国会记录：2001年7月31日（参议院）第S8481-S8482报表ON提出的法案和联合决议案通过克辛先生：1285 S.一项法案，以提供总统灵活设置战略核运载系统的水平，以满足美国的国家安全目标;对军事委员会。科赞先生。主席先生，我今天介绍的立法，2001年的战略武器灵活性法案，这将恢复总统的权力，废除过时的法律，现在阻止他减少核武器数量来管理我们国家的核武库的规模。2001年的战略武器适应性法案将减少灾难性事故或恐怖事件的风险，减少整个世界的紧张局势，并节省大量纳税人的钱。我们有更多的核武器比以往任何时候都将需要赢得一场战争。基于START的计数规则，我们有7300枚战略核武器。Yet, as Secretary of State Colin Powell has said, we could eliminate more than half of these weapons and still, ``have the capability to deter any actor.'' Furthermore, the U.S. nuclear arsenal is equipped with sophisticated guidance and information systems that make our nuclear weapons much more accurate and effective than those of our adversaries. This is one reason why we should not be overly influenced by calls for maintaining strict numerical parity. While the huge number of nuclear arms in our arsenal is not necessary to fight a war, maintaining these weapons actually presents significant risks to national security. First, it increases the risk of a catastrophic accident. The more weapons that exist, the greater chance that a sensor failure or other mechanical problem, or an error in judgment, will lead to the detonation of a nuclear weapon. In fact, there have been many times when inaccurate sensor readings or other technical problems have forced national leaders to decide within minutes whether to launch nuclear weapons. In one incident, a Russian commander deviated from standard procedures by refusing to launch, even though an early detection system was reporting an incoming nuclear attack, a report that was inaccurate. The second reason why maintaining excessive numbers of nuclear weapons poses national security risks is that it encourages other nations to maintain large stockpiles, as well. The more weapons held by other countries, the greater the risk that a rogue faction in one such country could gain access to nuclear weapons and either threaten to use them, actually use them, or transfer them to others. Such a faction could obtain weapons through force. For example, there are many poorly guarded intercontinental ballistic missiles that are easy targets for terrorists. Senator Bob Kerrey, who introduced this legislation in the last Congress, speculated that a relatively small, well-trained group could overtake the few personnel who guard some of the smaller installations in Russia. Alternatively, a hostile group might be able simply to purchase ballistic missiles on the black market. This risk may be especially relevant in Russia, where many military personnel are poorly paid and a few may feel financial pressure to collaborate with those hostile to the United States. In addition, some have speculated that the high cost of maintaining a large nuclear stockpile could encourage some nuclear powers themselves to sell weapon technologies as a mean of financing their nuclear infrastructure. By reducing our own stockpile, we can encourage Russia to reduce its stockpile and discourage other nuclear states from expanding theirs. In particular, Russia is faced with the exorbitant annual cost of maintaining thousands of unnecessary ICBMs. The present state of Russia's economy leaves it ill-equipped to handle these costs, a fact readily admitted by Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev. Russia has expressed an interest in reducing its stockpile dramatically, from about 6,000 weapons to fewer than 1,000. However, Russia is unlikely to make such reductions without a commensurate reduction by the United States. If the United States takes the first step, it would provide Russia with a face-saving way to do the same, without waiting for START II, which now appears unlikely to be ratified in the short term. Beyond the benefits to national security of reducing our nuclear stockpile, such a reduction also would save taxpayers significant amounts of money. According to the Center for Defense Information, in FY 01, the United States spent $26.7 billion on operations, maintenance, and development related the United States' nuclear program. Of that $26.7 billion, $12.4 billion, just under half, goes to build, maintain, and operate our arsenal of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. Although a precise cost estimate is not available, it seems clear that reducing the stockpile of nuclear weapons would provide major cost savings. While a reduction in the nuclear stockpile would improve national security and reduce costs, the 1998 defense authorization act now prevents the President from reducing such weapons until the Russian Duma approves the START II treaty. The Bush Administration has made it clear that it wants this law repealed, and would like the authority to unilaterally reduce the nuclear stockpile. In hearings before various Senate Committees, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, have expressed the Administration's desire to retire immediately 50 unnecessary MX peacekeeper missiles with some 500 warheads. The Administration is still conducting a more comprehensive review and may well propose additional reductions. However, as Secretary Wolfowitz has testified, ``we will need the support of the Congress to remove the current restrictions that prohibit us from getting rid of a nuclear system that we no longer need.'' Some might question whether it is appropriate to reduce the United States stockpile without a direct assurance that other nations would reduce theirs by the same amount. However, this is flawed Cold War thinking. As Secretary Powell has stated, we have far more weapons than necessary to devastate any opponent, real or imagined, many times over. Clearly, we can reduce our stockpile without in any way reducing our nuclear deterrent, or our national security. Having said this, reducing the stockpile is not enough. We also need to encourage and assist others in doing so. In particular, it is important that we help Russia by providing aid for dismantling weapons and by offering other economic assistance. We also need to continue to negotiate arms reductions and non-proliferation agreements with other countries, including, but not limited to Russia. Unilateral action can provide many benefits, but we need multilateral agreements to more fully reduce the nuclear threat, and prevent the spread of nuclear technology. Ultimately, the nuclear threat is a threat to all of humanity, and all nations need to be part of a coordinated effort to reduce that threat. In recent months, we have renewed a long-standing debate about whether to deploy a national missile defense. Proponents of such a system argue that it would reduce the threat posed by nuclear weapons by giving us the capacity to deflect incoming nuclear weapons. However, many have raised serious concerns about this approach, and the risk that it actually could reduce our national security by creating a new arms race and heightening international tensions. The bill I am introducing today offers a proven way to reduce the nuclear [[Page S8482]] threat that can be accomplished quickly and without the controversy associated with a national missile defense system. There are few issues more important than reducing the risks posed by nuclear weapons. For the past half century, the world has lived with these weapons, and it is easy to underestimate the huge threat they represent. Yet it is critical that we remain vigilant and do everything in our power to reduce that threat. The fate of the world, quite literally, is at stake. I urge my colleagues to support this simple but powerful measure. ____________________