国会记录：2003年6月25日（众议院）第H5866-H5870页，规定审议H.R.2417，《2004财年情报授权法》，戈斯先生。议长先生，根据规则委员会的指示，我要求立即审议众议院第295号决议。秘书宣读决议如下：H.Res.295决议，议长可在本决议通过后的任何时间，根据第XVIII条第2（b）款的规定，宣布众议院就国情向众议院全体委员会作出决议，以供审议法案（H.R.2417）授权2004财政年度拨款，用于美国政府、社区管理账户、中央情报局退休和残疾系统的情报和与情报有关的活动以及其他用途。条例草案无须一读。所有反对审议本条例草案的规程问题均获豁免。一般性辩论仅限于本条例草案，由情报常设专责委员会主席及排名靠前的少数族裔成员平均分配及控制的时间不得超过一小时。一般性辩论后，应根据五分钟规则审议该法案的修正案。在五分钟规则下，应将其视为修订原件的原状条例草案，该修正案是由永久性特别情报委员会建议的替代性质，现已印在条例草案中。具有替代性质的委员会修正案应视为：。所有反对委员会修正案的程序问题，如属替代性质，均予以放弃。除本决议随附的规则委员会报告中所载的修正案外，任何具有替代性质的委员会修正案修正案均不符合程序。每项修正案只可按报告书所印的次序提出，只可由报告书所指定的议员提出，并须视为已读，而无须在众议院或全体委员会要求将问题分组表决。反对这些修正案的所有程序问题均被放弃。修正案审议结束时，委员会应起立，并向众议院报告该法案及其可能通过的修正案。任何议员可要求在众议院就全体委员会通过的法案修正案或委员会修正案的替代性修正案进行单独表决。上一项质询须视为已按命令在条例草案及其修正案上通过，而无须动议干预，但有一项动议在有或无指示的情况下重新承诺，则属例外。临时演讲者。这位来自佛罗里达州的先生（戈斯先生）被认了一个小时。戈斯先生。议长先生，仅为辩论之目的，我向我的同事和朋友、来自佛罗里达州的尊敬的先生（黑斯廷斯先生）让出30分钟的时间，我很高兴向他报告，他与我一起在规则委员会和常设情报特选委员会中任职，在此之前，我将尽我所能地让出自己的时间。在审议本决议期间，所有时间仅用于辩论目的。议长先生，规则委员会批准了H.R.2417的修改开放规则，即2004财年的《情报授权法》。这是我们多年来用于考虑情报授权的标准规则。规则是公平的。这将为审议所有事项提供充足的时间。该规则规定，情报常设特别委员会的主席和高级成员平均进行一小时的一般性辩论。报告中列出的形式修正案将在5分钟规则下进行辩论。与该立法的以往规则一样，修正案需要预先印制。我们认为这是一个非常好的做法，对委员会和各位议员都有帮助。最后，该规则提供了一个动议，可以按照宣布的那样，在有指示或无指示的情况下重新提交。议长先生，与过去几年一样，我们认为最好让各位成员有一个很好的机会来审查该法案，并就他们认为重要的问题进行辩论，这些问题在我们考虑国家安全的时候对我们国家的安全尤其重要。我们的机密附件和工作人员已提供给任何以前或现在有兴趣审查基本法案和报告的国会议员。{time}1600 H.R.2417实际上是必须立法的，因为众议院的规则。它授权为2004财政年度美国政府、社区管理账户和中央情报局退休和残疾系统的情报和与情报有关的活动拨款。实际上，这是联合国的15个机构ReportsReports金博宝正规网址intelligence community. In the nearly 2 years since the tragic terrorist attacks on September 11, the intelligence community continues to build its capabilities to combat new threats that are threats to our Nation's safety, the well- being of Americans at home and abroad. The bill authorizes resources to improve the analytical depth and capacity in all areas of intelligence, an area that has been in crying need. This will allow us to process and disseminate the information collected in a more efficient, hopefully wiser and more timely fashion, and make sure all interested parties have access. In addition, this legislation continues the sustained effort and long-term strategy to enhance human intelligence, an area that is vital to our current war on terrorism and is essentially the core business of intelligence, plans, and intentions of the enemy. H.R. 2417 helps to improve information sharing among Federal, State, and local governments. This is an area and a desire where we have overlapping interests with other committees in the House. This bill also provides including increased training for State and local officials on how the intelligence community can support their counterterrorism efforts, again, a matter of some overlapping interest. Mr. Speaker, these are only a few highlights from the bill that passed the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence unanimously, in the true bipartisan fashion we like to operate our House Permanent Select Committee on. I am sure a whole breadth of topics will be discussed during our general debate; and I think that we have, in this modified open rule, provided ample opportunity for all matters to come to the floor. I noted today in earlier debate that there was focus on one issue that was not necessarily the subject that was under debate, and that was the intelligence assessments of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Obviously, this is a topic currently under review by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and I would like all Members and all interested listeners to understand that we have been conducting a review on the House Permanent Select Committee to discharge properly our oversight responsibilities. We have been using the tools of oversight that are available to us. I think they are adequate, and I think they are being well used. I think we are using them in a thorough and in a nonpartisan manner. And, in fact, the ranking member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), and I have taken extra steps to detail how this review will be conducted and have actually issued a public statement on that. [[Page H5867]] I think it is worth rehashing what that statement says: committee hearings, closed and open, as appropriate, that will permit Members to question senior administration officials about the prewar intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction holdings and programs, and its links to terrorism, to include questions relating to the sufficiency of intelligence collection and analytical coverage on these targets. Granting accesses to any Member of the House who wishes, under appropriate security provisions and House rules, to review the documentation provided to the Committee by the Director of Central Intelligence in response to a May 22 letter from the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) and myself to provide information. And I am happy to report we are getting full cooperation from the Director of Central Intelligence on that. Staff interviews of intelligence community personnel involved in drafting intelligence community analyses of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction holdings and programs and Iraqi links to terrorism. Regular committee updates and status reports on current efforts to locate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, which, after all, is a priority, including actions of the Iraq Survey Group and other government agencies employed in that task. And a written report suitable to the results of the committee's review, including an unclassified summary as promptly as is possible. In fact, I would say, Mr. Speaker, the committee has taken a very important additional step in its review. We have voted to allow access to the 19 volumes that we now have on hand of information provided by the Director of Central Intelligence outlining American intelligence analysis on Iraq and the sources that supported it. I do not believe we have ever done anything that specific before. To those who believe that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence is not doing its job or that we are incapable of doing our job, they can come and literally read over our shoulder. I think that the committee is doing its job, and I am very proud of its members and its staff and the way it works; and I am very thankful that I have a ranking member who is anxious to preserve the nonpartisan approach that we take to the Nation's important security business. Those who have questions about the competence of myself, my ranking member, or any of the other members on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence are welcome to express that today in a vote of no confidence; but I would urge that they not do that. We are doing our very best, and if you would like to come upstairs and help us try to do it better, we would welcome your presence. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I first want to thank my good friend, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), the distinguished chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for yielding me the time, and I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I would like to first point to the extraordinary leadership of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the ranking member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), and the bipartisan spirit of the unanimous consent of the entire Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in support of H.R. 2417. I rise in support of the rule providing for the consideration of that measure. It is the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004. This is a modified open rule, and I believe that it is adequate for a bill that is relatively noncontroversial and was reported from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence by unanimous vote, as I just said. I would like to reiterate a part of what the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) has said and state to Members who wish to do so that they can go to the committee's office to examine the classified schedule of authorizations for the National Intelligence Program. This schedule includes the CIA, as well as the Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence programs within the Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, the FBI, and the Departments of State, Treasury, and Imaging. Also included in the classified documents are the authorizations for the Tactical Intelligence and related activities and the Joint Military Intelligence program of the Department of Defense. Mr. Speaker, the Intelligence Authorization Act we consider today will provide authorizations for some of the most important national security programs in this country. This bill is the result of the committee's ongoing oversight of the intelligence community and oversight responsibilities, which include hundreds of hearings, briefings, and site visits annually. We are well aware that the global war on terrorism has focused even greater attention on the intelligence community and its mission. The men and women who serve in this community have faced many challenges in the past 21 months and, in my judgment, have responded admirably. This bill assists them in these many challenges. It fully supports the intelligence community's efforts in the war on terrorism by providing funds for analysis, analytic tools, and a unified overhead imagery architecture. Overall, the committee found the intelligence community is making progress in many areas, but noted that there is currently no one office in the executive branch that is charged with coordinating all elements of the intelligence and law enforcement communities to ensure they cooperate and coordinate their efforts. The committee also called on the Director of Central Intelligence to improve diversity in the workplace and special attention on recruitment initiatives for women and minorities. I would be terribly remiss right here if I did not mention two former members, one still alive and one who is deceased: former member Louis Stokes from Ohio, and our dear departed friend Julian Dixon, from California, both of whom spearheaded efforts to ensure greater diversity in the intelligence community. I hasten to urge that the chairman of this committee, and the now leader of the Democratic Caucus, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), and certainly the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Eshoo), the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), and the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Bishop), who served on the committee previously, have all been vigorous in their assertions that the intelligence community must do more in the area of diversity. So I will be introducing an amendment that I believe will assist the director in attaining the goals in this critical area. I do urge my colleagues to support this rule and the bill; and before reserving the balance of my time, I take a point of personal privilege to thank the fine staff of the majority and the minority for the rather extraordinary work that it takes in putting this measure together, and the many measures that come across their desks on a given day, including putting up with some of us as Members and our requests. I urge my colleagues to support the rule. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume, and I wish to thank the gentleman for his kind remarks. I also associate myself with his remarks about Lou Stokes and Julian Dixon, as well as the efforts of the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), when she was ranking member in the committee, to deal with the diversity issue. It is critically important. And as the gentleman from Florida knows, I am prepared to accept his amendment at the appropriate time and pleased to have his leadership. I would also point out that I believe the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) has shown another element that has improved our bill that we approved and were able to bring to the floor in our mark. So that is an area that has received attention because it needed attention, and I am entirely satisfied that we are taking good steps. I would also point out for other Members that we had a number of amendments requested. I do not think any were particularly controversial as to the bill itself. We have this year, because we are dealing with standing up the Department of Homeland Security, some questions about where we plug in the intelligence piece from our foreign [[Page H5868]] intelligence community, which is a very big piece, into the homeland security apparatus. The gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) has been a leader on that and done excellent work and is working with the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) and the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner), the chairman and ranking member of the Select Committee on Homeland Security. We also, obviously, are working closely in some other areas that are a little new for us with the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Oxley), the chairman of the Committee on Commerce, because of some questions about how we deal with some of the Treasury aspects, and, additionally, how we deal with some of the judicial aspects as we respond to the challenge in this country of preventive enforcement for people who would take advantage of our hospitality here and do mischief. And regrettably, we do get the reports regularly that there are still some of those folks in our midst. So we are going to be working in that area. Not all of that is going to come to a final conclusion today. We are going to go from here, from our authorization bill, to a conference process. I expect there will be progress made in some of these areas where there is some apparent overlap between now and conference time, and certainly everybody is going to be assured that this committee is interested only in the portfolio of intelligence. That is what we do, the Foreign Intelligence Program. The other committees of standing that have jurisdictional areas that are associated we will work with closely and on a friendly and nonterritorial basis. I wish to assure them all of that. We had, I understand, some amendments that came in late and we had one amendment that was not germane; but otherwise, I understand that the Committee on Rules made six amendments in order. Five were Democratic amendments, one was a Republican amendment; and I believe that the Committee on Rules responded very fairly. I see no reason to oppose this rule and every reason to support it. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the ranking member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time, and I would state that I do not intend to use all the time. I will spend the first part of the debate on H.R. 2417 sharing my views about our bill and several other issues of enormous interest to the public. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule and of the underlying bill, H.R. 2417. It is interesting and wonderful that both managers of this rule also ably serve on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) is our bipartisan and collaborative chairman, and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) is a senior member on the Democratic side. Both have contributed enormously to this rule and, obviously, enormously to the product we will soon debate. {time} 1615 Under this rule, as has been explained, amendments will be considered under the 5-minute rule and thus debate on all amendments that were filed with the Rules Committee, germane and did not require waivers will be in order. I am certain we will have a spirited debate on several of those amendments, and I think that is exactly what we should be doing in the people's House. In that vein, I will conclude, and I look forward to a spirited debate in a few minutes. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee). (Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.) Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I, too, wish to comment and respond that all of us know that individuals who accept the responsibility of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence go to it with nothing but good intentions and a desire to provide the greatest service to this Nation, so I appreciate very much the leadership of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and our ranking member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman). They have been unique in the shadow of the controversy of the Iraqi war to have come together on the question of weapons of mass destruction. I look forward to their work. They have come to this floor to indicate the opportunity for Members to review thousands of documents. Mr. Speaker, I will continue to pursue my position, and that is that there should be an independent commission designed to investigate the issues dealing with the weapons of mass destruction. But in light of their bipartisan effort, I wrote an amendment that indicated subsequent to the completion of their work, 6 months subsequent to that, that we would have the opportunity to design a commission that would then be able to address the questions again, and that is an independent commission separate and apart from this body and as well, of course, the executive and legislative bodies. I believe the intent was respectful of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. I am disappointed that the amendment was not allowed to be admitted on the basis of waiving the points of order, but I will continue to insist that this is the appropriate process to proceed under. It is not a question of whether or not we find weapons of mass destruction or not. It is not a question of whether we are in a battle over the truth. All we need is the truth, the finding of weapons of mass destruction or not. Many made the decision to vote for the war because we were told that we were about to be under imminent attack. I think the American people are owed the ultimate determination how that decision was made. My other amendment had to do with providing local law enforcement assess to intelligence as needed and to get security clearances faster than they have been able to do so in the past. I hope we will be able to work together to ensure that happens so all of us who have local officials who need the information to perform their duties appropriately can assess this important intelligence to serve our communities. I look forward to this bill moving through the House, and working on these important issues. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the Rule governing floor debate on H.R. 2417, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. I oppose this modified open Rule because it fails to make in order several amendments that improve this legislation and benefit the public. I proposed two amendments to H.R. 2417 that were not made in order. The first amendment called for the establishment of a "National Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq." This Commission was to be responsible for reviewing and assessing the administration's knowledge of the status of and threats posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program before America went to war. The need for and the benefits of this Commission are obvious. The administration declared war, without a declaration of war by the Congress, based upon the claim that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and that the United States was in immediate danger of being attacked by the Iraqi regime. Over the several weeks of Operation Iraqi Freedom, dozens of American and British soldiers lost their lives and many more suffered grave injuries. I had the honor of personally meeting many of our valiant, injured troops on visits to Bethesda Medical Facility and Walter Reed Army Hospital. Their courage and sacrifice was overwhelming. For many Americans, myself included, questions remain whether the deaths and injuries suffered by young Americans in Operation Iraqi Freedom were justified. To date, we have discovered no evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Many Americans are left wondering if the justifications for waging war proffered by the administration were legitimate. That is why I proposed an amendment to H.R. 2417 calling for the establishment of a National Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq. We must study the intelligence available to the administration when war with Iraq was commenced. Was Saddam Hussein producing weapons of mass destruction? Was the Iraqi regime capable of producing weapons of mass destruction? Did the Iraqi regime conceal their weapons of mass destruction after Operation Iraqi Freedom began? These questions, and many more, need answers. The Commission established under my amendment would have provided those answers. I support the amendment offered by my colleague from California, the Honorable Barbara Lee. Her amendment calls for a General [[Page H5869]] Accounting Office report on the degree to which U.S. intelligence services shared information about weapons of mass destruction sites with the United Nations inspections teams searching for those weapons in Iraq. Ms. Lee's timely and important Amendment will provide many of the answers the American public seeks. I also proposed an amendment to H.R. 2417 to expand the security clearance for law enforcement agents, specified by State executives, so that classified and vital information related to homeland security can be shared. This amendment was also not made in order, but is vital to preparing or local communities to wage the war on terrorism. Protecting our homeland will be conducted by local law enforcement agencies and small communities across the country. It is vital for valuable, often classified information related to homeland security to be accessible to local law enforcement agents. My amendment would have expanded the security clearance for designated State and local officials and given them the ability to receive vital information. Mr. Speaker, I reiterate my opposition to this Rule. The Rule is too narrowly drafted and fails to make in order several valuable amendments offered by myself and my colleagues. I urge my colleagues to join me in opposing the narrowly-tailored Rule and in support of the amendment to H.R. 2417 offered by my colleague Ms. Barbara Lee. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I just wish to respond to my colleague by inviting the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee) to come upstairs, as all Members are permitted, and see the material being worked on by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and to read the mission of the committee in that regard. I think all Members would find that substantial work is being done, and I believe all Members of this body would be very proud of the efforts put forward by Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in investigating the continuing concern that all of us in this body have, and I dare say the members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence are probably more directly concerned in light of the fact that we are there on a day-to-day basis. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Tauscher). Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose the rule for the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004. I commend the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the ranking member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), who are doing valuable work by looking into the intelligence surrounding Operation Iraqi Freedom. By necessity and design, their work is classified. I feel strongly that their work must continue, but that this issue is beyond the scope of a single committee and is of such importance to our democracy that responsible public hearings by a select committee of users of intelligence are necessary. Members of relevant committees such as the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on International Relations, who use intelligence to make policy decisions every day, provide valuable perspective that should be part of a broader review. As a member of the Committee on Armed Services, I am a user of intelligence, and the information I receive shapes the decisions I make for many men and women in uniform every day. Members of Congress and military planners need to have confidence that intelligence is objective and provides a sound basis for policy decisions. No decision is more grave than sending American fighting men and women into harm's way. We have a duty to be certain that public policy that we base these decisions on is credible and real. With American and British soldiers continuing to be killed at an alarming rate in Iraq, we have to be sure that our intelligence is providing a realistic view of the threats they have. Having open hearings by a select committee of policymakers who are customers of intelligence would not only allow Congress to reclaim its vital oversight role, but help convince the American people that their elected officials and President have the right tools to make the right decisions to protect them. Mr. Speaker, this is not about the purview of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. I deeply respect the work that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence does, but with all due respect, as a customer of that intelligence, the classified work that the committee does needs to remain classified, but after that work is declassified and moves to the National Security Agency, to the Pentagon, to the military planners, to the differing alphabet soups of agencies, who then take that classified work and begin to shape public policy with it, once that work becomes declassified and is starting to be moved into the public policy realm, I and others in relevant committees, like the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on International Relations, need to understand what exactly is being done to that intelligence to either promote it or shape it to perhaps fit a preconceived decision by people in the administration or in other parts of the policy-making chain. I want to know if the intelligence work that is being done so ably by our intelligence people and the analysis done by them has been shaped in any way that would change my mind when I make these decisions. That is why I think we need a select committee. I urge my colleagues to vote no on the rule, but I support the work of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the ranking member. Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I would just point out to the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Tauscher) that our committee is one of the users of intelligence. We are part of this community that uses intelligence information; and so it seems to me her point is right, and we are, therefore, the right committee to be assessing these questions and issues.. Second, we have already agreed on a bipartisan basis to hold public hearings as appropriate, and the subject and timing of our first hearing is under active discussion right now. I am hopeful it will be held in July. I certainly agree that the public needs to know about some of these questions. We will discuss them in more detail in a moment. I do commend her for raising this issue. We are trying to address it responsibly in the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. If we should fail, then it would be timely to set up a different committee, or a commission, or use another mechanism. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Colorado (Ms. DeGette). Ms. DeGETTE. Mr. Speaker, we are in a very curious position in Congress today. We standing here debating a critical bill to provide funding for our intelligence services while we ask whether those intelligence services might have suffered a massive failure in assessing Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program. I use the word "might" very deliberately because we do not know whether there was an intelligence failure. That is why we need an investigation, and I commend my colleague from California for pushing for an investigation within the committee because not only the public deserves to know, but we deserve to know equally. I am puzzled by many of my colleagues' lack of curiosity on this issue. The question of where Iraq's biological, chemical and nuclear weapons now may be is critical to the security of our Nation, and yet more than 90 days after the fall of Saddam Hussein, we have still not located one chemical weapon, biological weapon, or even their precursors production facilities or delivery systems. We went to war because of the imminent threat those weapons posed. We need to find those weapons if they are there; and if they are not there, we need to ask the question what caused this massive intelligence failure that was presented to Congress as an imminent threat to our national security? Our soldiers in Iraq are still engaged in combat operations. Saddam Hussein may still be out there, Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda are still on the loose, and we need to ensure through our Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that we have solid information as we move forward. Congress has to exercise its powers of oversight openly and honestly and look into these in a thorough way. That is what our constituents deserve. That is what the American people deserve. I [[Page H5870]] look forward to working with the committee to make sure this happens in a timely fashion. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt), a distinguished member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. Mr. Speaker, although I think this should be a totally open rule, as has been the tradition for dealing with this bill each year, I do think that the House should understand that the bill that is being brought to the House today is not controversial in the sense that it was agreed to unanimously within the committee. I would add to the remarks of my friend from Florida that this is, once again, a truly nonpartisan and bipartisan effort. It is appropriate that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence should operate that way, both as the committee that provides oversight for intelligence activities and a committee that is, as the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) points out, a consumer of intelligence product. No doubt there will be a great deal of controversy to follow, a great deal of political discussion to follow in coming weeks and months about the intelligence that led up to the fighting and into the fighting in Iraq. In fact, I think this will be very good for the committee because it is an excellent case study of what intelligence should be, what intelligence should not be, how it can be used, and how it can be misused. I applaud the decision of the chairman and the ranking member to investigate the disturbing matter thoroughly, and I have no doubt that we will be able to investigate it thoroughly. {time} 1630 I applaud their decision to allow Members of the House to read the large volume of material that the Director of Central Intelligence has provided to the Congress. And our committee intends to issue a written report on its findings as promptly as possible. We have only begun to examine in detail the testimony, the statements, the published intelligence relating to Iraq's weapons programs and terrorist associations. It is early in our investigation, too early in the military's search within Iraq itself to come to any definitive conclusions or explanations of our failure so far to substantiate the prewar claims and expectations of what we would find there. But I have no doubt that the House will be satisfied with the thorough and critical look that the committee will take in this issue. There is no question that there is a lot of ambiguous information to search through. There is no doubt that there have been some exaggerated claims at least, and lives and deaths have hung on these things. We must take a thorough look at it. We will and I think the Members of the House will be satisfied with that look. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I just wanted to add one bit of remark with regard to some of the comment we have just heard which I thought was very helpful. We understand very clearly and the Intelligence Community understands very clearly that finding the weapons of mass destruction or what happened to them or whether there was faulty intelligence is a critical issue and that is indeed ongoing. As the gentleman from New Jersey just said, we are early in the game and we have literally thousands of pages for our staff and Members to work through. There is one thing that has not been said very clearly yet that does need to be said. I think we all share the desire to make as much of this known as possible to the public. We want the public to understand how good intelligence is and how good it is not. Frankly, I want to do everything I can to make the American people aware as well as people overseas who might be watching what we have to say here, whether they are our friends or our enemies, that our intelligence is indeed formidable and when in fact we find a place where there is a gap in it, it will be repaired and fixed and that gap will no longer be there. I think that will be a comfort to everybody. That process is partially what this bill is about. But we are doing this as regard to the debate with the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq at a time when we desire transparency but we understand that transparency might include some people who are our enemies in the Iraq area where there is still a very dangerous and difficult operational climate as we are tragically reminded every day. I would ask that we understand that this is not just a question of going back and reviewing material at our leisure trying to come to some Solomon decision about whether it was good or bad or where we can fix it. This is matching information that we had which was the best we had at the time as far as we know with what we are beginning to find as we are able to talk to people who are captured in Iraq and other areas who are terrorists or are associated with them, document exploitation, those types of things and match that up. This process is a process that the committee has taken on. We are not just doing the prewar analysis. We are doing the what is going on now and where is it going on a daily basis. I hope Members can be assured, we will be in a continuous position to assess, both give a score card to the community and perhaps to come back to our colleagues here and say there are some other areas where we need to invest in the Intelligence Community because a small investment will yield a greater national security return before we are through. That is an ongoing process and charge of this committee and one we take seriously. Mr. Speaker, I urge support of the rule. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution. The previous question was ordered. The resolution was agreed to. A motion to reconsider was laid on the table. ____________________ Congressional Record: June 25, 2003 (House) Page H5870-H5881 INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004 The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 295 and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 2417. The Chair designates the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Isakson) as Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, and requests the gentleman from California (Mr. Ose) to assume the chair temporarily. {time} 1635 In the Committee of the Whole Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 2417) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with Mr. Ose (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair. The Clerk read the title of the bill. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having been read the first time. Under the rule, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) each will control 30 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss). Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I am very pleased to bring the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 to the floor today. As always, this authorization is the culmination of both an intensive review of the intelligence budget request and the rigorous oversight of the Intelligence Community that the committee conducts on [[Page H5871]] an ongoing basis. And I mean ongoing basis. That involves Members and staff here in Washington and elsewhere around the globe. In putting together this legislation and schedule of authorizations, the committee must first answer the question, what is the state of America's Intelligence Community? Overall there have been some significant improvements since the low point we hit in the last decade, and I am pleased about that. I applaud the President for making needed investments in intelligence capabilities and his appreciation for intelligence as a vital element of the national security of our Nation. I am pleased to say that our intelligence authorization comes very close to the number that the President has asked for. In dollar terms, we have basically come in at exactly the level of the President's request. Within that framework and building on the progress made to date, the committee has been able to accomplish quite a bit. Among other things, the bill before us provides full support for the Intelligence Community's efforts in the war on terrorism, job one. It postures the United States for the future with a unified overhead imagery intelligence architecture. I just can put it this way. We have been well served by technology for a number of years. Technology gets old, just like the rest of us, and gets fragile. We need to be in a position to keep a robust architecture of the best technology available and this bill goes a long way to doing that. This bill also makes needed investments in analysis and analytic tools. Anybody who has followed the progress of the 9/11 joint review done with our colleagues in the Senate and our committees have come to the conclusion that a big part of the problem lies in the coordination and making the whole analytical piece work better. We have focused rather extensively on that this year. It is not a new subject for us. We also address counterintelligence concerns stemming from such celebrated cases tragically as the Hanssen case and the Montes espionage cases. These cases did do us damage and there are others that can as well. Counterintelligence becomes even more important because we understand counterintelligence may stop people from doing damaging things to Americans here at home. In addition, the bill continues the committee's push for improved and aggressive human intelligence tools and capabilities. Human intelligence, spying, espionage, getting enemies' plans and intentions is the core business of intelligence. On the homeland front, homeland security is very much part of our mission in the sense that we must authorize the establishment of some connection between our foreign intelligence and our domestic authorities who are dealing with the problems on the homeland. So we authorize the establishment of a pilot program to enable State and local authorities to gather terrorist threat related information and push it upward to the Federal level. The Intelligence Community must be forward leaning on this. As we have discovered consistently through our oversight and through the joint inquiry into the events of September 11, the United States does not have the luxury to be complacent about its national security requirements. Risk aversion, inattention to detail, lack of investment in capabilities, these are not options that the American people are willing to accept and certainly the committee is not willing to accept. Mr. Chairman, I am also pleased that H.R. 2417 continues the nonpartisan tradition of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of reaching consensus. This is entirely appropriate because partisanship has no place in a debate over America's security. None at all. This measure was reported out of the committee by a unanimous vote of 16-0. And I daresay, we did not start with a piece of paper that we all agreed on. We got to 16-0 by dealing with some things that we did not necessarily all agree on but we did it in a responsible and, I would say, adult way, understanding that the flag we work for is the flag of this country, not the flag for any other agenda. I urge the House to support H.R. 2417. I will look forward to making comments on individual amendments as they come along. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.哈曼女士。主席先生，为了支持第2417号决议，我牺牲了我所有的时间。首先，我要感谢我们委员会的主席，感谢他管理委员会的方式。他的方法是建设性的、合作的、合作的，并显示出与委员会每一位成员合作的真正意愿。我有幸在情报常设特别委员会工作了6年。自1997年以来，戈斯主席一直优雅而称职地担任委员会主席，在我任职期间担任高级委员的前任包括已故伟大的朱利安·迪克森(Julian Dixon)，以及我们有能力的领导人、来自加州的女士(佩洛西女士)。我们委员会的成员是真正有才能的、多元化的、勤奋的，并致力于履行其监督职责和对众议院的责任。顺便说一下，主席先生，我们的员工也是。委员会成员和工作人员密切合作，起草了一项法案，为反恐战争和应对一系列全球挑战提供新的、更好的能力。正如我们刚刚从我们的主席那里听到的，这是一个很好的法案，并获得了我们委员会的一致投票。 An excellent summary of the public portions of our bill has been presented by the chairman, so I will not repeat it. The committee made thorough but sensible decisions to focus resources on the highest priority intelligence collections programs and placed limitations on certain new programs until they are defined in more detail. The bill also supports the strategic vision of the committee for strengthening the Intelligence Community. It provides additional support for all- source analysis and encourages virtual reorganization for better information sharing and collaboration across the agencies. Mr. Chairman, whatever the details of this intelligence authorization bill, we all know that it was developed at a time of heightened concern about the nature and quality of the intelligence that led to the decision to go to war in Iraq. I know that there are questions on both sides of the aisle about this intelligence, questions which our committee is already asking. While an independent commission or other mechanism might be needed at some later date, the members of our committee have now initiated an investigation and I would like to spend a few minutes discussing our effort. As our colleagues know, I voted to authorize the use of military force against Iraq because I believed the intelligence case was compelling. The Intelligence Community judged that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and the danger, in the President's words, was grave and gathering. The aftermath of the war has revealed just how brutal Saddam Hussein's regime was. The discovery of mass graves in Iraq and the gut-wrenching grief of families victimized by the regime speak for themselves. To date, however, coalition forces have only uncovered two suspected Iraqi mobile biological warfare agent production plants. Coalition forces have yet to uncover chemical or biological weapons or further evidence of Iraqi links to terrorism. Where are Iraq's chemical and biological weapons? Why can't our forces find them? For our committee, these questions have loomed over the preparation of this authorization bill. It has been anything but business as usual. On5月22日，高斯主席和我寄了封信向中央情报署署长，乔治宗特表示，表达委员会对详细学习的兴趣，如何制定有关伊拉克威姆和恐怖主义联系的情报图。主席和我也与这一主题的总监遇到了两次。根据我们的要求，智力界提供了有关伊拉克WMD计划和与恐怖主义联系的19册。6月12日，主席和我宣布两党和我们委员会的一致承诺，以严重，重点，全面审查预警情报的质量和客观性。我们宣布，我们将举行听证会，封闭和开放式公开方式 - 质疑关于伊拉克WMD的预警情报及其与恐怖主义联系的高级管理和情报官员。[[页H5872]] {时间} 1645我认为委员会举行公开听证会非常重要，我有来自佛罗里达董事长（主席Goss）个人承诺的绅士。我希望我们的第一次听证会在7月发生。我们的委员会还决定尽可能迅速生成书面，未分类的报告，此外我们同意在适当的安全条件和房屋规则下向委员会要求提供所有房屋成员。上周，我们委员会举行了两次与我们调查有关的听证会，其中一项审查了2002年10月，关于伊拉克大规模毁灭性计划武器的国家情报估计，另一方面就目前检索伊拉克武器。虽然我们仍处于这项调查的早期阶段，但我想评论到目前为止我们审查的内容。 First, past possession of WMD. We know that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons in the past. In the 1980s the Iraqi military used chemical weapons against Iran and the Kurds. In the 1990s Iraq admitted to U.N. weapons inspectors that it had produced over 8,400 liters of anthrax and 3.9 tons of the chemical warfare agent VX. Drawing on both direct and circumstantial evidence collected over many years, the intelligence community also concluded that Iraq had people, planning documents, and equipment to support WMD production. Number two, hiding WMD. The agents that comprise weapons of mass destruction are exceedingly easy to hide, a point neither the administration nor the intelligence community made adequately clear before the war in Iraq. Five hundred metric tons of bulk chemical agents would fill a backyard swimming pool. Biological agents can be hidden in small vials in private residences. But it is not so easy to hide delivery vehicles like unmanned aerial drones, missiles, or munitions. That none of these other harder-to-hide items has been found is cause for real concern. Number three, overstating the case. When discussing Iraq's WMD, administration officials rarely included the caveats and qualifiers attached to the intelligence community's judgments. Secretary of State Powell, for example, told the U.N. Security Council that "we know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction . . . " On the eve of war, President Bush said, "Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised." And on a March 30 Sunday news show, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld said that he knew where the WMD were located. Bogus information on Iraq's alleged nuclear connection to Niger was even included in the President's State of the Union Address. For many Americans, the administration's certainty gave the impression that there was even stronger intelligence about Iraq's possession of and intention to use WMD. Number four, circumstantial evidence. The committee is now investigating whether the intelligence case on Iraq's WMD was based on circumstantial evidence rather than hard facts and whether the intelligence community made clear to the policy-makers and Congress that most of its analytic judgments were based on things like aerial photographs and Iraqi defector interviews, not hard facts. This is an issue that we have to explore. And, finally, number five, weak ties to al Qaeda. Iraq did have ties to terrorist groups, but the investigation suggests that the intelligence linking al Qaeda to Iraq, a prominent theme in the administration's statements prior to the war, contradictary contrary to what was claimed by the administration. Much remains to be investigated in this area. Mr. Chairman, the highest priority of our committee, and I think of our Nation, remains finding and dismantling Iraq's WMD. It is counterintuitive to think that Iraq destroyed its weapons and did not report this to the United Nations. It is conceivable that Saddam destroyed them on the eve of or even after the start of the war once he recognized the futility of using them and the political advantage of keeping the United States from finding them; but the more likely scenario is that he buried or dispersed his weapons of mass destruction and that some may now be in the hands of terrorist groups outside of Iraq or counterinsurgents in Iraq who continue to harm and kill U.S. and British troops. But even if Iraq's chemical and biological weapons are found tomorrow, and I hope they are, these issues warrant scrutiny by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. It is already clear that there were flaws in U.S. intelligence. Iraq's WMD was not located where the intelligence community thought it might be. Chemical weapons were not used in the war despite the intelligence community's judgment that their use was likely. I urge this administration not to contemplate military action, especially preemptive action, in Iran, North Korea or Syria until these issues are cleared up. Certainly this Member would not support such action until these matters are cleared up. As the committee moves forward with its investigation, we need also be mindful of the burden the intelligence agencies are carrying, not only in Iraq but also in the war on terrorism in other areas of the world. Our Nation is best served by an effective intelligence community, not one hobbled by risk aversion and finger-pointing. The committee's review must be based on facts, which I and others intend to follow unflinchingly wherever they may lead. Our Nation needs a robust intelligence budget, which this authorization bill supports. At the same time, the committee's immediate priority is to resolve the questions regarding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and ties to terrorist groups. If the answers dictate changes in the future intelligence budgets or policy, I am committed to bringing those recommendations forward. Meanwhile, this authorization bill deserves our strong support. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased that we are going to have a lot of Member participation in the general debate today. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Gibbons), the chairman of the Human Intelligence, Analysis and Counterintelligence Subcommittee. (Mr. GIBBONS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the intelligence authorization bill, and I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) for yielding me this time. This bill addresses vital intelligence needs, and may I say there is no greater need nor more important need, in my view, than the need for more and better human intelligence, also known as HUMINT. For America's intelligence community, fighting terrorism, as the chairman has said, is job one and rightly so. In order to learn the plans and intentions of America's terrorist enemies, which we must do to defend against another terrorist attack, we must improve the quality and quantity of intelligence from human sources. Technology certainly can help, but it has limited application. For instance, the overhead collection systems of the Cold War era continue to be a wonderful resource. However, they are not much good for tracking individual terrorists, and they certainly cannot get inside the heads of those individuals who are plotting to kill Americans. For that we must have HUMINT. HUMINT is the force multiplier. As good as the information is that the National Security Agency collects, it is that much more powerful when HUMINT officers down on the ground locate individuals who can tell them just what those electronic signals mean while talking to them in their native language. This authorization bill recognizes this fact, and I am very proud of the significant bipartisan support given to our HUMINT capabilities by the community. As I have said previously, throughout much of the 1990s there was a debate about whether America really needed to spend so much money on defense; and as for intelligence, some people even said there was no longer any need for the CIA. Mr. Chairman, that debate is long over. The task before us now is to continue to provide the necessary [[Page H5873]] resources for HUMINT programs so that our policymakers can have a better, more detailed understanding of what the intelligence analysis means. Unfortunately, the HUMINT programs of the CIA, America's premier HUMINT agency, were nearly starved to death during the mid-1990s; and with the help from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Congress, and now a supportive administration, those programs are being resuscitated and brought back to new life. But despite this renewed commitment, the CIA still has to surge to cover the world's hot spots. This needs to change, and this bill helps us get there. The men and women of the CIA wherever they are found are doing a wonderful job; but they need encouragement, they need support from Congress, and they need the support of the American people. Our committee has again this year, under the leadership of the chairman and with the support of the ranking member, made the commitment to provide the resources to properly support these fine people to add to their numbers, to improve their foreign language skills, and to get them overseas where they are needed and needed badly. The support for the effort of these people must be sustained and a vote on H.R. 2417 is a perfect expression of that support. I urge my colleagues to support this bill. Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), a very valuable member of our committee. Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman, ranking member, for yielding me this time. I want to thank the chairman for his leadership, along with our ranking member, in presenting a bill that I think addresses many of the concerns that many Members of Congress have expressed to a number of us on the committee. H.R. 2417 expresses, among other things, the committee's deep and longstanding concern about the lack of progress made by the intelligence community in diversifying its workforce, especially in the senior ranks and the core mission areas. In fiscal year 2002, the intelligence community had a smaller proportion of women and minorities than the Federal Government workforce and the civilian workforce at large. Women and minorities continue to be especially underrepresented in senior grades GS-13 through 15 and in Senior Intelligence and Executive Services positions. This bill requires that the Director of Central Intelligence submit a report outlining the current diversity action plan including short- and long-term goals. This report should also include the DCI's plan for implementing diversity initiatives across the intelligence community and plans for measuring the progress made by the individual agencies in the intelligence community. The bill limits the use of a portion of the money authorized to be appropriated to the Community Management Account until such time as the Director of Central Intelligence reports to this committee on his plan for implementing an effective and a meaningful diversity plan. Diversity in the workforce is a corporate imperative. It is critical to defeating global threats and simply makes good business sense. Therefore, the committee will look to the Director of Central Intelligence and each intelligence community agency director to ensure that more is done to diversify the intelligence workforce. The DCI and agency heads are also urged to take diversity into account when selecting officers to fill the many senior management vacancies in the agencies across the intelligence community. It makes good business sense. Therefore, I strongly urge my colleagues to support H.R. 2417. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood), who is the chairman of the Terrorism and Homeland Security Subcommittee who has done an extraordinary job on a very difficult subject. Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 2417, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. {time} 1700 I want to pay my respects and admiration to both the chairman and the ranking member who I think are extraordinary public servants and do a great job for our committee. As chair of the HPSCI's Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, I am continuously impressed by the men and women of the Intelligence Community. Over the past year, we have witnessed significant success in the war on terrorism, to include the capture of a number of significant terrorist operatives around the world. The men and women of the Intelligence Community have worked tirelessly to deter, disrupt, and destroy terrorist capabilities wherever they threaten our interests, and they have performed remarkably in support of our successful military action in Iraq. Their ability to carry out their mission is due, at least in part, to the support provided by the Select Committee on Intelligence. Under the leadership of the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), this House has consistently supported providing more resources and better tools to the Intelligence Community. This support has only now begun to reverse the underinvestment suffered by the Intelligence Community in the last decade. As we continue to face threats to U.S. interests at home and abroad, we must remain vigilant. We must ensure that the Intelligence Community has the personnel, the skill, the languages, and the resources necessary to work against such threats. The Intelligence Community must be prepared to confront the asymmetrical threat to the future. Mr. Chairman, to this end, H.R. 2417 provides authorization funding for the counterterrorism activities of the Intelligence Community. It provides money and other resources to deepen all-source analytical capabilities. This is most important when confronting the terrorist target. It is through our analytical efforts that all the dots that get collected ultimately get connected. This bill also provides funding for the Terrorist Threat Integration Center proposed by the President of the United States in his State of the Union address. The TTIC is a primary example of how well the Intelligence Community is marshalling its resources, encouraging efficiencies, and disseminating timely intelligence across government in defense of the American homeland. The President deserves a great deal of credit for his vision. The Intelligence Community deserves credit for putting that vision into action. H.R. 2417 also authorizes additional funding to specifically improve the sharing of terrorist threat-related information across all levels of government, Federal, State and local, and it is through the aggressive collection, analysis, and dissemination of threat information that the agencies and organizations of the Federal, State, and local governments, as well as the private sector, can best protect the homeland, prosecute the war on terrorism, and work together to keep America safe. The counterterrorism elements of the Intelligence Community are at the forefront of this effort, and this bill is an investment in that effort, and I urge support of H.R. 2417. I want to say a word about two other issues. Some of us have been briefed on the House floor by Secretary Rumsfeld. He stood in the well of this House and briefed many Members. On one occasion, when asked the question, how do we know when we have won the war, he said three things: regime change, which we have accomplished; a new regime, which is now being put in place; and finding the weapons of mass destruction. I have great faith that with two of those goals accomplished, the third goal will be accomplished. I have great faith, after a number of briefings from folks in the Intelligence Community, that the weapons of mass destruction will be found. And I think all Members should have that kind of reassurance from the Select Committee on Intelligence, based on reports that we have received, based on information we have been given by the Secretary of Defense that that will take place. If I could say one other thing. I want to say this, Mr. Chairman: I think our committee probably has stepped over the bounds a little bit by saying to every Member of the House they can have all of this information. I think sharing this information is going to [[Page H5874]] turn out to be a mistake. This is the greatest talking body in the whole world. People love to talk. Very few listen. And I am afraid that when 435 Members have access to the information we do, a select committee, an important committee, I am afraid of what is going to happen, particularly after what the New York Times had to say about a very important meeting that we had in the Select Committee on Intelligence, which is now out in the public. Nobody knows how it got out there, but I guarantee my colleagues, if we give 435 access, we got big problems. Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would say to the gentleman, I have great faith that the WMD will be found too, and in the seriousness and responsibleness of the Members of the House. Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Boswell), who is ranking member of the Subcommittee on Human Intelligence, Analysis and Counterintelligence. (Mr. BOSWELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me this time, and I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) for his hard work. He is truly a leader, and he treats us with fairness, and he has the best interests of our Nation in his heart, as well as the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman). I appreciate that very much. I would associate myself with some of the remarks that the previous speaker just made concerning having some faith. We are two-thirds of the way there, and I think we have reason to believe we will get there. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 2417. As the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Human Intelligence, Analysis and Counterintelligence, working with the gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Gibbons), who I appreciate very much his hard work and efforts, we have observed firsthand the dedication and the professionalism of the men and women on the frontline collecting intelligence around the globe. Through their sacrifices and their heroic efforts, they have helped make our Nation more secure and have contributed greatly to our military success in Iraq and Afghanistan. I am pleased that this bill provides the tools essential to intelligence collectors to meet operational goals; in particular, those related to military operations, combating terrorism, and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. My colleagues will also appreciate that in H.R. 2417, it also requires the Director of Central Intelligence to report back to the committee on lessons learned from the war in Iraq. Careful analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of our technical systems and processes will allow both the executive branch and Congress to make better resource allocation decisions in the future. H.R. 2417 also stresses the need for improved strategic and all- source intelligence analysis, both key to U.S. policymaker understanding of the capabilities and the intentions of rogue nations and individuals posing threats to U.S. interests. The bill further authorizes additional billets for analysts, as we all know we have to have people to do jobs, and additional funds for information technology upgrades to help analysts more efficiently do their job. Mr. Chairman, this is a good bill. I trust my colleagues will support it. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Collins), who is a new and valued member of our committee, and we welcome him. Mr. COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, I too rise in strong support of H.R. 2417, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. It is a good bill with bipartisan support and, hopefully, it will be adopted, and I feel sure it will. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on our Nation, the Select Committee on Intelligence has noted the urgent need for better information-sharing between and among our various Intelligence Community's agencies, and Federal, State, and even local law enforcement are enjoying better shared intelligence. Since joining the committee earlier this year, I have observed the chairman, ranking member, and committee members, how they have advocated the implementation of new policies and technologies which are designed to facilitate the timely sharing of important information among our intelligence agencies and our local law enforcement. Technical shortfalls in communications and collaboration systems, however, have undermined efforts to fully share information across the Intelligence Community. This bill makes an effort to correct those issues. These technical limitations can be overcome with proper management and capital investments. This bill provides significant funding to assist the Intelligence Community's leadership in developing and sharing useful information, management tools, capabilities, and operating systems throughout the Intelligence Community. As important as technological solutions to information-sharing are the needs for updated policies to direct the flow of information. The community's leadership has not been sufficiently clear about its information-sharing policies with its various component agencies. As a result, information becomes irrelevant due to outdated directives or conflicting opinions about what information can or cannot be shared, and with whom. One of the key lessons learned by the committee's 9/11 inquiry last year was that a failure to communicate sensitive data on an urgent basis among intelligence law enforcement agencies can cost our Nation dearly. The committee has taken steps to improve this situation with this important bill. It is a good piece of legislation, a strong piece of legislation. I encourage its passage and support it fully. Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Peterson), a valued member of our committee. Mr. PETERSON of Minnesota. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me this time. Today I rise in support of H.R. 2417, the Intelligence Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2004. I want to commend the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), our ranking member, for their leadership and the professional, bipartisan manner in which they conduct the business of the Committee on Intelligence. H.R. 2417 includes authorizations for the CIA, as well as Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Programs within the Departments of Defense, Justice, State, Treasury, Energy and the FBI. The bill addresses critical threats to our national security, but it also calls attention to particular areas of concern. Among those concerns is the connection between drug trafficking and terrorist activities. The committee is concerned about the level of personnel and funding resources dedicated to combat transnational crimes such as drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and money laundering. As seen in both Colombia and Afghanistan, the activities of terrorist organizations are closely linked to the drug trade. These illicit activities feed upon and sustain each other. To defeat terrorist organizations, the Intelligence Community must understand the transnational organized crime that supports them. Therefore, the committee calls upon the administration to reinvigorate the strategy in this area. In addition, the bill extends the authority granted last year to allow foreign intelligence funds dedicated for Colombia to be used in a unified campaign against drug trafficking and activities by groups designated as terrorist organizations. Finally, the bill establishes an Assistant Secretary of Intelligence and Enforcement within the Department of Treasury to enhance the identification and targeting of illicit financial transactions. This office will also seek to improve the coordination and dissemination of intelligence products concerning drug trafficking, international crime, and terrorist activities. Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this measure. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am very happy to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), the distinguished vice chairman of the committee. (Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for yielding me [[Page H5875]] this time. I rise in strong support of the legislation. This Member would like to commend the exemplary bipartisan efforts of the chairman and the distinguished ranking member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman). Often when people in Washington talk about the need for bipartisanship, what they really mean is that the other side should agree with them. In the case of the Committee on Intelligence, however, there has been true bipartisanship and genuine cooperation towards the goal of serving the Nation's interest. Although this bipartisanship is a tradition on the Committee on Intelligence, it is commendably reinforced by the leadership style and the efforts of the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman). Under the chairman's leadership, and in this bill, the legislative branch will be moving rapidly to address a number of long-standing concerns in our collection and analysis of intelligence. This Member would mention just a few. First, it should be recognized that in the aftermath of the terrorist attack of September 11, President Bush declared war on terrorist financing. There is, however, no single office in the Federal government that is responsible for ensuring that all elements of law enforcement and intelligence share terrorist information in a timely fashion. As a result, our counterterrorist financing efforts to date have not been as effective as they could be. The committee concluded that the Department of the Treasury needs to be more effective in implementing its counterterrorist financing mission from an intelligence sharing perspective. By elevating the intelligence function within the Treasury Department, this bill ensures that the coordination and information sharing between the Treasury and the rest of the Intelligence Community can be more effective. This Member recognizes that the assistance and the cooperation of the chairman of the Committee on Financial Services, the distinguished gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Oxley), will be required to achieve this important policy change. The Select Committee on Intelligence will continue to work with him and his committee, on which this Member also serves, to ensure that we get this correct. Mr. Chairman, secondly, it should be noted that Americans have become painfully aware of the threats to the homeland and the risk that terrorist cells and their support networks may be operating in the United States. Several suspected cells already have been cracked. Indeed, an individual has just been convicted last week of conducting surveillance operations for possible al Qaeda attacks. The presence of this new and very real threat has compelled the FBI to transform the way it conducts investigations. {time} 1715 No longer does the FBI solely pursue investigations in order to build criminal cases. Now they are also actively at work to disrupt and destroy terrorist cells before they launch attacks. This is nothing less than revolutionary in the way that the FBI does its business. It is a very necessary transformation that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence is following closely through careful oversight. We in the legislative branch are attempting to ensure that the information flow between the FBI and the intelligence community is done effectively, but also within the confines of the law. The committee intends to continue aggressive oversight. I want to assure our colleagues of this evolving relationship between this intelligence and law enforcement. Third, and finally, this Member would remind his colleagues of the enormity of the challenge now faced by the intelligence community. The war on terrorism has required an unprecedented commitment requiring timely, actionable intelligence on a truly global scale. In addition, our intelligence services are devoting significant resources to the effort to Iraq, not only to identify and to apprehend the remaining elements of Saddam Hussein's regime but also to locate Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. More on that subject later. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for yielding me time. Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Cramer), the distinguished ranking member of our subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence, TNT, who became a grandfather for the second time yesterday. Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Chairman, on behalf of my new granddaughter, Patricia Lanier, I would say it is my pleasure today to speak about a very important piece of legislation that our colleagues in this House will pass judgment on. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 2417, the fiscal year 2004 intelligence authorization act. I am a fairly new member of this House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. It is a unique opportunity for Members of the House to serve on this select committee. I came on to the committee at the time that the joint 9-11 hearings were taking place. And as I look around the room today and I observe my colleagues that participated in those joint sessions with the Senate, I want my other colleagues that are not on this committee to know how impressed I was with the leadership of this committee and our participation with the Senate as well. I also want to take this opportunity to thank the staff who have been most kind and generous on both sides of the aisle to participate with us as we have gone through these very tough issues. This is a good bill. It is a complicated bill. It is hard for some Members to understand. For example, traditionally, the executive branch, the Congress, the industry, we focus on expanding the capability of sensors. Sensors are used to take pictures, to intercept communications or to measure some special signature whether they are from satellites, whether they are from aircraft, or whether they are from ships. But the government has underinvested in abilities to task the collection systems properly and to exploit and disseminate the collection data once received. For a number of years this subcommittee that I am on on this committee has worked to improve and rectify that imbalance. This year's bill accomplishes that and expands the concept as well. In years past, the committee has stressed the need for more investment and better management at the National Imagery and Mapping Agency and the National Security Agency to improve processing, exploitation and dissemination capabilities for imagery and signals intelligence. The committee sustained these initiatives in the current bill. We also lay a foundation for applying information technology to solve problems revealed by the congressional investigation into the September 11 tragedy as well. This is an important bill. I urge its support. I also want to point out that the missile in space intelligence command in my district is adequately covered by funding under this important piece of legislation. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert), the distinguished chairman of the House Committee on Science. (Mr. BOEHLERT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the intelligence authorization bill, and I want to start by commending the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the ranking member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), for their leadership, their bipartisanship and their commitment. We are all in this together. And while I am at it, I want to compliment the most professional staff that I have seen of any committees in the Congress in my years in this institution. As a member of the committee, I know well the threats facing our country. They are many. They are varied and they are serious. The job of intelligence is challenging and never ending. All of us, not just in the Congress but across the country, have become painfully aware that while many countries of the world are working with us to promote peace and stability, there are those who are committed to undermining our efforts. The Nation has been exposed to this ugly reality. The memory of September 11 will forevermore be seared on our souls. Our collective awareness has increased as has our understanding of the [[Page H5876]] absolute need for a very capable intelligence community. This bill accelerates investment in enhanced capabilities and people to move the intelligence community from being postured from the threats of the past to being positioned to address the increasingly asymmetric threats facing us in the future. It will not happen overnight, but the changes needed must and will come about at a rapid pace. Rebuilding the infrastructure and retooling for the future is under way even as we debate this issue. Every area of intelligence operations needs support and attention. But I want to focus on what I believe is the most critical need we face, and that is in the area of human intelligence. Mr. Chairman, the sad fact is that we, of necessity, need to reverse course from the years of decline in investments in the people that make up our cadre of human intelligence officials. This does not mean we should not continue to invest in important technical systems, but we must not become solely dependent on them. Satellites in the heavens and all the sophisticated and complex technologies here on Earth must be complemented by our eyes and ears around the globe. There must be a proper balance between people and machines. We are proud of our intelligence professionals because of the outstanding work they perform day in and day out, so often putting their lives at risk. What they do and how they do it is not easy. And they have earned our gratitude for their dedication and professionalism. One of the basic tools that these professionals need in order to do their job is the ability to speak foreign languages. Quite frankly, and this is sad to say, this is a deficient area. I am not at all happy, and I will confess it up front, about the response we have received from the intelligence community leadership on this issue, despite our continuing efforts to improve language skills. We set a clear priority to ensure that we have people with native language capabilities regardless of where we might find ourselves. Yet year after year we have provided an increase in the amount of funds requested for language training, and year after year something happens that is not our intent. The response to our concerns has been unsatisfactory. Year after year the intelligence community finds ways to avoid implementing these initiatives which are essential to its success. Mr. Chairman, this year we insist that the community leadership resolve to fix the language inadequacy. No more finessing, no more fudging. Just do it or else. Our country's intelligence community is still recovering from years of decline. There are fundamental shortcomings that must be addressed, and we will fail in this challenge if we do not adequately restore the resources to a sufficient level to get the job done. While this budget represents a significant increase over the past years, we support it with the full knowledge and understanding there is a great deal more work to be done. Language being only one of the issues, but this is an issue that we have to pay attention to. It does not do us any good to have some sophisticated satellite costing a jillion dollars up in the heavens taking pictures of Afghanistan, if in the caves there are all these people bent on doing us harm and there is nobody in there who can understand them, communicate with them, or provide us with necessary intelligence. And that is what we intend to correct, and I am proud to say the committee stands strong behind this commitment and we will follow through on it. Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 seconds. The 15 seconds is to tell the prior speaker, our wonderful colleague, that I totally agree with him. As the representative from the district in America that probably makes most of our intelligence satellites and has fabulous technology, that is great; but we need more investment in human intelligence. And he is right. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Eshoo), a classmate and good friend, one of the rookies on our committee, but already the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Policy, and National Security. Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Chairman, I thank our distinguished ranking member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), and the chairman of our committee for their joint leadership and the standards that they set for us every day. I respect and have high regard for the men and women of the intelligence community, and I really consider it a high privilege to have been appointed to serve on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in the House. As a new member, I have valued meeting and learning from the many talented and patriotic individuals in our intelligence community; and I believe it is important for the foreign policy and the national security of the United States that our intelligence community be given the tools and the support they need and that their efforts be focused on important priorities. That is why we are on the floor today in support of this authorization act for fiscal year 2004. I do have some concerns today that I would like to voice. I serve as the ranking member of the Subcommittee of the Intelligence Policy and National Security, as the ranking member just said. The role of the subcommittee is to examine how intelligence supports national security policy, ensuring that intelligence is focused on the right priorities and is as reliable as it can be and that it is used appropriately by senior policymakers in furthering U.S. foreign policy. Issues such as potentially politicized intelligence, potential exaggeration of intelligence and imprecise characterizations of intelligence are of significant concern to me in my role on this committee. So I am very concerned about the role intelligence played in the foreign policy debates about going to war in Iraq. The answers must await a thorough accounting, and we cannot predetermine what those outcomes are. But I am concerned that the administration and the American people and the Members of this House relied too heavily on their interpretation of the threat facing this country, a threat that was described as imminent, as grave and growing without sufficient transparency into the intelligence picture underpinning the argument for war. I think we are learning that a foreign policy based on preemption puts far too much pressure on the intelligence community to deliver certainty when it simply cannot. So the intelligence community must be given all that they need to protect our magnificent Nation. Every administration deserves the best intelligence that they possibly can get. But we must assure the credibility of this for the American people and for the world community. Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of this authorization act. It is important for our country and the protection of our people. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Cunningham), the distinguished gentleman who is a very valued member of our committees and has helped us on a number of fronts. Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I would like to first thank not only the chairman, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), but he ranking member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman). Our committee is a bipartisan committee. The defense committee that I sit on is also, with the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha) and the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) and people like that; and it is really a pleasure to work on. {time} 1730 When there is a pressure put on the ranking member to force political gain on weapons of mass destruction, it is a sign of true leadership and bipartisanship to not do that and to work with the chairman to come about and perform a bill like this, and we should all be proud of that, the Members, and I want to personally thank the gentlewoman from California. The weapons of mass destruction, we cannot say too much about them, but the chairman and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) also made something in order that has not been done before, and that is for every single Member to be able to look at the information. I am convinced that if anyone on this floor looks at that information, they only have one conclusion. There are weapons of mass destruction still there. If we take a vial [[Page H5877]] this big, the size of an eye dropper and have two seeds in it and in 2 days a person can whip up a batch to kill every man, woman and child in New York City and then try and find that with deceit, a system that was designed to hide it on deceit or destroy it if people get close, and the one thing I can say is we were told there would be absolutely no way possible for Hans Blix and the U.N. to find such things, especially with Saddam Hussein still there trying to hide it. So that was a bogus issue. I would also tell them that the committee does not just deal with terrorism, the war on drugs, local crime and the one thing that I could say before we ever did a pre-9/11 look was that we did not fund the folks enough. We need to change some laws. The Phoenix report, we knew there were terrorists in Arizona, but our intelligence agencies were afraid to act because they would be sued because it would be racial profiling, and these guys put out papers supporting Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, and we could not touch them under the first amendment and that is wrong. There is the same type of people there in Arizona today. One guy was so stupid he went to navigator school. He failed that. Do my colleagues know what he is in today? Airport security, and we cannot touch him. So I think we need to go further and change some of our laws to protect American citizens, and I know there is a fine line in protecting rights and the other, but by golly, I know where I stand and I know where the committee stands, and I am proud of them. Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his comments. We are all proud to serve on this committee. It is now my pleasure to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger), the rookie on the committee and a rookie in Congress, but he is no rookie to these issues. Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I too want to acknowledge the leadership of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), the chairman, and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the ranking member. I have been in local politics for 18 years, and we have tremendous leadership on this committee, and I think all members of this committee put the Nation first. I rise in support of H.R. 2417. The bill reflects the committee's support for the Intelligence Community and the men and women who serve in the intelligence agencies. Often unrecognized, these individuals have made great sacrifices to secure our homeland and to support the war in Iraq, the global war on terrorism and other important national priorities. I am proud to represent many of the men and women who work for the National Security Agency, NSA, in Fort Meade, Maryland, my Second Congressional District. This bill addresses concerns for the health and well-being of NSA employees by providing additional funds to ensure a cleaner, healthier and better maintained workforce. It provides tort liability protection to NSA security officers so that they have legal protections similar to those provided other law enforcement officers. The bill gives NSA the authority to provide living quarters to the bright and talented students participating in NASA's summer and cooperative educational programs. It also encourages NASA to continue its acquisition reform initiatives and bring its processes in line with standard commercial and government practices. It increases funds available for the recapitalization and modernization of NASA's technical systems which will allow the Nation's Signals Intelligence Systems to keep pace with changing technology. H.R. 2417 emphasizes the need for the Federal Government to improve information sharing with State and local governments. As the Baltimore County Executive, I was the county executive during 9/11, this is very important, and where appropriate, private companies. To make this possible, the bill allows the Director of Central Intelligence to establish pilot projects to train State and local officials to increase the flow of information between them and Federal agencies. Advisory councils on privacy and civil liberties and State and local issues will help ensure the protection of individual rights, and the needs of State and local governments need to be properly addressed. I am also pleased that this bill provides additional funding to the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center to enhance the analysis of health risks to our deployed forces. Together, the enhancements provided for in H.R. 2417 will contribute to our Nation's efforts to prevent terrorism and to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction around the globe. I urge my colleagues to support this bill. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Burr), also a valuable member of our committee. (Mr. BURR asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. BURR. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2417. After terrorists struck on September 11, 2001, our government has been engaged in an aggressive prosecution of the global war on terrorism, a war that will be fought for years to come, I fear. Our efforts I have no doubt will be successful. To ensure success, however, we must prepare for the long road ahead of us. That is exactly what this bill does. The men and women of Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities have been instrumental in the numerous successes thus far. I thank them for their sacrifices, for their dedication. We are indebted to them for their tireless service. In my view, the key to success in this war on terrorism is communication. We have to improve our communication across the Federal Government. We must improve and make seamless the flow of information within our Intelligence Community. It is essential to have good communication with our liaison partners, and better communication between Federal, State and local authorities and with the private sector must be ensured. Without doubt, intelligence and law enforcement officers are our front line defenders in our daily battle against this evil. State and local authorities also stand at the forefront of this war. Success in safeguarding the homeland lies firmly in the ability to communicate effectively and share sensitive, timely and actionable information among Federal, State and local officials. Mr. Chairman, H.R. 2417 is an important bill because it also specifically authorizes greater training and support to local and State authorities as it relates to preventing the possible use of weapons of mass destruction in the United States. Additionally, H.R. 2417 authorizes funding to ensure greater participation of city, county and State law enforcement officials in joint terrorism task forces that are spread across this country. Mr. Chairman, only with better communication and sharing necessary, relevant and actionable information with State and local authorities, can we best wage the best effort on the war on terrorism in our homeland. I urge its passage. Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, we have no further speakers except for me and I have some brief closing remarks. So I would yield if there are speakers over there and perhaps speak just before our chairman closes this debate. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to advise the Chair to advise the gentlewoman that we have no further speakers except myself to make a few household and closing remarks. Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. This debate has been friendly, collaborative, supportive, not just of each other but our staffs. It is clear that committee members are putting the country first in our service on the committee. I believe that our authorization bill is putting the country first in terms of the priorities it chooses, and I believe further, Mr. Chairman, that our investigation of the quality of intelligence supporting the war in Iraq is also putting the country first. Our investigation has a long way to go but it is serious, collaborative, and bipartisan. We will do as much as possible in public, and we will report to the public on our findings. Should we hit the wall and fail in our endeavor, then it may be time for a commission or an alternative committee or set of committees of Congress to take over. But meanwhile, I [[Page H5878]] want to commend the Members of this committee who serve with great distinction, and I urge the passage of this authorization bill, H.R. 2417. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have? The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida has 2 minutes remaining. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the remaining time. I would like to also announce that the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra), who is the chairman of our Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence, and the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Everett) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Gallegly) are other members of the committee who will probably join us later on and we are equally proud of them. We obviously have an extraordinarily high level of group of members, as my colleagues have seen, on both sides of the aisle who take this business quite seriously, and we are very pleased about that. I would like to include for the Record the administration policy and exchange of correspondence with the chairmen of the appropriate committees. That would be the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Oxley), the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), and the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter). Statement of Administration Policy H.R. 2417--Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2004 (This statement has been coordinated by OMB with the concerned agencies.) The Administration appreciates the support of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for the work and efforts of the Intelligence Community (IC), as well as the Committee's inclusion in its bill of a significant number of requested provisions. The Administration would support H.R. 2417 if the concerns outlined below are addressed. The Administration has not had the opportunity to review the classified schedule of authorizations, and reserves comment on those authorizations. The Administration would strenously object if certain high priority transformational development programs affecting the IC's future collection and research and development strategies, are not authorized as requested. The Administration appreciates the Committee's support for our initiatives to improve our nation's intelligence capabilities, and believes that section 336, regarding improved information sharing among federal, State, and local government officials, addresses significant and important issues. However, the Administration has concerns with this and other sections of the bill (such as section 321) which seek to direct specific roles and responsibilities to be carried out by particular components of the Executive Branch. They could impinge on the President's constitutional authority to determine how Executive Branch agencies should be organized to carry out national defense and anti-terrorism activities. Section 505, concerning the measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT) research program, would provide the Defense Department the authority to review CIA and other intelligence agencies' MASINT programs. The Administration would oppose this expanded authority for DoD, as we believe the existing authorities and responsibilities are properly vested. The Administration looks forward to working with the Congress on these and a number of other policy and technical concerns as H.R. 2417 moves through the legislative process. ____ House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC, June 17, 2003. Hon. Porter Goss, Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Dear Chairman Goss: In recognition of the desire to expedite floor consideration of H.R. 2417, the intelligence authorization bill for fiscal year 2004, the Committee on the Judiciary hereby waives consideration of the bill with the understanding that you will continue to work with me on sections within the Committee on the Judiciary's jurisdiction and that for any of those sections on which we cannot reach a mutually agreeable resolution, you will remove them before enactment. I further understand that you will support the Committee on the Judiciary's request for conferees on these sections. The sections in the bill as reported that contain matters within the Committee on the Judiciary's Rule X jurisdiction are: 104(e) (relating to funding for the Department of Justice's National Drug Intelligence Center); 321 (relating to procedures for using classified information); 332 (relating to the use of explosives by certain qualified aliens if they are in the United States to cooperate with the CIA or the United States military); 333 (relating to the naturalization of certain persons); 334 (relating to the types of financial institutions from which law enforcement can obtain financial records for criminal investigation purposes); 335 (relating to certain aspects of the mandatory source rules for Federal Prison Industries as they relate to procurements by the Central Intelligence Agency); 336 (relating to pilot projects to encourage the sharing of intelligence information between state and local officials and representatives of critical infrastructure industries on the one hand and federal officials on the other) 401 (relating to giving certain employees of the Central Intelligence Agency the protections of the Federal Tort Claims Act when they take certain actions to prevent crime) 504 (relating to giving certain employees of the National Security Agency the protections of the Federal Tort Claims Act when they take certain actions to prevent crime) (These section numbers refer to the bill as reported.) Based on this understanding, I will not request a sequential referral based on their inclusion in the bill as reported. The Committee on the Judiciary takes this action with the understanding that the Committee's jurisdiction over these provisions is in no way diminished or altered. I would appreciate your including this letter in your Committee's report on H.R. 2417 and the Congressional Record during consideration of the legislation on the House floor. Sincerely, F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman. ____ House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC, June 16, 2003. Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Dear Chairman Sensenbrenner: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 2417, the intelligence authorization bill for fiscal year 2004. As you noted, several provisions of the bill as reported fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary. I will continue to work with you on these sections. For any of these sections on which we cannot reach a mutually agreeable resolution, I will remove them before enactment. Further I will support the Committee on the Judiciary's request for conferees on these sections. The sections of the bill as reported that contain matters within the Committee on the Judiciary's Rule X jurisdiction are: 104(e) (relating to funding for the Department of Justice's National Drug Intelligence Center); 321 (relating to procedures for using classified information); 332 (relating to the use of explosives by certain qualified aliens if they are in the United States to cooperate with the CIA or the United States military); 333 (relating to the naturalization of certain persons); 334 (relating to the types of financial institutions from which law enforcement can obtain financial records for criminal investigation purposes); 335 (relating to certain aspects of the mandatory source rules for Federal Prison Industries as they relate to procurements by the Central Intelligence Agency); 336 (relating to pilot projects to encourage the sharing of intelligence information between state and local officials and representatives of critical infrastructure industries on the one hand and federal officials on the other); 401 (relating to giving certain employees of the Central Intelligence Agency the protections of the Federal Tort Claims Act when they take certain actions to prevent crime); 504 (relating to giving certain employees of the National Security Agency the protections of the Federal Tort Claims Act when they take certain actions to prevent crime). (These section numbers refer to the bill as reported.) I appreciate you willingness to forgo consideration of the bill and not request a sequential referral based on this understanding. I acknowledge that by agreeing to waive its consideration of the bill, the Committee on the Judiciary does not waive its jurisdiction over the bill or any of the matters under your jurisdiction. I will include a copy of your letter and this response in our Committee's report on H.R. 2417 and the Congressional Record during consideration of the legislation on the House floor. Thank you for your assistance in this matter. Sincerely, Porter J. Goss, Chairman. ____ House of Representatives, Committee on Financial Services, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC, June 17, 2003. Hon. Porter J. Goss, Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC. Dear Chairman Goss: On June 12, 2003, the Select Committee on Intelligence ordered reported H.R. 2417, The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. As you are [[Page H5879]] aware, the bill as reported contained several provisions which fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Financial Services pursuant to the Committee's jurisdiction under Rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives. As you know, we continue to have strong concerns about some of these provisions, particularly those relating to the creation of a Bureau of Enforcement and Intelligence within the Department of the Treasury. However, because of your commitment to support my position regarding all of these provisions as the bill moves through the process and the need to move this legislation expeditiously, I will waive consideration of the bill by the Financial Services Committee. By agreeing to waive its consideration of the bill, the Financial Services Committee does not waive its jurisdiction over H.R. 2417. In addition, the Committee on Financial Services reserves its authority to seek conferees on any provisions of the bill that are within the Financial Services Committee's jurisdiction during any House-Senate conference that may be convened on this legislation. I ask your commitment to support any request by the Committee on Financial Services for conferees on H.R. 2417 or related legislation. Finally, I request that you include a copy of this letter and your response in the Select Committee's report on the bill, and that they be printed in the Congressional Record during the consideration of this legislation on the floor. I appreciate your commitment to address my concerns as the process moves forward and willingness to work constructively toward common goals. Sincerely, Michael G. Oxley, Chairman. ____ House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC, June 17, 2003. Hon. Michael G. Oxley, Chairman, Committee on Financial Services, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC. Dear Chairman Oxley: On June 12, 2003, the Select Committee on Intelligence ordered reported H.R. 2417, the "Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2004." The bill as reported contained several provisions which fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Financial Services, pursuant to the Committee's jurisdiction under Rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives. I am quite aware of, and sensitive to the specific concerns you raise about the inclusion of section 105 in H.R. 2417 concerning the establishment of a Bureau of Intelligence and Enforcement within the Department of the Treasury. Once again, I want to convey my personal commitment to work with you to resolve this issue to our common satisfaction and support your position in a conference with the Senate on the Intelligence Authorization bill. I very much appreciate your willingness to waive consideration of H.R. 2417 by the Financial Services Committee. I acknowledge that, by agreeing to waive its consideration of the bill, the Financial Services Committee does not waive its jurisdiction over H.R. 2417. I further recognize that the Committee on Financial Services reserves its authority to seek conferees on any provisions of the bill that are within the Financial Services Committee's jurisdiction during any House-Senate conference that may be convened on this legislation. I will support a request by the Committee on Financial Services for conferees on H.R. 2417 or related legislation. Finally, I am pleased to accommodate your request to include a copy of your letter and my response in the Select Committee's report on the bill, and that they be printed in the Congressional Record during the consideration of this legislation on the floor. I appreciate your commitment to work together so as to achieve an appropriate and mutually satisfactory resolution of this important national security matter. Sincerely, Porter J. Goss, Chairman. ____ Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Washington, DC, June 19, 2003. Hon. Porter J. Goss, Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC. Dear Chairman Goss: I am writing to you concerning the jurisdictional interest of the Committee on Armed Services in matters being considered in H.R. 2417, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. I recognize the importance of H.R. 2417 and the need for this legislation to move expeditiously. Therefore, while the committee is entitled to a jurisdictional claim on this legislation, I do not intend to request a sequential referral. The Committee on Armed Services asks that you support our request to be conferees on the provisions over which we have jurisdiction during any House-Senate conference. Additionally, I request that you include this letter as part of your committee's report on H.R. 2417. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. Sincerely, Duncan Hunter, Chairman. ____ House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC, June 18, 2003. Hon. Duncan Hunter, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC. Dear Chairman Hunter: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 2417, the intelligence authorization bill for fiscal year 2004. As you noted, elements of the bill as reported fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on Armed Services. I will continue to work with you on these sections. I will support the Committee on Armed Services' request for conferees on these sections. I appreciate your willingness to forgo consideration of the bill and not request a sequential referral based on this understanding. I acknowledge that by agreeing to waive its consideration of the bill, the Committee on Armed Services does not waive its jurisdiction over the bill or any of the matters under your jurisdiction. I will include a copy of your letter and this response in our Committee's report on H.R. 2417 and the Congressional Record during consideration of the legislation on the House floor. Thank you for your assistance in this matter. Sincerely, Porter J. Goss, Chairman. Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank our staff. We have a perfect balance, I believe, between professional management staff and expertise on the various facets of the Intelligence Community which is what we need to do our job properly in terms of providing oversight on the one hand, to make sure the Intelligence Community plays in bounds and to make sure they have the necessary wherewithal, the advocacy piece that is our other side, the other hat we wear. I am very much convinced that intelligence is the best investment. We are involved globally. There is no question the United States of America is no secret any place around the world, and in order for us to do the best we can in terms of our security, we have to have good information. It is a good investment. Nobody would pretend that we are fully sufficient in all that we have. We can always do better, and I think we will probably be talking about sufficiency and insufficiency as we go along in our review. Nobody would say that we are inherent. There is no document I know that is written that is inherent with the possible exception of the Bible, and some would say the New York Times, but I think they forfeited their right to that recently, nor is there anyone infallible. We are all human beings. What I can say to the American people is that I am satisfied that the men and women of the Intelligence Community of our Nation, and there are thousands of them, are doing their best for our national security, and I think we need to be behind them, and supporting this bill would be a good way to do that. Mr. SIMMONS. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H.R. 2417, a bill to reauthorize appropriations for FY 2004 for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government. It has been my honor to serve this Nation with the Central Intelligence Agency for 10 years, five of which were spend as an operations officer in Southeast Asia. For over 30 years I served on active and reserve duty as a Military Intelligence Officer and have also had the unique privilege of serving as Staff Director for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence under Chairmen Barry Goldwater and Daniel Patrick Moynihan. All this service took place at a time when our Nation was seeking to win the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union changed our world for the better, but did not eliminate the need for accurate and timely intelligence. We now face a new uncertainty and risk. Rather than focusing on one or two superpowers, we have to defend against numerous lethal covert terrorist groups. H.R. 2417 responds to these changing threats by boosting the role of human intelligence or HUMINT gathered from human sources around the world; increases our ability to analyze material from a broad spectrum of sources; increases our capability to conduct counter terrorism; and authorizes protections and benefits for our intelligence officers at home and abroad. Mr. Chairman, it is incumbent on this body to improve the intelligence capabilities of the Nation, to better serve as the "eyes and ears" of America in a difficult and dangerous world. This bill responds to this urgent requirement, and I support it completely. [[Page H5880]] H.R. 2417--Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2004, Updated June 24, 2003 floor situation The House is scheduled to consider H.R. 2417, pursuant to a rule, on Wednesday, June 25, 2003. On Tuesday, June 24, 2003, the Rules Committee granted, by voice vote, a modified open rule providing one hour of general debate equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The rule provides that the bill shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. The rule provides that it shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the five-minute rule the amendment in the nature of a substitute now printed in the bill, which shall be considered as read. The rule waives all points of order against consideration of the bill, and against the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute. The rule provides that no amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be in order except those printed in the Rules Committee report accompanying the resolution, and all points of order against said amendments are waived. The rule provides that each amendment may be offered only in the order printed in the report, may be offered only by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered as read, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question in the House or in the Committee of the Whole. Finally, the rule provides one motion to recommit with or without instructions. summary H.R. 2417 authorizes appropriations for FY 2004 for (a) the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government, (b) the Community Management Account, and (c) the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System. The authorization level is classified. The funding levels and personnel ceilings for most programs are outlined in a classified annex to the committee report, which Members only may review in the offices of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in H-405 in the Capitol. highlights H.R. 2417 will: Provide full support for the Intelligence Community's efforts in the war on terrorism; Focus attention on the need to enhance Human Intelligence capabilities and tools; Authorize additional resources to improve analytical depth in all areas of intelligence, and increase our analytical capacity to process, exploit, and disseminate all of the intelligence that is collected; Posture the Intelligence Community to develop a framework for a unified overhead imagery architecture; Include provisions that are intended to improve the government's ability to identify any spies that might be working against the United States and to provide the government additional leverage as it moves to prosecute such traitors, such as Hanssen, Ames, and Montes; Establish a Bureau of Intelligence and Enforcement within the Department of the Treasury, to be headed by an Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Enforcement, that will enhance the government's ability to gather and process information about the financial support of terrorism and other illegal activity; Require the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to report on lessons learned as a result of military operations in Iraq; Improve information sharing among Federal, State, and local government officials; including increased training for state and local officials on how the intelligence community can support their counterterrorism efforts; Require the Intelligence Community's senior leadership to comprehensively examine (and report to Congress on) policy and technical issues related to digital information sharing, electronic collaboration, and "horizontal integration" across the Intelligence Community; Extend the authority for the use of funds designated for intelligence and intelligence-related purposes for assistance to the Government of Colombia for counter-drug activities to be used also to fund counterterrorism activities in Colombia for each of FYs 2004 through 2005; Provide limited immunity from tort liability to those Special Police Officers of the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency; Authorize the personnel ceilings on September 30, 2004 for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government and permit the Director of Central Intelligence to authorize personnel ceilings in Fiscal Year 2003 for any intelligence element up to two percent above the authorized levels, with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; and Authorize $226.4 million for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund (CIARDS) in order to fully fund the accruing cost of retirement benefits for individuals in the Civil Service Retirement System, CIARDS, and other Federal retirement systems. background Agencies' activities affected by the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2003, include fourteen agencies of the U.S. government, such as: Central Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; Defense Intelligence Agency; National Imagery and Mapping Agency; National Reconnaissance Organization; FBI (Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence); DOE; Homeland Security; and U.S. Coast Guard. Legislative History H.R. 2417 was introduced by Chairman Goss on June 11, 2003. It was reported from the Select Intelligence Committee by a vote of 16-0 on June 12, 2003 (H. Rpt. 108-163). Cost Estimate CBO estimates that the unclassified portions of this measure will cost $320 million over the 2004-2008 period, assuming appropriation of the specified and estimated amounts. CBO also estimates the bill will affect direct spending and receipts by an insignificant amount. H.R. 2417 contains intergovernmental and private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA), but CBO estimates that the costs of complying with these mandates will not exceed the thresholds established by that act ($59 million for intergovernmental mandates and $117 million for private-sector mandates in 2003, adjusted annually for inflation). Amendments Made in Order Under the Rule (6 amendments) Rep. Cox will offer an amendment (#10) on Wednesday, June 25, 2003. The amendment strikes Section 336 (Improvement of Information Sharing Among Federal, State, and Local Government Officials) of the bill. Contact: 6-8417. Rep. Farr will offer an amendment (#9) on Wednesday, June 25, 2003. The amendment seeks to improve the foreign language training of the intelligence community by providing: (1) training in the application of standardized foreign language skill assessment mechanisms; (2) development of curriculum for advanced proficiency intelligence community foreign language speakers and interpreters; (3) non-degree training for translators and interpreters; (4) training intelligence community foreign language teachers in the use of technology geared for teaching advanced "critical languages;" (5) intensive on-site foreign language training. Contact: 5- 2861. Rep. Harman will offer an amendment (#2) on Wednesday, June 25, 2003. It amends section (g)(1) of Section 343 of the bill by requiring the Director of Central Intelligence to report on whether further consolidation or elimination of watch list databases in Federal departments and agencies would contribute to the efficacy and effectiveness of the Terrorist Identification Classification System in identifying known or suspected terrorists. If passed, it would also require the Director of Central Intelligence to report on steps required to consolidate or eliminate such watch lists. Contact: 5- 8220. Rep. Hastings (FL) will offer an amendment (#1) on Wednesday, June 25, 2003. The amendment directs the Director of Central Intelligence to establish a pilot project to improve recruitment of ethnic and cultural minorities and women to meet the diversity of skills, language, and expertise required by the current mission. Contact: 5-1313. Rep. Kucinich will offer an amendment (#8) on Wednesday, June 25, 2003. The amendment directs the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency to conduct an audit of all telephone and electronic communications between the CIA and the Office of the Vice President that relate to weapons of mass destruction obtained or developed by Iraq preceding Operation Iraqi Freedom. Not later than one year after the date of enactment, the Inspector General shall submit a report to Congress on the audit conducted. Contact: 5-5871. Rep. Lee will offer an amendment (#7) on Wednesday, June 25, 2003. The amendment requires the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a study to determine the extent of intelligence sharing by the Department of Defense and intelligence community with United Nations inspectors searching for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Contact: 5-2661. Ms. McCARTHY of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to commend the collaborative efforts of my colleagues who serve on the Permanent Select Committee in crafting the FY2004 Intelligence Authorization, H.R. 2417. This measure encourages information sharing among agencies, which is critical to our Nation's ability to respond to threats to our homeland security. There are still important intelligence questions unresolved from our war in Iraq--questions that will, and should, face greater scrutiny in the coming months. This Intelligence Authorization provides added resources that will be used in securing the answers to those questions and we should support it. Mr Chairman, in closing, I want to commend the committee for giving us a bill that strengthens the Intelligence Community and provides new and better capabilities to fight the war on terrorism, and I urge my colleagues to support this measure. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIRMAN. All time having expired, the debate is concluded. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise. The motion was agreed to. Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. [[Page H5881]] Hefley) having assumed the chair, Mr. Isakson, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 2417) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for intelligence and intellience-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon. ____________________ Congressional Record: June 25, 2003 (House) Page H5883-H5903 INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004 The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 295 and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, H.R. 2417. {time} 1824 In the Committee of the Whole Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H.R. 2417) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with Mr. Simpson (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair. The Clerk read the title of the bill. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. When the Committee of the Whole rose earlier today, all time for general debate had expired. Pursuant to the rule, the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in the bill shall be considered as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule and shall be considered read. The text of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute is as follows: H.R. 2417 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the "Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004". (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations. Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations. Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments. Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account. Sec. 105. Intelligence elements of the Department of the Treasury. TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations. TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS Subtitle A--Recurring General Provisions Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law. Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities. Subtitle B--Intelligence Sec. 311. Modification of notice and wait requirements on projects to construct or improve intelligence community facilities. Subtitle C--Counterintelligence Sec. 321. Counterintelligence initiatives for the intelligence community. Subtitle D--Other Matters Sec. 331. Extension of suspension of reorganization of Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office. Sec. 332. Modifications of authorities on explosive materials. Sec. 333. Modification of prohibition on the naturalization of certain persons. Sec. 334. Modification to definition of financial institution in the Right to Financial Privacy Act. Sec. 335. Procedural requirements for Central Intelligence Agency relating to products of Federal prison industries. Sec. 336. Improvement of information sharing among federal, State, and local government officials. Subtitle E--Reports and Technical Amendments Sec. 341. Extension of deadline for final report of the National Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community. Sec. 342. Modification of various reports required of intelligence community elements. Sec. 343. Technical amendments. Sec. 344. Report on lessons learned from military operations in Iraq. TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Sec. 401. Protection from tort liability for certain Central Intelligence Agency personnel. Sec. 402. Repeal of limitation on use of funds in Central Services Working Capital Fund. TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE MATTERS Sec. 501. Use of funds for counterdrug and counterterrorism activities for Colombia. Sec. 502. Authority to provide living quarters for certain students in cooperative and summer education programs of the National Security Agency. Sec. 503. Authority for intelligence community elements of Department of Defense to award personal service contracts. Sec. 504. Protection of certain National Security Agency personnel from tort liability. Sec. 505. Measurement and signatures intelligence program. TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2004 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Central Intelligence Agency. (2) The Department of Defense. (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (4) The National Security Agency. (5) The National Reconnaissance Office. (6) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency. (7) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (8) The Department of State. (9) The Department of the Treasury. (10) The Department of Energy. (11) The Department of Justice. (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (13) The Department of Homeland Security. (14) The Coast Guard. SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts authorized to [[Page H5884]] be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2004, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 2417 of the One Hundred Eighth Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS. (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2004 under section 102 when the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall notify promptly the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever the Director exercises the authority granted by this section. SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2004 the sum of $192,640,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and Development Committee shall remain available until September 30, 2005. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence are authorized 320 full-time personnel as of September 30, 2004. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2004 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts shall remain available until September 30, 2004. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2004, there are hereby authorized such additional personnel for such elements as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2004 any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence. (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.-- (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated in subsection (a), $34,248,000 shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds provided for research, development, testing, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2005, and funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2006. (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General funds available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the National Drug Intelligence Center. (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)). (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center. SEC. 105. INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY. (a) In General.--(1) Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: "bureau of intelligence and enforcement of the department of the treasury "Sec. 119. (a) In General.--There is within the Department of the Treasury a Bureau of Intelligence and Enforcement headed by an Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Enforcement, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. "(b) Responsibilities.--(1) The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Enforcement shall oversee and coordinate functions of the Bureau of Intelligence and Enforcement. "(2) The Assistant Secretary shall report directly to the Secretary of the Treasury. "(c) Composition of Bureau.--The Bureau of Intelligence and Enforcement shall consist of the following offices: "(1) The Office of Intelligence Support. "(2) The Office of Foreign Assets Control. "(3) The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. "(4) Such other offices as the Assistant Secretary may establish.". (2) The table of contents contained in the first section of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 118 the following new item: "Sec. 119. Bureau of Intelligence and Enforcement of the Department of the Treasury.". (b) Consultation with DCI in Appointment of Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Enforcement.--Section 106(b)(2) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403-6(b)(2)) is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: "(E) The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Enforcement.". (c) Conforming Amendments.--(1) Section 3(4) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended-- (A) by striking "the Department of the Treasury," in subparagraph (H); (B) by striking "and" at the end of subparagraph (J); (C) by redesignating subparagraph (K) as subparagraph (L); and (D) by inserting after subparagraph (J) the following new subparagraph: "(K) the Bureau of Intelligence and Enforcement of the Department of the Treasury; and". (2) Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended in the item relating to Assistant Secretaries of the Treasury by striking "(7)" and inserting "(8)". TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2004 the sum of $226,400,000. TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS Subtitle A--Recurring General Provisions SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW. Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise permitted under the Constitution or authorized pursuant to the laws of the United States. Subtitle B--Intelligence SEC. 311. MODIFICATION OF NOTICE AND WAIT REQUIREMENTS ON PROJECTS TO CONSTRUCT OR IMPROVE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FACILITIES. (a) Increase of Thresholds for Notice.--Section 602(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-359; 108 Stat. 3432; 50 U.S.C. 403-2b(a)) is amended-- (1) by striking "$750,000" each place it appears and inserting "$5,000,000"; (2) by striking "$500,000" each place it appears and inserting "$1,000,000"; and (3) in paragraph (2), as amended by paragraph (2) of this subsection, by inserting after "$1,000,000" the second place it appears, the following: "but less than $5,000,000". (b) Notice and Wait Requirements for Emergency Projects.-- Section 602(b)(2) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-359; 108 Stat. 3432; 50 U.S.C. 403-2b(b)(2)) is amended-- (1) in the third sentence, by striking "21-day" and inserting "7-day"; and, (2) by adding at the end the following new sentence: "Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this paragraph, when the Director of Central Intelligence and Secretary of Defense jointly determine that an emergency relating to the national security or to the protection of health, safety, or environmental quality exists and that delay would irreparably harm any or all of those interests, the project may begin on the date the notification is received by such committees.". Subtitle C--Counterintelligence SEC. 321. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. (a) In General.--(1) Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: "counterintelligence initiatives "Sec. 1102. (a) Inspection Process.--(1) In order to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, the Director of Central Intelligence shall establish and implement an inspection process for all agencies and departments of the United States that handle classified information relating to the national security of the United States intended to assure that those agencies and departments maintain effective operational security practices and programs directed against counterintelligence activities. [[Page H5885]] "(2) The Director shall carry out the process through the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive. "(b) FBI Counterintelligence Office.--The Attorney General, acting through the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall establish an Office of Counterintelligence within the Bureau to investigate potential espionage activities within the Bureau. "(c) Annual Review of Dissemination Lists.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall establish and implement a process for all elements of the intelligence community (as defined in section 101(4)) to review, on an annual basis, individuals included on distribution lists for access to classified information. Such process shall ensure that only individuals who have a particularized `need to know' (as determined by the Director) are continued on such distribution lists. "(2) Not later than October 15 of each year, the Director shall certify to the congressional intelligence committees that the review required under paragraph (1) has been conducted in all elements of the intelligence community during the preceding fiscal year. "(d) Required Completion of Financial Disclosure Statements.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall establish and implement a process by which heads of the elements of the intelligence community (as defined in section 101(4)) direct that all employees, in order to be granted access to classified information, submit financial disclosure forms required under section 1.3(b) of Executive Order No. 12969 (August 2, 1995; 60 F.R. 40245; 50 U.S.C. 435 note). "(2) The Director shall carry out paragraph (1) through the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive. "(e) Arrangements To Handle Sensitive Information.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall establish, for all elements of the intelligence community (as defined in section 101(4)), programs and procedures by which sensitive classified information relating to human intelligence is safeguarded against unauthorized disclosure by employees of those elements.". (2) The table of contents contained in the first section of such Act is amended in the items relating to title XI by adding at the end the following new item: "Sec. 1102. Counterintelligence initiatives.". (b) Intelligence and National Security Aspects of Espionage Prosecutions.--The Attorney General, acting through the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review of the Department of Justice, in consultation with the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, shall establish policies and procedures to assist the Attorney General in the Attorney General's consideration of intelligence and national security equities in the development of charging documents and related pleadings in espionage prosecutions. Subtitle D--Other Matters SEC. 331. EXTENSION OF SUSPENSION OF REORGANIZATION OF DIPLOMATIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROGRAM OFFICE. Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107-108; 115 Stat. 1401; 22 U.S.C. 7301 note), as amended by section 351 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2401; 22 U.S.C. 7301 note), is amended-- (1) in the heading, by striking "two-year" before "suspension of reorganization"; and (2) in the text, by striking "ending on October 1, 2003" and inserting "ending on the date that is 60 days after the date on which appropriate congressional committees of jurisdiction (as defined in section 324(d) of that Act (22 U.S.C. 7304(d)) are notified jointly by the Secretary of State (or the Secretary's designee) and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (or the Director's designee) that the operational framework for the office has been terminated". SEC. 332. MODIFICATIONS OF AUTHORITIES ON EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS. (a) Authority To Distribute Explosive Materials To Qualified Aliens.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall be lawful for any person knowingly to distribute explosive materials to any qualified alien-- (1) if, in the case of a qualified alien described in subsection (c)(1), the distribution to, shipment to, transportation to, receipt by, or possession by the alien of the explosive materials is in furtherance of such cooperation; or (2) if, in the case of a qualified alien described in subsection (c)(2), the distribution to, shipping to, transporting to, possession by, or receipt by the alien of explosive materials is in furtherance of the authorized military purpose. (b) Authority for Qualified Aliens To Ship Explosive Materials.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall be lawful for a qualified alien to ship or transport any explosive in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or to receive or possess any explosive which has been shipped or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce-- (1) if, in the case of a qualified alien described in subsection (c)(1), the possession, shipment, or transportation by the alien of the explosive materials is in furtherance of such cooperation; or (2) if, in the case of a qualified alien described in subsection (c)(2), the possession, shipment, or transportation by the alien of explosive materials is in furtherance of the authorized military purpose. (c) Qualified Alien Defined.--In this section, the term "qualified alien" means an alien-- (1) who is lawfully present in the United States in cooperation with the Director of Central Intelligence; or (2) who is a member of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or other friendly foreign military force (as determined by the Attorney General with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense) who is present in the United States under military orders for training or other military purpose authorized by the United States. SEC. 333. MODIFICATION OF PROHIBITION ON THE NATURALIZATION OF CERTAIN PERSONS. Section 313(e)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1424(e)(4)) is amended-- (1) by inserting "when Department of Defense activities are relevant to the determination" after "Secretary of Defense"; and (2) by inserting "and the Secretary of Homeland Security" after "Attorney General". SEC. 334. MODIFICATION TO DEFINITION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTION IN THE RIGHT TO FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT. (a) In General.--Section 1101(1) of the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3401(1)) is amended by inserting ", except as provided in section 1114," before "means any office". (b) Definition.--Section 1114 of such Act (12 U.S.C. 3414) is amended by adding at the end the following: "(c) For purposes of this section, the term `financial institution' has the same meaning as in section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code, except that, for purposes of this section, such term shall include only such a financial institution any part of which is located inside any State or territory of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, or the United States Virgin Islands.". SEC. 335. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RELATING TO PRODUCTS OF FEDERAL PRISON INDUSTRIES. The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: "procedural requirements for central intelligence agency relating to products of federal prison industries "Sec. 23. (a) Market Research.--Before purchasing a product listed in the latest edition of the Federal Prison Industries catalog under section 4124(d) of title 18, United States Code, the Director shall conduct market research to determine whether the Federal Prison Industries product is comparable to products available from the private sector that best meet the Agency's needs in terms of price, quality, and time of delivery. "(b) Competition Requirement.--If the Director determines that a Federal Prison Industries product is not comparable in price, quality, or time of delivery to products available from the private sector that best meet the Agency's needs in terms of price, quality, and time of delivery, the Director shall use competitive procedures for the procurement of the product or shall make an individual purchase under a multiple award contract. In conducting such a competition or making such a purchase, the Director shall consider a timely offer from Federal Prison Industries. "(c) Implementation by Director.--The Director shall ensure that-- "(1) the Agency does not purchase a Federal Prison Industries product or service unless a contracting officer of the Agency determines that the product or service is comparable to products or services available from the private sector that best meet the Agency's needs in terms of price, quality, and time of delivery; and "(2) Federal Prison Industries performs its contractual obligations to the same extent as any other contractor for the Agency. "(d) Market Research Determination Not Subject to Review.--A determination by a contracting officer regarding whether a product or service offered by Federal Prison Industries is comparable to products or services available from the private sector that best meet the Agency's needs in terms of price, quality, and time of delivery shall not be subject to review pursuant to section 4124(b) of title 18. "(e) Performance as a Subcontractor.--(1) A contractor or potential contractor of the Agency may not be required to use Federal Prison Industries as a subcontractor or supplier of products or provider of services for the performance of a contract of the Agency by any means, including means such as-- "(A) a contract solicitation provision requiring a contractor to offer to make use of products or services of Federal Prison Industries in the performance of the contract; "(B) a contract specification requiring the contractor to use specific products or services (or classes of products or services) offered by Federal Prison Industries in the performance of the contract; or "(C) any contract modification directing the use of products or services of Federal Prison Industries in the performance of the contract. "(2) In this subsection, the term `contractor', with respect to a contract, includes a subcontractor at any tier under the contract. "(f) Protection of Classified and Sensitive Information.-- The Director may not enter into any contract with Federal Prison Industries under which an inmate worker would have access to-- "(1) any data that is classified; "(2) any geographic data regarding the location of-- "(A) surface and subsurface infrastructure providing communications or water or electrical power distribution; "(B) pipelines for the distribution of natural gas, bulk petroleum products, or other commodities; or "(C) other utilities; or "(3) any personal or financial information about any individual private citizen, including information relating to such person's real property however described, without the prior consent of the individual. "(g) Application of Provision.--This section is subject to the preceding provisions of this Act, and shall not be construed as affecting any right or duty of the Director under those provisions. [[Page H5886]] "(h) Definitions.--In this section: "(1) The terms `competitive procedures' and `procurement' have the meanings given such terms in section 4 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 403). "(2) The term `market research' means obtaining specific information about the price, quality, and time of delivery of products available in the private sector through a variety of means, which may include-- "(A) contacting knowledgeable individuals in government and industry; "(B) interactive communication among industry, acquisition personnel, and customers; and "(C) interchange meetings or pre-solicitation conferences with potential offerors.". SEC. 336. IMPROVEMENT OF INFORMATION SHARING AMONG FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. (a) Pilot Project To Encourage State and Local Officials, As Well As Representatives of Critical Infrastructure, To Collect and Share Relevant Information.--Section 892(c) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296; 6 U.S.C. 482) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: "(3)(A) The Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection of the Department of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, may conduct projects in several cities to encourage officials of State and local government, as well as representatives of industries that comprise the critical infrastructure in those cities to lawfully collect and to pass on to the appropriate Federal officials information vital for the prevention of terrorist attacks against the United States. "(B) The Director of Central Intelligence shall carry out any duty under this paragraph through the Director of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. "(C) Under the projects, training shall be provided to such officials and representatives to-- "(i) identify sources of potential threats through such methods as the Secretary determines appropriate; "(ii) report information relating to such potential threats to the appropriate Federal agencies in the appropriate form and manner; and "(iii) assure that all reported information is systematically submitted to and passed on by the Department for use by appropriate Federal agencies. "(D) The Under Secretary shall carry out the pilot project under this paragraph for a period of 3 years. "(E) Not later than 1 year after the implementation of the pilot project, and annually thereafter, the Under Secretary shall submit to Congress a report on the pilot project conducted under this paragraph. Each such report shall include-- "(i) an assessment of the effectiveness of the project; and "(ii) recommendations on the continuation of the project as well as any recommendations to improve the effectiveness of information collection and sharing by such officials and representatives and the Federal government.". (b) Pilot Project To Test Use of Tear-line Intelligence Reports.--(1) Subtitle C of title II of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: "SEC. 226. PILOT PROJECT TO TEST USE OF TEAR-LINE INTELLIGENCE REPORTS. "(a) Authority.--The Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection of the Department of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, may carry out a pilot program under which the Under Secretary may make intelligence information in the possession of the Department available to officials of State and local governments through the use of tear-line intelligence reports. "(b) Tear-line Intelligence Reports Described.--For purpose of this section, a tear-line report is a report containing intelligence gathered by an agency or department of the United States that is in the possession of the Department that is prepared in a manner such that information relating to intelligence sources and methods is easily severable from the report to protect such sources and methods from disclosure. Such a report may be in a paper or an electronic format. "(c) Duration of Project.--The Under Secretary shall carry out the pilot project under this section for a period of 3 years. "(d) Reports to Congress.--Not later than 1 year after the implementation of the pilot project, and annually thereafter, the Under Secretary shall submit to Congress a report on the pilot project conducted under this section, and shall include in the report an assessment of-- "(1) the effectiveness of the use of the tear-line reports in providing intelligence information on a timely basis to State and local authorities; and "(2) if the use of such tear-line reports were to be made permanent, whether additional safeguards are needed with respect to the use of such reports. "(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Under Secretary such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section.". (2) The table of contents in section 1(b) of such Act is amended in subtitle C of title II by adding at the end the following new item. "Sec. 226. Pilot project to test use of tear-line intelligence reports.". (c) Homeland Defender Intelligence Training Program. (1) Establishment of program.--The Director of Central Intelligence may establish a comprehensive program of orientation and training to qualified State and local officials in accessing and using available resources of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401(4))). (2) Consultation.--Insofar as the Director establishes the intelligence training program under paragraph (1), the Director shall consult and coordinate with the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secretary of Homeland Security on the development and administration of the program. (3) Program goals.--Any intelligence training program established under paragraph (1) shall provide qualified State and local officials instruction on the mission and roles of the intelligence community to promote more effective information sharing among Federal, State, and local officials to prevent terrorist attacks against the United States. (4) Curriculum.--Insofar as the Director establishes the intelligence training program under paragraph (1), the Director shall develop a curriculum for the program after consultation with qualified State and local officials. The curriculum shall include classroom instruction with respect to and orientation to the various elements of the intelligence community. (5) Reports to congress.--Not later than 1 year after the initial implementation of the intelligence training program under paragraph (1), and annually thereafter, the Director shall submit to Congress a report on the program. Each such report shall include-- (A) an assessment of the effectiveness of the project; and (B) recommendations on the continuation of the project as well as any recommendations to improve the effectiveness of information collection and sharing by qualified officials and representatives and the Federal government. (6) Qualified state and local officials defined.--For purposes of this subsection, the term "qualified State and local officials" means officials of State and local government agencies that Director of Central Intelligence determines-- (A) have received appropriate security clearances from the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for access to classified information; and (B) oversee or manage first responders or counterterrorism activities. (7) Authorization of appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the Director such sums as are necessary to carry out the intelligence training program under this subsection. (d) Advisory Councils.--(1) The Director of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center shall establish two advisory councils (described in paragraph (2)) to provide the Director such advice and recommendations as the Director may require to effectively carry out the functions of the Center. (2)(A) One advisory council shall have as its focus privacy and civil liberties issues. (B) The other advisory council shall have as its focus State and local government information needs. Subtitle E--Reports and Technical Amendments SEC. 341. EXTENSION OF DEADLINE FOR FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1007 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 401 note; 116 Stat. 2442) is amended by striking "September 1, 2003" and inserting "September 1, 2004". (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect as if included in the enactment of section 1007 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. SEC. 342. MODIFICATION OF VARIOUS REPORTS REQUIRED OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ELEMENTS. (a) Reports on Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions.--Subsection (b)(1) of section 721 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-293; 110 Stat. 3474; 50 U.S.C. 2366), as amended by section 811(b)(5)(C) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2424; 50 U.S.C. 2366), is amended by striking "a semiannual" and inserting "an annual". (b) Periodic and Special Reports on Disclosure of Intelligence Information to United Nations.--Section 112(b)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404g(b)(1)) is amended by striking "semiannually" and inserting "annually". SEC. 343. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS. (a) National Security Act of 1947.--Section 112(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404g(d)(1)) is amended by striking "section 103(c)(6)" and inserting "section 103(c)(7)". (b) Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--(1) Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403g) is amended by striking "section 103(c)(6)" and inserting "section 103(c)(7)". (2) Section 15 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403o) is amended-- (A) in subsection (a)(1), by striking "special policemen of the General Services Administration perform under the first section of the Act entitled `An Act to authorize the Federal Works Administrator or officials of the Federal Works Agency duly authorized by him to appoint special policeman for duty upon Federal property under the jurisdiction of the Federal Works Agency, and for other purposes' (40 U.S.C. 318)," and inserting "officers and agents of the Department of Homeland Security, as provided in section 1315(b)(2) of title 40, United States Code,"; and (B) in subsection (b), by striking "the fourth section of the Act referred to in subsection (a) of [[Page H5887]] this section (40 U.S.C. 318c)" and inserting "section 1315(c)(2) of title 40, United States Code". (c) National Security Agency Act of 1959.--Section 11 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(1), by striking "special policemen of the General Services Administration perform under the first section of the Act entitled `An Act to authorize the Federal Works Administrator or officials of the Federal Works Agency duly authorized by him to appoint special policeman for duty upon Federal property under the jurisdiction of the Federal Works Agency, and for other purposes' (40 U.S.C. 318)" and inserting "officers and agents of the Department of Homeland Security, as provided in section 1315(b)(2) of title 40, United States Code,"; and (2) in subsection (b), by striking "the fourth section of the Act referred to in subsection (a) (40 U.S.C. 318c)" and inserting "section 1315(c)(2) of title 40, United States Code". (d) Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.-- Section 343 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2399; 50 U.S.C. 404n-2) is amended-- (1) in subsection (c), by striking "section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6))" and inserting "section 103(c)(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))"; and (2) in subsection (e)(2), by striking "section 103(c)(6)" and inserting "section 103(c)(7)". (e) Public Law 107-173.--Section 201(c)(3)(F) of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-173; 116 Stat. 548; 8 U.S.C. 1721(c)(3)(F)) is amended by striking "section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6))" and inserting "section 103(c)(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))". (f) Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002.-- Section 3535(b)(1) of title 44, United States Code, as added by section 1001(b)(1) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296), and section 3545(b)(1) of title 44, United States Code, as added by section 301(b)(1) of the E- Government Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-347), are each amended by inserting "or any other law" after "1978". SEC. 344. REPORT ON LESSONS LEARNED FROM MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ. (a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the intelligence lessons learned as a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom, including lessons relating to the following: (1) The tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. (2) Accuracy, timeliness, and objectivity of intelligence analysis. (3) Intelligence support to policymakers and members of the Armed Forces in combat. (4) Coordination of intelligence activities and operations with military operations. (5) Strengths and limitations of intelligence systems and equipment. (6) Such other matters as the Director considers appropriate. (b) Recommendations.--The report under subsection (a) shall include such recommendations on improvement in the matters described in subsection (a) as the Director considers appropriate. (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term "appropriate committees of Congress" means-- (1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SEC. 401. PROTECTION FROM TORT LIABILITY FOR CERTAIN CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY PERSONNEL. (a) In General.--Section 15 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403o) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: "(d)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any Agency personnel designated by the Director under subsection (a) shall be deemed for purposes of chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code, or any other provision of law relating to tort liability, to be acting within the scope of their office or employment if the Agency personnel take reasonable action, which may include the use of force, to-- "(A) protect an individual in the presence of the Agency personnel from a crime of violence; "(B) provide immediate assistance to an individual who has suffered or who is threatened with bodily harm; or "(C) prevent the escape of any individual whom the Agency personnel reasonably believe to have committed a crime of violence in the presence of such personnel. "(2) In this subsection, the term `crime of violence' has the meaning given that term in section 16 of title 18, United States Code.". (b) Construction.--Subsection (d) of section 15, as added by subsection (a), shall not be construed as affecting the authorities of the Attorney General under the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-694; 28 U.S.C. 2671, 2674, 2679(b), 2679(d)). SEC. 402. REPEAL OF LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS IN CENTRAL SERVICES WORKING CAPITAL FUND. Section 21(f)(2) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403u(f)(2)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking "(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), the Director" and inserting "The Director"; and (2) by striking subparagraph (B). TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE MATTERS SEC. 501. USE OF FUNDS FOR COUNTERDRUG AND COUNTERTERRORISM ACTIVITIES FOR COLOMBIA. (a) Extension of Authority.--Subsection (a) of section 501 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2404) is amended by striking "for fiscal years 2002 and 2003" and inserting "for each of fiscal years 2002 through 2005". (b) Modification.--(1) Subsection (e) of such section is amended to read as follows: "(e) Prohibition.--No United States Armed Forces personnel, United States civilian employee or contractor engaged by the United States will participate in any combat operation in connection with assistance made available under this section, except for the purpose of acting to protect the life or the physical security of others, in self defense, or during the course of search and rescue operations.". (c) Technical Amendment.--Subsection (d) of such section is amended by striking "Sections 556, 567, and 568 of Public Law 107-115, section 8093 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2002," and inserting "Section 553 and the certification requirements of section 564(a)(2) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2003 (division E of Public Law 108-7; 117 Stat. 200, 205), and section 8093 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003 (Public Law 107-248; 116 Stat. 1558; 10 U.S.C. 182 note),". (d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsections (b) and (c) shall apply to assistance made available under such section 501 during fiscal years 2004 and 2005. SEC. 502. AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE LIVING QUARTERS FOR CERTAIN STUDENTS IN COOPERATIVE AND SUMMER EDUCATION PROGRAMS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY. Section 2195 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: "(d)(1) The Director of the National Security Agency may provide a qualifying employee of a defense laboratory of that Agency with living quarters at no charge, or at a rate or charge prescribed by the Director by regulation, without regard to section 5911(c) of title 5. "(2) In this subsection, the term `qualifying employee' means a student who is employed at the National Security Agency under-- "(A) a Student Educational Employment Program of the Agency conducted under this section or any other provision of law; or "(B) a similar cooperative or summer education program of the Agency that meets the criteria for Federal cooperative or summer education programs prescribed by the Office of Personnel Management.". SEC. 503. AUTHORITY FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ELEMENTS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO AWARD PERSONAL SERVICE CONTRACTS. (a) In General.--Subchapter I of chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section: "Sec. 426. Personal services contracts: authority and limitations "(a) Personal Services.--(1) The Secretary of Defense may, notwithstanding section 3109 of title 5, enter into personal services contracts in the United States if the personal services directly support the mission of a defense intelligence component or counter-intelligence organization. "(2) The contracting officer for a personal services contract shall be responsible for ensuring that a personal services contract is the appropriate vehicle for carrying out the purpose of the contract. "(b) Definition.--In this section, the term `defense intelligence component' means a component of the Department of Defense that is an element of the intelligence community, as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).". (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of such subchapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item: "426. Personal services contracts: authority and limitations.". SEC. 504. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY PERSONNEL FROM TORT LIABILITY. Section 11 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: "(d)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, agency personnel designated by the Director of the National Security Agency under subsection (a) shall be considered for purposes of chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code, or any other provision of law relating to tort liability, to be acting within the scope of their office or employment when such agency personnel take reasonable action, which may include the use of force, to-- "(A) protect an individual in the presence of such agency personnel from a crime of violence; "(B) provide immediate assistance to an individual who has suffered or who is threatened with bodily harm; or "(C) prevent the escape of any individual whom such agency personnel reasonably believe to have committed a crime of violence in the presence of such agency personnel. "(2) Paragraph (1) shall not affect the authorities of the Attorney General under section 2679(d)(1) of title 28, United States Code. "(3) In this subsection, the term `crime of violence' has the meaning given that term in section 16 of title 18, United States Code.". [[Page H5888]] SEC. 505. MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURES INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH PROGRAM. (a) Research Program.--The Secretary of Defense, acting through the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency's Directorate for MASINT and Technical Collection, shall carry out a program to incorporate the results of basic research on sensors into the measurement and signatures intelligence systems of the United States, to the extent the results of such research is applicable to such systems. (b) Program Components.--The program under subsection (a) shall review and assess both basic research on sensors and technologies conducted by the United States Government and by non-governmental entities. In carrying out the program, the Director shall protect intellectual property rights, maintain organizational flexibility, and establish research projects, funding levels, and potential benefits in an equitable manner through Directorate. (c) Advisory Panel.--(1) The Director shall establish an advisory panel to assist the Director in carrying out the program under subsection (a). (2) The advisory panel shall be headed by the Director who shall determine the selection, review, and assessment of the research projects under the program. (3)(A) The Director shall appoint as members of the advisory panel representatives of each entity of the MASINT community, and may appoint as such members representatives of national laboratories, universities, and private sector entities. (B) For purposes of this subsection the term "MASINT community" means academic, professional, industrial, and government entities that are committed towards the advancement of the sciences in measurement and signatures intelligence. (C) The term for a member of the advisory panel shall be established by the Director, but may not exceed a period of 5 consecutive years. (D) Members of the advisory panel may not receive additional pay, allowances, or benefits by reason of their service on the advisory panel, but may receive per diem in lieu of subsistence, in accordance with applicable provisions under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code. (4) The Director may accept contributions from non- governmental participants on the advisory panel to defray the expenses of the advisory panel. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. No amendment to the committee amendment is in order except those printed in House Report 108-176. Each amendment may be offered only in the order printed in the report, by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered read, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in House Report 108-176. Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Cox Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: Amendment No. 1 offered by Mr. Cox: Strike section 336. Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, as chairman of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, I am pleased to rise in support of H.R. 2417. The amendment that I have introduced I will address in a moment but let me state at the outset that there is no more important function in the war on terrorism than having and acting on good intelligence, intelligence about attacks that are yet to come, intelligence about who is involved, what is planned, where and when it will take place and how it might be executed. The bill as it is written provides critical support for the Intelligence Community's efforts in the war on terrorism. I especially appreciate the provisions in the legislation focusing additional attention on enhancing our capability for gathering human intelligence as well as the provisions that provide additional resources to increase our analytical capacity to process and make use of the intelligence we do gather. The amendment that I am offering seeks to strike section 336 of the legislation. Section 336 would amend the Homeland Security Act to create two pilot programs, one, to encourage State and local officials, critical infrastructure owners to collect and share relevant information; and, two, to test use of tear-line intelligence reports. However, Mr. Chairman, the Homeland Security Act already includes training and information sharing requirements for State, local and private sector officials. The Director of Central Intelligence, the head of the CIA, would under the language of the bill as it is written have a central role in both of these pilot programs which would inject the CIA into this domestic, homeland security function. Under the first section 336 pilot program on sharing critical infrastructure information, the DCI would carry out his responsibilities through the Director of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, or TTIC, which has never before been recognized in law and has no responsibilities whatever for critical infrastructure information. Using TTIC in this way would undermine the statutory function of the Office of Infrastructure Protection subdirectorate of the Department of Homeland Security. We do not need to pilotize the Department's existing statutory obligations. The Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, already is required to, and this is now a quote from existing law, "coordinate training and other support to the elements and personnel of the Department, other agencies of the Federal Government, and State and local governments that provide information to the Department, or are consumers of information provided by the Department, in order to facilitate the identification and sharing of information." That is the Homeland Security Act as it is written. The Homeland Security Act already requires that the Secretary of Homeland Security "coordinate with elements of the Intelligence Community and with Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, and the private sector." Extensive information sharing requirements covering State, local and private officials already exist in the Homeland Security Act, for example, in sections 891 and 892. Tear-line reporting, unclassified reports to convey the critical substance of classified intelligence reporting, is already a common practice. There is not a need for a pilot program. The Homeland Security Act already requires that the Secretary of Homeland Security "in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, shall work to ensure that intelligence or other information relating to terrorism to which the Department has access is appropriately shared with State and local governments." {time} 1830 At this point I hope that the distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, could rise to enter into a colloquy so that I might obtain additional information on the amendments to the Homeland Security Act contained within section 336 of the legislation, and I would yield for this purpose to the chairman. As the chairman knows, I am offering an amendment to strike section 336 of the legislation as it proposes amendments to the Homeland Security Act that fall within the jurisdiction of the Permanent Select Committee on Homeland Security. I am prepared to withdraw this amendment pending appropriate clarification by the gentleman. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. COX. I yield to the gentleman from Florida. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I would like to clarify for the record that the provisions of H.R. 2417, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, amending the Homeland Security Act, fall within the jurisdiction of the Select Committee on Homeland Security and that their inclusion in H.R. 2417 does not create a basis for the assertion of jurisdiction over the act by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Furthermore, I would like to clarify for the distinguished chairman that the chairman of the Select Committee on Homeland Security and I have indeed agreed upon a revision of the provisions that are acceptable to both our ranking members, that is, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) and the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner), the gentleman's committee's ranking member. I will commit to work with the gentleman's committee and the Committee on the Judiciary for substitution of the revised language in the conference negotiations between the House and the Senate, and to that end I have also agreed to support the request of the Select Committee on Homeland Security for the appointment of two conferees on H.R. 2417. Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I thank the gentleman for his comments. [[Page H5889]] I include in the Congressional Record copies of the exchange of correspondence between our two committees on this topic. U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC, June 25, 2003. Hon. Christopher Cox, Chairman, Select Committee on Homeland Security, Washington, DC. Dear Mr. Chairman: This letter is to memorialize our understanding that the provisions of H.R. 2417 (the "provisions") amending the Homeland Security Act (the "Act") fall within the jurisdiction of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, and that their inclusion in H.R. 2417 does not create a basis for the assertion of jurisdiction over the Act by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. We have agreed upon a revision of the provisions that is acceptable to both of our Ranking Members, a copy of which is attached, and we agree to work for a mutually agreeable resolution of this provision with your Committee and the Committee on the Judiciary, for substitution in the conference negotiations between the House and the Senate. To that end, I have agreed to support the request of the Select Committee on Homeland Security for the appointment of two conferees on H.R. 2417. Sincerely, Porter J. Goss, Chairman. ____ U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Homeland Security, Washington, DC, June 25, 2003. Hon. Porter Goss, Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC. Dear Chairman Goss: This letter is to memorialize our understanding that the provisions of H.R. 2417 (the "provisions") amending the Homeland Security Act (the "Act") fall within the jurisdiction of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, and that their inclusion in H.R. 2417 does not create a basis for the assertion of jurisdiction over the Act by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. We have agreed upon a revision of the provisions that is acceptable to both of our Ranking Members, a copy of which is attached, and we agree to work for substitution of the revised language in the conference negotiations between the House and the Senate. To that end, I have agreed to support the request of the Select Committee on Homeland Security for the appointment of two conferees on H.R. 2417. Sincerely, Christopher Cox, Chairman. ____ Amendment to H.R. 2417, as Reported Offered by Mr. Cox of California (for himself and Mr. Turner of Texas) Amend section 336 to read as follows: SEC. 336. IMPROVEMENT OF INFORMATION SHARING AMONG FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. (a) In General.--Section 892(c) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296; 6 U.S.C. 482) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: "(3)(A) The Secretary shall establish a program to provide appropriate training to officials described in subparagraph (B) in order to assist such officials in-- "(i) identifying sources of potential terrorist threats through such methods as the Secretary determines appropriate; "(ii) reporting information relating to such potential terrorist threats to the appropriate Federal agencies in the appropriate form and manner; "(iii) assuring that all reported information is systematically submitted to and passed on by the Department for use by appropriate Federal agencies; and "(iv) understanding the mission and roles of the intelligence community to promote more effective information sharing among Federal, State, and local officials to prevent terrorist attacks against the United States. "(B) The officials referred to in subparagraph (A) are officials of State and local government agencies that oversee or manage first responders or counterterrorism activities. "(C) The Secretary shall consult with the Attorney General to ensure that the training program established in subparagraph (A) does not duplicate the training program established in section 908 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Public Law 107-56; 28 U.S.C. 509 note). "(D) The Secretary shall carry out this paragraph through the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (acting pursuant to the duties described in section 201(d)(16)), in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General.".- (b) Report.--(1) Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to Congress a report that describes the Secretary's plan for implementing such section 892 (as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act) and an estimated date of completion of the implementation. Because of the agreement between our two committees, I will also ask unanimous consent to withdraw the amendment. I look forward to working with the chairman and members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for an agreeable resolution of this matter in conference. Mr. Chairman, if I have remaining time, I yield to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the ranking member. Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I rise to state that I fully support the agreement that has been worked out between the chairmen of the two committees on which I serve. Since the language at issue was language that was inserted in our bill at my request, I want to make clear that we should work out these jurisdictional issues, but we also should proceed to find the right sections of the right bills to insert additional language on information sharing which is still a critical need in the homeland security and the terrorist threat areas. We also need to insert language at the right places about the protection of civil liberties. I listened to the comments by the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) concerning the fact that we have no statutory language for TTIC, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, and perhaps we should decide about that in some other forum. Nonetheless, TTIC exists, and it is critically important that we make sure that it respects the civil liberties of Americans. So we will continue to search for new venues, but I thank both chairmen for finding the proper way to solve this issue. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to use the 5 minutes. I just want to clarify this point while the distinguished chairman of the Select Committee on Homeland Security is here that his efforts and the gentlewoman from California's (Ms. Harman) efforts to work out acceptable language had in fact transpired and we were prepared to accept an amendment to the bill to do that. There is another party involved, and we wanted to make sure that the appropriate full dialogue took place because what we are about here is really trying to plug in a Foreign Intelligence Program, which is what our portfolio is with the new efforts domestically to deal with terrorism on the homeland. We are not interested in any territorial acquisition, as I have said many times. We are interested in plugging in the national foreign intelligence activity and capability in the right places in the right way. That will involve working with a number of committees. Fortunately, we have good Members who serve on a number of committees and we are using that expertise to make these bridging arrangements. I would like to publicly thank the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) for their efforts to get the homeland security piece done. We have more work to do on this particular element. They have my pledge in the colloquy that we will work together to get this done properly, and I have nothing further to add to that. Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from California. Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I want to return the favor and thank both the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), ranking member, for all of the work that went into making this language acceptable, the language that we had agreed upon. I am sorry it cannot be included procedurally, but our understanding to do it at the next step is certainly satisfactory to me; and I just want to say that I could not agree more with the sentiments of both the chairman and the ranking member about the importance of sharing information. That is what the mission of Homeland Security is all about, and we do have between us and among us ample opportunity to amend whatever laws it takes to get this job done; and I would point out that the Speaker has made it possible for all three of us to work together on the Select Committee on Homeland Security. So we are doing our version of fusion here in the House, and I am confident we will succeed. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw the amendment. [[Page H5890]] The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California? There was no objection. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 printed in House Report 108-176. If the amendment proposed by the gentleman from California (Mr. Farr) is not to be offered, then it is now in order to consider amendment No. 3. printed in House Report 108-176. Amendment No. 3 Offered by Ms. Harman Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: Amendment No. 3 offered by Ms. Harman: At the end of title III, add the following new section: SEC. 345. MODIFICATION OF TERRORIST IDENTIFICATION CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM. (a) Certification Requirement for Consolidation of Watch Lists.--Subsection (g)(1) of section 343 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2399; 50 U.S.C. 404n2) is amended-- (1) by redesignating subparagraph (D) as subparagraph (E); (2) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following new subparagraph: "(D) Whether further consolidation or elimination of watch list databases in the departments and agencies with access to the System would contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness of the System in identifying individuals who are known or suspected international terrorists."; and (3) in subparagraph (E), as so redesignated, by adding at the end the following: "If the certification under subparagraph (D) is in the positive, the steps required to consolidate or eliminate such watch lists.". (b) Establishment of Advisory Council.--Subsection (b) of such section is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: "(4) The Director shall establish an advisory council comprised of experts in the field of civil liberties and privacy issues to advise the Director on issues of civil liberties and privacy as they relate to the maintenance of the System.". Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, let me say first that the amendment which the gentleman from California (Mr. Farr) would have offered is an excellent amendment having to do with language skills, and my understanding is that we have accommodated him in some other way. I am sure the chairman will speak to that. And I would be happy to yield to him first on that subject. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield? Ms. HARMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Florida. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentlewoman for yielding. All I would say is that I was going to compliment the gentleman from California (Mr. Farr) for a very helpful, thoughtful contribution to our work product. In fact, we have been working on this subject for a number of years, which is the training question and the language question; and the gentleman has some very unique perspectives on this which have been very helpful to us. We are improved in our committee for his participation in this process. I do not believe it is necessary to offer the amendment. Apparently he has not, but I nevertheless wanted to appreciate publicly the contribution he has made. Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, turning to my amendment, in August, 2001, the FBI was frantically looking for two men who became part of the terrorist suicide team on 9-11. Had we been able to find Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khaled al-Mihdhar, we may have been able to unravel the plot for 9- 11. At least we would have stopped these two individuals from participating in it. The problem, it turns out, was that the State Department and INS watchlists, which included their names, were not available to the FAA and the airlines. So the hijackers were freely allowed to board the ill-fated American Airlines Flight 77. Two years later, the Federal Government still has as many as 50 databases used for tracking international terrorists and international terrorist organizations. Just recently, the GAO highlighted 12 watchlists run by nine agencies. This is shocking. Information contained in one database need not be connected to information in another. Vital data that could help prevent the next terrorist attack could be missed. We must consolidate or at least ensure the interoperability of government watchlists, and my amendment pending before this House to this intelligence authorization bill addresses this. In last year's intelligence authorization act, the Congress required the creation of a Terrorist Identification Classification System, TICS. This system is intended to be an authoritative real-time compilation of individuals and organizations known or suspected of international terrorism derived from all-source intelligence and available for use by other government agencies. The establishment of TICS is still a work in progress. The Director of Central Intelligence is required to report on progress by the end of November. My amendment requires the Director of Central Intelligence to certify whether further consolidation, or increased interoperability, is the best way to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of TICS. Either way we go, the point is to connect the dots in real time. The concept of a single government database to track suspected terrorists does raise some civil liberties concerns. To address the privacy and civil liberties concerns, my amendment requires the Director of Central Intelligence to establish an advisory council of experts on matters of civil liberties and privacy. Mr. Chairman, the relationship of civil liberties and security has been an abiding concern for this committee. The gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt), one of our members, has been active in this area, and so has our chairman, who convened the first hearing, public hearing, on civil liberties earlier this year where a panel of witnesses from the ACLU to the Heritage Foundation agreed that we need to balance civil liberty and security. As Ben Franklin once said: "They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." The Harman amendment addresses both liberty and safety, and I urge its adoption. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word. First of all, I want to congratulate the gentlewoman on an amendment that she has worked hard on and I know cares a great deal about, and I will say right up front that the amendment is acceptable to the committee. I do want to make a comment on it, though. The amendment requires the DCI to consider whether further consolidation of the various U.S. Government terrorist watchlist databases might add to the efficiency of the watchlist system in identifying known or suspected terrorists. Absolutely a goal that we have to achieve. The question is what is the right way to do it? And the gentlewoman has raised the question properly. I commend her for it. Her dedication and expertise on counterterrorism issues I think is well known. She has served not only the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of this Congress but previous iterations of this effort on national commissions and so forth; and I think we all very much respect her judgment. And as I said, this amendment is a good one and it brings the issue to the floor. It asks the DCI to review and determine how much more consolidation of the various terrorist watchlists is needed, but I would add the words "if any." And the reason I say that is I am concerned about the potential loss of data that might result from the consolidation of all the watchlists available to the government. I do not know that that would happen. It is a question that has to be asked. Additionally, I would think that there is one other area that I worry about a little bit, and that is sort of the idea of Big Brother. The one big unified, centralized U.S. Government computer database with all of the information available to the U.S. Government on individuals and their associates might be viewed to some as concerning, particularly those who worry about Big Brother invading their privacy. I am not saying I have the answer; but at this stage of my thinking, I am sort of in the position to be inclined to support a network solution that virtually combines the data in various databases without actually dumping all of the information from all the databases into one big government Big [[Page H5891]] Brother database. So I would think that something on the order perhaps of Web browser or Web sniffer, some way of searching out all the databases simultaneously, using some of those extraordinary technological tools that are developed in the gentlewoman's district, the software that is out there that not only searches all of them at the same time but also crossreferences the search results in such a way that maximizes the researchers' efficiencies and at the same time gives us some of the safeguards, or the appearance of safeguards anyway, the perception that we are safeguarding better than one big database. I do not wish to prejudge the outcome of the review. As we always do, we candidly state our positions on these things. As I said, I think the gentlewoman has raised exactly the right question. I thank her for her contribution in doing that, and I believe the amendment is worded properly so we go forward, and I will accept the amendment on behalf of the committee. Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. I support the gentlewoman's amendment also, and I am very pleased to acknowledge the atmosphere in this committee that allows us to function so well. It is what a committee should be. The gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), ranking member, avoid, I think, destructive partisanship and allow us to air our differences in a very constructive way. I would like to draw attention to section 336 of this bill that includes a provision that I have strongly advocated for to require the director of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center to establish two advisory councils to help the center carry out its critical and time- sensitive work, Mr. Chairman. {time} 1845 One Advisory Council will focus on privacy and civil liberty concerns. We all know and understand that we are engaged in an ongoing fight against global terrorism and that our entire Intelligence Community is central to prosecuting and winning this struggle. But, at the same time, as we enhance our intelligence-gathering and analysis, it is equally important that the Director of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center and all employees there must respect the basic civil liberties that define our lives as Americans. Surely this Advisory Council will help us more nearly achieve the right delicate balance between security and liberty. Now, equally important, this section of the bill also requires an Advisory Council to the Director of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center be established to concentrate on getting more and better information to State and local governments. The efforts to improve substantially our homeland security as a matter of urgency fall primarily upon our first responders and the local and State governments who employ them. In my meetings with State and local officials in New Jersey, and with first responders in my district, I have heard repeatedly that they receive only the most general and vague and almost useless information from Washington. They seldom, if ever, receive any more specific information about what they should guard against. Clearly, they deserve more timely and useful information if they are to function to protect the lives, the safety, and the security of Americans. This Advisory Council should help overcome this incomplete communication of practically useful intelligence information from the Federal to the community level. Third, I would like to comment about the importance of incorporating information based on open sources. These sources of information are not classified secret. And traditionally, within the Intelligence Community and to this day, some individuals seem to think that if information is not classified secret, it is not valuable. In the 21st century this institutionalized mindset is unfortunate, since our sources of information and the amount of information readily available to the public domain and in the public domain have grown enormously. The Internet has enabled one to access information that was once extremely hard or impractical to obtain, and the dynamics of globalization, the accelerated integration of global industry, commerce, communication, and travel have created many new sources of information. The civil and commercial sectors, for instance, are looking into subjects and technologies that once were the exclusive preserve of governments and intelligence services. A prominent example is imagery from satellites that is publicly or commercially available. In HUMINT intelligence, open access to officials and experts is unparalleled today. I believe that the Intelligence Community should be exploiting such open source information far more than it is today, and achieving this goal will require a culture change and the application of technology. I thank the chairman for agreeing to include in the report a call for the Director of Central Intelligence to study and report back to Congress within 6 months how to incorporate and use open source material in virtually every aspect of intelligence, from collection to analysis, and across all disciplines. There are many instances where open source information can be useful, perhaps even more useful than classified sources, and surely, in many cases, cheaper. Now, Mr. Chairman, I spoke earlier about the decision by the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and the gentlewoman from California (Ranking Member Harman) to investigate thoroughly concerns about weapons of mass destruction and the intelligence that led into our fighting in Iraq. Our committee intends to issue a written report on its findings as promptly as possible, and I spoke about that earlier. I would like to say a bit more, though. One concern that I have had is that the administration officials too often appear to have dropped the caveats and the uncertainties expressed in the intelligence reporting. Another concern is that at times the intelligence reporting or the officials presenting the intelligence appear to have been very certain about their conclusions that were based on uncertain evidence. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). The time of the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt) has expired. (By unanimous consent, Mr. Holt was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.) Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, it is critically important to determine whether the Intelligence Community's estimates on Iraq were badly off base, or whether the Iraqi regime managed to destroy or spirit away the suspect weapons or materials. Either way, it seems clear that performance of the Intelligence Community was less than we would expect. It is clear to all of the world that the coalition did not have the intelligence information specific enough to find, identify, and secure any massively destructive weapons. That realization certainly raises questions about whether we were ready to go to war if the Commander in Chief and the Pentagon were convinced that the weapons were real, but they did not know quite where they were or how we would secure them once we went to war. But that is a question for another day. We will be talking about that in weeks to come. Now, I would say, with the amendments that we have in front of us today, I offer my full support to this legislation. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman). The amendment was agreed to. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider Amendment No. 4 printed in House Report 108-176. Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Hastings of Florida Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment. The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Hastings of Florida: At the end of subtitle D of title III, insert the following new section: SEC. 337. IMPROVEMENT OF RECRUITMENT, HIRING AND RETENTION OF ETHNIC AND CULTURAL MINORITIES IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. (a) Pilot Project to Improve Diversity Throughout the Intelligence Community Using Innovative Methodologies for the Recruitment, Hiring and Retention of Ethnic and Cultural Minorities and Women [[Page H5892]] With the Diversity of Skills, Languages and Expertise Reflective of the Current Mission.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall carry out a pilot project under this section to test and evaluate alternative, innovative methods to recruit and hire for the intelligence community women and minorities with diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds, skills, language proficiency, and expertise. (b) Methods.--In carrying out the pilot project, the Director shall employ methods such as advertising in foreign language newspapers in the United States, site visits to institutions with a high percentage of students who study English as a second language, and other methods that are not used by the Director under the DCI Diversity Strategic Plan to increase diversity of officers and employees in the intelligence community. (c) Duration of Project.--The Director shall carry out the project under this section for a 3-year period. (d) Report.--Not later than 2 years after the date the Director implements the pilot project under this section, the Director shall submit to Congress a report on the project. The report shall include-- (1) an assessment of the effectiveness of the project; and (2) recommendations on the continuation of the project as well as for improving the effectiveness of the project in meeting the goals of increasing the recruiting and hiring of women and minorities within the intelligence community. (e) Diversity Plan.--(1) Not later than February 15, 2004, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report which describes the plan of the Director, entitled the "DCI Diversity Strategic Plan", and any subsequent revision to that plan, to increase diversity of officers and employees in the intelligence community, including the short- and long-term goals of the plan. The report shall also provide a detailed description of the progress that has been made by each element of the intelligence community in implementing the plan. (2) In implementing the plan, the Director shall incorporate innovative methods for the recruitment and hiring of women and minorities that the Director has determined to be effective from the pilot project carried out under this section. (f) Definition.--In this section, the term "intelligence community" has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401(4))). Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to offer an amendment to the Intelligence Authorization bill on behalf of myself and the following members who are immediate cosponsors of the Select Committee on Intelligence: The gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Eshoo), the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger), and the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Boswell). I would also like to thank the chairman of the committee, my good friend, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), for his previously stated support for this amendment. Further, I would be remiss if I did not recognize the efforts of former member Louis Stokes and now departed and former member Julian Dixon; our present minority leader of the Democratic Caucus, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), and the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Bishop), and I had forgotten about Tim Roemer, who also was very instrumental in this particular arena as a former member, and others on both sides of the aisle that have been interested in this issue. Mr. Chairman, this amendment directs the Director of Central Intelligence to establish a pilot program to improve the recruitment, hiring, and retention of ethnic and cultural minorities throughout the Intelligence Community. Leaders in the Intelligence Community have, for a number of years, expressed the view that diversity within their population can pay dividends with respect to cultural understanding and especially language capabilities. And, for an equal number of years, the Select Committee on Intelligence has urged them to improve their efforts of hiring, promoting, and retaining individuals from diverse backgrounds. While we noted in our report to accompany H.R. 2417 that progress has been made and, indeed, it has been, especially in the more recent years just passed, we also noted a lack of progress with respect to hiring, promotion, and retention of women and minorities under the current plan. The Secretary of Defense has stated that, "The current personnel system is not flexible enough to confront the dangers of the 21st century." The amendment we offer today addresses one of the many concerns raised by the Secretary and proposes a potential solution. It directs the DCI to develop a pilot program to achieve the goals for increased diversity amongst the Intelligence Community staff. This amendment requires that the Director use methods such as advertising in foreign language newspapers or conducting site visits to high schools, and I would even encourage middle schools as we look toward the future, because it is interesting that in those areas I feel we find many of our grandchildren and little children know a lot about computers that a lot of us older hands do not know about; and colleges as well, with a high percentage of students from diverse backgrounds as two or more recruitment methods. It also requires an annual report from the Director to assess the effectiveness of this project in meeting his goals. If the horrors of 9/11 taught us anything, it is that the biggest threat to our democratic ideals and cultural beliefs comes from those who do not share our ideals and beliefs. The war on terrorism has focused even greater attention on the Intelligence Community as they have collectively faced these and many other challenges with commendable determination. It will take time, innovation, and a long-term strategy to ensure that the Intelligence Community remains capable of both understanding and responding to the threats of the 21st century. I believe that this amendment will help the Intelligence Community meet the goals they have set for themselves and challenges in the decades to come. I urge my colleagues to support this noncontroversial amendment. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that this amendment is before us. It is entirely consistent with the committee position, and I am very happy to accept it. I want to congratulate the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) for his continued, persistent, effective leadership on this, along with our colleague, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), who have both done the committee a big favor by keeping us focused on this. The amendment directs the DCI to establish a pilot project to test and evaluate alternative and innovative methods to recruit and hire women and minorities with diverse skills, expertise, cultural, and ethnic backgrounds, and language proficiencies. That is obviously a very rich contribution to the Intelligence Community. The pilot project would be carried out for a 3-year period, with a report on the effectiveness of the project at the end of the second year, as I understand the amendment. The amendment also includes direction to the DCI to report to the committee by mid-February of the next calendar year on the DCI's diversity strategic plan, which is something we have been after for a while. This aspect of this amendment incorporates, in part, the amendment made to the schedule of authorizations by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) in the committee's markup. I think they are complementary to each other. I see no conflict, and I think that combined, they are a benefit. Both members deserve and are commended for promoting the needs of the Intelligence Community in the area of diversity of skills, expertise, languages, cultural understanding, and ethnic background, which is not a fully met need, very clearly, in the Community, as we know. In the committee report we stated that, and I am going to quote the language, "Diversity throughout the Intelligence Community population can pay dividends with respect to the richness it brings to the work of the IC, particularly as it relates to cultural understandings of particular target sets, increased language capabilities, and increased skills to address particular intelligence problems." Amen. I believe that this project will help. I very eagerly accept the amendment without reservation, and I am pleased that the gentleman has offered it. Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentlewoman from California. Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for the civilized and collaborative way in which this whole debate is going. I rise in strong support of this amendment, and I just want to make a few brief points, Mr. Chairman. [[Page H5893]] When the DDCICM, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management--that is a mouthful--Joan Dempsey, came to say good-bye recently, it occurred to me that she was one of the few senior women in the entire Intelligence Community. The only other one I can think of is Joanne Isham, who is the Deputy Director of the National Security Agency. The same story can be said about people from other ethnic groups. That is unfortunate. This amendment, which is carefully drafted and consistent with our policy in our committee for the last 15 years, will hopefully move the Community forward. {time} 1900 Earlier in this debate, I spoke, and others did, about the importance of beefing up HUMINT, our human intelligence resources. What is the point of human intelligence? The point is obviously to learn about terrorists. Their plans and intentions. How do you do that? Well, you try to penetrate terrorist cells. How do you do that? Well, it would help if you looked like the terrorists and spoke their languages. And we cannot succeed in our effort if we just recruit the same old, same old. So it should be obvious that this is not the politically correct thing to do; it is the intelligent thing to do if we are trying to expand the talent pool and the capability of our intelligence agencies. I strongly support this amendment. I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings), and the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes). They and others have done us a huge service. Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Hastings amendment. As has been stated, and I hope those that are watching this debate tonight can see the kind of cooperation and willingness to work together to solve some of the issues that greatly effect the national security of our country watching our chairman and ranking member and other members of the committee talk about what is good for our country. Mr. Chairman, I think that people of diverse backgrounds can bring their unique cultural experiences, skills and language proficiencies to bear on intelligence problems, intelligence issues and intelligence expertise. The percentage of women and minorities in the intelligence community has for way too many years been smaller than the percentage of women and minorities in the total Federal workforce and the civilian workforce. Fiscal year 2002 data demonstrates that women and minorities continue to be under-represented in the intelligence community, especially in core mission areas and the senior ranks, as has been noted here by other members of our committee. The committee has repeatedly expressed grave concern about the lack of progress made by the intelligence community in recruiting, in hiring and retaining a diverse workforce, essential if we are going to protect our country's national security. New tools must be brought to bear on the challenge of sufficiently diversifying the intelligence community workforce. Intelligence agencies must think, as we like to say, outside the box. I believe that the Hastings amendment encourages this kind of thinking, out-of-the-box thinking, by requiring the Director of Central Intelligence to carry out a pilot project to test and evaluate innovative alternative methods for recruiting and hiring people with diverse backgrounds. The amendment, like the general provisions that have been reported out of our committee, also requires that the DCI report to Congress on his current diversity plan, including short- and long-term goals and the progress that is being made in implementing it by each of the intelligence community agencies. Mr. Chairman, not only does this make good sense. It is good practice, it is good business, and it is good public policy. And, therefore, I urge all of my colleagues to support the Hastings amendment. Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) for putting this before us. I think its time is overdue, and I think it is reasonable that he would have a pilot project. I just have to think back on my own life experience, and I will not tell you about that today, in starting in a country home, way out in the country. But I go to schools a lot, and I particularly want to talk to the young folk in regard to their futures and education and what it means to them. And I often tell them my story and, again, I will not tell you tonight, but what it can do for equal opportunity. It is the road to success. So I think that it would be very good if I can go to my African American schools, which I will, to my Hispanic community, to my Asian- Americans and all the others and say to them, this opportunity is happening and you too can be an effective person if you will get your education and come forth, and we will have a pilot project to show that; but you can come forth, and you can be in the high-level place to make sure our country is secure as the others have done before you. So I encourage you to do this, and I am really glad that you have done this. It is a reasonable request that is needed. It ought to be done, and I am glad to hear the responses that we are hearing here tonight. I congratulate the gentleman, and I thank the gentleman. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt). Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for yielding. I join him in expressing support for this amendment and accolades to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings), the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), and the others who are working on this. I wanted to reiterate my concern about the lack of racial, linguistic, cultural and gender diversity within the intelligence community. Our intelligence network should reflect much more of the diversity and multicultural composition of the American people and of the world that we seek to understand. But no one should be comforted by the words in this amendment. This is the umpteenth time that the problem has been identified and that intelligence agencies have been exhorted, even required, to do better. I hope this amendment produces real results. Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his comments. Mr. BISHOP of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings), the chairman, and the members of committee for the sensitivity and the concern that we are now paying to the issue of diversity. For some time now this committee has been wrestling with the idea of diversity going back to former chairman Lou Stokes, former ranking member Julian Dixon. In my service on the committee for 6 years up until this term of Congress we have repeatedly been concerned. And I believe that the director has made it clear that diversity, cultural diversity, lingual diversity is a matter of good business sense for the intelligence community. We all wish that we had been a little more sensitive and a little more knowledgeable prior to 9-11. But this I think is an opportunity now for us to get it right. And the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) has done an excellent job in helping us to think out of the box by requiring the director to carry out this pilot test project to evaluate innovative alternative methods for recruiting and hiring and retaining members of the intelligence community with a diverse background. Let me take this opportunity to mention just one member of the African American community who is completing 30 years of service to both the military and the intelligence community, and that is Mr. Garnett Stowe who has retired as chief of staff of the National Reconnaissance Office. Mr. Stowe made tremendous contributions in his own right as a member of the intelligence community, but he too was very sensitive. And he took the time to come with the Congressional Black Caucus last year to appear on a panel that we had dealing with this issue of diversity in diplomatic and intelligence matters. He has made a tremendous contribution to our country, to the free world through his 30 years of service; and I [[Page H5894]] certainly would like to take this opportunity as we debate this bill to congratulate him on a career of great service and wish him well in the future. With that, I would just like to associate myself with all of the remarks that have been said in a positive way in support of the Hastings amendment. I worked very hard when I was on the committee. I am delighted that the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) and the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) and the other members of the committee are continuing this work because it is one on which we must be vigilant. We cannot afford to give it up. We have got to get it done, and we have got to do it until we get it right. And I want to commend the committee and commend my colleagues for a job well done. Hopefully, we can complete this and get on the road to having the best real-time intelligence for our policymakers and our war fighters based on the most broad net of collection devices and individuals. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. BISHOP of Georgia. I yield to the gentleman from Florida. Mr. GOSS. I appreciate the gentleman yielding. I just wanted to say I was remiss in my remarks not to note the gentleman's service on the committee on this particular issue and many other issues as well. It is a pleasure to welcome you back to the debate here. Mr. BISHOP of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman very much. Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, I rise to support the Hastings amendment and to again restate my appreciation for the service of the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and the service of the ranking member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman). I also want to thank the members who served on this committee, and I do not want to say served, I want to have it correct, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) is still serving on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. His leadership we have appreciated. In the debate previously, he extended to me an opportunity to pursue reviewing a number of documents dealing with the question of the weapons of mass destruction. I wanted to publicly say to him that I noted in my remarks earlier how pleased I was in a bipartisan way this committee would not only open up this massive documentation but also work together in a bipartisan way to find out the truth. And I still hold to that, and I will comment very briefly in my remarks on that point. But I wanted to rise initially to support the Hastings amendment because we learned a lot after 9-11. We learned that information would come or has come or needs to come from people from all walks of life, ethnic backgrounds and languages. We found that in our intelligence community we did not have the reach that we possibly needed to ensure the safety of this Nation, to secure the kind of intelligence we needed to have representation in parts of the world where languages are spoken that we may not be familiar with. And so the issue of diversity is crucial. Not only that, I think it is important to have the "mosaicness" of America represented in the intelligence community, the intellect that they bring, the sensitivity that they bring, the cultural understanding that they bring, the knowledge that they bring about the Muslim faith, and also the understanding that all immigration, all people who are different does not equate to terrorism. That comes from a cultural understanding. We know that in the United States military, we found that the military expanded its chaplain corps and that is, of course, to include people from many different faiths, and that those serving in the military come from many different faiths and many different racial and ethnic backgrounds. Many Hispanics are serving. Many Muslims are serving, many Native Americans, African Americans, obviously Caucasians, and certainly the wide breadth of diversity, Asian- Americans, in our Nation. So this is a very good amendment, and I applaud the gentleman and I believe this will go a long way in securing America because that is what we are talking about in actually securing America. I would like to take this opportunity also to lend my support to the Kucinich amendment. That clearly speaks to, I think, us getting at the truth, and that is to secure an audit that would include information about telephone and electronic communications between the CIA and the office of the Vice President. I also lend my support to the distinguished representative, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee), her amendment to require the Government Accounting Office to conduct a study to determine the extent of intelligence sharing by the Defense Department and the intelligence community with the United Nations. Collectively, these amendments do not in any way indict the good work of the intelligence committee. What it does is helps to build, it provides anchors, it moves us forward in staffing diversity, but it also moves us forward in finding out particular aspects of this question dealing with the weapons of mass destruction. I have already said on this floor that I believe that ultimately a commission, after the work of this House committee and after the work of the Senate committee, whatever their processes will be, that we look at creating an independent commission. I also believe that if we are to find wrong-doing that a special prosecutor would be appropriate as well. I am prepared to work in this bipartisan effort, but I think truth is important. And, again, it is important not only for the American people, but my colleagues who in good faith, many who, sincerely, all of us, might I say came to the floor of the House and voted our conscience, many voting because they believed that we were under imminent attack by the alleged weapons of mass destruction. Many would say that those of us who argue this point will find it out. We will get ours. They will find the weapons of mass destruction. {time} 1915 Mr. Chairman, I will not be in any way offended because the question of America is about democracy and truth. It is about sharing with the American people the reasons why we make such decisions. It is not about a "get you" foreign policy. I do not need a "get you" foreign policy. I do not need to be victorious in this independent commission or the work of the intelligence committee. I do not need to find out that there were no weapons of mass destruction. I simply need to find the truth because the administration is obligated to tell the truth to the American people and to this Congress, for us to make the life and death decision of war and peace. I also believe that war should have been the last option, but I believe my colleagues voted in good faith, and therefore, they should have the truth, the American people should have the truth, and I think a commission will bring us to a point of securing the truth. So I rise in support of the Hastings amendment enthusiastically, the Kucinich amendment and the Lee amendment so we can move forward in a bipartisan manner. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings). The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote. The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) will be postponed. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 printed in House report 108-176. Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Kucinich Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Kucinich: At the end of title III, add the following new section: [[Page H5895]] SEC. 345. REPORT ON COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND THE OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN IRAQ. (a) Audit.--The Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct an audit of all telephone and electronic communications between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Vice President that relate to weapons of mass destruction obtained or developed by Iraq preceding Operation Iraqi Freedom on or after September 11, 2001. (b) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General shall submit to Congress a report on the audit conducted under subsection (a). The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex. Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, we now know that there were not vast stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq when the U.S. invaded and that, therefore, Iraq did not pose an imminent threat to the United States, as the administration claimed before the war. The question remaining is whether the administration compelled the Central Intelligence Agency to release raw, undisseminated information they knew to be unreliable because it helped support the worst case scenario concerning Iraq's weapons program and, therefore, helped make the case, an erroneous case it turns out, that Iraq posed an imminent threat to the United States. The administration has made numerous assertions. The President in his State of the Union said, The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production. Number one, the claim about uranium from Africa was forged. Number two, the aluminum tubes were not suitable for a nuclear enrichment program. These assertions made by the President in his State of the Union to justify an immediate war with Iraq were false. Did the Vice President play a role in making false information become the public reason the President went to war in Iraq? The Vice President, as reported in the Washington Post of June 5, 2003, Vice President Cheney and his most senior aide made multiple trips to the CIA over the past year to question analysts studying Iraq's weapons programs and alleged links to al Qaeda, creating an environment in which some analysts felt they were being pressured to make their assessments fit with the Bush administration's policy objectives. That is from the Washington Post on June 5, 2003. Number two, the Vice President knew or should have known that documents purporting to show that Iraq had bought uranium from Niger were forged. On March 7, the IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reported the following to the U.N. Security Council: These documents which form the basis for reports of recent uranium transactions between Iraq and Niger are, in fact, not authentic. We have, therefore, concluded that these specific allegations are unfounded. We have found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons program in Iraq. It turns out that the forgeries were crude. Anyone with an Internet search engine could determine that these documents were forgeries. Yet on March 16, nine days afterwards, the Vice President repeated the falsehood on national television. He said, We believe, and he was talking about Hussein, has in fact reconstituted nuclear weapons. The Vice President knew 1 year earlier, it appears, that the documents were forgeries and, therefore, the allegations false. According to the New York Times of May 6, 2003, More than a year ago the Vice President's office asked for an investigation of the uranium deal. So a former U.S. ambassador to Africa was dispatched to Niger. In February 2002, according to someone present at the meetings, that envoy reported to the CIA and the State Department that the information was unequivocally wrong and that the documents had been forged. So public reports indicate the Vice President made assertions which were unreliable, and the Vice President visited the CIA, making analysts there feel, according to the Washington Post, that a certain output was desired from here. In summary, what this amendment seeks to do is to probe what role the Vice President played in causing the CIA to disseminate unreliable, raw, previously undisseminated, untrue information about Iraq's alleged threat to the United States. Specifically, this amendment would direct the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency to audit all electronic and telephone communications between the Office of the Vice President and the CIA which would answer the question about how extensive the visits by the Vice President to the CIA were. Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Kucinich amendment. The gentleman from Ohio has woven an interesting story and made a number of bald and bold assertions, but I think it is important to look at what the amendment says. The amendment calls for the Inspector General of the CIA to conduct an audit of all telephone electronic communications between the CIA and the Office of the Vice President relating to Iraq and WMD. The amendment is unusual and frankly a bit confusing. It purports to address what is allegedly a very serious issue, the altering or shading of intelligence for political, perhaps for strategic, purposes, but then it focuses only on the Vice President and only on his phone and e- mail communications. If there was a real problem, one would expect a comprehensive review, but the amendment targets only one individual, the Vice President, and this is an individual who has the right, indeed he has the obligation, to receive information related to, for example, Iraq WMD and a run-up to a war. However, the Vice President's telephone conversations are not recorded. Thus, the information that is sought in this amendment does not exist when it comes to telephone calls. Perhaps a record of the number of telephone conversations between the Vice President and the CIA could be compiled, but this would tell us only how many calls were made and when they occurred. Frankly, this is not useful information. Mr. Chairman, the fact that the Vice President was in contact with the Intelligence Community should not be surprising. Frankly, it would be very upsetting if there was insufficient contact. These are sensitive communications, of course, on important matters. We should all expect the Vice President's office to talk regularly with the CIA, to visit the CIA for that matter, and the rest of the Intelligence Community. So should not the Vice President and the President be avid consumers of intelligence in order to be well-informed in the decisions that they make? Remember what the amendment says. It is targeting the telephone calls between the Vice President, only the Vice President, and the CIA, only that component of the Intelligence Community, and the electronic communications that took place between that individual and that agency. So it seems very clear to me that it is not a comprehensive review. It is targeted at the Vice President, and one simply has to realize that it is going to be unsuccessful in really revealing any information that it purports to have as an interest of the amendment. Mr. Chairman, I think the amendment should be defeated. Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. BEREUTER. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio. Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I want to point out for clarification purposes, and I thank the gentleman for yielding, that the result of this amendment would be both a count of the number of communications and an inventory of the substance of the communications. The count would establish the number of times the Vice President took the unusual step of traveling to the CIA to meet directly with CIA analysts and the inventory would establish the nature of those visits. I thank the gentleman for yielding. Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Ohio raises the serious issue of politicization of intelligence. The question of the integrity of the intelligence process is a legitimate one and has [[Page H5896]] been a continuing concern in the oversight of the intelligence agencies. The question of politicization of intelligence is an area that our committee, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, will explore in its investigation of Iraq intelligence. I must, however, oppose the gentleman's amendment. The amendment, in my view, does not take the best approach to ensuring a comprehensive look at the matter. It is narrowly focused on one possible area for investigation, and it addresses that one area in a way I believe would be counterproductive. It is not clear to me that the audit as described in the amendment would develop useful information. The offices of the Inspectors General can be effectively utilized in congressional investigations and oversight, but the resources of these offices should be deployed according to a comprehensive plan of investigation. In sum, I believe the gentleman has raised an important issue, and that issue should and will be examined in the context of our committee's investigation. The amendment in this form should be defeated. Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield? Ms. HARMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio. Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, just to point out to the gentlewoman that I think it would be helpful if the committee supported the amendment because, at worst, if the amendment would be repeating the work of the committee, if it would be essentially redundant, then it could not hurt, and I would also want to point out that the gentlewoman is correct. I mean, this amendment is narrowly focused, and it is aiming specifically at obtaining information relative to the relationship between the Vice President and the CIA. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding. Ms. HARMAN. Just to conclude, Mr. Chairman, I believe that we can get to the issue of politicization of intelligence in a different manner, one that is bipartisan and one that falls within the thorough and comprehensive investigation of this committee. That would be a better way for this House to go. Once again, I commend the gentleman for raising this issue but hope that we will decide to take a different course on this subject. Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word. Mr. Chairman, the way I would characterize this amendment is as the cheap shot amendment. This is a totally political amendment. It is a totally cheap shot at the Vice President. It is an extension of a campaign being waged by the gentleman from Ohio who has made a number of speeches on this floor and around the country. I believe it is an extension of his presidential campaign to try and besmirch the record of this administration, to besmirch the good name of the Vice President, and I think when people have an opportunity to really look at the amendment, they can see that it is so shallow in its wording and in its nature, that it is what it is. It is a political amendment. It is only brought here to the floor to continue an opportunity for the gentleman from Ohio to try and find something that simply cannot be found. It also, I think, degrades the work of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. This gentleman who is offering this amendment has been a Member of this House. He knows of the work of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. He knows that if he had some kind of a complaint about the kind of activity that he is trying to allege the Vice President has engaged in that he could come to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. He could petition the chairman, he could petition the ranking member. He could ask the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. I guess we are not good enough to do our work that you have to seek some kind of an outside counsel or outside organization to try and look into it. {time} 1930 This is unprecedented what this amendment asks for. It is unprecedented in its nature to think that this body, under this amendment, is going to go after the phone records of the Vice President. Now, anybody who does not see the politicizing of what is going on here cannot see the nature of it. You can see it in the words, because they are very shallow. Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. LaHOOD. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio. Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman. Under the gentleman's logic, there would be no reason at all for any amendments to be offered from this floor. We might as well dispense with the amendment process and move to a system in which the committees of Congress report bills for a simple up or down vote from the whole House. So we might as well extend the suspension calendar for all bills. Mr. LaHOOD. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, let me respond to the gentleman by saying this. If this is the authorization for the intelligence bill, and the gentleman is offering this amendment under our authorization, why does the gentleman not give some direction to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to look into the matter? Why does the gentleman have to find somebody else to do it? And the gentleman may respond, if he would like. Mr. KUCINICH. Well, Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for continuing to yield, and I would say that, first of all, the idea that it is the committee's jurisdiction and, therefore, should be left to the committee, I do not believe the gentleman is seriously proposing what I think is an absurdity, but the argument rests on the same absurd logic. All Members of the Congress have the privilege to offer amendments, and if a majority of the House agrees with the amendment, it passes. However, I do not believe it is legitimate or logical against my amendment to say that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence should enjoy an exemption from the amendment process. Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, what I am saying to the gentleman is apparently the gentleman does not think the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence is doing their job. Apparently, the gentleman does not think we have the capability to carry this out, and so he has crafted an amendment to go to some outside group, some outside organization because the gentleman does not have trust and faith in what we have been doing and the work that we have been doing. Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will continue to yield, I would ask that the gentleman not take offense. This is certainly, I would hope the gentleman would agree, a salient issue of interest to the American people and that the public does have a right to know, and there have been published statements that provide contradictory information relative to what is really a question of a singular cause of war. So I respect the gentleman's right to make these statements, and I would ask the gentleman to respect my right as a Member of Congress to offer this amendment. Mr. LaHOOD. Well, I would say, Mr. Chairman, that if the gentleman wanted to offer an amendment on our authorization bill, at least he ought to give us the benefit of the doubt that we have professional staff and we have people who spend an inordinate amount of time, including the gentleman's ranking member because this is her only committee assignment. She spends all of her time in this Congress working on intelligence activities. Apparently the gentleman does not think enough of her expertise and the expertise of the committee staff on that side to give them some kind of an assignment. And why the Vice President? Why not the President? Why not the Director of the CIA? Why not the Director of the FBI? This is a political amendment. This is an extension of a campaign. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Upton). The time of the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood) has expired. Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 2 additional minutes. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois? Mr. KUCINICH. Reserving the right to object, I would be happy to grant the gentleman an additional 2 minutes if he would be happy to return the favor to me. [[Page H5897]] Mr. LaHOOD. I will be more than happy to yield to the gentleman. Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois? There was no objection. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood) is recognized for 2 additional minutes. Mr. LaHOOD. Why the Vice President? Why not other officials of the government? Why not officials of the government who have direct responsibility for intelligence-gathering information? If there is some kinds of a cabal going on around here, why did the gentleman just happen to pick this individual? I believe this is what it is. This is a political amendment. This is an amendment to try and embarrass one member of this administration. This is an amendment to try and embarrass the second-highest-ranking elected official in our government by some way, shape, or form, thinking that if the gentleman gets some kind of phone records he is going to find something out. As members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, we get information every day, 24-7, our staff. Pretty much 24-7, our staff are working on gathering intelligence; and this is a slap in the face at the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to the gentleman's own members, to our members. It really is what it is. It is a political amendment, and I stand by what I said. It is the cheap shot amendment. It is the cheap shot amendment of the year. It gets the award, in my opinion; and I hope people see it for what it is. Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent for an additional 2 minutes. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio? There was no objection. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich) is recognized for 2 minutes. Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I want to say to my friend, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood), that I would hope the gentleman would appreciate receiving clear direction for an inquiry. I can only assume that the gentleman does not want the direction of the whole Congress to get to the bottom of the Vice President's role. Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. KUCINICH. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois. Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I simply would say to the gentleman that he knows that we have established in this bill two advisory committees. We had people on the floor earlier suggesting a commission; but apparently, the gentleman does not think the oversight obligation that we serve, as the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, is enough. And I say it is a slight. It is a slap at us. Mr. KUCINICH. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I would just tell the gentleman that as a member of the Committee on Government Reform I certainly appreciate the role of government oversight, and I certainly appreciate the role of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as well. I would say that if the gentleman did not want to get to the bottom of the role of the Vice President, which has been a matter of public contest and controversy long before I have spoken here, that would indeed be a reason to oppose the amendment; but it would not be a reason for anyone else in Congress to vote "no" on the amendment. And to the Members of Congress, I say if they want to demand a thorough investigation into the role that the Vice President may have played in offering the American public discredited intelligence reports of a nonexisting Iraqi weapons program, then they should vote "yes" for my amendment. Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield once again? Mr. KUCINICH. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois. Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, let me simply say this. I would say that the gentleman's ranking member has bent over backwards. It was the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt) and others who asked for the two advisory committees. And it is other people on the gentleman's side who are asking for some kind of a commission. Now, we have not acted on that, and that is not in this bill; but I think every request that was made by the gentleman's side to the chairman has been granted. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Time of the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich) has expired. Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 2 additional minutes. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois? There was no objection. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood) is recognized for 2 additional minutes. Mr. LaHOOD. Really, Mr. Chairman, I think we have done everything we can. Now, to go outside of the jurisdiction of the committee and to take a cheap shot at the Vice President, it makes no sense, I say to the gentleman. It really does not. I think, really, the truth is, after listening to this and listening to the fact that the gentleman's ranking member is not going to support the gentleman's amendment, I think it is in his best interest to withdraw the amendment. Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. LaHOOD. I yield to the gentlewoman from California. Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the kind words, and it's nice that the gentleman from Illinois is worried about me and whether I am respected. I believe I am respected, and I believe that the person who offers this amendment respects me, and I certainly hope that he respects our committee. I just want repeat something I said earlier, which is that our investigation will be thorough and it will be bipartisan and we will follow the facts unflinchingly. So I do not want the gentleman from Ohio to assert, because it is not correct, that we are taking things off limits. The reason I oppose the gentleman's amendment is that I think we will do a comprehensive job in a fair way, and all of us, on a unanimous basis, will proceed and go forward. We will do the right job for this House, and we should have a chance to proceed and do it that way. Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. LaHOOD. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio. Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I take great pride in serving in the Congress with the gentlewoman and the gentleman. I would say, though, that I do not see this so much as being a battle over turf as I see it being an assertion of the need for pursuing the truth. And I would expect that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has the capability to do the job, but I also think that this particular matter is so unique that it receive the attention of the House, which is why I have offered this amendment and why I will continue to insist on it. Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to my colleague's amendment, and I put it in the context of the work that this committee has done and that we have accomplished and the vision that we outlined in the Intelligence Authorization Act for 2004. I serve as chairman of the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence. As such, one of our jobs is to oversee some of the Nation's most sophisticated intelligence technologies. I have the opportunity and responsibility for critically reviewing new concepts of operation. I must ensure that currently fielded systems continue to be capable of meeting the needs that we have outlined. In this area, we are pursuing aggressive oversight. We have worked with the ranking member. We have been to the ranking member's district to meet with some of the contractors there; and I think it is a good example of how, in a bipartisan way, we have asked some tough questions of the intelligence community and of those groups that provide us with the materials and the equipment that we need. We have asked the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to provide us with a long- range plan and how all of these pieces will fit together and what a strategic plan may look like for the next 6 to 10 years. In the comments attached to the bill, we have outlined our disappointment [[Page H5898]] that that plan has not come forward to the committee, so that we are moving forward with a little bit less information, perhaps, at this time, than what we would like to have had. But I do not think that the amendment that the gentleman is bringing up is one that is going to work in the best interest of what we are trying to get accomplished. On a weekly basis, this committee meets with the communities analytic cadre. We have met with them on a regular basis to review the intelligence that they prepared for us and they prepared for the President, the Vice President and Members of Congress; and that information is now available to all 435 Members of Congress so that they can take a look at what we were looking at and how we were shaping our judgments and where we were getting our information from. I think it is important for the American people to know that. That information is not secret. We are being very open with our colleagues because we recognize the importance of maintaining the credibility of the process, the individuals, and the analysis that goes into the intelligence that we have gathered. We take this job very, very seriously. One of the things that I am concerned about with this gentleman's amendment is that if we pursue this path, and in this case it identifies the Vice President but also implicates the folks at the different intelligence agencies as perhaps not keeping the best interest of the country in the forefront, then what we will end up with, and I agree with my colleague from Illinois that it is a cheap shot amendment because there is not a basis in fact to make these accusations against the Vice President or against the folks at the intelligence agency, but the result and danger is that what we are going to end up with is we are going to end up with a cadre of analysts that are going to be intimidated to such a point that they are going to go through the process, they are going to gather the intelligence, and they are going to be sitting there and saying, you know, I really cannot take the next step of providing some expert judgment, which I have been trained for, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 years. I am not going to be able to share that expert judgment with the folks who recognize the source and the art of this work. Remember, the job we give these folks, in plain English, is we ask them to go out and steal other people's secrets. We ask them to do that in an imprecise way and to put the pieces together. And when they have a few pieces of the puzzle, we ask them to try to paint for us what the picture and what the final puzzle may look like. If we put a cloud over their heads and say every time you have a few of the pieces out there and you have painted a picture for us, for us to better understand the environment after the fact, if what you laid out beforehand does not perfectly match what we find out afterwards, you have failed. In reality, these are talented people. They are doing a very, very good job. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) has expired. (By unanimous consent, Mr. Hoekstra was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.) {time} 1945 Mr. HOEKSTRA. They come back and they give us their best judgment. I am impressed with the work of the chairman and the ranking member, how they have set a course that says we are going to go through this in a bipartisan way. We are going to take a look at the information and how the people processed the information. We are going to take a look at how we analyzed it and how decisions were made off that information, but we are going to do that in a bipartisan way and we are going to make sure that we do not take this down a road of pure partisan politics because in the 2\1/2\ years I have been on this committee, in a bipartisan way we have kept as our primary focus what is good for this country, recognizing the sensitive nature of the information that we deal with, recognizing the importance of us to work through very, very difficult issues, but to reach a consensus that enables us to move forward. That is exactly what the leadership of this committee has done, it is exactly the way that the members of the committee have guided their behavior, and it is what sets the behavior of our committee and the members of that committee apart from the amendment that is brought forward at this time. It is a partisan amendment, it has a potential to be used in many, many different ways, but primarily in my analysis it hurts the prospect of truly improving the process so that when we move forward in the future, we will have the intelligence, the capability and the right people in place to ensure that we make the best possible decisions. Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. I rise to underscore the right of the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich) to offer this amendment and say that he is getting at a very important point, but to say further it is a bad amendment and should be opposed. It is both too narrow and too broad. He is certainly intending to get at an important point, but it is too narrow in that it deals with the phone records of one public official, and it is too broad in the sense that it is a fishing expedition. It is the kind of fishing expedition which I think so sullied some previous Congresses. The question of whether intelligence has been cooked or coerced is a critical question, and I thank the gentleman for raising it. But in fact in the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence we have already raised that, and we will continue to raise that issue. I ask the assistance of every Member of this body on both sides of the aisle to help us formulate the questions that need to be asked and to hold us to task that those questions are asked to the satisfaction of all Members of this body and of the citizens of America. But I do not believe that this amendment will help us do that. I must oppose this amendment, and I encourage my colleagues to oppose it. Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. HOLT. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio. Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be useful as we begin these debates for us to reflect on the essential constitutional role of the Congress and on the importance of separation of powers and on the cause which took a Nation into war because we are not talking about just any other matter here, we are talking about a matter that resulted in the people of this country having their sons and daughters sent to Iraq. Nothing less than the entire involvement of this Congress will do to be able to hold safe the constitutional prerogatives of separation of powers. No congressional committee can override the requirements of the Constitution and the role of this Congress. When Members of this Congress gave the President authority to pursue an attack against Iraq, they took upon themselves a serious and grave responsibility, and since information has been presented that raises grave questions about the cause of our action against Iraq, we have a moral obligation to get into this, and I take nothing away from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, but I would tell Members, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence should take nothing away from Members of the House. Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, perhaps the gentleman did not hear me earlier this evening when I said that what we are looking at are critical questions that have to do with lives and deaths that have occurred or might occur. It has a lot to do with the future direction of our country; but I do not believe that this amendment will help us carry out the investigation that we need to carry out and ask the questions that we need to ask and have for the future the kind of truth-telling intelligence agents and analysts who will help this country get where we want to go. Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. HOLT. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois. Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I want to respond to the latest speech of the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich), and that is to say if the gentleman really wants the prerogatives of the House to be worked out, let the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence do it. The gentleman's amendment says the IG or the GAO is supposed to [[Page H5899]] go in and get the Vice President's phone records. If the gentleman thinks it is such a great idea, let us do it. We have been doing it. Why have some outside group do it? That is the flaw in the gentleman's amendment. That is what our committee is supposed to do. That is the flaw, and that is what politicizes it. Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. HOLT. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio. Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I would direct the gentleman from Illinois to an article in the Washington Post on June 5 which says that the esteemed chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence said there is "no indication that analysts at DIA or CIA changed their analysis to fit what they perceived as the desire of the administration officials." The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). The time of the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt) has expired. (On request of Mr. Kucinich, and by unanimous consent, Mr. Holt was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.) Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. HOLT. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio. Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, it goes on to say the intelligence oversight panels have received no whistleblower complaints from the CIA or other intelligence agencies on the issue. I would maintain that this would not be a subject of whistleblowing, and only the Office of Inspector General or in this case the investigative agency would have an opportunity to be able to get this in an evenhanded way, and it takes it out of politics at a time when Members suggest this is only political. I might further add that I did not make my reputation in this House by raising partisan issues, and I do not see this as a partisan issue, I see this as justifying the administration's claim that this country had to go to war against Iraq because there was imminent threat. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. I want to point out two things, and they are meant to be constructive. First of all, it is certainly true everybody in the United States counts on it being true and it is true that the Vice President and the President are responsible for the protection of the national security. The national security team involves the Vice President. The President and the Vice President are regular consumers of intelligence information, and were they not, we probably should be calling for some kind of an investigation. I do recall it was not so long ago that one of the complaints from one of the Directors of the CIA was in fact just that, that he did not get enough quality time and enough access with the top leaders of the country and the Intelligence Community was not being well-served. That was at another time and we need not go into that. My suggestion to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich), who I have great respect for, is that this amendment is truly not worthy of his best efforts. I do not believe the gentleman is fully informed on it. It appears that the gentleman is basing his amendment and information and his case on media. Again, at the risk of getting impaled by the media, I have this trouble with the errancy problem in the media. Media simply does not know everything, and if they did, they would stop asking me and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) and other members of the committee questions. Believe me, the media does not know everything. They are not fully informed, and if the gentleman is using the media, the gentleman is not fully informed. I invite the gentleman to come upstairs, sign the secrecy agreement if the gentleman has not already, and review the material. That is why we have it there. If the gentleman took advantage of that, the gentleman would be better able to understand what we are doing, and I would hope would be supportive of our efforts. Having said all that, I hope we are getting ready for a vote on this amendment. Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. I rise in support of the Kucinich amendment. Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield? Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio. Mr. KUCINICH. The gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) is familiar with the amendment and the letter of the amendment, and I would ask if the chairman would be willing to commit the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to seeking specifically the information that I am asking here of the Inspector General. Would the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence be willing to conduct publicly an audit of all telephone and electronic communications between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Vice President as they relate to this matter? Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield? Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentleman from Florida. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, certainly we will publicly not commit to that. We will publicly commit to where the review of the information takes us. We have a bipartisan agreement on that. We have 20 able members who are members of good judgment and good sense who will follow the review and the material that comes in to the appropriate places. The gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) has used the word "unflinching." It is a fair word. I assure the gentleman I am going where the information takes us. Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield? Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio. Mr. KUCINICH. I would suggest to the gentleman and I would not impugn his answer by stating that his unwillingness to clearly commit to gathering this information publicly would in any way reflect a partisan position on his part, just as my desire to have the Inspector General bring that information forward is not reflective of a partisan position on my part. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield? Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentleman from Florida. Mr. GOSS. There are two reasons why this would be a difficult task to do publicly, and I would not make that broad a commitment. The first is that much of the material that the gentleman is talking about is probably classified if the gentleman is talking about the content of what may or may not be involved in calls, and I cannot go there. The second part is the matter of Constitution which does understand that working documents and so forth of the executive are respected and privileged. That has always been the case no matter who is in the White House. Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield? Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio. Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, it would be more than instructive. It would be classified information if the Vice President manipulated CIA analysts to disseminate false, raw unreliable information to justify a war in Iraq. I am hopeful no one is saying that and I am not aware that the administration has asserted executive privilege in an attempt to shield such information from the Congress. I am not aware of that at all. Maybe that has happened privately, but I am not aware that such an assertion can be private and that in fact such an assertion has been made. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield? Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentleman from Florida. Mr. GOSS. That is an option that they have and that is why I cannot make a commitment. I cannot overcome that. Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield? Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio. Mr. KUCINICH. I would say in order for the test to be made to make the request first then imposes our responsibility as Members of Congress, and as a coequal branch of government, we are entitled to do that and the executive branch is entitled to assert executive privilege, if they so choose, and that would be illuminating, I think. Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to ask that the Bush administration provide the American people with a full account of the events leading up to the war with Iraq. [[Page H5900]] The amendment sponsored by Representative Kucinich is a good starting point but there is still much that we do not know about the basis of our war with Iraq. Since August of last year, when the administration began beating the war drum, they have offered little concrete evidence backing up their claims that Iraq posed an "imminent threat" to the United States. The rhetoric employed by the administration was strong and unwavering: On September 12, 2002, the President told the UN: "Right now, Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production of biological weapons . . . . Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon." On October 7, 2002, the President said: "It [Iraq] possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons." The Vice President said earlier this year on "Meet The Press" that: "we believe he [Saddam Hussein] has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons." And the Secretary of Defense joined in saying: "We know where they [weapons of mass destruction] are, they are in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad." Yet, despite this certainty, 3 months after the fall of Baghdad, no chemical, biological or nuclear weapons have been found. Nor have the facilities to make these weapons been found. The administration has tried to capitalize on our fears born out of the September 11th terrorist attacks, suggesting there was a link between Saddam Hussein and leaders of al Qaeda. Even though this connection has been disproved consistently, the President still cites it as fact. And today, we learned that at least one member of the intelligence community felt pressured to shape his reports to fit the administration's position on weapons of mass destruction even though he had no evidence to support those claims. Congress must work to ensure that the information that comes out of the intelligence community is reliable and is not unduly influenced by anyone. This is not a partisan issue. This is about restoring the credibility of the United States both with our constituents and throughout the world. The President has said that he is confident that weapons of mass destruction will be found; the evidence is strong he says. I encourage him to shine the light of day on the evidence so that the world can understand why the United States went to war--unprovoked--and put the lives of thousands in danger. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich). The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that the noes appeared to have it. Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich) will be postponed. {time} 2000 It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 printed in House Report 108-176. Amendment No. 6 Offered by Ms. Lee Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). The Clerk will designate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: Amendment No. 6 offered by Ms. Lee: At the end of title III, add the following new section: SEC. 345. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH UNITED NATIONS WEAPONS INSPECTORS SEARCHING FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN IRAQ. (a) In General.--The Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct a study to determine the extent to which intelligence developed by the Department of Defense and by the intelligence community with respect to weapons of mass destruction obtained or developed by Iraq preceding Operation Iraqi Freedom was made available to the United Nations weapons inspectors and the quantity and quality of the information that was provided (if any). (b) Specific Matter Studied.--The study shall provide for an analysis of the sufficiency of the intelligence provided by the Director of Central Intelligence to those weapons inspectors, and whether the information was provided in a timely manner and in a sufficient quantity and quality to enable the inspectors to locate, visit, and conduct investigations on all high and medium value suspected sites of weapons of mass destruction. (c) Access to Information.--(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the Comptroller General may secure directly from any agency or department of the United States information necessary to carry out the study under subsection (a). (2) The appropriate Federal agencies or departments shall cooperate with the Comptroller General in expeditiously providing appropriate security clearances to individuals carrying out the study to the extent possible pursuant to existing procedures and requirements, except that no person shall be provided with access to classified information under this section without the appropriate security clearances. (d) Report.--Not later than 12 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit to Congress a report on the study conducted under subsection (a). The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex. Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, first I would like to thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) for her support and her leadership in crafting this bipartisan bill. Also to my staff, Julie Little and Shannon Smith, I want to thank them for their very diligent work. This is a commonsense amendment seeking an answer to a question that the American people have a right to know: How was our intelligence regarding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction handled in the months before the war? Specifically, this amendment seeks a GAO study to determine the extent and timeliness with which the Intelligence Community shared information about suspected weapons in Iraq with the United Nations inspectors on the ground searching for those weapons. There are growing questions being raised about the use or possible misuse of intelligence in the months leading up to the war against Iraq. If intelligence was distorted, that raises serious doubts around the world about United States credibility. Our President told the American people, the Congress and the world that inspections had failed, that Iraq unquestionably possessed weapons of mass destruction, and that these weapons posed such a dire, imminent threat to the United States that we had no choice but to go to war. All other options, he said, had been exhausted. But the question we must continue to ask is, were those options truly exhausted? Were they, in fact, fully pursued? Did the United States Intelligence Community share information with the United Nations inspectors about suspected weapons sites? Did it happen in a timely and sufficient manner? President Bush went before the United Nations General Assembly and stated, "My nation will work with the U.N. Security Council to meet our common challenge." He and Secretary Powell pledged to work with the United Nations to pursue inspections to seek out and destroy weapons of mass destruction. What we have before us is a question of both policy and credibility. If we failed to fully share intelligence with United Nations inspectors, we may have undermined their effectiveness. If we relied on intelligence that was distorted or less complete than implied, if we failed to share crucial information with our allies, then we have undermined our own national credibility. This Nation launched a preemptive war based on what it claimed was indisputable evidence. If that evidence was not so solid and especially if it was distorted, then we severely undercut our ability to convince the world about future dangers from weapons of mass destruction in other countries. The doctrine of preemption, which I happen incidentally to strongly oppose, totally collapses without credibility. For these reasons, we need to find the answer to these questions. The American people have a right to know. A respected and esteemed member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence said that he has been working for the last 6 months to try to force disclosure of important facts relevant to the sharing of intelligence information on suspect weapons of mass destruction sites by the CIA with the United Nations arms inspectors. He continued, and I quote, "If it had been public knowledge in February or March of this year that the CIA had not shared information on all of the top Iraqi WMD suspect sites with the United Nations inspectors, it could have worked against the administration's timetable for initiating military [[Page H5901]] action against Iraq. There could have been questions as to why; it could have made the administration's decision to cut short the U.N. inspection process and to institute military action less compelling; and there could have been greater demand that we share all such information with the United Nations before abandoning the inspection process." I share his concerns and I echo his call for a bipartisan investigation. These are not partisan issues, they are fundamental questions about credibility and they need to be answered. This amendment calls for a GAO study into the sharing of United States intelligence with the U.N. inspections teams. It calls for a report to Congress with a classified annex if necessary for security reasons. We are all aware that to date the United States military has not found weapons of mass destruction in its searches since the end of the war. We also know that that does not prove the weapons are not there. They may well be. And I believe we should bring in more IAEA and United Nations inspectors to help seek out, secure and destroy them if they are hidden in Iraq. Given the Administration's confident and unequivocal statements that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and given the President's assurances that he wanted to work with the United Nations to seek non- military solutions through a renewed inspections process, it is important that we learn to answer to the question of whether or not intelligence was shared in a timely and sufficient manner with the UN inspections teams. I urge you to support this amendment. Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Members are reminded to refrain from improper references to the Senate. Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word. I rise in opposition to the Lee amendment. It calls, of course, for the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a study and determine the extent of intelligence sharing within the Intelligence Community, DOD and the U.N. inspectors in Iraq. I would like to make two general points first. As a part of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence's review of the Intelligence Community regarding prewar intelligence on Iraq, the committee has already begun to examine this issue and will assess the effectiveness and procedures governing the sharing of intelligence to international and foreign bodies. Secondly, the committee acknowledges that the Comptroller has some capabilities for investigation. But I would note that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has a long and distinguished record of conducting bipartisan and thorough reviews of intelligence matters. Therefore, before outside help is requested, it seems only appropriate that the committee should have an opportunity to fulfill its mandate for the House and for the Congress to conduct rigorous oversight of the Intelligence Community. This subject area of the amendment is not going to be neglected. Now a few details. In the run-up to renewed weapons inspections in Iraq late last year, U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix told the press that although his team could use U.S. intelligence, the team was not supposed to trust anyone, and that it was the team's decision, not a particular government's, as to what facilities and where the inspections were to be carried out. The earlier U.N. mission to Iraq was accused of spying for the United States. Therefore, Hans Blix indicated that he had to make the distinction between his possible use of intelligence and his team's ability to conduct an independent and neutral investigation of Iraq's WMD facilities. Blix admitted using CIA reports in a November 28 interview with CNN but cautioned that he would not allow his team to be dictated to by a foreign government. Some have suggested that the U.S. failed to provide the arms inspectors with useful information. At this point, this Member believes that this is simply not true, not true at all. We are going to find out about that, however, when we complete our investigation. Hans Blix actually received, I think, unprecedented access to intelligence. The U.S. provided the U.N. weapons inspectors with the ability to task and assign U.S. U-2 surveillance aircraft operating over Iraq. He told the U-2s where to go and what to target. This is virtually unheard of, U.N. civilians ordering U.S. pilots on hazardous missions. Why did we do this? Why did we give a U.N. official this extraordinary opportunity and authority? In the words of Hans Blix, "The U-2 data will improve our ability to carry out our inspections." If there was a problem in timely response to intelligence, the problem was in the U.N.'s ability to act on information after they had received it from the United States or from other sources. This is not really too surprising since there were literally hundreds of Iraqi agents or personnel whose job it was to slow down the inspectors, to send them in the wrong direction, or to make sure they would end up in the wrong place, or to report on their progress so that deception and deceit and cover-up could take place before they arrived. This is not a failing of the United States but, rather, the inability of UNMOVIC to overcome Iraqi denial and deception techniques. The gentlewoman, I hope, would understand that if there were problems in communication of intelligence, much of the problem was the U.N. reluctance to rely on U.S. sources. This is addressed in an article in USA Today and I do not cite it except that they are quoting Blix. They were reluctant, they said, to rely on U.S. intelligence for fear that Iraq would accuse them of spying for the United States, an accusation that Iraq made, of course, the first time we had inspectors in. Here is a quote: "Still smarting from their admission that U.S. intelligence gave inspectors secret missions during the last round of inspections in 1998, U.N. officials have deliberately curbed access to the CIA and allied intelligence agencies." The ground rules established by the U.N. stipulated that the CIA would not equip the inspectors, unofficial discussions between the CIA and the inspectors were prohibited, and only the U.N. would be allowed to analyze the data that was collected. We have got a lot to look at. Members will have access to some of this very information across the board in an unprecedented fashion. This is a responsibility of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. We have the capabilities. We have the intent. I would say we ought to be given the opportunity. Therefore, I rise in opposition to the gentlewoman's amendment. I hope it will be rejected. Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, I have enormous respect for the sponsor of this amendment. She is prepared to vote her conscience in this House, even if she is a minority of one. I think that is admirable, courageous and her constituents should be enormously proud to be represented by her. I am certainly proud to serve with her. I listened carefully to the comments made by the gentleman from Nebraska. Frankly, I agree with them. I think that is the context of the search for weapons by the U.N. inspector. However, agreeing with them does not get me to his conclusion. My conclusion is that we should support this amendment because it contains a specific request for a discrete investigation that would be of value in understanding precisely what information was shared with the U.N. weapons inspectors. It may turn out that more was shared than we know. It may turn out that less was shared than we know. And it may turn out, and I think it will, that what the gentleman from Nebraska had to say includes the context in which it was shared. Nonetheless, I think this investigation could provide a constructive baseline in understanding the difficulties of conducting U.N. inspections. Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me just say that the specific matters to be studied under this amendment are not to my knowledge currently part of the scope of our Committee's review. We are not specifically investigating what information was shared with the U.N., though we certainly could, I suppose. Thus, I believe the amendment is helpful and I would urge us to support it. Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. I rise to support the Lee amendment. I thank the ranking member for her support. As this House, our Nation and [[Page H5902]] the world debate the quality of the intelligence that the war in Iraq was fought over, it is too easy to forget that our troops were not the first to search the Iraqi desert for weapons of mass destruction. United Nations inspectors spent a decade searching for and destroying illegal Iraqi weapons facilities, but in the days and months leading up to the war, they were scorned for their failure to find weapons of mass destruction. This resolution calls on the GAO to investigate how much cooperation the United States intelligence agencies gave United Nations inspectors. Understanding about that cooperation with the United Nations, or lack thereof, will give us a better picture of the efforts this Nation took to avoid war with Iraq. If America did not fully share its intelligence with U.N. inspectors, Congress needs to find out why. The fact is that the rhetoric leading up to the war in Iraq led many Americans to believe that finding weapons of mass destruction would be absolutely easy, that the U.N. inspectors must have been grossly incompetent. But I do not believe that to be true and I think that our inability to find weapons of mass destruction now requires the United States to reexamine the rhetoric and the events that led up to the war. We need to find out beyond reports from USA Today if our U.S. intelligence agencies were cooperating fully with the U.N. inspectors. And we need to find out if the prewar rhetoric reflected the intelligence we shared with the United Nations. This amendment is about getting answers to questions that we are all asking in this country. I urge my colleagues to support the Lee amendment. {time} 2015 Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. I have given this amendment very careful consideration, and I appreciate the effort. I do believe we have got the matter handled already in the committee, and I will tell the gentlewoman that; and I would invite the gentlewoman upstairs to talk to us about it in a classified setting if she would like to. The reason I say that I think this is unnecessary is I think it is duplicative of work we are doing that, frankly, we are best prepared to do. But I would like to point out there are a couple of problems with the United Nations that we have been working with for quite a number of years, and I think we, frankly, have the expertise to judge better than anybody else. Perhaps our sister body in the Senate, Senate Intelligence Committee, would dispute that; but I would say that either the Senate or us are going to do a pretty good job on this, and in fact we are both working on it. The question of how much information we shared with the U.N. is a fair question to ask, and the answer is we shared a remarkable amount, more than they could handle. It turns out as we heard from the gentleman from Nebraska's (Mr. Bereuter) comments that the U.N. inspectors were very worried about being called spies of the United States and there was quite a debate about taking any information from the United States at all lest this be a U.S.-driven thing and Hans Blix did not want that and he said so publicly a number of times and said that frankly they could do the job fine without us. But notwithstanding, we had been working with them for some time and giving them some good information and frankly at some peril because the U.N. leaks like a sieve, and there are some things about the U.N. that are worth noting. Not all the members of the U.N. are particularly friendly to the United States of America, and that brings us to the question of do Americans want us to be sharing our crown jewels and our sovereignty with nations who may not want to be particularly helpful to us and some who may actually want to be harmful to us. So there is a question there of whether our American constituency would like us to keep this in control in the House or get it out where some other people might want to make some mischief for the United States of America and our security. And I am very much aware of that because we have actually had problems in the past that are documented, which I am not going to go into but which are documented, where materials and information was not properly safeguarded or was willfully given to the wrong people in the U.N. That is not a good track record and I think would not be prudent of us to ignore. I would say that for some time U.N. weapons inspectors had unprecedented access to U.S. intelligence information. Whether they used it or not or wanted to use it was their problem, including analytical reports. We obviously protected our sources. We had imagery from the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, which I think everybody knows now. Probably what some people do not know which I believe I can say is that the U.N. inspectors had the ability, the task to request how that U-2 was used. That is rather remarkable, turning over an asset like that to another country, a set of countries. I believe everybody knows that Colin Powell played intercepts for the Security Council that are frankly things that do not happen in our committee very often. They do not play intercepts for us very often. So I would say an unusual amount of information, perhaps more than I would have approved of, was given to the U.N. And there is a problem with the U.N. that I want to go into a little further, and it is an appearance problem; and it is one I think we are better prepared to handle in the House than an outside group trying to come in here. There is a lot of feeling, I think, that the U.N. does not always get it right in terms of our national purpose or national mission, and I would point out that the presidency of the Security Council for the month of June is the Russian Federation. I would like to also point out, and I think I can say this in a responsible way, that there are an extraordinary number of Russian espionage activities going on in our Nation's capital as I speak, even though we are on a friendly basis. Nations do spy on each other. Russians are still in a little bit of their paranoia and their conspiratorial mode that there are things to find out about us that if they just ask us, they will not believe the answer; so they have to spy on us. We have a good friendship with them, but it has got a ways to go. There is a little bit of a problem there. There is a problem with Syria which is on our terrorist list being on the Security Council. These kinds of things lead one to pause about how we do business, and these are matters which we are well aware of on our committee. And on the Commission on Human Rights, which has recently been in the news at the U.N., it is clearly true that the U.N. took a slap at the United States by throwing us off that commission in order to put Cuba on it. That is not really great. The chairmanship of that committee, I understand, right now is Libya. Libya's human rights record is not worth commenting on, it is so terrible. Zimbabwe? Give me a break. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). The time of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) has expired. (By unanimous consent, Mr. Goss was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.) Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, when we take a look at this, the U.N. business is a complicated, complex business. We work closely with the Department of State, I&R, and others in this. We for years had a good working relationship. I do not think it is necessary for us to abandon that relationship or supplement it. So I am going to urge that we do not mess with what we have got now. If it turns out that there is a need to do that down the road, I will come back and admit it. But I do not think we are there at this point; so I will thank the gentlewoman for her amendment and the spirit in which it is offered. Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentlewoman from California. Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, let me just thank the gentleman very much for his response and for this debate, but I want to reiterate the purpose of this amendment, really, and it has nothing to do with whether one supports or opposes the United Nations. Basically, this amendment requires the GAO to conduct a study, a report, that would be submitted in an unclassified form but may contain a classified annex with regard to the sharing of information between our intelligence agencies and the [[Page H5903]] United Nations leading up to the war against Iraq. I believe the American people have a right to know this and this is what this sentiment of this amendment is, and I would urge the gentleman to reconsider. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) has again expired. (By unanimous consent, Mr. Goss was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.) Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I well understand the purpose of the gentlewoman's amendment, and what I am trying to say and outline for her is that dealing with the United Nations with intelligence is an extraordinarily complex issue, and I do not think there is a particular body in Congress that has more experience than the oversight committees on intelligence, House and Senate. And I therefore say give us a chance to do our job and I think she will understand. If the gentlewoman wants to know how much intelligence has been shared with the U.N., I guarantee we can find out upstairs. Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentlewoman from California. Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman again for that response; but, again, this amendment allows the American people to know what that information was in a declassified form. This amendment allows for a classified index, and I believe in terms of the fact that U.S. tax dollars were of course used in this war that people, the American people, just have a right to ask these questions and have the right to know. This has nothing to do with whether one supports or opposes the United Nations. Mr. GOSS. Reclaiming my time, this is not supporting or opposing the U.N. I will tell the gentlewoman flat out that I do not have the capacity to declassify information. Our committee does not. We can get involved in a process, but the declassification question is another issue which I would love to enlist her support on on how we can make it better, but that is not part of this amendment. Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Chair will once again remind Members to refrain from improper references to the Senate. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee). The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that the noes appeared to have it. Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee) will be postponed. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise. The motion was agreed to. Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. Dreier) having assumed the chair, Mr. Simpson, Chairman pro tempore of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 2417) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon. ____________________ Congressional Record: June 26, 2003 (House) Page H5943-H5946 INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004 The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Pence). Pursuant to House Resolution 295 and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, H.R. 2417. {time} 1020 In the Committee of the Whole Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H.R. 2417) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with Mrs. Biggert (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair. The Clerk read the title of the bill. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. When the Committee of the Whole rose on Wednesday, June 25, 2003, a request for a recorded vote on amendment No. 6 printed in House report 108-176 by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee) had been postponed. Sequential Votes Postponed in Committee Of The Whole The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, proceedings will now resume on those amendments on which further proceedings were postponed in the following order: Amendment No. 4 offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings); amendment No. 5 offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich); amendment No. 6 by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee). The first electronic vote, if ordered, will be conducted as a 15- minute vote. Remaining electronic votes will be conducted as 5-minute votes. Amendment No. 4 Offered by Hastings of Florida The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The unfinished business is the demand for a recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the ayes prevailed by voice vote. The Clerk will redesignate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Hastings of Florida: At the end of subtitle D of title III, insert the following new section: SEC. 337. IMPROVEMENT OF RECRUITMENT, HIRING AND RETENTION OF ETHNIC AND CULTURAL MINORITIES IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. (a) Pilot Project To Improve Diversity Throughout the Intelligence Community Using Innovative Methodologies for the Recruitment, Hiring and Retention of Ethnic and Cultural Minorities and Women With the Diversity of Skills, Languages and Expertise Reflective of the Current Mission.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall carry out a pilot project under this section to test and evaluate alternative, innovative methods to recruit and hire for the intelligence community women and minorities with diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds, skills, language proficiency, and expertise. (b) Methods.--In carrying out the pilot project, the Director shall employ methods such as advertising in foreign language newspapers in the United States, site visits to institutions with a high percentage of students who study English as a second language, and other methods that are not used by the Director under the DCI Diversity Strategic Plan to increase diversity of officers and employees in the intelligence community. (c) Duration of Project.--The Director shall carry out the project under this section for a 3-year period. (d) Report.--Not later than 2 years after the date the Director implements the pilot project under this section, the Director shall submit to Congress a report on the project. The report shall include-- (1) an assessment of the effectiveness of the project; and (2) recommendations on the continuation of the project as well as for improving the effectiveness of the project in meeting the goals of increasing the recruiting and hiring of women and minorities within the intelligence community. (e) Diversity Plan.--(1) Not later than February 15, 2004, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report which describes the plan of the Director, entitled the "DCI Diversity Strategic Plan", and any subsequent revision to that plan, to increase diversity of officers and employees in the intelligence community, including the short- and long-term goals of the plan. The report shall also provide a detailed description of the progress that has been made by each element of the intelligence community in implementing the plan. (2) In implementing the plan, the Director shall incorporate innovative methods for the recruitment and hiring of women and minorities that the Director has determined to be effective from the pilot project carried out under this section. (f) Definition.--In this section, the term "intelligence community" has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401(4))). Recorded Vote The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. A recorded vote has been demanded. [[Page H5944]] A recorded vote was ordered. The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 418, noes 0, not voting 16, as follows: [Roll No. 318] AYES--418 Abercrombie Ackerman Aderholt Akin Alexander Allen Andrews Baca Bachus Baird Baker Baldwin Ballance Ballenger Barrett (SC) Bartlett (MD) Barton (TX) Bass Beauprez Becerra Bell Bereuter Berkley Berman Berry Biggert Bilirakis Bishop (GA) Bishop (NY) Bishop (UT) Blackburn Blumenauer Blunt Boehlert Boehner Bonilla Bonner Bono Boozman Boswell Boucher Boyd Bradley (NH) Brady (PA) Brady (TX) Brown (OH) Brown (SC) Brown, Corrine Burgess Burns Burr Burton (IN) Buyer Calvert Camp Cannon Cantor Capito Capps Capuano Cardin Cardoza Carson (IN) Carson (OK) Carter Case Castle Chabot Chocola Clay Clyburn Coble Cole Collins Cooper Costello Cox Cramer Crane Crenshaw Crowley Culberson Cummings Cunningham Davis (AL) Davis (CA) Davis (FL) Davis (IL) Davis (TN) Davis, Jo Ann Davis, Tom Deal (GA) DeFazio DeGette Delahunt DeLauro DeLay DeMint Deutsch Diaz-Balart, L. Diaz-Balart, M. Dicks Dingell Doggett Dooley (CA) Doolittle Doyle Dreier Duncan Dunn Edwards Ehlers Emanuel Emerson English Eshoo Etheridge Evans Everett Farr Feeney Ferguson Filner Flake Fletcher Foley Forbes Ford Fossella Frank (MA) Franks (AZ) Frelinghuysen Frost Gallegly Garrett (NJ) Gerlach Gibbons Gilchrest Gillmor Gingrey Gonzalez Goode Goodlatte Gordon Goss Granger Graves Green (TX) Green (WI) Greenwood Grijalva Gutierrez Gutknecht Hall Harman Harris Hart Hastings (FL) Hastings (WA) Hayes Hayworth Hefley Hensarling Herger Hill Hinchey Hinojosa Hobson Hoeffel Hoekstra Holden Holt Honda Hooley (OR) Hostettler Houghton Hoyer Hunter Hyde Inslee Isakson Israel Issa Istook Jackson (IL) Jackson-Lee (TX) Janklow Jenkins John Johnson (CT) Johnson (IL) Johnson, E. B. Johnson, Sam Jones (NC) Jones (OH) Kanjorski Keller Kelly Kennedy (MN) Kennedy (RI) Kildee Kilpatrick Kind King (IA) King (NY) Kingston Kirk Kline Knollenberg Kolbe Kucinich LaHood Lampson Langevin Lantos Larsen (WA) Larson (CT) Latham LaTourette Leach Lee Levin Lewis (CA) Lewis (GA) Lewis (KY) Linder Lipinski LoBiondo Lofgren Lowey Lucas (KY) Lucas (OK) Lynch Majette Maloney Manzullo Markey Marshall Matheson Matsui McCarthy (MO) McCarthy (NY) McCollum McCotter McCrery McDermott McGovern McHugh McInnis McIntyre McKeon McNulty Meehan Meek (FL) Meeks (NY) Menendez Mica Michaud Millender-McDonald Miller (FL) Miller (MI) Miller (NC) Miller, Gary Miller, George Mollohan Moore Moran (KS) Moran (VA) Murphy Murtha Musgrave Myrick Nadler Napolitano Neal (MA) Nethercutt Neugebauer Ney Northup Norwood Nunes Nussle Oberstar Obey Olver Ortiz Osborne Ose Otter Owens Oxley Pallone Pascrell Pastor Paul Payne Pearce Pelosi Pence Peterson (MN) Peterson (PA) Petri Pickering Pitts Platts Pombo Pomeroy Porter Portman Price (NC) Pryce (OH) Putnam Quinn Radanovich Rahall Ramstad Regula Rehberg Renzi Reyes Reynolds Rodriguez Rogers (AL) Rogers (KY) Rogers (MI) Rohrabacher Ros-Lehtinen Ross Rothman Roybal-Allard Royce Ruppersberger Rush Ryan (OH) Ryan (WI) Ryun (KS) Sabo Sanchez, Linda T. Sanchez, Loretta Sanders Sandlin Saxton Schakowsky Schiff Schrock Scott (GA) Scott (VA) Sensenbrenner Serrano Shadegg Shaw Shays Sherman Sherwood Shimkus Shuster Simmons Simpson Skelton Slaughter Smith (MI) Smith (NJ) Smith (TX) Snyder Solis Souder Spratt Stark Stearns Stenholm Strickland Stupak Sullivan Sweeney Tancredo Tanner Tauscher Tauzin Taylor (MS) Taylor (NC) Terry Thomas Thompson (CA) Thompson (MS) Thornberry Tiahrt Tiberi Tierney Toomey Towns Turner (OH) Turner (TX) Udall (CO) Udall (NM) Upton Van Hollen Velazquez Visclosky Vitter Walden (OR) Walsh Wamp Waters Watson Watt Waxman Weiner Weldon (FL) Weller Wexler Whitfield Wicker Wilson (NM) Wilson (SC) Wolf Woolsey Wu Young (FL) NOT VOTING--16 Brown-Waite, Ginny Conyers Cubin Engel Fattah Gephardt Hulshof Jefferson Kaptur Kleczka Rangel Sessions Smith (WA) Weldon (PA) Wynn Young (AK) Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mrs. Biggert) (during the vote). Members are reminded there are 2 minutes remaining on this vote. {time} 1042 Messrs. TANCREDO, SIMPSON, CANTOR, GARY G. MILLER of California, and FLAKE changed their vote from "no" to "aye." So the amendment was agreed to. The result of the vote was announced as above recorded. Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Kucinich The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The unfinished business is the demand for a recorded vote on Amendment No. 5 offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the noes prevailed by voice vote. The Clerk will redesignate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Kucinich: At the end of title III, add the following new section: SEC. 345. REPORT ON COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND THE OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN IRAQ. (a) Audit.--The Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct an audit of all telephone and electronic communications between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Vice President that relate to weapons of mass destruction obtained or developed by Iraq preceding Operation Iraqi Freedom on or after September 11, 2001. (b) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General shall submit to Congress a report on the audit conducted under sub-section (a). The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex. Recorded Vote The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. A recorded vote has been demanded. A recorded vote was ordered. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote. The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 76, noes 347, not voting 11, as follows: [Roll No. 319] AYES--76 Allen Baldwin Becerra Berkley Blumenauer Brown (OH) Brown, Corrine Capps Capuano Carson (IN) Clay Clyburn Davis (IL) DeFazio Delahunt Dingell Doggett Farr Filner Frank (MA) Grijalva Gutierrez Hinchey Honda Inslee Jackson (IL) Jackson-Lee (TX) Johnson, E. B. Jones (OH) Kleczka Kucinich Lee Lewis (GA) Lofgren Maloney Markey McDermott McGovern Meehan Meeks (NY) Miller, George Moran (VA) Nadler Napolitano Neal (MA) Oberstar Olver Owens Pastor Paul Payne Rahall Rush Ryan (OH) Sanders Schakowsky Scott (VA) Serrano Slaughter Solis Stark Strickland Thompson (MS) Tierney Towns Udall (CO) Udall (NM) Van Hollen Velazquez Waters Watson Watt Waxman Weiner Wexler Woolsey NOES--347 Abercrombie Ackerman Aderholt Akin Alexander Andrews Baca Bachus Baird Baker Ballance Ballenger Barrett (SC) Bartlett (MD) Barton (TX) Bass Beauprez Bell Bereuter Berman Berry Biggert Bilirakis Bishop (GA) Bishop (NY) Bishop (UT) Blackburn Blunt Boehlert Boehner Bonilla Bonner Bono Boozman Boswell Boucher Boyd Bradley (NH) Brady (PA) Brady (TX) Brown (SC) Burgess Burns Burr Burton (IN) Buyer Calvert Camp Cannon Cantor Capito Cardin Cardoza Carson (OK) Carter Case Castle Chabot Chocola Coble Cole Collins Cooper Costello Cox Cramer Crane Crenshaw Crowley Culberson Cummings Cunningham Davis (AL) Davis (CA) Davis (FL) Davis (TN) Davis, Jo Ann Davis, Tom Deal (GA) DeGette DeLauro DeLay DeMint Deutsch Diaz-Balart, L. Diaz-Balart, M. Dicks Dooley (CA) Doolittle Doyle Dreier Duncan Dunn Edwards Ehlers Emanuel [[Page H5945]] Emerson Engel English Eshoo Etheridge Evans Everett Fattah Feeney Ferguson Flake Fletcher Foley Forbes Ford Fossella Franks (AZ) Frelinghuysen Frost Gallegly Garrett (NJ) Gerlach Gibbons Gilchrest Gillmor Gingrey Gonzalez Goode Goodlatte Gordon Goss Granger Graves Green (TX) Green (WI) Greenwood Gutknecht Hall Harman Harris Hart Hastings (FL) Hastings (WA) Hayes Hayworth Hefley Hensarling Herger Hill Hinojosa Hobson Hoeffel Hoekstra Holden Holt Hooley (OR) Hostettler Houghton Hoyer Hulshof Hunter Hyde Isakson Israel Issa Istook Janklow Jenkins John Johnson (CT) Johnson (IL) Johnson, Sam Jones (NC) Kanjorski Keller Kelly Kennedy (MN) Kennedy (RI) Kildee Kilpatrick Kind King (IA) King (NY) Kingston Kirk Kline Knollenberg Kolbe LaHood Lampson Langevin Lantos Larsen (WA) Larson (CT) Latham LaTourette Leach Levin Lewis (CA) Lewis (KY) Linder Lipinski LoBiondo Lowey Lucas (KY) Lucas (OK) Lynch Majette Manzullo Marshall Matheson Matsui McCarthy (MO) McCarthy (NY) McCollum McCotter McCrery McHugh McInnis McIntyre McKeon McNulty Meek (FL) Menendez Mica Michaud Millender-McDonald Miller (FL) Miller (MI) Miller (NC) Miller, Gary Mollohan Moore Moran (KS) Murphy Murtha Musgrave Myrick Nethercutt Neugebauer Ney Northup Norwood Nunes Nussle Obey Ortiz Osborne Ose Otter Oxley Pallone Pascrell Pearce Pelosi Pence Peterson (MN) Peterson (PA) Petri Pickering Pitts Platts Pombo Pomeroy Porter Portman Price (NC) Pryce (OH) Putnam Quinn Radanovich Ramstad Regula Rehberg Renzi Reyes Reynolds Rodriguez Rogers (AL) Rogers (KY) Rogers (MI) Rohrabacher Ros-Lehtinen Ross Rothman Roybal-Allard Royce Ruppersberger Ryan (WI) Ryun (KS) Sabo Sanchez, Linda T. Sanchez, Loretta Sandlin Saxton Schiff Schrock Scott (GA) Sensenbrenner Shadegg Shaw Shays Sherman Sherwood Shimkus Shuster Simmons Simpson Skelton Smith (MI) Smith (NJ) Smith (TX) Snyder Souder Spratt Stearns Stenholm Stupak Sullivan Sweeney Tancredo Tanner Tauscher Tauzin Taylor (MS) Taylor (NC) Terry Thomas Thompson (CA) Thornberry Tiahrt Tiberi Toomey Turner (OH) Turner (TX) Upton Visclosky Vitter Walden (OR) Walsh Wamp Weldon (FL) Weldon (PA) Weller Whitfield Wicker Wilson (NM) Wilson (SC) Wolf Wu Young (FL) NOT VOTING--11 Brown-Waite, Ginny Conyers Cubin Gephardt Jefferson Kaptur Rangel Sessions Smith (WA) Wynn Young (AK) Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mrs. Biggert) (during the vote). Members are reminded that there are 2 minutes remaining in this vote. {time} 1051 Ms. DeLAURO and Mr. REYNOLDS changed their vote from "aye" to "no." So the amendment was rejected. The result of the vote was announced as above recorded. Amendment No. 6 Offered by Ms. Lee The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The unfinished business is the demand for a recorded vote on amendment No. 6 offered by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the noes prevailed by voice vote. The Clerk will redesignate the amendment. The text of the amendment is as follows: Amendment No. 6 offered by Ms. Lee: At the end of title III, add the following new section: SEC. 345. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH UNITED NATIONS WEAPONS INSPECTORS SEARCHING FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN IRAQ. (a) In General.--The Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct a study to determine the extent to which intelligence developed by the Department of Defense and by the intelligence community with respect to weapons of mass destruction obtained or developed by Iraq preceding Operation Iraqi Freedom was made available to the United Nations weapons inspectors and the quantity and quality of the information that was provided (if any). (b) Specific Matter Studied.--The study shall provide for an analysis of the sufficiency of the intelligence provided by the Director of Central Intelligence to those weapons inspectors, and whether the information was provided in a timely manner and in a sufficient quantity and quality to enable the inspectors to locate, visit, and conduct investigations on all high and medium value suspected sites of weapons of mass destruction. (c) Access to Information.--(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the Comptroller General may secure directly from any agency or department of the United States information necessary to carry out the study under subsection (a). (2) The appropriate Federal agencies or departments shall cooperate with the Comptroller General in expeditiously providing appropriate security clearance to individuals carrying out the study to the extent possible pursuant to existing procedures and requirements, except that no person shall be provided with access to classified information under this section without the appropriate security clearances. (d) Report.--Not later than 12 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit to Congress a report on the study conducted under subsection (a). The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex. Recorded Vote The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. A recorded vote has been demanded. A recorded vote was ordered. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote. The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 185, noes 239, not voting 10, as follows: [Roll No. 320] AYES--185 Abercrombie Ackerman Allen Andrews Baca Baird Baldwin Ballance Becerra Bell Berkley Berman Berry Bishop (GA) Bishop (NY) Blumenauer Boswell Boucher Boyd Brady (PA) Brown (OH) Brown, Corrine Capps Capuano Cardin Carson (IN) Carson (OK) Case Clay Clyburn Costello Crowley Cummings Davis (AL) Davis (CA) Davis (FL) Davis (IL) Davis (TN) DeFazio DeGette Delahunt DeLauro Deutsch Dicks Dingell Doggett Dooley (CA) Doyle Edwards Emanuel Engel Eshoo Etheridge Evans Farr Fattah Filner Ford Frank (MA) Frost Gonzalez Green (TX) Grijalva Gutierrez Harman Hastings (FL) Hill Hinchey Hinojosa Hoeffel Holt Honda Hooley (OR) Hoyer Inslee Israel Jackson (IL) Jackson-Lee (TX) Jefferson Johnson, E. B. Jones (OH) Kanjorski Kaptur Kennedy (RI) Kildee Kilpatrick Kind Kleczka Kucinich Lampson Langevin Larsen (WA) Larson (CT) Lee Levin Lewis (GA) Lipinski Lofgren Lowey Majette Maloney Markey Matheson Matsui McCarthy (MO) McCarthy (NY) McCollum McDermott McGovern McIntyre Meehan Meek (FL) Meeks (NY) Menendez Michaud Millender-McDonald Miller (NC) Miller, George Moore Moran (VA) Nadler Napolitano Neal (MA) Oberstar Obey Olver Ortiz Owens Pallone Pascrell Pastor Paul Payne Pelosi Pomeroy Price (NC) Rahall Reyes Rodriguez Ross Rothman Roybal-Allard Rush Ryan (OH) Sabo Sanchez, Linda T. Sanchez, Loretta Sanders Sandlin Schakowsky Schiff Scott (GA) Scott (VA) Serrano Sherman Skelton Slaughter Snyder Solis Spratt Stark Stenholm Strickland Stupak Tanner Tauscher Taylor (MS) Thompson (CA) Thompson (MS) Tierney Towns Turner (TX) Udall (CO) Udall (NM) Van Hollen Velazquez Visclosky Waters Watson Watt Waxman Weiner Wexler Woolsey Wu NOES--239 Aderholt Akin Alexander Bachus Baker Ballenger Barrett (SC) Bartlett (MD) Barton (TX) Bass Beauprez Bereuter Biggert Bilirakis Bishop (UT) Blackburn Blunt Boehlert Boehner Bonilla Bonner Bono Boozman Bradley (NH) Brady (TX) Brown (SC) Burgess Burns Burr Burton (IN) Buyer Calvert Camp Cannon Cantor Capito Cardoza Carter Castle Chabot Chocola Coble Cole Collins Cooper Cox Cramer Crane Crenshaw Culberson Cunningham Davis, Jo Ann Davis, Tom Deal (GA) DeLay DeMint Diaz-Balart, L. Diaz-Balart, M. Doolittle Dreier Duncan Dunn Ehlers Emerson English Everett Feeney Ferguson Flake Fletcher Foley Forbes Fossella Franks (AZ) Frelinghuysen Gallegly Garrett (NJ) Gerlach Gibbons Gilchrest Gillmor Gingrey Goode Goodlatte Gordon Goss Granger Graves Green (WI) Greenwood Gutknecht Hall Harris [[Page H5946]] Hart Hastings (WA) Hayes Hayworth Hefley Hensarling Herger Hobson Hoekstra Holden Hostettler Houghton Hulshof Hunter Hyde Isakson Issa Istook Janklow Jenkins John Johnson (CT) Johnson (IL) Johnson, Sam Jones (NC) Keller Kelly Kennedy (MN) King (IA) King (NY) Kingston Kirk Kline Knollenberg Kolbe LaHood Lantos Latham LaTourette Leach Lewis (CA) Lewis (KY) Linder LoBiondo Lucas (KY) Lucas (OK) Manzullo Marshall McCotter McCrery McHugh McInnis McKeon McNulty Mica Miller (FL) Miller (MI) Miller, Gary Mollohan Moran (KS) Murphy Murtha Musgrave Myrick Nethercutt Neugebauer Ney Northup Norwood Nunes Nussle Osborne Ose Otter Oxley Pearce Pence Peterson (MN) Peterson (PA) Petri Pickering Pitts Platts Pombo Porter Portman Pryce (OH) Putnam Quinn Radanovich Ramstad Regula Rehberg Renzi Reynolds Rogers (AL) Rogers (KY) Rogers (MI) Rohrabacher Ros-Lehtinen Royce Ruppersberger Ryan (WI) Ryun (KS) Saxton Schrock Sensenbrenner Shadegg Shaw Shays Sherwood Shimkus Shuster Simmons Simpson Smith (MI) Smith (NJ) Smith (TX) Souder Stearns Sullivan Sweeney Tancredo Tauzin Taylor (NC) Terry Thomas Thornberry Tiahrt Tiberi Toomey Turner (OH) Upton Vitter Walden (OR) Walsh Wamp Weldon (FL) Weldon (PA) Weller Whitfield Wicker Wilson (NM) Wilson (SC) Wolf Young (FL) NOT VOTING--10 Brown-Waite, Ginny Conyers Cubin Gephardt Lynch Rangel Sessions Smith (WA) Wynn Young (AK) Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (during the vote). Members are reminded that there are 2 minutes remaining in this vote. {time} 1059 So the amendment was rejected. The result of the vote was announced as above recorded. {time} 1100 The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mrs. Biggert). The question is on the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended. The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, was agreed to. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Under the rule, the Committee rises. Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. Shimkus) having assumed the chair, Mrs. Biggert, Chairman pro tempore of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 2417) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, pursuant to House Resolution 295, she reported the bill back to the House with an amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered. Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute adopted by the Committee of the Whole? If not, the question is on the amendment. The amendment was agreed to. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill. The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time. (By unanimous consent, Mrs. Harman was allowed to speak out of order.) Thanking Members and Staff Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, now that we have completed debate on our intelligence authorization bill for 2004, I just wanted to thank our chairman who is graceful, collaborative and bipartisan and the members and staff on the majority side and to thank the strong team we have on the Democratic side and especially our staff. By name: Christine Healey, John Keefe, Marcel Lettre, Wyndee Parker, Beth Larson, Kirk McConnell, Bob Emmett and Ilene Romack; and also David Flanders of my personal staff for all the effort they put into yesterday's very thorough and, I thought, outstanding debate. (By unanimous consent, Mr. Goss was allowed to speak out of order.) Thanking Members and Staff Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I too would like to congratulate my ranking member and the members of the staff on both sides of the aisle. Normally I would name all those staff. This year I am just going to point to one individual who really was the architect of the bill for the majority, put it together, did the hard work as he always does. He does the budget number and he understands the programs. His name is Mike Meermans. In addition to the spectacular work he did for us in a bipartisan and a thoroughly professional way, Mr. Meermans and his family had a sudden and significant illness in the family. We wish his family well and we wish his son Godspeed, full and complete recovery. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill. The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays. The yeas and nays were ordered. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this question will be postponed. ____________________