国会记录：2003年3月7日（参议院）第S3358-S3365页上午业务的延长华纳先生。当然这位来自马萨诸塞州的参议员是最有耐心的。我请求大家一致同意将上午的工作时间延长到1点，这一时间由我和另一方的同事平均分配。主持会议的官员（科宁先生）。无异议，就这样命令。华纳先生。关于你提出的两点，参议员，首先——我在笔记中抄录了——你问美国是否真正参与了检查过程，有这样的话。多德先生。在你对我说这番话之前，我一直担心的是，政府并没有非常支持视察过程。许多政府官员对检查工作非常不屑一顾。我的弗吉尼亚同事可能有一个不同的。但我的印象是，政府从来没有接受检查程序、认可检查程序，或以我认为应该是这样的措辞支持检查程序，因为我们肯定支持确立检查倡议的决议。华纳先生。主席先生，我们有权坦诚地表达不同意见。我的同事和我昨晚在一个公共论坛上就这个问题进行了辩论。但是我相信我们的政府已经非常彻底地参与了检查过程，并试图支持它。今天，我提供了一些具体证据，即我收到了中央情报局局长给我的一封信，并抄送了我尊敬的同事莱文参议员和罗伯茨参议员，他们将我们所做的一切记录在案，向美国提供有关大规模杀伤性武器可能正在制造、储存或其他过程中的可能地点的情报。我们在这方面进行了有力的合作。我认为这证实了弗吉尼亚州参议员的断言，即我们的政府正在参与。我只是在这里读了一段，特尼特说我们，美国：。现已向监核视委和原子能机构提供了所有高价值和中等价值场址的详细资料。这是对你关于真正参与的评论的反驳。我认为这表明了诚意。第二，这种仓促？这位参议员很清楚，1441年11月8日获得通过。此后，联合国立即开始实施布利克斯一段时间以来一直在做的工作，并使之正式化。正如你所知，联合国考虑建立第二个视察制度，布利克斯在几个月前就任并开始工作。他是否承诺尽快进入伊拉克，从后勤角度看是可行的，并与他一起训练个人，而他基本上从11月下旬，12月初就在那里——我说的不对吗？布利克斯没有提高生产率的原因——我想他已经尽力了——是伊拉克绝对缺乏合作，我的康涅狄格州同事也同意这一点。我们现在到了。我国总统、总理和志愿联盟的其他国家已经召集了他们的预备队，召集了他们的警卫，运送了部队，并将其安置到位。10天前，我与莱文参议员、罗伯茨参议员和洛克菲勒参议员一起访问了那里。我们已经把它们放在那里了。正如来自康涅狄格州的参议员所说，公平地说，他们的存在确实支持了总统和联合国其他方面所作的外交努力，这一努力仍在继续。我们的总统昨晚说，我们将拭目以待Blix报告的结果。他今天又来了。对于布利克斯，他往往有些自相矛盾。在以前的报告中，他相当积极地对伊拉克没有更加合作表示遗憾，缺乏合作阻碍了他的努力。这位参议员很清楚，这次检查的概念并不是布利克斯和他的团队必须找到武器；这是因为伊拉克要合作并展示武器的位置，以便布利克斯能够监督武器的销毁。正如我们作为水手所说的那样，这件事完全偏离了轨道，因为布利克斯需要同时摧毁他目前正在监督的一个小型导弹储藏库，同时利用美国情报和其他国家的情报对这些地点进行搜索。我对参议员说，我看不出有任何理由说这位总统、英国首相或其他人，如你所说，正仓促地试图使用武力作为最终解决办法。我们做这件事已经12年了。布利克斯自去年11月开始经营。多德先生。让我回答你的长问题。华纳先生。对多德先生。我想这里有个问题。华纳先生。对多德先生。我的回答是检查ReportsReportsteams were not at full strength until about the end of January. Obviously, we didn't think Saddam Hussein was a wonderfully truthful, reliable head of state last fall when the U.S. voted for U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441. We have known Saddam Hussein for a long time, and it therefore comes as no great surprise that it has taken international pressure to get results. It has only been about a month since the inspections team has been fully operational in Iraq. That is a fact. To expect somehow that within a month's period of time, or a little more than a month, an inspections team was going to be able to complete the job was naive. This morning U.N. Weapons Inspections chief, Mr. Blix--whom I think most people respect as being an honorable person and certainly one who has dedicated much of his career to eliminating weapons of mass destruction--reported that the inspections are making progress, that today inspectors are getting a lot more done than they did in the 1990s. We should listen to Mr. Blix and give his remarks serious consideration as we decide the next steps. My only point in taking the floor today is not to suggest, as some may, that we ought to under no circumstances in dealing with Iraq ever contemplate the use of force. I would disagree with that. I think having a threat of force is absolutely critical to achieving a desired result. The only point is that we ought not do this alone. I don't think it is necessary, and I think we ought to at least give this process time to work. I think the cost [[Page S3359]] of not doing that could be profoundly dangerous to our country. I hope I am wrong about that, but I am fearful I may be right. In waiting a few weeks to get this right, I don't think the dangers posed by Iraq are that imminent that a few weeks or a few months would necessarily cost us. I would argue differently about North Korea. I don't think we have that much time. I think every day we lose in dealing with North Korea raises the risks to this country and the world profoundly. I don't disagree with my colleague from Virginia at all about this except to the extent that the impression is we really are not going to give this the kind of time to prove it can work and then have the kind of support that I think we ought to have internationally. We only paid about 10 percent of the cost of the gulf war. The rest of the world which felt most threatened by Iraq contributed 90 percent of that cost. As I shared with my colleagues last evening a conversation which I had with one of the major European Commissioners, a great ally of ours, the Commissioner said: We have been delighted to support the effort in Afghanistan. I think the European Community contributed about $1 billion. He said: I would not anticipate any financial support under the present circumstances in winning the peace in Iraq if this is a unilateral effort on the part of the United States. That is a very troubling comment. This problem is a problem not just for us, it is a problem for the region, as my colleagues have said. I believe Saddam Hussein poses a global threat, and that certainly needs to be addressed. But we need to understand that diplomacy has value. And I think there are those who today are in positions of making a difference who don't appreciate that enough. That is my concern as I take the floor today. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I see the Senator from Massachusetts. I ask unanimous consent that the time the Senator from Virginia consumed in this colloquy be charged to his allocation and the time consumed by the Senator from Connecticut be charged to the other side. I thank my colleague. I hope to have more to say on this. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from Massachusetts. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, this morning we heard the most encouraging report so far on the recent developments in Iraq from the United Nations' chief weapons inspectors. Progress is clearly being made. Iraq is beginning to destroy its missiles. As a result of strong international pressure on Saddam, the inspectors are receiving greater cooperation from the Iraqi Government. Hans Blix, the chief United Nations weapons inspector, reported this morning that the international pressure is working. He says the inspectors are encountering fewer difficulties than when inspections occurred there a decade ago. The inspectors have free access to the entire country, and they can now conduct air surveillance throughout Iraq. The question is, For how long? Hans Blix says it will not take years or weeks, but months. So we are not talking about an endless process. Saddam knows he is on the clock at the United Nations. The eyes of the world are on him, and he must disarm. We all agree there is still much more to be done before full disarmament is achieved. But inspections are working and Saddam is being disarmed. Yet in its rush to war with Iraq, the Bush administration ignores this progress and rejects the wise words of caution from our allies. President Bush deserves great credit for the progress so far--both in the war against al-Qaida terrorism, and in disarming Saddam. Al-Qaida is on the run, and Saddam is disarming. But it is time for this President and this White House to pause before pushing aside the rest of the world and ordering an invasion of Iraq. Rash action will only place our troops in greater harm's way. As we unleash a firestorm of military might over Iraq, we could easily unleash a firestorm of hatred for America creating a far more dangerous world for Americans here at home and in many other countries. We are squandering the immense good will and support for America following the tragedy of 9/11. We are shattering the coalition that is effectively fighting the war against terrorism, and that is pursuing Osama bin Laden at this very moment. War now will inflame the Arab and Muslim world against us as never before, and generate intense new support for anti-American terrorists who will stop at nothing to do us harm. In recent days, Iraq has destroyed 34 of its 100 illegal missiles--a process which continues. Seven more scientists have been privately interviewed, and each day more come forward. The Iraqi government stepped up and revealed the location of previously destroyed biological weapons in order to enable the inspectors to verify their destruction. Many of us wish that this cooperation had occurred earlier, and that Iraqi officials were more forthcoming. No one ever said it would be easy to disarm Iraq. Even South Africa, which agreed to unilaterally disarm its nuclear program, required two full years of inspections to confirm that its nuclear capability was destroyed. Disarmament is a process--not a single simple event. Disarmament takes time. Progress comes step by step. But when progress does occur, it makes no sense to reject it out of hand. It makes no sense to start a war when we have a genuine chance to preserve the peace. The wisest course for America is to give the inspectors more time and to maintain the pressure on Saddam by keeping our troops in the region. It is better to pay the price of keeping our troops there to pressure Saddam than to pay the far greater cost of going to war. It is clear from the foreign ministers who spoke today at the Security Council that a majority of the world's governments still want to wait before pulling the trigger for war. Even the British are now asking for more time. This is a delicate and dangerous situation. We need allies to help us meet our goals, and to provide for the security of the American people. But surely we can have effective relationships with other nations without adopting a chip-on-the-shoulder, my-way-or-the-highway policy that makes all our other goals in the world more difficult to achieve. We cannot be a bully in the world schoolyard and expect cooperation, friendship, and support from the rest of the world. The threat of war may be tough talk that Saddam needs to hear. But continuing inspections is a tough-minded policy. It takes patience and perseverance. There is the chance that they will succeed in disarming Iraq. And inspections build international support if other steps are required. The goal is the disarmament of Iraq by peaceful means--not to use every opportunity to justify a war, as the administration is doing. All of us agree that Saddam is a despicable and deceitful dictator, but I am deeply concerned that such a war will make the world even more dangerous for Americans--not less dangerous. But as long as inspectors are on the ground and making progress, we must give peace a chance. War must always be a last resort. The question now is whether the Bush Administration will view Iraqi cooperation as a glass half empty, or a glass half full. At his press conference last night, President Bush still failed to offer adequate answers to the key questions on the minds of the American people about the issues at stake in this war and its aftermath. In his speech last week, he also painted a simplistic picture of the brightest possible future--with democracy flourishing in Iraq, peace emerging among all nations in the Middle East, and the terrorists with no place of support there. We have all heard of rosy scenarios, but that was ridiculous. War with Iraq runs the very serious risk of inflaming the Middle East and provoking a massive new wave of anti-Americanism in other countries that may well strengthen the terrorists, especially if the Muslim world opposes us. What if al-Qaida were to time the next terrorist attack to the day we go to war? A year ago, the Wall Street Journal quoted a dissident in Saudi Arabia who has turned his focus from his own government to the U.S. Government. He said the main enemy of the Muslims and the Arabs is America, and that they do not want us to impose on them. [[Page S3360]] He said many Arabs would rather tolerate dictatorship in their own countries than import reforms from America. The burning of the U.S. flag has become a common ritual in Arab capitals. Calling someone an American is now regarded as an insult in parts of the Arab world. What a tragic change in the support we had in the world after 9/11, let alone from the time when America stood as a beacon of hope and a model for freedom and democracy throughout the world. In a desperate effort to justify its focus on Iraq, the administration has long asserted there are ties between Osama and Saddam--a theory with no proof, and widely doubted by the intelligence experts. Two weeks after 9/11, Secretary Rumsfeld claimed we had "bulletproof" evidence of the link. But a year later, CIA Director Tenet conceded in a letter to the Senate Intelligence Committee that the administration's understanding of the link was still "evolving" and was based on sources of "varying reliability." In fact, the link is so widely doubted that intelligence experts have expressed their concern that intelligence is being politicized to support the rush to war. The Bush administration was wrong to allow the anti-Iraq zealots in its ranks to exploit the 9/11 tragedy by using it to make war against Iraq a higher priority than the war against terrorism. Al-Qaida--not Iraq--is the most imminent threat to our national security. Our citizens are asked to protect themselves from Osama with plastic sheeting and duct tape, while the administration prepares to send our Armed Forces to war against Iraq. Those priorities are wrong. There is also much more we need to do at every level of government to strengthen our defenses at home against terrorist attack, especially if we go to war alone against Iraq and inflame the Arab world. America is already on constant alert. There is no time to shortchange our security at home. Yet across the country the Bush administration is leaving local governments high and dry in the face of continuing threats at home. Despite promises of funding from Washington, our cities are not receiving the urgent help they need. If there is any lesson from September 11, it is that we cannot afford to fail to meet this threat. The cost in lives at home is too great. The war with al-Qaida is far from over, and war with Iraq may well make it worse. And what about the aftermath of war? We know a stable government will be essential in a postwar Iraq. But the administration refuses to discuss, in any real detail, how it will be achieved and how long our troops will need to stay. President Bush assumes everything will go perfectly. But war and its consequences hold enormous risks and uncertainties. As Retired General Anthony Zinni has asked, will we do what we did in Afghanistan in the 1970s--drive the old Soviet Union out and let something arguably worse emerge in its place? The administration has also tried to convince us the war will not be costly to the Treasury. If our national security were at stake, we would spare no expense to protect American lives. But the administration still owes the Nation a more honest discussion about the war costs we are about to face, especially if America has to remain in Iraq for many years, with little support from others. The vast majority of the Iraqi people may well want the end of Saddam's rule, but they may not welcome the United States to create a government in its own image. Regardless of their own internal disagreements, the Iraqi people still feel a strong sense of national identity and could quickly reject an American occupation force that tramples on local cultures. We must recognize that the day we occupy Iraq, we shoulder the responsibility to protect and care for its citizens. We are accountable under the Geneva Convention for public safety in neighborhoods, for schools, and for meeting the basic necessities of life for 23 million Iraqi civilians. This daunting challenge has received little attention from the administration. As the dust settles, the repressed tribal and religious differences of the past may come to the fore--as they did in the brutal civil wars in the former Yugoslavia, in Rwanda, and other countries. As our troops bypass Basra and other Iraqi cities on our way to Baghdad, how will we prevent the revenge bloodletting that occurred after the last gulf war in which thousands of civilians lost their lives? What do we do if the Kurds in northern Iraq claim an independent Kurdistan or the Shia in southern Iraq move toward an alliance with Iran, from which they have long drawn their inspiration? We have told the Government of Turkey that we will not support an independent Kurdistan, despite the fact the Kurdish people already have a high degree of U.S.-supported independence and have even completed work on their own constitution. Do we send troops again to keep Iraq united? This administration's record in postwar Afghanistan is not exactly the best precedent for building democracy in Iraq. Sixteen months after the fall of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai is still referred to as the "Mayor of Kabul" because of the weak and fragile hold of his government on the rest of the nation. Warlords are in control of much of the countryside. The Afghan-Pakistan border is an area of anarchy and ominous al-Qaida cells. If we have not been able to get it right in Afghanistan, where we went in with strong international support and involvement, how do we expect to go it alone in Iraq? Everyone talked about a Marshall Plan for Afghanistan where there is a clear need to rebuild and get it right so the Taliban and al-Qaida cannot take over again. President Karzai was here last week at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, begging for the adequate support and resources his new government needs to take hold. To get it right in Iraq, we need the international community and a long-term commitment on the part of the United States. That is less likely to happen if we do not have the international community with us from the start. Depending on our welcome, it could take as many as 200,000 American troops, as General Shinseki told the Armed Services Committee just over a week ago, or even more, to stabilize Iraq. We already have 37,000 troops in South Korea, 8,000 in Afghanistan, 5,000 in the Balkans, and another 1,000 in the Philippines and Colombia. We need to know whether our Armed Forces are being spread too thin. We need to know how long they can keep up this pace. The large-scale mobilization of the National Guard and Reserves for Iraq is already having an effect on police, firefighters, and others who are needed on the front lines at home, especially if there are new terrorist attacks on the United States. We have called up 167,000 Guard and Reserve personnel for active duty. We know the effect on their families who are left behind. What is the effect on the economy in lost productivity as these jobs go unfilled? Can we meet all these obligations now, let alone shoulder the long- term costs of war with Iraq? These may well total hundreds of billions of dollars in the years ahead. One of the highest and worst costs of the war may be the humanitarian costs. Sixty percent of the Iraqi people rely on the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program for their daily survival. Food is distributed through 46,000 government distributors supplied by a network of food storage barns. A war with Iraq will disrupt this network. Many Iraqis, especially low-income families, have no other source of food. Women and children will be the most vulnerable victims of war. According to recent reports, 500,000 Iraqi children already suffer from malnutrition. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks an excellent article in this morning's Washington Post by Ken Bacon and George Rupp. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 1.) Mr. KENNEDY. I will quote from the article. . . . The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the world's first responder when people flee their countries, lacks the resources to prepare for a flood of refugees. . . . Although the United States has spent $2.4 billion to send troops to the Persian Gulf region, it has spent less than $1 million to position relief agencies in the region. An official at the U.N. Office for the Coordination [[Page S3361]] of Humanitarian Affairs recently told a conference that his biggest concern is the small number of private relief agencies ready to move quickly into Iraq. We don't have the nongovernmental agencies that do humanitarian work in Iraq. We had them in Afghanistan. We have refused to permit them licenses to go in and set up some kind of system in the past months, although they have all desired to do so. Listen to this: Lack of preparedness by the [United Nations] and private relief agencies means the U.S. military will have to do most of the relief work, and this in turn could mean the suffering of the Iraqi people will be greater than necessary. Administration officials have done little to match the skills of relief agencies--some are specialists in medical care, others in water and sanitation projects, for instance--with projected needs. It is talking about the nongovernmental agencies. It continues: In modern warfare, precision bombs will limit civilian casualties during the conflict, so that most death and suffering occurs in the post-conflict period, when people are displaced, poorly fed or prone to disease because water sanitation and sewer systems have been disabled. This means that rapid humanitarian intervention is just as important to holding casualties and quick military victory. The United States may be ready for war, but it is not yet ready to help Iraq recover from war. This is Ken Bacon and the spokesman for the nongovernmental agencies that have worked so well historically on humanitarian needs. The U.S. military is far from equipped to handle the challenge. Our Government must have a plan in place to care for the population. Despite the immense need for help from relief organizations, we have had too few discussions with key nongovernmental agencies to provide the food, tents, medicines, and other supplies that will be needed. All we have to do is look in the newspaper and we find out where the preposition of every one of these aircraft carriers are, where the armored divisions are. Yet when you ask the Defense Department where are the prepositions on food, the tents, and medicines, we can't disclose those because those are secret. Are all these possible consequences acceptable to the American people? Are they manageable? Does the administration really have a plan that considers how we will reap--in the international community, in the Arab street, and in American families--what we sow in a war with Iraq. Finally, the President must explain why war with Iraq won't distract us from the more immediate and graver danger posed by North Korea. Something is gravely wrong at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue if we rush to war with a country that poses no nuclear threat, but won't even talk to one that brandishes its nuclear power right now. Any nuclear threat from Iraq is at least five years into the future. But the threat from North Korea exists now--today. CIA Director George Tenet recently informed the Senate Armed Services Committee, North Korean missiles can now reach American soil with a nuclear warhead. Look at this article from the Washington Post of March 4: The United States and Asian countries have begun to accept the idea of a nuclear-armed North Korea. I ask unanimous consent to print the article at the conclusion of my remarks. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 2.) Mr. KENNEDY. Continuing from the article: "The administration has acquiesced in North Korea becoming a nuclear power," said a Senate source who was briefed last week on the administration's evolving policy. "Our major fear is that North Korea would pass on fissile materials or other nuclear technology" to "rogue states" or outlaw groups, Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage warned Congress last month. "I don't think, given the poverty in North Korea, that it would be too long" before such sales could take place, he said. In other words, they are willing to accept North Korea as a nuclear power that has sold missiles to Iran, to Syria, to other countries that have supported terrorism and not give that the first priority when we are talking about the security of the United States. This makes no sense. "The total red line is the sale of nuclear weapons material," said [a spokesman for the administration] who follows the North Korea issue closely. "Nuclear weapons transferred to the Iraqis would be tantamount to nuking Jerusalem." You can have them, as long as you don't sell them, for a country that has already sold the technology of making nuclear weapons to Iran, to Syria, and other nations and has that capability itself. Experts--including professionals within our own government--have been ringing alarm bells for months about North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons. The views of the experts are brushed aside, despite the continually growing list of dangerous behavior by that government. This is a country that celebrated the inauguration day of South Korea's new president by test firing a missile into the nearby sea. Yet, last night, President Bush did not even mention North Korea in his statement. North Korea has long had advanced missiles which it sells to other countries. It has restarted its plutonium--producing reactor, kicked out the international inspectors, pulled out of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, and threatened to break the Armistice agreement that has brought 50 years of peace to the Korean peninsula. Desperate and strapped for cash, North Korea is the greatest current nuclear danger to the United States, and it is clearly taking advantage of the situation in Iraq. It is the country most likely to sell nuclear material to terrorists, and has missiles that can strike our soil. How long can the Administration continue to ignore North Korea? How will a war with Iraq affect our ability to deal with this escalating danger? Just the other day, two North Korean Mig fighter jets tailed an American plane near the Korean Peninsula, in a further attempt to get the attention of President Bush. But in his zeal on Iraq, the President has refused to call the situation on the Korean peninsula what it is--a genuine crisis. He has refused to even talk directly to the North Koreans to try to end its nuclear program. The Administration may even have tried to conceal information about North Korea. Intelligence analysts at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California concluded in November 2001 that North Korea had begun construction of a plant to enrich uranium to use in nuclear weapons. Yet, the Administration did not reveal this information until eleven months later, in October 2002--after Congress had voted on the legislation authorizing the use of force in Iraq. Only the Administration knows if the timing of the release of the information on North Korea was by design or coincidence. But if the Administration did conceal its knowledge of North Korea's dangerous nuclear weapons program until after the Congressional vote on Iraq, it would represent a breach of faith by our government not seen since the Vietnam War. The very real danger is that the Administration is making it more likely that North Korea will provide nuclear material or even nuclear weapons to terrorists or nations supporting terrorists. Is war with Iraq worth that risk--not taking more time with inspectors? We are poised at a moment of truth in the stewardship of the President. If President Bush commits our men and women to war, then all of us will close ranks behind them, and pray for their safety and a swift end to the conflict. But with inspectors on the ground and stiff international pressure still possible, this is an unnecessary war. History will judge how well we meet the challenges of this new era and this new century. We should move forward as the great and honorable nation we are--with patience and perseverance--as we carry on the difficult work of build a better and more peaceful world for all its people. Exhibit 1 [From the Washington Post, Mar. 7, 2003] Unready for the Aftermath (By Kenneth H. Bacon and George Rupp) Despite months of planning by the Bush administration to respond to the humanitarian challenges that could follow an attack against Iraq, preparations for dealing with displacement, injury, illness and food shortages remain inadequate. If current problems continue, the suffering caused by war could be amplified by lack of aid resources and coordination. The most urgent need could be food. The United States boasts that it has shipped 3 million humanitarian daily rations to the region to help feed Iraqis. But individual meal [[Page S3362]] packets will feed only a tiny portion of Iraq's 24 million people, and for just a few days. A United Nations official recently called U.S. and U.N. preparations to feed the Iraqi people "grossly inadequate." The official said that "they need to be sending ships of wheat to the Persian Gulf, along with ships of soldiers." More than a decade of U.N. sanctions has left approximately 16 million Iraqis dependent on government rations for their entire food supply under the U.N. Oil-for-Food program; most of the remaining 8 million Iraqis rely on government rations for a portion of their daily food basket. The U.N. Children's Fund estimates that more than 2 million Iraqi children will require therapeutic feeding in the event of a conflict. A break in the U.N. food pipeline could cause "extremely grave" conditions, Ramiro Lopes da Silva, director of the U.N. World Food Program office in Baghdad, told The Post. He estimates that 10 million people could run out of food within six weeks of the start of a war. "After that we will have to feed 10 million people. Eventually, we'll have to feed the entire population," Lopes da Silva said. The World Food Program currently has enough food in the region to feed 900,000 people for 10 weeks. Preparations to deal with refugees and displace people also are behind schedule. The United Nations estimates that in the "medium impact scenario"--a two- to three-month conflict involving ground troops--1.45 million refugees and asylum seekers would try to reach neighboring countries, and 900,000 people would be newly displaced within Iraq. Yet Ruud Lubbers says that his agency, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the world's first responder when people flee their countries, lacks the resources to prepare for a flood of refugees. So far the U.N. refugee office has raised less than $20 million of the $60 million it is seeking for tents, stoves, blankets and other materials for refugee camps. Most of that money came from the United States. As a result, the agency has positioned only about 20 percent of the equipment it needs in the region. In a flurry of news conferences last week, administration officials admitted that the military may have to provide food and medical assistance during and immediately after a conflict, but they say humanitarian tasks would quickly be turned over to the United Nations and private relief agencies. Sadly, private relief agencies, most of which depend on government funding, aren't yet well prepared for the task. Although the United States has spent $2.4 billion to send troops to the Persian Gulf region, it has spent less than $1 million to position relief agencies in the region. An official at the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs recently told a conference that his biggest concern is the small number of private relief agencies ready to move quickly into Iraq. Lack of preparedness by U.N. and private relief agencies means the U.S. military will have to do most of the relief work, and this in turn could mean that the suffering of the Iraqi people will be greater than necessary. Administration officials have done little to match the skills of relief agencies--some are specialists in medical care, others in water and sanitation projects, for instance--with projected needs. One urgent unanswered question is: Who will care for Iraqis exposed to weapons of mass destruction? Humanitarian organizations lack the skills and equipment to handle this challenge. In modern warfare, precision bombs limit civilian casualties during the conflict, so that most death and suffering occurs in the post-conflict period, when people are displaced, poorly fed or prone to disease because water sanitation and sewage systems have been disabled. This means that rapid humanitarian intervention is just as important to holding casualties down as quick military victory. The United States may be ready for war, but it not yet ready to help Iraq recover from war. ____ Exhibit 2 [From the Washington Post, Mar. 5, 2003] Foes Giving In to N. Korea's Nuclear Aims (By Doug Struck and Glenn Kessler) Tokyo, March 4.--The United States and Asian countries have begun to accept the idea of a nuclear-armed North Korea, according to officials and analysts here and in Washington. Increasingly, the Bush administration is turning its attention to preventing the Communist government in Pyongyang from selling nuclear material to the highest bidder. Envoys for the new South Korean president, Roh Moo Hyun, shocked Bush advisers in Washington recently when they said they would rather have a nuclear North Korea than a chaotic collapse of the government there, according to sources in Seoul. And in Japan, located within missile range of North Korea, officials feel their neighbor cannot be stopped from producing a bomb. "We need to be debating how to live with North Korea, with or without nuclear weapons," Taro Kono, a lawmaker from the ruling party, said in an interview. Washington had issued repeated warnings to North Korea not to begin reprocessing materials that could become fuel for a nuclear bomb, but administration officials have become resigned to North Korea taking that step sometime within the next two to four weeks. "The administration has acquiesced in North Korea becoming a nuclear power," said a Senate source who was briefed last week on the administration's evolving policy. U.S. officials have begun to contend that a decision by North Korea to begin reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods into weapons-grade plutonium will represent a diplomatic opportunity to swing international opinion to its side in the impasse over North Korea's nuclear ambitions, administration and congressional officials said today. The administration thinks the shock of a decision by Pyongyang to export nuclear materials would force Russia, China, South Korea and other nations to drop their reluctance to confront the Communist state. According to that view, they would go along with the United States in mounting a tough campaign to further isolate the North and possibly to try to interdict suspected shipments of nuclear materials. Production of plutonium that could flow abroad in clandestine sales "fundamentally changes the equation," contends an administration official. "Literally every city on the planet would be threatened." During the last crisis over North Korea's nuclear ambitions, in 1994, the Clinton administration warned Pyongyang that reprocessing materials for a nuclear bomb could prompt a military strike. Many officials in Asia believe that Washington will now set new "red lines" that it will not tolerate North Korea crossing. But Bush and his senior advisers have refused to do that, publicly at least, saying it would only encourage North Korea to charge past them. North Korean already is a major source of missile technology, and an Iranian resistance group recently said that North Korean experts are assisting Iran in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Now officials worry about a new kind of export. Even the Administration says North Korea's nuclear weapons are dangerous. "Our major fear is that North Korea would pass on fissile material or other nuclear techology" to "rogue states" or outlaw groups, Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage warned Congress last month. "I don't think, given the poverty of North Korea, that it would be too long" before such sales took place, he said. "The total red line is the sale of nuclear weapons material," said Rep. Mark S. Kirk (R-Ill.), who follows the North Korea issue closely. "Nuclear weapons transferred to the Iraqis would be tantamount to nuking Jerusalem." You can have them, as long as you don't sell them? The Senate source said the administration was playing "a very dangerous game" in not acting to stop reprocessing before it starts, because the resulting materials could be hidden in the country's network of caves awaiting export. But administration officials argue they have no good military options for eliminating North Korea's nuclear capability. A surgical strike might neutralize the plutonium plant, but the country's effort to enrich uranium is proceeding at another, unknown site. President Bush told reporters this week that he was still seeking a diplomatic solution and that a "military option is our last choice." He also said that he would seek to "accelerate the development of an anti-ballistic missile system" to counter a potential threat from North Korean missiles. U.S. officials quietly dropped the phrase that the United States has "no hostile intent" toward North Korea in their talking points about a month ago, an official said "It's clear North Korea has hostile intent to us," he said. "I wouldn't rule out use of military coercion if North Korea crosses . . . red lines," said Michael A. McDevitt, a retired rear admiral and director of the Center for Strategic Studies in Washington. "The one I am most worried about is if they produce enough plutonium to start hawking it on the open market." An administration official said Chinese officials have told North Korea that China would consider any attempt to produce nuclear weapons a "direct threat to Chinese national security." While the Chinese told U.S. officials that they made it clear to North Korea they would not accept such a step, the Chinese statement did not address reprocessing or foreign sales of the resulting materials. Many strategists have long asserted that the United States, China and Russia would not allow a nuclear-armed North Korea because it could dramatically alter the power structure in northeastern Asia and lead to an arms race as both Seoul and Tokyo demanded nuclear weapons. Increasingly, however, it appears that North Korea is determined to defy those wishes. "In a way we are wasting our time to talk about dialogue with North Korea," said Masashi Nishihara, president of Japan's National Defense Academy. "Only after they develop a nuclear program will they come to the table. Mr. KENNEDY. I see my friend and colleague, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee. I would like to maybe ask him a question. Mr. WARNER. Of course. Mr. KENNEDY. If I could ask unanimous consent to ask him a question and retain the right to the floor. I was interested in what our rules of engagement will be for our men and [[Page S3363]] women in Iraq. I am concerned, as are many of the nongovernmental agencies, that if we go past Basra, if we let it alone for a period of 48 hours--this is a community that is largely Shia, ruled by the Sunnis--I have heard estimates of up to 10,000 people being slaughtered there in bloodletting unless there is an immediate kind of police action and force presence which would keep these parties apart. I am wondering, in those circumstances, what will be the rules of engagement of American servicemen. Are they going to be called upon in terms of separating these blood feuds, which have been so much a part of these revolutions in Iraq? I want to know whether American servicemen are going to be instructed that they are to fire on the Iraqi people who are involved in these kinds of acts of violence. I am interested in what the rules of engagement will be for northern Iraq, if there should be a rush by the Kurds to go back to their old homes where, in many instances, families have lived for centuries and have been separated by Saddam Hussein. What are American troops going to be told to do when the Iraqi forces collapse and the Kurds make a rush to Kirkuk, for example, one of the great oil-producing areas? What are American service men and women going to be told to do? What will be the rules of engagement outside of just engaging with the Iraqi Army? What are going to be the rules of engagement in terms of maintaining civilian control? Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I welcome the question from my colleague. He is a very valued member of the Armed Services Committee. We had briefings this week by the Department of Defense, and indeed a representative from the Department of State, on the plans now being formulated by the Bush administration, should force be necessary, as to exactly what we would do with respect to the questions raised by my colleague. First and foremost, our forces, as they would move in, are responsible for the objective of trying to keep Iraq together and constituted as a nation, as it is today. It is the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and the consequent regime change that are the goals. Now, they are to provide first protection for the nongovernmental organizations which stand ready to assist our country. In other words, we will be making an effort to feed and care for the people of Iraq, as well as outsiders. That is the highest priority. So we are to provide a secure framework in which the people of Iraq can be cared for as best they can under wartime conditions. With respect to factions in Iraq and their desire to fight among each other, we are going to do our best to contain that. Our goal is to have Iraq as a nation, with its present boundaries, remaining intact. We are bringing in experts to put out any fires Saddam Hussein may set at the oil wells. We are bringing in people to establish, as quickly as possible, a secure framework in which the people of Iraq can begin to select their own leadership and government in due course. So there has been a lot of planning. As to the exact rules of engagement that commanders, as the Senator and I understand, will issue to their troops, at the moment I do not have those orders. But I assure the Senator that we are contemplating the challenge to maintain the integrity of Iraq as a nation. That could well involve stopping the civil strife between factions. But a lot of planning has been done. I think the administration has been subjected to undue criticism because the planning as yet has not been fully made public. But it is there, I say to the Senator. Mr. KENNEDY. I appreciate the Senator's response. This is enormously important because we have seen in Kosovo and other areas where servicemen did not protect local populations because they did not have what they call the "orders" and the appropriate rules of engagement to provide those protections. We are on notice about what is going to happen now in northern Iraq, with the desire of Kurd families returning to many of their home communities. We are on notice about the southern part of Iraq, where many of the Shia who have been denied their cities and communities want to reclaim them. It seems to me we ought to have some understanding about what our servicemen are going to be asked to do during those periods. I don't understand, for the life of me, why we cannot know that information and cannot have that information. One more word. Why can we not say, if we are going to have these circumstances, these are going to be the rules of engagement? At least we need to have some awareness and understanding that we are going to meet our responsibilities under the Geneva Convention. We have an international responsibility, obviously, in terms of protecting civilian populations. We have seen, in Kosovo and Serbia, where those populations were not protected in a number of instances because the rules of engagement were not proper. I say to the chairman of the committee, I hope prior to the time we go to war, we will have at least some understanding about what these instructions are. There is no reason they need to be kept secure. If we are interested in avoiding large bloodletting in that region of the country, we ought to know exactly what we are expecting of our service men and women. They are the best in the world, and they are trained to overcome any military force. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I assure my colleague that we are greatly concerned about the safety of our service personnel as they undertake this mission, if it has to be done. I visited with them, together with Senators Levin, Rockefeller, and Roberts. They are ready. The Senator raises, quit properly, the record we had first in Kosovo. I happen to have visited there during the early part of that securing of it by the United States and other forces. I assure the Senator that the rules of engagement were spelled out. I remember American servicemen guarding the Serbian churches from destruction. I remember instances where they would carefully respond to protect the Serbs, who were at that point in time in minority status, so to speak. So we performed that mission, and we did it admirably, together with a coalition of nations. We will have other nations assisting us in this engagement. Then you bring about Afghanistan. That is a country, historically, that has been fought over by factions. We visited there a week or 10 days ago. There is relative quietude there. There is no severe amount of factional strife today; that is, outbursts of actual casualties and the like. Tensions are present. We are trying to reconstitute an armed forces under the Government of Afghanistan now. So we have a good track record on that. Mr. KENNEDY. Does the Senator want to explain, on the reconstituting of the armed forces, how successful that has been? Mr. WARNER. Yes. We met with President Karzai. I assume you saw him when he visited here. Incidentally, the French are very active in the training of those forces, and the Germans are taking an active role in the training of those forces. It is coming together, I say to the Senator. Mr. KENNEDY. Well, my information is somewhat different from the Senator's, in terms of the recruitment and the ability to hold these individuals into any kind of a national army. I want to finish with this point. We are facing a variety of security challenges in this country. My belief is the No. 1, which is continuing, is al-Qaida and the dangers of terrorism. We have to look at everything. We know Saddam Hussein is a despot. We know progress is being made. We also have on the scene the danger of North Korea and the imminent threat they present. We ought to be making a judgment about our national security interests, our overall security--the security of the American people within the construct of the dangers of al-Qaida, the threat that is posed in North Korea, and whatever the current situation is with the inspectors in Iraq. On that kind of a situation, I draw the conclusion that we should give more time to the inspectors and work to try to galvanize the international community to support us in that effort. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would like to also--if I may, on my time--address points raised by my colleague from Massachusetts. Quite properly, the Senator raises the issue of North Korea. The President addressed that last night. [[Page S3364]] I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record his comments. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: The PRESIDENT. We, of course, are consulting with our allies at the United Nations. But I meant what I said, this is the last phase of diplomacy. A little bit more time? Saddam Hussein has had 12 years to disarm. He is deceiving people. This is what's important for our fellow citizens to realize; that if he really intended to disarm, like the world has asked him to do, we would know whether he was disarming. He's trying to buy time. I can understand why--he's been successful with these tactics for 12 years. Saddam Hussein is a threat to our nation. September the 11th changed the strategic thinking, at least, as far as I was concerned, for how to protect our country. My job is to protect the American people. It used to be that we could think that you could contain a person like Saddam Hussein, that oceans would protect us from his type of terror. September 11th should say to the American people that we're now a battlefield, that weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terrorist organization could be deployed here at home. So, therefore, I think the threat is real. And so do a lot of other people in my government. And since I believe the threat is real, and since my most important job is to protect the security of the American people, that's precisely what we'll do. Mr. WARNER. These are in strong rebuttal of my colleague's comments. I will read what the President said with reference to North Korea: Well, I think it is an issue. Obviously, I am concerned about North Korea developing nuclear weapons, not only for their own use, but perhaps choose to proliferate them, sell them. The President is working in a national multilateral forum to try to address this problem because it is regional in that Russia, Japan, South Korea and, indeed, China have a heavy stake in seeing that the Korean peninsula does not become nuclearized. It is clear as that, I say to my friend, and I think the President, in a very responsible way, the initial approach to this, a multilateral approach, the approach my colleague is urging on the President with regard to Iraq, is applying in the Korean peninsula situation. It does not preclude possibly bilateral discussions at some later date and time. Second, on the issue of Iraq, the question is time, months. Time is not on our side. The President addressed this very explicitly last night in his remarks. He simply said that his concern--and I will put the text in the Record--his concern is, again, the question of proliferation. No one in this Chamber thus far, in the weeks and the months we have debated this issue, has denied Saddam Hussein has enormous caches of weapons of mass destruction which he has failed to declare and which the inspectors have failed to destroy because of the inability to locate them through lack of cooperation from Iraq. What is to prevent Saddam Hussein, if he has not already done it, from taking small amounts of these weapons and allowing an international terrorist organization, be it al-Qaida or others, to take this material and begin to carry it to places throughout the world, whether it be Europe or the United States, and dissemble it? I bring back the tragic aftermath of the discovery of anthrax sent to Members of this body. Postal employees lost their lives. One of our Senate office buildings was shut down. We suffered a severe blow as a consequence of an unopened envelope which contained but a few ounces, if that, of this material. And Saddam Hussein, it is documented, has tons of it, undeclared, not found, and all of this could have been achieved if he had cooperated with the inspection regime which was initiated in November of last year. Time is not on our side. The failure of the United States and the coalition of willing nations, principally Great Britain, not to act is not in our interest. The price of inaction is far greater than the price of action. As I listened to my colleague from Massachusetts--and he has spoken very eloquently on these subjects over the past several days. I admire his courage to get out and lead in this debate. It is an important debate. It is taking place across the Nation. But I cannot find in my colleague's comments where he specifically has a program whereby to force Iraq to cooperate. Why is it that he has not emphasized the need for Iraq to cooperate and what steps should our country, Great Britain, or others do to force that cooperation, other than the steps we have taken thus far, which have not proved fruitful? Yes, here and there Saddam Hussein steps up and does some little thing to buy time, but he would not have needed that time if he had cooperated and began that cooperation when the inspection regime began last November. Mr. President, wherein does the Senator lay out a program to compel Iraq to cooperate? Mr. KENNEDY. Let me answer, if I may, in this way. First of all, the administration was strongly opposed to inspections. I heard the exchange with my friend and colleague from Connecticut. That is very clear. Secretary Rumsfeld said it. They never believed in inspections, No. 1. Then they agreed to the inspection process at the United Nations. It is only today, evidently, when the CIA is giving the inspectors all the information we have. The Senator from Virginia attended the Armed Services Committee hearings that I attended where our colleague and friend from Michigan, Senator Levin, pointed out time and again that the administration and the CIA had still not provided all of the material on intelligence to the inspectors. But all during this time, the administration was saying: Let's go to war; let's go to war; let's go to war; Saddam isn't complying. Now the Senator--and I have not had a chance to look at the document--says the record is clear, and he put the document in the Record an hour ago, that finally we are giving everything to the inspectors. Today, we had the leader of the inspection team say he believes they can do the job not in weeks, not in years but in some months. The international community says: We will be with you if you can do that in a period of months. My position is, it is better to work the international community to try and do it in weeks--if we cannot, do it in months. It is cheaper in terms of treasure and human life to keep the necessary military force there to make sure it is done. That is my position, I say to the Senator. I know we differ on some aspects, but we do not differ on the willingness to give to the inspectors the intelligence information. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I say to my good friend, a couple of letters are about to be handed to him. They are in the Record. He is mistaken in the facts. The letters cite what we have done over an extensive period of time--over the last 3 or 4 months. I personally, together with the former chairman, Senator Levin, now ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, have consulted with Director Tenet on this matter. We have been in a room with the actual person entrusted to convey on a daily basis to Hans Blix this information. It has been going on for months. It did not just start. Let me read one paragraph, and then I will yield. Statement for the record: The American intelligence community has-- That is past tense-- has provided extensive intelligence and other support to the United Nations on Iraq and WMD, and potential inspection sites for over 10 years. There is, therefore, a very strong common understanding of sites of potential interest to the inspectors, whether UNSCOM inspectors or UNMOVIC inspectors or IAEA inspectors. When the current round of inspections began, the Intelligence Community assembled several lists of suspect sites, which we combined into a common list in early January. This list consisted of high, moderate, and low value sites, depending on our assessment of recent activities suggesting ongoing WMD association or other intelligence information that the sites were worth inspecting. We have now provided detailed information on all of the high value and moderate value sites to UNMOVIC and IAEA. The letter continues to detail what has been done over a period of months, I say to the Senator. It just did not start yesterday. Mr. KENNEDY. Will the Senator yield on this point? First of all, I will put in the Record--and the Senator was there--the exchange between Senator Levin and Secretary Rumsfeld. The Senator from Virginia was at the Armed Services Committee meeting. I remember this meeting--it was 2\1/2\ weeks ago--when Senator Levin said the briefing he had and the answers he [[Page S3365]] had from the intelligence community were not consistent with Secretary Rumsfeld. I am going to put that exchange in the Record, and that will stand in terms of 3 weeks ago. I want to draw attention to this letter. "The American intelligence community has provided extensive intelligence"--extensive intelligence. It does not say "all" or "complete intelligence." It says "extensive intelligence." That is what my letter says. Mr. WARNER. Go on to the second paragraph. Mr. KENNEDY. I know, but why do they say--I will be glad to read this and go through it, Mr. President, but I want to stick with the facts I know about. The facts I know about are the testimony of the Secretary of Defense and the exchange that he had with Senator Levin in open session in the Armed Services Committee where Senator Levin had been told the evening before, and it was represented that a complete list of these sites had been provided, and he had the materials that demonstrated it had not been complete. Those are security matters, as the Senator well knows. That was 2\1/2\ weeks ago. The point is, as to the intelligence given to the inspector, whatever has been given, is it the Senator's statement now as chairman of the Armed Services Committee that all of the information the intelligence agency has in terms of weapons has been given to the inspectors? Is that what the Senator is telling us? Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think this letter answers Senator Kennedy's first statement: We have just begun to provide information. Mr. KENNEDY. I did not say "just begun." No, the Senator is not correct. There was a provision, there was a filtering out of this material. It was very slow in January. We are getting close to classified. I remember the briefing we had from the deputy of the CIA at that time. It was clear they were cooperating. It was also clear there were a limited number of inspectors and they were going to provide more, and it would be soon. I think the Senator would remember that briefing. I remember it clearly. This has been a process of filtering out. The authority I have, I sat right next to Carl Levin, 2\1/2\ weeks ago, when he looked in the eyes of the Secretary of Defense and they reviewed documents, and the Secretary of Defense leaned over and shared various documents. At the end of that, he had to agree with the position Senator Levin had, that all of the information had not been provided. I will put that in the Record. My point is, if we still, 2\1/2\ weeks ago, had a ways to go with intelligence information that would be advantageous to the inspectors, it strengthens those who believe we should make sure our inspectors have all of the relevant material that will help them do the job which we all agree should be done. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, in fairness, this letter is part of a very complex and long dialog between Senator Levin and various members of the administration. Were he here today, he would say he is still not satisfied with regard to this issue. At one point I recognized that one member of the administration said to him, Senator, I gave you incorrect numbers at one time and I am now correcting them. I think a good-faith effort has been made by the administration to resolve such differences as Senator Levin has had. Having been in most, if not all, of the discussions with Senator Levin at the time he raised these important questions, the preponderance of the facts shows unequivocally our Nation has cooperated fully on the matters of intelligence. I stand by that. I heard the National Security Adviser state that, the Director of Central Intelligence state that, and others. We have cooperated. Have there been some disjoints of timing and perhaps numbers? I cannot say it is perfect, but there has been overall sincere cooperation. We have had an excellent debate today. I thank my colleagues for joining me on the floor, both on my side of the aisle and the other side of the aisle. We have met the test of the Senate addressing this question. I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sununu). The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. ____________________