指数

Written Statement for the Record of the
中央情报
之前
联合调查委员会

17 October 2002

I welcome the opportunity to be here today and to be part of an inquiry that is vital to all Americans. On September 11Th, nearly three thousand innocent lives were taken in brutal acts of terror. For the men and women of American Intelligence, the grief we feel—the grief we share with so many others—is only deepened by the knowledge of how hard we tried—without success—to prevent this attack.

It is important for the American people to understand what CIA and the Intelligence Community were doing to try to prevent the attack that occurred — and to stop attacks, which al-Qa'ida has certainly planned and remains determined to attempt.

我今天早上要尽可能明确地做的是描述我们对抗Qa'ida多年来发动的战争 - 努力，计划，焦点以及巨大的勇气和纪律。我们的官员在世界各地。对于美国人民而言，重要的是要了解对敌人的知识如何转化为全球行动，包括阿富汗的恐怖分子庇护所 -前9月11日。

重要的是要将我们的努力置于环境中 - 了解资源和人的权衡，我们有做出 - 我们有意识地做出的选择，以确保我们保持积极的反恐努力。

我们需要了解，在智力领域，出现紧急情况时不能迅速撤消资源的长期侵蚀。我们需要解释持续对情报投资（尤其是人民）的差异，这对我国的未来意味着意味着。

我们需要诚实面对我们homel的事实和is very difficult to protect. For strategic warning to be effective, there must be a dedicated program to address the vulnerabilities of our free and open society. Successive administrations, commissions, and the Congress have struggled with this.

对我来说，这不是为安全提供自由的问题，而是找到一个使我们捍卫我们所珍惜的自由所需的安全的公式。不仅是在和平时期捍卫它，而且要在战争时期保存它 - 我们必须准备同时发挥进攻和防守的战争。这就是为什么我们必须在国土安全方面达成共识。

我们需要对我们的缺点诚实，并告诉您我们做了什么以提高未来的表现。在这场战争中，有成千上万的行动（这是一项巨大的人类努力）并不是所有这些都是完美无瑕的。我们犯了错误。

Nevertheless, the record will show a keen awareness of the threat, a disciplined focus, and persistent efforts to track, disrupt, apprehend, and ultimately bring to justice Bin Ladin and his lieutenants.

Somehow lost in much of the debate since September 11 is one unassailable fact: The US intelligence community could not have surged, as it has in the conflict in Afghanistan, and engaged in an unprecedented level of operations around the world, if it was as mired as some have portrayed.

对于美国人民来说，重要的是要知道，尽管过去一年（多年来）我们取得了巨大的成功，但Qa'ida继续计划，并将对我们进行更致命的罢工。将会赢得更多的战斗，可悲的是，更多的战斗失败了。我们也必须对此诚实。

最后，我们需要专注于未来，并考虑将如何应用我们在这场战争中获得的知识。

这些是一些主题，我希望您今天听这张证词时会反思。

Let me begin by describing the rise of Usama Bin Ladin and the Intelligence Community's Response.

The Early Years: Terrorist Financier (1986-1996)

战争的第一个规则是“知道你的敌人”。我的声明记录了我们对本·拉丁（Bin Ladin）的知识和分析，从他作为恐怖金融家的早年到他在阿富汗的全球恐怖主义网络领导。

本·拉丁（Bin Ladin）在阿富汗战争期间因其在1980年代与阿富汗圣战者（Apghan Mujahedin）对抗苏联的招募，运输和培训中的作用，在阿富汗战争期间获得了突出性。

中央情报局报道说，在本·拉丁在苏丹的五年居住期间，他将业务与圣战under the umbrella of al-Qa'ida.

随着本·拉丁（Bin Ladin）在1990年代初的突出性增长，CIA很明显，仅仅收集和报告有关他的情报还不够。

我必须在这里停下来。在一个公开的论坛中，我无法描述我们寻求或收到的当局。但是，重要的是，美国人民了解两件事。

当本·拉丁（Bin Ladin）于1996年离开苏丹并将自己和他的恐怖网络搬到阿富汗时，情报界正在采取强有力的行动来阻止他。

我们必须记住，尽管关注了这种关注，但本·拉丁（Bin Ladin）在1990年代中期仅在我们的反恐中心CTC中的四个集中注意力领域之一。

塔利班圣所年：成为战略威胁

Beginning in January 1996, we began to receive reports that Bin Ladin planned to move from Sudan. Confirming these reports was especially difficult because of the closure in February of the US Embassy as well as the CIA station in Khartoum for security reasons.

Later in 1996, it became clear that he had moved to Afghanistan. From that safehaven, he defined himself publicly as a threat to the United States. In a series of declarations, he made clear his hatred for Americans and all we represent.

By the time of the 1998 East Africa bombings, al-Qa'ida had established its intention to inflict mass casualties and a modus operandi emphasizing careful planning and exhaustive field preparations, which Bin Ladin saw as a prerequisite for the type of spectacular operations he had in mind.

The East Africa bombings in August 1998 and the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000 succeeded because of al-Qa'ida's meticulous preparation and effective security practices.

除了传统的威胁之外，我们还越来越关注（因此加强了我们的警告），即Al-Qa'ida对购买非常规武器的兴趣，不仅是化学或生物元素，还包括核材料。

塔利班提供的庇护所，恐怖分子的情节，规划，招募和培训在1990年代后期所做的恐怖分子在1990年代后期所做的。

阿富汗本拉登提供一个相对安全的operating environment to oversee his organization's worldwide terrorist activities.

In summary, what Bin Ladin created in Afghanistan after he relocated there in 1996 was a sophisticated adversary—as good as any that CIA has ever operated against.

与QA'IDA战争 - “计划”

随着情报界提高对威胁的理解，随着威胁的增长，我们重新集中并加强了我们追踪，破坏和将恐怖分子绳之以法的努力。

到1998年，中央情报局针对本·拉丁（Bin Ladin）和Qa'ida战略的关键要素 - 在阿富汗和全球范围内，将我们放在了强烈的进攻姿势中。他们包括：

中央情报局（CIA）对1998财年向国会提交预算提交的政策和目标声明（于1997年初准备）推动了这一决心对恐怖主义的进攻。

Despite these clear intentions, and the daring activities that went with them, I was not satisfied that we were doing all we could against this target. In 1998, I told key leaders at CIA and across the Intelligence Community that we should consider ourselves "at war" with Usama Bin Ladin. I ordered that no effort or resource be spared in prosecuting this war. In early 1999, I ordered a baseline review of CIA's operational strategy against Bin Ladin.

In spring 1999, CTC produced a new comprehensive operational plan of attack against the Bin Ladin/al-Qa'ida target inside and outside Afghanistan.

这个策略 - 我们称之为“计划”—built on what CTC was recognized as doing well—collection, quick reaction to operational opportunities, renditions, disruptions, and analysis. Its priority was plain: to capture and bring to justice Bin Ladin and his principal lieutenants.

“计划”的一部分集中在阿富汗，面临着一些令人生畏的障碍（其中一些会在9/11之后改变）。例如：

Collection Profile

Despite these facts, our surge in collection operations paid off.

人类来源收集的领域经常分为“联络报告”（我们从合作外国情报服务中获得的）和“单方面报告”（我们从我们自己经营的代理商中获得的）。甚至在“计划”之前，我们对恐怖主义的Humint的愿景也很简单：我们必须获得more的两种类型。The figures for both rose every year after 1998. And in 1999,for the first time，单方面资产的恐怖主义报告的数量超过了联络来源，这一趋势在随后的几年中一直持续。

The integration of technical and human sources has been key to our understanding of—and our actions against—international terrorism. It was this combination—this integration—that allowed us years ago to confirm the existence of numerous al-Qa'ida facilities and training camps in Afghanistan.

反击Qa'ida的全球存在

即使将UBL和Qa'ida瞄准他们的阿富汗巢穴时，我们也没有忽略它的恐怖牢房，遍布全球。特别是在高峰威胁报告的时期，我们加快了工作，以在任何地方找到它们，以动摇和破坏al-qa'ida细胞。

到1999年，我们运营的密集性正在破坏本·拉丁国际基础设施的要素。我们认为，我们的努力消除了基地组织的印象，即它可以不受惩罚地组织和运作。我们的行动传达了这样的信息，即美国不仅追随QA'IDA的罪行，而且还在积极寻求并追求来自al-Qa'ida和其他参与其他团体的恐怖分子planning future attacks无论何时何地，我们可以找到它们。

During the Millennium threat period, we told senior policymakers to expect between five and fifteen attacks, both here and overseas. The CIA overseas and the FBI in the US organized an aggressive, integrated campaign to disrupt al-Qaida using human assets, technical operations, and the hand-off of foreign intelligence to facilitate FISA court warrants.

在几个月的时间里，每日咨询包括弗里什（Freeh），国家安全顾问和总检察长。我们当时在世界各地确定了36位恐怖分子。我们在50个国家进行了针对他们的行动。我们的中断活动对其中21个人进行了成功，包括逮捕，剥夺，拘留，监视和直接方法。

2000年冬季，美国情报局以致命的敌人的反击一直持续到斋月时期，这是另一个峰值威胁报道的阶段。

融合和分享 - 情报界和执法部门

对Bin Ladin和al-Qa'ida进行战斗不仅是动员CTC甚至中央情报局的问题。这是一个跨机构和国际效果。这项工作至关重要的两件事是：融合和共享。

同样很明显，当出现错误时（我们错过信息或机会时），通常是因为我们的共享和融合并不像他们需要的那样强大。跨官僚机构，任务和文化之间的交流是我们在反恐的快节奏，高压环境中最持久的挑战之一。当我为将来提供一些处方时，我将在证词后面回到这个问题。

反恐战争中最关键的联盟之一是中央情报局和联邦调查局之间。在过去几年中，这个联盟取得了成就，如果最近关于全面争执的一些媒体故事是真实的，那将是不可能的。

There are abundant examples of close FBI-CIA partnership in counterterrorism.

当然，这种关系并不完美，摩擦偶尔会出现。1994年的一份CIA Inspector总报告指出，两个组织之间的互动与个性相关。当两人在同一案件中执行不同的任务时，尤其如此：联邦调查局试图制定法庭起诉案件，而中央情报局试图开发情报来评估和应对威胁。

增加机构间通信的难度是一种不幸的现象，称为“墙”。以前在这些听证会上已经提到过，这是妨碍情报和刑事起诉领域之间信息流的复杂法律和规则系统（以及对它们的看法）。“墙”放慢了速度，有时会停止信息流，这是我们简直负担不起的。《爱国者法》有助于减轻这一点。

运行到9/11-我们的操作

第三个峰值威胁是在2001年春季和夏季。与2000年的千年和斋月一样，我们提高了针对al-qa'ida的行动的节奏。我们停止了一些袭击，使恐怖分子推迟了其他人。

运行到9/11-监视清单问题

During the period of the Millennium threats, one of our operations, and one of our mistakes, occurred during our accelerating efforts against Bin Ladin's organization—when we glimpsed two of the individuals who later became 9/11 hijackers, Khalid al- Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi.

在这个早期阶段，即2000年1月的第一天，中央情报局非正式地向联邦调查局介绍了吉隆坡的监视行动。我们在2000年1月5日的CIA内部通讯中指出，我们已经通过了Al-Mihdhar的护照副本 -with its US visa- 到联邦调查局进行进一步调查。联邦调查局（FBI）的一名CTC官员在2000年1月写了一封电子邮件，报道他向联邦调查局官员介绍了监视行动，并指出可疑活动，但没有即将发生袭击的证据。

The relative importance of al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi at this time should be kept in perspective. Neither al-Mihdhar nor al-Hazmi at the time of their travel to Kuala Lumpur were identified as key al-Qa'ida members or associates. Thus, at this point, their significance to us was that they might lead us to others or to threat information. During this period when all CIA facilities were involved in dealing with the Millennium Threat, there was particular CTC focus on three separate groups of al-Qa'ida personnel:

监视始于2000年1月5日哈利德·米·米哈尔（Khalid al-Mihdhar）的到来，并于1月8日结束。监测表明,的行为dividuals was consistent with clandestine activity—they did not conduct any business or tourist activities while in Kuala Lumpur, and they used public telephones and cyber cafes exclusively.

Other individuals were also positively identified by the surveillance operation.

To this day, we still do not know what was discussed at the Kuala Lumpur meeting. Al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi remained there a few days. On 8 January 2000, they traveled to another Southeast Asian country with Khallad. We learned in March 2000 that al-Hazmi flew from that country to Los Angeles on January 15, 2000. We did not learn that al-Midhar was on the same flight until August, 2001.

Al-Mihdhar departed the US on 10 June 2000 and obtained a new passport and US visa, possibly for operational security reasons. Al-Mihdhar applied for this new US visa in Jeddah in 13 June and stated that he had never traveled to the US before. On 4 July 2001, he returned to the US, entering in New York.

在2001年8月，中央情报局越来越关注对美国利益的重大恐怖袭击，我指示对我们的档案进行审查以识别潜在的威胁。CTC审查了其对Al-Mihdhar的持股，因为他与其他恐怖分子有联系。在这项审查的过程中，CTC发现Al-Mihdhar和Al-Hazmi于2000年1月15日进入美国。它确定Al-Mihdhar于2000年6月10日离开美国，并于2001年7月4日重新进入。Al-Hazmi离开美国。

There are at least two points before August 2001 when these individuals were on our scope with sufficient information to have been watchlisted. During the intense operations to thwart the Millennium and Ramadan threats, the watchlist task in the case of these two al-Qaida operatives slipped through. The error exposed a weakness in our internal training and an inconsistent understanding of watchlist thresholds. Corrective steps have been taken.

These corrective steps notwithstanding, we must not underestimate our enemies' capabilities.

运行到9/11 - 警告问题

在直到9/11的几个月中，我们坚信本·拉丁打算攻击美国人，旨在杀死大量的美国人，袭击可能在国内，国外或两者兼而有之。我们急切地报告了这些威胁。

我们的收集来源在这个时期“点亮”。他们指出，计划了多次壮观的攻击，其中一些地块处于最后阶段。

Our analysts worked to find linkages among the reports, as well as links to past terrorist threats and tactics. We considered whether al-Qa'ida was feeding us this reporting—trying to create panic through disinformation—yet we concluded that the plots were real. When some reporting hinted that an attack had been delayed, we continued to stress that there were, indeed, multiple attacks planned and that several continued on track. And when we grew concerned that so much of the evidence pointed to attacks overseas, we noted that Bin Ladin's principal ambition had long been to strike our homeland. Nevertheless with specific regard to the 9/11 plot, we never acquired the level of detail that allowed us to translate our strategic concerns into something we could act on.

The Intelligence Community Counterterrorism Board also issued several threat advisories during the summer 2001. These advisories—the fruit of painstaking analytical work—contained phrases like "al-Qa'ida is most likely to attempt spectacular attacks resulting in numerous casualties," and "al-Qa'ida is prepared to mount one or more terrorist attacks at any time."

从我们的分析和我们传播的原始情报中，FAA在2001年夏季向航空公司发出了两个警报，这表明我们的警告也表明我们的警告是从我们的分析和我们传播的原始情报中发出的。

Our warnings complemented strategic warnings we had been delivering for years about the real threat of terrorism to America.

Message Received

1997年2月，白宫航空安全与安全委员会报告说：

"The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other intelligence sources have been warning that the threat of terrorism is changing in two important ways. First, it is no longer just an overseas threat from foreign terrorists. People and places in the United States have joined the list of targets, and Americans have joined the ranks of terrorists. The bombings of the World Trade Center in New York and the Federal Building in Oklahoma City are clear examples of the shift, as is the conviction of Ramzi Yousef for attempting to bomb twelve American airliners out of the sky over the Pacific Ocean. The second change is that in addition to well-known, established terrorist groups, it is becoming more common to find terrorists working alone or in ad-hoc groups, some of whom are not afraid to die in carrying out their designs."

美国联邦航空局（FAA）在出版《 2000年针对民航的犯罪行为》中说：

“尽管不知道本·拉丁曾攻击过民航，但他既有动力，又有这样做的动力。本·拉丁的反西方和反美态度使他和他的追随者对平民航空构成了重大威胁，尤其航空。”

In discussing the plot by convicted World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef to place explosive devices on as many as 12 U.S. airliners flying out of the Far East, the FAA's report points out that at least one other accused participant in the conspiracy remains at large, and

"There are concerns that this individual or others of Yousef's ilk who may possess similar skills pose a continuing threat to civil aviation interests — Increased awareness and vigilance are necessary to deter future incidents — be they from terrorists or non-terrorists. It is important to do the utmost to prevent such acts rather than to lower security measures by interpreting the statistics as indicating a decreasing threat."

我们听到指控，我们的分析师因不明确警告被劫持的飞机被用作武器而犯了错误。您的员工已被访问超过一百万页的文件，并采访了数百名情报官员，以调查这一复杂问题。我们提供的文件显示了大约12个报告，分布在七年中，这与可能将飞机用作恐怖袭击中ReportsReports的武器有关。

预算和资源

To evaluate our work on al-Qa'ida before 9/11 objectively, it is essential that you look at three issues: global geopolitical issues we were grappling with — including counterterrorism; resource changes throughout the 1990s that affected our ability to fight the counterterrorism fight; and the overall health of US intelligence during this period. It is simply not enough to look at al-Qa'ida in isolation.

The last decade saw a number of conflicting and competing trends: military forces deployed to more locations than ever in our nation's history; a growing counterproliferation and counterterrorism threat; constant tensions in the Mid East and, to deal with these and a host of other issues, far fewer intelligence dollars and manpower. At the end of the Cold War, the Intelligence Community, like much of the National Security Community, was asked by both Congress and successive Administrations to pay the price of the "peace dividend."

“和平股息”的成本是，在1990年代，我们的情报社区的资金实际上下降了 - 在十年中，我们的购买力减少了数亿美元。我们失去了近四分之一的职位。这种失去人力的损失是毁灭性的，尤其是在我们最大的强化活动中：全源分析和人类来源收集。到1990年代中期，新的中央情报局分析师和案件官员招募了虚拟的停顿。在我们一生中最大的信息技术变化期间，NSA没有雇用新技术人员。绝对必须了解，在过去的十年中，国会和行政部门都接受了我们可以“激发”我们的资源来应对新兴情报挑战的想法，包括恐怖主义的威胁。和激增我们做到了。

During this time of increased military operations around the globe, the Defense Department was also reducing its tactical intelligence units and funding. This caused the Intelligence Community to stretch our capabilities to the breaking point — because national systems were covering the gaps in tactical intelligence. It is always our policy to give top priority to supporting military operations.

尽管我们努力应对如此高的优先级，重叠的危机，但我们别无选择，只能将选择性的情报系统和基础设施现代化，在我们缩小规模的同时，我们推迟了必要的投资，否则我们会发现自己倒闭了。我们有一个生动的例子，说明了几年前NSA失去了总部及其现场站之间的所有通信，而几天我们无法处理任何信息。当我们努力将老化的卫星星座重组（和平股息上的另一个“回报”）重组时，我们有一个更典型的延期投资成本的例子，鉴于有意识地接受风险并延期延期替代这些系统的决定是在中期做出的。1990年代。同时，我们将国家图像和地图代理添加到情报界，以及合并和现代化其地理空间和图像功能所需的巨大资金短缺。

Throughout the Intelligence Community during this period we made difficult resource reallocation decisions to try to rebuild critical mission areas affected by the funding cuts. For example,

但是，随着基地组织的威胁变得越来越不祥，并且我们的资源致力于清楚地反对它，我们开始拿钱，人们远离其他关键领域，以改善我们反对恐怖主义的努力。

尽管资源降低和对我们的关注的巨大竞争要求，但我们还是设法为从1990年至1999财政年度为反恐社区范围的三重智力提供资金。反恐中心的资源在同一时期几乎三倍。正如您自己的联合查询人员图表所示，我们已经大量重新分配了美元和计划中的人员来解决恐怖主义问题。此询问已专门提出了CIA资源，我想特别解决它。

从预算的角度来看，1990年代的最后一部分反映了中央情报局转向战时反对恐怖主义的努力。在这十年中，中央情报局的预算实际上下降了18％，我们损失了16％的人员。然而，在那张鲜明的资源图片中，CIA在9/11之前的反恐资金水平高于我们1997财年的50％以上。同一时期，CTC人员增加了60％以上。中央情报局一直重新分配并为这场战斗寻求其他资源。实际上，在1994年，对反恐活动的预算要求不到CIA总计划的四分之一。在我们在9/11之前提交的2002财年中央情报局预算请求中，反恐活动占预算请求的近10％。在您面对重建基本情报能力的预算严格时期，我必须做出一些艰难的选择。尽管中央情报局几乎所有其他方面的资源都在下降，但反恐资源仍在上升。

But after the US embassies in Africa were bombed, we knew that neither surging our resources nor internal realignments were sufficient to fund a war on terrorism. So in the fall of 1998, I asked the Administration to increase intelligence funding by more than $2.0 billion annually for fiscal years 2000-2005 and I made similar requests for FY 2001-2005 and FY 2002-2007. Only small portions of these requests were approved. Counterterrorism funding and manpower needs were number one on every list I provided to Congress and the Administration and, indeed, it was at the top of the funding list approved by Speaker Gingrich in FY1999, the first year in which we received a significant infusion of new money for US intelligence capabilities during the decade of the 90s.

That supplemental and those that followed it, that you supplied, were essential to our efforts - they helped save American lives. But we knew that we could not count on supplemental funds to build multi-year programs and that's why we worked so hard to reallocate our resources and to seek five year funding increases. Many of you on this Committee and the Appropriations Committees understood this problem very well. You were enormously helpful to us. And we are grateful.

I want to conclude with a couple of comments about manpower. In CIA alone, I count the equivalent of 700 officers working counterterrorism in August 2001 at both headquarters and in the field. That number does not include the people who were working to penetrate either technically or through human sources a multitude of threat targets from which we could derive intelligence on terrorists. Nor does it include friendly liaison services and coalition partners. You simply cannot gauge the level of effort by counting only the people who had the words "al-Qa'ida" or "bin Ladin" in their position description.

我们重新分配所有的人可以考虑到demands placed on us for intelligence on a number of the highest priority issues like chemical, nuclear and biological proliferation and support to operational military forces, and we surged thousands of people to fight this fight when the threat was highest. But when we realized surging wasn't sufficient, we began a sustained drumbeat both within the Administration and here on the Hill that we had to have more people and money devoted to this fight.

我们可以在一天的其余时间里争论我们解决这个问题的确切人数，但是我们从未说过的是我们的数字已经足够了。我们的官员告诉您的调查人员，他们总是被刺伤。他们是对的。美国可能永远不知道这些军官的名字，但美国应该知道他们是英雄。他们孜孜不倦地工作了多年，以与本·拉丁（Bin Ladin）和Qa'ida作斗争，并以显着的强度应对在这段时间里打击恐怖主义的挑战。他们的奉献精神，专业精神和创造力阻止了许多基地组织的曲目 - 他们挽救了无数的美国生命。他们中的大多数仍在这场战斗中 - 对于这场战斗至关重要 - 他们通过继续服务来纪念我们。

Thanks to the last two emergency supplementals and the Administration's FY03 budget request, which both Houses approved during the past week, we have begun to move aggressively to reverse the funding shortfalls that have had such an impact on the nation's intelligence capabilities. But we have hardly scratched the surface in our efforts to recover from the manpower reductions, and we cannot reconstitute overnight the cadre of seasoned case officers and assets overseas, or the expert team of analysts we've lost. It will take many more years to recover from the capabilities we lost during the resource decline of the 1990s.

FINAL OBSERVATIONS

Success against the terrorist target must be measured against all elements of our nation's capabilities, policies and will. The intelligence community and the FBI are important parts of the equation, but by no means the only parts. We need a national, integrated strategy in our fight against terrorism that incorporates both offense and defense. The strategy must be based on three pillars:

Nothing did more for our ability to combat terrorism than the President's decision to send us into the terrorist's sanctuary. By going in massively, we were able to change the rules for the terrorists. Now they are the hunted. Now they have to spend most of their time worrying about their survival. Al-Qa'ida must never again acquire a sanctuary.

We have learned an important historic lesson: We can no longer race from threat to threat, resolve it, disrupt it和Then move on. Targets at risk remain at risk.

我强烈支持总统建立国土安全部的提议。该国非常需要该部门将带给国土安全的单一重点。我们有一个外国情报界和执法机构，但是我们没有一个有凝聚力的机构负责的，并赋予了国土安全的能力。总统的提议在所有三个社区之间建造桥梁时缩小了差距。

While the Department will be vital to our homeland defense, the most valued resource for our work against terrorism has always been and will forever be our people.

Moving from this necessary organizational change, I cannot emphasize enough our overwhelming need to recruit and train the intelligence officers we need to win this war.

恐怖分子具有战术优势。他们可以选择他们想要的任何目标，愿意牺牲自己的生命，并且不在乎他们伤害或杀害多少无辜者具有战术优势。发展智力以对抗他们是人力的密集型。有了我们今天投资的人员投资的人员，我们可以做的比9/11之前的更多，但仍然需要更多。我提醒您，自冷战结束以来，我们失去了近4个职位。

Our people also need better ways to communicate. Moreover, we also need systems that enable us to share critical information quickly across bureaucratic boundaries. Systems to put our intelligence in front of those who need it wherever they may be, whatever their specific responsibilities for protecting the American people from the threat of terrorist attack. That means we must move information in ways and to places it has never before had to move. We are improving our collaborative systems. We need to improve our multiple communications links—both within the Intelligence Community and now in the Homeland Security community as well. Building, maintaining, and constantly updating this system will require a massive, sustained budget infusion, separate from our other resource needs.

Now, more than ever before, we need to make sure our customers get from us exactly what they need — which generally means exactly what they want — fast and free of unnecessary restrictions. Chiefs of police across the country express understandable frustration at what they do not know. But there's something else: Intelligence officers in the federal government want to get their hands on locally collected data. Each could often use what the other may already have collected. The proposed Department of Homeland Security will help develop this vertical sharing of information. So, too, will the Intelligence Community's experience in supporting our armed forces. We're going to have to put that experience to work in "supporting the mayor." We don't have the luxury of an alternative.

One last point with regard to our human talent. As critical as terrorism is, our people will not concentrate solely on counterterrorism. Even in the last year, when national attention was focused on terror, other events occurred which demanded the attention of experienced intelligence officers. The risk of an Indian-Pakistani war and the deterioration of the situation in the Mid East are just two examples. The Intelligence Community must keep skilled, experienced officers on all such issues.

总结声明

自9月11日以来，我们的有效性有所提高，情报界将继续采取一项将战争带给恐怖分子的策略。

But in the counterterrorism business there is no such thing as 100 percent success—there will never be.

有时可能会想到，如果我们能找到一个错误的过程，那么我们就可以补救失败并重返9/11之前享有的安全感。现实情况是，我们容易受到自杀恐怖袭击的攻击，我们今天仍然容易受到恐怖袭击。对于美国人来说，这并不是一个令人愉快的事实，但事实是如此。没有简单的修复程序。我们将继续敏锐地看待自己的过程，并在持续的努力中倾听他人，以更好地做我们的工作。但是，我们还必须对自己和公众对我们生活的世界保持诚实。

The fight against international terrorism will be long and difficult.

这将要求我们整个政府中的所有人都在9月11日之后效仿美国人民的榜样 - 团结起来，作为一个团队合作，并以坚定不移的奉献精神和对我们最高理想的忠诚而无情地追求我们的使命。我们欠那些在9月11日去世的人，所有美国人都不少。

来源：http://www.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/dci_testimony_10172002.html

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