Statement of Lt. Gen. William Odom on Homeland Security and Intelligence: June 26, 2002 - 金博宝网站,金博宝正规网址,金博宝更改账户

在参议院政府事务委员会作证

在

CREATING国土安全部门

2002年6月21日

由William E.奥多姆

�� Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, for inviting me to appear before you today and to share some thoughts on the plan to create a new department of homeland security.

�� I will address my comments to three points. First, the general question of creating this new department; second, how intelligence collection needs can best be accomplished; third, how best to deal with intelligence analysis in support of this department.

为什么边境和安全责任的整合势在必行��

建立一个完全负责控制美国边境的内阁级别的部门早就应该成立了。一个“边境管理机构”实际上是由卡特政府提出的，但是当时在行政部门内部遇到了很大的阻力。自那时以来，这一问题定期提出，特别是涉及毒品贩运的问题。我写了一篇简短的专栏文章美国新闻与世界报道in 1988, not long after I retired, calling for such a department because from the point of view of providing intelligence to support the war on drugs, I had seen interagency competition and the lack of secure communications create all kinds of difficulties.� Too often we had good intelligence but ineffective action because of fragmented arrangements within the federal government charged with border control responsibilities.� There were also serious limits on the capacities of local law enforcement officials for using intelligence. At the time, I likened the drug war to a football game in which the drug traffickers were an NFL team and government a division III college team.� The fragmentation of responsibilities among agencies � at least nine with border responsibilities being spread among five different cabinet departments � made it impossible to defend US federal borders effectively.�

几年后，当国民警卫队和海军陆战队开始加强我们与墨西哥边境的边境巡逻以对付非法移民时，分裂问题变得更加严重。现在我们面临着恐怖主义的威胁，边境控制迫在眉睫。因此，成立这个新部门的理由不仅涉及恐怖主义，而且涉及移民、毒品和其他贸易违禁品。我提到这些其他目的，是因为在今天的公开辩论中，这些目的常常被忽略了。��

因此，我看不出有什么严肃的论点可以反对政府现在提议的那种大规模重组。逾期已久。我们所生活的组织可以追溯到18世纪^日和19^日centuries when the federal bureaucracy grew haphazardly, often in response to parochial political interest before genuine needs.� The resulting potpourri of fragmented bureaucracies is not surprising, but it is astonishing that we have failed for the last half a century to modernize the federal organization for dealing with the plethora of dysfunctions caused by the fragmentation.

这些谁警告说，重组将不会解决这些问题是正确的。重组不能单独投保的改进，但它将使之成为可能。由于组织安排站在今天，这些问题不能固定。Do the critics prefer to keep it impossible to improve the situation?� I was involved in the reorganization that created FEMA during the Carter administration.� The same arguments were made, and for several years, various parts of FEMA did not work together very well, but over time, it has developed a respectable record of performance, a record that the pre-FEMA organizations could not have matched.

支持重组的最后一点是，不断变化的技术和不断变化的市场已经导致美国很多大公司倒闭。其他一些公司进行了重组，以适应变化，并因此取得了成功。在过去的几十年里，通讯和信息管理技术发生了巨大的变化，我们应该认为先验我们需要对控制美国边境的官僚机构和防止恐怖袭击的国内安全组织安排进行重大重组。换句话说，那些反对设立新部门的人应该承担责任，证明为什么不需要设立新部门。

情报搜集，以支持国土安全

�� In considering intelligence support to this new department, we should break it into two parts:� 1) collection of intelligence and 2) analysis of intelligence for decision makers. I shall comment first on collection, then analysis.

�� The Intelligence Community has been slowly changing toward a system of national managers for the main intelligence collection disciplines, the three being signals (SIGINT), imagery (IMINT), and human intelligence (HUMINT) collection. A fourth, counterintelligence, also needs national management but remains fragmented beyond anyone's control at the national level.�

许多内阁部门和几十个下级内阁机构现在都从美国国家安全局、美国国家地理协会和中央情报局的行动理事会接收情报。如果用户机构保持适当安全的通信和存储设施，并有清净的人员处理信号情报，他们会定期得到支持。我不确定这种分配系统已经为IMINT和HUMINT发展了多远，但是用于它的技术已经存在了至少20年。因此，国土安全部(Homeland Security Department)没有理由不能直接从目前构成的情报系统的各个组成部分接收来自所有这三个部门的情报。例如，国务院就依赖这种方法来满足其情报需求。其他几个部门和机构也是如此。

�� It is not enough, however, that the SIGINT, IMINT, and HUMINT are delivered to a single office in the headquarters of the Homeland Security Department.� Several of its sub-departments and agencies will also need to receive relevant intelligence directly, often on a "time sensitive" basis, for their own analysis and.�When the Intelligence Community agencies supply intelligence to a major command within the Department of Defense, for example, the Central Command (CENTCOM), they do not dump it all at CENTCOM headquarters.� Much of it is sent directly to tactical units in the field. The new Homeland Security Department will need to develop analogous systems of direct intelligence distribution based on the particular needs of the various organizations within the department.� They will have to have secure communications and storage facilities, and they must provide "cleared" personnel to receive and process it at every level of the department where time-sensitive intelligence is used.

�� To use a familiar metaphor � news services � the Security Department's various subunits will have to subscribe to intelligence collection services just like customers subscribe to AP, UPI, Reuters, CNN, FOX, and others. The Intelligence Community will need to make more progress in getting the CIA/DO and NIMA to act as news services. NSA is more advanced in this approach for historical and technical reasons, dating back to World War II when distribution of SIGINT (such as "ULTRA") was compartmented and handled in special communications channels.� Advances in imagining technologies and broadband communications have made the same approach feasible for IMINT. The technology to distribute HUMINT is simple enough, but the security problems are different.� Still, the general approach can be adapted for all three collection disciplines.

�� Another kind of intelligence collection will be especially important within this new department. It is analogous to what the military calls "reconnaissance" or "tactical" intelligence reporting by non-intelligence units. Rifle platoons, for example, report all kinds of enemy actions and locations as a result of their direct encounters with enemy forces.� The results of combat actions immediately become "intelligence" although they are not collected and reported by intelligence personnel. Air force pilots and ship crews at sea do analogous collecting and reporting of enemy activities and capabilities.

在国土安全部，所有分队和现场操作人员的战术报告将是非常重要的，因为可以观察到有用的信息。—这将由该部门的内部情报程序负责。了解到并非所有的情报都来自于情报部门，这对国务院的成功至关重要。

�� I have not yet mentioned counterintelligence (CI) support, which is terribly important for homeland security. To be clear about CI, it is like ordinary intelligence except that it focuses only on hostile intelligence services, their collection capabilities, agents, knowledge of the United States, etc.� Because terrorists have much in common with spies, operating clandestinely, CI must also include counter-terrorism (CT) intelligence, both domestically and abroad.� Until CI is better organized within the Intelligence Community, CI support to homeland security will be poor.� If a "National CI Service" were created to provide "national management" for all CI � and counter-terrorist intelligence � removing it from the FBI, then CI/CT could be handled just like SIGINT, IMINT, and HUMINT.� Putting the FBI within the new department would not provide better CI/CT, but rather worse.� Moreover, it would make CI/CT cooperation with the CIA, Army, Navy, and Air Force virtually impossible.

如果做出这样的改变，减轻联邦调查局CI/CT的责任，那么联邦调查局和所有地方执法机构仍然需要分享和分发与恐怖分子及其活动有关的所有犯罪活动的信息。新的国家反间谍机构将负责收集和制作美国国内外的情报。�受到中央情报局局长,它会有相同的,也许更多,比其他情报机构监督,其预算和任务优先级将DCI符合提供的情报需求,他每年收集来自所有机构在行政部门需要智力支持。�

国土安全情报分析

�� Thus far I have discussed intelligence collection and distribution.� "Analysis" and "production" of so-called "finished" intelligence, or "all-source" intelligence, are different from "collection" of intelligence. Normally done by different people from intelligence "collectors," they consist of the processes of integrating intelligence, making sense of it, and using it to answer questions that users of intelligence have for their particular operational and policy goals.� I emphasize this difference between collection and analysis because the public debate about intelligence support for the new Homeland Security Department often confuses the two as one and the same. They are not.

�� The new department must have its own analysis and production capabilities.� They will have to give their special collection requirements to the Intelligence Community agencies according to the DCI's guidance, and those agencies must collect and sort information to answer the requirements. The Homeland Security intelligence analysts will have to put it all together from the various reports supplied by the collection agencies.� Because these analysts will be within the Homeland Security Department, they will be properly located to know its intelligence needs and how to shape them, both to steer collection efforts and to produce answers that are timely and truly needed.�

�� Within the department, there will undoubtedly have to be a decentralized system of analysis in some cases, centralized in others.� With modern communications, however, the mix of both approaches is easy to establish. For example, central data bases can be built, allowing dispersed access and use in decentralized analysis units.�

我的建议在这里，当然，是在各军种中发现的情报分析模型。每个操作命令具有一个人员情报部，其可以请求和接收信号情报，HUMINT，IMINT，和Cl。This intelligence staff section is responsible to the operations staff section for finished intelligence analysis.� At the joint level, this section is known as the J-2 and the J-3 is the operations section. At the corps and division levels, we find the G-2 supporting the G-3, and so on, down to S-2s and S-3s in brigades and battalions. In the air force and navy, analogous staff intelligence sections are found with different names.

我们可以把这种智能的“分布式处理”的模式，而不是“中央处理”的模式。The latter model is analogous to a big mainframe computer that serves many users who have only "dumb" terminals to provide access to the central processor.� The distributed processing model is analogous to small microprocessors in PCs and laptop computers located in many analytic units, widely dispersed with different needs and demands, performing analysis tailored for local use. The distributed processing model removes the queues, the lines in which users may have to wait for responses.� And it emphasizes particularizing analysis for the familiar user immediately at hand, not a faceless one far away. Only analysis done locally, where the intelligence officers are in immediate contact with operators who use intelligence to make decisions, can accurately perceive what kinds of intelligence analysis is useful.� A large intelligence analysis center far away from the users will never have the sensitivity to local operations to provide effective support.� This has always been the weakness of much of the all-source intelligence produced by CIA/DI and DIA.� Both can produce useful products for some purposes, but they cannot provide comprehensive and "time sensitive" support to all users within a single department, much less the entire government.

�� When we understand the difference between 1) intelligence collection and 2) intelligence analysis and production, it becomes clear why it makes no sense to put collection agencies from the Intelligence Community inside of the Homeland Security Department. That will makes things worse, not better, for intelligence support, unless the Intelligence Community agencies work only for that department. In that case, additional and similar agencies would have to be created to prove support to the military services, the State Department, and dozens of other executive branch intelligence users.

然而，另一种问题出现了。情报收集人员如何决定优先给予谁?国防部?美国国务院?国土安全吗?财政部?bb0必须设定优先事项，而负责这方面工作的主管是中央情报局(Central Intelligence)局长。

�� Like any other resource, intelligence is costly and scarce. All users cannot have all they want all the time.� Their requirements have to be prioritized, giving some preference over others as situations and needs change.� This prioritization task is not new. The Defense Department has dealt with it for a long time, quite successfully in most cases. Among departments, especially its largest users, State and Defense, the DCI has also developed a reasonably effective record of handling the prioritization task according to the demands of the department secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.� The new Homeland Security Department should look to that experience in handling its own internal priorities and learning how to get the most from the Intelligence Community's collection agencies and centralized analysis and data bases.

结论

�� The complexities surrounding both the practical matter of creating a new Homeland Security Department and of providing it with adequate intelligence support are enormous.� In my remarks I have merely sketched the broad outlines, but I hope that they explain these conclusions:

First, the wisdom of creating the new department is beyond doubt.� It will not be easy, and mistakes will be made in the process, but they can be ironed out by trial and error.� This reorganization process is absolutely必要如果要在我们的边界的控制和对美国境内的恐怖行动辩护任何认真改进。�

其次，恐怖主义不是创造这个新部门的唯一原因。It has long been needed for dealing with immigration, drugs, illegal trade, and several lesser matters.� If it is properly organized and tasked, it can help reduce the rising transaction costs these issues are placing on the US economy.

Third, intelligence support for the new department is not a matter of putting the FBI, CIA, or some other intelligence organization within its domain.� It is a matter of creating its own intelligence analysis elements and insuring that they have access to the major collection capabilities in the Intelligence Community.� That approach works well for the Intelligence Community's support to many cabinet departments and lesser agencies today.�

There is one exception.� The Intelligence Community is poorly organized to provide "counterintelligence" (CI).� CI must also take the lead in providing counter-terrorism intelligence (CT) as well.� And its collection and production cannot be the responsibility of criminal law enforcement agencies, not just in the case of the FBI but also in the military services. As the Intelligence Community is now organized, it simply cannot provide a comprehensive CI and CT picture to anyone, not to mention the Homeland Security Department.