2453年代RS

日历609

第109届国会

2 d会话

S. 2453.

制定审查电子监察计划的程序。

在美国参议院

二六年三月十六日(立法日，三月十五日

幽灵先生（为自己和哈格尔先生）介绍了以下条例草案;这是两次读两次并提交司法委员会

2006年9月13日

由斯佩克特先生报告，附修正案

第1.短头衔。

秒。2.调查结果。

秒。3。定义。

“第七条——电子监控

“证交会。701.定义。

秒。4.外国情报监测法院管辖权审查电子监测计划。

“证交会。702.外国情报监测法院管辖权审查电子监测计划。

秒。5.批准电子监测计划的申请。

“证交会。703.申请批准电子监测计划。

秒。6. APPROVAL OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS.

“证交会。704. APPROVAL OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS.

秒。7. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT.

“证交会。705. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT.

秒。8。1978年外国情报监视法的澄清。

“标题八世——行政机关

“证交会。801.行政机关。

秒。9.其他符合FISA的修正案。

`无法院秩序的电子监测授权;授权书的认证;ReportsReports报告国会委员会;发射下密封;沟通公共航空公司的职责和赔偿;申请;法庭管辖权

10秒。。符合目录的修改。

“第七条——电子监控

“标题八世——行政机关

日历609

第109届国会

2 d会话

S. 2453.

一项法案

制定审查电子监察计划的程序。

2006年9月13日

报告有修正案