RECORD VERSION

STATEMENT OF:

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BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

UNITED STATES SENATE

108TH CONGRESS, 2nd SESSION

HEARINGS ON

FISCAL YEAR 2005 JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM (JMIP)

AND

ARMY TACTICAL INTELLIGENGE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES (TIARA)

7 APRIL 2004

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL
RELEASED BY THE SENATE
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

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OPENING COMMENTS

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am Lieutenant General Keith Alexander. Thank you for this opportunity to testify in support of the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and Army Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA). I would like to personally thank each of you for your support, which is vital to our Soldiers fighting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) on the ground in Iraq, Afghanistan and throughout the world. Your support is sincerely appreciated and is critical as we continue to fight the war, rapidly adapt and transform our current force and design the Future Force.

Army Intelligence is fully embedded within the aggressive Army Transformation plan which is moving from the Current to Future Force . . . Now. Focused on fixing the current force while building towards the Future Force, we are synchronized within the overarching Army plan, ensuring that the intelligence capabilities and processes are fully capable of supporting a joint and expeditionary quality force that will be relevant and ready to fight our nation's wars and defend our homeland. As we continue to fight this war, improve and reset our current force and transform while in contact, we remain intrinsically synchronized with the Department of Defense Intelligence objectives. We are also working closely with the other services, the Combatant Commands, the Combat Support Agencies, the joint community and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to ensure we develop an integrated and relevant Intelligence Community. Within this written testimony, I would like to briefly discuss the following areas:

- Intelligence lessons learned from the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)
- Army Operational and Tactical Intelligence support to the War
- Army Intelligence JMIP and TIARA Program highlights
- Army Intelligence Transformation – Actionable Intelligence

BACKGROUND

Our Army, our Army Intelligence team, and our Soldiers are fighting and are doing a superb job not only in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also throughout the entire world. By the end of this year, nine of our ten active Army Divisions – all but the 2nd Infantry Division committed in Korea – will have seen action in Afghanistan or Iraq. More than 325,000 Soldiers remain forward-deployed and stationed in 120 countries around the globe supported by over 164,000 mobilized Reserve and National Guard Soldiers while 23,000 Soldiers are directly supporting Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) operations within the United States. Decisively engaged in defending our homeland and fighting the GWOT, Intelligence Soldiers are serving with distinction at home and abroad. As of 12 March 2004, there were approximately 2,700 Active Component and more than 1,000 Reserve Component Intelligence Soldiers mobilized for active federal service in support of Operations NOBLE EAGLE, ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), and JOINT TASK FORCE, GUANTANAMO.

We are making significant improvements within our current force, fixing problems, adapting processes and systems and are giving our Commanders and Soldiers the best possible support and systems available, but we are not done - we still have a lot to do. We are working through the institutional procedures and policy barriers that have been in place since the Cold War. We intend to rapidly adapt structures and procedures to develop and field the equipment our Soldiers need and deserve today, vice waiting years as we now do under an archaic and lengthy acquisition process.

The Army is fighting a war while simultaneously rotating, resetting, rethinking, rebalancing, restructuring and designing a Future Force; incorporating lessons learned while also spiraling technology insertions into the Current Force. As we design and incorporate technological solutions for the future intelligence force, we are also pulling relevant technology to the left (spiral insertions) into the current force. The INSCOM Information Dominance Center (IDC) and Project Morning Calm are exceptional

examples of how we are accelerating transformation by operationally applying new analytic tools and capabilities in support of Army and Joint Warfighters for insertion or inclusion into our new systems, most specifically, Distributed Common Ground System-Army and Joint (DCGS-A and DCGS-J).

We are moving from the Current Force to the Future Force . . . Now:

- to reflect wartime realities
- to incorporate “next generational” capabilities
- to keep Soldiers first
- to develop a Joint and Expeditionary Army

Intelligence Lessons from the War

Traditional intelligence methods and products served U.S. forces well during the combat phase of OIF, although there was a notable degradation of situational awareness for forces on the move because of the lack of an adequate network and the inability to fuse all source intelligence while on the move. During Phase IV (Post Combat Operations), intelligence sensing requirements shifted dramatically to Human Intelligence (HUMINT) as the principal of the intelligence disciplines rather than more technical collection means.

Following an on the ground assessment of the intelligence resources and processes in Iraq, the Army G2 Staff worked with Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 7, identifying long and short term solutions to improve intelligence for Operation Iraqi Freedom and to improve the Current Force. Short-term solutions are well underway. Of the 127 actions initially noted, the majority are in place today and new actions are being addressed as they are identified not only in support of OIF, but OEF as well. These lessons are proving critical as we concurrently develop an intelligence transformation to the Future Force.

The Intelligence related lessons learned are categorized in four major areas:

(1) **Tactical collection**: Overall, analysis and sensing capabilities were inadequate at maneuver brigade and battalion echelons. Since the ability to strike at the enemy exceeded our ability to target them, we needed more Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and other targeting sensors. *(Every Division Commander stated that they needed both more UAVs and more Human Collection Teams (HCTs).* Limited capabilities to conduct tactical surveillance of the enemy revealed the need for more signals intelligence (SIGINT) assets and more HUMINT capabilities. We are addressing these priorities through our close work with Task Force Modularity in redesigning the Army's new Maneuver Units of Action (Brigades of today). We are ensuring there are sufficient organic collection and analysis capabilities to meet the identified requirements. Some upgrades already implemented include augmenting units monitoring borders with existing sensors and further providing leading-edge capabilities as they become available. We have also installed special-purpose document exploitation suites (Harmony) to facilitate Document Exploitation (DOCEX).

(2) **Reporting**: The information obtained from combat patrols, logistics activities, and other non-Military Intelligence (MI) missions was not adequately integrated into the intelligence system for analysis. Information that Soldiers reported was not in digital form and therefore did not enter the reporting system quickly enough to be of operational use. The small percentage of reports that actually entered the intelligence system were manually transcribed and entered the analytic network after the completion of the operation. To resolve this issue, we must digitize all reporting at the point of origin and connect the Soldier and tactical echelons to the network. In the near term, we are rapidly fielding Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) to provide a reporting and intelligence exchange capability at the Soldier level. To link the soldier and tactical echelons to the network we are rapidly creating and fielding DCGS capability down to battalion level. We also must re-emphasize the doctrinal aspects of tactical reporting. The Intelligence Center and School has sent out a Mobile Training Team to address both this and tactical questioning issues.

(3) **Access to National Intelligence**: *We have made great strides in information access, but we still have a way to go.* Intelligence access was, and still is, constrained by policies that restricted dissemination and use, especially at the tactical level (division and below). These policies complicated basic access to many databases, limiting our ability to conduct all-source analysis. We are working with DoD to eliminate classification dissemination caveats and grant universal data access. Initiatives such as the IDC and Project Morning Calm are assisting in accessing and providing access to various databases and agencies. We are building Trojan Spirit (a classified communications capability) into every Maneuver Unit of Action.

(4) Networking Analytic Centers**: During the war, especially as troops deployed forward, we had large volumes of message traffic, with incredible amounts of information, but did poorly in extracting and synchronizing relevant knowledge with our tactical forces. The increased volume of intelligence at higher echelons could not be processed, refined or fused for tactical or operational use on a timely basis. We had good situational awareness across the force until our units crossed the line of departure (LD) into combat. After crossing the LD, the pace of the attack limited shared situational awareness and resulted in a constant movement-to-contact operational environment. This lack of shared situational understanding revealed the need for a digital intel-on-the-move network capability supported by communications-on-the-move at the lowest echelons. We also need to evolve our doctrine such that analytic centers provide "overwatch" of tactical formations 24/7.**

ARMY INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO CURRENT OPERATIONS

The Soldier is our Focus – *Every Soldier is a Sensor*. We have over 120,000 Soldiers - sensors - located on the battlefield in Iraq. The Soldier on the ground, patrolling and interacting within their environment or battlespace, has constant access to immeasurable amounts of data. Information is reported verbally at the lowest levels and a small portion is later digitized into a database. In the end, the majority of

observations - reports by Soldiers on the ground typically do not make it into the reporting network. Further, we must continue to develop training our Soldiers as sensors or collectors of battlefield information. They do not fully understand how to observe or sense their environment. At the opposite end of the spectrum, since the Soldier is not connected to the network, he is not receiving the most current data or information relevant to his battlespace or environment. We would not send our pilots up without ensuring that they were digitally linked with the best, most relevant, actionable intelligence available, such as early warning radar. But, today, we send our Soldiers into battle, unlinked and without dedicated intelligence support.

Fight for Knowledge: The successful units at the tactical echelons (company through brigade) within Iraq and Afghanistan have developed a tactic we refer to as "*Fight for Knowledge*." They are not waiting for intelligence from higher to tell them where the enemy is. They are utilizing combat patrols, interaction with the local populace, and any other legitimate means at their disposal to acquire intelligence and knowledge to enable operations (*combat intelligence, when merged with intelligence from higher, is a powerful force enabler*). They are, in essence, "creating their own luck," -- "fight(ing) for knowledge." They are reinvigorating the existing, but often neglected concept of Combat Intelligence. Prior to revitalizing this concept, unit Commanders would wait for intelligence to come from higher before acting. In the type of war we are fighting now--over mountains, through caves, house to house--our technical collection will not always provide all the information required to enable action. ("Fight for Knowledge" will become further enhanced when we digitally connect the Soldier and lower tactical echelons to the network.)

Tactical Overwatch: Currently, tactical units receive their intelligence through an echeloned structure: from national, to theatre, to corps, to division, and so on. This lockstep methodology is a remnant of Industrial-Age, Cold War structures and procedures. Before OIF, this process was marginally adequate when units were static or garrisoned; however, the dissemination and reporting channels collapsed when the units moved into battle in Iraq. This legacy process causes information or intelligence

latency. Latency that is caused by the existing echeloned structure that requires information and intelligence be sent step by step, through the various levels of command, which can often take hours, if not days. The lower tactical echelons rarely receive the intelligence in a timely manner, nor do they have direct access to experts located at agencies in the United States or elsewhere. This also impacts the ability for lower tactical echelons to provide critical reports that are relevant to the higher agencies or headquarters that need them. Our vision is to implement a new approach to this concept, creating a dedicated structure to provide intelligence or tactical overwatch, focusing higher level intelligence capabilities in direct support to the tactical echelons. We have already started this effort through support provided by the IDC and through initiatives such as Project Morning Calm and The Pantheon Project.

Three initiatives have significantly contributed to the overwatch concept over the last year and continue to contribute to the overall establishment of an overwatch capability in the future.

Information Dominance Center (IDC): The IDC is an Operational, state of the art, analytic Intelligence center. The IDC has been and continues to support the tactical forces engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan through direct support to the JTF Headquarters or through the IDC Extensions located in direct support to CJTF-7 and JTF-GTMO. The IDC has pioneered and is using processes and methodologies for timely situational awareness and analysis of complex networks of individuals and organizations that can be shared to the extent that the network and / or policies allow. The IDC uses advanced software tools and special data access agreements to extract, correlate and capture the essence of vast amounts of information across many databases. The IDC is the premier Army Intelligence test bed for advanced, new technologies and concepts which, when operationally proven, are spiraled into the intelligence community and the tactical force. The true power of the IDC will be realized when the tactial overwatch initiative is fully established along with a global network.

Project Morning Calm: An outgrowth of the IDC is an initiative referred to as Morning Calm and sponsored by OSD. This is a rapidly evolving intelligence structure in support of a Theater Combatant Commander; virtually a testbed for concepts that may have application in GWOT and all theaters in both joint and combined environments. Morning Calm creates an all-inclusive intelligence "system" capable of rapidly sharing and visualizing intelligence and all disparate data, from the numerous collection systems and agencies, tactical through national and combined. Morning Calm demonstrates a revolutionary capability to merge high volume, multi-lingual, live collection feeds (streaming data) with the INSCOM IDC advanced technological processes for interacting with large repositories of disparate data types in a much more rapid, timely, and visually intuitive manner than currently available. Numerous overwatch related tools and technologies have already been developed within this Project - benefiting from the development of advanced tools and capabilities operationalized within Morning Calm.

The Pantheon Project: This initiative has contributed significantly to advancing technological innovations within the IDC**,** Morning Calm and the entire Intelligence Community. This project has brought together a grouping of world-class individuals from business, academia, and government to address and solve the hardest technical problems, creating technological or procedural solutions for the enhancement of tactical through national intelligence echelons. These solutions have been rapidly spiraled forward primarily into the IDC and Morning Calm Project. While previously done ad hoc, and through the generosity of several “patriots” who have volunteered their time to enable this rapid technology insertion program, our goal is to formalize this initiative into a core group who will constantly be on call to assist with issues and provide expert advice.

Systems: Supporting the tactical echelons were several TIARA (funded) systems to include: Ground Surveillance Radars (GSRs); Prophet; All Source Analysis System (ASAS); Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence (CI/HUMINT) Information Management System (CHIMS); Integrated Meteorological System - Light (IMETS-L); Remotely Monitored Battlefield Surveillance System (REMBASS); GUARDRAIL Common Sensor (GRCS) airborne Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) system; Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), Shadow 200 and Hunter - and Tactical Exploitation System (TES). We have also successfully deployed our JMIP funded UAV, Shadow

200 and Hunter. All of these systems have and continue to successfully support tactical echelons in Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, or both. A noteworthy achievement was the ability to rapidly insert technology patches - upgrades into some of these systems to adapt them and maximize capabilities - based upon the threat in both Afghanistan and Iraq. A noted shortcoming was that these systems were neither networked nor integrated. Even when data was collected, often it did not make it to the required database or user; or, if it did, it was extremely late. Our transformation plan includes the rapid convergence of many of these systems into DCGS-A, which is addressed later in this paper.

Tactical HUMINT: Our tactical HUMINT Collection Teams (HCTs) continue to provide critical intelligence, supporting both ongoing missions and Force Protection to our units serving in both Afghanistan and Iraq. With the services short on linguists across the board, contract linguists have successfully augmented the HCTs. HCTs integrated themselves into the tactical echelons and provided superb support throughout the force. These teams, especially in the follow-on phase of operations, were lauded by Commanders who have consistently requested additional teams – a request that our existing inventory cannot sufficiently supply. One notable shortcoming was the inability to network these teams while they were on the move.

Today: Our Soldiers are adapting, learning to observe and report. Our tactical Commanders have also learned to use patrols aggressively to interact with the environment and collect combat intelligence. Our systems have operated well overall and numerous adaptations or improvements have been incorporated in order to maximize their effectiveness. Our HCTs, although lacking in quantity, have established themselves as the premier force enabler. Overall, each separate, distinct area of the intelligence fight is working well with the exception of an integrated network that binds these similar, but disparate, entities together to create an integrated framework. We have several initiatives geared to resolve this issue. The most critical one is establishing the Network :

Establishing the Network

The top priority for Army intelligence transformation is rapidly converging our current "diverse" intelligence processors into the Distributed Common Ground System – Army (DCGS-A). DCGS-A is a modular and scaleable family of multi-intelligence systems for posting, processing, exploiting, and updating ISR information. While it will eventually replace current and future Army intelligence processing systems (TIARA and JMIP) for national, joint and army organic sensor data, the Army intent is to rapidly build and field an integrated DCGS-A capability, establishing intelligence interoperability vertically across all echelons down to the battalion level. It is important to note, we are dependent on the Army network for much of our collateral connectivity.

DCGS-A will be implemented using a spiral development acquisition strategy through the evolutionary merging of existing and programmed Army processing systems, including ASAS, GUARDRAIL Information Node (GRIFN), future ACS ground processing segment, Army Space Program Office (ASPO) Tactical Exploitation System (TES) Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) processing systems, Joint STARS Common Ground Station (CGS) SAR/MTI processing, TUAV Ground Control Station (GCS), and Tactical Control System (TCS). All DCGS-A components will comply with Service, Joint, and National interoperability standards.

The current emphasis is to converge several different existing systems (ASAS, TES, CGS, CHIMS, CHATS) into what are being referred to as battalion and brigade DCGS-A thrusts. These initial systems will consist of existing off-the-shelf-type equipment utilizing existing hardware and software to establish a network-centric environment and get the capability into the hands of our Soldiers now, vice years down the road. As future DCGS-A upgrades come to fruition, they will be spirally inserted into the existing DCGS-A thrusts that we will have already established within the various echelons. In the near future, DCGS will be the "hub" for the Department of Defense to effectively implement the information sharing relationships between the warfighters, the service intelligence analysts, and the Intelligence Community. The end result will be, for the first time, a common intelligence network with common analytical tool sets truly enabling horizontal and vertical collaboration and integration.

Unique to the DCGS-A initiative is our plan--already initiated--to integrate "legacy" systems rapidly into DCGS, investing into the future system vice continuing to spend money on a system or program that will be terminated in the very near future. Also, in conjunction with INSCOM, theater level DCGS-A will be integrated with the various INSCOM Information Dominance Center Hubs located at the different Theater Intelligence Groups and Brigades throughout the world. In essence, Home Station DCGS and the IDC Hubs will become merged. This will enable the merging of technology and tool sets into one common system, and allow for proven integration of IDC technologies already in use and supporting the War, into the DCGS-A program.

The Army is also progressing with fixed-site DCGS-A assets at various garrison locations. This will give the Army a home-station ability to support the joint as well as organic forces from sanctuary locations 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The Army will have access to National and Air Force reconnaissance assets as well as Army organic assets. The Army fixed-site DCGS capability is in its formative stage with an initial capability at the 66th Military Intelligence Group in Darmstadt, Germany, as well as at the 501st Military Intelligence Brigade, located in South Korea.

ARMY INTELLIGENCE JMIP AND TIARA PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS

Tactical intelligence capabilities provided by TIARA and JMIP programs continue to be extraordinarily critical to the ability of the ground maneuver force's ability to prosecute the war. Our MI Soldiers are performing superbly as they collect, analyze and process data and information into intelligence, so that the ground commander can rapidly act against a very adaptive and mobile enemy. Our focus is to enable them and the entire intelligence enterprise to be connected to the intelligence framework.

1. Overview

Army Tactical Intelligence And Related Activities (TIARA) comprise an array of 25 separate programs and systems, training programs, and forces that are located throughout the Army. The various TIARA programs are engaged in ongoing military

operations, whether conducting combat counterterrorism operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, supporting Homeland Defense, maintaining the armistice along the DMZ in Korea, or enforcing the peace between various factions in the Balkans. Last year, Army intelligence supported the full spectrum of warfare ensuring that intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities were pervasive throughout the Current Force, the Stryker brigades, and are setting the stage for the Future Force. This year, as the Army continues to support U.S. commitments, Army Transformation remains on track and, in many cases, is being accelerated by the Army's Focus Area initiatives to address the urgent operational needs of our nation's Global War On Terrorism. Army intelligence transformation is embedded within the Army Campaign plan and is allowing the Army Intelligence Community to fast track several initiatives that will improve intelligence support to the tactical forces.

The Army Joint Military Intelligence Program consists primarily of research, development, and acquisition programs for manned and unmanned airborne ISR systems, advanced SIGINT, and intelligence Tasking, Posting, Processing, and Using (TPPU) (also known as Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination, or TPED) systems. Army TIARA and JMIP are focused on supporting the tactical echelons with Actionable Intelligence: providing Commanders and Soldiers with a high level of situational understanding, delivered with the speed, accuracy, and timeliness necessary to operate at their highest potential enabling rapid and successful execution of operations. Army intelligence transformation, empowered by the TIARA and JMIP systems and programs, achieves its intended purpose of empowering greater individual initiative and self-synchronization among tactical units by integrating information across organizations and echelons, accelerating the speed of decision making and the agility of operations.

2. LANGUAGE PROGRAM

The Army is DoD's Executive Agent for the Defense Language Institute and Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) in Monterey, California. DLIFLC annually trains 3,500 of

the best-trained linguists in the world and continues to be the pre-eminent language schoolhouse in the world, providing 700,000 hours of instruction in 23 languages at Monterey and 85 languages through the Washington Office.

DLIFLC is also on the forefront of using distant learning tools designed to maintain and improve language skills of service members. The Satellite Communication for Learning (SCOLA) program, using live television programs from over twenty-five countries beamed via satellite to posts, ships, and armories around the world, continues to be a vital tool to maintain easily perishable language skills. DLIFLC provided support to field operations through over 9,200 hours of Video Tele-Training (VTT) and 2,000 hours of mobile training team support using DLIFLC instructors.

The Global War on Terrorism has strained the Army system that provides trained linguists in support of DoD and national agencies, as well as the Warfighter. Thousands of additional requirements in Arabic, Kurdish, Pashto, Urdu, Dari and other languages have exhausted the Army's organic linguist base in the Active and Reserve Components. Consequently, the Army has outsourced more than 6,000 linguist requirements in support of the GWOT. The cost per annum of a single contract linguist varies from $15K per year for a locally hired linguist to approximately $200K. Factors such as clearance and duty location requirements contribute to the total cost. Further, there are simply not enough U.S. citizens with the requisite language skills and desire to deploy to harsh, frequently dangerous, locations to support the cleared linguist requirements of the Army, DoD, and the national community, thus increasing the demand from the same linguist pool. The cost to the Army of supporting the GWOT with contract linguists this FY exceeds $250M. The annual cost of the language contract in Bosnia, employing over 900 locally hired linguists is an additional $36 million. Given the number of linguists required by Commanders across the battlespace, contracted linguists will remain a necessity for the foreseeable future.

Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff established Joint Task Force- Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (JTF-GTMO), to support

detainee operations (including detention and interrogations) for enemy combatants who come under U.S. control. We must continue to operate and maintain support for the assigned intelligence missions and personnel. Counterterrorism supplementals provided initial funding for detainee operations and military construction at GTMO in both fiscal years (FY) 2002 and 2003. As an ongoing requirement, program funding commenced in FY 2004 as part of the JMIP. Supported missions include: screening, interrogation, intelligence collection, and interaction with other agencies involved in the detainee operations.

Questioning Guantanamo detainees improved the security of our nation and coalition partners by expanding our understanding of al Qaida, its affiliates and other extremely dangerous terrorist groups that threaten our security. Detainees have revealed al Qaida leadership structures, operatives, funding mechanisms, communication methods, training and selection programs, travel patterns, support infrastructures, and plans for attacking the U.S. and other countries.

3. AIRBORNE INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

Army airborne Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) is currently operating at a high tempo in support of ongoing military operations worldwide. Today, all five of our Military Intelligence Aerial Exploitation Battalions (AEB) are forward deployed, or recently returned to home station, again preparing to re-deploy in support of worldwide operations.

- Our Korea-based GUARDRAIL Common Sensor (GRCS) and Airborne Reconnaissance-Low (ARL) Aerial Exploitation Battalion continues to provide over 80% of the Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations (SRO) on the Korean peninsula.

- In November 1995, our Germany based GRCS AEB deployed to Taszar, Hungary, in support of Task Force Eagle. This GRCS unit provided critical

indications and warning, and force protection oversight during the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. After three plus years in Hungary, this unit further forward deployed to Brindisi, Italy, in support of Task Force Falcon operations in the Balkans. In late February of 2003, this unit redeployed to Germany for five short months to refit and refurbish in preparation for its deployment in support of Commander, Central Command, and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. At present, this unit is scheduled to redeploy to Germany in September of this year.

- The first of two U.S.-based GRCS AEBs deployed in August 2001 to participate in Operation PHOENIX VENTURE in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). After eight months supporting the USCENTCOM AOR, this unit deployed to South America to support the USSOUTHCOM Commander. Following a successful two-month deployment, this unit again forward deployed into the USCENTCOM AOR to support Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. This unit redeployed to homestation in October 2003, and is preparing to again deploy in September of this year.

- Our CONUS-based Airborne Reconnaissance Low (ARL) AEB that supports Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is currently deployed to the USSOUTHCOM AOR. Based upon the USSOUTHCOM Combatant Commander's requirements, portions of this unit are now deployed 365-days a year to support the theater's coordinated ISR plan in Colombia.

- In May 2002, our second CONUS-based GRCS AEB deployed to provide additional support to USCENTCOM. This unit redeployed to homestation after a successful 13-month deployment. At present, the unit is conducting refit and refurbish requirements in preparation for its redeployment in August of this year to support continuing OIF intelligence requirements.

The Army continues to work to ensure that our ISR aircraft deploy with AOR specific hardware and software capabilities. We have also continued to stress interoperability, and are achieving notable success in Airborne Overhead Cooperative Operations (AOCO) in coordination with the national systems. For the past four years we have fielded cooperative capabilities to all four GRCS units. AOCO allows us to connect a single GRCS aircraft to an National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) capability facilitating precision location especially at increased depths. Additionally, this capability yields other benefits such as improved geometry to the target, increased range, and connectivity to the national intelligence infrastructure via the GRCS Integrated Processing Facility. This dramatic interoperability success and sharing of functionality between systems is also a requirement for our Future Force airborne ISR system, Aerial Common Sensor.

GRCS is the workhorse of Army airborne ISR at the corps and theater level. There is no other ISR system in the world that equals the ability of GRCS to provide responsive, precision SIGINT geo-location data on threat communications and radar emitters. GRCS is presently flying an average of 1,900 sorties per year in support of USFK, USEUCOM, and USCENTCOM.

To meet the rapidly changing threat signals environment, we are continuing selective upgrades to the SIGINT capabilities of our fielded GRCS systems by integrating advanced technologies developed through the Defense Cryptologic Program (DCP). We are also modernizing the outdated GRCS Integrated Processing Facility (IPF) on the ground, replacing it with the state-of-the-art GUARDRAIL Information Node (GRIFN). GRIFN is an integral part of the DCGS-A.

To ensure our GRCS units forward-deployed in support of OIF can provide their critical information into the Global Intelligence Architecture and to ensure the system's ability to effectively prosecute terrorist targets, we are providing a near-term very small aperture terminal (VSAT) connection for forward deployed GRCS units. This connection will support GRCS's prosecution of CENTCOM targets.

ARL is our current manned, multi-intelligence airborne ISR system. ARL flies an average of 444 sorties per year in support of early warning/force protection for US Forces Korea (USFK), and over 288 sorties per year in the USSOUTHCOM AOR. ARL also flies ISR missions in support of Joint Task Force 6 (JTF-6) here in CONUS.

The Army's final ARL platform is currently in production and was funded in the FY00 supplemental appropriation as a replacement for the system that crashed in Colombia in July 1999, while conducting reconnaissance in support of counter-drug operations. This system will be fielded in April, FY04 , and will be available to support Combatant Commander requirements. In FY04, we continue to upgrade IMINT and SIGINT sensors, while also ensuring that the avionics on our oldest ARL systems meet international Airspace 2000 flight requirements. We used the Defense Emergency Relief Fund (DERF) to accelerate IMINT sensor upgrades and to develop, test and integrate MASINT sensors.

The Army continues to strive to meet airborne ISR requirements given our resource-constrained environment. The FY05 budget request will provide us the ability to minimally sustain our existing GRCS and ARL airborne fleets. We used DERF counter-terrorism funding and FY04 Supplementals to provide key sensor upgrades that were required to maintain technical relevance in pursuing the GWOT, but the majority of our modernization effort is focused on meeting the ISR requirements for the Army's Future Force.

The Army's next-generation manned, airborne, collection platform will be Aerial Common Sensor (ACS), which will replace both ARL and GRCS. ACS is a Joint Army and Navy program and will be a multi-intelligence collection system, with SIGINT, IMINT, and MASINT sensors. ACS sensor data will be processed and disseminated via the DCGS architecture. Building upon the success of GRCS, ACS will provide responsive precision targeting data to the full range of Army organic weapon systems in support of the Joint Task Force or ground component commander. The Army ACS

program will meet all Joint and National interoperability standards. The FY05 budget request supports the beginning of the ACS System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase. The robust ACS sensor suite includes precision location Communications and Electronics Intelligence sensors with the ability to prosecute new and emerging threat signals; highly accurate Imagery Intelligence sensors including: Electro-optic, Infrared; Synthetic Aperture Radar and a Ground Moving Target Indicator; and advanced Measurement and Signature Intelligence including a Ultra/Hyper/Multi-Spectral Imagery, Foliage Penetration Radar, Masked Target Sensor, Light Detection and Ranging Sensor; Non-Imaging Synthetic Aperture Radar; Calibrated Non-Imaging Infrared Sensor; and Unintentional Radiation Sensor. These sensor suites will ensure ACS is able to successfully prosecute and precisely locate threat targets regardless of their techniques to evade detection. ACS will begin production in FY07, with initial fielding in FY09. Meeting these timelines is essential in order to ensure that the first ACS system is operational when the Army's initial Future Force unit is fielded.

The Army leadership continues to strongly support the rapid fielding of a Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) in order to fill a critical warfighting capability – providing the tactical warfighting Commander with the ability to physically look over the next hill, without putting a Soldier in harm's way. Since the start of sustained combat operations a year ago, the Army's UAV capabilities have expanded significantly. Although limited at the outset of ground combat operations, Army UAV capability has improved and will continue to do so over this year. Our UAV lessons learned and demonstrated successful support of OIF missions have fortified our commitment to providing this capability as quickly as possible. This JMIP program accordingly remains a high modernization priority for Army tactical intelligence in FY05. The Army has fielded twelve TUAV systems, eight to operational units, of which, five are directly supporting combat operations today.

The Army's Shadow TUAV is the first UAV to be fielded through the normal acquisition process and holds the distinction of being the only DOD UAV system to achieve a full rate production decision, approved on 25 September 2002. Not only a true acquisition

success story, going from contract award in December 1999 to initial operational capability in just 32 months, this system has also proved to be an invaluable asset in the hands of our deployed Commanders. Between intelligence gathering and force protection, the TUAV has proven its usefulness time and again by revealing detailed information about enemy positions. By providing near-real-time combat information to Commanders, the TUAV has helped save Soldiers by providing video footage of the areas Soldiers are moving into. The Shadow TUAV flew over 2,350 hours in FY03 and has surpassed a total of 4,600 total hours in OIF to date. As a result of increased demand for this capability from the field, the Army is accelerating procurement of Shadow systems this year by three. The Army will field a total of 41 TUAV systems; 35 to the active component brigades, two to the National Guard, and four to the UAV training base.

Our FY04 budget provided funding for selecting an Extended Range/Multi-Purpose (ER/MP) air vehicle to be integrated into the Army's UAV architecture by FY09. The selection process will be completed in FY05. This new UAV will be capable of reaching out to 300 kilometers and carrying advanced data links and payloads such as electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) imagery, all-weather synthetic aperture radar and moving target indicator (SAR/MTI) sensors coupled with a communications relay payload to assist the ground commander's command and control infrastructure. These enhanced capabilities will be vital to the ability of the tactical ground and Joint Task Force Commander to achieve knowledge dominance across the full spectrum of military operations in the future.

During the interim, while we are developing the ER/MP capability, we will continue to use the Hunter UAV as an intervening capability. The Army has stationed three companies of Hunter UAVs with operational units, all of which have provided support to OIF. Most recently, the V Corps Hunter company deployed to support OIF in January and continues to provide vital day and night imagery intelligence to CJTF-7. In 2003, the two Hunter units deployed in support of OIF flew over 4,067 hours with the loss of seven Hunter air vehicles. The Army has since contracted to maintain an operational

readiness rate of 85 percent for our Hunter units allowing continued support to the Joint Task Force Commander in Iraq as well as maintaining training for units pending redeployment. This contract supports air and ground components of the Hunter system with refurbishment and replacement parts necessary to maintain the operational readiness rate. Replacement parts for the air component of the system will provide increased capability, reliability and precision with new heavy fuel engines, extended center wing sections for additional fuel, and modern avionics.

More recently, the Army has developed plans to deploy the Improved-GNAT (I-GNAT), a downsized Predator UAV, provided through a Congressional add in 2003. Manufactured by General Atomics, the I-GNAT was originally planned to be flown in the U.S. as a means to gain an understanding of this class of aircraft and its capability in relation to the ER/MP mission. However, operations in Iraq pre-empted this plan and the Army will now use this system to support the CJTF-7 Commander with an additional day and night full motion video capability. The Army has borrowed Air Force Lynx radars to supplement the day and night capability on I-GNAT with a near all-weather capability to provide a more robust intelligence capability to the commander. The employment of I-GNAT will be analyzed while deployed in order to develop doctrine and TTP for the ER/MP UAV.

4. GROUND INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR)

The Army's tactical ground ISR modernization efforts are focused on meeting current and future warfighting requirements. The FY05 budget request adequately supports these efforts. Prophet is the Army's next generation tactical ground COMINT system being developed. Prophet replaces four less capable systems while significantly reducing footprint. The system provides a near real time electronic picture of the battlefield. The benefits to the Commander include enhanced battlefield awareness, force protection and target development. Unlike previous systems, Prophet is able to perform collection and electronic attack on the move enabling it to operate in close

support to highly mobile maneuver forces throughout the full spectrum of operations. The system also operates in two configurations, mounted and dismounted.

The Prophet program uses a blocked acquisition strategy:

- Block I provides a basic communications intelligence and radio direction finding capability
- Block II provides an electronic attack capability
- Block III provides a capability to intercept and locate modern emitters

Block I is in full-rate production and fielding will be complete to the Active Force in FY05. Fielding will not be complete to the Army National Guard unless additional funding is provided to support Army National Guard requirements. The Block II/III System Development and Demonstration (SDD) contract was awarded in March 2003 to General Dynamics-Phoenix. The first unit equipped with Block II/III is expected in 4QFY05. The FY05 budget request supports the completion of the Block I buy and the continuation of the Block II/III SDD development phase, and the initial procurement of Block II/III systems.

Prophet is an OEF and OIF combat tested system. It deployed with Special Operations Forces in the early stages of OEF and crossed the line of departure with the 3rd Infantry Division at the beginning of OIF. Prophet's on-the-move collection capability proved its worth as it detected a waiting ambush for the lead elements of the 3rd Infantry Division. It also played a key role in the capture of the international airport as it located targets for the artillery units. Prophet continues to play an integral role in both theaters as it provides critical battlefield awareness at the brigade level. As the Army looks to the Future Force, Prophet plays a critical role. Based on warfighter requests, Prophet Block I deployed with additional capabilities to meet theater specific requirements. These capabilities include beyond line of sight communications and significantly enhanced collection and processing capabilities. This is the way of the future: keeping tactical SIGINT capabilities relevant across the full spectrum of operations by insertion of evolving technology. Prophet is key to the Army's transformation effort. The system is

an integral part of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) providing critical battlespace awareness and force protection capabilities. It has performed extremely well with the first SBCT in OIF. The Future Combat System (FCS) materiel developer considers Block III as the COMINT sensor payload baseline to meet the FCS COMINT requirements. The specific Unit of Action (UA) applications include the COMINT sensor payloads for the FCS Reconnaissance and Surveillance Vehicle and the Armored Robotic Vehicles. One of the key products these systems will provide to the UA commander is emitter mapping. The requirements for the Unit of Employment (UE) are being worked at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Early indications are that Prophet will be the UE ground ISR system.

Recent contingency operations have highlighted the need for electronic warfare (EW), a component of Information Operations (IO). While Army intelligence is not the sole practitioner of EW, it has a unique role in EW as it maintains the Army's electronic attack (EA) and electronic support (ES) capabilities. An EA capability is included in Prophet Block II/III. Additionally, the Extended Range/Multi-Purpose UAV will have an EA payload that will enable our warfighters to conduct effective non-lethal fires throughout the depth of the battlespace. Military Intelligence systems such a GRCS, ARL and ACS work hand-in-hand to provide the intelligence or electronic support to enable EA.

5. INTELLIGENCE FUSION

The ASAS is the current Army intelligence fusion program. ASAS and current ground processor capabilities will rapidly migrate into the DCGS-A architecture to provide: automated intelligence analysis; management of intelligence and electronic warfare resources; and production and dissemination of intelligence to warfighting Commanders and staff. Variants of ASAS are fielded at all echelons in the Army, enabling the rapid dissemination of the all source fusion picture of the current threat to forward combat maneuver battalions. ASAS is the Army intelligence interface to the warfighter Army Battle Command System (ABCS) and to the Joint Global Command and Control

System (GCCS), and provides the automated ground threat picture to the Joint Command Operational Picture (JCOP). The system is interoperable with national military intelligence integrated database (IDB) standards. The next generation ASAS Analysis and Control Element (ACE) will be fully integrated with the DCGS-A systems of systems, enabling true near-real-time multi-source intelligence correlation and target development.

The ASAS reliance on commercial-based hardware and a true open architecture allows continued interoperability with Current Force intelligence systems, while ensuring a smooth evolution to the future. We have used Congressional Supplemental funding to rapidly develop and integrate new software for the analysis of non-traditional / non-structured threats and adjust to Lessons Learned from OIF. This software is currently in use in Bosnia and has been delivered to all units engaged in OIF. The Army firmly believes our substantial TIARA investment in ASAS demonstrates our resolve in Joint intelligence information exchange and support to the Joint and ground Warfighter.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

CI and HUMINT are critical enablers to successful combat operations in environments such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Underscoring the importance of human intelligence, we have used Congressional Supplemental funding to accelerate procurement of the CI/HUMINT Information Management System (CHIMS) and the integration of biometric analytic tools into the software baseline. Over 900 systems have been fielded to Active Component and Army Reserve Soldiers who have been deployed to OIF. Fielding of these systems was a monumental task, which involved training 1,200 soldiers on the care and operation of the CHIMS. Our FY04 funding continued spiral development and procurement of CHIMS devices and acceleration of CHIMS enhancements to our Soldiers serving in OIF.

CHIMS automation has proven to be invaluable in meeting the challenge of screening, interrogating, and reporting intelligence from the large numbers of prisoners from OIF.

The experience we gained has validated a requirement for state-of-the-art equipment to support the exploitation of large volumes of documents and computer magnetic storage media. In the near term, the Army has provided the CHIMS with an initial document exploitation (DOCEX) capability.

Intelligence Transformation: The Soldier—Our Focus

The focus of intelligence transformation is the Soldier. All of our initiatives seek to leverage all collected data, utilizing smart tools and trained analysts, to conduct fusion analysis to generate relevant intelligence for decision makers, both Commanders and Soldiers. Today, our Soldiers in the fight have the greatest local knowledge but the poorest situational knowledge outside their immediate area of operations (only hundreds of meters). The opposite situation exists at the Joint, Theater and National levels, where the greatest operational and strategic knowledge resides, with little to no local knowledge available.

In part, we are hindered by our own remarkable technological advantages and capabilities. Information age technology has allowed us to develop exceptional collection system capabilities. However, realizing the full power of our entire intelligence system depends not only on our ability to collect information efficiently, but also on our ability to effectively process, analyze, and most importantly, make intelligence actionable. While we made incredible improvements in our collection systems, we neglected to technically and procedurally change how we process and analyze all this information. Our collection systems gather vast amounts of information, but the majority of that information is dumped into single source databases available to only those single source analysts in that particular collection organization. This stovepipe process is a consequence of how our intelligence community has evolved--or, more accurately, has failed to evolve--and how we have implemented technological change while continuing to use existing processes. Focus Area Actionable intelligence --our road map for intelligence transformation -- is working to bridge that gap through a variety of changes in TTP and materiel solutions.

Actionable Intelligence

Actionable Intelligence provides Commanders and Soldiers a high level of shared situational understanding, delivered with the speed, accuracy, and timeliness necessary to operate at their highest potential and conduct successful operations.

and integrates intelligence. Additionally, we must continually develop and integrate new technology solutions systematically to maintain first advantage in terms of capabilities, technologies, and knowledge sharing.

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Task Force Actionable Intelligence (the Army G2s transformation initiative team) has identified four critical components that we must address within the Army in order to transform intelligence in line with the overarching Army Transformation – while remaining integrated within DoD "Remodeling" Initiatives. I will also briefly discuss six critical initiatives which are nested within the four critical components that we are initiating in tandem within Army Transformation today.

1. Critical Component: ***Changing the Culture and Mindset of how the Army Integrates Intelligence -*** Change the methods and means of how we collect, move, process, analyze and use intelligence. Change how we think of intelligence starting with the Soldier, continuing through all echelons or our Army.

To change our culture and mindset, we must first change our behaviors through better training and career experiences. First and foremost, we must institute the mindset that every *Soldier is a Sensor*. There are three main premises to Soldier is a Sensor: (1) Soldiers on the ground have always been the best information collectors, and they must recognize themselves as such. Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom have

shown that there are no frontlines. All Soldiers and facilities are at risk of attack. Soldiers must become highly conscious, trained observers and reporters, aware of the value of reporting their experiences, perceptions and judgments so the right person, at the right time, can make the right decision to accomplish the mission – we must give them the means to do so. (2) We must move operational units from a passive (waiting to receive intelligence with which to take action) to an active role in pursuing intelligence. Commanders must acknowledge that every operation is also an intelligence operation. Some of the most valuable intelligence comes from Soldiers on point or on patrol. This "Fight for Knowledge" - *create your own luck* - begins prior to operations and extends through the post-operation phases indefinitely as long as the nation has a vested interest in the region. (3) Lastly, we need to see ourselves as the enemy sees us.

Focus Area Critical Initiative: Red Teaming Capability

Red Teaming has two significant components. First, we need a base cadre trained to think like terrorists, insurgents and paramilitaries. Soldiers who have been trained as Red Team cadre will represent the full spectrum of today's potential opponents (state and non-state actors), ensuring blue force planners truly reflect the asymmetric threat, the contemporary operating environment and the second and third order effects of blue and red force actions. Second, we need a baseline of geographic expertise to provide regional subject matter experts. Our initiative starts with organizing a core Red Team capability within INSCOM and in each of the Theater MI Brigades. This will expand to include the establishment of a Red Team University for training within the Army education system.

2. Critical Component: ***Improved battlespace capabilities organic to Soldiers and units*** - The capability of the Soldier to sense and understand his environment – integrating the Soldier into the network.

Situational Awareness on the complex battlefield of the 21st Century demands greater access to information with increased fidelity at every level, starting with the Soldier. Battlespace capabilities represent what is in the hands of our Soldiers or organic to their unit. Reporting by individual Soldiers will be digitized at the point of origin with FBCB2. Soldiers will be able to better share what they observe, realizing the *Every Soldier is a Sensor* concept. Connecting the Soldier to the network will revolutionize information

flow in both directions. For units, this means increasing our ability to rapidly build and deploy modular intelligence packages that satisfy the unit's needs, to include providing regional expertise to tactical forces in an Army with a global and Joint mission. We also need to connect the local sensors to the national networks and both the sensors and the Soldiers to the analytic base, DCGS. We will ensure that service intelligence interdependencies are identified and leveraged.

3. Critical Component: ***Overwatch support to engaged units*** - Assisting the Soldier by sensing and analytically overwatching his battlespace, providing awareness over the broader environment in which he is or may operate.

The concept of overwatch encompasses those capabilities that enable the Soldier or unit to reach out beyond their immediate area of operations via a collaborative network centric environment. Overwatch is part of a larger transformation where we are changing from a vertical, echeloned approach, to a collaborative enterprise approach. Overwatch provides the Soldier on the ground with situational awareness of the environment that influences his mission. The Soldier also senses his local environment and shares that high fidelity data with the rest of the force. The Intelligence Community then optimizes the capabilities and talents of intelligence professionals from the tactical through strategic level, active, reserve, civilian and contractors, across every discipline, to provide the shared situational understanding every soldier and leader requires to understand and control their battlespace.

Focus Area Critical Initiative: Analytical Overwatch

Our next initiative, analytic overwatch, is an improved way of operating that commits theater resources to tactical support, providing tailored products (vice megabytes of information) to decision makers at the tactical echelon. Analytic overwatch enables direct support intelligence capabilities, providing collaborative and tailored support down to the maneuver brigade and battalion echelons.

Focus Area Critical Initiative: Project Foundry

Complementing overwatch, Project Foundry is an initiative that will assign a portion of the Army's intelligence Soldiers in the tactical force to duty locations with organizations where they will conduct live environment intelligence operations. These soldiers will be assigned to Maneuver Units of Action (UA) and Units of Employment (UEx), but their duty location (including their families) will be at geographically dispersed locations away from their parent units.

Focus Area Critical Initiative: Information Dominance Center

The Intelligence and Security Command's (INSCOM) Information Dominance Center (IDC) is a state-of-the-art operational intelligence organization. The IDC has pioneered processes and methodologies for timely situational awareness and analysis of complex networks of individuals and organizations that can be shared across the intelligence enterprise from national to tactical. The IDC has established extension nodes in each theater and continually provides direct support to our deployed units around the globe. A direct capability "spin-off" from the IDC is Project Morning Calm. This project is an example of our rapidly evolving intelligence system in support of a Theater Combatant Commander -- virtually a test bed for concepts that may have application in all theaters. Morning Calm creates an all-inclusive intelligence system capable of rapidly sharing and visualizing intelligence and all disparate data, from the numerous collection systems and agencies, tactical through national and combined. The first iteration of Morning Calm was recently installed and tested in Korea.

Focus Area Critical Initiative: Pantheon Project

Today, any new technology that has intelligence applications, such as demonstrated in Project Morning Calm, must be promptly incorporated into the intelligence system. To that end, we are implementing a rapid fielding capability through the creation of The Pantheon Project. The project will bring together a team of 10-12 elite, world-class individuals from business, academia, and government to address and solve the hardest technical problems, creating technological or procedural solutions for the enhancement of tactical through national intelligence echelons.

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5. Focus Area Critical Initiative: Information Manhattan Project

Today, any new technology that has intelligence applications, such as demonstrated in Exercise Morning Calm, must be promptly incorporated into the intelligence system. To that end, we are implementing a rapid fielding capability through the creation of the Information Manhattan Project. The project will bring together a team of 10-12 elite, world-class individuals from business, academia, and government to address and solve the hardest technical problems, creating technological or procedural solutions for the enhancement of tactical through national intelligence echelons.

The intelligence enterprise is a function of information transparency made possible by a common network which integrates people with shared databases, advanced analytical tools, knowledge centers, and sensors/collectors that are accessible by all. An assured

network centric environment is the key enabler and the glue that binds all these concepts. Actionable Intelligence is dependent on the network as the communications backbone to set the conditions for a collaborative environment.

Focus Area Critical Initiative: Begin fielding of an interim Distributed Common Ground System – Army (DCGS-A) capability this year

The objective DCGS-A will fuse and integrate data from all collectors and sources. DCGS-A is the centerpiece of the future intelligence framework and is the enabler for all operations at all echelons from the UA to National. DCGS-A is already a future force Program of Record (POR) originally designed to field a capability in FY 08. Starting now, we have already begun accelerating DCGS-A to the field in a spiral development approach. Interim DCGS-A fixed site capabilities are being fielded to the theater intelligence brigades and groups. With additional funding, we will expand this effort and provide the Army with increasing capabilities that correspond to improvements in automated fusion and information visualization technologies down to the maneuver battalion level.

visualization technologies down to the maneuver battalion level.

ARMY INTELLIGENCE TRANSFORMATION SUMMARY

Army Intelligence is changing in all aspects to adapt faster than our adversaries. We are increasing our tactical collection in all intelligence disciplines, with particular emphasis on HUMINT. We are working with Task Force Network to form a network which creates the framework connecting the Soldier to the strategic level. We are changing how intelligence information is reported and disseminated throughout this operational and intelligence network. We are updating our processes to provide all echelons, down to the individual Soldier, with access to shared situational awareness.

Focus Area Actionable Intelligence is the vehicle for Army Intelligence transformation. Evolutions in sensing, fusion and analysis will solidify the foundation of the Army's ability to conduct knowledge-based operations. Our emphasis is on addressing current operational mission requirements, while maintaining first advantage in capabilities. Technology spiral insertions will continue to improve and optimize our intelligence capabilities. At its very core, however, the conduct of intelligence analysis remains a human endeavor. Technology creates possibilities; humans turn possibilities into realities.

Creating Information Age processes will allow us to leverage the essence of the vast amounts of information available today. This will radically change the way we do business and dramatically improve the Commander's and Soldier's understanding of the battlespace. The Soldier, whether intelligence analyst or operator, will interface directly, and in near real-time, with the information required for current operations. We will ingrain the concept that "*Every Soldier is a Sensor*" (a contributor to and a consumer of the global intelligence enterprise). Tactical Commanders nearest to the fight will leverage modular, tailored packages to develop intelligence, while being supported by a network of analytic centers providing overwatch.

CHALLENGES:

Our Greatest Challenges are:

(1) Changing the Culture and Mindset of the entire Army:

We must institutionally change the culture and mindset of the Army on how we collect, report, disseminate and use intelligence. Our challenge is to ingrain the changing concepts throughout not only the MI Branch, but throughout the entire Army.

Training: Our Soldiers must be trained on the perishable skill of conducitng Combat Surveillance and reporting the critical elements he observes within his environment. Soldiers must become highly conscious, trained observers and reporters, aware of the value of reporting their experiences, perceptions and judgments so the right person, at the right time, can make the right decision to accomplish the mission. This mindset starts with our institutional training and builds with unit training and experience.

Structure: Army leadership at all echelons must institutionalize a narrowing of the gap between intelligence and operations. Collecting intelligence must become a natural occurrence of any operation that we conduct, from logistics resupply to an actual combat patrol.

Doctrine: Furthermore, we must move operational units from a passive (waiting to receive intelligence with which to take action) to an active role in pursuing intelligence. Commanders must acknowledge that every operation is also an intelligence operation. Some of the most valuable intelligence comes from Soldiers on point or on patrol. This 'Fight for Knowledge' begins prior to operations and extends through the post-operation phases indefinitely as long as the nation has a vested interest in the region. Lastly, we need to see ourselves as the enemy sees us: through Red Teaming. Our challenge is to build these constructs into our structure.

(2) Breaking down the existing policies and procedures for data access:

Within the Army, as well as the Intelligence Community, we must revamp the current processes and procedures that hinder our ability to rapidly move data, information, and intelligence throughout all echelons. Some policies limit our ability to access essential data bases while some limit our ability to move classified information to the tactical echelons and Soldier. Others limit the sharing of certain types of data or intelligence. Another challenge is our tactics, techniques and procedures that we continue to use that were instituted prior to the advent of computers and current technology enablers. Existing TTP dictate an echeloned, stovepiped approach to requesting and passing intelligence. This slows and seriously limits the sharing or integration of data and knowledge, thereby impeding intelligence integration within the Intelligence Community and slowing and negating rapid intelligence sharing with the tactical echelons and Soldier – impacting the ability to rapidly execute operations.

(3) Funding our Intelligence Transformation initiatives:

Over the last several months, the Army has validated our Actionable Intelligence initiatives as enablers of modularity and larger Army Transformation. This is a first and critical step toward achieving these goals. The next and equally critical step is committing the funds to implement these initiatives. To date, we have the funding required to begin pursuing our initiatives for DCGS-A. At the same time, we are reprioritizing within the Army budget to fund emerging requirements within the

Information Dominance Center such as Red Teaming, Project Foundry, and The Pantheon Project. In the past, we have sustained minimal IDC operations with the assistance of Congress and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. We are very appreciative of your support. We are convinced that the advancements we have made over the last couple of years are a tremendous return on that investment. However, the IDC's participation in recent and ongoing operations and the lessons learned from Project Morning Calm have expanded its mission focus and support concept. The IDC has become integral to the battle rhythm of engaged forces and should therefore be funded as a formal Army program vice dependence on Supplementals and Congressional aids. We are also working with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) and the agencies on support for those functions and capabilities that support the joint fight.

Our Focus, The Soldier

Our Focus is on the Soldier of an Army that is fighting a war, resetting our forces and transforming to the future. Our dynamic environment features new technologies, non-traditional missions and unconventional, elusive adversaries requiring radically different operating capabilities, tactics, techniques and procedures. Focus Area Actionable Intelligence is the vehicle for Army Intelligence transformation. Evolutions in sensing, communications, fusion and analysis will solidify the foundation of the Army's ability to conduct integrated and shared knowledge-based operations. Our emphasis is on addressing current operational mission requirements, while maintaining first advantage in capabilities – constantly focused on connecting the network – linking the Soldier. At its very core, however, the conduct of intelligence analysis remains a human endeavor. Technology creates possibilities; humans turn possibilities into realities.

CONCLUSION

The Army is at an historic crossroad. Our dynamic environment features new technologies, non-traditional missions and unconventional adversaries requiring radically different operating capabilities, tactics, techniques and procedures. In response to this, the Army is transforming from top to bottom, even while engaging in combat operations, fighting an adversary unwilling and unable to challenge us directly, yet able to adapt to take advantage of real or perceived weaknesses. The funding provided is critical and essential in enabling our Soldiers to continue to take the fight to the enemy.

In closing, our common goal is to provide the best possible capabilities for our Soldiers. We all know that our Soldiers – our young men and women, Americas finest – deserve nothing less than the best we all can do and provide for them. On behalf of the entire Army Intelligence Community, we appreciate your interest and support as we fight the current war, adapt our current force to the fight, and continuously transform – always building towards a Future Force. Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to address you in this forum and we sincerely appreciate your resolute support to our greatest assets, our Soldiers.