国会纪录：2004年3月26日（参议院）Page S3207-S3210 Richard Clarke先生德里斯特先生的愤怒收费。主席女士，大约30分钟左右，我们将关闭。在这样做之前，我想花几分钟几分钟谈论过去一周的事件，并在过去的一周内源于一个名为Richard Clarke的前国务院公务员的意见和证词。在一本计划被CBS网络的母公司销售销售的书中，克拉克先生使布什政府在办公室的前7个月内令人讨厌的费用未能充分地解决奥萨马·本·拉登的威胁。媒体和一些参议员有关于这本书的迷失。我想借此机会反思这一点，因为我对Clarke先生所做的指控感到非常扰乱。部分地，我被一些同事和媒体本身处理的方式受到了干扰。我受到指控的困扰。我同样陷入困境，有人会出售一本书，以便在我们的国家获得往来的信息，我们国家最宝贵的情报的政府内幕，以便从周围遭受2001年9月11日遭受的痛苦中获利。我我陷入困境的是，过道的另一边的参议员非常快速接受此类索赔。 I am troubled that Mr. Clarke has had a hard time keeping his own story straight. I don't personally know Mr. Clarke--I have met him--although I take it from press accounts that he has been involved in the fight against terrorism for the past decade. As 9/11 demonstrates, that decade was a period of growing peril, a period of unanswered attacks against the United States. It is self- serving, I believe, that Mr. Clarke asserts that the United States could have stopped terrorism if only the three Presidents he served had listened to Mr. Clarke. In fact, when Mr. Clarke was at the height of his influence as the terrorism czar for President Clinton, the United States saw the first attack on the World Trade Center, saw the attack on the U.S. Air Force barracks in Saudi Arabia, the attacks on the two U.S. embassies in Africa, the attack on the USS Cole, and the planning and implementation for the 9/11 attacks. The only common denominator throughout those 10 years of unanswered attacks was Mr. Clarke himself, a consideration that is clearly driving his effort to point fingers and to shift blame. He was the only common denominator throughout that period. This pointing fingers, this shifting blame I will come back to because if we look at all the data and all the evidence, it becomes the common theme. While the reasons may be open to debate and discussion, the previous administration's response to these repeated attacks by al-Qaida was clearly inadequate--a few cruise missiles lobbed at some, at best, questionable targets. Al-Qaida could only have been encouraged by their record of success in the absence of a serious and a sustained response by the United States during that period. After 10 years of policies that failed to decisively confront and to eliminate that threat from al-Qaida, Clarke now suggests that those first 7 months of the Bush administration is where the blame should lie. Again, after 10 years of attack after attack with an inadequate response, with Mr. Clarke being the common denominator, to put the blame almost entirely on the first 7 months of the Bush administration to me is shifting blame and finger-pointing. What is interesting is that what we heard this week has not always been Mr. Clarke's view of the events leading up to September 11. This week, a transcript was released of a press interview that Mr. Clarke gave in August of 2002, not that long ago. I will submit for the Record the full transcript, but I do want to cite a portion of this interview reviewing in glowing terms the policies of the Bush administration in fighting terrorism. I will be quoting exactly from the interview: Richard Clarke: Actually, I've got about seven points. Let me just go through them quickly. Again, these are Mr. Clarke's words: [[Page S3208]] The first point, I think the overall point is, there was no plan on Al Qaeda that was passed from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration. No plan. Mr. Clarke's words: Second point is that the Clinton administration had a strategy in place, effectively dating from 1998. And there were a number of issues on the table since 1998. And they remained on the table when that administration went out of office--issues like aiding the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, changing our Pakistan policy, changing our policy towards Uzbekistan. And in January 2001, the incoming Bush administration was briefed on the existing strategy. They were also briefed on these series of issues that had not been decided on in a couple of years. Mr. Clarke continues, using his exact words: And the third point is the Bush administration decided then, you know, mid-January, to do two things. One, vigorously pursue the existing policy, including all of the lethal covert action findings, which we've now made public to some extent. And the point is, while this big review was going on, there were still in effect, the lethal findings were still in effect. The second thing the administration decided to do is to initiate a process to look at those issues which had been on the table for a couple of years and get them decided. So, point five, that process which was initiated in the first week in February, decided in principle, in the spring to add to the existing Clinton strategy and to increase CIA resources, for example, for covert action, five-fold, to go after Al Qaeda. The sixth point, the newly-appointed deputies--and you had to remember, the deputies didn't get into office until late March, early April. The deputies then tasked the development of the implementation details of these new decisions that they were endorsing, and sending out to the principals. I am still reading verbatim through the interview. His words: Over the course of the summer--last point--they developed implementation details, the principals met at the end of the summer, approved them in their first meeting, changed the strategy by authorizing the increase in funding five-fold, changing the policy on Pakistan, changing the policy on Uzbekistan, changing the policy on the Northern Alliance assistance. And then changed the strategy from one of rollback with Al Qaeda over the course [of] five years, which it had been, to a new strategy that called for the rapid elimination of Al Qaeda. This is in fact the time line. Those are the words of Richard Clarke during a series of questions I will make a part of the Record. I will take the final question, in the interest of time, to Mr. Clarke. Question: You're saying that the Bush administration did not stop anything that the Clinton administration was doing while it was making the decisions, and by the end of the summer had increased money for covert action five-fold. Is that correct? Mr. Clarke's answer: All of that's correct. Madam President, I went through the interview in detail like that because you can see clearly how out of sync it is. It is almost just the opposite of what he said this week, and it is important for us to understand, if we are going to look at Mr. Clarke's credibility, this juxtaposition, this contrast, how dissimilar to what comes out of his mouth it actually is. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 1.) Mr. FRIST. This is not the only account in which Mr. Clarke changes his story. In lengthy testimony before the congressional joint inquiry that reviewed the events surrounding the September 11 attacks, Mr. Clarke is equally effusive in his praise for his actions of the Bush administration. It is my hope we will be able to get that testimony declassified. That request has been made so all Senators may review it and discuss it as well. But it is effusive praise under oath. I do not know what Mr. Clarke's motive is. I have no earthly idea what his motive for these charges is. Is it personal gain? Is it partisan gain? Is it in some way personal profit? Is it animus because of his failure to win a promotion with the Bush administration? I just do not know. None of us is going to ever know. But one thing is clear, and that is his motive could not possibly be to bring clarity or true understanding of how we avoid future September 11 attacks. There are five points I would like to make, five points that I find absolutely inexplicable about Mr. Clarke's performance this past week. I have waited to come to the floor until the end of the week because I couldn't really believe what Mr. Clarke was saying, based on what we know of his past performance and his participation in the former administration. I wanted to have time, and I will make these five points in a quick fashion. Point No. 1: In an e-mail to the National Security Adviser 4 days after the September 11 attacks, Mr. Clarke expressed alarm that ``when the era of national unity begins to crack'' an effort to assign responsibility for the 9/11 attacks will begin. Mr. Clarke, in the e-mail, then proceeds to lay out in detail a defense of his own personal actions before the attack and those of the entire administration, all of that spelled out in the e-mail. Mr. Clarke clearly, when we look at his e-mail, was consumed by the desire to dodge any blame for the 9/11 attacks; while at the very same moment rescuers were still searching the rubble at the site of the World Trade Center looking for survivors, he was looking for some way to dodge blame for himself. In my mind, this offers some insight, maybe even perfect insight, as to what drove him to write his book. The second point, in August 2002, the interview I read, Mr. Clarke gave a thorough account of the Bush administration's very proactive policy against al-Qaida. When presented with that interview, Mr. Clarke tries to explain away that media performance, the interview itself, by suggesting, well, I just gave the interview in that way as a loyal servant to the administration. A loyal administration official? Does Mr. Clarke understand the gravity of the issues this body, we in the Congress, the United States, is facing as we review through that 9/11 Commission the gravity of the charges that have been made by him? If in the summer of 2001 he saw the threat from al-Qaida as grave as he now says it was, and if he found the response of the administration so inadequate, as he now says it was, why did he wait until Sunday, March 21 of 2004 to make his concerns known? It simply does not make sense. There is not a single public record of Mr. Clarke making any objection whatsoever in the period leading up to or following the 9/11 attacks. There is nothing in the public record. There is no threat from him to resign. There is no public protest. There is no plea to the President, to the Congress, to the public to heed the advice he now says was ignored. If Mr. Clarke held his tongue because he was loyal, then shame on him for putting policies above principle, but if he is manufacturing these charges for some sort of personal profit or some sort of political gain, he is a shame to this Government. Fortunately, I have not had the opportunity to work with such an individual who would write solicitous and self-defending e-mails to his supervisor, the national security adviser, and then by his own admission lie to the press out of some self-conceived notion of loyalty, to reverse himself on all accounts for the sale of a book, a book which obviously is very popular. It is selling now as I speak. The third point I would like to make is Mr. Clarke told two entirely different stories under oath. In July 2002, in front of the congressional joint inquiry on the September 11 attacks, Mr. Clarke said under oath the administration actively sought to address the threat posed by al-Qaida during its first 7 months in office. It is one thing for Mr. Clarke to dissemble in front of the media, in front of the press, but if he lied under oath to the Congress, it is a far more serious matter. As I mentioned, the Intelligence Committee is seeking to have Mr. Clarke's previous testimony declassified so as to permit an examination of Mr. Clarke on the two differing accounts. Loyalty to any administration will be no defense if it is found he has lied before Congress. Fourth, notwithstanding Mr. Clarke's efforts to use his book first and foremost to redirect, to shift blame, to shift attention from himself, it is also clear Mr. Clarke and his publisher did adjust the release date of his book in order to make maximum gain from the publicity around the 9/11 hearings. Assuming the controversy around this series of events does, in fact, drive [[Page S3209]] the sales of his book, Mr. Clarke will make a lot of money for exactly what he has done. I personally find this to be an appalling act of profiteering, of trading on insider access to highly classified information and capitalizing upon the tragedy that befell this Nation on September 11, 2001. Mr. Clarke must renounce any plan to personally profit from this book. Finally, it is understandable why some of the families who lost loved ones on that tragic and horrible day, September 11, find Mr. Clarke's performance this week appealing. The simple answers to a terrible tragedy, to the very human desire to find an answer of why, to help explain why on that beautiful fall day 2\1/2\ years ago a series of events shattered their lives forever. In his appearance before the 9/11 Commission, Mr. Clarke's theatrical apology on behalf of the Nation was not his right, was not his privilege, and was not his responsibility. In my view, it was not an act of humility but it was an act of arrogance and manipulation. Mr. Clarke can and will answer for his own conduct, but that is all. Regardless of Mr. Clarke's motive or what he says or implies in his new book, the fact remains this terrible attack was not caused by the Government of the United States of America. No administration was responsible for the attack. Our Nation did not invite the attack. The attack on 9/11 was the evil design of a determined and hate-filled few who slipped through the defenses of a nation, a nation that treasures its freedoms, that treasures its openness, that treasures its convenience. That our defenses failed is cause enough to review the sequence of events leading up to that awful day, and we must and will understand how to do better, balancing our determination to protect our Nation with that equal resolve to protect our liberties. The answer to Mr. Clarke's--and I clearly feel they are self- serving--charges is that, in fact, we all bear that responsibility, and we recognize that. Every one of us who served in Government before and at the time of the 9/11 attacks also has the responsibility to do our best to avoid such tragedy in the future. If we are to learn lasting lessons from the examination of the 9/11 attacks, it must be toward this end, not an exercise in finger pointing, not an exercise in blame shifting, not an exercise in political score settling. Exhibit 1 Transcript: Clarke Praises Bush Team in '02 (Washington.--The following transcript documents a background briefing in early August 2002 by President Bush's former counterterrorism coordinator Richard A. Clarke to a handful of reporters, including Fox News' Jim Angle. In the conversation, cleared by the White House on Wednesday for distribution, Clarke describes the handover of intelligence from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration and the latter's decision to revise the U.S. approach to Al Qaeda. Clarke was named special adviser to the president for cyberspace security in October 2001. He resigned from his post in January 2003.) Richard Clarke. Actually, I've got about seven points, let me just go through them quickly. Um, the first point, I think the overall point is, there was no plan on Al Qaeda that was passed from the Clinton administration to the Bush Administration. Second point is that the Clinton administration had a strategy in place, effectively dating from 1998. And there were a number of issues on the table since 1998. And they remained on the table when that administration went out of office--issues like aiding the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, changing our Pakistan policy--uh, changing our policy toward Uzbekistan. And in January 2001, the incoming Bush administration was briefed on the existing strategy. They were also briefed on these series of issues that had not been decided on in a couple of years. And the third point is the Bush administration decided then, you know, in late January, to do two things. One, vigorously pursue the existing policy, including all of the lethal covert action findings, which we've now made public to some extent. And the point is, while this big review was going on, there were still in effect, the lethal findings were still in effect. The second thing the administration decided to do is to initiate a process to look at those issues which had been on the table for a couple of years and get them decided. So, point five, that process which was initiated in the first week in February, uh, decided in principle, uh in the spring to add to the existing Clinton strategy and to in crease CIA resources, for example, for covert action, five- fold, to go after Al Qaeda. The sixth point, the newly-appointed deputies--and you had to remember, the deputies didn't get into office until late Mach, early April. The deputies then tasked the development of the implementation details, uh, of these new decisions that they were endorsing, and sending out to the principals. Over the course of the summer--last point--they developed implementation details, the principals met at the end of the summer, approved them in their first meeting, changed the strategy by authorizing the increase in funding five-fold, changing the policy on Pakistan, changing the policy on Uzbekistan, changing the policy on the Northern Alliance assistance. And then changed the strategy from one of rollback with Al Qaeda over the course of five years, which it had been, to a new strategy that called for the rapid elimination of Al Qaeda. That is in fact the timeline. Question. When was that presented to the president? Clarke. Well, the president was briefed throughout this process. Question. But when was the final September 4 document? (Interrupted.) Was that presented to the president? Clarke. The document went to the president on September 10, I think. Question. What is your response to the suggestion in the [Aug. 12, 2002] Time [magazine] article that the Bush administration was unwilling to take on board the suggestion made in the Clinton administration because of animus against the--general animus against the foreign policy? Clarke. I think if there was a general animus that clouded their vision, they might not have kept the same guy dealing with terrorism issue. This is the one issue where the National Security Council leadership decided continuity was important and kept the same guy around, the same team in place. That doesn't sound like animus against uh the previous team to me. Jim Angle. You're saying that the Bush administration did not stop anything that the Clinton administration was doing while it was making these decisions, and by the end of the summer had increased money for covert action five-fold. Is that correct? Clarke. All of that's correct. Angle. OK. Question. Are you saying now that there was not only a plan per se, presented by the transition team, but that it was nothing proactive that they had suggested? Clarke. Well, what I'm saying is, there are two things presented. One, what the existing strategy had been. And two, a series of issues--like aiding the Northern Alliance, changing Pakistan policy, changing Uzbek policy--that they had been unable to come to um, any new conclusions, um, from '98 on. Question. Was all of that from '98 on or was some of it---- Clarke. All of those issues were on the table from '98 on. Angle. When in '98 were those presented? Clarke. In October of '98. Question. In response to the Embassy bombing? Clarke. Right, which was in September. Question. Were all of those issues part of alleged plan that was late December and the Clinton team decided not to pursue because it was too close to---- Clarke. There was never a plan, Andrea. What there was was these two things: One, a description of the existing strategy, which included a description of the threat. And two, those things which had been looked at over the course of two years, and which were still on the table. Question. So there was nothing that developed, no documents or new plan of any sort? Clarke. There was no new plan. Question. No new strategy--I mean, I don't want to get into a semantics---- Clarke. Plan, strategy--there was no, nothing new. Question. 'Til late December, developing---- Clarke. What happened at the end of December was that the Clinton administration NSC principles committee met and once again looked at the strategy, and once again looked at the issues that they had brought, decided in the past to add to the strategy. But they did not at that point make any recommendations. Question. Had those issues evolved at all from October of '98 'til December of 2000? Clarke. Had they evolved? Um, not appreciably. Angle. What was the problem? Why was it so difficult for the Clinton administration to make decisions on those issues? Clarke. Because they were tough issues. You know, take, for example, aiding the Northern Alliance. Um, people in the Northern Alliance had a, sort of bad track record. There were questions about the government, there were questions about drug-running, there was questions about whether or not in fact they would use the additional aid to go after Al Qaeda or not. Uh, and how would you stage a major new push in Uzbekistan or somebody else or Pakistan to cooperate? One of the big problems was that Pakistan at the time was aiding the other side, was aiding the Taliban. And so, this would put, if we started aiding the Northern Alliance against the Taliban, this would have put us directly in opposition to the Pakistani government. These are not easy decisions. Angle. And none of that really changed until we were attacked and then it was---- Clarke. No, that's not true. In the spring, the Bush administration changed--began to change Pakistani policy, um, by a dialogue that said we would be willing to lift sanctions. So we began to offer carrots, which [[Page S3210]] made it possible for the Pakistanis, I think, to begin to realize that they could go down another path, which was to join us and to break away from the Taliban. So that's really how it started. Question. Had the Clinton administration in any of its work on this issue, in any of the findings or anything else, prepared for a call for the use of ground forces, special operations forces in any way? What did the Bush administration do with that if they had? Clarke. There was never a plan in the Clinton administration to use ground forces. The military was asked at a couple of points in the Clinton administration to think about it. Um, and they always came back and said it was not a good idea. There was never a plan to do that. (Break in briefing details as reporters and Clarke go back and forth on how to source quotes from this backgrounder.) Angle. So, just to finish up if we could then, so what you're saying is that there was no--one, there was no plan; two, there was no delay; and that actually the first changes since October of '98 were made in the spring months just after the administration came into office? Clarke. You got it. That's right. Question. It was not put into an action plan until September 4, signed off by the principals? Clarke. That's right. Question. I want to add though, that NSPD--the actual work on it began in early April. Clarke. There was a lot of in the first three NSPDs that were being worked in parallel. Angle. Now the five-fold increase for the money in covert operations against Al Qaeda--did that actually go into effect when it was decided or was that a decision that happened in the next budget year or something? Clarke. Well, it was gonna go into effect in October, which was the next budget year, so it was a month away. Question. That actually got into the intelligence budget? Clarke. Yes it did. Question. Just to clarify, did that come up in April or later? Clarke. No, it came up in April and it was approved in principle and then went through the summer. And you know, the other thing to bear in mind is the shift from the rollback strategy to the elimination strategy. When President Bush told us in March to stop swatting at flies and just solve this problem, then that was the strategic direction that changed the NSPD from one of rollback to one of elimination. Question. Well can you clarify something? I've been told that he gave that direction at the end of May. Is that not correct? Clarke. No, it was March. Question. The elimination of Al Qaeda, get back to ground troops--now we haven't completely done that even with a substantial number of ground troops in Afghanistan. Was there, was the Bush administration contemplating without the provocation of September 11th moving troops into Afghanistan prior to that to go after Al Qaeda? Clarke. I can not try to speculate on that point. I don't know what we would have done. Question. In you judgment, is it possible to eliminate Al Qaeda without putting troops on the ground? Clarke. Uh, yeah, I think it was. If we'd had Pakistani, Uzbek and Northern Alliance assistance. ____________________