未分类的版本
Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet's Testimony before the�
联合调查恐怖袭击对美国的袭击

2002年6月18日

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笔记：

1.�联合询问成员要求将6月18日提交给他们的高度分类的DCI宗旨进行修改以使其未分类，以便可以公开发布。取而代之的是未分类的文本。

2.� The numbers following names in the text—e.g., "(#14)"—are keyed to the photos in the accompanying graphic, which is offered in bothJPGandPDF格式。

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Before Director Mueller and I focus on the 9/11 plot, as you've asked us to do Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin with some remarks on the context in which the attacks occurred.� There are two key points:�

• First, we had followed Bin Laden for many years and had no doubt that he intended a major attack.

• Second, the eighteen months prior to 9/11 were a period of intense CIA/FBI efforts to thwart dramatically heightened UBL operational activity.�

从1991年到1996年，我们在苏丹时期首次锁定了本·拉登（Bin Laden）。

• 在那些年里，他主要是恐怖袭击的金融家，我们对他的努力与其他致命威胁竞争，例如真主党构成的威胁 - 那时，这是造成比任何其他恐怖组织更多的美国人死亡的。
  
  
• 本拉登跳对列表的顶部his move to Afghanistan in 1996 and his drive to build the sanctuary that subsequently enabled his most spectacular attacks.� This focus resulted in the establishment within CTC of a Bin Ladin-dedicated Issue Station staffed by CIA, FBI, DOD, and NSA officers.
  
  
• 当年，本·拉登（Bin Laden）清楚地表明了他的手，当时他说六月对霍巴尔塔（Khobar Towers）的轰炸标志着穆斯林与美国之间战争的开始。
  
  
• Two years later, he issued a fatwa stating that all Muslims have a religious duty "to kill Americans and their allies, both civilian and military worldwide".
  
  
• 然后，他在1998年袭击了我们东非大使馆，并说袭击inthe US was his highest priority.
  
  
• 我们将其视为他明确的战争宣言，而我们又向他宣战，开设了一段密集的反恐活动时期，填补了9/11的几个月。

There were three broad phases in that struggle before 9/11 and I want to set the stage for the 9/11 plot by telling you about them:

• First, the pre-Millennium Period in late 1999.``UBL特工计划针对我们和盟军的目标进行一系列攻击，旨在利用全球计划的千年庆祝活动。约旦的大型恐怖牢房计划炸毁雷迪森酒店，圣地和以色列旅游巴士，并计划使用化学武器。我们有大多数令人信服的证据表明，UBL打算在美国袭击我们。在此期间，我们确定了世界各地的许多恐怖嫌疑人，并对这些人进行了中断活动拘留和审讯。
  
  
• 第二，斋月时期。In November and December 2000, we had an increase in Ramadan-related threat reporting. Working with a number of foreign governments, we were able to successfully preempt attacks including a planned attack against US interests.� Overall, these operations disrupted several al-Qa'ida plans and captured hundreds of pounds of explosives, as well as weapons, including anti-aircraft missiles.� You will recall that the attack on theUSS Colehad just occurred in October 2000, a serious defeat.
  
  
• 最后是9/11之前的时期。Starting in the spring and continuing through the summer of 2001 we saw a significant increase in the level of threat reporting.� Again, working with the FBI and foreign liaison services, we thwarted attacks against US facilities and persons in Europe and in the Middle East.

Thus, even before September 2001, we knew that we faced a foe that is committed, resilient and has operational depth.� The Intelligence Community was already at war with al-Qaida.�

• Few wars are a series of unbroken victories or defeats.� We had had some successes and suffered some defeats—and we are finding things we could have done better.�
  
  
• But we were already in action.�

实际上，我们自1998年以来就考虑过自己与基地组织的战争。运营计划的中心重点是gainintelligence on Bin Ladin through penetrations of his organization.� This strategy structured our counterterrorist activity for the years leading up to the events of September 11.�

• 这种策略（我们简单地称为“计划”），随着秘密行动当局的增加，它是针对Bin Ladin和al-Qa'ida的多方面运动。

• The campaign involved a multifaceted program to capture and render Bin Ladin and his principal lieutenants.� The range of operational initiatives employed included a strong and focused FI collection program using all means at our disposal to monitor Bin Ladin and his network around the world, and to disrupt al-Qa'ida operations.
  

• I do not plan to go into great detail on this campaign now—this hearing is about 9/11.�
  
  
• But my message is that a full understanding of the events of 9/11 requires an understanding of this war in its entirety and, I hope subsequent hearings will develop the details of that story.�

Now, with that as a backdrop, let me begin by characterizing the 9/11 plot in broad terms.�

• First, the plot wasprofessionally conceived and executed—it showed patience, thoughtfulness, and expertise.
  
  
• Second, it was紧密地隔间—we would have had to penetrate a very small circle of zealots to have learned the precise details of this plot ahead of time.
  
  
• 第三，情节是resilient—several blows to the operation occurred without derailing it.
  
  
• I'll amplify each of these points.�

Start with what we know today of theprofessionalism of the plot。9月11日的行动是仔细，耐心地进行的，并且对如何在美国运营进行了明显的了解。'

• 劫机者（包括飞行员和其他人）以交错的间隔，来自不同国家以及通过不同的美国城市进入美国。
  
  
• 我们现在知道，Qa'ida领导人故意选择了没有进行以前恐怖袭击的年轻人，因此不会引起情报服务的关注。劫持了广泛记录Al-Qa'ida参与的劫机者-Nawaf al-Hazmi（＃14）和Khalid al-Mihdhar（＃12） - 可能会在启动后添加到该地块中。在我的讲话后来，这种可能性。
  
  
• 他们还选择了来自传统上公民获得美国入境签证的国家的人，并指示他们使用真正的护照以真实的名字旅行。
  
  
• The most important individuals in the plot—the pilots—had lived for some years in the West, making it even easier for them to operate in the United States.�
  
  
• 一旦在美国，劫机者还是要小心，除了轻微的交通违规之外，以避免引起执法的关注，甚至一般注意到可能将他们识别为极端主义者。他们在很大程度上避免了清真寺。
  
  
• 他们收到了通过普通的电线传输资金为飞行培训和生活开支提供资金所需的资金，通常每天在美国发生的数百万美元的金融交易中，他们并没有引起人们的关注。

I mentioned the plot was tightly隔间。

• Bin Ladin himself—in a candid videotape found in Afghanistan after the attacks—said even some members of his inner circle were unaware of the plot.
  
  
• 他还指出，一些劫机者本身从不知道目标。
  
  
• Based on what we know today, the investigation of the 9/11 attacks has revealed no major slip in the conspirators' operational security.�

My third characterization of the plot was to call itresilient。

• Flight 77 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi (#14) and Khalid al-Mihdhar (#12) tried to learn to fly in May 2000 and quickly had to abandon their efforts because of their poor technical and English-language skills.� But by the end of 2000, a replacement pilot for Flight 77, Hani Hanjur (#11), was in the US.
  
  
• In probably the most notable example of the plot's resilience, two members of Mohammad Atta's (#1) Hamburg cell—Ramzi Bin al-Shibh and Zakaria Essabar—appear to have intended to join the hijackings but were denied visas multiple times.� Bin al-Shibh ended up supporting the hijacking logistically from abroad.
  
  
• Muhammad Atta (#1) himself, the pilot of the first plane to hit the World Trade Center, was stopped upon re-entering the US from Spain in January 2001 because of questions regarding his application for a change in visa status�and was issued a court summons for driving without a license in April, but was not panicked by either incident.��
  
  
• 最重要的是，即使在2001年8月16日逮捕了Zacarias Moussaoui（目前，由于串谋犯下恐怖主义和飞机盗版等起诉书，尚未被起诉）。Moussaoui被捕后一周。

Keep these characterizations in mind as Director Mueller and I walk you through the details of the plot.� Also keep in mind that the 9/11 investigation is ongoing, and we expect to know even more in the future than we present to you here today.�

Let me start withwhat we knew before the 9-11 attacks：

• We knew, and warned, that Usama Bin Ladin and his al-Qa'ida organization were "the most immediate and serious" terrorist threat to the US.� We said that in several ways, including in my statement to the SSCI in February 2001.

• In the months prior to 11 September, we alerted policymakers that operations that al-Qa'ida had in motion were likely to cause large-scale loss of life and be spectacular in nature.�� ��
  
  
• 从2001年6月开始，我们收到了一大堆情报，表明阿富汗和国外的Al-Qa'ida同事预计将对未指定的美国利益发动袭击。

• 在2001年夏天，很明显，正在进行多次攻击，尤其是在国外。其中一些被禁止进行，例如计划对欧洲和中东地区的目标攻击 - 对美国情报的成功。
  
  
• Finally, we knew—and warned—of Bin Ladin's desire to strike inside the US.
  

Malaysia

A major question surrounding the 9/11 investigation is how the United States government was able to identify two of the hijackers as al-Qa'ida but not uncover the plot they were part of.� To explain how the intelligence case against Nawaf al-Hazmi (#14) and Khalid al-Mihdhar (#12) developed, I'll walk you through the case.

• 我们已经学了1999年末,两个怀疑本•Ladin operatives, "Nawaf" and "Khaled," were planning to travel to Malaysia.� At that point we only knew of their first names, and only suspected that they might be Bin Ladin operatives because of a link between them and a facility known to be connected to Al-Qa'ida and Egyptian Islamic Jihad operatives.�

• 中央情报局仅基于这个微弱的链接，开始了一项操作，将“哈立德”放在监视下。六个联络服务

• Our interest in monitoring the meeting was based on our suspicion that Khaled's travel to Malaysia was associated with supporting regional terrorist plans or operations.� We believed that the meeting was likely for discussion of regrouping from extensive disruptions around the world that the CIA had engaged in.�

• In early 2000, just before he arrived in Malaysia, we acquired a copy of "Khaled's" passport, which showed a US multiple entry visa issued in Jeddah in April 1999 and expiring on 6 April 2000.�

• 正是在这一点上，我们得知“哈立德”的名字是哈立德·本·穆罕默德·本·阿卜达拉·米哈尔（＃12）。这是中央情报局获得有关Al-Mihdhar的完整传记信息的第一点。

• On 5 January 2000, the US intelligence community widely disseminated an信息报告建议，“哈立德”被确定为与本·拉丁组织成员有联系的个人，已经到达马来西亚。

• It was not until 5 March 2000 that we obtained information from one of our overseas stations that enabled us to identify "Nawaf" as Nawaf al-Hazmi (#14).� This was the earliest time that CIA had full biographic information on al-Hazmi (#14).� By that time, both al-Hazmi (#14) and al-Mihdhar (#12) had entered the US, arriving on 15 January 2000 in Los Angeles.

The Malaysia meeting took on greater significance in December 2000 when the investigation of the October 2000 USS Cole bombing linked some of Kahlid al-Mihdhar's Malaysia connections with Cole bombing suspects.� We further confirmed the suspected link between al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi and an individual thought to be one of the chief planners of the Cole attack, via a joint FBI-CIA HUMINT asset.� This was the first time that CIA could definitively place al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar with a known al-Qa'ida operative.

2001年8月，由于中央情报局已经越来越关注美国的重大攻击，因此我们审查了我们所有的相关持股。）于2000年1月15日进入美国，al-Mihdhar于2000年6月10日离开美国，并于2001年7月4日返回，没有Al-Hazmi的记录。向国务院，联邦调查局，INS和其他美国政府机构发送了中央情报报告，要求将Al-Hazmi和Al-Mihdhar输入签证/Viper，Tipoff和TECS [财政部执行通信系统]。说中央情报局建议将两名男子立即列出，并拒绝进入美国。

The fact that earlier we did not recommend al-Hazmi (#14) and al-Mihdhar (#12) for监视列表不是单一的失败点。千年的破裂 - 点out that a whole new system, rather than a fix at a single point in the system, was needed.�

What we know of the plot now

�We have assembled a body of details that give a pretty clear picture of the plot.�在攻击之前没有可用的攻击之后，我们可以组装大量信息。�

• 首先，调查迅速建立了hijackers' identities。Some hijackers were identified by air crews and passengers who made phone calls from the hijacked planes, while analysis of the flight manifests, which the airlines provided immediately, revealed patterns among certain Arab nationals in first or business class: they had purchased one-way tickets and some had used the same telephone numbers or addresses when making their reservations.�
  
  
• 其次，一些劫机者都落后于识别和有罪的证据。在宾夕法尼亚州的93航班撞车事故的现场以及在杜勒斯机场的77劫机驾驶汽车中。
  
  
• 第三，攻击的巨大幅度促使情报服务和全球新闻组织都在调查中付出了重大而直接的努力。我们要建立有关人员的照片。

The operation fell into三个一般阶段：conceptualization，，，，preparation，，，，andexecution。

概念化

We now believe that a common thread runs between the first attack on the World Trade Center in February 1993 and the 11 September attacks.� We also know that a high-ranking al-Qa'ida member was either the mastermind or one of the key planners of the 11 September operation.

• Mukhtar。
  
  
• Following the 1993 attack, Yousef and Mukhtar plotted in 1995 to blow up US planes flying East Asian routes—for which Mukhtar was indicted in 1996.� Philippine authorities uncovered the plot in January 1995 and Yousef was apprehended the following month, but Mukhtar escaped.�
  
  
• Yousef also considered flying a plane into CIA headquarters, according to one of his co-conspirators [Murad], who was interrogated by Philippine authorities in 1995.
  

Mukhtar并不是唯一考虑如何在恐怖袭击中使用商业客机的Bin Ladin合伙人。

• After 11 September, we learned that in 1996, Bin Ladin's second-in-command, Muhammad Atif, drew up a study on the feasibility of hijacking US planes and destroying them in flight, possibly influenced by Yousef's and Mukhtar's unrealized plans.�� ��

本·拉丁（Bin Ladin）的决心随着1998年2月的法特瓦（Fatwa）的发行，以军事和平民为目标的法特瓦（Fatwa）发行。在那个法特瓦之后，已经复活了。

• Although we lack details on exactly when the plan was formulated and received Bin Ladin's approval, we know that the planning for the attacks began three years before 11 September.�� ��
  
  
• We understand that when one of Bin Ladin's associates proposed that the World Trade Center be targeted by small aircraft packed with explosives, Bin Ladin reportedly suggested using even larger planes.�� �

• 我们还认为，外部事件还塑造了QA'IDA领导人对客机袭击的思考。'1999年10月的埃及航空990坠机事故归因于媒体，归因于自杀飞行员，可能鼓励了Al-QA'ADA的成长印象是航空旅行对美国的脆弱性。

1999年12月，该情节从概念化转变为准备工作，到达阿富汗，来自德国汉堡的三名年轻阿拉伯人，他们将于9月11日成为飞行员 - 吉利克斯。

准备

The men selected to carry out the 11 September attacks largely fall into three overall categories:

• The three pilots from Hamburg I just mentioned;
  
  
• Al-Qa'ida veterans;
  
  
• And young Saudis.�

The Hamburg Cell

来自汉堡的人是穆罕默德·阿塔（＃1），马尔万·艾尔·施希（＃6）和齐亚德·贾拉（＃16），在2001年9月11日之前，美国没有贬低信息。

• 他们是来自来自不同国家和背景的汉堡的一群年轻穆斯林男子的一部分，但参加了同样的清真寺，共同的熟人，并被其日益极端的伊斯兰主义观点和与西方的仇恨所吸引。
  
  
• They wereintelligent, English-speaking, and familiar with Western society—traits crucial to carrying out the 11 September plot.
  
  
• 他们非常适合（包括技术学科），并精通多种语言，以掌握他们在9月11日驾驶四架飞机中的三架技能。
  

Muhammad Atta (#1)是一位受过教育的中产阶级埃及人，于1992年抵达汉堡。

• 阿塔并没有表现出任何极端主义的迹象leaving for Germany,�but Atta was open with his German acquaintances about his dissatisfaction with Egypt's increasing Westernization, what he perceived as the Egyptian government's corruption and persecution of the Muslim Brotherhood, and his antipathy toward Israel.�
  
  
• 阿塔became increasingly devout during his time in Germany and friends have also reported that Atta became increasingly pessimistic about his prospects for employment and expression of his religious and political beliefs back in Egypt.�By 1997, Atta appears to have lost contact with most of his German friends and was associating almost exclusively with other Muslims.�
  
  
• 阿塔may have traveled to Afghanistan for the first time in early 1998 when he told his roommate he was gone for two months on a pilgrimage.�During a trip to Egypt in June, Atta applied for a new passport, even though his old one had not yet expired, suggesting that he might have been trying to hide evidence of travel to Afghanistan.�� ���

Future hijacker-pilotMarwan al-Shehhi (#6)，1996年4月以阿联酋军事奖学金从阿拉伯联合酋长国来到德国。

• We believe he lived inBonnthrough early 1999, when he passed a German proficiency exam, but apparently was a visitor toHamburg1999年之前
  
  
• Al-Shehhi于1998年7月授予授权书，送给了居住在汉堡的摩洛哥Mounir Motassadeq，他于1996年成为Atta遗嘱的两个证人之一，目前正在德国当局拘留。
  
  
• Marwan al-Shehhi于1999年移居汉堡，并在汉堡 - 哈伯格技术大学入学。

Ziad Jarrah（＃16），，，，like Atta, came from a middle-class family.�

• Having dreamed of becoming a pilot since childhood,�Jarrah traveled from his home in Lebanon to Germany to study in 1996.�
  
  
• At some point during the time he spent in Greifswald from 1996 to 1997, Jarrah appears to have come in contact with Abdulrahman al-Makhadi, an imam at a Greifswald mosque suspected of having terrorist connections.�� ��
  
  
• Jarrah moved to Hamburg in August 1997 where he began studies in aircraft construction at Hamburg's School of Applied Sciences.�� ��
  
  
• Fellow students have told the press that while he was devout and prayed five times a day, he never struck them as an extremist.�� �������

阿塔（Atta）圈子成员的一个共同点是德国 - 叙利亚穆罕默德·海达尔·扎马尔（Muhammad Heydar Zammar），他是汉堡的著名al-qa'ida同事，他在9月11日之后被拘留。

• Zammar has been active in Islamic extremist circles since the 1980s and first trained and fought in Afghanistan in 1991.� He trained and fought in Bosnia in and made many return trips to Afghanistan.
  
  
• Zammar Met Atta（＃1），Al-Shehhi（＃6）和Jarrah（＃16）（＃16）（与汉堡牢房的其他人一起）在1990年代后期在汉堡al-qods清真寺，并说服他们前往阿富汗前往阿富汗加入圣战。

阿塔's (#1) relationship with his roommate, Yemeni Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, may also have been crucial in focusing the Islamist beliefs of the Hamburg circle on al-Qa'ida.� Since 11 September, we have received a variety of reports identifying Bin al-Shibh as an important al-Qa'ida operative and we suspect that, unlike the three Hamburg pilots, he may have been associated with al-Qa'ida even before moving to Germany in 1995.�� ���

The al-Qa'ida Veterans

We now know that two of the hijackers had been involved with al-Qa'ida for several years before 11 September 2001.�

• They were Saudis Nawaf al-Hazmi (#14) and Khalid al-Mihdhar (#12), who on 11 September would help to hijack American Airlines Flight 77 that crashed into the Pentagon.� We have learned a great deal about these men since 11 September
  
  
• The two men grew up together in Mecca.
  
  
• 在90年代中期，Al-Hazmi（＃14）和Al-Mihdhar（＃12）前往波斯尼亚。
  
  
• Afterward their involvement with Al-Qa'ida strengthened.� Al-Hazmi traveled to Afghanistan sometime before 1998 and swore loyalty to Bin Ladin.�Later, Al-Mihdhar (#12) also traveled to Afghanistan and swore his allegiance to Bin Ladin.
  
  
• ��Al-Hazmi (#14) �and al-Mihdhar (#12) returned to Saudi Arabia in early 1999.� In April, both men obtained visas from the US consulate in Jeddah.

The Young Saudis

自9月11日以来，我们已经学会了大部分支持劫机者的年轻沙特男子，他们在1990年代后期就参与了Al-Qa'ida。

• 许多人，例如退伍军人Al-Hazmi（＃14）和Al-Mihdhar（＃12），在他们前往阿富汗并参与了9月11日的行动之前，彼此认识。
  
  
• Investigative efforts have uncovered two sets of brothers—the al-Hazmis (#14 and #15) and al-Shehris (#4 and #5)—as well as small networks of friends and acquaintances among the young Saudi hijackers, many of whom came from southwest Saudi Arabia.�

• They came from a variety of backgrounds—their families came from different parts of the socioeconomic spectrum, and a few had higher education while others had little at all.� Some had struggled with depression or alcohol abuse, or simply seemed to be drifting in search of purpose.
  
  
• Some of these young men had reportedly never exhibited much religious fervor, before apparent exposure to extremist ideas—through family members, friends, or clerics—led to an abrupt radicalization and separation from their families.��� ���

As part of their commitment to militant Islam, these young Saudis traveled to Afghanistan to train in the camps of their exiled countryman Usama Bin Ladin.�

• An analysis of travel data acquired since 11 September suggests that most went to Afghanistan for the first time in 1999 or 2000, traveling through one or more other countries before entering Afghanistan to disguise their destination.�� ��
  
  
• Only for Fayiz Banihammad (#8) of the United Arab Emirates has no information emerged suggesting travel to Afghanistan, although it is reasonable to assume that he was there at some point before entering the US.�
  
  
• Although their early travel to Afghanistan added these young men to the ranks of operatives that al-Qa'ida could call upon to carry out future missions, we do not believe that they became involved in the 11 September plot until late 2000 [we don't believe the al-Qa'ida leadership would have wanted them knowing about a plot in the US any sooner than necessary given the conspiracy's compartmentation].� Even then, they probably were told little more than that they were headed for a suicide mission inside the United States.�

沙特Hani Hanjur(#11), the fourth pilot, is similar to the other young Saudi hijackers in some ways, yet stands out because of:

• 他在9月11日之前在美国延长了频繁的存在。
  
  
• His lack of known ties to other Saudi hijackers prior to becoming involved in the conspiracy.
  
  
• 鉴于他的飞行经验远比77架共同游行的Nawaf al-Hazmi和Khalid al-Mihdhar的飞行经验要高得多。

Hani Hanjur (#11) expressed an early wish to participate in a jihad conflict, but�did not appear to experience a sudden increase in his religious fervor until 1992.� That year, he returned to Saudi Arabia after four-and-a-half months in the US "a different man," according to one of his brothers who spoke to the Western media. Hanjur reportedly now wore a full beard, cut his past social ties, and spent most of his time reading books on religion and airplanes.� In April 1996, Hanjur returned to the US.�� ��

The Hamburg pilots traveled to Afghanistan in late 1999 at which time they were likely selected for and briefed on the 11 September plot.

• 阿塔（＃1）flew from Hamburg to Istanbul in late 1999, then on to Karachi, Pakistan. After that, he evidently traveled into Afghanistan.�
  
  
• According to information acquired after the 11 September attacks, Atta (#1) and al-Shehhi (#6) were both present at Bin Ladin facilities in Afghanistan in late 1999; Atta's presence has been corroborated by a separate source.�� ��
  
  
• al-Shehhi（＃6）很可能在1999年11月从汉堡牢房的另一名成员授予了他的德国银行帐户的授权书以来，大约在与Atta（＃1）的同一时间离开了汉堡。
  
  
• 贾拉（Jarrah）（＃16）此时旅行反映了阿塔（Atta）的，从汉堡飞往伊斯坦布尔，然后于1999年底前往卡拉奇。

Since 11 September we have also obtained information onwhich al-Qa'ida leaders were involved在计划在1999年末在阿富汗的关键时期的袭击时。

• We know that Bin Ladin deputy Muhammad Atif deliberately chose the hijackers from young Arab men who had no previous terrorist activities.�� ��
  
  
• The hijackers were also chosen on the basis of nationality so that they would not have trouble obtaining US visas. Another senior Bin Ladin lieutenant then arranged for them to get pilot training.
  
  
• 2000年攻击的关键策划者USS Colewas also in Afghanistan at this time.�� ��
  
  
• We also now believe that Bin Ladin's security chief,Sayf al-Adl，，，，played a key role in the 11 September plot, andAbu Zubaydahwas supportive and aware of the operation and its stages.����� ��

When they left Afghanistan at the end of 1999 and early 2000, the Hamburg hijackers immediately began to prepare for their mission。

• 他们首先获得了新护照，这些护照在申请美国签证时不会显示前往阿富汗的迹象。
  
  
• Al-Shehhi（＃6）于2000年1月在阿联酋获得了新的护照和美国签证。
  
  
• 贾拉（Jarrah，＃16）于1月9日返回汉堡，并于2000年2月9日返回汉堡。他的护照丢失了。
  
  
• 阿塔（＃1）returned to Hamburg in February 2000.�In March, he sent e-mails to flight schools in Florida and Oklahoma asking about pilot training.�Atta received a new Egyptian passport from the Egyptian consulate in Hamburg on 8 May 2000.�On the 18th, he was issued a visa by the US Embassy in Berlin.�� ��

Al-Shehhi (#6), Atta (#1), and Jarrah (#16) entered the US on different dates in May and June 2000, from three different European cities, possibly to mislead authorities as to their common purpose.

• Al-Shehhi（＃6）于2000年5月29日从布鲁塞尔飞往纽瓦克。
  
  
• 阿塔（＃1）traveled by bus to Prague, entering the city on 2 June 2000, and flew to Newark the next day.�� ��
  
  
• Jarrah (#16) flew from Dusseldorf to Newark, and then on to Venice, Florida, on 27 June 2000.�� ��

While the Hamburg pilots were wrapping up their training in Afghanistan and returning to Germany in late 1999 and early 2000, halfway around the world the al-Qa'ida veterans, Nawaf al-Hazmi (#14) and Khalid al-Mihdhar (#12), prepared to enter the US.�

• After receiving US visas in April 1999, both men had traveled to Afghanistan and participated in special training in the latter half of 1999.� This training may have been facilitated by a key Al-Qa'ida operative.��

• 在2000年1月的马来西亚会议之前概述的是1月15日进入美国。

As you may have already noticed, the inclusion of al-Hazmi (#14) and al-Mihdhar (#12) in the plot seems to violate one of the conspiracy's most successful tactics: the use of untainted operatives.� Unlike the other hijackers, al-Hazmi (#14) and al-Mihdhar (#12) had years of involvement with al-Qa'ida—to such an extent that they had already come to our attention before 11 September.� Without the inclusion of al-Hazmi (#14) and al-Mihdhar (#12) in the plot, we would have had none of the hijackers who died on 11 September in our sights prior to the attacks.� We speculate that this difference may be explained by the possibility that the two men originally entered the US to carry out a different terrorist operation prior to being folded into the 9/11 plot.� I'll briefly outline the factors, other than their long track record with al-Qa'ida, that have led us to consider this possibility.

• Al-Hazmi (#14) and al-Mihdhar (#12)更早获得了美国签证比其他劫机者 - 在1999年4月，汉堡飞行员直到2000年初才开始获得我们的签证。

• As noted above, al-Hazmi (#14) and al-Mihdhar (#12) receivedspecial training in Afghanistan在1999年下半年，以及USS Colesuicide bomber al-Nibras and a key planner of theColeattack.� None of the other hijackers are known to have received this training and the Hamburg pilots visited Afghanistan after al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar had apparently departed.

• Al-Hazmi (#14) and al-Mihdhar (#12)interacted far more with the local Arab populationwhen they settled in the US than did the other hijackers.

• Pilots Atta (#1), al-Shehhi (#6), Jarrah (#16), and later Hanjur (#11) all began flight training quite soon after arriving in the US, while al-Hazmi (#14) and al-Mihdhar (#12)did not engage in flight training activity until April 2000—approximately three months after coming to this country.�

As mentioned earlier, it appears that at least one other member of the Hamburg cell—and possibly two—intended to participate in the 11 September attacks as a pilot.�

• Yemeni Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, a close associate and roommate of Atta (#1) in Germany, failed on multiple occasions in 2000 to obtain a US visa and even sent a deposit to the flight school where Jarrah (#16) was training.�� ����
  
  
• After Bin al-Shibh's efforts failed, another cell member, Moroccan Zakaria Essabar, tried and failed to obtain a visa in January 2001; he was also trying to travel to Florida.�� ���
  
  
• Both men displayed the same tradecraft that characterized the other hijackers: persistence in the face of obstacles, an evident decision to enter the country legally and under true name, and flexibility regarding their roles in the plot.� Bin al-Shibh, for instance, transferred money to Marwan al-Shehhi (#6) in 2000 while still attempting to acquire a US visa.�� ���

The entry of the future pilots into the US also launched the financing of the plot in earnest.� The financial transactions that supported the attacks in many ways reflected the overall nature of the operation, relying on ostensibly legitimate activities carried out inside the US over the course of nearly two years.� Key characteristics of the financial support operation included:

• Long-term planning。�o相关重大资金的转移peration began nearly two years before the attacks and appear to have been calculated to cover specific training and travel needs.

• 劳工司。Each hijacker appears to have been responsible for maintaining his own account and personal transactions, while three hijackers—Atta (#1), al-Shehhi (#6), and Banihammad (#8)—generally assumed responsibility for communicating with financial facilitators, receiving and returning funds, and distributing money to other hijackers.

• 普遍使用现金。

• Trickle-down through intermediaries。The plotters obscured the operation's ultimate funding sources by sending funds through various individuals before reaching the final recipient.�

• 开放经济的开发。The operation's principal financial hubs were the UAE, Germany, and the US, partly because of the relative ease and anonymity with which financial transactions can be conducted in these countries.

• External funding。Virtually all of the financial support for the attacks came from abroad.�

在t作为pilot-hijackers接着训练he US through the latter half of 2000, al-Qa'ida leaders turned their attention to bringing into the plot the young men who would support the pilots。

• Most of the young Saudis obtained their US visas in the fall of 2000.� The State Department did not have a policy to stringently examine Saudis seeking visas prior to 11 September because there was virtually no risk that Saudis would attempt to reside or work illegally in the US after their visas expired.� US Embassy and consular officials do cursory searches on Saudis who apply for visas, but if they do not appear on criminal or terrorist watchlists they are granted a visa.� Thousands of Saudis every year are granted visas as a routine—most of whom are not even interviewed.� The vast majority of Saudis study, vacation, or do business in the US and return to the kingdom.

• Reporting suggests that all of them—possibly including pilot Hani Hanjur (#11)—then traveled to Afghanistan at some point in late 2000 or early 2001.�� �����

2001年1月3日，阿塔（＃1）flew from Tampa, Florida to Madrid, Spain.� No details have yet emerged on the week he spent in Spain, although it may have been to meet with another al-Qa'ida operative to pass along an update on the pilots' training progress and receive information on the supporting hijackers who would begin arriving in the US in the spring.� On 10 January, Atta returned to the US, flying from Madrid to Miami.�� ��

阿塔（＃1）was not the only pilot to travel outside the US during the period when he was attaining and honing his flying skills.�

• Jarrah（＃16）离开了美国六次，显然他的大部分时间都在美国探访黎巴嫩的家人或他在德国的女友的大部分时间。

• Al-Shehhi(#6) also traveled outside the US, flying to the UAE, Germany, Morocco, and Egypt on three different trips.� While it is known that al-Shehhi visited Atta's (#1) father during his April 2001 trip to Egypt to collect Atta's international driver's license, nothing else is known of al-Shehhi's activities while traveling outside the US.�

As you may have read in the press,阿塔（＃1）allegedly traveled outside the US in early April 2001 to meet with an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague, we are still working to confirm or deny this allegation.

• 有可能是阿塔(# 1)根据一个联合国known alias since we have been unable to establish that Atta left the US or entered Europe in April 2001 under his true name or any known aliases.
  

Khalid al-Mihdhar(#12) returned to the US on 4 July 2001 after nearly a year out of the country.� He had spent the past year traveling between Yemen and Afghanistan, with occasional trips to Saudi Arabia.

• Al-Mihdhar (#12) returned to Saudi Arabia in June and on 13 June obtained a US visa in Jeddah
  

In July 2001,阿塔（＃1）returned to Spain。7月7日，他从迈阿密飞往苏黎世，然后飞往马德里。

• After checking out of a Madrid hotel on the 9th, Atta's (#1) movements are unknown for several days.�� ��
  
  
• His next known location is in Tarragona on Spain's east coast on 13 July, when he checked into a local hotel.�
  
  
• After moving on to two other hotels, Atta (#1) returned to Madrid and flew back to Florida on 19 July.�� ��
  
  
• 尽管在西班牙时在西班牙的Atta（＃1）活动中尚无具体，但汉堡的同谋Ramzi bin al-Shibh于2001年7月9日从德国飞往塔拉贡纳。7月10日至16日没有责备，大约在同一时期，在同一时期，阿塔（Atta）的运动未知，这表明两人参加了有关情节进步的秘密会议。
  
  
• We are continuing to investigate Atta's (#1) and Bin al-Shibh's activities and possible contacts while in Spain.�

Conclusion

By 5 August 2001, all of the hijackers are in the United States to stay.� Before I turn to Director Mueller to describe what the plotters did in the United States, let me conclude with a few points:

The lessons of 11 September have not just been learned, but acted on.

• In this struggle, we must play offense as well as defense.� The move into the Afghanistan sanctuary was essential.� We have disrupted the terrorists' plans, denied them the comfort of their bases and training facilities and the confidence that they can mount and remount attacks without fear of serious retribution.

• 进入庇护所的行动导致了本·拉丁（Bin Ladin）开发大规模杀伤性武器的计划的发现，并至少部分地挫败了大规模杀伤性武器。基础架构，并为我们提供了其他细胞和网络。

• I have said we have been working closely with the FBI, and our cooperation has grown even closer since 9/11.� Director Mueller and I are working to deepen that cooperation.� Specifically, CIA is helping to build an FBI analytic capability.� We are also working to extend the good cooperation we have built between our chiefs of station and legal attaches overseas to a system of cooperation between CIA and FBI field offices in the United States.

• 我们已经显着增加了分析恐怖主义模式和趋势的中央情报局官员的数量。我们的能力。

• 和我们的支持观察名单中被修改。� Standardized guidance has been distributed to CTC officers on watchlist procedures, reminding them to err on the side of reporting when sending names to the Department of State.� In addition, language has been established that can be inserted into intelligence reports that flag information to review by the State Department for inclusion in the Visa Viper system.� Beyond CIA, a National Watch List Center is being designed that would be accessible to all relevant federal agencies; a database has been created so that State, FBI, DoD, FAA, INS, Customs, and Treasury representatives who sit in CTC can easily access it; and CTC is creating a unit within the center that will be dedicated to reviewing names and ID-related data fragments for watchlisting.

• As important as understanding and learning from the 9/11 plot is, we need to meet in a subsequent session so you can objectively assess the full scope of our counterterrorist effort from the early 1990's through the present.

Ongoing security enhancements and the development of new leads, investigations and human sources, have made it harder for identical attacks to take place.� However, al-Qa'ida is known for changing its tactics, and a determined group of terrorists, using a slightly different approach, could succeed if they used much of the resilient tradecraft employed by the 11 September hijackers.

• Al-Qa'ida's tradecraft, combined with the enormous volume of travelers entering the US every year, will make it impossible to guarantee that no terrorists will enter the country.

• 劫机者使用的金融交易和通信的类型仍将在每天在美国发生的数百万其他人中丢失，而没有曾经存在的信息以引起对发起人的关注。

• Based on what we have learned about the 11 September plot, an attempt to conduct another attack on US soil is certain.�

• Even with the increased government and public vigilance employed against terrorism since 11 September, the danger is still great.

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