主席先生和联合委员会成员早上好。在先前的听证会上，我们已经讨论了在9月11日事件之前与情报界表现有关的具体信息共享问题。金博宝正规网址情报界以及这些机构与其他联邦，州和地方实体之间。但是，在解决信息共享问题之前，我希望总结我们对社区机构对劫机者的了解的评论。 Counterterrorism Information Sharing
与其他联邦机构以及州
以及地方政府和私营部门埃莉诺·希尔（Eleanor Hill），参谋长，联合调查人员
2002年10月1日
INTRODUCTION
劫机者 我们没有发现任何证据表明，非智慧社区机构在9月11日之前有任何信息，表明参加9月11日袭击的19个人有恐怖关系。我们还发现，非智慧社区机构专注于对其责任领域的特定威胁，例如航空公司劫持或越过边界的个人恐怖分子。我们没有发现对针对本·拉丁的“战争”的重点，在这种“战争”中，恐怖特工可能会使用飞机作为武器发动多次针对美国大陆的攻击。尽管FAA，海关，州和INS都有关于19个劫机者的数据，但数据与他们的恐怖活动或协会无关。结果，这些信息本身都不会引起人们对美国境内计划的恐怖袭击的怀疑。取而代之的是，这些机构提供了有关某些劫机者的重要统计，旅行，移民和医疗状况的常规信息。Prior to September 11th, the FAA had airman records on hijackers Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Hani Hanjour, and Ziad Jarrah. Mohamed Atta filled out a medical history form on July 24, 2000. Marwan Alshehhi was issued a medical certificate on July 24, 2000. A medical record concerning Hani Hanjour dated back to 1996, while a medical record for Ziad Jarrah was issued on July 11, 2000. While the FAA had some records relating to Zacarias Moussaoui, it could not find any evidence that Moussaoui was ever issued a recreational pilot or higher-level airman certificate.
INS还拥有有关19个劫机者的记录 - 特别是移民官员为每个人裁定的签证类型和住宿期限。INS记录显示，19个，Salam Al Suqami，Nawaf Al Hazmi和Hani Hanjour中的三个均超过了签证。根据INS的说法，穆罕默德·阿塔（Mohamed Atta）提出了将其签证状态从B-1更改为M-1的申请，并于2001年7月17日授予。B-1签证是向外国国民发出的，以供曼联进行个人旅行国家虽然M-1签证是向外国国民发行的，以便在美国学习。但是，在2001年7月19日，根据当时的B-1访客签证，阿塔先生被接纳为美国。
美国海关服务官员告知工作人员，唯一的信息习俗在9月11日之前就包含在9月11日之前的19个劫机者，他们到达美国时填写的常规表格。
Information Sharing Obstacles to Counterterrorism 联合调查人员采访了众多的英特尔ligence Community officials and officials of departments and agencies outside the Intelligence Community to determine the extent to which terrorist-related information flows as necessary to avert terrorist attacks. The staff also reviewed relevant documents at the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Transportation, and Energy and at the U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), focusing on information received from the Intelligence Community.我们的审查还包括情报界以外的机构在9月11日之前对劫机者的了解以及该知识所基于的具体信息。工作人员审查了签证和移民信息，以及与这些机构分享的有关使用飞机作为武器的美国地标的威胁以及在美国的恐怖融资的信息。该工作人员还针对国防部机构和组件以及军事部门的各种官员，涉及他们提供或从情报社区机构提供的支持或收到的支持。
2001年2月，中央情报局（DCI）乔治·瑟特（George Tenet）局长向国会公开作证说：“恐怖主义的威胁是真实的，是直接的，而且正在发展。”此外，“ [osama]本·拉丁（Bin Ladin）及其全球副驾驶网络仍然是最直接，最严重的威胁。”回想起来，2001年9月11日的事件强调了DCI担忧的重要性。迄今为止，我们的工作表明，所有机构之间的信息流并不一定会跟上威胁的日益增长。
在我们的访谈过程中，情报和非情报人员都抱怨说，一系列政治，文化，管辖权，法律和官僚问题是信息共享的总障碍。金博宝正规网址在《美国爱国者法》通过之前，许多人建议执法信息与情报界没有充分共享。尽管对1990年代的《国家安全法》的修正案进行了修改，但旨在清楚地表明，可以为美国执法机构收集并分享外国情报。
We were also told that not all threat information in possession of the Intelligence Community or law enforcement agencies is shared with agencies that need it the most in order to counter the threats. For example, the FAA was not provided a copy of the FBI's Phoenix memorandum prior to September 11, 2001 and still did not have a copy two weeks after the matter had become public in early 2002. In another example, the CIA did not provide the Department of State with a large number of intelligence reports that included the names of terrorist suspects until shortly after September 11, 2001. The reasons for this reluctance to share range from a legitimate concern about the protection of intelligence sources and methods to a lack of understanding of the functions of other agencies.
The vast majority of the information related to the hijackers or to threats posed by aircraft came to the non-Intelligence Community agencies from the CIA, NSA, and FBI. According to officials from the Departments of Transportation, State, Energy, Defense, and Treasury, unless information in the possession of the CIA, NSA, and FBI is shared on a timely basis, they are unable to include dangerous individuals on various watch lists to either deny them entry into the United States or apprehend suspected terrorists in the United States. The State Department, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the U.S. Customs Service all maintain watchlists of named individuals. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), INS, and other agencies also perform a limited amount of information collection designed to place individuals on witchlists.
The staff review, to date, has found no single agency or database or computer network that integrates all counter terrorism information nationwide. Information about the hijackers and al-Qa'ida can be found in disparate databases spread among a range of intelligence and civilian agencies. Specifically, as exemplified by the Phoenix communication that wasdiscussed in detail at a prior hearing，与可能的Qa'ida恐怖分子有关的FBI信息分散在各个地区办事处，而不是与联邦调查局总部或其他机构共享的信息。此外，没有以任何方式组织与19个劫机者有关的执法，移民，签证和情报信息，以允许任何一个机构发现与恐怖主义有关的趋势和活动中的趋势和模式。
许多官员指出，共享信息有许多障碍。一个主要问题涉及正确清除人员的可用性。联邦官员告诉我们，清算一个人获得敏感隔间情报（SCI）的人需要一年到一年半的时间，并将过程描述为繁琐而笨拙。但是，如果没有SCI许可，则非智能社区机构通常无法访问与反恐相关的重要信息。我们访问过的一些联邦机构没有清理SCI数据的人员，建议他们可以从收到有关潜在恐怖分子的更多具体数据中受益。我们还被告知，许多州和地方机构甚至没有最低级别获得国家安全信息的人员，更不用说SCI访问了。结果，虽然适当清除的FAA，TSA，INS和州官员可能会收到大量的情报信息，但他们可能无法在其组织内部或州和地方官员传播数据，因为潜在的接收者没有被清除以接收它。
Another difficulty mentioned repeatedly is the "originator control" or ORCON caveat. Agencies that generate intelligence impose this caveat when disseminating raw and finished intelligence to prohibit further dissemination without their approval. Thus, an agency may receive very important information that could be of use to a third agency that is not a recipient, but may be unable to share it because of the caveat. Although this matter can be resolved through agreed-upon procedures, the process can be lengthy and cumbersome and may not meet the near-real time lines often required to track and apprehend terrorist suspects.
我们被告知，由于信息共享是不一致的，而且偶然的是，机构尝试了各种手段来绕过障碍。其中包括：（1）与其他机构签署的协议备忘录；（2）将详细的员工用于其他情报和执法机构；（3）参与联合工作队；（4）尝试设计和现场通用数据库。
Agencies Detail Employees Try To Ensure Access To Intelligence Information 一个方法处理信息共享的空间站ues is for agencies to detail employees to CIA, NSA, FBI, and other agencies in an attempt to improve access to relevant information on a timely basis. Theoretically, at least, the agencies believe this is one of the most effective ways to access a greater amount of information from the Intelligence Community. Thus, the Departments of State, Transportation, Treasury, and Energy and the INS, Customs, and other organizations have utilized detailees at the DCI's Counterterrorist Center (CTC), at the FBI, and, to a lesser extent, at the NSA. In turn, Intelligence Community agencies also send detailees to the non-intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies. Numerous task forces and cooperative agreements exist between the DOJ's FBI and border security and intelligence agencies.尽管将员工送往另一家代理商有优点，但这是对问题的不完美回应。JIS被反复地告知JIS，细节没有与主机员工相同的信息访问。细节机构中几乎一致的意见是，主机机构仍然限制对信息的访问，并限制其他机构以人员或信息安全以及情报策略的理由和情报策略来查询的数据库。我们被告知，经常在临时判决后，经常向细节咨询情报，以共享信息是由主持人员工提供的。细节机构的代表建议，主机员工可能没有对其他机构感兴趣的问题有适当的了解，因此向细节提供了通常缺乏适当背景的信息。金博宝正规网址细节机构的代表还建议，获得信息获取的成功可能是驱动人格的。所有机构都认识到，通过电子方式开放和确保访问机构的代理机构将是最佳解决方案答案，而雇员的细节基本上是增值方式。
联合恐怖主义工作队 To improve information sharing, the DOJ, through the FBI, has established 56 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) to involve other federal, state, and local agencies in investigation of terrorist events. The JTTF program is intended to prevent acts ofterrorism before they occur by assisting in identification, investigations, and prosecution. Each JTTF is responsible for dealing with domestic and international terrorism matters within the jurisdiction of the local FBI field office. Agencies participating in the JTTF are required to enter a formal memorandum of understanding that identifies the objectives of the JTTF as both reactive and proactive. In its reactive mission, the JTTF responds to and investigates terrorist incidents. In its proactive mission, the JTTF investigates domestic and foreign terrorist groups and individuals targeting or operating within its jurisdiction with the goal of preventing terrorist events.
JTTF被描述为FBI场Otrice的重要力乘数。在JTTF工作的人员用作联邦调查局特工，并被视为联邦调查局。他们会受到危机，以调查和访问大多数现场办公室的信息系统。但是，在纽约野外办事处，JTTF人员告诉工作人员，在某些情况下，非FBI人员可以访问FBI的信息系统。结果是，非FBI成员必须依靠FBI特殊代理商来获取可以帮助他们进行调查的信息。
非FBI成员与州和地方执法组织的知识，经验和隶属关系有助于增强JTTF处理恐怖主义的能力。在这方面，我们被告知JTTF中最受赞誉的成员通常是Ins。INS在JTTF中的成员身份反复允许FBI的纽约，波士顿和凤凰城现场办公室的人员使用违反移民法的行为，以破坏并从联邦调查局犯罪嫌疑人成为恐怖分子或与恐怖主义联系的个人那里获取信息。INS-FBI的合作在从这些人那里获取相关信息方面发挥了重要作用。
该工作人员被告知，对JTTF计划的一致投诉是当地执法组织缺乏参与。尽管这些组织通常被认为对参加JTTF不感兴趣，但它们的缺席在JTTF中留下了空白。就当地执法组织而言，他们断言，通过参加他们失去官员的JTTF计划，从而在很大程度上被认为是“ FBI问题”的工作，否则他们将在其城市的社区巡逻。金博宝正规网址JTTF参与者的另一个投诉是，在9月11日之前，被分配给JTTF的个人并不总是最适合工作的人。有人告诉我们，一些执法组织据报道将JTTF视为摆脱“ Deadwood并退休工作”的一种方式。我们被告知，这种趋势在9月11日之后发生了巨大变化。
FAA/TSA 在1980年代中期在中东劫持了一架TWA飞机之后，FAA建立了一个小型办公室（现在是运输安全局的一部分），以审查有关对航空威胁的传入情报。该情报被转化为航空业的信息通函，紧急修正和安全指令。通函和指令颁发给国内和外国航空公司，并向机场发出建议，以告知他们当前和潜在的恐怖威胁。他们还提供了情报界和执法机构。
在9月11日之前，美国联邦航空局（FAA）发布了许多通告和指令，这是情报界关于极端伊斯兰群体的情报的直接结果。这些FAA出版物向航金博宝更改账户空公司建议了这些群体可能使用的方法来劫持飞机或在飞机上种植炸药。但是，没有人发现撞到建筑物中的撞飞机。法律要求情报界向交通部（DOT）提供有关国际恐怖主义的情报。结果，该部门获得了中央情报局，国务院，联邦调查局，国家安全局和DIA的情报。但是，DOT官员建议工作人员他们不认为他们会收到执行任务所需的所有可用情报。他们认为，收集信息的机构就与点相关以及应分享的内容做出决定。据报道，这个问题是上下文和理解深度之一。通过未收到有关所有运输问题的情报的总和，TSA可能无法连接事件或连接可疑活动。金博宝正规网址最后，TSA官员表示，尽管他们可以通过既定程序向情报界提交要求，但没有任何要求情报界收集这些要求的。
Although no indications have been found that the FAA knew of the terrorist connections of the hijackers, the FAA did have detailed information regarding those who were pilots. The FAA maintains records of all certificated airmen--those who possess a U.S.-issued certificate, and also on all U.S. registered aircraft. According to the FAA, there are over one million airmen files, of which approximately 626,000 are pilots. Representatives of the FAA stated that the airmen file remains open until receipt of a death certificate. Each certificate contains specific medical information, flight test results, score, engine ratings, incident history, and enforcement activity. These records are kept in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma by the Department of Transportation--specifically the FAA Civil Aviation Registry--and are available to all federal, state and local law enforcement agencies.
根据TSA的说法，在扎卡里亚斯·穆萨（Zacarias Moussaoui）被捕后不久，联邦调查局（FBI）与该联邦调查局（FBI）联系，并从飞行员记录中索取了有关他的信息。明尼阿波利斯的FAA人员建议联邦调查局联系芝加哥的FAA办公室，该办公室使联邦调查局与俄克拉荷马市中心联系。华盛顿特区的TSA官员告诉工作人员，他们感到困惑，因为联邦调查局旨在支持执法部门，因此联邦调查局没有直接与俄克拉荷马州中心联系。
Immigration and Naturalization Service The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) maintains records on all visitors who arrive in the United States. INS officials told the staff that the Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) in Burlington, Vermont is a key data-sharing center designed to support other law enforcement agencies. The LESC assists in determining the status of detainees or to find persons. INS officials stated that the August 2001 notice to watchlist Nawaf al Hazmi and Kahlid al Mihdhar was not accompanied by any specific notation that indicated that the INS should use all means possible to find these two suspects. INS officials said that, had they been told to put the highest priority on that search, they would have used the LESC and might have found the two suspects prior to September 11, 2001.
国防情报机构 DIA常务委员会主席th的主任at serves as an integrating mechanism for the DOD: the Military Intelligence Board (MIB). DCI representatives usually attend and participate in its discussions. Over time, the MIB has wrestled with information sharing issues prior to September 11. According to the DIA, information-sharing issues such as restrictive caveats (e.g., originator or "ORCON" controlled information), handling of information in virtual and collaborative workspaces, limited distribution to senior officials only, and support to homeland defense have been discussed by the MIB since at least the mid-1990's. While most of the specific discussion at MIB meetings is classified, there are enough unclassified examples to provide some definition of the range of information sharing topics addressed. For example, the need to establish an information sharing mechanism was addressed at least as early as February 1995 in the context of multi-agency operations in Haiti. Several additional examples follow, drawn from the records of the proceedings of the group.In September 1998, an MIB was convened to receive briefings on the East African Embassy Bombings and the War on Terrorism. Generally recognizing the need for broad sharing of information in that context, one Command representative observed that there must be a "domestic piece", referring to FBI reporting. Another representative stressed that there was a "commercial piece" as well, with the FAA. Yet a third representative encouraged intra-organizational information sharing as it had done within its organization. Finally, another Command supported breaking through the existing information restriction barriers and recommended a collaborative strategy regarding how to examine and attack terrorist organization. It is not clear whether any follow-up actions were taken as a result of this discussion.
In April 1999, the MIB met to receive a briefing on computer network defense. Challenges to both network defense and information sharing were listed as: law enforcement vs. public interests, the interagency process, and policy and legal issues.
2000年1月，MIB开会了有关DIA非对称战争计划的简报。NSA和海岸警卫队代表都谈到了与国土防御有关的概念部分的法律并发症。在2000年7月的更新中，NSA重申了其对政策和法律问题的关注，尤其是关于支持国土防御和恐怖主义的NSA收集。金博宝正规网址海岸警卫队警告说，新的环境和新威胁可能意味着旧规则不再适用。同样，对于真实信息共享需求的障碍的讨论是否会导致进一步的行动。
2000年10月，MIB讨论了“需要知道”的问题。DCI社区管理人员代表表示，中央情报局正在努力解决与信息架构有关的问题，这些信息架构将使分析师共享信息。DIA的参与者说，从哲学上讲，国防情报已经“需要知道”，但中央情报局仍然遵守“作为基础”的原则。DIA参与者得出的结论是，国防情报界将无法就此信息共享问题与CIA弥合差距。
DIA高级官员告诉工作人员，信息共享问题并不是情报界的新问题，并且不仅限于9月11日的背景。金博宝正规网址据报道，在科尔号攻击号航空母舰之后，DIA采取了重大步骤来改变其结构，过程，产品和与恐怖主义分析相关的政策。DIA官员建议DIA现在挑战其分析师“开箱即用”，并利用所有相关信息，包括开源报告。他们还指出，DIA已经实施了机制，可以更有效地接收和传播关键情报信息。
The DIA has established a Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) to help enhance terrorist threat warning and analysis capabilities and significantly enhance communications and sharing between DIA, the FBI, and CIA. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz identified the value of the JITF-CT during his testimony to the Joint Inquiry on September 19, 2002. He also identified the issue of information discovery where "many agencies collect intelligence and lots of agencies analyze intelligence, but no one is responsible for the bridge between collection and analysis." Finally, Mr. Wolfowitz questioned the current culture that discourages collaboration and criticized the lack of sharing of information that leads to forfeiting of U.S. technological advantages.
根据DIA人员的说法，这些情报社区伙伴关系的结果不同，即仅将分析师分配给另一个组织的行为并不能确保更大程度地获取信息或更多开放信息。DIA承认，详细介绍对应组织的分析师并没有对所有相关恐怖分子信息的无限制和无条件访问。迪亚前董事托马斯·威尔逊（Thomas Wilson）向工作人员解释说，“信息共享”意味着“拥有信息”。他不同意这个概念。根据威尔逊的说法，机构需要改变他们的文化，并相信他们拥有信息 - 该信息属于美国政府和整个情报界。
财政部 几家财政部的部门收到了与中央情报局，美国国家安全局，联邦调查局和其他情报机构的财务问题有关的情报。JIS在特勤局（OFAC）的金融资产控制办公室（FINCEN）的金融犯罪执法网络（FINCEN）采访了财政部官员。和美国习俗。
财政部金融犯罪执法网络（FINCEN）和美国海关服务局的官员向工作人员报告了他们向LNTClligence社区提出情报要求，但没有保证将收集情报并及时和定期提供给他们。
The Secret Service at Treasury occupies a unique position because of its primary mission to protect the President of the United States. According to the Secret Service, it receives the intelligence that is necessary for it to perform that particular mission. It also reportedly receives all relevant intelligence regarding the maintenance of the protective perimeter around the White House.
9月11日后，美国海关官员使用了国库数据库中提供的信息，以对劫机者的旅行，财务和联系进行全面分析。具体而言，美国海关服务分析师使用可疑活动报告（SARS），货币或货币仪器报告（CMIRS）以及从财政部获得的当前交易报告（CTRS）。ReportsReports大部分分析已于2001年11月完成。
海关官员建议，该分析中使用的大多数信息显示劫机者的国内和国际活动以及协会来自执法数据库，特别是机构间边境检查系统（IBIS），而不是情报。IBIS是一个主要的信息共享系统，可将海关与INS，国务院，联邦调查局，国家执法电信系统（NETS），毒品执法局（DEA），酒精，烟草和枪支（ATF），特勤局，特勤局，毒品执法机构（DEA），毒品执法机构（NETS）联系起来国税局（IRS），FAA和加拿大皇家骑警。根据海关服务，有30,000多名IBI用户，但与情报界没有任何联系。海关官员告诉工作人员，他们需要从情报界获得有关恐怖主义与恐怖主义事项的定期和一致的信息。
Department Of State As mentioned earlier, and explained in more detail inthe September 18, 2002 JIS staff statement，国务院官员建议工作人员，至少有1,500名中央情报局中央情报报告（CIRS）直到2001年9月11日之后才提供包含恐怖名称的中央情报局。ReportsReports确定了大约150名可疑恐怖分子的名字，并将58名可疑恐怖分子名字添加到Tipoff监视清单中。共享情报的这种失误，以及在9月11日之前未能将至少两个劫机者的名字添加到州监视列表中，这归因于缺乏资源和注意力清单的认识。国务院官员建议，他们一直很难从联邦调查局（FBI）管理的国家犯罪信息中心的州际识别指数（NCIC III）中获得数据清单目的。
外国恐怖跟踪工作队 总统应总统的要求于2001年10月建立了外国恐怖追踪工作队（FTTTF）。FTTTF的使命是通过通过“数据挖掘”技术开发信息，并将这些信息提供给执法机构和其他运营机构，以帮助将外国恐怖分子及其支持者远离美国。FTTTF依靠公共，政府和其他数据库来链接有关恐怖分子及其支持者的相关信息。
根据FTTTF官员的说法，它试图解决确定可能的恐怖嫌疑人的问题。FTTTF旨在将执法和情报社区以及其他政府和非政府资源的数据共同设置数据，然后将这些信息提供给联邦，州和地方运营机构。
FTTTF官员指出，鼓励他们按照设想的计划进行了数据库和机构间参与。FTTTF不是一个独立的机构，它是一个多机构工作组，完全由不同机构的细节人员组成。国防部的联合反情报评估小组为FTTTF提供了主要的技术支持。
FTTTF officials reported that several thousand individuals from several countries have been already identified as "abscondees" within the United States by the FTTTF. Many new addresses for "cold" abscondees were provided to the INS and the INS is now working closely with the FTTTF to identify individuals who are engaged in immigration law violations. Additionally, the FTTTF works closely with the FBI on the identification and location of terrorists and their supporters.
执行和国会对信息共享问题的认可 2001年9月11日的事件导致的most universal acknowledgement in the United States Government of the need for consolidating and streamlining collection, analysis, and dissemination of information concerning threats to the United States and its interests. According to the President's National Strategy for Homeland Security ("the Strategy"), intelligence contributes to every aspect of homeland security and is a vital foundation for the homeland security effort. The Strategy recognizes that U.S. information technology is the most advanced in the world, but that our information systems have not adequately supported the homeland security mission. According to the Strategy, the U.S. government spends about $50 billion per year on information technology, but the systems purchased are not compatible between the agencies of the federal government, or with state and local entities. The Strategy also acknowledges that legal and cultural barriers often prevent agencies from exchanging and integrating intelligence and other information.
In response to these problems, the Strategy first calls for integrating information sharing across the federal government through the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO). Under this plan, the CIAO would design and implement an interagency information architecture to support efforts to find, track, and respond to terrorist threats. The CIAO would coordinate groups focusing on border and transportation security and other countermeasures to the use of weapons of mass destruction. As part of this effort, the FBI will create a consolidated Terrorism Watch List that includes information from both intelligence and law enforcement sources.
The Strategy also calls for integrating information sharing across state and local governments, private industry, and among the U.S. citizenry. Using modern information technology, more information is to be shared among various databases. The FBI and other agencies will augment information that currently is available in the National Crime Information Center databases and National Law Enforcement Telecommunications Systems. This information integration effort will require that Intelligence Community agencies make efforts to remove classified information from some documents in order to allow them to be shared with state and local officials.
Finally, the Strategy calls for the adoption of standards for information that is in electronic form and is relevant to homeland security. According to the Strategy, terrorist-related information from the databases of all government agencies with responsibilities for homeland security is to be integrated. The Department of Justice, FBI, and other federal agencies, and numerous state and local law enforcement agencies, will then be able to use data-mining tools to apply this information to the homeland security mission.
Major provisions of two of the homeland security-related bills now pending before Congress would promote the sharing of critical homeland security information regarding threats between federal intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies as well as state and local officials, sheriffs, governors, mayors, other elected officials, and other emergency responders. The bills recognize the continuing need to protect sensitive sources and collection methods by granting security clearances to appropriate state and local personnel.
账单还将指示总统制定联邦机构将与州和地方人员共享国土安全信息的程序。此外，账单将要求信息共享系统具有传输分类或未分类的信息的能力，可以根据收件人需要知道的需求限制信息的交付，并可以适用于适当的州和地方人员。
In recent years, a number of Commissions established by the Congress have reported on the ability of the United States to respond to terrorist events and have recommended that steps be taken to encourage closer cooperation between the intelligence and law enforcement communities. The hearings of this Joint Inquiry have shown that, although there is no information to indicate with certainty that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 could have been prevented, some have suggested that certain terrorist acts may have been facilitated by continuing poor information exchanges between intelligence and law enforcement agencies and by blurred lines of organizational responsibility.
国会建立的一种机制之一，是评估涉及大规模杀伤性武器的恐怖主义反应能力的咨询小组，非常仔细地研究了与州和地方官员共享反恐情报的问题。金博宝正规网址该咨询小组是由1999财年的《国防授权法》成立的，由当时的弗吉尼亚州州长詹姆斯·吉尔莫尔（James Gilmore）主持witnesstoday. The Advisory Panel issued three reports in December 1999, 2000, and 2001.
该咨询小组在其第一份报告中报告说，州和地方官员表示需要更多的情报，并且要在实体之间提供有关潜在恐怖威胁的各个层次之间的信息共享。该报告指出，虽然小组敏锐地意识到需要保护机密的国家安全信息以及可能获得的机构的来源和方法，但它认为可以做更多的事情来提供及时的信息，以向上，向上和横向提供及时的信息在各级政府面向需要信息的人提供有效威慑，阻碍，保护和对潜在威胁的反应。
该小组的第二次年度报告指出，起源于美国以外的恐怖主义与在美国境内实施的恐怖行为之间的潜在联系意味着，“外国”恐怖主义可能不容易与“家庭”恐怖主义区分开。该报告敦促必须开发比JTTF更全面的传播系统，以通过扩展的执法渠道提供信息，以进一步向当地响应实体传播。小组在第三次也是最后一份报告中描述了一项调查的结果，该调查的结果证实了该小组的观点，即州和地方实体需要威胁评估以及有关潜在恐怖活动的更好情报。
The premise of the Panel throughout its work has been that all terrorist incidents are local, or at least will begin that way. The Panel recommended that a federal office for combating terrorism establish a system for providing clearances to state and local officials and that the FBI implement an analytic concept similar to the CIA's "Reports Officers" to do a better job of tracking and analyzing terrorism indicators and warnings.
GAO's Assessment Of Information Sharing
Within And Between Federal, State, And Local AgenciesThe General Accounting Office has completed a number of reports for Congress that focus on combating terrorism, information sharing, and homeland security. In addition,Gao的记录书面声明for this hearing emphasizes the need for a commitment by the leadership of the FBI, CIA, and other agencies to transform the law enforcement and intelligence communities and achieve the most effective information sharing possible to combat terrorism.
GAO已确认，联邦调查局，中央情报局，NSA和其他机构具有不同的组织文化。此外，这些机构之间存在法律墙，分类墙和历史上官僚实践的历史墙壁。随着GAO认为这种情况，只有在强大而有远见的经理的承诺，有效性和持久性的情况下，这些墙壁才会被拆除，并发生更多的信息共享。
如果国家，州和地方政府将成功地在恐怖主义战争中取得成功，那么GAO确定的信息共享的三个问题对于解决重要的问题包括分裂，技术障碍和无效的合作。GAO对技术障碍重要性的评估得到了联邦调查局无法在其现场办公室和总部以及其他机构之间共享信息的支持。信息分散的问题还通过以下事实说明，即现在在运输安全管理局（TSA）的联邦航空管理局的情报局收到的信息表明，著名的恐怖袭击者艾哈迈德·雷森（Ahmed Ressam）在试图进入美国时已被捕来自加拿大的目的是轰炸洛杉矶国际机场。然后，它发布了对炸弹设备的分析，但该分析并未与情报界直接分享，同时它被释放到机场和航空公司。
附加数据库 The Joint Inquiry Staff has reviewed numerous databases that contain important financial, travel, and vital statistics information. The Staff also has been informed of other powerful search mechanisms that have not been tapped because agencies are not fully aware of their existence or capabilities.
For example, both INS at the Justice Department and the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) of the State Department claim that their databases and capabilities were never fully exploited in the FBI's efforts to locate the two hijackers, al Mihdhar and al Hazmi, who were identified by CIA in August 2001 as having entered the United States. Individuals at both INS and DSS claim that they may have been able to locate the two hijackers before September 11, 2001, had they been provided with the full context of the search and all the intelligence that was available on the two hijackers.
由于国家安全分类，在这里无法讨论情报界存在的多个数据库。但是，我们可以简要描述存在的许多未分类的数据库和工作组中的一些，并旨在促进执法机构之间的共享信息。
Selected Law Enforcement Databases NCIC:联邦调查局的国家犯罪信息中心是全国执法机构提交的盗窃报告，认股权证和其他刑事司法信息的国家指数。ReportsReportsNCIC向警察和执法人员提供有关人员和财产的信息的实时通知。
NLETS:NETS是一个全国性的网络，将所有州和许多联邦机构联系在一起以交换刑事司法信息。在每个州，一个机构都负责维护州内执法的电信系统，以在整个州传达信息。每个州的刑事司法系统都可以访问任何其他州的刑事司法系统，以获取各种信息，包括车辆注册，驾驶执照和犯罪历史记录。其他数据包括飞机，船和枪支注册。
TIPS:联邦调查局（FBI）建立的恐怖主义信息和预防系统由一个网站组成和免费的800号电话，以报告有关可能恐怖罪的任何信息。ReportsReports电话提示线在不到两个月的时间内接到了180,000多个电话，并产生了约30,000个线索。
CODIS:联合DNA指数系统由FBI于1990年成立，是DNA概况的国家指数。它是通过使联邦，州和地方犯罪实验室以电子方式交换和比较DNA概况的关键工具，从而将犯罪与彼此联系起来并与被定罪的罪犯联系起来。
nibin：The National Integrated Ballistics Information Network attempts to unify Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and FBI firearms databases.
NDPIX:The National Drug Pointer Index is a system that allows state, local, and federal agencies to determine if a suspect is under investigation by any other participating agency.
TECS：Treasury's Enforcement Communications Systems is a computerized information system designed to identify individuals and businesses suspected of involvement in violations of federal law. TECS is also a communications system permitting message transmittal between Treasury law enforcement offices and other national, state, and local law enforcement agencies. TECS provides access to the FBI's National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and the National Law Enforcement Telecommunication Systems (NLETS) with the capability of communicating directly with state and local enforcement agencies.
IBIS:The Interagency Border Inspection System assists border enforcement agencies in focusing their limited resources on potential non-compliant travelers at ports of entry. IBIS provides the law enforcement community with access to computer-based enforcement files of common interest. It also provides access to the FBI's National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and allows its users to interface with all fifty states via the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications Systems (NLETS). IBIS resides on the Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) at the Customs Data Center. IBIS also contains the INS' NAILS database. An IBIS network with more than 24,000 computer terminals provides field-level access. These terminals are located at air, land, and sea ports of entry. IBIS keeps track of information on suspect individuals, businesses, vehicles, aircraft, and vessels. IBIS terminals can also be used to access NCIC records on wanted persons, stolen vehicles, vessels or firearms, license information, criminal histories, and previous Federal inspections. The information is used to assist law enforcement and regulatory personnel.
指甲：国家自动化移民监视系统是一种中央大型计算机系统，它提供了一种可靠的方法来验证个人的可接受性并防止不可接受的人进入美国进入美国。实际上，通过提供快速，易于重试的传记或案例，以促进检查和调查过程有关不应被允许进入美国的个人的数据。单个INS应用程序提供指甲II中包含的数据。其他信息由联邦，州，地方和外国政府机构以及其他实体提供。
SELECTED FEDERAL TASK FORCES JTTF：2001年9月11日之前有34JTTFs nationwide that included members from federal agencies such as the U.S. Marshals Service, the U.S. Department of State's Diplomatic Security Service, the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the U.S. Secret Service and local entities such as the New York State Police. After September 11, the Department of Justice established 56 JTTFS, one in each FBI field office, to enhance the FBI's ability to promote coordinated terrorism investigations among FBI field offices and law enforcement organizations nationwide. The JTTFs now involve over 3,700 agents, compared to 2,178 before September 11.
attf：为了整合和进一步协调该领域的抗恐怖活动，司法部创建了93个反恐工作组，其中一个是美国检察官地区的一个 - 整合了地方，州和联邦执法部门的沟通和活动。ATTF包括每周24小时，7天，联系系统，以确保ATTFS和其他机构的主要成员可以迅速沟通并应对任何未来的恐怖袭击。
FTTTF:The Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force was established to better ensure that federal agencies, including the FBI, INS, and Customs Service coordinate their efforts to bar from the United States and locate aliens who are suspected of engaging in terrorist activity, or who provide material support to terrorist activity.
Conclusion In summary, the Joint Inquiry Staff believes that much information of great potential utility to the counterterrorism effort exists in the files and databases of many federal, state, and local agencies, as well as in the private sector. However, that information is not always shared or made available in timely and effective ways to those who are in a position to act upon it, add it to their analysis, and use it to better accomplish their individual miissions. Our review found problems in maximizing the flow of relevant information both within the Intelligence Community as well as to and from those outside the Community. The reasons for these information disconnects can be, depending on the case, cultural, organizational, human, or technological. Comprehensive solutions, while perhaps difficult and costly, must be developed and implemented if we are to maximize our potential for success in the war against terrorism.