证词
Glenn A.很好
Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice之前
参议院司法委员会
关于
“ 9月11日被拘留者：
A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges
关于9月11日袭击的调查”June 25, 2003
* * * * *主席先生，莱希参议员和司法委员会成员：
感谢您邀请我作证Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) report这检查了与2001年9月11日恐怖袭击有关的移民指控所持有的外国人的待遇。
In my testimony today, I will summarize the major findings and recommendations from our 198-page report, which we released on June 2. However, to help place our findings in context, I will first describe the background and scope of our review.
- 背景和OIG审查的范围
The OIG conducted this review under the authority of the Inspector General Act and the specific directives contained in The USA PATRIOT Act (Patriot Act). Section 1001 of the Patriot Act directs the OIG to receive and review claims of civil rights and civil liberties violations by Department of Justice (Department) employees and to inform Congress about the results of our reviews.
根据这些责任，OIG发起了这项审查，研究了与该部门9月11日的恐怖主义调查有关的移民指控，被逮捕的被拘留者的待遇，称为Penttbom。联邦调查局（FBI）开始了这项大规模调查，以确定犯下9月11日袭击的恐怖分子以及任何了解或帮助他们努力的人。此外，联邦调查局与其他联邦，州和地方执法机构合作，以防止该国和国外的任何后续袭击。
Given the identities of the September 11 terrorists, the Department recognized from the earliest days that the investigation contained a significant immigration law component. One of the principal responses by law enforcement authorities after the attacks was to use federal immigration laws to detain aliens suspected of having possible ties to terrorism. Many of these individuals were questioned and subsequently released without being charged with a criminal or immigration offense. Many others were arrested and detained for violating federal immigration laws.
我们的审查确定，在袭击发生后的头11个月，与恐怖主义调查有关的移民指控被拘留了762名外星人。在这762名外星人中，有24名被拘留在恐怖袭击之前违反移民的移民和归化服务（INS）。由于联邦调查局的评估，他们可能与9月11日的袭击或恐怖主义有联系，或者因为联邦调查局至少在最初无法，至少在最初无法，所有762名外星人都被置于被称为“ INS监护名单”的情况下。确定它们是否与恐怖主义有关。在我们的审查中，这些外星人被称为“ 9月11日被拘留者”。
Our review examined various issues relating to these detainees, including:
- 9月11日被拘留者的分类；
- 指控9月11日被拘留者违反移民行为的及时性；
- 金博宝正规网址影响被拘留者拘留时间的问题，包括联邦调查局和其他人在9月11日的袭击或恐怖主义的联系中所采取的过程；
- 被拘留者的债券决定；
- 撤离被拘留者的时间；和
- the conditions of confinement for the September 11 detainees.
Our review focused on detainees held at the Passaic County Jail (Passaic) in Paterson, New Jersey (a county facility under contract to the INS) and at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) in Brooklyn, New York, operated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). We chose these two facilities because they held the majority of September 11 detainees and were the focus of many complaints about detainee mistreatment.
在一开始,it is important to understand not only what our review examined, but also what it did not examine. We did not review all aspects of the Department's terrorism investigations. For example, we did not review individuals arrested on criminal charges in connection with the terrorism investigation or those held on material witness warrants. We did not examine the treatment of aliens or United States citizens considered enemy combatants and held in Guantanamo or in the United States. Further, we did not examine or assess the Department's decision to limit public release of information concerning arrests related to the ongoing terrorism investigation, the Department's decision to close immigration hearings to the public, or its use of voluntary interviews for certain categories of aliens. Several lawsuits related to these issues are currently pending. It was beyond the scope of our review to examine these issues, and we took no position on them.
此外，了解我们发现的背景很重要。为了回应9月11日对美国的恐怖袭击，联邦调查局向五角大陆博姆调查分配了大量资源，分配了4,000多名联邦调查局特殊特工和3,000名FBI支持人员在袭击发生的几天之内进行工作。袭击事件发生后数周和几个月，联邦调查局收到的袭击和潜在恐怖分子的信息和潜在的恐怖分子的数量和潜在的恐怖分子。此外，正如我们的报告指出的那样，该部门面临着空前的挑战，这些挑战应对袭击，包括袭击引起的混乱和后续攻击的可能性。例如，纽约联邦调查局（FBI）被迫撤离其位于零地面附近的办公室，不得不在纽约地区的停车场和其他地点设置指挥所。此外，在2001年秋季和2002年春季，联邦调查局现场办公室正在进行其他重要调查，包括炭疽病袭击，巴基斯坦的丹尼尔·珍珠绑架以及纽约皇后区一架客机的坠机事件。同时，联邦调查局正在协助盐湖城冬季奥运会安全。
Moreover, it also is important to recognize that Department employees worked tirelessly and with enormous dedication over an extended period of time to meet the challenges posed by the September 11 attacks and the ongoing threat of terrorism. In conducting our review, we were mindful of this context and the circumstances confronting Department employees at the time. Our findings should not be used to diminish, in any way, the dedication and contributions Department employees made and continue to make to ensure the safety of the country.
然而，尽管认识到与该部门面临并仍然面临的这些困难和挑战，但我们发现该部门处理9月11日被拘留者的方式。正如本听证会的标题所示（“经验教训 - 监察长关于9/11被拘留者的报告”），我们认为可以从对此问题的审查中学到教训。以这种方式，我们在报告中提出了21项建议，以帮助改善部门对未来的被拘留者的处理。
I will now discuss the major findings of our review, as well as our recommendations.
- OIG发现的摘要
- Classification of Detainees
在9月11日的袭击事件发生后，联邦调查局在纽约和其他地方追捕了数千个与其五角大陆调查有关的线索阿拉伯人和穆斯林邻居都保持了奇怪的时间表。
If the FBI encountered an alien in connection with pursuing any of these leads, whether or not the alien was the subject of the lead, the FBI asked the INS to determine the alien's immigration status. If the alien was found to be in the country illegally - either by overstaying his visa or entering the country illegally - the alien was detained by the INS.
然后，联邦调查局被要求评估被捕的外国人是否对其恐怖主义调查“感兴趣”。如果联邦调查局（FBI）表示，外国人是“感兴趣的”，“高利益”或“不确定的利益”，则将外星人置于INS托管名单上，并被视为9月11日的被拘留者。
这些初始分类到联邦调查局已经价格ficant ramifications for the detainees. First, the Department instituted a policy that any detainee on the INS Custody List had to be detained until cleared by the FBI. Although never communicated in writing, this "hold until cleared" policy was clearly understood and applied throughout the Department. As a result, the September 11 detainees were not allowed to be released on bond according to normal INS procedures and were not allowed to depart or be removed from the United States before FBI clearance, even if an Immigration Judge ordered their removal or the detainee voluntarily agreed to leave. Second, the initial classification decision by the FBI often determined where the detainees would be confined and their conditions of confinement.
我们的审查发现，这些分类决策在全国范围内并未统一处理。联邦调查局和纽约市以外的INS办事处试图筛选或“兽医”案件，在这些案件中，仅碰巧遇到了非法外国人，或者没有表现出与恐怖主义有任何联系的迹象。在这些情况下，外星人没有被列入INS托管名单，并根据正常的INS程序进行处理。
但是，纽约市地区未使用这种审查过程。相反，纽约的联邦调查局并没有试图区分那些实际上涉嫌与9月11日袭击或恐怖主义有联系的外国人与那些可能违反联邦移民法有罪的外国人与恐怖主义没有关系，但与恐怖主义无关，但与五角杆铅相关的只是遇到。结果，对于纽约地区的五角杆铅而捡起的任何人都被认为是“感兴趣的”，目的是“持有直到清除”政策，无论潜在客户的起源如何恐怖主义。例如，如果搜寻五角星铅的特定人员到达一个地点并发现其他违反其移民身份的人，则将这些人拘留并被认为是与penttbom调查有关的被捕。
Our review does not criticize the Department's decision to investigate or require FBI clearance for aliens who the FBI actually suspected of having a connection to terrorism or the September 11 attacks. However, we do criticize the inconsistent manner in which these decisions were made. Even in the hectic aftermath of the September 11 attacks, we believe the FBI should have taken more care to attempt to distinguish between aliens who it actually suspected of having a connection to terrorism and aliens who, while guilty of violating immigration law, had no connection to terrorism but simply were encountered in connection with a PENTTBOM lead. In most parts of the country this was done; in New York, where the bulk of the September 11 detainees were arrested, it was not.
- Notice of Charges
Our review found that many September 11 detainees did not receive notice of the charges against them in a timely manner. Normally, after an alien is arrested for violating federal immigration law, the INS notifies the alien of the charges and initiates a removal proceeding by serving a Notice to Appear (NTA) on the alien and the Immigration Court. The NTA must include the alien's specific acts or conduct that is in violation of the law.
9月11日袭击前,INS点播uired by federal regulation to make this charging determination within 24 hours of arrest. The Department changed the regulation soon after the September 11 attacks to allow the INS 48 hours to make the determination. The revised regulation also included an exception to the 48-hour rule that provided that in the event of an emergency or other extraordinary circumstances, the charging decision could be made within an additional reasonable period of time. The regulation does not define "extraordinary circumstances" or "reasonable period of time." Moreover the regulation contains no requirement as to when the INS must通知指控的外星人；该法规仅在INS必须何时解决制作its charging decision.
Our review determined that the INS did not record when the charging decisions were actually made, but it did record when the charges were served on the alien. According to the INS, before the September 11 attacks its goal was to serve charges on aliens in writing within 48 hours of arrest. After September 11, the INS's goal was to serve charges on aliens within 72 hours.
We found that the INS served 60 percent of the September 11 detainees with NTAs within its goal of 72 hours. However, many detainees did not receive their charging documents for weeks, and some for more than a month, after being arrested. Detainees housed in the MDC received notice of their charges an average of 15 days after their arrest. Delays were caused by several factors, including the INS's decision to review and approve all charges at INS Headquarters and miscommunications between the INS New York and Newark Districts, each of which presumed that the other office had served the charging documents on aliens who were transferred from the INS in New York to the INS in Newark.
收到指控通知的延误以各种方式影响了9月11日被拘留者。首先，它推迟被拘留者对他们所面临的特定移民指控的了解。其次，由于缺乏特定的指控，它影响了被拘留者获得有效法律顾问的能力。第三，它推迟了被拘留者要求重新确定听证会并寻求释放的机会。
- The Clearance Process
Our review found that the Department's "hold until cleared" policy was based on the belief - which turned out to be erroneous - that the FBI's clearance process would proceed quickly. For example, many Department officials told us that they believed that the FBI would take a few days or a few weeks to clear aliens arrested on PENTTBOM leads but who had no additional indications of a connection to terrorism.
That belief was inaccurate. The FBI cleared less than 3 percent of the 762 September 11 detainees within 3 weeks of their arrest. The average length of time from arrest of a September 11 detainee to clearance by FBI Headquarters was 80 days. More than a quarter of the 762 detainees' clearance investigations took longer than 3 months.
清除过程中的延迟归因于各种因素。联邦调查局没有提供足够的现场办公室工作人员来及时进行被拘留的清仓调查，也未能提供足够的联邦调查局总部工作人员来协调和监视被拘留者清除过程。我们还发现，在纽约，一旦联邦调查局调查了一名领导者，而INS逮捕了与领导有关的外国人，联邦调查局特工通常会搬到下一个领导者，而不是调查或清除被捕的人。此外，联邦调查局总部没有设定任何时间限制来完成清仓调查。联邦调查局还要求对被拘留者进行检查，但联邦调查局经常花几个月的时间来审查从中央情报局收到的信息。我们还发现，当地联邦调查局办事处清除被拘留者与联邦调查局总部处理最终许可之间的延误。
正如我们在报告中所指出的那样，与9月11日被拘留者的过时清除过程相反，联邦调查局在送往航空公司，火车站和普通承运人的“观察名单”中做了一个更好的工作处理许可，以协助恐怖主义来协助恐怖主义调查。例如，联邦调查局（FBI）制定了应将谁列入观察名单的准则，它努力工作以尽快删除与恐怖主义无关的人。联邦调查局（FBI）对该手表清单的有效处理与9月11日被拘留者的清除过程的处理明显形成鲜明对比。
如下所述，9月11日被拘留者的不合时宜的清除过程对被拘留者的影响很大，被拘留者被拒绝债券，并且在清除过程完成之前，被允许离开该国，即使他们收到了最终的撤职或自愿离开命令命令。
- Bond and Removal Issues
该部门为所有9月11日被拘留者制定了一项“无债券”政策，作为其决定被拘留者的决定的一部分，直到联邦调查局可以完成其清算调查。几位INS官员告诉OIG，至少在最初，他们希望联邦调查局向他们提供在债券听证会上提供的信息，以支持“无债券”职位。取而代之的是，INS官员告诉OIG，他们经常收到联邦调查局（FBI）关于9月11日被拘留者的信息，因此，他们不得不在被拘留者的债券听证会上要求多个延续。
我们的审查确定了对这种情况引起的关注，特别是当很明显联邦调查局的清除过程比预期的要慢得多，而在许多个体情况下，INS几乎没有信息，无法将其继续反对债券。结果，即使没有联邦调查局的信息来支持该论点，INS也被置于争论“无债券”的位置，除了被拘留者被逮捕的事实之外。
Moreover, the question arose whether the INS legally could hold September 11 detainees after they had received final orders of removal or voluntary departure orders from an Immigration Judge. In general, aliens found to have violated immigration law must be removed from the United States within 90 days of when the alien is ordered removed. Because of the "hold until cleared policy," detainees were held, even beyond the 90 days normally provided for removal, despite their willingness and ability to leave the country. Senior INS attorneys expressed doubts about the legality of preventing the September 11 detainees from leaving the country, not only after the 90-day period had expired but even within the 90-day removal period, if the detainee was willing to leave the country and arrangements could be made to remove the detainee.
Considering the significant concerns that INS attorneys harbored about the legality of the Department's policy, we believe the INS had a responsibility to press the issue clearly - and in writing - if it believed that the policy presented a legal issue for the Department. It did not do so until January 2002, several months after the issue first arose.
In late January 2002, the FBI brought this issue to the Department's attention, and the Department abruptly changed its position as to whether the INS should continue to hold aliens after they had received final departure or removal orders until the FBI had completed the clearance process. After this time, the Department allowed the INS to remove aliens with final orders without FBI clearance.
法律顾问办公室于2003年2月发表的部门法律意见，此后审查的时间范围之后 - 最终得出结论，如果延误是延迟是，该部门可以花90天以上的时间去除外星人与影响国家的移民法律和政策有关。观点得出的结论是，调查外星人是否有恐怖关系达到了这一测试。未决诉讼也在解决这个法律问题。
我们的报告得出的结论是，该部门没有及时解决此问题，并在2002年1月突然改变了其政策，而没有法律分析的利益。直到后来，该部门要求法律意见。我们认为，该部门应该直接解决该部门的授权，即从他们收到最终撤职令后的90天后将被拘留者延续到90天之后。
最后，联邦法规要求在最终撤职令后90天持有的外国人有权进行监护权审查，以确定是否有必要继续监护权。我们发现，INS很少对9月11日被拘留者进行此类审查。
- Conditions of Confinement
INS决定于9月11日被拘留者在哪里安置，主要依靠联邦调查局对被拘留者与恐怖主义的可能联系的评估。联邦调查局（FBI）认为对其恐怖主义调查的“高度关注”的外星人通常在BOP高安全设施中举行，例如纽约布鲁克林的MDC。通常，尽管并非总是如此，但被联邦调查局视为“感兴趣”或“不确定的利益”的外星人被拘留在较低的安全设施中，例如新泽西州帕特森的Passaic县监狱。联邦调查局代理人通常根据外星人被捕时提供的有限信息，对没有指导或标准标准进行了对利息的评估。
在9月11日被拘留的地方，有很大的后果，因为在MDC持有的被拘留者经历了比Passaic举行的限制性限制性更大。
- Metropolitan Detention Center
In examining the treatment of detainees at the MDC, we appreciated the fact that the influx of high-security detainees stretched the MDC's resources. Its employees often worked double shifts during a highly emotional period of time, close to the scene of the terrorist attacks. We also appreciate the uncertainty surrounding the detainees and the chaotic conditions in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks.
但是，我们的审查引起了人们对MDC 9月11日被拘留者的待遇的严重关注。在恐怖袭击发生后，在高度戒备状态下，BOP在9月11日在MDC举行的被拘留者中施加了数周的通信停电。停电期结束后，MDC在其他情况下为囚犯组合了一系列现有的政策和程序，并将其应用于9月11日的被拘留者。例如，MDC将被拘留者指定为“证人安全”囚犯，以限制对信息的访问，包括其身份，位置和身份。以这种方式将被拘留者指定为被拘留者的律师，家庭甚至执法人员的努力挫败了确定被拘留者在哪里持有的努力。由于此名称，我们发现MDC的工作人员经常（错误地）告诉那些询问9月11日被拘留者的人，实际上被拘留者在该设施中没有被拘留。
此外，MDC对被拘留者的电话访问政策的限制性和不一致的政策阻止了某些被拘留者及时获得法律顾问。9月11日被拘留者在MDC被拘留之前没有法律代表。因此，由MDC制定的政策每周仅允许被拘留者一个合法电话（同时遵守广泛的国家标准），严重限制了被拘留者获得和咨询法律顾问的能力。
9月11日提供的无偿律师名单使被拘留者为获得律师的努力的努力更加复杂，其中包含不准确和过时的信息。结果，被拘留者经常在一周内使用其唯一的法律电话，试图与无偿列表中的一位法律代表联系，却发现律师要么更改了电话号码，要么没有处理特定的移民类型被拘留者面临的局势。
此外，被拘留者抱怨说，导致忙碌的信号或语音邮件接听电话的法律电话被视为当时的一个法律电话。当对此质疑时，MDC官员就是否算出被视为完整的法律电话的答复机做出了不同的回应。我们认为，计算只能到达语音邮件，导致繁忙的信号的电话或错误的数字是不适当的限制和不适当的。
Moreover, the manner in which the MDC inquired whether the detainees wanted to place a legal call was unclear. In many instances, the unit counselor inquired whether September 11 detainees wanted their weekly legal call by asking, "are you okay?" Several detainees told the OIG that for some time they did not realize that an affirmative response to this casual question meant they opted to forgo their legal call for that week. We believe the BOP should have asked the detainees directly "do you want a legal telephone call this week?" rather than relying on the detainees to decipher that a shorthand statement "are you okay?" meant "do you want to place a legal telephone call?" As a result of these policies, it took many detainees a long period of time to contact a lawyer.
MDC创建了一个新的特殊住房单元（称为行政最大住房单位，或Admax Shu），以持有9月11日被拘留者，直到联邦调查局清除了他们。在本单元中，MDC应用了适用于纪律隔离的囚犯的现有BOP策略。结果，每当移动时，被拘留者都会受到限制，包括手铐，腿铁和重链。每次被拘留者从牢房中护送时，都必须出席四名MDC官员。
由于这些限制性条件，我们认为联邦调查局在合理的时间范围内确定这些被拘留者是否与恐怖主义有关，或者是否可以清除它们从Admax Shu转移到MDC的限制性较小的一般性，这一点很重要。人口。然而，长期等待联邦调查局的清除过程，被拘留者留在Admax Shu中。即使联邦调查局清除被拘留者，由于联邦调查局清除了与恐怖主义联系的被拘留者与MDC收到正式通知通知的时间，因此他们在Admax Shu中持续了几天，有时甚至比必要的数周更长几周。
The OIG found that certain other conditions of confinement for the September 11 detainees at the MDC were unduly harsh, such as subjecting the detainees to having two lights illuminated in their cells 24 hours a day for several months longer than necessary, even after electricians rewired the cellblock to allow the lights to be turned off individually.
关于虐待指控，我们得出的结论是，证据表明，MDC的一些惩教人员对9月11日被拘留者进行了身体和口头虐待模式，尤其是在袭击发生后的头几个月，囚犯的摄入和运动期间。这通常包括将一些被拘留者猛撞到墙壁上。将他们拖到他们的手臂上；踩在脚踝袖口之间的链条；扭曲他们的手臂，手，手腕和手指；并制造诸如“您会感到痛苦”和“您将在这里死”之类的威胁和威胁。
Most correctional officers we interviewed denied the allegations of abuse, and federal prosecutors have declined the cases for criminal prosecution. However, the OIG is continuing to investigate these matters administratively. Our investigation has not uncovered any evidence that the physical or verbal abuse was engaged in or condoned by anyone other than the correctional officers who committed it.
我们还发现，MDC的工作人员未能及时通知MDC被拘留者，以提出有关其治疗的正式投诉的过程。
此外，我们发现，MDC工作人员适当采取了一些肯定的步骤，以防止潜在的员工虐待9月11日的被拘留者，并有可能通过在每个被拘留者的牢房中安装安全摄像机，并要求员工通过视频录像所有被拘留者来保护MDC员工免受毫无根据的虐待指控。在其细胞外运动。但是，BOP改变了其政策，并允许MDC的工作人员在30天后重复使用或销毁这些录像带（而不是按照原始政策中的要求“无限期地”将其“无限期地”），这阻碍了录像系统的实用性，以证明或反驳指控。个人被拘留者造成的虐待。
The decision to change the videotape policy was made by a BOP Regional Director. We do not believe, and have found no evidence to suggest, that the decision to change the policy was designed to cover up abuse. We also understand the difficulty in storing the hundreds of videotapes the MDC accumulated after several months of taping the detainees. But the decision to recycle or destroy the videotapes after 30 days meant that the usefulness of the tapes was limited.
- Passaic County Jail
In contrast to our findings at the MDC, our review found that the September 11 detainees confined at Passaic had much different, and significantly less harsh, experiences. According to INS data, Passaic housed 400 September 11 detainees from the date of the terrorist attacks through May 30, 2002. This was the largest number of September 11 detainees held at any single U.S. detention facility.
被关押在普通人群中的Passaic被拘留者被视为也被拘留在该设施的“常规”拘留者。尽管我们收到了一些关于身体和言语虐待的指控，但我们没有发现证据表明帕萨奇的虐待模式。但是，我们确实发现INS未能对Passaic进行足够的定期访问，以确保9月11日被拘留者的禁闭条件是适当的。
- 建议
We believe the chaotic situation and uncertainties surrounding the detainees' role in the September 11 attacks, and the potential of additional attacks, explain many of the problems we found in our review, but they do not explain or justify all of them. We therefore offered 21 recommendations to address the issues in our review. We have asked the Department, the FBI, and the BOP to respond to these recommendations in writing within 30 days. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) OIG has made the same request on our behalf to the immigration officials involved in these issues but who have since transferred out of the Department of Justice into DHS. At this stage, it appears that the Department and its components are taking our recommendations seriously and are considering implementing many of them.
Examples of our recommendations include:
- The Department and the FBI should develop clearer and more objective criteria to guide their classification decisions in any future cases involving mass arrests of illegal aliens in connection with terrorism investigations. We note that the FBI, in connection with its Watch List, developed guidance to govern who should be placed on that list. With regard to detainees the FBI could, for example, develop generic screening protocols (possibly in a checklist format) to help agents make more consistent and uniform assessments of an illegal alien's potential connections to terrorism.
- 除非联邦移民当局（现在是DHS的一部分）与部门和联邦调查局密切合作，以开发一个更有效的分享信息和疑虑的过程，否则让外国人在一个机构的权限下拘留的问题固有的问题同时依靠进行调查。另一个机构可能会导致延误，冲突和对问责制的担忧。我们建议移民官员与部门和联邦调查局达成协议，以正式制定涉及外国拘留者的国家紧急情况的政策，责任和程序。
- 当我们欣赏的巨大需求the FBI in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, the FBI did not adequately staff or assign sufficient priority to investigate or clear September 11 detainees of a connection to terrorism. We believe it critical for the FBI to devote sufficient resources in its field offices and at Headquarters to conduct timely investigations on immigration detainees. In addition, FBI Headquarters officials who coordinate the detainee clearance process and FBI field office supervisors whose agents conduct the investigations should impose some deadlines on agents to complete background investigations or, in the alternative, reassign these cases to other agents.
- Under federal regulation, the INS was required to decide whether to file immigration charges against an alien within 48 hours of his arrest. However, the regulation contained no requirement with respect to when the INS must notify the alien or Immigration Court about the charges. We recommend that the immigration authorities in the DHS document when the charging determination is made in order to determine compliance with the "48-hour rule." We also recommend that the DHS convert the goal of service of charges on aliens within 72 hours to a formal requirement. Further, we recommend that it be defined what constitutes "extraordinary circumstances" and the "reasonable period of time" when circumstances prevent the charging determination from being made within 48 hours.
- We recommend that the BOP establish a unique Special Management Category other than "Witness Security" for aliens arrested on immigration charges who may be of interest to a terrorism investigation. Such a classification should identify procedures that permit detainees' reasonable access to telephones more in keeping with the detainees' status as immigration detainees who may not have retained legal representation by the time they are confined, rather than as pre-trial inmates who most likely have counsel. In addition, BOP officials should train their staff on any new Special Management Category to avoid repeating situations such as when MDC staff mistakenly informed people inquiring about a specific September 11 detainee that the detainee was not held at the facility.
- 我们建议BOP发行新程序，要求将据称与恐怖主义联系的被拘留者的录像带保留更长的时间。
- We recommend that the BOP ensure that all immigration detainees housed in a BOP facility receive timely notice of the facility's policies, including its procedures for filing complaints.
- CONCLUDING OBSERVATION
I believe it is important to recognize that, despite the sensitivity of many of the issues in our report, the Department fully cooperated with our review, including the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the FBI Director, and the many other Department officials and employees to whom we spoke. On June 2, we released our full report with only a few words or phrases that contain specific identifying information "redacted" (blacked out) because they were considered "Law Enforcement Sensitive" by the Department and the FBI.
The fact that the Department permitted the full report on these topics to be released publicly is a credit to the Department. It also is a strength of the system that was established in the Inspector General Act, which allows evaluations of important and sensitive government actions by an independent OIG.
Although people have interpreted our report differently, we have attempted to describe in detail the treatment of the September 11 detainees, to lay out the facts underlying the policies that were implemented, and to provide the basis for the recommendations we made. I believe this report can have a positive impact by describing what occurred and providing recommendations for improvement should the Department be faced with handling detainees in other situations, both large and small scale, that may arise in the future.
This concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions.