国会纪录：2004年2月2日（参议院）关于被道德·道德尔先生的账单（参议院）关于Daschle先生的陈述（为Lieberman先生（为他自己，麦凯恩先生，Daschle先生，Dorgan先生，Lautenberg先生，Corzine先生，佛罗里达州格雷厄姆先生，德林先生，多德先生，柯林斯女士，南卡罗来纳州格雷厄姆先生和哈格尔先生）：[[Page S372] S. 2040。举办国家恐怖主义袭击事件最终报告的提交日期的条例草案，为委员会提供额外的资金，并提供其他目的;到智力选择委员会。（根据DASCHLE先生的要求，下列声明被命令在记录中印刷。）利伯曼先生。总统先生，今天参议员麦凯恩和我正在介绍立法，以扩展国家恐怖主义袭击事件的生活对美国的生活，以便它能够对9月第11次恐怖主义袭击的原因来完成其批评性的调查，这些恐怖袭击事件宣称生命近3000人无辜的人。根据立法参议员McCain和我在2001年12月撰写委员会以创建委员会，其最终报告将于2004年5月27日完成。委员会本身已要求更多的时间。因此，我们现在建议将该截止日期扩展到2005年1月10日，并为委员会提供额外的600万美元来完成其工作。参议员麦凯恩和我感谢少数民族领导，参议员Daschle，加入我们的努力。 We are also happy to have the support of Senators Dorgan, Lautenberg, Corzine, Graham, Durbin, and Dodd. In the House, Representatives Fossella, Shays, Hinchey and Emanuel are expected to introduce companion legislation this week, and we welcome their support as well. We want the Commission's final report to be as searching and complete as possible. We owe that to the memories of the 3,000 victims and their families. And we owe it to the Nation as a whole. In fact, our future security depends upon it. George Washington once said we should look back ``to derive useful lessons from past errors, and for the purpose of profiting by dear- bought experience.'' That is the precise mission of this Commission to better understand what went wrong so we can prevent such a catastrophic attack from ever happening again. The Commission simply needs more time to do that. From the beginning, Senator McCain and I have been motivated by the experience of the families of victims of September 11. Above and beyond the grief of their losses, they have endured terrible pain in not knowing the whole account of how something so horrific could have happened to them and those they loved. It was a tribute to the power of the families' message that our legislation creating the Commission passed the Senate on September 24, 2002, by a resounding vote of 90-8. And it is a tribute to the enduring power of their message that Senator McCain and I are seeking this extension. Last week, the Commission asked Congress for at least an additional 60 days to finalize its interviews, hearings, and report. The families, however, expressed concern that two months may be an inadequate amount of time to accomplish all that must be done. They have called for a seven-and-a-half month extension so the Commission can conduct all the public hearings it had originally intended to hold, so that it can conduct thorough reviews of the President's daily intelligence briefings--a process barely underway--and so that it has the time to deal with the Administration's anticipated objections to declassifying material in the final report. Indeed, the Commissioners I asked have confirmed that they can benefit from more than the minimum two months requested. I have therefore been convinced by the families and the Commissioners that the extra time is necessary. But I would also warn the Administration that this extension is not an excuse to engage in additional dilatory tactics. I add this warning because the Bush Administration has a long record of opposing this Commission and an equally long record of making its work more difficult. Ever since Senator McCain and I first joined forces on this issue, we have faced White House intransigence. The President opposed the Commission for 10 months until the eve of a Senate vote he knew he would lose. During final negotiations over the details of the legislation, the White House negotiated to keep the Commission's duration as short as possible, rather than give it ample time to do a thorough job. Once the Commission got underway, the Administration hampered the Commission's progress through slow document production and other stalling tactics, limiting the Commission's ability to proceed expeditiously with its investigation. Even now, the Administration is refusing to give the full Commission notes, taken by members of the Commission, that describe key White House documents. When one considers the obstacles generated by the White House, it is not in the least bit surprising that the Commission now needs additional time to finish the job. I would note, however, that this extension does not preclude the Commission from releasing interim reports, as the original legislation establishing the Commission allows. Furthermore, the Commission is free to release its final report before the deadline, if it has completed its work. The Commission's hearings, questioning of witnesses, factual findings, and staff report issued last week proved exceptionally valuable in shedding light on some of the causes of the terrorist attacks. Future hearings and staff reports, no doubt, will continue to provide important new information about weaknesses in our defenses against terrorism. Therefore, we encourage the Commission to continue to release its findings and recommendations as they become available, so that we can learn from the mistakes of our past as quickly as possible, and work harder to shore up existing vulnerabilities. Congress and the relevant federal agencies have a duty to develop new strategies and capabilities to deter and prevent future terrorist attacks, and expeditious reporting by the Commission will help enormously. Major systemic problems have already surfaced, for example, that can point us in the right direction, or maybe even an entirely new direction, to address an array of vulnerabilities, particularly in our law enforcement and intelligence communities. Allow me to cite just a few examples from the Commission's work thus far to illustrate how many hands we will need, laboring in unison, to patch the breaches that remain in America's domestic security: 1. An immigration official at Orlando International Airport, Mr. Melendez-Perez, testified that on August 4, 2001, he turned away and sent home a suspicious, unresponsive, and belligerent Saudi national holding a one-way ticket with no departure plans and insufficient funds to stay in the U.S. and purchase a ticket home. This individual claimed that he was to meet a friend at the airport but would not name the friend. It turned out that one of the 9/11 hijackers, Mohamed Atta, was at the airport on that day. Amazingly, neither the FBI nor anyone else from the intelligence community has ever debriefed Mr. Melendez-Perez, even though the immigration inspector informed the FBI of the incident immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 2. The excellent performance of Mr. Melendez-Perez demonstrated that a vigilant and well-trained officer can spot suspicious behavior in the course of a routine interview. But the Commission's hearings and reports also revealed how infrequently that occurs. Government officials admitted in public testimony that consular employees are not expected to screen for possible terrorists during interviews of visa applicants, nor are they trained to do so. The Commission discovered that many of the hijackers had passports that were fraudulently altered or had other suspicious indicators, but between 1992 and September 11, 2001, the federal government had not attempted to disseminate, to border security or other relevant employees, available information about the travel and passport practices of Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. All of the hijackers' visa applications were incomplete, and several contained false statements that were easily identifiable. The hijackers entered the United States, often more than once, without incident, despite the fact that several of them had violated immigration law. Hijackers referred to secondary inspections for more detailed scrutiny were nevertheless admitted. 3. New information has been revealed about the abundant knowledge the intelligence community had about three of the 19 hijackers, who held a strategy session in Malaysia and were extensively tracked by U.S. and foreign intelligence services. The story fleshed [[Page S373]] out by the Commission underscores the fact that not only did the government fail to share information that might have kept the terrorists out of the country, but they also failed to share information that might have exposed the terrorists' September 11th plot. That is why I have focused personal attention on the Terrorist Threat Integration Center and the Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection at DHS to make sure that these new centers are receiving all intelligence information, mixing it together with skilled and intense analysis, and warning the relevant state, local, and federal officials of emerging terrorist plots. 4. All the evidence that consolidated watch lists might have prevented entry to some of the terrorists notwithstanding, the watch lists still haven't been consolidated despite numerous Administration promises to do so. The Commission learned from the Federal Aviation Administration that, prior to September 11th, the no-fly list created for the airlines had only 12-20 names on it, whereas the terrorist watch list at the State Department had tens of thousands of terrorists' names. We also learned that the no-fly list and the larger terrorist watch list are still not equal in numbers and that there are still terrorists on the larger list who might be permitted to fly if they evade other detection. These disclosures demonstrate the Commission is accomplishing its assignment, and so it must be allowed to complete its investigation. I am certain the Commission will use the extra months wisely to complete a thorough investigation, continue its public hearings, interview all relevant government officials and complete a comprehensive final report for release as soon as possible. It is a basic American principle that we must learn from the past in order to secure a better future. Our ability to counter, prevent, and defend against the next terrorist attack on our homeland depends in no small part on the Commission's ability to bring satisfactory closure to its work. If we only give the Commission the time, resources, and cooperation it deserves, the Commission's full, fair, and unflinching assessment of what went wrong will be of immediate value to our national security. And it will be of lasting value to the American people, who will finally discover the unvarnished truth. I urge the Senate to approve this legislation in a timely manner so that the victims' families and the rest of America may have some measure of peace. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: S. 2040 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES. (a) Extension.--Section 610(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 6 U.S.C. 101 note; 116 Stat. 2413) is amended by striking ``18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act'' and inserting ``January 10, 2005''. (b) Additional Funding.--Section 611 of that Act (6 U.S.C. 101 note; 116 Stat. 2413) is amended-- (1) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c); (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection (b): ``(b) Additional Funding From the National Foreign Intelligence Program.--In addition to the amounts made available to the Commission under subsection (a), of the amounts authorized to be appropriated by the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177) and available in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004 (Public Law 108-87) for the National Foreign Intelligence Program, not more than $6,000,000 shall be available for transfer to the Commission for purposes of the activities of the Commission under this title.''; and (3) in subsection (c), as so redesignated, by striking ``subsection (a)'' and inserting ``this section''. Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, the Democratic and Republican commissioners on the blue ribbon commission investigating the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks reached an important and bipartisan decision. They decided they needed more time--more time to get access to the documents and people that can help us understand what happened on that fateful day; more time to analyze this information so they can help us identify which corrective measures are needed to reduce the prospects for future 9/11s; in short, more time to do what they are required to do by law. I come to the floor today to talk briefly about my views on this commission and its work, and to explain why I have joined with Senators McCain and Lieberman to offer legislation to give the commission the time needed to complete its task and provide the families of the victims of 9/11 and all Americans with a complete and thorough report. The importance of this commission's work cannot be overstated. This independent commission represents the last and perhaps best hope for our Nation to understand how 19 individuals were able to execute the most deadly terrorist attack on American soil in this Nation's long history. How did these terrorists get into this country? What is the source of funding they used to carry out these activities? How did the hijackers get themselves, and apparently knives and mace, past airport security? How were they able to hijack four aircraft and drive them to such a deadly end? Why could our intelligence community and policymakers not do more to prevent these heinous acts? What can the Government and individual citizens do in the future to prevent similar attacks? These are but some of the difficult questions the commission has to address. Given the importance of their task, one would think that all parties--Democratic and Republican, Congress and the White House--would quickly agree to provide the commission whatever it needs. Unfortunately, in the days immediately after the commissioners made their request, it became evident some parties may not believe the commission should be provided the time it needs to do what is required by law. Quoting from the New York Times on January 28: The White House and Republican congressional leaders have said they see no need to extend the congressionally mandated deadline . . . and a spokesperson for Speaker J. Dennis Hastert said . . . Mr. Hastert would oppose any legislation to grant the extension. As unsettling as this position is, in hindsight, it should not be surprising to those who have followed the history of this commission. In the months immediately after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, President Bush and Vice President Cheney personally appealed to me and to other Members of Congress not to establish a bipartisan blue ribbon commission. Vice President Cheney suggested to me that creating such an effort could detract from administration officials' efforts to get the terrorists responsible. Fortunately, neither the families of the victims of 9/11 nor the American people accepted this argument. They understood, and properly in my view, that an independent investigation would enhance our efforts on the war on terror. Far from endangering national security, an inquiry could actually help us pinpoint and correct flaws in our security and intelligence communities and identify the necessary corrective measures. Despite the fact that the idea of a commission enjoyed the overwhelming support of the families of the victims and of the American people, the administration, and the House Republican leadership persisted in their efforts to see that this idea never took flight--in some instances, at the same time they were publicly professing their support for the commission. For example, on the same day the White House spokesperson indicated President Bush supported the idea of a commission, his negotiators were on Capitol Hill vetoing a congressional agreement to establish one. In October of 2002, the House and Senate Intelligence Committees announced they had reached a deal to include language to establish the commission in the intelligence authorization bill. The next day, the deal collapsed and negotiators involved laid the blame at the doorstep of the White House and the House Republican leadership. According to the Washington Post, a senior Republican Senator said: The House Republican leadership weighed in against [the deal] and the deal collapsed. . . . It is no secret that the White House works through the House Republican leadership. [[Page S374]] Again, the families of the victims and supporters of the commission were not deterred. In fact, this commission would not exist were it not for the dedicated efforts of the families of the victims. They pressed on, and in November of 2002, they prevailed. Congress passed the legislation creating the commission and the President signed it into law. The commission was given until May of 2004 to do its work. We all knew at the time that this deadline was both arbitrary and highly ambitious, given the scope of the work involved. Subsequent actions would make meeting this deadline impossible. The commission was immediately embroiled in controversy over the selection and subsequent resignation of Henry Kissinger, who the President selected to chair its work. But the obstacles placed in front of this commission were just the beginning. In light of the sensitive nature of much of the information the commission would be examining, getting the commission high-level security clearances was the first priority. However, for a variety of reasons, a process that could have taken weeks stretched into months, thereby preventing the commissioners from examining numerous important documents. Then came open resistance from the Bush administration to commission requests for access to documents and individuals the commissioners deemed vital to their inquiry. The commission quickly became bogged down in negotiations over which documents and individuals it would have access to and under what terms and conditions. Many agencies flat out refused to provide access. Others insisted the administration minders be present when the commission questioned Government employees. The commission was forced to resort to subpoenas to obtain information from several Federal agencies, and press reports is actively considering issuing others. As recently as this past week, it was reported that the administration is still placing roadblocks in front of the commission's vital work. Over the weekend, it was disclosed that the White House is refusing to allow the commission access to notes its own members have taken on briefings received by the President. As a result of the administration's repeated failure to cooperate fully and immediately with the commission and its important work, it has become increasingly clear that it cannot fulfill the immense task placed before it and comply with the deadline imposed on it. In order to meet this deadline, commissioners tell us they would have to cut corners. Scheduled hearings would have to be canceled. Interviews with key officials would have to be scrapped. Time to analyze their information and write their report would be short. All of these reasons led the commission, wisely in my view, to request additional time. All of these reasons led me to join the families of the victims, as well as Senators McCain and Lieberman, to conclude we must do everything possible to meet their requests. I hope those who have opposed the commission and its work in the past will step aside. I hope they will allow us to provide the commission with the time it needs to give the families and America the report it deserves. ______