[国会纪录:2006年5月25日(参议院)] [Page S5298-S5301]迈克尔五世议员的提名。主席先生,海登中央情报局署署长提名处于关键时刻。该机构处于混乱状态。目前的主任显然被迫出去,前任董事乔治·宗旨,在污染自己的客观和独立以及伊拉克智力支持政府政策议程的情况下损害了他自己的客观和独立以及他的机构之后离开了云之后。下一名董事必须对此船舶右转,将中央情报局恢复至其批判性重要的使命。我将投票证实哈德登,因为他的行动已经证明了一些重要的场合,所需的性格的独立性和力量,以满足中央情报局总监的最重要作用以及对智力评估的权力愿意说出真理的愿意智力界的专业人士。我的提名已经被我在两个关键问题上审议:一个,留胡子是否将是独立的 - 而且我认为他会 - 和两个,基于国家金博宝正规网址安全所着创的内容,应如何判断他代理商的监督计划,他在其任职期间作为NSA董事管理。再次,新任董事的最高优先级必须是确保向总统和国会提供的情报是客观和独立于政治考虑因素。 It was only a few years ago that then-CIA Director George Tenet shaped intelligence to support the policy position of the administration. There are many examples. On February 11, 2003, just before the war, Director Tenet publicly stated, as though it were fact, that Iraq has ``provided training in poison and gases to two Al-Qaeda associates.'' However, we now know that the DIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, had assessed a year earlier that the primary source of that report was more likely intentionally misleading his debriefers, and the CIA itself had concluded in January 2003, before the Tenet public declaration that I have quoted, that the source of the claim that Iraq had provided training in poisons was not in a position to know if any training had in fact taken place. On September 28, 2002, President Bush said that ``each passing day could be the one on which the Iraqi regime gives anthrax or VX nerve gas or someday a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group.'' A week later, on October 7, 2002, a letter declassifying CIA intelligence indicated that Iraq was unlikely to provide WMD to terrorists or al-Qaida and called such a move an ``extreme step,'' a very different perspective from that which had been stated by the President. But the very next day after that declassification was obtained, Director Tenet told the press that there was ``no inconsistency'' between the views in the letter and the President's views on the subject. His statement was flatly wrong. His effort to minimize the inconsistency or eliminate it not only revealed his lack of independence, but it damaged the credibility of the Central Intelligence Agency. [[Page S5299]] At a hearing in 2004, I asked Director Tenet about the alleged meeting between 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in April 2001. He told us that the CIA had ``not gathered enough evidence to conclude that it had happened'' and that ``I don't know that it took place. I can't say that I did.'' What he neglected to say was that the CIA did not believe that the meeting had happened, a fact that he finally acknowledged publicly in July of 2004, after the war began, when he wrote that the CIA was ``increasingly skeptical that such a meeting occurred'' and that there was an ``absence of any credible information that the April 2001 meeting occurred.'' We determined later that that CIA skepticism dated back at least to June 2002, before the war. Director Tenet also looked the other way when the administration publicly alleged that Iraq was seeking uranium from Africa. As a matter of fact, he had personally called the Deputy National Security Adviser to urge that the allegation be removed from the President's October 2002 Cincinnati speech. Director Tenet was silent after the President included the allegation in his January 2003 State of the Union speech. It was not until July of 2003, long after the war began, 2 months after President Bush declared major combat operations were over in Iraq, that Director Tenet finally acknowledged publicly that the allegations should not have been included in the State of the Union speech. According to Bob Woodward's book ``Plan of Attack,'' when the President asked Director Tenet, following the CIA's presentation to him in December of 2002, about its intelligence relative to Iraq's suspected WMD programs, How confident are you in the intelligence about that, Director Tenet replied, ``Don't worry; it's a slam dunk,'' which it surely was not. But that is what the President wanted to hear. That is the message which Director Tenet presented to him, and that is the message that the President then presented to the American public. It is essential that the new Director of the CIA stand up to the administration in power, no matter what administration it is, when the intelligence does not support the direction that the administration wants to go. We cannot afford another Iraq intelligence fiasco. General Hayden has said that he will be an independent CIA Director. Based on his record, I believe him. One piece of evidence in that Hayden record relates to a strategy that the administration used to bolster its case for war. The decision was made by the administration to put a set of what was called ``fresh eyes'' to look over the intelligence relative to the alleged links between Iraq and al-Qaida. The Secretary of Defense created a separate operation in a DOD policy office led by Douglas Feith. While the intelligence community was consistently dubious of the links between al-Qaida and Iraq, the Feith office scraped and scratched and cherry- picked the intelligence to produce assessments that said that there was a strong relationship between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida. And then Mr. Feith bypassed the CIA, bypassed the intelligence community, and briefed that analysis to senior policymakers at the National Security Council and the Vice President's office. George Tenet told us that he was not aware of that prewar briefing by Mr. Feith, until I brought it to his attention in February of 2004. In making its case for war with Iraq, the administration used Mr. Feith's misleading intelligence to convince the country that Saddam and bin Laden were allies. There were few in the administration who had been willing to speak up against this bypass of the intelligence community process, a process whose very purpose is to provide balanced, objective assessments for the intelligence community. One of the few who has spoken up is General Hayden. At his nomination hearing, I asked General Hayden whether, when he was NSA Director before the Iraq war, he was comfortable with what Douglas Feith was up to. My question to General Hayden was not just about Doug Feith. It was about whether the General was willing to speak the truth as he saw it, even if it went against the administration's case for war. General Hayden told the committee, relative to the Feith operation: No, sir. I wasn't comfortable. Has anyone else in the administration said that, spoken up and said that which is so obvious about the Feith operation? There may be others, but General Hayden is the only one that comes to mind. This is what he then said to the committee at our hearing on his nomination: It is possible, Senator, if you want to drill down on an issue and just get laser beam focused, and exhaust every possible--every ounce of evidence, you can build up a pretty strong body of data, right? But you have to know what you're doing, all right. I got three great kids, but if you tell me go out and find all the bad things they've done, Hayden, I can build you a pretty good dossier, and you'd think they were pretty bad people, because that was what I was looking for and that's what I'd build up. General Hayden said this: That would be very wrong. That would be inaccurate. That would be misleading. Wrong, inaccurate, and misleading. That is a pretty good description of the Feith shop's prewar intelligence analysis. It is an indictment of the administration's use of that intelligence to make the case for war. But what is interesting, in particular, is not just what General Hayden said at his confirmation hearing; it is what he did at the time that the Feith office was actually out looking for intelligence to try to prove their premise that there was a connection between Saddam and al-Qaida. General Hayden actually placed a disclaimer on NSA reporting relative to any links between al-Qaida and Saddam Hussein, stating that SIGINT--or signals intelligence--``neither confirms nor denies'' such a link. So while you had the administration claiming the link and Doug Feith scrapping around, scratching for any little bit of evidence that could prove his preordained conclusion that there was such a link, you had General Hayden saying SIGINT, signals intelligence, neither confirms nor denies that such a link exists. In other words, we have in General Hayden more than just promises of independence and objectivity and a willingness to speak truth to power. We have somebody who has actually done so. There is another significant way in which General Hayden has spoken truth to power. When we were considering reforming the intelligence community to fill the gaps and the cracks that existed prior to 9/11 and the Iraq War, there was a major effort to derail the proposal, in part because the legislation sought to shift some authority from Department of Defense components to the new office of the Director of National Intelligence. Although General Hayden is a four star general, he stood up to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld on this issue. It took some backbone and strength of character for him to do so. As to General Hayden remaining in active duty if he is confirmed, I would only make three points. One, he is not the first person to do so. Since the Central Intelligence Agency was established by law in 1947, three commissioned officers have held the tile of Director of Central Intelligence, RADM Roscoe Hillenkoetter, GEN Walter Bedell Smith, and ADM Stansfield Turner. I would also remind my colleagues that the Senate confirmed then LTG Colin Powell to be President Reagan's National Security Adviser even though there is no law that removes that position from the supervision or control of the Secretary of Defense. Secondly, General Hayden has sent a letter to Senator Warner which states ``I do not intend to remain in active military status beyond my assignment as Director, Central Intelligence Agency (if confirmed).'' This is an added assurance of independence and that he will not be shaping intelligence to please the Defense Department in order to put himself in a better position for some future appointment in the military establishment. Third, General Hayden's supervisor in his line of work as Director of the CIA will be by law Ambassador Negroponte, not Secretary Rumsfeld. So General Hayden would not be in the military chain of command but in the intelligence chain of command. To eliminate any doubt of that, we are including a provision in the Defense authorization bill, which is awaiting Senate floor action, to make [[Page S5300]] that absolutely clear in law. Senator Warner and I think it is already clear, but we are going to make it doubly clear by putting that into the pending DOD authorization bill. As I mentioned, the key issue relative to General Hayden's nomination is the President's domestic surveillance program. Over the past 6 months, we have been engaged in a national debate about the appropriate limits on the Government's authority to conduct electronic eavesdropping on American citizens. General Hayden was Director of the National Security Agency when the President authorized the program, and many of our colleagues have raised concerns about that. The administration has repeatedly characterized the electronic surveillance program as applying only to international calls and not involving any domestic surveillance. In February, for instance, the Vice President said: Some of our critics call this a domestic surveillance program. Wrong, that is inaccurate; it is not domestic surveillance. Ambassador Negroponte said: This is a program that was ordered by the President with respect to international phone calls to or from suspected al- Qaida operatives and their affiliates . . . This was not about domestic surveillance. General Hayden found a way to signal that the administration has not described the entire program. When asked at his confirmation hearing whether the program the administration described is the entire program, General Hayden said he could not answer in open session. Presumably, if it were the entire program, he could have easily answered, ``yes.'' In addition, while Stephen Hadley, the President's National Security Adviser, has said relative to the reports that phone records had been provided to the Government under the NSA program, that it is hard to find a privacy issue here, General Hayden did not make that claim and instead acknowledged that, indeed, privacy was an issue, and surely whatever one thinks they believe about this program, privacy is an issue. There may be some who, when they understand the program, believe the privacy concerns are overridden by the security advantage. There may be others who reach the other conclusion that whatever security advantages are achieved do not overcome the privacy intrusions that are reported to exist by those phone records being in the possession or being available to the Government, according to those press reports. But whatever one's conclusion is, there are clearly privacy concerns involved. And when the general was in front of us--he was honest enough--and said: I cannot say there are no privacy concerns here, he was telling us something which should be obvious to each one of us. There are remaining for me a lot of unanswered questions about the NSA program, and I have been one who has been at least partially briefed. I am one of that subcommittee of seven for whom the briefing has begun. But the fact is, the legal opinions about this program are not General Hayden's, they are the Attorney General's. I am aware of no allegation that General Hayden took any action that went beyond what the President authorized or what the Attorney General advised was legal. There are legitimate grounds for criticism regarding this program, but such criticism should be aimed at the White House and the Attorney General. The Intelligence Committee is in the middle of an inquiry into the program. Now that the full committee has been authorized to be briefed on the program, all of the members of the Intelligence Committee need to catch up to where seven of us are, which is about halfway through the briefings. We are still waiting for the administration to answer many questions that we have asked about the program. I want to turn for a few moments to the issue of detainee treatment. I would have liked General Hayden to be more forthcoming on this issue at his hearing. In his testimony, General Hayden affirmed that the CIA is bound by the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In particular, General Hayden stated that this legislation's prohibition on the cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment of detainees applies to all Government agencies, including the CIA. The Detainee Treatment Act also requires that no individual under the effective control of the Defense Department or in a DOD facility will be subjected to any interrogation technique that is not listed in the Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogations. In response to my questioning, General Hayden agreed that the Army field manual would apply to CIA interrogations of detainees under DOD's effective control or in a DOD facility. I was disappointed, however, that General Hayden repeatedly chose not to 12 respond in public to many other questions on detainee treatment, deferring his answers to the hearing's closed session. I believe that he could have answered these questions and related his professional opinion in the public hearing. In response to Senator Feinstein's questions, General Hayden would not say publicly whether individuals held at secret sites may be detained for decades. He would not say publicly whether waterboarding is an acceptable interrogation technique whether the Agency has received new legal guidance from the Department of Justice since passage of the Detainee Treatment Act in December of last year. General Hayden would not answer my question whether the Justice Department memo on the legality of specific interrogation techniques, referred to as the second Bybee memo, remains operative, saying only that ``additional legal opinions'' have been offered. The problem is exacerbated because the administration continues to deny our requests for the second Bybee memo and other Justice Department legal memos which set out the legal boundaries for what constitutes permissible treatment of detainees. Under the Detainee Treatment Act, we have established a single standard--no cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment of detainees. This standard applies without regard to what agency holds a detainee, whether the Defense Department or the CIA, or where the detainee is being held. Yet the administration will not say publicly whether this standard has the same meaning for the intelligence community that it has for our military. The Government's views on the standard for how we treat detainees remains cloaked in secrecy. The Armed Services Committee has heard from the judge advocates general of our military services on what they believe the standard for detainee treatment is. The judge advocates general were asked about the use of dogs in interrogations; forcing a detainee to wear women's underwear during interrogation to humiliate him; leading a detainee around the room on all fours and forcing him to perform dog tricks; subjecting a detainee to provocative touching to humiliate or demean him; subjecting a detainee to strip searches and forcing him to stand naked in front of females as an interrogation method; and waterboarding. In each case, the judge advocates general said that such treatment is not consistent with the spirit or intent of the Army fie1d manual. As I mentioned earlier, with the enactment of the Detainee Treatment Act, the Army field manual applies to all interrogations of detainees under the effective control of the Defense Department and all interrogations conducted in DOD facilities. General Hayden, in contrast, would not say in open session whether even waterboarding is even permitted. When the Senate Armed Services Committee's markup of the national defense authorization bill for fiscal fear 2007 comes to the floor later this year, the Senate will have the chance to demand some answers on the standard for the treatment of detainees. The new bill includes a requirement that the President provide Congress a definitive legal opinion, coordinated across government agencies, on whether certain specific interrogation techniques--including waterboarding, sleep deprivation, stress positions, the use of dogs in interrogations and nudity or sexual humiliation--constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. This provision would also require the President to certify to Congress that this legal opinion is binding on all departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, including the CIA, their personnel, and their contractors. While I disagree with General Hayden's decision not to publicly state his [[Page S5301]] personal view, the general did affirm that the prohibition on cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment in the Detainee Treatment Act applies to all Government agencies, including the CIA. We have asked the administration to clarify this matter. I would hope that the administration would, one, state clearly that waterboarding, sleep deprivation, and stress positions are unacceptable; two, state clearly that the standard in law prohibits the use of dogs in interrogations; and three, state clearly that acts like stripping a detainee for interrogation purposes or subjecting a detainee to sexual humiliation are prohibited. I also hope that the administration will state clearly that the International Committee of the Red Cross will be informed about all detainees held by the United States Government and adopt a policy of not rendering individuals in our custody where there is a reasonable possibility that the person will be tortured. As I said at the time the Senate approved the Detainee Treatment Act, enactment of this legislation means the United States has rejected any claim that this standard--cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment--has one meaning for the Department of Defense and another for the CIA--one meaning as applied to Americans and another applied to our enemies, or one meaning as applied on U.S. territory and another applied elsewhere in the world. I conclude by saying, in my view, General Hayden will be the independent Director of the Central Intelligence Agency that we so desperately need and that the country deserves. The record demonstrates his willingness to speak truth to power, and I will vote to confirm General Hayden. I yield the floor. ____________________