国会纪录：2003年11月21日（参议院）2004年财政年度的情报授权法案 - 会议报告德国先生。主席先生，我现在搬到了对H.R. 2417的审议，情报授权会议报告。在主席提出问题之前，这份会议报告双方已被清除，我希望我们能够非常迅速完成行动。主持会议的官员。问题是同意议案继续进行。来自内华达州的参议员。里德先生。主席先生为应对领导者的发言，我们还相信能源独立和国家的安全。主持会议的官员。这不是一个可贬值的运动。里德先生。 Fine. I will withhold. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to proceed. The motion was agreed to. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The report will be stated. The legislative clerk read as follows: The Committee of Conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 2417) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, having met, have agreed that the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate, and agree to the same with an amendment and the Senate agree to the same, signed by a majority of the conferees on the part of both Houses. The Senate proceeded to consider the conference report. (The会议报告打印在11月19日的记录，2003年）FRIST先生家诉讼。主席先生，我很高兴得到尊敬的助手民主党领袖的问题。[...]主持会议的官员。来自堪萨斯州参议员承认。罗伯茨先生。主席先生，这是我的理解是，参议院悬而未决的业务是智能大会报告;那是对的吗？主持会议的官员。参议员是正确的。罗伯茨先生。 Mr. President, I rise today to urge Senate passage of the conference report for the Fiscal Year 2004 Intelligence Authorization Act. On November 20 the conference report was approved by the House of Representatives. In order to quickly provide the Intelligence Community the authorities it requires in order to pay, house, and equip its personnel for our most sensitive and critical national security work, this legislation should be sent to the President without delay. The horrible terrorist attacks in Turkey underscore the urgency of our task. This conference report is good legislation with important management and budget authorities. I will review just a few of them for you. In the conference report, the Senate receded to a number of significant House provisions of interest. The most significant of these is a provision that will consolidate and organize existing intelligence-related functions in the Department of the Treasury by creating a new Office of Intelligence and Analysis. This administration-supported provision also creates a new Assistant Secretary position. Senate managers also accepted a House provision intended to foster better information-sharing among Federal, State and local government officials. The bombings in Turkey illustrate that terrorists remain capable of striking at the heart of peaceful societies. We must be prepared to meet this continuing threat. The conference report retains a Senate provision on Central Intelligence Agency Compensation Reform, with a House amendment to ensure that Congress will have an opportunity to assess the impact of such reform before it becomes permanent. The conference report provides important new personal services contracting authority to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations. This authority is intended to permit the Director to exercise greater hiring flexibility as was recommended post-9/11 in order to bring aboard certain categories of critically-needed skills more quickly. Turning to the budget, when we began to review the President's fiscal year 2004 request I became very concerned at the recent growth in intelligence funding. I am still concerned. There is clearly not enough money in future years to fully fund the intelligence programs in this year's budget request. That is the sad reality of this budget. The intelligence community is stretched thin, with far more requirements than available funds. Too many projects and activities have been started that cannot be accommodated in the top line. It does not matter what caused this problem. The problem exists. Unless the President directs a dramatic and sustained increase to the intelligence budget next year, we will have to make the hard choices ourselves. A significant issue that must be addressed by the executive branch is the manner in which cost estimates for the procurement of major intelligence community systems are conducted. The magnitude and consistency in the cost growth on recent acquisitions indicates a systemic intelligence community bias to underestimate the cost of major systems. This ``perceived affordability'' creates difficulties in the out years as the National Foreign Intelligence Program becomes burdened with content that is [[Page S15355]] more costly than the budgeted funding. This underestimation of future costs has resulted in significant re-shuffling of NFIP funds to meet emerging shortfalls. In an attempt to correct this problem, the conference report contains a provision which would mandate a fundamentally more sound approach to cost estimates for major systems. The business-as-usual approach must end. There is another area I wish to mention in general terms concerning the analytical capabilities of the intelligence community. All recent after-action reports or studies of intelligence failures point to the inability of analysts to process ever-growing quantities of information. In an effort to correct this problem, the conferees agreed to move funds to programs at the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the CIA to improve the community's analytic capabilities. My key objectives in formulating the conference report were to ensure our Nation's continuing effort to prosecute the war on terrorism and to ensure that the ``longer view'' about intelligence community requirements is taken into account. I believe that this conference report meets both objectives. We met those objectives because we had bipartisan cooperation when and where it counted. I wish to thank the distinguished vice chairman, Senator Rockefeller, as well as the distinguished House chairman, Representative Goss, and his ranking member, Representative Harman, for their assistance in making the conference report possible. The staff of both intelligence Committees must also be commended for their diligent work on this important legislation. There is no opposition on our side of the aisle. We have worked very hard with the House to come up with a good compromise. This bill is vitally needed on behalf of national security. A similar bill passed the Senate several weeks ago by unanimous consent. I yield to my distinguished colleague, the vice chairman, Senator Rockefeller. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia is recognized. Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I agree with the chairman of the committee, the Senator from Kansas. There is no objection on this side. It has been cleared. There is no objection on our side. I presume the bill will be voted through. Mr. President, I am pleased to join the distinguished chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence in recommending passage of the conference report on H.R. 2417, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. The bill authorizes appropriations for the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence components of the F.B.I. and other U.S. government agencies. It also contains a number of important provisions intended to lay the foundation for process and organizational changes in the intelligence community. The classified nature of U.S. intelligence activities prevents us from disclosing publicly the details of our budgetary recommendations. As I described to the Senate when our bill was considered in July, 10 years ago I joined a majority of Senate colleagues in voting to express the sense of Congress that the aggregate amount requested, authorized, and spent for intelligence should be disclosed to the public in an appropriate manner. The House opposed the provision. I continue to believe that we should find a means, consistent with national security, of sharing with the American taxpayer information about the total amount, although not the details, of our intelligence spending. In holding the intelligence community accountable for performance, and the Congress and the President accountable for the resources they provide to the Intelligence Community, citizens should know the Nation's overall investment in intelligence. The bill includes a number of provisions intended to promote innovations in information sharing, human intelligence, and counterintelligence, among other things. Many of these initiatives represent initial steps rather than solutions, but they are necessary to raise the level of awareness in Congress and the executive branch regarding a variety of urgent and complex challenges and to lay the foundation for reforms the committee will be considering next year. Section 351 of the bill requires a report on the threat posed by espionage in an era when secrets are stored on powerful, classified U.S. computer networks rather than on paper. A single spy today can remove more information on a disk than spies of yesteryear could remove with a truck. We have already suffered losses, for example, in the Ames, Regan, and Hanssen cases, where sloppy computer security permitted traitors to exploit large quantities of highly classified information. Unfortunately, these cases provide a warning that appears to have gone largely unheeded. We still do not have a cohesive set of policies and procedures to protect our classified networks from cleared insiders who seek to betray their country, Our reliance on classified information systems for warfighting and intelligence is growing daily, yet hundreds of thousands of individuals have virtually unrestricted access to these critical networks. All but a few Government personnel are honest and patriotic Americans, but the sad fact is that there has not been a day since WWII when we have not had spies within our Government. There have been over 80 espionage convictions in the last 25 years. They include personnel from the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, NSA, CIA, FBI, State Department, the National Reconnaissance Office and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It is a very real and continuing problem and there will undoubtedly be more espionage arrests in the months and years ahead. Espionage is an unfortunate fact of life, and we simply cannot afford to operate classified systems in which thousands of individuals enjoy the ability to download or upload classified information at will. Other countries are seeking to exploit this situation to collect defense secrets, and no doubt contemplate blinding our Government and troops in time of war. We would never permit such broad access to weapons in an armory, yet these classified systems are of much greater strategic significance than M-16 rifles, tanks, or 500 pound gravity bombs. We simply must develop the policies and capabilities necessary to control input and output devices on these systems and monitor their use. Section 352 of the bill calls for a review of our cumbersome, outmoded, and many would say ineffective personnel security system. It is a fact that almost every spy has held high-level security clearances. It is also a fact that few, if any of these individuals were identified through routine security clearance updates. Most people who become spies join the government with no intention of betraying their country. Research by the Defense Department shows that most spies are people who develop grievances as their careers progress, at times having developed money and alcohol problems as well, and then turn to espionage as a way of feeding their egos and their bank accounts. Yet, we give a young, single Navy recruit seeking an intelligence assignment the same scrutiny as a 30-year intelligence operative with financial troubles who routinely travels to countries of concern. Further, even when derogatory information surfaces, sometimes even very disturbing information which raises serious espionage issues, the government rarely revokes the clearances we rely on so heavily and which cost so much. In the information age, we cannot wait 5 to10 years to identify employee problems that may be related to espionage. Too much damage can be done too quickly. We need fresh thinking and recommendations that will provide more effective security for the large sums of money the taxpayer is investing. Section 354 of our bill calls for a review of classified information sharing policies within the Federal Government. This is an issue closely related to the foregoing provisions regarding inadequate security policies. ATM machines, for example, are a wonderfully convenient and effective means of providing access to banking resources--but they could not exist without magnetic cards, personal identification [[Page S15356]] numbers, cameras and locks. Similarly, improved security is not a barrier to more flexible information sharing, it is a fundamental ingredient. The Joint Inquiry report on the 9/11 attacks highlighted information sharing as a critical shortcoming that prevented the interception of several hijackers. To help accelerate reform, the Joint Inquiry requested an administration report by this past June 30 on progress to reduce barriers among intelligence and law enforcement agencies engaged in counterterrorism. Unfortunately, no report has been submitted. We have the technology for improved information sharing, and significant progress is being made. A Terrorist Threat Integration Center has been established, and new guidelines regarding sharing of grand jury information have been promulgated. These are very important steps forward. But to truly break down the barriers to information sharing, rather than relying on work-arounds, we need revised policies on sharing classified information which recognize and exploit the opportunities provided by modern information technology. This is especially important as we look to bridging the gap between the Intelligence Community and organizations charged with Homeland Security. Section 355 of the bill identifies a problem that would probably stun most taxpayers. Simply stated, notwithstanding the many billions of dollars invested in complex intelligence systems, ranging from satellites, to aircraft, to ships, and land-based collection platforms, there is no capability in the executive branch to independently and comprehensively model the performance of these systems. Consequently, new multi-billion-dollar systems are procured without the ability to rigorously evaluate potential trade-offs with other systems. Questions such as these should be asked: Given projected satellite, aircraft and UAV constellations, what is the marginal value of adding space-based radar satellites? Are there alternative investments that can better satisfy intelligence requirements? Don't senior policymakers need the ability to systematically examine the interactions of these many systems to identify trade-offs that can be achieved? Currently, most of the analysis of proposed collection systems is performed by the agencies seeking to justify their programs, or by senior policy officials who struggle to apply common sense and spread- sheet level analysis to systems that often have overlapping capabilities. There is no reason that a rigorous, independent and comprehensive capability cannot be developed to support the programmatic reviews of the DCI and the Defense Department. This is but one example, though an important one, of the ways in which we believe the intelligence community can improve its strategic planning and decisionmaking processes. Section 356 of the bill raises an issue of profound strategic significance for the United States, namely the growing reliance of our country on hardware and software produced overseas. Although specific cases are classified, this is clearly a growing problem. After 1973, when the risks inherent in America's reliance on foreign oil became clear, many positive steps were taken to ameliorate our national vulnerabilities. Those steps included establishment of a strategic petroleum reserve, establishment of the Central Command, and research into alternative fuels. Unlike our dependence on foreign oil, however, our rapidly growing dependence on foreign hardware and software creates numerous opportunities for espionage and information operations that are extremely difficult to detect. Ironically, the countries identified by the FBI as most actively engaged in economic espionage against the United States are leading producers of the hardware and software we all use on a daily basis. The plain truth is that even the Defense Department does not know where most of the hardware and software it uses originates. Moreover, the Government does not have the right to examine source code unless voluntarily supplied. Further, at the present time, there are limited capabilities for analyzing source code that is made available. This situation requires serious attention by senior policymakers, including Congress, and the report required by section 356 should help to prompt a long overdue discussion of these issues. In concluding my remarks, I would like to look beyond our current bill to the issues the Intelligence Committee must contend with next year. Other committees share responsibility for reviewing the funding and systems needed by the intelligence community, but our committee is uniquely positioned to evaluate the intelligence community's performance--both its successes and failures--and to identify the changes required to meet the challenges of the future. In my view, money alone is not sufficient to enable the intelligence community to reach its full potential. The current structure of the intelligence community is fundamentally unchanged from its establishment in 1947. Serious change is long overdue. I strongly believe that new structures and authorities, coupled with able and aggressive leadership, are required to dramatically improve our intelligence community's efficiency and effectiveness. In many respects, the organizational issues confronting the intelligence community are analogous to those confronting the Defense Department prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The fundamental problem confronting the Department of Defense prior to Goldwater-Nichols was excessive military service control over military operations, policies and budgets. In response, Congress strengthened the weak integrating mechanisms in DoD, specifically the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Commanders of the Combatant Commands. The difference in military performance before Goldwater-Nichols--e.g., Desert 1, Lebanon, and Grenada--and after--Panama, Haiti, and Iraq--is stark and clear. In fact, I am convinced that the Goldwater-Nichols Act did more to enhance U.S. national security than any weapons system ever procured by the Department of Defense. Although the Goldwater-Nichols reorganization is not a precise template for restructuring the intelligence community, the problems are fundamentally similar: towering vertical structures--NSA, CIA, DIA, NRO, NIMA, the service intelligence components--and relatively weak integrating mechanisms--the DCI and his Community Management Staff. Any reorganization proposal needs to address this fundamental problem of inadequate integration and coordination. In that regard, I would suggest that the intelligence community's lack of responsiveness to the DCI's declaration of war on al- Qaida prior to 9/11 was in part a result of the DCI's weak community management authorities and inability to move the system. I am convinced that a strengthened DCI could more effectively manage the intelligence community, leading to performance improvements comparable to those achieved by the military in the wake of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. A conservative, incremental approach would involve the creation of a permanent cadre to staff the DCI much as the Secretary of Defense has an OSD staff. This simple change, coupled with aggressive business process reengineering and ``year of execution budget authority'' for the DCI over NFIP programs, would significantly strengthen the DCI's ability to manage the intelligence community and respond to new threats and opportunities. A more aggressive and far-reaching plan would have to address the fundamental changes that have occurred since the current structure was established by the National Security Act of 1947. Specifically, it would recognize that the once useful distinction between home and abroad has become not only irrelevant, but dysfunctional. This is not to suggest any need to reduce the protections afforded U.S. persons under the Constitution, merely that globalization and the development of cyberspace, combined with the rise of apocalyptic terrorists groups empowered by lethal new technologies, require a different, more agile structure that is not impeded by outmoded geographic distinctions. In that regard, we should find ways to more effectively coordinate foreign and domestic intelligence. Achievement of any substantial reorganization will require meticulous research by the congressional oversight committees, a substantial hearing record, and sustained interest by the administration. At the end of the day, [[Page S15357]] incremental steps will be better than none, and a more aggressive reorganization require a consensus not only on the Intelligence Authorization Committees, but with the Armed Services Committees as well. As challenging as these issues are, we simply cannot fulfill our duty to the American people unless we confront these crucial issues when Congress returns next year. In conclusion, the important steps we have taken with this measure, to include full funding of the administration's requests for intelligence activities, are the result of lengthy deliberations on matters as complex as they are vital. It is gratifying to see the work that has been done in both Chambers come together today in a bill we can send to the President. It is a useful first step, but only a first step, towards the development of an intelligence community better able to adapt to the rapidly evolving threats confronting our great nation. Finally, I would like to thank the chairman and the Committee staff for their arduous work on this bill. I look forward to making great strides together next year. I urge support for this measure. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise in my capacity as the chairman of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs regarding the Conference Report to accompany H.R. 2417, the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2004. Section 105 of the act will create a new Office of Intelligence and Analysis within the Department of the Treasury. The Office is to be headed by a newly authorized Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. It will enhance the Department's access to intelligence community information and permit a reorganization and upgrading of the scope and capacities of Treasury's intelligence functions in light of the Nation's counterterrorist and economic sanctions programs. This section was drafted with bipartisan participation and close coordination with the Department of the Treasury. The particular terms governing the new office are important to me as chairman of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs over legislative and oversight matters relating, inter alia, to the Nation's economic sanctions laws and the Bank Secrecy Act, and, more generally, because of the importance of carefully delineating the limitations on any part of the U.S. intelligence community that lie within the structure of an executive department of the Government. I have a letter signed by the ranking member of the Banking Committee, Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, and myself addressed to Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snow, as well as Secretary Snow's response. This letter reflects the agreement of Treasury about the organization, structure and role of the new Office and Assistant Secretary position created and important related organizational matters concerning the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network and the Office of Foreign Assets Control. I request unanimous consent that the two letters be included in the Record. They provide, I believe, a good statement of congressional intent with regard to the establishment of the new Office and the new Assistant Secretary position. At this time I would yield the floor to the ranking member of the committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Senator Sarbanes. Mr. SARBANES. I thank the Senator. I simply want to note my agreement with the chairman and with his request to include the two letters in the Record. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: U.S. Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Washington, DC, November 20, 2003. Hon. John W. Snowe, Secretary of the Treasury, Department of the Treasury, Washington, DC. Dear Secretary Snowe: A proposed amendment to section 105 of the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2004, H.R. 2417, would create a new Office of Intelligence and Analysis within the Department of the Treasury, The Office would be headed by a newly-authorized Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Office would enhance the Department's access to Intelligence Community information and permit a reorganization and upgrading of the scope and capacities of Treasury's intelligence functions in light of the nation's counter-terrorist and economic sanctions programs. We are writing to you to confirm formally, before consideration of the amendment proceeds, your and our mutual understanding of the role of the proposed new Office and Assistant Secretary within the Department of the Treasury. Such confirmation is necessary because of the authority of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs over legislative and oversight matters relating, inter alia, to the Nation's economic sanctions laws and the Bank Secrecy Act, and, more generally, to the Nation's financial system. In that context, the Committee is necessarily concerned with the careful delineation of the functions, and limitations, of any part of the U.S. Intelligence Community that lies within the structure of the Department of the Treasury. Based on discussions between members of our staffs and the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Legislative Affairs), we understand that: 1. The new Office is to be responsible for the receipt, collation, analysis, and dissemination of all foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence information relevant to the operations and responsibilities of the Treasury Department, and to have such other directly related duties and authorities as the Secretary of the Treasury may assign to it. The new Office will replace and absorb the duties and personnel of Treasury's present Office of Intelligence Support (``OIS'') and will carry on OIS' work in the provision of information for use of the Department's senior policy makers. 2. The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis will report to an Under Secretary of the Treasury (Enforcement) as required by the statute. The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis will at no time supervise any organization other than the new Office or assume any other policy or supervisory duties not directly related to that Office. 3. The Secretary will seek prompt designation of a new appointee for the vacant position of Under Secretary, and ensure the chain of command will be organized and implemented as outlined above. 4. Our mutual understanding is that Treasury plans to have an official appointed to a vacant Assistant Secretary position. The official appointed to that position will supervise the Office of Foreign Assets Control (``OFAC'') and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (``FinCEN'') as well as other functions, but he or she will at no time supervise the Office of Intelligence and Analysis. This Assistant Secretary also will report to the Under Secretary referred to in paragraphs 2. and 3., above. 5. The general responsibilities of OFAC and FinCEN will not be changed in the course of creating the new Office and these new positions. However, it is anticipated that the new Office will coordinate and oversee all work involving intelligence analysts who work in OFAC and FinCEN (or in other parts of the Treasury) primarily with classified information, in the interest of creating the more robust analytic capability at Treasury that was the articulated reason for the authorization of this new Office. One of the primary tasks of the new Office will be to examine and analyze classified information, in conjunction with the relevant unclassified information already available to OFAC and FinCEN, so that the resultant product can be of use to OFAC and FinCEN as well as to other agencies, under applicable legal rules. Thus, the new Office will have access to all relevant information held by FinCEN and OFAC for national security and anti-terrorism purposes. The expertise of the Department of the Treasury is necessary and integral to our Nation's security and to success in the war on terrorism. We expect within the next year to highlight your efforts in this area in one of the series of Terror Finance hearings to be held by the Committee, and we look forward to hearing at that time about the innovative approaches to counter-terrorism efforts that the proposed revitalization of Treasury's capacity for financial intelligence analysis can produce. Sincerely, Richard C. Shelby, Chairman, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. Paul S. Sarbanes, Ranking Member, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. ____ Department of the Treasury, Washington, DC, November 21, 2003. Hon. Richard Shelby, Chairman, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Development, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. Dear Chairman Shelby: Thank you for your letter concerning creation, in section 105 of the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2004, of the proposed Office of Intelligence and Analysis, to be headed by a new Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, within the Department of the Treasury. I have reviewed your letter and it correctly states the commitments made to you on behalf about the role of the proposed new Office and new Assistant Secretary within the Department of the Treasury. I appreciate your input and look forward to working with you, Senator Sarbanes, and [[Page S15358]] your House colleagues to make sure the Treasury Department meets the Congress' expectations. An identical letter has also been sent to Senator Sarbanes. If there is anything that I can do to be of assistance to you, please do not hesitate to contact me. Sincerely, John W. Snow. Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask that the Chair put the question to the body. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate? If not, the question is on agreeing to the conference report. The conference report was agreed to. ____________________