国会记录：2004年9月21日（参议院）第S9428-S9429页情报改革指导原则史蒂文斯先生。主席先生，今天我们的拨款委员会举行了一次听证会，听取了杰出人士对情报改革建议的意见。当时，我们收到了一份2004年9月21日题为“情报改革指导原则”的声明。签名人如下：前参议员大卫·博伦、前参议员比尔·布拉德利、前国防部长弗兰克·卡鲁奇、前国防部长威廉·科恩、前中央情报局局长罗伯特·盖茨、前国防部副部长约翰·哈姆雷、前参议员兼总统候选人加里·哈特、，前国务卿亨利·基辛格、前参议员萨姆·纳恩、前参议员沃伦·鲁德曼和前国务卿乔治·舒尔茨。我确实提请所有参议员注意这次对9/11委员会关于情报改革建议的审查。我请求大家一致同意将《情报改革指导原则》印在记录中。在没有异议的情况下，该材料被下令记录在案，内容如下：情报改革的指导原则美国的安全取决于加强我们的情报收集和分析。关于情报改革的辩论正在进行中，利用选举季节的能量是确保该问题得到应有关注的一种健康方式。竞相在选举时间表上实施改革恰恰是错误的做法。情报改革过于复杂和重要，不可能以极快的速度进行。根据我们在美国政府行政和立法部门以及政治通道两侧的经验，我们认为，这些是指导任何改革努力的基本原则：在我们理解所有问题都是失败的秘诀之前，先找出问题并提出解决方案。只有在充分了解情报界的问题及其优势后，才能做出明智的改革决定，包括是否重组。此外，改革必须全面才能成功。孤立地解决这个或那个缺陷——无论多么严重——将无法提高我国安全所需要的情报能力。加强情报机构的领导负责领导情报机构的个人必须获得与其职责相称的权力。特别重要的是，未来领导人必须有能力将人员和资源与国家情报优先事项相协调。无论我们是维持情报机构的现有结构还是建立一个新的结构，我们都必须确保情报机构的领导人拥有履行其职责的工具。将情报与政策分开情报界改革的一项基本原则必须是情报界保持独立于决策者。没有什么比健康的国家安全结构更重要了。当情报和政策联系过于紧密时，决策者的要求可能会扭曲情报，情报分析师可能会劫持政策制定过程。要确保这种分离，情报界领导人不扮演政策角色至关重要。否则，情报界领袖的声音可能会压倒内阁秘书和国家安全顾问的声音，并剥夺总统从强有力、知情的政策辩论中获益的机会。一个在情报方面拥有最后发言权和政策发言权的个人可能会在国家安全领域成为一个危险的强大角色，利用情报宣传其他人缺乏挑战知识的特定政策立场、预算要求或武器系统。因此，情报部门的领导人不应该在白宫工作；他或她应该与政策进程保持一定距离，而不是站在总统的右边。领导人也不应成为外交或政策制定的工具；他或她的角色应该是支持其他人履行这些职能。同样，情报界改革绝不能通过集中大部分评估资源剥夺内阁秘书评估情报的能力；部长们必须能够向自己的分析师寻求独立的观点，并能够责成情报界领导人为决策过程提供投入。最后，为了防止不健康的职能混合，我们认为，被选择领导情报界的人应该被双方广泛接受，并根据其实质性或管理专业知识进行选择。[[第S9429页]]提高分析的质量智力整合和分析想象力的失败have been the major culprits in most intelligence breakdowns, from our failure to predict accurately India and Pakistan's nuclear tests, to our misjudgment of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction programs. Improving the quality of the analysis on which policy makers rely must therefore be a top reform priority. The best analysis emerges from a competitive environment where different perspectives are welcomed and alternative hypotheses are encouraged. Intelligence reform must institutionalize these traits in the analytical process. To preserve their independence, analysts must be insulated from policy and political pressure. Finally, we must not only concern ourselves with the appropriate structure of intelligence analysis, we must also address the critical shortage of human expertise in critical fields. Funding for programs to address this deficiency is dangerously low and the trust funds for the National Security Education Program will be fully depleted within the next two years unless Congress acts. Ensure More Effective Information-Sharing Intelligence Community players have overwhelming cultural and bureaucratic incentives not to share their information with each other or with those outside the community. These include a natural impulse to hoard information to protect turf, and a deeply ingrained passion for secrecy. Domestic agencies and foreign agencies, in particular, traditionally have resisted sharing information with each other. Yet our nation has learned with painful clarity that failure to share, coordinate, and connect available intelligence can have devastating consequences. The next time an FBI special agent suspects an Arizona flight trainee is an al Qaeda terrorist, the Intelligence Community needs to know. Reform must fundamentally alter agency incentives and culture to require sharing. This must include addressing the excessive emphasis on secrecy and classification that inhibits constructive, timely information flows, while continuing to respect the need to protect genuine sources and methods. Protect Civil Liberties Collection of intelligence is inherently intrusive; spying on fellow citizens carries with it great potential for abuse. Even as we merge the domestic and foreign intelligence we collect, we should not merge responsibility for collecting it. Intelligence reform might well create a single strategic coordinator of domestic and overseas collection on cross border threats like terrorism, but exclusive responsibility for authorizing and overseeing the act of domestic intelligence collection should remain with the Attorney General. This is the only way to protect the rights of the American people upon whose support a strong intelligence community depends. Preserve Situational Awareness for Tactical Military Operations As we have seen from the skies over Bosnia to the sands and cities of Afghanistan and Iraq, tactical intelligence and situational awareness are indispensable to our military's unparalleled operational success. Any successful intelligence reform must respect the military's need to maintain a robust, organic tactical intelligence capability and to have rapid access to national intelligence assets and information. Assure Clarity of Authority for Clandestine Operations The war on terrorism has blurred agency roles for some critical national security activities. The Department of Defense now performs more clandestine and intelligence operations than in the past; meanwhile, the CIA's Directorate of Operations engages more in traditional military functions, such as the successful campaign in Afghanistan. Authority for these newer roles is murky, and there are sometimes disparities in the type or level of approval needed for an operation, depending on who performs it. The new challenges we face mandate a wide range of tools and creative approaches to intelligence. But establishing absolute clarity of chain of command, oversight, and accountability for clandestine operations is essential. Reform Congressional Oversight Too Intelligence reform will not succeed unless Congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community becomes more effective as well. Rather than relying on review of agency submissions and after-the-fact investigation of failures or abuses, Congress should reach out periodically to test and assure the Community's health. Whether meaningful legislative oversight demands a major overhaul of committee structure or merely a change of philosophy, Congressional reform is as vital as changes affecting the Executive Branch. Elections are a perfect time for debate, but a terrible time for decision-making. When it comes to intelligence reform, Americans should not settle for adjustments that are driven by the calendar instead of common sense; they deserve a thoughtful, comprehensive approach to these critical issues. If, as seems likely, Congress considers it essential to act now on certain structural reforms, we believe it has an obligation to return to this issue early next year in the 109th Congress to address these issues more comprehensively. We hope the principles we've suggested will help shape serious discussion of reform. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho. ____________________