见证约翰·沃纳
前参议院司法委员会
2001年7月18日
我要感谢组委会的邀请作证。背景
I am a self-employed general contractor in Cary, N.C. After more than 27 years of service, I retired from the FBI in 1999. During my Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) career, I investigated criminal matters in Washington, D.C., served as a Foreign Counterintelligence supervisor, worked in the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) as a supervisor, and supervised the Raleigh Resident Agency until my retirement. Additionally, I had extensive experience in internal affairs investigations beginning about 1985. This included my being the supervisor responsible for the investigation of alleged wrongdoing against then FBI Director William Sessions and his executive assistant. In another case, Special Agent (SA) John Roberts and I were ordered back from our respective field offices to investigate cover-up allegations in the Ruby Ridge matter. I was also involved in numerous other internal investigations of FBI management.
管理问题，道德标准金博宝正规网址
我知道我们今天要地址FBI管理改革都在这里，讨论这些问题FBI问题和潜在的修复。不要忘记由超过26,000名员工FBI，谁每年成功调查数千起案件进行专门的辛勤工作是很重要的。有些事情在FBI，主要是管理相关的打破，但代理商如何进行他们的调查，基本都破不了。
佐员工击中所有气瓶，尽管受挫管理上的低效率，损坏或不存在的信息系统，并在关注被关押多名资深管理行为的更高标准。
Management problems begin with the FBI�s Senior Executive Service (SES) personnel. It would not be fair to suggest all members of the SES have been engaged in abuses of authority described herein, because the majority are sincere, dedicated law enforcement professionals who have made many sacrifices for the Bureau. My remarks are being addressed to that vocal minority of SES members, often referred to as the �Club� by street agents, who are motivated by self-preservation and self-interest at any cost. For the most part, these SES personnel are not motivated by the best interest of the FBI.
In his testimony before this committee, former Senator John Danforth suggested that an element of management misconduct, concerning the failure of disclosing wrongdoing, has its roots in the employees� desire to �not embarrass the Bureau.� While there may be an element of this involved, I would suggest that protecting their self-interest is primary, and the excuse of �not embarrassing the Bureau� is a convenience to justify their misconduct. Hiding behind a wall of arrogance, senior managers hold the belief that they always know what is best for the Bureau. These SES members are intolerant of any suggestion that their way is wrong. They use intimidation and retaliation against anyone who would be so impertinent as to challenge their interests.
SES人员打击报复谁已分配SES不当行为的调查代理人。特别探员罗伯特，谁是今天在这里，有他的职业生涯严重损害，因为对一些涉及SES人员高调情况下，他决心努力工作。这些报复性做法发送心寒消息，谁可能被指控类似的调查任何其他代理。
在有些情况下SES高管已经采取行动或避免采取行动，以保护自己的职业生涯，从发病危险。在Ruby岭的第一次调查，SES检查员试图通过进行草率和不完全调查，以防止行政纪律的某些同胞同行。At the same time, they were most willing to hang lower tier employees �out to dry.� Another way the SES members protect themselves is by handling SES personnel misconduct adjudications differently from other cases. Until recently, the SES Board conducted SES adjudications. The discipline for SES infractions was typically somewhat less harsh to much less harsh than that given to non-SES employees charged with the same type of offense. This double-standard has debilitated rank and file employees� morale and, as will be noted later, is one of the reasons quality agents are disinclined to enter the Career Development Program (CDP).
管理结构大修
有在FBI的管理结构许多公认的根本问题高级管理层忽视了认真的地址。该SES人员光刻胶改变一个系统，在所有野外作业的好处他们，并确保总部的过度控制。这些问题产生抑制作用，从参与CDP劝阻优质代理商。
有迹象表明，从希望参加职业发展的阻碍剂显著障碍。例如，为了促进署助理署长（AD）的水平，代理人必须做出的六大职业的动作，最需要的家庭搬迁一个铅丹，和至少三个旅行团必须在FBIHQ进行。这给总部的高级管理人员对这些上升代理束缚，要求绝对效忠SES人员。此外，这些频繁的转移不给局有充足的时间来判断其管理人员的管理能力。
另一个FBIHQ问题的关注SES人员承担这一历史已经填补剂FBIHQ位置禁止非代理的专业工作人员。代理是谁在该领域更好地利用昂贵的，稀少的调查资源。简单地说，有丰富FBIHQ职位，目前由代理人填写的，这可能在一个更加一致和长期的基础更加有效和经济地填补支持人员。
In 1998, Special Agent Carl Christiansen, then the Louisville Division Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC), was tasked with conducting a survey of the Executive Development Selection Program (EDSP) to determine what impacts an agent�s decision to participate in management. The following is a sampling of the survey results:- 还有比奖励参与CDP更为不利因素。有太多的转让，财政激励措施不足等;
- FBIHQ任务被看作是非常不利的，因为总部的工作被视为文书，缺乏监督的责任，并做一点准备未来任务的代理人;
- 表示不愿卷入了他们认为是虚伪的，缺乏职业道德的管理系统代理。
SA Christiansen and his committee identified some of the underlying reasons for agents� disinterest in the CDP. The FBI�s organizational structure, culture and approach to management are no longer suited to today�s world. They recommended that the Director needed to consider drastic changes to the structure and philosophy of management to allow the organization to adapt more readily to a quickly changing external environment. When SA Christiansen presented the survey recommendations to a group of 15 SES employees, the proposals were �scoffed� at. To date, only a few minor changes have been made to the CDP as a result of the survey.
Recently the outgoing President of the FBI Agents Association (FBIAA), SA John J. Sennett, stated in the �President�s Column� in the Spring 2001 FBIAA newsletter, �Along with better information automation, the FBI must re-tool. We must re-engineer our administrative and investigative practices. Keeping what is worth keeping, we also have to be aggressive in throwing away outdated and cumbersome administrative practices that drag down even the best and most energetic investigator.�
I fully agree with SA�s Christiansen and Sennett. A holistic overhaul of the entire system is needed. This should begin with a critical evaluation of the true needs of FBIHQ. For example, the multi-tiered, bloated headquarters structure is not necessary. The review might start with an eye toward expanding the management career track in the field to enable a street agent to rise to ASAC without a transfer to headquarters. New practices, along these lines, may begin to attract the FBI�s �best and brightest� into management. The �Blue Ribbon� commission proposed by Senate Bill 1074 intended to examine all aspects of FBI operations is a positive step toward revamping the current system.
我鼓励委员会研究一个独立的薪酬制度的利弊联邦执法。The Office of Personnel Management researched this matter in 1993 at the direction of Congress and was the subject of a report, entitled �Report to Congress - A Plan to Establish a New Pay and Job Evaluation system for Federal Law Enforcement Officers.� The management survey, mentioned previously, found pay compression at the top was a disincentive to CPD participation. In addition, the survey showed that agents believe that anyone who volunteers to be a manager will become one, because they do not see a valid performance appraisal system that measures management attributes. An overhaul of the pay system would address pay compression and performance appraisal issues that are a great concern to the FBI, FBIAA, and other federal law enforcement agencies.
FBI监督
Due to recent FBI management failures there has been a call for increased oversight over the FBI�s own internal watch dog functions. The oversight options are the following:
1. Continue to operate the FBI�s OPR Division in its present form with the addition of an oversight function by the Senate Judiciary Committee or a similar body;
2. Expand the oversight of the Office of Inspector General, Department of Justice (OIG/DOJ) to assume the functions of the FBI�s OPR; and
3.创建联邦调查局的OIG。
2001年6月20日，参议院法案1065引入呼吁建立一个监察长（IG）对FBI的。上周，司法部长约翰·阿什克罗夫特扩大了OIG / DOJ权威调查两个联邦调查局和缉毒署的所有内部事务。As a practical matter, because of the Attorney General�s action only the last two options remain viable.
In considering these two approaches, I favor the FBI IG concept with a very important caveat: the FBI IG�s investigative staff should be comprised of FBI personnel. Based on my extensive FBI internal affairs experience, I strongly believe that only FBI agents can most effectively investigate their own. In the FBI�s OPR history, the office has never failed to conduct aggressive, hard-hitting investigations of misconduct, regardless of the subject�s position. For example, other agents and I conducted a thorough investigation of former Director Sessions, which resulted in his removal from office. The FBI�s OPR has proven its independence, and I am confident the office would be loyal to the mission of the IG. Additionally, using FBI personnel, who are already in place, is a more cost effective approach. This is especially significant when compared to increasing the 42 million dollar budget of the OIG/DOJ office for additional investigators, training, and staff to handle the increased work load.
联邦调查局（FBI）IG方法还保留独立联邦调查局在OIG / DOJ概念增加的元素，而仍然由国会建立适当的监督。由OIG增加控制/ DOJ可能会削弱，在未来的独立性。I want to emphasize that it is absolutely necessary to protect the Bureau�s investigative independence so that its ability to investigate wrongdoing within the Federal Government is not impaired. An apolitical FBI is a must. Some of the worst sins committed by senior FBI management were those acts that created the impression that the FBI was politicized, such as the Filegate matter.
由OIG / DOJ扩大控制的问题是相当大的。If the FBI is no longer responsible for investigating internal wrongdoing, the FBI�s ability to maintain strong command over its operations and employees is weakened. The organization itself is undermined. The FBI, every law enforcement agency, should be forced to conduct its own internal affairs investigations in an honest and straightforward manner. Additionally, the OIG/DOJ personnel would always be considered outsiders who would never gain the FBI employees� confidence and cooperation, which are necessary for successful internal affairs investigations. Non-FBI investigators would be hampered in their investigative efforts by not knowing the culture, mores, relationships, and subtle nuances of the FBI environment.
I am hopeful Attorney General Ashcroft will reconsider giving OIG/DOJ the authority to handle the FBI�s internal affairs and support an FBI IG.
我会很乐意回答任何问题。