



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SSCI# 2003 - 2134

April 30, 2003

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Following the February 11, 2003 hearing at which Assistant Secretary Carl Ford testified, additional questions were submitted for the record. Please find enclosed the responses to those questions.

If we can be of further assistance to you, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Paul V. Kelly".

Paul V. Kelly
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

Enclosure:
As stated.

The Honorable
Pat Roberts, Chairman,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
United States Senate.

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

Intelligence Community Information Sharing

Question:

1. As this Committee learned through our Joint Inquiry, terrorist attacks, information sharing to enhance operations among intelligence agencies was inadequate. Please describe the progress made, and the problems that still exist, in sharing information between the various intelligence agencies.

Answer:

INR's TIPOFF program has improved intelligence sharing within the Intelligence and law enforcement communities by working to share the unclassified portion of the TIPOFF database with law enforcement community users. We are finalizing coordination on a memorandum of understanding with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and our Intelligence Community providers to download the names of known or suspected foreign terrorists to the Violent Gang and Terrorist Organizations File (VGTOF) - a subset of the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). This will enable federal, state, and local law enforcement officers to access the names of known or suspected foreign terrorists from TIPOFF during traffic stops or when conducting criminal investigations. We have encountered some difficulty in this endeavor due to incompatible record management systems. For example, software development was

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003
needed to enable TIPOFF to electronically share information
with NCIC. The Intelligence Community assisted in this
effort by funding the contract for the software changes.

TIPOFF has also made its entire classified database
available on Intelink to certified users in the CIA, FBI,
NSA, DIA and DOS (the Warning 5). The purpose is not only
to share our biographic profiles of known or suspected
foreign terrorists with other users, but to receive input
from those agencies on additional intelligence available to
improve existing TIPOFF records. We are also working on a
draft request to the intelligence community requesting DHS
have this Warning-5 level.

Currently, the only DHS entities that TIPOFF has a data
sharing agreement with are the successor agencies of INS
and Customs. Unclassified bio elements have been shared
with these agencies for watch listing purposes since 1991.
We are currently circulating a draft MOU to include other
DHS entities, such as the Transportation Safety
Administration and Coast Guard, in receiving the same
information shared with immigration and customs officials.

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

TIPOFF was recently awarded funding from the Intelligence Community System for Information Sharing (ICSIS) program to upgrade a redacted version of TIPOFF (TIPOFF Lite) on Intelink. TIPOFF Lite is available to those in the Intelligence/law enforcement communities outside the Warning 5. These funds will improve the current capability of TIPOFF Lite, notably the name finding function, and will give users access to the source documents used to create the records. The funding will also allow TIPOFF to develop the framework to metadata data fields to allow TIPOFF to be used on various databases within Intelink that range in classification from SBU to Top Secret.

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

Question:

2. To what extent have each of your organizations committed to providing intelligence analysts and other staff to the new Department of Homeland Security? How many employees have you committed, or anticipate committing, to the new Department? Have you determined the categories of information that you will be providing to the Department of Homeland Security without a specific request from Secretary Ridge? If so, what are they? How will your commitment to the Department of Homeland Security diminish your ability to focus on other Intelligence Community priorities?

Answer:

The TIPOFF program is an entity of Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State. It has a small staff and is working at full capacity to keep up with the current workload. As a result, TIPOFF has not been asked to provide analysts to DHS.

Following 9/11, the TIPOFF developed a Concept of Operations to establish a National TIPOFF Lookout Center. This center would operate 24/7 and work collaboratively with the FBI's Terrorist Watch Center, The Terrorism Threat Intelligence Center (TTIC), the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) and other intelligence and law enforcement components. The draft of this plan expands the current staff from 14 to a staff of 80 plus. We have included in the staffing plan detailees from other government agencies, including DHS entities. Further action

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003
towards implementing this concept requires several policy
and budget decisions.

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program

Question:

3. North Korea has recently withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, reopened nuclear installations shut down under the 1994 US-North Korean Agreed Framework, expelled monitors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and demanded new negotiations with the U.S. What policy objectives is North Korea trying to attain through these actions? Under what circumstances is North Korea likely to use a nuclear weapon? What is the likelihood that North Korea will export fissile material, nuclear weapons technology, or a complete nuclear weapon? To what extent are China, Japan, and South Korea helping to resolve this issue?

Answer:

Assessing North Korea's motives is never easy, and thoughtful analysts sometimes arrive at different conclusions. In our view, the DPRK move to restart the Yongbyon facilities and its attempted withdrawal from the NPT were, in the first instance, a response to mid-November decision by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to suspend Agreed Framework heavy fuel oil shipments. For the North, this was the best way to raise the stakes and put pressure on the United States, which the DPRK blamed for the KEDO fuel cut-off. We believe, on a deeper level, the North saw the move as improving its security: restarting Yongbyon, and successfully developing a uranium enrichment capability, would put the DPRK several steps closer to acquiring a

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

credible nuclear deterrent, which the DPRK would have seen - and still sees - as a way to guarantee its survival. On the question of nuclear doctrine or use, we believe the North is likely to employ nuclear weapons only as a last resort - if it believes the regime itself is threatened. However, we believe the DPRK will continue to invoke its nuclear capabilities as part of its "brinkmanship" negotiating style to pressure the US and the international community.

Given the North's desperate economic situation and its history of exporting military equipment, including short and medium-range missiles, we take very seriously the concern that the North might export nuclear material or technology. The North is most likely to export nuclear material if it has more fissile material that it believes it needs for deterrent purposes and if it perceives little risk of detection in selling "surplus" material to foreign buyers. However, we do not know what number of nuclear weapons the DPRK would consider adequate for deterrence.

The US government coordinates North Korea policy very closely with our South Korean and Japanese allies, both of whom strongly support the Beijing talks that began on April

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

23. Seoul and Tokyo have spoken out loudly and consistently in support of a nuclear-weapons free Korean peninsula. These governments understand quite clearly the serious implications for their own national security if North Korea moves toward serial production of nuclear weapons. Both have made the nuclear issue a top priority in their bilateral diplomacy with the DPRK, and both have indicated a strong desire to participate fully in efforts to find a multilateral diplomatic solution to this problem.

It is apparent that China laid the groundwork for the initial US-DPRK-PRC talks on North Korea's nuclear arms program. The confidential minutes of PRC-DPRK high-level consultations, coupled with Pyongyang's continued, belligerent anti-US rhetoric, prompted some to speculate earlier that China was not doing as much as it could to press North Korea to reverse course. Beijing responded to such criticism by indicating that its influence was limited, according to press reports. The prospect of DPRK miscalculations in reaction to the US push into Iraq nonetheless imparted greater urgency to Beijing's deliberations. The temporary oil supply cutoff earlier this year and the more recent PRC move to block a UN motion condemning the DPRK withdrawal from the NPT probably were

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

among the "enticements," according to media reports, that Beijing employed to modify Pyongyang's behavior. China is hopeful that the upcoming talks will return the Korean peninsula to the non-nuclear status quo ante. However, Beijing does not rule out the possibility of additional DPRK mischief or escalatory steps should talks falter.

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

Prospects for Instability in North Korea

Question:

4. (A) What are the prospects for a coup or revolution in North Korea? What are the risks of such an event spilling over into a regional conflict as the competing interests of the U.S., South Korea and China come into conflict? How strong is Kim Jong Il's hold on power?

Answer:

We believe Kim Jong Il is firmly in control and see no signs of revolt brewing beneath the surface. Although coup attempts in totalitarian regimes can never be ruled out, we are unaware of any opposition or plotting to overturn the current leadership. Should there be an unexpected regime change, neighbors would likely be quick to offer support to shore up the new government and avoid disorder and uncertainty from spreading. Both China and South Korea will be keen to help avert large-scale migration of North Koreans across shared borders and prevent the North's WMD from falling into the wrong hands. They would support expanded relief operations within the North.

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

Question:

4. (B) Who will likely succeed Kim Jong Il?

Answer:

Recent speculation focuses on two of Kim's sons--Jong Nam (32) and Jong Chol (22)-- as contenders for replacing him as top leader of the regime. Because the two have different mothers, there are tensions between their families. To our knowledge, neither has moved through the grooming process far enough to dominate the other. We are unaware of any possible successor who is not a blood relative.

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

Question:

4.(C) What is the likelihood that North and South Korea will unify within the next 5 years? What is the likelihood that unification between North and South Korea will be a peaceful process? Under what circumstances would war be likely?

Answer:

Seoul remains anxious about assuming the immense economic and social burdens of reunification in the near-term. It ideally prefers a gradual and peaceful process that seeks to foster North Korean economic development and social transformation in order to create pressure for a less authoritarian government. Under this scenario, closing the gap between the North and South will require at least a generation or two. However, there is always the prospect of sudden reunification as a result of military conflict or the North's collapse. Tensions on the Peninsula remain high; the possibility of a sequence of events -- calculated or accidental -- triggering war is worrisome.

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

Question:

4. (D) How confident are you of your assessments considering the closed nature of North Korea?

Answer:

The DPRK remains a difficult regime to "read." We have a fairly good understanding of its economic and military problems and capabilities. We are less informed about the calculus and timing of Kim Jong Il's decisions.

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

Prospects for War between China and Taiwan

Question:

5. (A) What is the likelihood that China will attempt an invasion of Taiwan in the next five years?

Answer:

China is unlikely to attempt an invasion of Taiwan in the next five years. Beijing clearly prefers peaceful reunification and seems content to let economic integration increase its leverage over Taiwan, while reserving the right to use force. Taipei, for its part, is likely to continue to encourage a separate Taiwan identity while avoiding provoking Beijing to open threats of force.

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

Question:

5.(B) What factors would lead Beijing to consider a military versus a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues?

Answer:

The PRC consistently declines to renounce the use of force. It is likely that an outright declaration of independence by Taiwan would trigger the use of force, but other assertive acts by Taiwan, e.g., amending the constitution to eliminate reference to "The Republic of China," could also cause the PRC to resort to force. Beijing would weigh many factors in making the decision.

In February 2000 the PRC State Council issued a White paper on Taiwan that spelled out three conditions for the use of force against Taiwan. It states that "...if a grave turn of events occurs leading to the separation of Taiwan from China in any name, or if Taiwan is invaded and occupied by foreign countries, or if the Taiwan authorities refuse, indefinitely, the peaceful settlement of cross-Strait reunification through negotiations, then the Chinese government will only be forced to adopt all drastic measures possible, including the use of force, to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and fulfill

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003
the great cause of reunification." However, The White
Paper did not stipulate a timetable for reunification.

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

Question:

5.(C) What is your current assessment of China's amphibious program and future invasion capabilities?

Answer:

The Chinese military is making gradual strides toward a limited amphibious capability, but it would be some time before it would have the ability to mount a full-scale assault on Taiwan from the sea. **(See classified annex.)**

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

Question:

5. (D) How many missiles does China possess that could strike Taiwan, what is the destructive capability of this missile force, and what is Taiwan's retaliatory missile capability?

Answer:

(See classified annex.)

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

Question:

5.(E) To what extent has close US-Taiwan relations been an obstacle to closer US-China ties?

Answer:

US support for Taiwan is the most problematic issue for the PRC in its relations with the US. However, stable relations with the US are key for the PRC to achieve its 20-year development goal. The Taiwan issue has not, so far, deterred Beijing from cooperating with the US in areas such as counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, and efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation in North Korea.

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

Sino Japanese Relations

Question:

6.(A) What is the likelihood that there will be an increase in tensions between Japan and China in the next five years? What are the main factors that influence this bilateral relationship?

Answer:

Over the next five years, we foresee neither a steep downward decline in bilateral ties nor a rapid or sustained warming trend. Instead, Beijing and Tokyo are likely to experience occasional periods of heightened tension over a range of security, economic and political issues. Those periods will be followed by intensive efforts by officials on both sides to ensure a stable relationship. The fate of Taiwan is the main issue that could strain the Sino-Japanese relationship to the breaking point.

Beijing and Tokyo are developing increasingly complex economic, diplomatic and security relations and each arena holds out the possibility for exacerbating tensions for brief periods. However, as suggested above, none of these factors is likely to lead to irreconcilable differences in the next five years.

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

With respect to economic ties, Japanese leaders recognize a mix of costs and benefits to China's increasing economic presence. Among Tokyo's concerns are companies relocating to China (the so-called "hollowing-out" effect), the growing Chinese economic presence in Southeast Asia, and competition with Beijing over energy sources. With export markets in the US and Europe slowing, Japanese officials and business leaders are increasingly recognizing the benefits of an expanding Chinese market. Chinese counterparts, who see economic growth as essential to prop up domestic stability, look to Japan as both a lucrative export market and a source of investment and expertise. Although growing interdependence makes increased friction inevitable, the overall importance of economic ties to both countries acts as ballast that helps to keep the bilateral relationship on an even keel.

Chinese and Japanese efforts to strengthen their respective armed forces are likely to create mutual suspicions. As a nation that relies on sea-borne trade, Tokyo is especially worried about Chinese efforts to expand its control over the East and South China Seas. It is also looking for ways to cope with Beijing's nuclear and conventional missiles. Fired by memories of Japanese

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

aggression and recognizing the country's technical prowess, Beijing is critical of any move by Tokyo to weaken its self-imposed constraints on using military force abroad, boost its military capabilities or strengthen its alliance with the United States. Wariness of each other's armed forces and a general interest in protecting the regional status quo makes it likely that any bilateral military issue will be resolved quickly.

- The two sides have engaged in periodic, thus far low-key, exchanges over the Senkaku Islands, over which they (along with Taiwan) claim sovereignty. The Senkakus are not likely to take on a high-level profile but they nonetheless remain an irritant to relations, with the potential to catalyze confrontation should either side choose to use the islands to assert sovereignty.

The diplomatic dimension is problematic. For most of the past four decades, Tokyo has seen itself as the predominant voice of East Asia in international organizations and a bridge to the United States and advanced industrial economies. A decade of economic stagnation coupled with China's rapid emergence in global

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

affairs have led many Japanese to believe that their country is in serious jeopardy of losing out to Beijing. The Chinese, conversely, are cautiously optimistic that their nation has the opportunity to take its place among the great powers, perhaps at Tokyo's expense. However, the overall desire in both countries to avoid major bilateral complications is likely to keep this competition in check.

Differing views on historical issues can also heighten tensions. The Chinese public and leadership remain sensitive to Japanese words or actions that appear to glorify past Japanese aggression against China. Beijing's irritation with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni War Memorial to pray for the souls of dead soldiers- including those convicted of war crimes and those who may have carried out such atrocities as the Nanjing massacre - has stymied Japanese efforts to hold summits over the past two years. Occasional spats will probably occur over the history issue, but are unlikely to lead to serious tension in the relationship.

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

Question:

6.(B) What factors could most exacerbate tensions in this relationship?

Answer:

Imminent conflict between Beijing and Washington over Taiwan would most exacerbate Sino-Japanese tensions. Taiwan is the single issue in which Beijing has threatened to overturn by force the regional status quo. In addition to the overriding importance it attaches to the US-Japan alliance, Tokyo also views Taiwan as a national security issue. The Japanese probably prefer an independent Taiwan to prevent Chinese encroachment on vital Japanese sea-lanes. Moreover, a successful Chinese military takeover of Taiwan would significantly erode Japanese confidence in the US security guarantee. Beijing would almost certainly view Tokyo - home to key US bases that would be instrumental in US military actions -- as Washington's accomplice in an effort to interfere in what it considers to be a Chinese internal issue. In such circumstances, both Tokyo and Beijing would have little choice but to put aside the economic and political benefits of stable bilateral relations.

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

The Situation in Iran

Question:

7. (A) Last year, State/INR informed the Committee that "Iran, despite the setbacks of the last couple of years, stands among the most democratic governments of the Islamic world." Is President Khatami still considered a champion of reform among the general public? How strong is his hold on power?

Answer:

President Khatami continues to champion reform in Iran, but is under significant ongoing countervailing pressure, including conservative victories conservative victories in local elections in February. The reform movement has lost much of its earlier steam: reform proponents are disappointed with Khatami's performance and average Iranians, especially young adults, are disenchanted with the lack of progress.

President Khatami appears to have placed his last hopes in two pieces of legislation, one designed to strengthen the Presidency against such hardline clerical controlled institutions as the judiciary, and the other designed to reduce the power of the non-elected Council of Guardians (GC) over the vetting of candidates in elections. The first draft law passed the Majlis (parliament), was rejected by the Council of Guardians, and is now back in

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

the Majles; the second draft passed the Majles and is under GC review. There has been much speculation in Iran that President Khatami will resign if either bill is rejected or will submit them to public referendum. Either way, there is little chance the bills will pass the review process unscathed, so a major confrontation within the government seems inevitable unless Khatami backs down. As with past controversies, however, the regime likely will muddle through and reach some compromise that allows Khatami to finish out his remaining two years in office.

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

Question:

7.(B) How has the War on Terrorism in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and the potential for war in Iraq, affected the reform movement in Iran?

Answer:

The War on Terrorism and the invasion of Iraq have had no direct impact on the reform movement, though the two together have given many Iranians the impression that the US intends to surround Iran. That may lead to a rally-around-the-flag sort of nationalism which would strengthen the conservatives. The international perception of a maverick US going against world opinion to attack Iraq may have hurt support among Iranian leaders for improved relations with the US, but Iranian relief at Saddam Hussein's removal has tempered anti-American sentiments, though suspicions remain strong about US intentions toward Iran now that Saddam's regime is overthrown. Iranian attitudes toward the US role in Iraq will depend on the outcome of Iraqi reconstruction: if we succeed in creating an Iraqi democracy -- in which the Shia majority would inevitably have greater power and influence -- Iran may end up closer to the US, with its reform movement strengthened.

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

Question:

7.(C) Have you seen any reduction in Iran's support for international terrorism in the last year? Do you have any information that the government of Iran and al-Qa'ida are working together to conduct terrorist operations? Under what circumstances would Iran be likely to end its support for terrorism?

Answer:

We have seen no reduction in Iran's support for terrorism, mainly directed against Israel. We know of no occasion when the government of Iran and al-Qa'ida worked together to conduct terrorist operations. In recent years, Iran's support for terrorism has focused less on exporting the Islamic Revolution and more on supporting anti-Israel groups, especially Hizballah. Although Iran has strongly stated its opposition to the existence of Israel and to any peace agreement with it, any peace agreement accepted by most Palestinians, Lebanese, and Syrians would make it far harder for Iran to continue to support anti-Israel terrorists, and might lead it to abandon the policy entirely.

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

Question:

7.(D) What is the status of Iran's WMD efforts and how do they compare to Iraq?

Answer:

Chemical Warfare (CW) Program - Despite being a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Iran has an offensive chemical warfare (CW) program. In the past, Iran has manufactured and stockpiled blister, blood, and choking chemical agents, and weaponized some of these agents into artillery shells, mortars, rockets, and aerial bombs. It also is believed to be conducting research on nerve agents. Iran has continued its efforts to seek production technology, expertise and precursor chemicals from entities in Russia and China that could be used to create a more advanced and self-sufficient CW infrastructure. Iran acknowledged the existence of a past CW program for the first time in May 1998, which it claimed it had developed as a deterrent against Iraq's use of CW during the Iran-Iraq war. However, Iran has yet to acknowledge its own use of chemical weapons during that war.

Biological Warfare (BW) Program - Iran's BW program began during the Iran-Iraq War. Iran is believed to be pursuing offensive BW capabilities and probably has

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

capabilities to produce small quantities of BW agents, but has a limited ability to weaponize them. Iran has ratified the Biological Weapons Convention. Iran has a growing biotechnology industry, significant pharmaceutical experience and the overall infrastructure to support its BW program. Tehran has expanded its efforts to seek considerable dual-use biotechnical materials and expertise from entities in Russia and elsewhere. Outside assistance is important for Iran, and also difficult to prevent because of the dual-use nature of the materials and equipment being sought and the many legitimate end users for these items.

Iran-Iraq Comparison - Iraq's CBW programs, as assessed prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, were more advanced than Iran's CBW programs, particularly in regard to production capability and weaponization of CBW agents.

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

Question:

7.(E) How is Iran likely to react -- militarily and otherwise - to a U.S. led invasion of Iraq?

Answer:

Iran maintained a posture of careful military neutrality during the invasion of Iraq. Tehran has historical religious ties to the Shia population in southern and central Iraq, and has provided support to Kurdish groups, principally the PUK. Therefore, Iran undoubtedly will exploit those relationships to influence the formation of a new Iraqi government that takes those groups' interests into account and represents much less of a strategic threat to Iran in the future.

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

The Challenges Facing Post-Saddam Iraq

Question:

8.(A) Last year, the CIA told the Committee that: "[t]he nature of post-Saddam Iraq would depend on how and when Saddam left the scene, but any new regime in Baghdad would have to overcome significant obstacles to achieve stability. If Saddam and his inner circle are out of the picture and internal opponents of the regime band together, we assess that a centrist Sunni-led government would be pressed to accept an Iraqi state less centralized than Saddam's. Iraq's restive sectarian and ethnic groups, however, would probably push for greater autonomy. Decades of authoritarian rule have deprived Iraqis of the opportunity to build democratic traditions and parliamentary experience that could help them master the art of consensus building and compromise."

With the fall of Saddam's regime, there will be many challenges to making Iraq a democratic, stable and economically viable regime -- including creation of an effective transitional security force, developing a comprehensive plan for security, eliminating weapons of mass destruction, and establishing an international transitional administration. How long will this process take and how much will it cost? How is the Arab world reacting to an Iraq defeated and occupied by the U. S. and its allies?

Answer:

Arab reaction to coalition military operations in Iraq and the subsequent occupation has been somewhat less significant than expected by some observers. Clearly, there is considerable popular opposition throughout the Arab world. But with the termination of major military operations, the rapid collapse of Saddam's regime, and the joy with which so many Iraqis greeted its fall,

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

demonstrations and other public expressions of opposition on the part of the "Arab street" have fallen off substantially. Many Arabs remain concerned over the potential length and nature of the coalition presence in Iraq, but many also now recognize that Saddam Hussein's military strength and prowess were vastly exaggerated and that his crimes against the Iraqi people were considerable.

Question:

8.(B) To what extent is this outcome increasing the likelihood that the U.S. will be targeted by Islamic terrorism such as al-Qa'ida?

Answer:

Widespread fears that terrorist groups, including some presumably inspired by Iraqi government entities, would take advantage of the US invasion to strike American targets have thus far proven baseless. The increased number of US forces in the region certainly provides more targets for al-Qa'ida and other anti-US terrorist organizations. Many Arabs regard the invasion as unjustified, taken in service of Israeli interests, and a Christian crusade aimed at Arabs and Muslims. Additionally, the rapid collapse of Saddam's regime could feed Arab frustration over their seeming helplessness in the face of U.S. military might.

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

Those beliefs will likely lead to an increase in volunteers for jihad organizations, including perhaps al-Qa'ida. Quick progress toward a Palestinian settlement that includes clear and effective US pressure on the Israelis over settlements and visible progress toward establishing democracy and humanitarian relief in Iraq may defuse that problem. But absent miraculous progress in both areas, we should expect continued and increasing Arab-Muslim animosity for the US, with attendant increased threat levels, for the foreseeable future.

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

The Future of North Korea

Question:

9. In 1996, DIA informed the Committee that "[t]he likelihood that North Korea will continue to exist in its current state 15 years from now is low to moderate. Unless solutions to the North's economic problems are found, the regime will not be able to survive. It will have to adapt, slide into irrelevance, or collapse/implode. This has led many analysts to believe a process of political self-destruction has begun with potential for system collapse within 3 years." While the North Korean regime obviously did not collapse within three years of that statement, what do you think of the long-term viability of the North Korean regime? What do you believe is the likeliest scenario for the regime's demise - adaptation, sliding into irrelevance, or collapse/implode?

Answer:

We do not believe that North Korea's system, as currently constituted, can persist. But we do not perceive collapse as imminent. The regime has honed its skill at coping with serious economic difficulties. Throughout the 1990s, many speculated that the North would fail to survive the demise of European communism, the death of Kim Il Sung, or the social dislocation stemming from the collapse of its economy and a famine that claimed more than a million lives. Kim, however, has shown that he is enough of a pragmatist to be able to muddle through these challenges. In particular, he reached out to the international community for aid and probably realized that the North

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003
could benefit by taking advantage of neighbors' fears of
its instability.

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

The Impact of U.S. Military Withdrawal From South Korea

Question:

10. How serious is anti-American sentiment in South Korea? If the U.S. were to withdraw its military forces from South Korea, what would be the impact on the region and North Korea-South Korea relations?

Answer:

Anti-American sentiment reached a fever-pitch late last year during the presidential election due to the impact of a tragic accident that claimed the lives of two South Korean schoolgirls, long-standing perceptions that our alliance relationship is unequal, as well as generational change in the South. President Roh has taken steps to defuse anti-American sentiment. He has voiced strong support for the U.S. military presence on the Peninsula and visited USFK headquarters to visibly demonstrate his support. A majority of Koreans support and are grateful to the U.S., and as one of our most important allies in Asia, the U.S. is committed to further strengthening and deepening the alliance. An untimely U.S. troop withdrawal would probably create deep anxiety about a power vacuum in Northeast Asia. The impact of such a move on inter-Korean relations would depend on how the current nuclear standoff is resolved.

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

Possible Iraq-Libya WMD Cooperation

Question

11. What information do we have regarding cooperation between Iraq and Libya with regard to Weapons of Mass Destruction? Please elaborate.

Answer:

There are some known cases of Iraqi scientists with WMD-related expertise who have resided for a period of time in Libya. We have not been able to confirm whether they have actually performed any WMD work in that country, on behalf of the Libyan and/or Iraqi regimes.

In addition, we have serious concerns regarding reports over the years of WMD cooperation between the two countries. As yet, however, we have not been able to confirm any of these reports.

We do not have information as to whether Libyan WMD personnel have traveled to or worked in Iraq.

(See classified annex)

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003

Saudi Arabia

Question:

12. The Sunday, February 9, 2003 edition of The New York Times reported that "Saudi Arabia's leaders have made far-reaching decisions to prepare for an era of military disengagement from the United States, to enact what Saudi officials call the first significant democratic reforms at home, and to reign in the conservative clergy that has shared power in the kingdom." The article also stated that Crown Prince Abdullah will ask President Bush to withdraw all American armed forces from Saudi Arabia as soon as the campaign to disarm Iraq has concluded. What is your assessment of the likelihood that Saudi Arabia will seek to alter its military relationship with the U. S. and institute democratic reforms? Please characterize the nature and extent of Saudi cooperation with U.S. intelligence and law enforcement on counterterrorism in general and the investigation into the September 11 attacks in particular.

Answer:

We are unaware of any linkages between the issues of democratic reform and the stationing of U.S. military personnel in the kingdom.

We are aware of various articles in the Saudi press expressing a desire to have U.S. troops supporting Operation Southern Watch depart once regime change in Iraq was effected. We have seen no official indication from the SAG that they are contemplating a shift in the strategic U.S.-Saudi military relationship that has benefited us both for over 50 years, which has been marked by close

Questions for the Record Submitted to INR A/S Carl Ford
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 11, 2003
cooperation and consultation with both the political and
military leadership.

Crown Prince Abdallah's reform efforts have not been
constrained by or delayed pending resolution of these
military issues. Abdallah's "Arab charter" issued earlier
this year was a remarkably frank look at the many human
resource issues and socio-economic obstacles affecting
development in the Arab world. Abdallah has made efforts to
address the issues continuously since taking over day-to-
day rule in the kingdom in 1995, and has not linked these
efforts to military issues.

Regarding counter-terrorism, Saudi Arabia has
demonstrated a strong commitment to combat terrorism and
terrorist financing, as well as a new willingness to be
more proactive. Earlier this month, we laid the groundwork
for a joint working group with Saudi Arabia to bring senior
USG and SAG officials together on all aspects of counter-
terrorism.