对

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

问

Assistant Secretary of State

为了

情报与研究

Carl W. Ford, Jr.

By the

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

2002年2月6日

情报界监视恐怖活动的能力

1) The Intelligence Community is America's early warning system against threats to American lives and property both here and overseas. What are the Intelligence Community's greatest strengths and deficiencies in monitoring terrorism? What lessons have you learned from September 11, 2001, to address any shortcomings? Do you all believe that you have sufficient resources to fight the war on terrorism?

A: PERHAPS THE GREATEST LESSON LEARNED FROM AN INTELLIGENCE PERSPECTIVE WITH REGARDS TO THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS ARE THE DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH IDENTIFYING "CLEAN" TERRORISTS. THOSE TERRORISTS WITH NO PRIOR RECORD EITHER IN INTELLIGENCE OR POLICE FILES WILL REMAIN A SIGNIFICANT THREAT FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. EFFORTS ARE, HOWEVER, CURRENTLY UNDERWAY TO IMPROVE INTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION WORLDWIDE AND, AS A RESULT, WE HAVE SEEN SEVERAL HIGH-PROFILE ARRESTS IN EUROPE, ASIA, AND ELSEWHERE. WE WOULD DIRECT YOU TO CIA AND FBI FOR ASSESSMENTS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN PARTICULAR INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORECEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE PARTNERSHIPS.

Duration of the War on Terror

2）布什总统在去年9月20日在国会联席会议上的讲话中谈到反恐战争：“直到发现，停止和击败的每个全球范围内的每个恐怖组织都不会结束。”您认为，实现这一目标需要多长时间？

答:白宫和国防部CAN BETTER RESPOND TO QUESTIONS REGARDING PROPOSED TIMELINES FOR THE COMPLETION OF THE VARIOUS PHASES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS. WITH REGARDS TO STATE DEPARTMENT'S INITIATIVES IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM, AS YOU ARE AWARE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS ARE ONGOING AT ALL TIMES.

支持恐怖主义的国家

3) In his Speech to a Joint Session of Congress last September 20, President Bush stated that "from this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime." The Secretary of State maintains a list of countries that have "repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism." Currently, the seven countries on this terrorism list are: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. How good is our intelligence on the terrorist related activities of these countries? Has the intelligence community noted any increase or diminution of these countries support to terrorism since last September 11, 2001?

A: INFORMATION DRAWN FROM NUMEROUS SOURCES ALLOWS US TO DETERMINE THAT ALL SEVEN STATE SPONSORS CONTINUE TO SUPPORT TERRORISM TO SOME DEGREE.

SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, THE COUNTRIES LISTED HAVE DONE THE FOLLOWING:

伊朗：PRESIDENT KHATAMI CONDEMNED THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND OFFERED CONDOLENCES TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. ALTHOUGH SOME ARAB AFGHANS, INCLUDING AL QA'IDA MEMBERS, HAVE USED IRAN AS A TRANSIT ROUTE TO AND FROM AFGHANISTAN, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF IRANIAN OR HIZBALLAH SPONSORSHIP OR FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS.

IRAQ:在官方电视台评论伊拉克统计ION ON SEPTEMBER 11 STATED THAT AMERICA WAS "...REAPING THE FRUITS OF [ITS] CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY." A SUBSEQUENT COMMENTARY IN A NEWSPAPER RUN BY ONE OF SADDAM'S SONS EXPRESSED SYMPATHY FOR USAMA BIN LADIN FOLLOWING INITIAL US RETALIATORY STRIKES.

SYRIA谴责了9月11日对美国的袭击。它反对叙利亚与本·拉丁相关的恐怖分子的存在一直保持一致，并驱逐了几名。大马士革还表示愿意支持我们追踪和占领基地组织成员的努力。

LIBYA:9月11日，利比亚领导人卡扎菲（Qadhafi）发表了一份新闻声明，称这次袭击可怕而令人恐惧，并敦促利比亚人为受害者献血。他后来说，美国的报复将是一种自卫行为。

北朝鲜：平壤发表了几句官方声明，谴责了9月11日的袭击，并向美国表示慰问。9月11日袭击之后，朝鲜签署了两次反恐公约，并表示愿意签署所有其余公约。

古巴：自9月11日以来，他在今年的峰会上签署了全部12项联合国反恐公约以及伊伯罗裔美国人恐怖主义宣言，以表现出古巴对国际恐怖主义战争的支持。此外，古巴说，尽管它与美国如何打击恐怖主义方面有所不同，但它不会阻止拘留可疑的恐怖分子在古巴关塔那摩湾的恐怖分子。

SUDANCONDEMNED THE 11 SEPTEMBER ATTACKS AND PLEDGED ITS COMMITMENT TO COMBATING TERRORISM AND FULLY COOPERATING WITH THE UNITED STATES. THE SUDANESE GOVERNMENT HAS STEPPED UP ITS COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION WITH VARIOUS US AGENCIES, AND SUDANESE AUTHORITIES HAVE INVESTIGATED AND APPREHENDED EXTREMISTS SUSPECTED OF INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

Embassy and Overseas Facilities Security

Q. 4) What is the nature and extend to the terrorist threat to U.S. Diplomatic and military facilities overseas and how has it changed since September 11, 2001? Do you believe that the Departments of Defense and State have taken appropriate security measures to address the terrorist threat to all of their overseas facilities?

答：我们不断收到与威胁有关的报告，这些报告涉及国内外的美国利益和设施。我们评估这些报告的一部分反映了实际恐怖计划，以攻击美国或其盟友。ReportsReports尽管持久自由行动的影响，但我们认为基地组织及其分支机构仍然能够像非Qaida相关的恐怖组织一样发动攻击。由于这种情况是海外的美国设施，因此经常根据当地环境的变化进行审查并调整其安全姿势。此外，该部门定期审查威胁信息，以以修改格式向美国个人和企业释放。我们将指示您到国防部以获取有关其全球安全姿势的信息。

Possible Terrorist use of "Conflict Diamonds"

问：5）武装冲突当事方（尤其是安哥拉，塞拉利昂和刚果民主共和国）的钻石的采矿和销售被认为是助长这种敌对行动的重要因素。这些钻石被称为“冲突钻石”，占全球钻石贸易价值的3.7至15％。您是否有任何信息可以使用“冲突钻石”来补贴包括al-qa'ida在内的恐怖组织的活动？

答：媒体报道最近提ReportsReports高了恐怖组织参与“冲突钻石”贸易的可能性。我们无法确认真主党或基地组织等恐怖组织之间的任何联系，并使用非法钻石来筹集资金或洗钱，但是我们继续调查指控。

The Situation in Iraq

Q.6）萨达姆·侯赛因（Saddam Hussein）从现在起一年后执政的可能性是多少？情报界确定伊拉克发生了什么的能力有多好？当萨达姆从现场删除时，伊拉克最有可能的情况是什么？伊朗和其他邻国将如何应对萨达姆的离开（例如入侵）？情报界有什么证据表明伊拉克可能参与了2001年9月11日的恐怖袭击？如果美国要采取军事行动将萨达姆从权力中撤离，那么美国盟友以及该地区其他国家可能会有什么反应？

答:我们注意到接触IRA的报告ReportsReportsQI OFFICIAL AND MOHAMED ATTA, A KEY FIGURE IN THE WORLD TRADE CENTER ATTACKS. THIS CONTACT CONCERNS US AND REMAINS UNDER INVESTIGATION BUT IT DOES NOT DEFINITIVELY LINK IRAQ TO THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS. IRAQ, HOWEVER, REMAINS A STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM AND AS SUCH ITS ACTIVITIES REQUIRE A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF OUR ATTENTION. IT PROVIDES BASES TO VARIOUS TERRORIST GROUPS INCLUDING THE PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT, THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION. IN EARLY DECEMBER, ISRAELI AUTHORITIES ANNOUNCED THE ARREST OF A PLF MEMBER WHO HAD ALLEGEDLY TRAINED IN IRAQ AND WAS SUSPECTED OF PARTICIPATING IN ANTI-ISRAELI ATTACKS. IN A MEETING WITH FORMER PFLP SECRETARY GENERAL HABASH IN BAGHDAD IN JANUARY 2001, THE IRAQI VICE PRESIDENT SAID IRAQ CONTINUED TO SUPPORT THE INTIFADA USING ALL AVAILABLE MEANS, ACCORDING TO IRAQI STATE RADIO. IN MID-SEPTEMBER A SENIOR DELEGATION FROM THE PFLP MET WITH THE IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER. THE LEADER OF THE PFLP DELEGATION THANKED IRAQ FOR ITS SUPPORT THAT ENCOURAGED AND MAINTAINED THE INTIFADA. BAGHDAD ALSO CONTINUES TO HOST THE 15 MAY ORGANIZATION, THE MUJAHEDIN E KHALQ, AND THE KURDISH WORKER'S PARTY. THE CZECHS EXPELLED AN IRAQI INTELLIGENCE OFFICER IN APRIL 2001 FOLLOWING REPORTS THAT IRAQI OPERATIVES MIGHT RETALIATE AGAINST THE US FUNDED RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY FOR BROADCASTS CRITICAL OF THE IRAQI REGIME. SEPARATELY THE SAME IRAQI OFFICIAL WAS IDENTIFIED BY CZECH AUTHORITIES AS HAVING MET WITH ATTA.

问：伊拉克军方的准备是否足够高以对邻国构成重大威胁？伊拉克大规模杀伤性武器（WMD）能力的状况如何？

A。

• 自1998年12月以来，巴格达一直拒绝按照安全理事会第687号决议要求联合国检查员进入伊拉克。失去了此地面访问权，更难准确评估伊拉克WMD计划的当前状况。

• 伊拉克过去的行为，巴格达很可能已经利用中间时期采取步骤来重组禁止的计划。伊拉克未能在1995年或1997年提交准确，最终和完整的披露（FFCD）以及其广泛的隐藏工作，这表明BW计划继续进行。

• 自从海湾战争以来，伊拉克已经重建了其用于工业和商业用途的化学生产基础设施及其导弹生产设施。

• 评估巴格达能够在几周到几个月内重新定位其CW计划。此外，伊拉克似乎正在与CW相关的设施安装或修理双使用设备。这些设施中的一些可以很快转换为CW代理。

• Iraq has also rebuilt a plant that produces castor oil, allegedly for brake fluid. The mash left over from this production could be used to produce ricin, a biological toxin. Iraq has continued dual-use research that could improve BW agent R&D capabilities. With the absence of a monitoring regime and Iraq's growing industrial self-sufficiency, we remain concerned that Iraq may again be producing biological warfare agents.

• 伊拉克试图为合法平民使用或以合法的平民使用购买多种双重使用物品。该设备（原则上受到未经审查）可以用于WMD目的。

• Iraq has probably continued low-level theoretical R&D associated with its nuclear program. Baghdad may be attempting to acquire materials and equipment that could aid in reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.

• 伊拉克继续追求联合国安理会决议不禁止的SRBM系统的开发，并可能扩展到更长的系统。情报界认为，伊拉克也可能保留了一支小型的飞毛型导弹的秘密力量。

Situation in Iran

Q. 7) What is the status of President Khatami's hold onpower? To what extent has he been an agent for democratic reform? Would it be accurate to characterize Iran as being as democratic a government as any other nation in the Islamic world?

哈塔米总统的政治力量一直依赖于大众支持，而不是宪法权威。伊斯兰共和国的真正权力由最高领导人哈梅内伊（Khamenei）持有。哈塔米（Khatami）在他的第一任期中设法改变了机构，通过内阁改革推进了法治，并通过在1999年成立地方政府理事会来增加民主代表，并监督了2000年的改革主义者对议会的收购。但是，艰难的司法机构尚未有效地捍卫这些改革的收益或其支持者。因此，在没有善待改革主义的承诺方面，哈塔米（Khatami）在家庭中失去了很多个人信誉，这是他的C0N服务对手的强大对手，也是公众变革的拥护者。尽管如此，改革的压力仍在继续；战斗还远远没有结束。尽管过去几年遭受了挫折，但伊朗还是伊斯兰世界上最民主的政府之一。

什么是你的自然和exten评估t of Iran's support for international terrorism? Does Iran continue to provide assistance to Hizballah in Lebanon and to Islamic-oriented Palestinian groups that oppose the Arab-Israeli peace process, such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)? To what extent has the Iranian government provided support to the effort against al-Qa'ida and the Taliban since September 11, 2001?

答：伊朗参与与恐怖主义有关的活动的参与仍然集中在对反对以色列的团体的支持上。自从起义于2000年9月开始以来，这种支持似乎已经加强了。2001年期间，伊朗在鼓励反以色列活动方面寻求备受瞩目的政治作用，同时增加对从事与恐怖主义有关活动的团体的支持。伊朗继续为黎巴嫩真主党和巴勒斯坦拒绝群体提供，尤其是哈马斯，巴勒斯坦伊斯兰圣战和PFLP-GC，以及不同的资金，SafeHaven，培训和武器。它还鼓励真主党和巴勒斯坦团体协调他们的计划，并升级对以色列的活动。伊朗还为波斯湾，非洲，土耳其和中亚的极端主义团体提供了有限的支持。这种支持的水平要低于与以色列反对的群体所提供的支持，并且近年来一直在下降。

问：伊朗WMD努力的状况如何？伊朗是否继续从中国，俄罗斯和朝鲜获得武器和与WMD相关的技术？

答：伊朗正试图开发一种土著能力，以生产所有类型的WMD（核，化学和生物武器）以及各种系统来提供此类武器。通过这样做，它试图从许多国家获取相关的技术专长，材料和技术，但在WMD学科的俄罗斯，中国和朝鲜方面的WMD学科内都集中在不同程度上。

核。伊朗有一个有组织的结构，致力于开发核武器，试图建立生产高度富集的铀和p的能力。它试图使用其平民核能计划，该计划在范围上非常适中，以证明建立国内或以其他方式获得燃油周期能力的努力是合理的。但是，这种能力可以支持裂变材料生产，我们认为这是伊朗收购工作背后的驱动目标。俄罗斯实体仍然是伊朗核计划支持的主要来源。黑市裂变材料的潜在可用性也可能提供捷径，伊朗可以获取核武器所需的裂变材料。

CHEMICAL.伊朗在伊朗 - 伊拉克战争期间开始了其化学战（CW）计划，但直到1998年5月举行的CWC州会议会议之前，才承认其存在。伊朗已经制造和储存了水泡，血液和窒息化学剂，并成功地将其中一些试剂武器武器化。伊朗还继续寻求来自俄罗斯，中国和西欧实体的生产技术，专业知识和化学先驱，目的是创建自给自足的CW基础设施。

BIOLOGICAL.IRAN HAS A ROWING BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY, SIGNIFICANT PHARMACEUTICAL EXPERIENCE, AND THE OVERALL INFRASTRUCTURE TO SUPPORT A BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW) PROGRAM. IRAN IS ASSESSED TO BE ACTIVELY PURSUING OFFENSIVE BW CAPABILITIES AND MAY HAVE SMALL QUANTITIES OF USEABLE AGENT FOR LIMITED DEPLOYMENT. TEHRAN HAS EXPANDED ITS EFFORTS TO SEEK CONSIDERABLE DUAL-USE BIO-TECHNICAL MATERIALS AND EXPERTISE FROM ENTITIES IN RUSSIA AND CHINA. OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE WILL BE CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESS OF AN IRANIAN BW PROGRAM AND WILL BE DIFFICULT TO THWART OWING TO THE DUAL-USE NATURE OF THE MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT INVOLVED.

导弹。伊朗越来越重视其弹道导弹计划。目前，它具有300公里的SCUD B，500公里的SCUD C和中国制造的短距离（150公里）弹道导弹，并具有生产Scuds的能力。它目前的主要重点似乎是生产Shahab-3中型弹道导弹，该导弹基于朝鲜No Dong，预计将拥有1,300公里的范围。伊朗试图多次飞行Shahab-3，并取得了有限的成功。导弹仍处于开发阶段。伊朗也对甚至更长的系统感兴趣，但是根据我们的判断，即使这些系统中的粗糙最多也将至少几年 - 缺乏大量且持续的外国援助。

从历史上看，伊朗在俄罗斯，中国和朝鲜的EMTIE的导弹开发工作中获得了关键的帮助。它仍然取决于当前的导弹开发工作的这种帮助。

伊朗导弹能力

问：8）去年12月的《弹道导弹威胁》（Nie）指出，“伊朗正在追求短期和远程导弹的能力”。伊朗是中东最大的导弹库存之一。伊朗导弹计划旨在面对哪些特定的安全威胁？在什么情况下（如果有的话）伊朗可能会削减其导弹计划？

答：伊朗认为其导弹力量是其战略威慑能力的关键要素，旨在应对潜在的军事侵略（就像伊拉克在1980 - 88年的伊朗 - 伊拉克战争中对伊朗城市进行了一系列导弹袭击时一样）。目前，德黑兰认为其主要的国家安全威胁来自伊拉克，以色列和美国。美国军队从波斯湾地区，南亚和阿富汗撤离，以及定义减少武力限制的地区范围内的共同裁军计划或安全协议可能会说服伊朗削减其战略导弹计划。

Stability of the Jordanian Regime

问：9）约旦国王阿卜杜拉政权有多稳定？阿卜杜拉国王面临着什么威胁伊斯兰原教旨主义者？复兴的巴勒斯坦民族主义将破坏约旦的稳定的可能性是多少？

JORDAN'S KING ABDULLAH HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY SELF-ASSURED DURING HIS THREE YEARS ON THE THRONE AND HAS BEGUN TO CLARIFY AND PURSUE A DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRAM DESIGNED TO ADDRESS SOME OF HIS COUNTRY'S BASIC PROBLEMS. THE KING MOVED FORCEFULLY TO BACK THE U.S. IN THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM AND HAS ACTED AS A MODERATING INFLUENCE IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT. HOWEVER 17-MONTHS OF INTIFADA VIOLENCE, ONGOING UNCERTAINTY OVER IRAQ, NEWP RESSURES ARISING FROM SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE CONTINUED SLUGGISHNESS OF THE JORDANIAN ECONOMY FORCE THE KING TO DEFEND HIS POLICIES TO A JORDANIAN PUBLIC THAT IS DISSATISFIED AND APPREHENSIVE ABOUT THE REGIONAL SITUATION, ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO U.S. POLICY ON IRAQ AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT.

约旦伊斯兰团体公开参加约旦政治。他们倾向于批评该政权，但在继续在系统中继续工作有既得利益。约旦政权来自这些团体面临的主要威胁是公共秩序。自从“ Al-Aqsa Intifada”开始以来，约旦有效地禁止了大规模示威活动，这是由于约旦安全服务部的困难在于包含示威者的强烈情绪，抗议以色列对以色列对待以色列对巴勒斯坦人的待遇的强烈情绪加沙。伊斯兰团体通常尊重该禁令，但已举行了情节示威。

超过一半的约旦人是巴勒斯坦人的起源，在西岸和加沙巴勒斯坦人的困境方面，他们同样情绪化。当以色列 - 巴勒斯坦暴力升起时，潜在的暴力街道示威游行的威胁就会上升。与周围阿拉伯国家的巴勒斯坦人口不同，约旦的巴勒斯坦人享有公民身份，并参加了约旦政治制度。他们不主张取代阿卜杜拉国王，并通过所有约旦人提供的法律和民主手段来表达他们的政治观点。

沙特阿拉伯

Q: 10) How stable is the Saudi Government?

A:
• FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE FORCES FOR STABILITY IN SAUDI ARABIA OUTWEIGH THOSE AGAINST STABILITY.

  FORCES FOR STABILITY:

  克罗恩王子阿卜杜拉（Abdullah）是有史以来最受欢迎的沙特领导人之一，在很大程度上是因为他能够表达普遍持有的感受和用沙特人轻松理解的话语。阿卜杜拉也被视为宗教和根据伊斯兰教义生活。他对普通商店，农村村庄和该国偏远地区的访问证明了他的C0mmon触点。阿卜杜拉（Abdullah）也被称为改革家，并且在改善教育和妇女权利等问题上已经说出来（尽管尚未取得太大的实际进展）。金博宝正规网址

  - 苏迪阿拉伯是一个保守的社会，非常尊重权威，并希望避免内乱。在短期内，沙特人不太可能支持推翻沙特政府。

  --IN ADDITION TO ROYAL FAMILY MEMBERS, THE MERCHANT CLASS, BUSINESS CLASS, MANY OF THE ISLAMIC CLERICS, AND MANY ORDINARY SAUDIS WOULD NOT WANT A GOVERNMENT RUN BY EXTREMISTS.

  FORCES AGAINST STABILITY:
  --THE SAUDI HIGH POPULATION GROWTH RATE (OVER THREE PERCENT A YEAR) AND YOUTH BULGE (HALF THE POPULATION IS UNDER 15) PLUS AN ECONOMY OVERLY DEPENDENT ON OIL AND OFFERING TOO FEW JOBS IS A POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING SITUATION.

  - 苏迪学校和大学还没有对现代经济中所需的工作进行充分教育的年轻人。即使很快实施了教育改革，也需要多年才能培养一代有能力的工人。失业和不满青年容易受到伊斯兰极端主义的影响。

  - 越来越多的AL SAUD王室成员（可能多达8,000名王子）获得津贴和特权，最终可能被认为是对经济的不必要的消耗。有些皇室成员被认为过分生活，而不是根据伊斯兰的教义。

Q. What factors would be most likely to bring about change in that country?

A:
• 经济多元化和改革将向沙特人口开放就业市场，并允许该国从对石油的严重依赖。

• 教育体系的改革（现在被沙特领导人认可为重要），以便为年轻人提供有关各种主题和文化的更全面的教育，并准备好参加现代经济。

Q: To what extent are the Saudi government and public supportive of the U.S. led campaign against UBL and terrorism?

• THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT HIGHLY SUPPORTS THE US LED CAMPAIGN AGAINST USAMA BIN LADEN WHO SEEKS THE DOWNFALL OF THE AL SAUD REGIME AND FAMILY AS HIS KEY GOAL. THE CROWN PRINCE HAS DENOUNCED THE AL QAIDA, SUICIDE BOMBINGS, AND ALL KILLING OF INNOCENT PEOPLE. HE HAS ASKED SAUDI CLERICAL LEADERS TO EMPHASIZE PEACE AND AVOID STIRRING UP ANTI-MUSLIM SENTIMENT. SAUDI PRACTICE, HOWEVER, MAKES COOPERATION ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM CAMPAIGN DIFFICULT AND SLOW. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SAUDI BANKING SYSTEM IS NOT TOTALLY TRANSPARENT, AND RIYADH HAS NOT MAINTAINED STRICT OVERSIGHT ON NGOS ABROAD. THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT IS MAKING CHANGES, BUT THESE WILL LIKELY COME SLOWLY.

• THE SAUDI PEOPLE MAY HAVE MIXED SENTIMENTS ABOUT THE US LED WAR ON TERRORISM. WHILE MOST SAUDIS CONDEMNED THE KILLING OF INNOCENT PEOPLE ON SEPTEMBER 11, SINCE THE INTIFADA BEGAN 17 MONTHS AGO, ANTI-US SENTIMENT HAS GROWN AMONG THE SAUDIS WHO HOLD THE UNITED STATES RESPONSIBLE FOR ISRAEL'S ACTIONS AGAINST THE PALESTINIANS. SAUDIS WIDELY BELIEVE THE UNITED STATES IS BIASED TOWARD ISRAEL AND KEEPS ISRAEL WELL SUPPLIED WITH ARMS NO MATTER WHAT ISRAEL DOES. THEY SEE THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AS VICTIMS WHOSE LANDS ARE UNFAIRLY "OCCUPIED" BY ISRAEL THROUGH THE USE OF WEAPONS PROVIDED BY WASHINGTON. WHILE MANY SAUDIS WOULD NOT WANT USAMA BIN LADEN OR ANY "EXTREMIST" RUNNING THEIR GOVERNMENT, MANY AGREE WITH HIS MESSAGE CONCERNING THE PALESTINIANS AND HIS CRITICISM OF THE US SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL.

问：从沙特阿拉伯撤离美国军事力量会在多大程度上减少反美国。在沙特阿拉伯和整个伊斯兰世界内的情感？

• REMOVAL OF US MILITARY FORCES FROM SAUDI ARABIA MAY DIMINISH ANTI-US SENTIMENT IN SAUDI ARABIA AND IN OTHER PARTS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD, ESPECIALLY AMONG RADICALS AND ACTIVISTS. BUT SUCH AN ACT MAY ALSO EMBOLDEN MILITANTS ESPECIALLY IF IT IS SEEN AS A RESULT OF USAMA BIN LADEN'S CALL FOR THE REMOVAL OF US TROOPS.

叙利亚政权的稳定性

Q. 11) How stable is the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad? What are the most significant threats to his regime? What is the status of Syria's weapons of mass destruction infrastructure, as well as its support for international terrorism?

巴沙尔·阿萨德（Bashar Al Asad）担任叙利亚总统近两年，他正在采取措施巩固他的权威。他的政权似乎稳定，对他的力量几乎没有内部威胁。去年12月，ASAD实施了一个主要的内阁改组，用更面向改革的技术官员取代了许多老后卫精英。在18名新内阁成员中，有两个杰出的人物包括替换长期经济学部长，以自由主义的世界银行经济学家和任命前国际货币基金组织官员担任财政部长。此外，阿萨德（Asad）表示，他愿意通过废除四个部委来修剪政府的努力。尽管ASAD努力的重点是经济改革而不是政治改革的重点，但最近的指标 - 即，长期国防部长Mustafa Tlas明年7月的辞职宣布，他可能会在政治领域更加强烈地主张自己，因为出色地。

SYRIA'S PRIMARY WMD FOCUS IS ON OFFENSIVE CHEMICAL WEAPONS; EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT SYRIA HAS ACHIEVED A TACTICAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITY AND IS PURSUING THE DEVELOPMENT OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. SYRIA IS LIKEWISE WORKING TO UPGRADE ITS BALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILITIES TO DEVELOP OR ACQUIRE LONGER-RANGE REPLACEMENTS FOR SCUD-B AND SCUD-C MISSILES CURRENTLY DEPLOYED. WE CONTINUE TO MONITOR SYRIA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM FOR ANY SIGNS OF INTEREST IN DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

SYRIA DID NOT SPONSOR DIRECTLY AN ACT OF TERRORISM DURING 2001, ALTHOUGH IT CONTINUED TO PROVIDE SAFEHAVEN AND SOME LOGISTICS SUPPORT TO A NUMBER OF TERRORIST GROUPS. SYRIA CONTINUED TO ALLOW SEVERAL PALESTINIAN REJECTIONIST GROUPS -- INCLUDING HAMAS, THE PALESTINE ISLAMIC JIHAD (PIJ), THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE-GENERAL COMMAND (PFLP-GC), FATAH-THE INTIFADA, AND THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP) -- TO MAINTAIN OFFICES IN DAMASCUS. IN ADDITION, SYRIA CONTINUED TO GRANT A VARIETY OF TERRORIST GROUPS -- INCLUDING LEBANESE HIZBALLAH, HAMAS, THE PFLP-GC, AND THE PIJ --BASING PRIVILEGES OR REFUGE IN AREAS OF LEBANON'S BEKAA VALLEY UNDER SYRIAN CONTROL. DAMASCUS, HOWEVER, GENERALLY UPHELD ITS AGREEMENT WITH ANKARA NOT TO SUPPORT THE KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY (PKK). DAMASCUS ALSO SERVED AS THE PRIMARY TRANSIT POINT FOR TERRORIST OPERATIVES TRAVELING TO LEBANON AND FOR THE RESUPPLY OF WEAPONS TO HIZBALLAH. ALTHOUGH SYRIA CONTINUED IN 2001 TO MAINTAIN A BAN ON ATTACKS LAUNCHED FROM SYRIAN TERRITORY OR AGAINST WESTERN TARGETS, IT HAS NOT ACTED TO STOP ANTI-ISRAELI ATTACKS BY HIZBALLAH AND THE PALESTINIAN GROUPS, WHICH IT CLAIMS ARE ENGAGED IN A JUST STRUGGLE AGAINST ISRAEL'S OCCUPATION OF PALESTINIAN TERRITORY.

自9月11日以来，叙利亚和黎巴嫩安全部队就极端主义活动分享了情报，并采取行动遏制基地组织附属团体。但是，叙利亚合作并不能扩展到真主党和巴勒斯坦的拒绝群体。叙利亚继续否认将“恐怖分子”的指定应用于此类团体，并坚持其抵抗权。叙利亚可能会继续对真主党和其他人的支持，同时保持对与以色列的直接对抗保持警惕。

Qadhafi持有利比亚的权力

问：12）您对Qadhafi在利比亚的权力持有的评估是什么？您对卡扎菲进一步和挫败该地区西方政策目标的能力的评估是什么？利比亚的大规模杀伤性基础设施武器以及对国际恐怖主义的支持是什么？

A: QADHAFI'S HOLD ON POWER CURRENTLY IS FAIRLY SOLID. HE HAS GREATLY REDUCED THE EXTENT AND INTENSITY OF THE ONLY REAL INTERNAL CHALLENGE HE HAS FACED SINCE THE EARLY 1990'S--ARMED ISLAMIC MILITANT GROUPS OPERATING MAINLY IN EASTERN LIBYA. HE STILL RETAINS SOME ABILITY TO FRUSTRATE WESTERN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REGIONS. THAT CAPABILITY IS LIMITED IN THE MIDDLE EAST BY THE GENERALLY LOW REGARD IN WHICH LIBYA IS HELD BY SO MANY OTHER GOVERNMENTS. BUT RELATIVELY HIGH OIL PRICES HAVE GIVEN HIM THE FINANCIAL WHEREWITHAL TO EXERCISE SOME INFLUENCE, ESPECIALLY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. HIS INTERVENTIONS IN BOTH REGIONS, HOWEVER, HAVE HAD A MIXED IMPACT ON WESTERN POLICY.

我们评估的黎波里对获得核武器有持续的兴趣。被暂停的英国制裁可能为利比亚人创造新的机会，以确保开发核武器所需的大量外国援助。利比亚还继续努力从外国来源获得弹道导弹援助（这可能会导致MRBM或扩展范围的SCUD能力），并显然保留了进攻性CW能力的目标。证据还表明，利比亚正试图获得开发和生产BW代理的能力。

LIBYA APPEARS TO HAVE LARGELY CURTAILED ITS SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. HOWEVER IT MAY MAINTAIN RESIDUAL TIES TO A FEW GROUPS IN ORDER TO BURNISH ITS REVOLUTIONARY CREDENTIALS AND TO MONITOR ITS OWN OPPOSITIONISTS. TRIPOLI'S PAST RECORD OF TERRORISM CONTINUES TO CROP UP PUBLICLY. ON 31 JANUARY 2001 A SCOTTISH COURT FOUND ABDEL BASSET AL-MEGRAHI GUILTY OF MURDER, CONCLUDING THAT HE CAUSED AN EXPLOSIVE DEVICE TO DETONATE ON BOARD PAN AM FLIGHT 103 "IN FURTHERANCE OF THE PURPOSES OF ... LIBYAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES." AT YEAR'S END, LIBYA HAD YET TO COMPLY FULLY WITH THE REMAINING UN SECURITY COUNCIL REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO PAN AM 103: ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY, PAYING APPROPRIATE COMPENSATION, DISCLOSING ALL IT KNOWS, AND RENOUNCING TERRORISM. ALSO IN LATE 2001, A GERMAN COURT CONVICTED FOUR DEFENDANTS IN THE 1986 "LA BELLE DISCO" BOMBING. IN RENDERING HIS DECISION, THE JUDGE STATED THAT THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT WAS CLEARLY CULPABLE. TRIPOLI HAS IN RECENT YEARS SOUGHT TO RECAST ITSELF AS A PEACEMAKER AND HAS THUS INSERTED ITSELF INTO A VARIETY OF ISSUES, SUCH AS NEGOTIATION IN THE SUDANESE AND ETHIOPIA-ERITREA CONFLICTS. LIBYA ACTED AS A HIGH-PROFILE NEGOTIATOR--AND RANSOM PAYER--IN THE SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL KIDNAPPING INCIDENT IN 2000.

Possibility of Support to Terrorists by the Palestinian Authority

问13）是否有任何证据表明去年巴勒斯坦权力机构（PA）参与或支持恐怖活动？

• WE HAVE CONCERNS ABOUT THIS ISSUE. IN EARLY JANUARY, ISRAEL INTERDICTED A SHIP IN THE RED SEA THAT HAD WEAPONS THAT WERE HEADED FOR THE PA-HELD AREAS. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT SEVERAL SENIOR MEMBERS OF ARAFAT'S FATAH FACTION, WHO HELD POSITIONS WITHIN THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) AND POSSIBLY ALSO THE PA, WERE INVOLVED IN AN ATTEMPT TO SMUGGLE ARMS TO THE PA-HELD AREAS.

• 也有证据表明，在西岸，加沙和以色列的适当的情况下，一些PA元素都参与了反以色列袭击。没有证据表明，PA高级官员告诉他们这样做，但PA仅做出了零星的努力来在其队伍中执行真正的纪律。

• MEANWHILE, ARAFAT AND OTHER PA OFFICIALS HAVE STRONGLY AND PUBLICLY SUPPORTED COALITION ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AND HAVE DEFENDED THE U.S. POSITION IN REGIONAL FORA LIKE THE ARAB LEAGUE AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (OIC).

问：谁可能是阿拉法特（Arafat）担任巴勒斯坦当局负责人的继任者？

• WE SHOULD DRAW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PA AND THE PLO. UNDER A DRAFT LAW, AHMED QURAI (ABU ALAA), 63 AND THE PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL SPEAKER, WOULD TAKE OVER THE PA TEMPORARILY AND CALL ELECTIONS WITHIN 45 DAYS THEREBY "SUCCEEDING" ARAFAT IN THAT ROLE.

• UNDER PLO RULES, MAHMOUD ABBAS (ABU MAZEN), 65, A SENIOR MEMBER OF THE PLO'S RULING EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND COFOUNDER OF FATAH, WOULD STEP IN TO LEAD THE PLO AND ALSO LIKELY FATAH.

• 在阿拉法特（Arafat）之后，阿布·马祖（Abu Mazen）和阿布·阿拉（Abu Alaa）都没有阿拉法特（Arafat）的身材，不得不分享这些官方机构。两者也可能需要其他有影响力的巴勒斯坦政治要素（例如安全部门）的支持，以确保其立场。

问：阿拉法特（Arafat）离开现场后，巴勒斯坦领导人变得更加激进的可能性是多少？

• IF THE INTIFADA IS STILL RAGING WHEN ARAFAT DIES, WE BELIEVE IT VERY LIKELY THAT VIOLENCE WILL GET WORSE AS HIS SUCCESSORS ARE LIKELY TO SUPPORT A CERTAIN LEVEL OF VIOLENCE, AS THE BEST WAY TO MAINTAIN CREDIBILITY AND TO QUASH COMPETITORS.

• MEANWHILE, REJECTIONIST ELEMENTS, SUCH AS HAMAS AND PIJ, WHOSE POPULARITY HAS BEEN RISING THROUGHOUT THE INTIFADA, WOULD SEIZE UPON THE POST-ARAFAT CONFUSION TO INCREASE THE ANTI-ISRAELI ACTIVITIES WHICH THEY BELIEVE ARE THE FOUNDATION OF THEIR RENEWED STRENGTH.

• ARAFAT'S SUCCESSOR WILL BE EVEN LESS LIKELY TO CONFRONT THESE ELEMENTS, AS THE PALESTINIAN POPULATION WILL SEE THEM AS LESS LEGITIMATE.

Vietnam POW/MIA

问：14）您对越南政府在美国POW/MIA问题上提供的援助水平有何评估？金博宝正规网址您认为该领域有任何改进的余地吗？

A:
• 是的，但是国务院情报与研究局定期协助该问题的某些特定方面，例如解决所谓的实时目击案件，但并未每天遵循此问题。

The India-Pakistan Conflict

问：18）印度和巴基斯坦在明年发动战争的可能性是多少？这样的冲突可能导致核武器交换的可能性？在这样的冲突中，哪个国家可能会占上风7为什么？印度和巴基斯坦最终同意接受克什米尔作为其国际边界的控制线（LOC）的可能性是多少？

答：在没有两国之间的对话过程的情况下，双方可能会继续在克什米尔的LOC上贸易小武器，迫击炮和炮火。涉及印度和巴基斯坦军队的更广泛冲突的机会，跨越广泛的LOC以及可能包括国际边界，尽管可能比几个月前还低，但不能排除。

自2001年底以来，两军都在克什米尔以南的LOC和国际边界互相部署。这一完全部署和提高警报的事实增加了这样的可能性，即偶然地，错误估计甚至是故意的决定，可能会引发严重的冲突，从而可以想象，即使有早期的国际参与，也可能难以控制这种报复。如果印度在接下来的几个月中，印度决定不从巴基斯坦渗透不断降低，那么印度袭击的可能性再次上升。

与印度不同，巴基斯坦尚未承诺不首先使用核武器。其背后的原因是，随着较小的两个大国，核武器的拥有旨在阻止印度的上级传统力量。但是，印度仍然认为，如果不越过巴基斯坦的核用途门槛，就可以进行“有限的战争”。当然，问题在于，这些阈值并未明确阐明，这使得印度无意中威胁巴基斯坦的“红线”之一，这可能会触发释放核武器的释放。自然而然，印度可能会用自己的核武器对这种核使用作出反应。

WHILE A NUCLEAR WAR IN SOUTH ASIA WOULD BE AN IMMENSE TRAGEDY FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS AS WELL AS FOR THE REST OF THE WORLD, IT IS LIKELY THAT INDIA WOULD "PREVAIL" IN SUCH A CONFLICT -- IF WE CAN USE THAT WORD -- IF ONLY BECAUSE IT IS SEVEN TIMES LARGER THAN PAKISTAN. IT IS LESS LIKELY THAN PAKISTAN TO BE COMPLETELY CRIPPLED BY ONE OR EVEN SEVERAL NUCLEAR STRIKES, AND IS MOREOVER SUFFICIENTLY DECENTRALIZED TO ENSURE THE SURVIVAL OF KEY FACILITIES -- BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY.

PAKISTAN, MORE THAN INDIA, IS A LONG WAY FROM ACCEPTING THE LOC AS THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER. IN THE MEANTIME, HOWEVER, WE HAVE ASKED BOTH SIDES TO RESPECT THE SANCTITY OF THE LOC AS AN INTERIM DIVIDING LINE, A PRINCIPLE THAT WAS RE-AFFIRMED AS RECENTLY AS MID-1999, WHEN THE US PERSUADED PAKISTAN TO WITHDRAW FORCES THAT HAD CROSSED THE LOC INTO THE KARGIL SECTOR OF INDIAN KASHMIR, AND ASKED INDIA NOT TO CROSS THE LOC INTO PAKISTANI KASHMIR IN ITS ATTEMPT TO PUSH THE INFILTRATORS BACK OUT OF INDIAN TERRITORY.

朝鲜的情况

Q. 19) What is the likelihood that North and South Korea will unify within the next 5 years? What is the likelihood that unification between North and South Korea will be a peaceful process? Under what circumstances would a war be likely? How strong is Kim Jong Il's hold on power? Who will likely succeed him?

A:
• INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS HAVE IMPROVED OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS AS A RESULT OF PRESIDENT KIM DAE JUNG'S "SUNSHINE POLICY," BUT WE SEE LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE TWO KOREAS WILL REUNIFY WITHIN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, BECAUSE NEITHER SIDE WANTS TO DO SO. THE KOREAN PENINSULA REMAINS ONE OF THE MOST HEAVILY MILITARIZED AREAS IN THE WORLD. BETTER TIES BETWEEN SEOUL AND PYONGYANG HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO ENHANCED CRISIS STABILITY ON THE PENINSULA.

• 平壤方面作了很大努力来提高它的文凭TIC AND ECONOMIC CONTACTS IN RECENT YEARS--AND HAS HAD SOME SUCCESS IN THIS EFFORT. THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IN NORTH KOREAN FOREIGN POLICY OVER THE LAST DECADE HAS BEEN ITS DRIVE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. AS LONG AS THE NORTH REMAINS ON THIS PATH, WE THINK THE CHANCES OF ANOTHER WAR ARE LOW. PYONGYANG MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO INITIATE A CONFLICT IF IT FELT IT WAS UNDER DIRECT THREAT AS A RESULT OF A SHARP DETERIORATION OF ITS SECURITY ENVIRONMENT.

• 董事长金正日（Kim Jong Il）似乎牢固地控制了。他在所有关键职位上都拥有近三十年的国家，政党和军事事务已有近三十年的忠诚主义者，并遇到了几个重大危机 - 包括他父亲的去世，社会主义集团的崩溃，北方经济的崩溃，以及夺取超过一百万人生的饥荒。好像要强调他对权力的掌握，金去年在俄罗斯进行了近一个月的火车旅行。我们知道他的权威没有严重的挑战。

• 我们几乎没有关于金正日计划的计划的信息。正如一些新闻报道所结论的那样，目前还为时过早，他的家人中的一个特定成员会继承他。ReportsReports

中国

问：20）中国减少大规模杀伤性和导弹武器的扩散的可能性是多少？

A.中国已经对美国做出了几项不扩散的承诺，与十年前相比，它的扩散行为有了很大的改善，当时中国实体正在出口完全的弹道导弹，并且在与扩散关注的州的核交易方面有不均匀的记录。仍然有改进的空间，我们预计WMD和与导弹有关的技术会继续进行。许多从事扩散活动的公司都是来自国有国防行业的衍生产品，但它们可能在未经中国政府授权的情况下运作。

ENFORCEMENT IS LIKELY TO IMPROVE AS CHINA SETS UP COMPREHENSIVE MISSILE-RELATED EXPORT CONTROLS PURSUANT TO A NOVEMBER, 2000, PLEDGE TO THE UNITED STATES, BUT IN THE MEANTIME CHINESE AUTHORITIES WILL CONTINUE TO BE HAMPERED BY THEIR INABILITY TO POLICE PRODUCERS AND VENDORS ADEQUATELY. A DRAMATIC INCREASE IN CHINESE PROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES IS NOT LIKELY, EVEN IN RETALIATION FOR STEPS TAKEN BY THE U.S. ON (FOR EXAMPLE) SANCTIONS, MISSILE DEFENSE, OR TAIWAN THAT THE BEIJING LEADERSHIP MAY NOT LIKE.

PROGRESS IN CURBING SALES -- ESPECIALLY IN DUAL-USE AREAS -- WILL NO DOUBT BE GRADUAL, IF NOT SPOTTY. CHINA WILL CERTAINLY CONTINUE ACTIVITIES WITH PAKISTAN THAT IT HAS NOT FORESWORN, INCLUDING CONVENTIONAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND CIVILIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION INVOLVING SAFEGUARDED FACILITIES, SOMETIMES CREATING AMBIGUITIES ABOUT ITS COMPLIANCE AND INTENTIONS. WE ASSESS THAT CHINA CONTINUES TO TAKE ITS NON-PROLIFERATION PLEDGES SERIOUSLY AND IS UNLIKELY TO ABROGATE ANY OF THEM.

Q. To what extent have you observed an improvement in China's human rights policy?

答：我们欢迎最近对几个被拘留者发行的版本，但我们注意到，仍然存在严重侵犯人权的行为。在过去的一年中，我们没有观察到中国人权政策的改善。

问：中国与美国与恐怖恐怖战争的合作程度如何？

答：9月11日之后，中国领导人在2001年10月和2002年2月在上海与布什总统会面时，对美国总统江的支持重申了这一支持。联合国打击恐怖主义。

Q. To what extent have close US-Taiwan relations been an impediment to closer US-China ties?

A。US SUPPORT FOR TAIWAN IS THE MOST PROBLEMATIC ISSUE FOR THE PRC IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE US. HOWEVER, BEIJING HAS TAKEN SOME STEPS TO REDUCE TENSIONS IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT, AND IT APPEARS UNLIKELY TO UNDERTAKE ANY INITIATIVES IN CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE AS IT GRAPPLES WITH OTHER MORE PRESSING DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN PRIORITIES. THE TAIWAN ISSUE SHOULD NOT DETER EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN US-CHINA COOPERATION ON COUNTER-TERRORISM AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 AND TO SEEK IMPROVEMENTS IN OTHER AREAS OF US-CHINA RELATIONS.

The Security of U.S. Interests in the Philippines

问21）美军正在向菲律宾军队提供训练。菲律宾共产党团体和伊斯兰极端分子在菲律宾的美国人员和利益在多大程度上？马卡帕加尔·阿罗约总统在多大程度上通过与美国的紧密联系并获得美国军方的反恐支持，从而在政治上脆弱？

A:
• U.S. FORCES HAVE LONG BEEN CONSIDERED TARGETS BY MILITANT COMMUNIST GROUPS SUCH AS THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY (NPA) AND THE ALEX BONCAYO BRIGADE (ABB), A BREAKAWAY FACTION RESPONSIBLE FOR MURDERING COL. JAMES ROWE IN 1989. LOCAL NPA ELEMENTS MAY HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR KILLING AN AMERICAN TOURIST ON MT. PINATUBO LAST WEEK, ALTHOUGH THE COMMUNIST SPOKESMAN DENIED NPA INVOLVEMENT.

• 在穆斯林占主导地位的棉兰老岛地区，阿布沙耶夫集团（ASG）叛军将两名美国公民人质持有并斩首去年的第三名，可能针对美军，以分散他们隐藏的地区的注意力。他们可能会认为，杀害美国军事或平民人员会说服华盛顿将其反恐教练赶出菲律宾。莫罗民族解放阵线的一个脱离派别也可能会尝试为最近的领导人逮捕而报仇。

• 民意调查显示，美国参与菲律宾南部的支持很高 - 一项民意调查显示，支持为84％。但是，人们对这项练习的范围和参数存在疑虑，这是基于民族主义对我们以前军事基地的敏感性的敏感性，而这种高水平的公共支持可能会消失。总统马卡帕加尔·阿罗约（Macapagal-Arroyo）的政治反对者可能会寻求对练习的宪法挑战，以削弱她，因为她希望在2004年连任。

哥伦比亚

问：23）哥伦比亚：哥伦比亚的经济疲软在多大程度上 - 出口下降，财政改革的进展，高失业率 - 对哥伦比亚的政府改革计划产生影响？帕斯特拉纳总统能够在明年与哥伦比亚革命武装部队（FARC）达成最终解决的可能性？

A:
• COLOMBIA'S MINIMAL PROGRESS 0N ITS REFORM PROGRAM HAS MANY CAUSES, INCLUDING ITS WEAK ECONOMY. OTHER FACTORS IMPEDING REFORM INCLUDE A DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION, ELECTION YEAR POLITICS, AND PRESIDENT PASTRANA'S LACK OF POLITICAL CAPITAL. THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT FOR FURTHER REFORM IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

• 帕斯特拉纳（Pastrana）总统几乎不可能在明年与哥伦比亚革命武装力量（FARC）达成最后的和解。帕斯特拉纳（Pastrana）劫持了一架飞机并绑架了一名参议员，这一行为终止了2月20日的哥伦比亚革命武装力量，这一行为导致了为期一个月的恐怖爆发浪潮。军方进入了非军事区，哥伦比亚革命武装力量逃离了。尽管双方都公开宣布他们愿意返回桌子，但这种情况极不可能发生。帕斯特拉纳（Pastrana）的任期将于八月结束，接替他的主要候选人都说他们更喜欢谈判解决方案。然而，最近的暴力行为的增加将排除一段时间内的任何重新开始谈判。

墨西哥

问：25）自就职典礼以来，墨西哥总统福克斯（Fox）在结束腐败，加强反对非法麻醉品的斗争，更多地关注人权并普遍将有效的治理带到他的国家方面取得了多大的成功？

A:

PRESIDENT FOX SEEMS INTENT ON REMOVING ANY OFFICIAL WHO EVEN HAS THE APPEARANCE OF BEING CORRUPT. HE HAS FIRED 43 HIGH-LEVEL CUSTOMS OFFICIALS AND FORCED THE RESIGNATION OF A SENIOR ATTORNEY GENERAL OFFICER FOR INVOLVEMENT IN QUESTIONABLE PRACTICES. MORE IMPORTANTLY, PRESIDENT FOX APPOINTED FRANCISCO BARRIO TERRAZAS AS THE ANTI-CORRUPTION CZAR WITH THE BROAD AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH ANTI-CORRUPTION PROGRAMS IN FEDERAL AGENCIES. THAT SAID, THE GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO DOUBTLESS REALIZES THAT PUTTING A PERMANENT DENT IN CORRUPTION WILL TAKE YEARS TO ACHIEVE.

PRESIDENT FOX HAS SHOWN A GENUINE DESIRE TO IMPROVE MEXICO'S DRUG CONTROL EFFORT. THE SUSTAINED OPIUM POPPY AND MARIJUANA CROP SUPPRESSION EFFORT AS WELL AS THE CAPTURE OF SEVERAL IMPORTANT DRUG BOSSES ARE EXAMPLES THAT HE IS KEEPING HIS ANTIDRUG PROMISE. WE ARE STILL AWAITING INDEPENDENT CONFIRMATION, BUT RAMON ARELLANO FELIX MAY HAVE BEEN KILLED IN A SHOOT-OUT WITH MEXICAN SECURITY FORCES.

• 福克斯政府在改善墨西哥的人权记录方面取得了重大进展。最近，福克斯（Fox）沦为时间，加拉多（Gallardo）将军呼吁为武装部队提供人权申诉专员。去年11月，福克斯从监狱释放了两名农民环保主义者，他任命了一名特别检察官，调查了1970年代8OS的“肮脏战争”期间被迫失踪的人。一月份，最高法院扩大了调查，其中包括1968年的学生大屠杀在墨西哥城特拉特洛尔科广场。福克斯政府还提交了“有关透明度和获得政府信息的联邦法律草案”，以供国会批准。

• 福克斯总统亲自致力于民主，法治和善政 - 在过去60年中，PAN党的所有基本面。福克斯的就职典礼标志着大约70年来，政党从PRI到PAN的首次变化。在任职的第一年之后，他面临的挑战的范围变得越来越清楚。也许最困难的是与国会的关系仍处于审议机构的起步阶段（在PRI下，这是一个橡皮图章组织）。立法者没有准备任职，没有专业员工，国会图书馆为他们研究问题，没有任何选区要求他们负责（因为没有连任），因此没有积累的立法专业知识。金博宝正规网址福克斯（Fox）的主要成功是将墨西哥的外交政策重新定位，而不是担心失去主权，成为在半球和联合国内科委中成为积极的球员。

美国退出《 ABM条约》的影响

Q. 26）2001年12月13日，布什总统通知俄罗斯，美国打算退出《 ABM条约》 - 撤回将于今年6月完成。俄罗斯将对美国从ABM条约撤军的军事反应7中国可能是军事反应？美国弹道导弹防御的部署可能导致其他国家升级弹道导弹和战术导弹防御系统的可能性，以及弹道和战术导弹的数量的相应增加，以压倒这些防御系统？

答：普京总统表示，在表示美国退出《 ABM条约》是一个错误时，美国的决定不会对俄罗斯的国家安全构成威胁。此外，俄罗斯已致力于就新的战略框架达成与美国达成协议，该框架将在运营部署的战略力量方面有重大削减。预计将继续进行美国撤回公告之前的俄罗斯战略力量的持续趋势 - 定量下降和定性改进（就渗透导弹防御能力而言）的趋势预计将继续。

中国还大步向美国撤军。在宣布这一消息之前的中国战略力量的逐步现代化和建立时，北京似乎并没有改变其“最低威慑”政策。中国似乎已经预料到了美国的决定，并将其军事反应集中在加强所需的对策上，以确保其弹道导弹可以渗透到美国的导弹防御措施。

朝鲜的Taepo Dong-2

Q. 27）去年12月在弹道导弹威胁上的NIE指出，“朝鲜的多阶段Taepo Dong-2，能够以核武器大小（几百公斤）有效载荷到达美国部分地区准备进行飞行测试。”北方的暂停暂停对Taepo Dong-2的发展的延续会产生什么影响？

答：如果朝鲜计划部署TD-2，我们认为平壤将至少一次进行一次导弹测试。该测试可能是在与1998年TD-1发射类似的太空发射车配置中进行的。朝鲜遵守其自宣告的飞行测试暂停措施将延迟部署，直到最早的某个时候，最早的某个时候。（朝鲜曾表示将在2003年保持暂停。）

问：在什么情况下，朝鲜可能会利用其对美国的导弹能力？

A: WE BELIEVE THAT PYONGYANG BEGAN ITS MISSILE AND WMD PROGRAMS IN THE 1970S TO COUNTER ROK PROGRAMS THEN UNDERWAY AND TO ESTABLISH A CAPABILITY FOR INTRA-WA DETERRENCE BY HOLDING U.S. BASES IN THE REGION AND ROK AND JAPANESE CITIES HOSTAGE. PYONGYANG MAY HAVE BELIEVED THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS MARRIED TO AN INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILE WOULD PROVIDE A USEFUL "STOPPER," LIMITING U.S. STRIKES SHOULD WAR BREAK OUT. WE DO NOT BELIEVE NORTH KOREA WOULD FIRE ITS MISSILES AGAINST U.S. FORCES IN ANY SITUATION SHORT OF WAR.

问：当前对朝鲜核武器库大小的估计是什么？

答：我们评估朝鲜已经为至少一种核武器或两个核武器生产了足够的p。

Q: How confident are we that North Korea is complying with the terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework regarding plutonium production activities in Yongbyon?

答：DPRK尚未在Yongbyon重新加载或操作其5 MWE反应堆，并且在较大的50和200 MWE反应堆上停止了结构。它没有在Yongbyon的燃料制造设施中生产燃料，并且已保留了后处理燃料，并允许国际原子能局（IAEA）密封那里的加工厂。IAEA检查员自1994年以来一直在Yongbyon核研究中心保持不断的业务，他们报告说，生产的冻结仍然有效。

Public Disclosure of the Aggregate Intelligence Budget

Q. 29) For a number of years, individuals have advocated the public disclosure of the aggregate intelligence budget. In your opinion, what would be the specific threat to U.S. national security from publicly disclosing the aggregate intelligence budget?

A:

敌对情报服务已经对美国情报社区预算，资源和能力的了解更多，而不是公众确认在媒体帐户中以不同准确性报告的总数所揭示的。

关于此事的决定是政策呼吁。