国会记录：2004年2月3日（参议院）第S388-S389页伊拉克情报委员会达施勒先生。总统先生，我们国家安全的切身利益对于我们理解我们能够在多大程度上应对我们在过去一年或更长时间里经历的涉及情报失败的情况至关重要。两个重要的声音已经加入到越来越多的合唱中，对政府用来将这个国家推向战争的指控的准确性和真实性提出了质疑。就在昨天，国务卿鲍威尔明确表示了战前声明的重要性，表示如果没有现有武器储备的指控，战争的理由要弱得多。当被问及如果他当时知道他现在知道的情况，他是否会在去年建议入侵时，鲍威尔国务卿说：我不知道，因为正是库存构成了最后一小块，使其对该地区和世界构成了更真实和现实的危险和威胁。一年前的这个星期，鲍威尔国务卿向联合国安理会作了一次冗长的演讲，谈到伊拉克大规模毁灭性武器构成的严重威胁。国务卿没有提到“与大规模杀伤性武器相关的计划活动”，而是提到现有的库存——现有的可怕武器库存及其运载工具。在很大程度上，由于国务卿鲍威尔的惊人言论以及布什总统、副总统切尼、国防部长拉姆斯菲尔德、国家安全顾问赖斯和许多其他高级政府官员的类似主张，国会多数议员投票授权总统派遣军队对伊拉克发动战争。上个月底，国务卿鲍威尔说了一些截然不同的话。自从他在联合国发表演讲以来，他第一次明确承认他关于伊拉克武器的说法极有可能是不真实的，他在访问格鲁吉亚时对记者说：。悬而未决的问题是：伊拉克人有多少股票，如果有的话？如果他们有，他们去了哪里？如果他们没有，那为什么事先不知道呢？几天后，几周前还在伊拉克的首席武器检查员大卫·凯博士在参议院这里告诉武装部队委员会，用他的话来说，政府关于伊拉克的战前情报是，“全错了。”“虽然几位无党派专家对我们的情报得出了类似的结论，并对政府在这个问题上的声明的准确性表示担忧，但听到国务卿鲍威尔和凯博士这两位美国最受尊敬、知识最渊博的官员这样说，在国内外关于伊拉克战争的成立的基础上提出了一些问题。鉴于这些问题的重要性，对情报界对伊拉克威胁的评估以及政府对这些信息的使用进行无党派审查，对于恢复美国公众和国际社会对政府和情报系统本身的信任至关重要。原因很清楚。打击恐怖主义和当今美国面临的许多其他国家安全挑战的最有效手段是获得和维持美国人民的支持，并组建一个国际联盟。准确、无懈可击的情报是总统用来团结美国人民和世界的最重要工具之一。如果总统要成功地说服美国人有必要让女儿和儿子受到伤害，并敦促我们的盟友支持美国的行动方针，我们的情报必须被视为绝对可信和准确。两党的国家安全专家已经开始警告说，在伊拉克政府在战争爆发前做出了严肃的预测之后，伊拉克缺乏任何大规模杀伤性武器，这不仅在伊拉克问题上，而且在其他国家安全挑战上，都在损害美国的信誉。例如，美国越来越相信朝鲜利用过去几年制造了更多的核材料和核武器。然而，韩国和中国的官员对这些结论提出了质疑，部分原因是他们指出了我们的情报机构在伊拉克的失败。由于未能就朝鲜构成的威胁达成共识，有效对抗一个已经拥有核武器并被称为世界最大武器扩散国的国家的努力变得非常复杂。考虑到这些利害关系，人们会认为总统将是第一个要求全面、完整地说明伊拉克战前情报的准确性和使用情况的人。然而，直到上周末，总统还顽固地坚持认为这一情报或令人震惊的断言没有错he and senior administration officials made in the days leading up to the start of the war in Iraq. In a remarkable about-face this past week, administration officials said publicly that the President will support the establishment of an independent commission, provided he appoints the commissioners and defines the scope of their work. As in other instances, the administration is apparently seeking to both convince the America public it supports a thorough investigation at the same time it stacks the deck against such an investigation effort ever occurring. Although one of the major questions that needs to be addressed is whether senior administration officials exaggerated the nature of the threat to Iraq, the President is attempting to make the case that actions by these officials are best investigated by a commission whose members are appointed by and report to those very officials in the White House. There is little reason to believe a commission appointed and controlled by the White House will have the independence and credibility necessary to investigate and bring closure to these crucial issues. Consider this: At the same time the Secretary of State was suggesting that it was an open question whether Iraq had any weapons of mass destruction and the chief weapons [[Page S389]] inspector in Iraq was concluding that Iraq did not have any stockpiles of weapons before the war, Vice President Cheney was on national radio still suggesting that it was just a matter of time until such weapons could be found. If the President's senior advisers are still arguing that the prewar intelligence was right, can the American people be certain that commissioners handpicked by the White House to undertake an investigation defined by the White House will follow the facts wherever they lead? It would be a shame to have such an important commission start its work under the shadow of such doubt. We can avoid ever having to ask those questions by forming a truly independent commission that can rise above those concerns. I strongly believe the Congress can and should establish a truly independent commission to examine the collection, analysis, dissemination, and use by policymakers of intelligence on Iraq. Twice the Senate has voted to establish just such a commission that would be given access to all relevant information, appointed on a bipartisan basis by the congressional leadership of the House and Senate. I voted for this proposal both times. Although supporters of this commission fell short both times, I continue to believe that after putting our troops in harm's way we owe it to them to get to the bottom of this question. We owe them a truly independent investigation, conducted in the same way that our Armed Forces carry out their duties every day in Iraq, with honor and with integrity. I fear the process being started by the administration is neither, but it is not too late to establish a commission of which we can all be proud. I yield the floor. Mr. KENNEDY. Will the Senator be good enough to yield? Mr. DASCHLE. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Massachusetts. Mr. KENNEDY. First, I thank the Senator for an excellent statement. Earlier today the Armed Services Committee had meant to meet. We were going to have Secretary Rumsfeld up before the committee. I intended to ask him two or three questions on the issue of intelligence, but since the Senator is on his feet now, I am wondering if he would be willing to respond to a question or two and help clear this up in my mind. What we have now, as I understand it, is the intelligence agencies saying that they provided the intelligence to the administration and that they were not intimidated. I intended to ask the Secretary whether he was aware of the Defense Intelligence Agency's own intelligence report that stated--and I am quoting. This has been published. It was declassified and published in the news sources--this is the Defense Intelligence Agency: . . . there is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, or where Iraq has--or will--establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities. That was in September of 2002. Yet a month later, just as Congress was about to vote, the National Intelligence Estimate stated very precisely that: Iraq probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons and possibly as much as 500 metric tons of chemical weapon agents--much of it added in the last year. I was just wondering, if I can raise this point, here we have the Defense Intense Intelligence Agency giving one report. Then, if we look at the State Department Bureau of Intelligence, this is what the State Department Bureau of Intelligence concluded: The activities we have detected do not . . . add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would consider an integrated and comprehensive approach to get nuclear weapons . . . INR considers the available evidence inadequate to support such a judgment. The Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence. Mr. KYL. Could we have regular order? Mr. KENNEDY. Regular order. I believe I have the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator may yield for a question but not for a statement. Mr. KENNEDY. I am making the predicate. If the Senator from Arizona is not pleased with it, that is his problem. The third intelligence report was the Department of Energy disagreed that the famous tubes were for nuclear weapons. The State Department's Intelligence Bureau also concluded that the tubes were ``not intended for use in Iraq's nuclear weapons program.'' Finally, Greg Thielmann, retired State Department official, who served as director of the Office of Strategic Proliferation and Military Affairs in the Bureau of Intelligence, said last July: Some of the fault lies with the performance of the intelligence community, but most of it lies with the way senior officials misused the information they are provided. He said: They surveyed the data, and picked out what they liked. The whole thing was bizarre. The Secretary of Defense had this huge Defense Intelligence Agency, and he went around it. I just ask, are these the kinds of questions that we hope an independent kind of commission might be helpful to resolve? When the administration's own Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department agency, and the Energy Intelligence Agency came up with similar conclusions as Dr. Kay prior to the time the Senate voted on this issue, don't you think the American people are entitled to know what the facts are, not just the intelligence information made available but how it was used by the administration and by the President? Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I appreciate the question, as well as the predicate offered by the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts. The answer is yes, I am troubled by one fact that is now undeniable. That fact is, we were given bad information, information that now is much clearer than it was 6 months or 12 months ago, information that many of our colleagues have used repeatedly on which to base decisions fundamental to their interpretation of circumstances and ultimately the vote they cast on the resolution committing this country to a course of action. I was troubled by a report I read just this morning that there are many in the intelligence community who are becoming increasingly angered and frustrated that all of this responsibility has been put on their shoulders. The report by one intelligence officer was: ``We did our job. We reported the information. It isn't us.'' My question is, If it is not the intelligence community, who is responsible? Why did we get bad information? Was it the collection and analysis or was it the use of that information once it was collected and analyzed? We do not know the answer to that today. But we do know our best opportunity for collecting the answers to the questions posed by the Senator from Massachusetts is an independent counsel. What does it say of the independence of those potential commissioners when someone is suggesting to them, we want you to take this job to investigate us; we want you to have the authority to investigate us, with the implication that the detrimental consequences of an adverse investigation could weigh heavily on the commission itself. I don't think there is any doubt about the need for independence, about the need to look at past precedent when we have established commissions of this kind. We need to know beyond a shadow of a doubt that this commission will have the opportunity to go wherever the facts lead them. The way the President and this administration are proposing this investigation be done flies in the face of past precedent, with that cloud that hangs over any investigation that could not be as open, honest, and ultimately successful as it needs to be. I yield the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois. Mr. DURBIN. It is my understanding that under the previous unanimous consent I am recognized for 10 minutes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. ____________________