国会记录：2003年7月8日国防部（楼）第H6276-H6303部门拨款法案，2004 [...] OBEY先生。主席先生，我谨罢工的最后一个字。{}时间1215主席先生，让我确认，我认为这项法案将广泛过道两侧的支持，我只想把三件事众议院的关注。首先，我真的相信，该机构将不得不看看在承诺的数字，我们在全球和比较，为应变，我们有可用的部队在这些许多承诺使用。我认为任何人谁看的情况会明白我们是危险地接近具有军事过度扩张;我认为，我们应该问自己诚实，如果我们要参与世界各地的这些许多承诺，我们需要有一个更大的军队。在我看来，如果我们，然后我们做的。如果我们不打算扩大军队，那么我认为我们必须更加积极在要求我们的盟友来帮助我们处理一些维和职能，我们面对的，例如，在伊拉克。其次，我有关于该法案的资金水平SDI一些疑虑。第三，我想讲的东西，我觉得比任何的考虑更重要。 This Subcommittee of Defense is perhaps the most bipartisan of all appropriations subcommittees, and the Committee on Appropriations is probably the most bipartisan committee in the House; and it is in that spirit that I raise a matter that I think every Member should be aware of because of its deadly importance. It involves intelligence, specifically the intelligence gathering and analysis used in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. What I am going to say is based on published reports purportedly based on interviews with intelligence officials and military officers. Neither I, nor I suspect anyone in the House of Representatives, knows the extent to which these reports are accurate so there is no possibility of disclosing classified material. We have had the staff of the committee look at the allegations on a bipartisan basis, and I think it is fair to say, while they do not have enough information to reach specific conclusions, they do find much of what has been said in these stories to be credible. In addition to the CIA, which is an independent agency, there are four major intelligence organizations inside the Department of Defense. All of these entities are funded in this bill. The press stories I am referring to, and I would be glad to provide copies of them to any Member who is interested, those stories argue that a group of civilian employees in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, all of whom are political employees, have long been dissatisfied with the information produced by the established intelligence agencies both inside and outside the Department. That was particularly true, apparently, with respect to the situation in Iraq. As a result, it is reported that they established a special operation within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which was named the Office of Special Plans. That office was charged with collecting, vetting, and disseminating intelligence completely outside the normal intelligence apparatus. In fact, it appears that the information collected by this office was in some instances not even shared with the established intelligence agencies and in numerous instances was passed on to the National Security Council and the President without having been vetted with anyone other than OSD political appointees. It is further alleged that the purpose of this operation was not only to produce intelligence more in keeping with the preheld views of those individuals, but to intimidate analysts in the established intelligence organizations to produce information that was more supportive of policy decisions which they had already decided to propose. There is considerable discussion regarding the intelligence relating to weapons of mass destruction. I think it would be unfortunate if this issue were subsumed by the question of whether or not Saddam Hussein had such weapons. First of all, we do not know at this point. My personal suspicion has always been that he did. Secondly, measuring the quality of our intelligence apparatus requires more than determining whether the reporting was right or wrong on any single issue. Is what was reported consistent with the best information that was available? Did we reach the right conclusion based on good information or by happenstance? These allegations, however, go well beyond the issue of WMDs. It appears that the individuals in question also challenged the consensus within the intelligence community on the number of troops that would be required for a successful invasion. The political appointees within the Office of the Secretary maintained regular contact with sources within the Iraqi National Congress, who in turn maintained contact with sources inside of Iraq. [[Page H6298]] The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Obey) has expired. (By unanimous consent, Mr. Obey was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.) Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, based on information transmitted by these sources, the political appointees argued that the conclusions of the intelligence community, the Joint Chiefs, and in particular General Shinseki, were in error and the invasion could be successfully carried out with fewer than 50,000 troops. While the chiefs in the end got most of the troops that they requested, it appears that the invasion was both lighter than they would have desired and lighter than what was required. The inability to fully protect supply lines did in fact result in the loss of life. The shortage of available personnel did leave certain critical sites such as nuclear facilities unprotected. We all know this is incredibly serious business. It is important not only to understand what we did or did not do with respect to Iraq, but it is far more important in terms of what we will do in the future. How will the information that the President and the Congress receive on our options in Korea be put together, for instance? Will the long- established collection mechanisms, evaluation and dissemination be used, or will we again fall back on the ad hoc efforts of this self- appointed group of experts? It is important to note that these same individuals have established a new office with an Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. This office will have more than 100 people, and it is widely believed in the intelligence community that the office is being created for the express purpose of pressuring analysts to produce information more supportive of predetermined policy. I do not know if that is true or not, but the question remains, Will this office stand between our war fighters and the information they need? Why did they require this small group of civilians to employ this kind of a role? Will the Under Secretary compete with the Director of Central Intelligence in the coordination of these agencies? All I can say is that we are paying for all of this. We ought to have the answers. I would like to ask Members to remember that there was a reason the National Security Act of 1946 placed all intelligence activities under the control of one man, the Director of Central Intelligence. General Hoyt Vandenberg, who himself served as the DCI, explained that decision in testimony before Congress. He said, ``The joint congressional committee to investigate the Pearl Harbor attack found failures that went to the very structure of our intelligence organizations, a failure to coordinate the collection and dissemination of intelligence, and the failure to centralize intelligence functions of common concern to more than one department of the government which could more efficiently be performed centrally.'' I think we need to remember those words, and I think the Congress needs to dig and dig hard to get to the bottom of this. I do not, frankly, know what the right structure for gathering and dissemination of intelligence information ought to be, but I am very leery of the fact that we have a new operation which can deal with information without clearing it with anyone else. The reason the system has served us so well over the past years is because all information has been vetted with other people who are supposed to know the most about it. I think it is dangerous when we get away from that practice. [...]