| 主席先生、哈奇参议员、司法委员会成员: 我很欣赏的委员会会讨论监察长办公室（OIG）的有关反恐和国家安全问题在美国司法部（部门）工作的机会。金博宝正规网址 今天上午，我打算以突出移民归化局（INS），调查的联邦调查局（FBI）等部门组成部分，涉及到反恐几个正在进行的和最近完成OIG评论。In addition, I will describe a review we have initiated that will examine the FBI�s handling of information and intelligence prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks, including a document known as the �Phoenix EC,� and issues raised in a May 21, 2002, letter to Director Mueller from FBI Special Agent Coleen Rowley. Finally, I will address the importance of creating a culture in the FBI that encourages employees to report problems or misconduct in their agencies, and I will discuss the OIG�s role in investigating complaints of whistleblower retaliation. 自9 / 11恐怖袭击以来，监察办公室已经调整了许多监督资源，以配合司法部在反恐问题上的优先任务。金博宝正规网址我们正在花费大量资源审查与司法部在美国发现和制止恐怖主义能力有关的项目和行动。 At the outset of my remarks, let me express my respect for many the employees in Department components like the FBI and the INS who serve on the front lines in our nation�s counterterrorism efforts. While the OIG has found significant deficiencies in INS and FBI systems and operations over the years, this should in no way diminish the important contributions that thousands of employees at these agencies make on a daily basis. I offer my comments and concerns today in the same vein that we present findings from our audits, inspections, and special reviews � with the intent to help improve the Department�s ability to better accomplish its critical mission. 一，INS PROGRAMS - 影响反恐和国家安全监督 A. INS联系方式，配有两张9月11日恐怖分子 Less than three weeks ago, the OIG released a 188-page report that examined why the INS mailed forms notifying a Florida flight school that two September 11 terrorists had received approval to change their immigration status from �visitors� to �students� six months after the terrorists attacks. The mailing of these forms raised questions about the INS�s handling of change of status applications for Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi and their three admissions into the United States in 2000 � 2001. The incident also raised serious concerns about the INS�s monitoring and tracking of foreign students in the United States. The OIG found that the INS�s adjudication of Atta�s and Alshehhi�s change of status applications and its notification to the flight school were untimely and significantly flawed. First, the INS took more than 10 months to adjudicate the two men�s applications. As a result, Atta�s and Alshehhi�s applications were not adjudicated until July and August 2001, respectively, well after they had finished their flight training course at the Florida flight school. Second, the INS adjudicator who approved their applications did so without adequate information, including the fact that Atta and Alshehhi had left the country two times after filing their applications, which meant they had abandoned their request for a change of status. And third, even after the INS took 10 months to approve the applications, the notification forms were not sent to the Florida flight school for an additional seven months because the INS failed to adequately supervise a contractor who processed the documents. Atta�s and Alshehhi�s cases highlight important weaknesses in the INS�s handling of foreign students. Historically, the INS devoted insufficient attention to foreign students, and its current, paper-based tracking system is inefficient, inaccurate, and unreliable. SEVIS, the new Internet-based system the INS is developing, has the potential to dramatically improve the INS�s monitoring of foreign students. But we found that it will not solve all the problems in the INS�s monitoring system. 除非INS致力于足够的资源和精力有效地实施和使用SEVIS，许多问题将继续存在。别的不说，移民局必须确保它充分审查认证，以招收外国学生（目前超过70,000）的学校，请确保准确及时的信息被输入到SEVIS，制订和执行清晰的指导INS官员和学校对他们的责任和有关外国学生的程序，要求学校官员和INS员工对这些要求和程序适当的培训，并确保在SEVIS有关学校和学生的信息由INS有效地用于发现和制止滥用。 Our report offers 24 recommendations to help address the problems that Atta�s and Alshehhi�s cases highlighted and that our review of the INS foreign student program revealed. We believe these recommendations will improve the usefulness of SEVIS and help address the serious deficiencies we found in our review. While many of these recommended changes will require additional resources, we believe these efforts are necessary for the INS to improve its handling and monitoring of foreign students. B.自动I-94系统 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 directed the INS to develop an automated entry and exit control system that would collect a record for every alien departing the United States and automatically match these departure records with the record of the alien�s arrival. This automated system was envisioned to replace the manual system of collecting I-94 cards and to enable the INS, through on-line searching procedures, to identify lawfully admitted nonimmigrants who remain in the United Sates beyond the period authorized. 在响应于这一要求，INS于1997年推出的导频系统的自动化的飞机乘客I-94形式的处理。这种自动化的I-94系统所捕获的到达和离开电子数据和上载的非美国公民数据到INS数据库。 在2001年8月OIG颁发的设计和实现自动化的I-94系统的审计，发现INS没有妥善管理的项目。尽管已经花费了300万$ 31.2系统上的财政年度（FY）1996〜2000年财政年度，该INS：（1）没有明确的证据证明该系统满足其预期目标;（2）赢得了唯一的两家航空公司的合作;（3）中，在只有少数机场操作该系统;和（4）在修改系统的过程。INS officials estimated that an additional $57 million would be needed for FY 2001 � FY 2005 to complete the system. These projections include development, equipment, and operation and maintenance costs. 基于我们的担忧，我们提出了一系列建议，以确保INS在进行进一步支出之前严格分析I-94自动系统的成本、收益、风险和性能指标。在我们的审计和9 / 11袭击之后，移民局决定将资源用于开发美国爱国者法案所要求的出入境系统，而不是继续花钱改进I-94自动系统。因此，INS在2002年2月18日正式终止了自动I-94项目。 C.后续审查 In the six months following the September 11 attacks, the OIG initiated and completed a series of follow-up reviews that examined the INS�s efforts to address national security deficiencies identified in previous OIG inspections. The OIG examined the INS�s progress in securing the northern border, linking INS and FBI automated fingerprint identification systems, improving the Visa Waiver Program, addressing security concerns regarding the Transit Without Visa Program (TWOV), and tracking nonimmigrant overstays. In each of these follow-up reviews, the OIG found that many of the security concerns we identified in our original reports continued to exist. � The Border Patrol�s Efforts to Improve Security Along the Northern Border: We examined the progress the Border Patrol had made in improving the security of the northern border since the OIG issued an inspection report on the subject in February 2000, Border Patrol Efforts Along the Northern Border. Our follow-up review found that the INS had made some improvements that enhanced border security, including increased international and multi-agency cooperation. However, we found that northern border sectors had received a minimal number of additional Border Patrol agents and no new support staff. Consequently, many Border Patrol stations still could not operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. In addition, the Border Patrol�s communications system remained inadequate, and a critical shortage of air support continued. We concluded that increased staffing and resources for the northern border continues to be a critical priority to help control illegal immigration and enhance national security. � Status of IDENT/IAFIS Integration: We reviewed the status of efforts to integrate the INS�s automated biometric fingerprint identification system (IDENT) and the FBI�s integrated automated fingerprint identification system (IAFIS). This review, conducted in response to a request by the Senate Judiciary Committee�s Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Governmental Information, followed up on two prior OIG reviews, Review of the Immigration and Naturalization Service�s Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) (March 1998), and The Rafael Resendez-Ramirez Case: A Review of the INS�s Actions and the Operation of its IDENT Automated Fingerprint Identification System (March 2000). The primary finding of our follow-up review, similar to our prior reports� conclusions, was that the Department and its components have moved slowly toward integrating the two fingerprint systems and that full integration of IDENT and IAFIS remains years away. We recommended that the Department continue to seek linkage of the FBI and INS biometric identification systems and continue to use IDENT while this integration is proceeding. We concluded that IDENT workstations should be deployed to additional INS sites pending full integration with IAFIS because IDENT allows a rapid check of aliens seeking entry into the United States. As an interim measure, we also recommended adding fingerprint records for aliens wanted in connection with crimes to the IDENT lookout database. � Visa Waiver Program: The Visa Waiver Program (VWP) allows citizens from 28 countries to enter the United States, as temporary visitors for business or pleasure, without a visa. We evaluated the INS�s progress in implementing recommendations contained in the OIG�s March 1999 report, The Potential for Fraud and INS�s Efforts to Reduce the Risks of the Visa Waiver Pilot Program. Our follow-up review found that the INS had distributed guidance to improve the collection and dissemination of information about missing VWP passports but did not take appropriate measures to ensure the guidance was followed at ports of entry. Therefore, the INS did not have a mechanism that provides systematic, consistent, and timely information about missing VWP passports to its immigration inspectors. We concluded that the failure to make this information available to INS immigration inspectors could contribute to the admission into the United States of criminal aliens or terrorists fraudulently using passports from VWP countries. We urged the INS to reissue the guidance and to take aggressive follow-up actions to ensure that inspectors follow the guidance. � Improving the Security of the Transit Without Visa Program: The TWOV Program allows certain nonimmigrants to transit through the United States en route to a destination in another country. Visa requirements are waived for eligible nonimmigrants in TWOV status; they can remain in the United States for up to eight hours awaiting departure on connecting flights to their final destination. We found in our follow-up review that many of the security concerns identified in our March 1993 report, Transit Without Visa Program, continued to exist. Specifically, the INS had not taken adequate measures to improve airlines� supervision of TWOV passengers, and the INS could not verify departure of TWOV passengers. Prior to September 11, 2001, TWOV passengers were permitted to wait for their connecting flights in �in-transit lounges� (ITL) without having to undergo INS examination of their travel documents. The INS temporarily suspended the ITL program after the terrorist attacks but resumed operations in November 2001 after enhancing security by requiring that all ITL passengers undergo more rigorous inspection. Still, the TWOV program continued to offer an avenue for aliens to enter the United States illegally. 在第五次后续审查中，我们发现自我们1997年的报告《检查移民和归化局对非移民逾期居留的监控》以来，移民局在解决非移民逾期居留这一重要问题上几乎没有取得什么进展。9 / 11恐怖袭击再次引起人们对了解非移民入境和离开美国的重要性的关注。移民局必须能够识别个人逾期逗留，收集逾期逗留的汇总信息，并制定有效的内部执法策略，追查那些被认定为对美国安全构成最大潜在风险的逾期逗留者。我们最初的报告侧重于非移民信息系统的弱点，该系统过去是，现在仍然是移民局识别逾期居留的主要手段。在我们提交最初报告时，移民局期望它的自动I-94系统能提供必要的抵离资料，以查明逾期逗留的情况，并协助制订有效的执法策略。然而，正如本声明之前所讨论的，在断定I-94自动系统不能识别超期停留或满足要求开发综合出入境控制系统的美国爱国者法案的要求后，INS在2002年2月终止了该系统。因此，我们1997年报告的结果仍然适用，而且移民局没有一个可靠的系统来跟踪逾期滞留。 D. �Bombs in Brooklyn� Report 在1998年3月发布的一份报告中，OIG审查两个人，嘎子易卜拉欣阿布Mezer和Lafi哈利勒，如何进入并涉嫌策划炸毁纽约市地铁系统在布鲁克林其1997年7月前的忧虑留在美国。Mezer随后被定罪并被判处终身监禁。哈利勒被无罪释放的从炸机阴谋所产生的费用，但因犯违反移民法的。 在我们的报告中，我们描述了两个人如何能够进入美国和留在这里。哈利勒，谁约旦护照，通过美国途中厄瓜多尔应用于美国领事办公室在耶路撒冷签证旅行。领事官员经过三分钟的采访给了他29天，C-1过境签证。当哈利勒抵达纽约 1996年12月7日，移民检查员错误地授予他一个B-2旅游签证有效期为6个月。他认为逾期签证，在布鲁克林被捕，与Mezer一起，于1997年7月。 Mezer，谁声称约旦国籍，在加拿大获得了签证从加拿大驻以色列研究。1993年9月在抵达加拿大后不久，他申请了约定的状态，这类似于在美国政治避难的基础上，在以色列迫害他声称恐惧。Mezer后来承认，他曾前往加拿大的意图，到达美国。 1996年，Mezer被拘留边境巡逻队两次试图非法越过边境进入美国华盛顿州。每一次边境巡逻允许他自愿返回加拿大。1997年1月，边境巡逻队逮捕Mezer在华盛顿第三次正式启动驱逐出境的程序。Mezer然后提出申请，要求在美国政治避难，后来在$ 5,000债券发行。在他的庇护申请，Mezer声称，以色列当局迫害他，因为他们错误地认为他是哈马斯的成员。The immigration court requested comments from the State Department about Mezer�s asylum application, and the State Department returned the application with a sticker indicating that it did not have specific information on Mezer. Mezer�s attorney later withdrew the asylum application, stating that Mezer had returned to Canada. Mezer was arrested shortly thereafter in Brooklyn for plotting to bomb the subway system. 在审查过程中，我们没有发现任何信息Mezer是一个已知的恐怖分子。然而，我们发现，他的案件表明严重的系统性问题。Mezer进入，尽管两项刑事定罪存在，这凸显了轻松进入加拿大和控制来自加拿大的非法移民进入美国的难度仍留在加拿大。我们也注意到边境巡逻资源不足沿北部边界解决非法移民。In addition, Mezer�s case reflected confusion between U.S. government agencies as to which agency would conduct a check for information on whether an asylum applicant was a terrorist. We recommended that the INS and the State Department coordinate more closely on accessing and sharing information that would suggest a detained alien or asylum applicant may be a terrorist. 2检察长对州和地方国内的审查 防备赠款 The Department�s Office of Justice Programs (OJP) awards grants for specialized training and equipment to fire and emergency service departments to enhance their ability to respond to domestic acts of terrorism. In our audit of this program, we found that grant funds had not been awarded quickly, and that grantees were slow to spend available monies. We found that as of January 15, 2002, more than half of the total funds appropriated for equipment under the grant program from FY 1998 through FY 2001 � $141 million out of $243 million � still had not been awarded. About $65 million in grant funds awarded was still unspent. We also found that nearly $1 million in equipment purchased with grants was not available for use because grantees did not properly distribute the equipment, could not locate it, or had not been trained adequately on how to operate it. III。监督FBI PROGRAMS - 影响反恐和国家安全 The Department�s counterterrorism and law enforcement responsibilities require timely access to automated information and effective systems for sharing that information. OIG reviews in the FBI have identified mission-critical computer systems that were not adequately planned; experienced long delays in implementation; or failed to share information with other FBI systems. In addition, OIG reviews have disclosed serious problems in computer security that could lead to the compromise of sensitive systems and data. 监察长办公室已经发起了广泛的评论在FBI该检查的信息技术（IT），反恐和国家安全问题。金博宝正规网址 在俄克拉何马城爆炸案文件的A.迟来的生产 我该委员会作证在今年3月左右轰炸对迟来的产量在俄克拉荷马城文档OIG报告情况（OKBOMB）。的蒂莫西·麦克维的安排执行前一周的文件披露提出的问题，以联邦调查局是否有意未能开庭前披露文件防御，为什么没有出示证件的发生。 我们的调查发现，联邦调查局的普遍失误导致OKBOMB案中超过1000份文件姗姗来地曝光。我们追踪失败有多种原因,包括联邦调查局员工个人错误,联邦调查局�年代繁琐和复杂的文档处理程序、代理�失败遵循联邦调查局政策和指示,不一致的政策和程序的解释,代理�缺乏了解的不寻常的发现协议在这种情况下,和巨大的体积的物质在短时间内被处理。失败的情况很普遍，不仅限于联邦调查局现场办公室或OKBOMB任务小组;我们发现双方都有责任。然而，重要的是，我们没有发现任何联邦调查局的工作人员故意隐瞒他们知道可能会被发现的任何文件。 This review highlighted the significant weaknesses in the FBI�s computer systems which we found to be antiquated, inefficient, and badly in need of improvement. Although we do not believe the failures in this case were caused by the computer systems, these systems cannot handle or retrieve documents in a useful, comprehensive, or efficient way, and they do not provide FBI employees with the type of support they need and deserve. 本案中遇到的问题暴露出联邦调查局存在已久的几个问题:陈旧低效的计算机系统;不重视信息管理;质量控制体系不健全。尽管迟来的文件问题是作为一个发现问题提出的，联邦调查局混乱的信息管理系统很可能会对其在整个联邦调查局适当调查犯罪和分析信息的能力产生持续的负面影响。在报告的最后，我们提出了帮助解决这些系统弱点的建议，其中大部分与FBI计算机系统和文件管理有关。 B. FBI信息技术 在我们OKBOMB报告的几个发现之后，OIG目前正在审查FBI对其IT投资的管理。这次审计将检查FBI是否对其IT系统的收购进行了充分的管理。 为了进行这项审计，OIG正在评估FBI当前的IT投资管理实践和新的IT投资和管理策略。我们正在采访联邦调查局信息资源司、刑事司法信息服务司、实验室司、检查司、财务司和战略计划处的工作人员。此外，我们正在进行一个案例研究三部曲，联邦调查局的全面倡议升级机构的IT系统。 C. The FBI�s Management of its Counterterrorism Resources 在FBI另一项正在进行的OIG评价对自1995年财政年度提供给FBI除了确定资金专门用于反恐的总美元金额的反恐资金，我们计划检查FBI是如何自1995财政年度花费了它的反恐资源，包括哪些资源已自9月11日，2001年重新分配作为该审查的一部分程度上，我们还在评估由联邦调查局决定了它的反恐资源需求和管理它的反恐资源的过程。 具体来说，这次审查将探讨： � Evaluation of Terrorist Threats: The FBI committed itself in 1999 to formally assess the threat and risk of chemical and biological terrorism and also to conduct a national level threat and risk assessment of terrorism in general. We plan to determine the FBI�s progress toward completing the assessments, evaluate the process used, identify the reasons for the delays in completing the assessments, and identify any changes contemplated in the assessments since September 11. �战略规划和绩效指标:OIG将评估联邦调查局�年代进展会议行动项建立司法部长�年代五年跨部门反恐技术犯罪计划,部门�年代的战略计划,联邦调查局�年代的战略计划,联邦调查局的战略和项目计划�年代反恐部门。我们将审查联邦调查局的计划过程，包括，例如，计划的全面性，以及是否包括目标、可衡量的结果和资源需求。 D. FBI案件审计 This ongoing OIG review is examining the FBI�s allocation of resources to investigate the varied crimes under its jurisdiction. Our objectives are to determine the types and number of cases the FBI investigates; assess performance measures for FBI casework; and determine if the mix of cases investigated by the FBI comports with FBI priorities. This review will evaluate trends in various types of cases worked by the FBI over the past six years and evaluate any disparities among different geographic regions and FBI field offices. In addition, in a second and separate part of this review, we plan to obtain opinions from other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies about FBI support on joint cases and their reliance on FBI resources. E. Review of FBI Legal Attach� Program 检察官办公室最近启动了一项审查，对维持FBI 44个法律专员办事处的海外存在的成本进行调查。作为我们审查的一部分，我们将审查联邦调查局决定在何处设立新的法律办公室的程序，以及联邦调查局在这一决策过程中与其他机构的协调。此外，我们计划审查法律专员办公室所从事的活动类型。最后，我们计划评估联邦调查局与美国和外国执法机构之间的协调，并确定与其他美国政府机构的执法机构和法务办公室之间的任何重复工作。 F.竞选财务 Several findings from a July 1999 OIG report, The Handling of FBI Intelligence Information Related to the Justice Department's Campaign Finance Investigation, are particularly relevant in light of the FBI�s counterterrorism mission. 联邦调查局（FBI）必须能够快速识别，分析和其掌握的执法信息为散发有关的情报。In this 1999 review, the OIG examined why classified intelligence information pertaining to the Department�s Campaign Finance Task Force investigation was not appropriately disseminated within the FBI and the Department and subsequently to congressional oversight committees. The OIG found that a series of problems, including the National Security Division�s failure to disseminate information in a consistent manner, ultimately contributed to this failure. 审查还发现联邦调查局在使用和维护其计算机数据库系统方面存在缺陷。FBI自动案件支持(ACS)系统的一个关键特性是FBI包含线索和其他FBI文件的主要案件管理数据库是用户检索有关特定个人的信息的能力，包括他们是否曾是其他调查的对象。但是，我们发现FBI特工经常没有将重要信息输入到数据库中，也没有使用数据库对信息进行适当的搜索。最终的结果是，联邦调查局不能确信在ACS数据库中搜索信息实际上会提供联邦调查局拥有的所有相关信息。我们发现FBI的信息管理问题是由多种因素造成的，包括不适当的政策和培训不足，我们提出了解决这些问题的建议。金博宝正规网址然而，两年后，我们发现许多同样的缺点并没有得到纠正，并助长了我们在审查联邦调查局迟交的文件OKBOMB案件中发现的缺点。 G.凤凰EC /罗利信 上星期，独立检察官办公室启动了一项调查，将对联邦调查局在9 / 11恐怖袭击前处理信息和情报的方式进行调查。调查重点,除此之外,FBI如何处理电子通信凤凰部门写的关于伊斯兰极端分子在2001年7月参加民航学校在亚利桑那州(凤凰EC��)和问题在5月21日,2002年,信到联邦调查局局长从特工Coleen罗利明尼阿波利斯首席顾问。金博宝正规网址 监察长办公室已进行了2001年秋季初步调查凤凰EC在FBI总部处理。我们决定把这个问题指的是参议院和众议院情报委员会9月11日联合查询（联合查询），确立了以审查有关9·11袭击的情报和执法信息的国会委员会。我们决定将此事提交给联合调查是基于我们的信念，即凤凰EC需要提供给联邦调查局当时的其他信息和其他情报机构的背景下进行分析。然而，在最近发生的事件和监察长办公室几个请求的光之前，9月11日进行的怎么情报在联邦调查局处理的审查，包括来自主任穆勒特定的要求，我们已同意采取凤凰的全面调查EC, the important issues raised by Special Agent Rowley�s letter, and the FBI�s handling of other intelligence information prior to the September 11 attacks. Director Mueller also has asked the OIG to provide any recommendations, based on our review, as to how the FBI can best handle its counterterrorism responsibilities. 目前，我们正在组装OIG律师，调查员和其他工作人员组成进行这项调查小组。To the extent possible, we will coordinate our investigation with the Joint Inquiry�s investigation. IV。概述FBI举报者保护措施 其中一个FBI可以因为它看起来未来最重要的改变是培养一种文化，使员工能够识别程序或操作，并把他们的关注，以管理缺陷，而不必担心遭到报复。该OIG支持FBI告密者，以提高机构运作的方式有力的保护。FBI告密者已经在FBI，显著变革的推动力，如联邦调查局实验室做了改进。 关于联邦调查局雇员所受到的保护以及雇员必须遵循的程序，仍然存在大量的混乱。在此声明中，我将简要介绍适用于联邦调查局雇员的举报人规则以及OIG在这一过程中的作用。 大多数联邦雇员谁相信他们已经受到报复使得在1989年的举报人保护法保护的披露可能会要求通过特别顾问办公室或调查，在适当的情况下，追求动作的保护考绩制度之前的个人权利板。见第1214和美国法典第5的1221。然而，FBI员工从举报人保护法豁免。Instead, they are covered by a policy developed by the Department pursuant to a delegation of authority from the President to the Attorney General in April 1997 to provide protections for FBI whistleblowers �in a manner consistent with applicable provisions of sections 1214 and 1221 of [title 5].� 因此，该部已建立的程序在其下员工FBI可能使受保护的信息披露和流程通过对这种FBI雇员报复的指控进行调查。Under these regulations, FBI employees must bring their complaint to one of several specified individuals or organizations for the complaint to be considered a �protected disclosure.� Presently, these individuals include the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, FBI Director, FBI Deputy Director, OIG, the Department�s Office of Professional Responsibility (DOJ OPR), or the highest ranking official in any FBI field office. 第二，进行披露的FBI员工必须有理由相信，披露的信息证明其违反了任何法律、法规或管理不善;资金的严重浪费;滥用职权;或对公众健康或安全构成实质和具体的危险。 一旦保护的公开已经到指定实体之一制成，法规禁止采取任何FBI或部门的雇员，指使他人采取，推荐或批准任何人事行动对于披露员工作为保护披露报复。如果员工认为他或她一直是一个人行动，用于制作受保护披露报复的对象，员工可能会报告涉嫌报复要么监察长办公室司法部或OPR。由于是与非FBI雇员的情况下，维持报复的情况下，为保护披露FBI员工最终必须证明保护披露是在人员的行动有关，他们抱怨的一个因素。 监察长办公室和司法部OPR分享调查有关FBI雇员打击报复举报人的指控的责任。如果没有报复的发现是由，FBI告密者仍然可以提出他们的要求，以律师招聘和管理的部门的办公室主任（局长）。如果OIG或司法部OPR找到报复，该报告被发送到谁的权力秩序整治，除非FBI可以通过明确和令人信服的证据表明，没有发生报复显示主任。由导演决定可以上诉到副检察长。 独立检察官办公室处理了联邦调查局告密者提出的各种报复指控。此外，在一件最初由联邦调查局举报人向OIG提出的事情中，我们即将完成对联邦调查局是否在其纪律过程中实行双重标准的审查，以及联邦调查局对其高级管理人员的处罚是否比其他雇员更严厉的审查。 我准备的发言到此结束。我很乐意回答任何问题。 |