S. HRG。106-671全国情报估计对美国的弹道导弹威胁=======================================================================在国际安全，扩散和联邦服务小组委员会之前听到the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ FEBRUARY 9, 2000 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs _______________________________________________________________________ For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 63-638 cc WASHINGTON : 2000 COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee, Chairman WILLIAM V. ROTH, Jr., Delaware JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut TED STEVENS, Alaska CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi MAX CLELAND, Georgia ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire Hannah S. Sistare, Staff Director and Counsel Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Minority Staff Director and Counsel Darla D. Cassell, Administrive Clerk ------ INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi, Chairman TED STEVENS, Alaska DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine CARL LEVIN, Michigan PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania MAX CLELAND, Georgia JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina Mitchel B. Kugler, Staff Director Richard J. Kessler, Minority Staff Director Julie A. Sander, Chief Clerk C O N T E N T S ------ Opening statements: Page Senator Cochran.............................................. 1 Senator Akaka................................................ 2 Senator Thompson............................................. 11 Senator Levin................................................ 14 WITNESSES Wednesday, February 9, 2000 Robert Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, National Intelligence Council................ 3 Dr. William Schneider, Jr., Ph.D., Adjunct Fellow, Hudson Institute...................................................... 31 Joseph Cirincione, Director, Non-Proliferation Project, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.............................. 32 Alphabetical List of Witnesses Cirincione, Joseph: Testimony.................................................... 32 Prepared statement with attachments.......................... 71 Schneider, Dr. William Jr.: Testimony.................................................... 31 Prepared statement with attachments.......................... 54 Walpole, Robert: Testimony.................................................... 3 Prepared statement........................................... 45 APPENDIX National Intelligence Council summary report entitled ``Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015,'' September 1999................... 91 Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, ``Executive Summary,'' Pursuant to Public Law 201, 104th Congress, July 15, 1998......................... 107 THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES ---------- WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 2000 U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, of the Committee on Governmental Affairs Washington, DC. The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m. in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. Present: Senators Cochran, Akaka, Thompson, and Levin. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN Senator Cochran. The Subcommittee will please come to order. Welcome to our hearing today on the National Intelligence Estimate of the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. Last year Congress passed and the President signed the National Missile Defense Act, which officially stated the policy of the United States to be the deployment, as soon as technologically possible, of a national missile defense system, effective against a limited ballistic missile attack. We are now aware that several nations, which may not be impressed with our overwhelming missile forces, are working hard to build long-range ballistic missiles. North Korea is one example. In August 1998, North Korea launched a three-stage Taepo Dong-1 ballistic missile. This missile demonstrated that despite the economic difficulties and isolation of North Korea, it has made impressive progress in developing a multi-stage ballistic missile capable of flying to intercontinental ranges. North Korea appears ready to test an even more capable Taepo Dong-2; Iran has tested a medium-range ballistic missile and has begun developing longer-range weapons. These developments reflect not just a determination by rogue states to acquire ballistic missiles, but the increasing availability of the technology required to develop these weapons. Recent assessments make clear that one factor enabling rogue states to acquire ballistic missiles is the continuing flow of missile technology from Russia, China, and North Korea. Of even greater concern is the fact that traditional importers of ballistic missile technology are now becoming suppliers. CIA Director Tenet testified just last week that, ``Iran's existence as a secondary supplier of this technology to other countries is the trend that worries me the most.'' More suppliers will create greater opportunities for proliferation in the future. In September of last year, the Intelligence Community released a new estimate projecting the likely course of the threat, the unclassified summary of which is the subject of today's hearing.\1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Summary report by the National Intelligence Council entitled ``Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015,'' September 1999, appears in the Appendix on page 91. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Robert Walpole, the Intelligence Community's National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, oversaw the formulation of the National Intelligence Estimate, and will be our first witness. Mr. Walpole will be followed by a panel of two non-governmental witnesses who will provide their views on the Estimate. Dr. William Schneider, Jr., who is an Adjunct Fellow at the Hudson Institute, previously served as Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, and was a member of the Rumsfeld Commission. And Joseph Cirincione, who is the Director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. I would like to emphasize that all discussion in our hearing today will be confined to the unclassified summary of the National Intelligence Estimate. Also, during my questions of the witnesses after they have completed their presentations, I may refer to the National Intelligence Estimate, or NIE, but in each case in which I do so, I am referring to the unclassified summary, even though I may not specifically say that, and the answers to the questions should include only information in the unclassified summary of the NIE, or National Intelligence Estimate. With that I am happy to yield to my distinguished colleague and friend from Hawaii, Senator Akaka. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for scheduling this hearing. We know that this is one of the most important issues facing American policymakers. Every Congress should begin with a hearing on this subject. I look forward to hearing the witnesses and so my opening statement, gentlemen, will be brief. We all fear the terror that may rain down with little warning from the skies--missiles launched by rogue nations carrying nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads. The job of our first witness, Mr. Walpole, from the NIC, and the job of all of us in Congress is to understand the threat and not to let policy be governed by imagined fears. I hope today's hearing will allow us to understand better the real terrors that we face. In August 1998, the North Koreans launched a three-stage missile that blew up shortly after launch. We were surprised by that development and the Clinton Administration has been seeking to halt North Korean missile exports and production ever since. Next month a senior North Korean official will be coming to Washington to discuss the missile moratorium. I would hope the Subcommittee might have the administration brief us on the results of those talks. We have begun testing elements of a National Missile Defense, NMD, to help safeguard us against some of the threats from rogue nations. We are starting to spend billions of dollars to guard America against attack by a few missiles. However, if other nations had lived up to their commitments under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and had not provided assistance to North Korea, Iran, and other countries' missile programs, we wouldn't have to spend this money now. Some of the states that have complained the loudest about NMD are also the ones who have provided the most assistance to Iran and North Korea. I also think that it is time that we give serious thought to alternatives to the MTCR. It is an arms control regime that is not working as it should. More and more states are also looking to develop space- launched vehicle programs, including countries like South Korea and India. Their legitimate desire to be in space will mean that more and more nations will have the technology to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles. I am not certain what the answer is, but I think that we need to look seriously at finding peaceful outlets for nations who want to be involved in space exploration and exploitation. I would encourage my colleague, the Chairman of this Subcommittee, to hold a hearing on this subject. I think the private sector and the arms control community would both be interested in participating. So let me thank you, Mr. Chairman, again, for scheduling this hearing and I look forward to the testimony of Mr. Walpole, Mr. Cirincione, and Dr. Schneider. Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Senator. Mr. Walpole, you may proceed. TESTIMONY OF ROBERT WALPOLE,\1\ NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR STRATEGIC AND NUCLEAR PROGRAMS, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL Mr. Walpole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittee. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Walpole appears in the Appendix on page 45. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the Intelligence Community's recent National Intelligence Estimate on the ballistic missile threat, as well as to discuss the methodologies that we use to devise that Estimate. You have copies of the unclassified NIE, and following my comments, I will try to answer questions that you pose without giving any further assistance to foreign countries that love to hide stuff from us. They don't need any help and sometimes our answers can end up helping them. If there are questions that you need answers to that we can't do unclassified, we could provide an answer classified for the record. I support writing unclassified papers for the public from the Intelligence Community--I have written several myself. They provide an important insight into the Intelligence Community and its work. The American public is one of our primary customers, but generally only their Congressional representatives get to see what it is that we do, so I appreciate these opportunities. We need the general populace to understand how important intelligence work is for our security and safety. That necessity did not end with the Cold War, in fact, in some ways it is more important today. Intelligence is essential for dealing with hostile intentions of some nations, for combating terrorism, weapons proliferations that you have discussed, and narcotics trafficking. Significant intelligence work goes on every day to make our lives safer and more secure. I would like to summarize my statement and if I could I would like to submit both the unclassified paper and my written statement for the record.\1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Summary report by the National Intelligence Council entitled ``Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015,'' September 1999, appears in the Appendix on page 91. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Senator Cochran. Without objection, they will both be made a part of the record. Mr. Walpole. OK, thank you. Congress has requested that the Intelligence Community do annual reports on this ballistic missile threat. The first was in March 1998; we did an update on October 1998, because of the Taepo Dong launch that you mentioned, and then we did the September 1999 Estimate. In that case we worked with the Director of Central Intelligence to do an unclassified version of the document, and that is what we are meeting on today. There are three major differences with how we approached this past year's report and previous reports, and I would like to walk through those a little bit. First, we projected to the year 2015; previous reports have only gone to 2110. In essence what we have done is added 5 years of very important development time frame for these countries. The second one--and this is probably the most important point--we examined when a country could acquire an ICBM as well as when they were likely to do so; the ``likely'' is our judgment, when they are likely to do so. Earlier intelligence reports focused only on what countries would most likely do. The Rumsfeld report focused only on what a country could do. We felt that an honest thorough analysis was going to need both, and I highlight that as probably the most important one. The day after this Estimate was released, the unclassified version, I read in the newspaper, a quote from an individual from the Carnegie Endowment that said that all we had done was looked at what the countries could do and didn't tell policymakers what the countries were likely to do. I called the individual and said, ``We have even got it in italics.'' And he admitted that he hadn't read it yet. That is kind of irresponsible. This issue is too important to be dealt with lightly like that. That is why we went into this saying, ``You know, in order to help everybody out--policymakers, people on the Hill--we have got to lay out both what the countries could do--technologically, economically--and contrast that with what we judge that they are likely to do.'' You will see some of those differences as I walk through this. The third difference is because a country could threaten to use ballistic missiles against the United States after only one successful test, we are now using the first successful flight test as an indicator of initial threat availability. Former estimates talked about when the system would be deployed. Countries don't have to deploy these systems in the way that we were used to during the Cold War--that is a Cold War thinking idea. We have got to think in terms of, ``What can the countries do?'' They can erect a missile from a test-launch stand and use it to strike us. Now it is vulnerable to being eliminated through other means, that is absolutely true, but the threat is still there, and that is what we are talking about, is the threat. They don't need to deploy these systems in large numbers, they don't need to have robust test programs, they can deploy after only one successful test and we have seen that happen. And so that makes it different than the 1995 Estimate, a lot different. Now, I should note that our projections are based largely on limited information and engineering judgment. Adding to that uncertainty is that many countries hide their programs with secrecy and they use deception. A primary example of deception in this area is that a country could fly a missile and call it a space-launch vehicle. And really the only difference between a missile and a space-launch vehicle is the warhead on the end. Yes, you have to reprogram the guidance system but that is not hard for somebody who knows what they are doing in the missile program. We also incorporated recommendations of former members of the Rumsfeld Commission. And we didn't always agree with them and Bill Schneider could probably tell you some of the areas where we had disagreements, but we felt, here is a bi-partisan group that had all the intelligence available that we had. First, we had them read through various drafts and tell us if they think we are not addressing some of the questions we ought to. Second, we had politico-economic experts get involved and help us assess what could cause a country like Russia to sell an ICBM since we judged that they are unlikely to do so right now. And third, we had missile contractors come in and help us design configurations that these countries could do quickly that would be able to deliver weapons to the United States. So that instead of being hostage to some of our old thinking about how the Russians did it or how we've done it, we got some engineers together and said, ``How could you put this together?'' Worldwide missile proliferation has continued to evolve over the last 18 months. The missile capabilities themselves are advancing, as evidenced by North Korea's Taepo Dong-1 launch. The number of missiles has increased; medium-and short- range ballistic missile systems already pose a significant threat to U.S. forces, interests, and allies overseas. We have seen increased trade and cooperation among countries that have been recipients of missile technologies in the past. Finally, some countries continue to work toward longer-range systems, including ICBMs. The missile threats that we will see develop over the next 15 years will depend heavily on changing relations with these foreign countries; political and economic situations, and other factors that we cannot predict with confidence, but that we have to project anyway. So we decided that we would project what the countries could do, what the countries were likely to do, independent of significant changes. Now if significant changes occur, then our judgments are going to alter. That is the value of doing an annual report. But just to give you an idea of how difficult projecting 15 years out is--15 years ago we and the Soviet Union were posturing forces opposite each other in Europe during the Cold War. You wouldn't have projected 15 years ago where we are today. Fifteen years ago, Iraq shared common interests with the United States. You wouldn't have projected that we would have gone to war and then gone back and bombed them again. You wouldn't have been accurate with those projections. Finally, we couldn't tell you whether some of the countries of major concern will continue to exist 15 years from now, or whether they will continue to sell missiles and technologies 15 years from now. That said, we are confronted with missile development programs that take a long time and we have to give you our assessments, but we are doing that. Now recognizing those uncertainties, we project that during the next 15 years the United States most likely will face ICBM threats from Russia, China, and North Korea, probably Iran, and possibly from Iraq. Now, pause here for a moment because one of the things that is of interest to people is that we contrast this with what we did in 1995. This is the whole United States; we are not just talking about the continental United States and leaving Hawaii and Alaska out. At the same time, least anyone think that I am trying to take advantage of how close the Aleutian Islands get to Russia, that I am wanting to use short-range missiles to strike the United States, we are not doing that. To avoid that problem, and I will break one of your rules for a moment here, in the classified version of the NIE, we provide range-payload curves. Now obviously those curves were going to be classified so I couldn't put those in the unclassified version. What is important about that is that anybody can look at that curve and say, ``Oh, well, this means they could develop this pay-load or send this payload to this range.'' Now to help the readers of those curves, we list cities on the curves, so that you can see where these things could reach. So that people can see that I am not just talking about Aleutian Islands, here are some of the cities that are listed on those charts, these are unclassified: Bangor, Maine; Atlanta, Georgia; Miami, San Francisco, Seattle, Honolulu, and Anchorage. So we have covered all of the United States. Now the Russian threat, while it is going to decrease substantially, will still be the most robust and lethal. China's is going to grow, and the other countries that emerge are going to have small forces, constrain to small payloads, be less accurate, and less reliable. So the new missile threats are going to be far different from what we faced during the Cold War. Even so they threaten, but in different plans. North Korea's three-stage Taepo Dong-1 heightened sensitivities and moved earlier projections of the threat from the hypothetical to the real. If flown on a ballistic trajectory with an operable third stage, the Taepo Dong-1 could deliver a small payload to the United States, albeit with significant inaccuracy. Second, many countries probably assess that the threat alone of longer-range missiles complicate U.S. decisionmaking. Third, the probability that a missile with a weapon of mass destruction will be used against the United States forces or interests is higher today than during most of the Cold War, and that will continue to grow. More nations have used them, and in fact some have used them against U.S. forces, but not with weapons of mass destruction. But they have demonstrated a willingness to use those weapons of mass destruction. Now, we project that in the coming years, U.S. territories are probably more likely to be attacked by weapons of mass destruction from non-missile delivery means, most likely from terrorist or non- state entities than by missiles primarily because those means are less costly, more reliable and accurate and they can be used without attribution. Nevertheless, the missile threat will continue to grow, in part because missiles have become important regional weapons in numerous countries' arsenals, and missiles provide a level of prestige, coercive diplomacy, and deterrence that non-missile means do not. Thus, acquiring long-range ballistic missiles armed with these weapons probably will enable weaker countries to defer, constrain, and harm the United States. The missiles need not be deployed in large numbers, they need not be accurate or reliable. Their strategic value is derived primarily from the threat of their use, not in the near certain outcome of such use. Some of these systems are probably intended for potential terror weapons, others to perform specific military functions, facing the United States with a broad spectrum of motivations, development time lines, and resulting hostile capabilities. The progress toward achieving these longer-range missiles has been demonstrated dramatically over the past 18 months. The Taepo Dong-1 launch and the Taepo Dong-2 flight-test program has been frozen, but the program itself could still continue to pace. Pakistan and Iran flight-tested their 1,300 kilometer range-missiles. India flight-tested a 2,000 kilometer-range AGNI II, and China tested its 8,000 kilometer range DF-31 mobile ICBM. Now against this backdrop, let me walk through the projections we make in the NIE. And what I would like to do is array these by time blocks, blocks of 5 years. The Estimate itself walks through it country by country. I think sometimes it is helpful to look at it in a little different way. So where are we today? The proliferation of medium-range ballistic missiles, driven primarily by North Korean's No Dong sales has created an immediate, serious, and growing threat to U.S. forces, interests, and allies, and has significantly altered the strategic balances in the regions. As alarming as long-range missile threat is, it should not overshadow the immediacy, and seriousness of the threat of these shorter-range systems. Iran's Shahab-3, for example can reach most of Turkey. India and Pakistan have growing arsenals postured against each other. Alright, now to the long-range missile front. North Korea's Taepo Dong-1 could be converted into an ICBM that could deliver small payloads to the United States. Most believe that such a conversion is unlikely, especially with the much more capable Taepo Dong-2 that could be ready for testing at any time. The Taepo Dong-2 in the two-stage configuration could deliver a several-hundred kilogram payload to Alaska and Hawaii, and a lighter payload to the western United States. A three-stage Taepo Dong-2 would be capable to delivering a several-hundred kilogram payload anywhere in the United States. Russia currently has about a thousand strategic ballistic missiles with 4,500 warheads. We judge that an unauthorized or accidental launch of those missiles is highly unlikely, as long as current technical and procedural safeguards remain. China's force of about 20 CSS-4 ICBMs can reach targets in all of the United States, although Beijing almost certainly considers its silos to be vulnerable. China began testing, as I mentioned a moment ago, its first mobilized ICBM last year. Now let's look at the next 5 years, 2001-2005. North Korea, Iran, and Iraq could all test ICBMs of varying capabilities, some capable of delivering several-hundred kilogram payloads to the United States. Most believe that the Taepo Dong-1 program, short of flight testing, is continuing, and that North Korea is likely to test the system as a space-launch vehicle, unless it continues the freeze. Some believe that Iran is likely to test some ICBM capabilities in the next few years, most likely as a Taepo Dong-type space-launch vehicle. All believe that Iraq is not likely to test an ICBM capable of threatening the United States, during this time period. So, there is an example of the ``could'' and the ``likely.'' They could do it, but we judge that they are not likely to do it during that time period. Russia will maintain as many missiles and warheads as it can but economics are going to drive those numbers below START limitations. We believe that China will test a longer-range mobilized ICBM in the next several years, as well as the JL-2 submarine launch ballistic missile. Both of those will be able to target the United States. China could use that mobilized ICBM RV to make a multiple-RV payload for its CSS-4. They are also improving their theater systems, and while I am talking about long-range I can't just skip this. It is important to note that in the next several years, China is expected to increase significantly in the number of short-range ballistic missiles deployed opposite Taiwan. Let's turn to the next 5 years, 2005-2010. Again, all three could test ICBMs, this time all of their ICBMs will be capable of delivering several hundred kilogram payloads. North Korean capabilities to test and threaten would likely remain the same even with the freeze in place. Although non- flight-testing aspects of the program are likely to continue. Some believe Iran is likely to test an ICBM that could threaten the United States before 2010, others believe that there is no more than even chance of an Iranian test by 2010, and a few believe less than an even chance before 2010. So you can see some of the struggles we have in coming down to the likelihood judgment, there is a lot of difference of view. Many factors are involved in that. Nevertheless, all believe that Iran is likely to test a space-launch vehicle by 2010 that could be converted into an ICBM capable of delivering a several-hundred-kilogram payload to the United States. Some believe that if Iraq received foreign assistance that it would be likely to test an ICBM capable of delivering a several-hundred-kilogram payload to the United States. Russia's forces will continue to fall and China will continue to test its new systems. Finally the last 5 years. All three again could test more capable ICBMs. Most believe that Iran is likely to test a U.S.- threatening ICBM during this time period, one that could deliver a several-hundred-kilogram payload. A few believe that is unlikely. Most believe Iraq's first flight test of a U.S.- threatening ICBM is still unlikely before 2015; some believe it is likely before 2015, as I said with foreign assistance, before 2010. If Russia ratifies START II, its numbers will be considerably reduced. START II bans MIRVed ICBMs so their forces would be about half of what they could have without that ban. By 2015, China will likely have tens of missiles targeted against the United States, mostly land- and sea-based mobile missiles with smaller nuclear warheads, in part influenced by the U.S. technology gained through espionage. Foreign assistance continues to have demonstrable effects on advances around the world. Russia and China's assistance continues to be of significance. North Korea may expand sales, and as you noted, Mr. Chairman, we now have second-tier proliferators, those that used to be recipients, sharing with others. Sales of ICBMs or space-launch vehicles could further increase the number of countries or the number of missiles that countries could have. North Korea continues to demonstrate a willingness to sell. Projecting the likeliness of a Russian or Chinese sale is difficult, but we continue to judge it unlikely. That said, I note that in evaluating the risks involved, the likelihood of a sale has to be weighed against the consequences of even one such sale. Now I know Congress is interested in our ability to provide warning, which depends highly on our collection capabilities from country to country. Our warnings about North Korea in the past, observed as an important case study. Six years ago we warned that North Korea was trying to acquire an ICBM. In hindsight, we projected years too soon when North Korea would start testing these vehicles. We projected pretty accurately when they would get a system that could reach ICBM range, but we underestimated the capabilities of the Taepo Dong-1. Now, the point here is that we can project fairly easily what countries are considering doing and what they might be doing. What we can't project with certainty is what the configuration on the performance is going to be until flight tested. Recall that we weren't aware of the third stage on the Taepo Dong-1 until after the flight test. Furthermore, countries practice denial and deception as I mentioned before--masking things, for example, as a space-launch program. Nations with a space-launch vehicle could convert it into an ICBM relatively quickly with little or no chance of detection before the first flight test. They would have to have a RV. Now if a country had Russian or Chinese assistance, they could develop a RV covertly, not flight-tested, and have some confidence that it would work. If they developed an RV themselves, and we have been told that there is enough information in the open to pull this off, they could have a much less degree of confidence in it but we wouldn't be able to be confident that it would fail, and that is an important part of the problem. Now, several other means of delivering weapons of mass destruction to the United States have probably been devised, some more reliable than ICBMs that we have discussed. The goal of the adversary would be to move the weapon closer to the United States. These means however, as I noted before, don't provide the prestige, coercive diplomacy, or deterrence associated with long-range missiles. They could put the missiles on a ship and bring them closer to the United States and we would not be able to provide much warning of such an event. Non-missile delivery means are still of significant concern. They are less expensive than ICBMs; can be covertly deployed and employed; probably would be more reliable, accurate, and effective for disseminating biological agents, for example, and would avoid missile defenses. Foreign non- state actors, including some terrorists and extremist groups have used, possessed, or are interested in weapons of mass destruction. Most of these groups have threatened the United States or its interests. We cannot count on obtaining warning of all planned terrorist attacks. We assess that countries developing ballistic missiles would also develop various responses to U.S. theater and national defenses. Russia and China have developed numerous countermeasures and are probably willing to sell some technologies. Many countries such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq probably would rely initially on readily available technology--there is a list in the unclassified paper--to develop penetration aids and countermeasures and they could do so by the time they flight-test their ICBMs. Finally, we assess that foreign espionage and other collection efforts are likely to increase. I led an interagency team last year to examine China's collection and espionage efforts against U.S. nuclear information. We have since assessed that China, Iran, and others probably are targeting U.S. missile information as well. That concludes my opening statement and I am prepared to take questions. Senator Cochran. Thank you Mr. Walpole. I am going to ask one question and then yield to the Chairman of the Full Committee who has joined us, along with Senator Levin who has also joined us. We welcome you to our hearing. We will yield to Senator Thompson for questions first. But let me ask you this: The administration says that North Korea has agreed to refrain from flight testing its longer- range ballistic missiles during discussions that are taking place between our two countries. What effect is that going to have on the program that is under way to develop long-range missiles? Is this going to stop the program, or if not will it impede it in any way? Mr. Walpole. It is a good thing anytime that you can constrain a country's program, that is a good thing. But, as I have indicated in my statement, we don't believe that the program has ended. We believe that the non-flight testing aspects of the program are continuing. Senator Cochran. Senator Thompson. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THOMPSON Senator Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your leadership in this area. Along those lines, I noticed that it was reported today in the Washington Times that North Korea sold twelve medium-range ballistic missile engines to Iran. You may have discussed this before I got here but they could be used as boosters for long- range Iranian missiles. The same article reported that in the Pentagon's Estimate, North Korea was continuing with preparations for a test of its newest and longest range missile, the Taepo Dong-2. How do these reports impact your assessment? Mr. Walpole. Let me first say that I hate leaks like this. The sad part is, the more leaks like this that continue, the harder my job is going to be, and we are not going to be able to give our Estimates that have any meaning because we won't be able to collect anything. So, I think that the leak is abominable. Second, since it is a leak, I cannot talk about the intelligence aspects of it. What I can tell you about engines like that in general, is that those engines are critical. They are critical to the Taepo Dong program, and they would be critical to the Shahab-3 program and any extensions of the Shahab-3 program. Senator Thompson. We have a hard time even ourselves getting information on some of these things. I understand your concern about the leaks, however there is a growing concern that the American people and perhaps even Congress doesn't fully comprehend what is going on out there. We continue to read about underground facilities; nobody seems to know what is going on in North Korea and stories like this, and at the same time, the administration is waiving U.S. economic embargo provisions. Let me ask you this. This follows up the assessment of the Rumsfeld Commission. In a broad generalization, in what material ways do you agree or disagree with the findings of the Rumsfeld Commission? Mr. Walpole. Well, as I indicated in my opening statement, the Rumsfeld Commission laid out what the countries could do. So, our ``likely'' judgments, it would be hard to compare or contrast them with the Commission's report because they didn't have the ``likely'' judgments. On the ``could'' judgments, they said a country could do it in 5 years. We have countries doing it sooner than that, so in that sense we are in line or maybe even quicker than that, on the ``could'' side of the equation. Senator Thompson. Well, it seems like every major assessment seems to bring it closer. Your 1995 assessment, of course was much less concerned about the imminence of it, I would say than this. Rumsfeld came a good way and now you are going a little further in that respect. Mr. Walpole. Well, the 1995 Estimate only looked at ``likely.'' It didn't look at the ``coulds.'' The problem of comparing the 1995 Estimate to the Rumsfeld report is that it was an apples and oranges thing. The 1995---- Senator Thompson. You changed your standard of analysis somewhat? Mr. Walpole. Well, we added a standard. Senator Thompson. Some people, of course, have been critical of that and they talk about now, ``this could happen, and that could happen.'' I think absolutely we need the assessment like you have given us. Clearly it is an inexact science. Critics on the other hand say that the Estimate is overblown because these nations could become friendly, or they could want to have this nuclear option in their own area or---- Mr. Walpole. That would be great. Senator Thompson [continuing]. Perhaps it is not as imminent, or treaties could solve the problem, and all that. So everybody is dealing, to a certain extent, in kind of a nebulous area. Most of the critics, I think, are opposed to a missile defense system and this is necessary for them to get where they need to get. But, I think in light of the fact that the Rumsfeld Commission was a unique Commission--I haven't been up here that long but you had all these people come together, all different levels of relevant expertise from different vantage points, not part of any political group and so forth and all unanimously coming to the same conclusion. One of those conclusions is that we really have some real blind spots in terms of being able to tell what is going on and yet every assessment we get: 1995, Rumsfeld Commission, 2000 is a greater and greater concern, and of course you acknowledge from the things that we absolutely know such as the Taepo Dong- 2 shot across Japan that we were surprised. When objective factors come out it seems like it is always on the side of it being a little worse perhaps than what we thought. Mr. Walpole. Yes, we weren't surprised by the test---- Senator Thompson. Third stage. Mr. Walpole [continuing]. And I sure would have liked to have been the analyst that said earlier, before that launch, that they could put a third stage on that vehicle and extend its range. That would have been neat. That is why we changed our methodology. We said we have got to think outside the box. We have got to lay out some of these excursions, what could happen and then step back and evaluate the likelihood of those occurring. Senator Thompson. Well, you are going to be criticized because you are not absolutely promising things that are going to occur, but that to me---- Mr. Walpole. I can live with that. Senator Thompson [continuing]. That is fallacious criticism and I think you have done exactly the right thing. Let me ask you in the remaining time that I have about the sources of some of these problems and that has to do with foreign assistance. Our CIA, it seems, comes up every year and says that China is still the world's greatest proliferators and Russia apparently is not that far behind. You mentioned China and Russia with regard to Iran, North Korea, various items--missile components, technology knowhow, all of that. Could you give us a fairly concise summary for each of those two countries in terms of what--unclassified, of course--they are doing with regard to assistance to the so-called rogue nations? Mr. Walpole. And that is the problem, I can't give it unclassified. The best I can say is that---- Senator Thompson. Well, you said some things in your report. Mr. Walpole. Yes, and that was pushing it about as far as I could go. I said both the assistance from Russia and the assistance from China is significant in the proliferation realm. Senator Thompson. And that assistance continues? Mr. Walpole. Yes. Senator Thompson. And it has to do--let me see how far I can go. Does that have to do with both missile components and missile technology? Mr. Walpole. It is a mix. Senator Thompson. All right, I think that is as far as I will push it. Mr. Walpole. OK, thanks. Senator Thompson. Thank you very much. Senator Cochran. Thank you Senator Thompson. Senator Akaka, do you want to yield to your senior colleague? [Laughter.] Senator Akaka. I am here to stay. Senator Cochran. I wasn't suggesting that you do so. Senator Akaka. Thanks. First, I want to say that you paint a disturbing picture of more and more countries gaining advanced missile technology. Is it your sense that as other countries develop and improve their own ICBM capabilities, they will also develop and improve counter-measures to missile defense systems? Could you describe, when you do reply, some of the counter-measures which countries such as China, Russia, and Iran might take in response to our national theater missile defense program? Mr. Walpole. Yes, in the Estimate we laid out what a country could do on the counter-measure side, we didn't make a likelihood judgment. The reason we didn't there is that counter-measures are supposed to be just that, measures to counter something else. So until an NMD architecture is laid out, they don't need to commit to one type of counter-measure or another. So we laid out those counter-measures that they could draw from initially and I will cover that list here: Separating re-entry vehicles, spin stabilized RVs, RV reorientation, radar-absorbing material, booster fragmentation, low-powered jammers, chafe, simple or balloon decoys. These were all readily available--that they could have available--our missile contractors tell us--by the time they flight test their missiles. So they could draw from those. Now, how sophisticated any of those measures would be, would depend upon how much effort they put into it. One of the reasons we are reporting on it as early as we are is because you can then have counter-counter-measures and our military needs to be aware of all of those as well. So this ends up being an arms race within an arms race, that you have to deal with. Senator Akaka. Let me ask another question. If the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was to come into force, would this constrain the size and design of future Chinese nuclear weapons? Do you believe that CTBT ratification would limit weapons development? Mr. Walpole. When we did the damage assessments on the China espionage, we did an unclassified key finding for that. And I was trying to turn to that, I can't find it readily enough, but I will just try to remember from memory. We said in that, China's effort is progressing far enough along that they can do a lot for a number of years with their nuclear developments. The implication would be that they don't need to do a lot of testing. So, the impact would be further down the road than you might think, from your question there. It would constrain others but some of these other countries may not be interested in testing a nuclear device. They may be satisfied in just having one that will work based on the physics and not worrying about the test. But anytime you put countermeasures on the front of a missile, you are reducing the payload capability of that missile. You are going to exchange payload for countermeasure and vice versa. So that in the end, of course it is going to have an effect, but how much of an effect is going to depend on how dependent they would be on testing in the near-term and the long-term. Senator Akaka. Mr. Chairman, I have other questions but I will wait. Senator Cochran. Senator Levin. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN Senator Levin. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Mr. Walpole, let me add my welcome and my thanks for your report. It is, as always, enlightening. The part that is focused on often is the missile threat and it is important that we understand that threat, where it is coming from, who supplied the technology--it hasn't just come from China and Russia? Mr. Walpole. Oh, if you push back far enough, your statement will be true. Senator Levin. In addition to giving us your assessment on the missile threat from either terrorist groups or rogue nations, your report also talks about non-missile delivery of weapons of mass destruction. It seems to me that part of your report is really quite stunning and I want to spend a few minutes on that as well because I think the part about the missile delivery of weapons of mass destruction will get its proper attention but what may be overlooked, and shouldn't be overlooked, are the portions of your report that tell us about the non-missile delivery of weapons of mass destruction. I want to just read a portion, and ask you to comment on it. In your testimony you indicate on page 3, ``We project that in the coming years, U.S. territory is probably more likely to be attacked with weapons of mass destruction from non-missile delivery means, most likely from non-state entities, than by missiles.'' And then you give four reasons why that is true, and on page 15 of your report you go into some detail about those reasons: Non-missile means of delivery, which are the more likely way in which a weapon of mass destruction would be delivered, include--let me see if I can follow this-- ``trucks.'' Is that correct? Mr. Walpole. Yes. Senator Levin. ``Ships?'' Mr. Walpole. Yes. Senator Levin. ``Airplanes?'' Mr. Walpole. Yes. Senator Levin. Possibly, you indicate, cruise missiles. Mr. Walpole. Yes. Senator Levin. All right. Now, reason one that it is more likely that one of those non-missile means would be delivering the weapon is that the non-missile delivery option--you say on page 15--is ``less expensive than developing and producing ICBMs.'' Is that correct? Mr. Walpole. Yes. Senator Levin. Second, ``Can be covertly developed and employed.'' Is that correct? Mr. Walpole. Yes. Senator Levin. In other words, in your words, ``The source of the weapon could be masked in an attempt to evade retaliation.'' Third, you indicate, ``probably would be more reliable than ICBMs that have not completed rigorous testing and validation programs.'' Is that correct? Mr. Walpole. That is correct. Senator Levin. Fourth, you say ``Probably would be more accurate than emerging ICBMs over the next 15 years''--that is your qualifier--but the accuracy comment relates to over the next 15 years. Is that accurate? Mr. Walpole. That is correct. Senator Levin. Next, you say that the non-missile means of delivery is more probable because--and this is one that I want to ask you about--``Probably would be more effective for disseminating biological warfare agents than a ballistic missile.'' And that is a fifth reason why it is more likely that a truck, a ship, or a plane would be used for delivery than a ballistic missile, or at least one of those three would be the delivery means rather than a ballistic missile. And I would like to ask you, why would a non-missile probably be more effective for disseminating biological warfare agents than a ballistic missile? Mr. Walpole. If a highly advanced country like us, or Russia, were to develop a ballistic missile with a biological-- and of course that would violate treaties--but, a biological dispersion mechanism, we'd be able to pull it off and it would be very effective. That is because we do rigorous testing, long flight test programs; we test it every which way. What we have seen happening here is that these countries aren't testing a lot, and so our judgment for ``probably would be more effective'' is that if they are doing something on the ground, they can do the testing without doing flight-testing. They can put it in the back of a pickup, they can spread it, they can test the aerosolization and make sure that it is going to work. They would have high confidence that the biological agent either being sprayed or being put in a water supply is going to work that way, where they wouldn't be so sure the other way. That is what was really behind that. Senator Levin. So in your assessment, you give five reasons why a non-missile means of delivery would probably be more likely to be used than a missile-means of delivery. And then your sixth reason, it seems to me, is kind of the bottom line, is that all of those means of delivery would avoid missile defenses. In other words, a missile defense does not defend us against any of those non-missile-means of delivery. Is that correct? The truck, the ship, the plane? Mr. Walpole. That is correct. Certain types of cruise missiles would probably be captured in some of the instances. Senator Levin. But except for that, the more likely means of delivery would not be defended against by a missile defense? Mr. Walpole. Correct. Senator Levin. All right. Now, I don't think there has been enough attention paid to the entire mix. I think it is important that we see what all the threats are, the range of threats, including missiles, but that we also understand the most likely threats, what would defend against them and where our resources are being placed, as well as what the impact of those means of delivery are because that is also important. It is not just that a truck is more likely than a missile but what would be the impact if it were a missile, rather than a truck--that also has to be put into the calculus. But there hasn't been nearly enough attention paid to that portion of what you are telling us, it seems to me, as to the missile part of what your report focused on. Mr. Walpole. Well, that is why I stated, especially in the statement with, ``We think that we are more likely to have U.S. forces and interests struck with a missile with a weapon of mass destruction, than at most points during the Cold War.'' But, then at the same time I am saying that, to say but as far as U.S. territories in the coming years, there is other ways to get us that are probably more likely, at this point. Senator Levin. I want to go back to the Cold War, because at some point during the Cold War we still have a Cold War going on with North Korea, it still is a confrontation, it is not a---- Mr. Walpole. That is probably an accurate terminology for it. Senator Levin. North Korea had missiles, short-range or medium-range missiles, against which we had no defense for many years. Is that correct? In other words, we put in Patriot missiles a few years ago to defend against North Korean missiles, but until then there was no defense against those missiles. Mr. Walpole. That is correct. Senator Levin. Do you know what that length of time was, off hand? Mr. Walpole. I don't know the length. Senator Levin. But is it fair to say that there was a period of time before we got the Patriot missiles into South Korea that there was no missile defense against their medium or short range missiles? Mr. Walpole. I think that is accurate. Senator Levin. Now, during that period of time, North Korea did not use those missiles, although there was no defense against them. What was the assessment of the Intelligence Community during that period of time, as to the likelihood of the use of the missiles by North Korea, even though it faced no missile defense? Can you remember what your assessment was? Mr. Walpole. I can't. That would be interesting to go back and look at, and the same would be true of artillery. Senator Levin. Would you do that for us? Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Cochran. Mr. Walpole, I was asking you a few questions about North Korea and the fact that during these discussions they have refrained from flight-testing their ballistic missiles, and you indicated that this doesn't mean that they have stopped the development of the long-range missile program. What kind of activity, specifically, can you tell us could be conducted, or do you expect would be likely to be conducted, by North Korea during this period of time when they are not actually flight-testing their missiles? Mr. Walpole. Well, there are a lot of aspects of a missile program that are not flight testing: Any of the production, any of the ground testing, whether you are doing ground testing of engines, whether you are doing testing of propellent or fuel tanks, whether you are doing electronic checkout of various components, telemetry systems, I mean you can have all of that kind of activity and not have it be part of the flight-testing. Senator Cochran. All right, do you expect that it is going on at this time? Mr. Walpole. Our judgment is that they are continuing the program. Now, I was purposely using a generic list to talk about so I didn't talk specifically about anything we have or have not seen. Senator Cochran. How would you characterize the status of the Taepo Dong-2 program in North Korea? Mr. Walpole. That the program is still alive. Senator Cochran. One witness who testified before our Subcommittee was John Pike, who may be the Federation of American Scientists, or at least he is one of them, if he is not all of them. But he said when he was testifying before the Subcommittee, ``It is quite evident that the Taepo Dong launch facility was not intended to support, in many respects is incapable of supporting the extensive test program that would be needed to fully develop a reliable missile system.'' Do you agree with his conclusion? Mr. Walpole. Let me rephrase his conclusion and then I will--``That it certainly wouldn't support a robust United States or former Soviet flight test program.'' Then I would agree with it. But where I would disagree with him is, it supported a nearly-successful space launch. It supported a nearly successful test of a system that had flown on a ballistic missile trajectory that could deliver a payload to the United States. So, we have to get out of this mind set that everybody has to do it our way. Senator Cochran. Does North Korea need an extensive test program to develop its Taepo Dong-2 ballistic missile? Mr. Walpole. An extensive one, no. Senator Cochran. Is a long and extensive test program characteristic of previous North Korean practices? Mr. Walpole. No. Senator Cochran. Does North Korea need to flight-test its Taepo Dong-2 missile before deploying it? Mr. Walpole. That is an easy answer. The easy answer is no. Anybody can deploy whatever they want. The question is going to be, what kind of confidence would they have in a system they haven't flown? Senator Cochran. Well, should we conclude from this that North Korea's level of confidence in its ballistic missiles is different from the United States? Mr. Walpole. Oh, I would conclude that. Their confidence is different, but their need for confidence would probably be different as well. Senator Cochran. Why is that? Could you explain why and in what ways the required confidence levels differ between the United States and countries like North Korea? Mr. Walpole. Yes, our missiles were designed to be counter- force missiles. We were going after silos. If you didn't get the silo, the missile coming back at you was going to have multiple nuclear warheads on it, so you wanted to eliminate that silo and make sure that the missile couldn't be used. That required highly reliable, highly accurate systems. If you are doing a counter value, that is going after populations, it doesn't require that kind of reliability, that kind of accuracy. Obviously North Korea wouldn't want to have a dud and say, ``We're going to launch at you'' and then fire something in that duds. We'd love it to be a dud. But there is a big difference in what they are going after, what they would want to threaten and what we would want to threaten. Remembering, of course that if North Korea launched, they would probably view it as one of their last acts. Senator Cochran. That leads me to this next question which is that some are suggesting that the capacity to send a long- range missile to the United States is the reason why some rogue states may want to possess an effective ballistic missile system, but the NIE says in many ways that such weapons are not envisioned at the outset as operational weapons of war but primarily as strategic weapons of deterrence and coercive diplomacy. Is it your view that this is of significant utility, for rogue states to merely possess intercontinental ballistic missiles, even if they are not used? Mr. Walpole. The short answer is yes. I think that they view it as significant. If nothing else, as a bargaining chip. And I guess the case that I would make is to look at what North Korea has been able to accomplish just with having had a failed space-launch attempt, and an untested Taepo Dong-2. I think it falls into the category of coercive diplomacy. So, yes, I think they see this as valuable. Senator Cochran. The term ``emergency operational capability'' has been used before in briefings of our Subcommittee and also in the semi-annual report to Congress on proliferation. What is meant by the phrase, ``emergency operational capability,'' and how does it differ from the term ``deployment'' as it is used in connection with ballistic missile systems? Mr. Walpole. I didn't like the term, ``emergency operational capability'' and that is why we used, in our report, ``initial threat availability.'' ``Emergency'' conjures in my mind fire trucks and rescue squad and stuff. It is just my bias, but what ``emergency operational capability'' means is that before deployment, before having a robust test program where something is fully integrated into the doctrine and military of a country, they could launch that for military purposes and have some operational value. I don't know how ``emergency'' fits into that unless it is because someone else is attacking you. That is why we thought it was better characterized by, ``initial threat availability.'' They can threaten to use this as soon as the thing can fly. Now how that differs from deployment--and I kind of defined that a moment ago--fully integrated into the doctrine and the military forces of the country in question. That is what we mean by deployment. Senator Cochran. How many rogue states do you think will be likely to have that kind of capability by the year 2005? Mr. Walpole. The initial threat availability? Senator Cochran. Right. It used to be the ``emergency operational capability'' but now you call it the ``initial threat availability.'' Mr. Walpole. Well, you said likely. We are talking ``likely.'' Senator Cochran. Yes, I said likely. Mr. Walpole. On the ``likely'' side, what the Intelligence Community obviously has said by 2005, is North Korea. China and Russia, of course, but not North Korea. Most agencies are saying unlikely for Iran and unlikely for Iraq. As you remember, there was an earlier part of my statement about ``Some believe that Iran could try to test a Taepo Dong-1 copy in the next few years.'' I am one of those some. And so, to answer your question, I think Iran would fall into that category. Senator Cochran. Senator Thompson, do you have any other questions? Senator Thompson. Just a few, Mr. Chairman. On the issue of what is the major threat, the most imminent threat, clearly we should be preparing for the full range of threats that this new world is bringing us, but I know last year the President requested, and I think got, $10 b
     [10关于大规模毁灭性武器的恐怖主义威胁。所以关于那些卡车炸弹，它并不像我们没有做任何事情。所以我建议我们与我们在其他威胁方面做出的比较，无论是较小的威胁，还是更大的威胁。我猜，我觉得，在某些方面更容易，在实现国内恐怖主义的行为中更容易。另一方面，对导弹有一些因素，我会说，但是对于流氓国家的改变而言，与恐怖主义相反，人们已经触动了一个，这与声望有关。为什么朝鲜 - 一个国家，他的人在真正挨饿的国家 - 将他们进入他们的导弹计划的资源，如果不是你一直在谈论，声望和顽强能力，那么导弹会带来的因素？这是一个正确的评估吗？沃尔波先生。这是一个很好的评估。Senator Thompson. Also, what about the regional threat that missiles will bring? What about our troop vulnerability, and our allies? I mean, that has nothing to do with domestic terrorism as far as we are concerned but it certainly would bring us into the mix, big time. Just as much as if we were attacked ourselves. Mr. Walpole. That is here and now. Senator Thompson. That is here and now? What do you mean by that? Mr. Walpole. I mean the medium-range, short-range ballistic missile threat to our troops and our interests and allies overseas is already there. That is not waiting for flight- testing or anything else. The Shahab-3 can already reach three-fourths of the way into Turkey. That is NATO. Senator Thompson. Well, I was going to ask you about Europe in general. Could you elaborate on that a bit, in terms of vulnerability of our allies, with regard to this? Mr. Walpole. Well, it is basically Turkey at this point, because you would have to get a few-thousand kilometer missile from Iran, to be able to capture, as I recall looking at the range the other day, it had to be about 2,500 for Iran to reach Italy and almost 4,000 to reach France. So you would have to get some longer range systems to get out there. They are coming. Those systems are coming down the road. Senator Thompson. Are we sharing our assessments with our NATO allies? Mr. Walpole. Absolutely. I have personally been to the UK to brief, to France to brief. I have been to Geneva and briefed the Russians on where we saw this. My deputy has been to Denmark and in fact, he is meeting with the Danes today to go over it again. I mean, we have spent time with the allies. There are so many versions of this NIE out at this point. We have a secret releaseable NATO version and a secret releaseable allies version. It has got obviously more information than the unclassified version to get out to people. We are trying to get this message out. Senator Thompson. I don't want to discourage you but some of us just came back from the conference over in Munich and the Russian representative said that our concern with nuclear proliferation was fantasy. Mr. Walpole. He said that to me too. Senator Thompson. He has got more work to do. Mr. Walpole. They said that to me and that is when I coined the phrase that, I am sorry, it was a General that said that, I said, sorry General, but the Taepo Dong-1 launch moved us from hypothetical or fantasy to real. It flew. We know what it can deliver. It is no longer just a hypothetical issue. Senator Thompson. After we received a round of criticism, I responded that I thought it was ironic that the countries that were complaining so much about our proposed missile defense system were the main causes of our need for one, that is China and Russia's proliferation. The Chinese responded that that was unfounded. So that settled that matter. Mr. Walpole. They know better than---- Senator Thompson. You mentioned, too, that part of the Chinese development of their own capabilities will be based upon U.S. technology and some of that was acquired through espionage, is that correct? Mr. Walpole. Yes. Senator Thompson. How does your assessment comport with the Cox Report's conclusions along those lines? Mr. Walpole. In the general sense it comported all right. The Cox Report used a little different definition of espionage. We determined that, and I can't say one is right or wrong, but we determined that if the information was available through some other means, even though it was classified but had been available because of a leak or something else, we wouldn't throw that into the espionage pot. We only called espionage what we knew couldn't have been attained through any other means, because then we could have proved that espionage took place. The Cox Report said no, if it is classified we are going to count it as espionage. I can't prove which is right because you would have to get to the Chinese people that collected it to sort it out. Senator Thompson. Even by your definition you concluded that some of their advancement was based on espionage-- obtaining of our technology. Mr. Walpole. Yes, we concluded that they did conduct espionage, influenced their program; their systems would look more like ours even though they will be different because they have deficiencies in their own requirements. Senator Thompson. Thank you very much. Senator Cochran. Senator Akaka. Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to hear more about new missile states and the threat they are to us. I would ask you describe those threats. For instance, the Iranians as you testified, have been working on medium range missiles. Do the Iranians now have the ability to develop, on their own, engines for their medium-range missiles? Mr. Walpole. You know that is an interesting question because unlike Pakistan, who basically got the No Dong and called it the Ghauri, Iran got the No Dong and wanted to work with it with Russian assistance. They want to have more hands- on involvement. I don't know how to answer the question unclassified, other than that they have certainly gotten Russian assistance to help with making that conversion. That said, overnight they could change their mind and follow the Pakistan round, just buy them and be done with it. Senator Akaka. And what have you been alluding to if they don't have the ability now, do you have an estimate as to when they might be capable of developing one? Mr. Walpole. Well, I don't think there is any question that Iran has the capability of developing engines. Senator Akaka. Can they do it without---- Mr. Walpole. Yes, I am sorry, I should have answered that part. Iran certainly has the ability to develop engines. Whether they would be able to develop exactly the same as a No Dong engine or something else and then advance it from that would be what their program was set up to do. Senator Akaka. Do you think they can develop it without outside support? Mr. Walpole. Oh, they could. It would take them longer but they could. Senator Akaka. How would you describe the contributions made by Russia, China, and North Korea to the Iranian missile program? Mr. Walpole. That is what Senator Thompson tried. I have gone about as far as I can in an open session on that one. Sorry. If I start to tell you what we know, then they'll figure out how we figured it out and we won't pick it up next time. Senator Akaka. Well, if you can answer this, in your opinion who has provided the most help to Iran of those countries? Mr. Walpole. I don't know that I've ever thought about counting it up that way because they have both helped in different ways. Senator Akaka. Let me ask you about North Korea's missile program. The North Koreans tested a three-stage missile, Taepo Dong-1, as you testified, how large a warhead could it carry over the distance necessary to hit the United States? You mentioned a ``light warhead,'' and my question on that is what is a ``light warhead'' and how much damage could it cause? Mr. Walpole. I can't give the numbers unclassified, but when I am using terms like light and small, we are talking more in terms of a biological or a chemical-sized warhead. When I use the phrase several hundred kilograms that's when I think you can figure, oh well somebody could make a nuclear weapon at the several hundred-kilometer range, and that is how we separated it. So in answer to your question, the Taepo Dong-1 could deliver a small, that is biological or a chemical-sized warhead to parts of the United States. Senator Akaka. In your testimony you seemed to indicate that it is unlikely that the North Koreans would place a weapon on a three-stage missile and that they would more likely put it on the Taepo Dong-2. First, why do you draw that conclusion and, since the Taepo Dong-2 has not been tested, how can you be certain that it is a much more capable missile, as you say in your testimony? Mr. Walpole. Trust us. [Laughter.] No, we have sufficient intelligence on both missiles to know that one is a whole lot more capable than the other. I think you've seen line drawings in the open on the two and the Taepo Dong-2 is a lot larger missile, in fact, the Taepo Dong- 2's second stage is the first stage of the Taepo Dong-1--just to give you an idea of how much bigger it is. We feel--and I can't go into the intelligence behind it-- but we feel that they basically moved from the Taepo Dong-1 to the Taepo Dong-2 effort, and that is why our judgment is unlikely to weaponize the Taepo Dong-1 with the Taepo Dong-2 around the corner. Now, if you were to ask me the question, ``Well, what if they were to freeze flight-testing from now on, would they then be forced to use the Taepo Dong-1?'' Yes, but remember, it failed, so they have a tested, but not a successful version or an untested version, and they have no idea how successful it would be, or another missile. And which one are they going to put their confidence in, particularly since one would have range to reach further than the other. We can't get into their minds to sort that out. Senator Akaka. There might be a possibility, if tested it might fail. Mr. Walpole. Yes. Senator Akaka. Do you have an opinion as to which country, historically has been the greatest proliferator, I mean which country has provided the most assistance on missiles to the greatest number of other states? Mr. Walpole. A few years ago, that would have been easy; it would have been Russia. But North Korea has been doing so much anymore that it is a hard call. The problem is, do you calculate that based on the amount of hardware, would you calculate that on the amount of know- how, or would you calculate that based on the impact it has had on countries' programs? Now I would rather do it on the latter. But that is one I haven't calculated. I have a much better idea of these two, but they could be artificial answers. I think the impact on the program has got to be the critical answer and I don't know the answer to that one. Senator Akaka. Senator Levin asked the question but I want to ask it again. We have a situation in which a lot of states have developed short-range missiles for use in war time. There are a few states that are developing weapons of mass destruction. Pretty much those same states, if left unchecked, would probably develop long-range missiles that could hit the United States. If they do develop these weapons and missiles, they will probably do so, less for offensive military reasons and more for diplomatic prestige or deter attack. If these states wanted to attack the United States, they might more likely use something like a cruise missile from an offshore ship or submarine or a ship container in an ICBM to deliver their weapons. Would you agree with that statement or not? Mr. Walpole. Well, it is pretty close to what we had said in the Estimate. The struggle when you start getting down to ``use,'' we have been talking about missile threats, now if we start to come down to use, it depends a lot on the conditions. If the country were going to use it because they knew they were going down and it was just, ``We're going to get back at you before we go,'' then they don't have time to use one of these terrorist techniques, then they would launch a missile because they are going down anyway. If they were trying to damage the United States without being attributable, then a missile is not the way they are going to want to do it because we are going to figure out where it came from. They would want to use some other means to that end. So the whole ``use'' question comes down to, it is very scenario-dependent. And when it starts coming down to U.S. population at risk, those scenarios need to be looked at closely. Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your response. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Cochran. Senator Levin. Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In terms of the diplomatic pressure or the prestige or the intimidation factor, North Korea has had our troops at risk for decades, have they not, through their medium-range missile? Mr. Walpole. Artillery? Senator Levin. And artillery. Just talking missiles for a moment. Their medium-range---- Mr. Walpole. There are SCUDS, short-range missiles. Senator Levin. And short-range missiles. Medium and short- range missiles have had our troops at risk for decades. Mr. Walpole. Well, not medium for decades; short. Senator Levin. OK. Mr. Walpole. I honestly don't remember when the SCUD was first introduced. Senator Levin. OK. Mr. Walpole. But it has been many years. Senator Levin. It has been a long time that our troops have been at risk from North Korean missiles. Mr. Walpole. Yes. Senator Levin. Our means of defense against those missiles for a long period of time, was it not, was deterrence, the threat of retaliation against them if they would use it? Before we had deployed a Patriot, was that not the only defense we had against an incoming missile, deterrence and retaliation? Mr. Walpole. Well, we didn't have a defense but deterrence, you can argue would have been a play, yes. Senator Levin. All right. Did the presence of those missiles achieve any diplomatic gains for North Korea? In other words, our troops at risk just the way our population will someday be at risk against the North Korean weapon of mass destruction, be it a truck bomb or be it a long-range missile. Our population--well the troops are part of our population---- Mr. Walpole. They are part of our population but since our troops--and that is why I threw artillery into the equation-- since we have sent troops over there for decades knowing that they were at risk to artillery. When the SCUDS were added to the deck, and you would have to ask the military how they calculated this, but from my calculation, when the SCUDS were added, it was just an added threat, we knew we were putting our troops in harms way anytime they went to North Korea or South Korea or anywhere near the DMZ. That's a different equation than our population that didn't join the military and didn't get sent near the DMZ. Senator Levin. Not in my book. I don't have the slightest doubt that if North Korea attacked our troops with artillery or missiles, that our response would be massive, direct, immediate. I don't have the slightest doubt, and I hope North Korea doesn't have the slightest doubt, and I don't think there would be any difference. I think that would be considered an attack on us to the same extent as if they were---- Mr. Walpole. Oh, that's true but I thought you were asking in terms of coercive diplomacy against us. I think when you are holding a population in our homeland at risk, there is a different value relative to constraining U.S. options elsewhere than simply in an area where you are already still a part of the Cold War, that was the struggle I was having was how to equate coercive diplomacy in the two scenarios. Senator Levin. No. Do you believe that North Korea is likely to deploy or use a ballistic missile that has never been flight tested? Mr. Walpole. I know they can. Anybody can deploy---- Senator Levin. My question is likelihood. Are they likely to? Mr. Walpole. Deploy starts to seem really unlikely. Use, as I said, you can start walking down these scenarios, if you've got it available, you might try it. Senator Levin. What is the scenario in which the--you are talking about the suicide scenario? Mr. Walpole. The scenario where you are losing everything anyway. Senator Levin. All right. Mr. Walpole. Whether it has been flight tested or not, I mean you can sit there and watch and say, ``Gee, it's too bad we didn't flight test.'' Senator Levin. Are you talking about the suicide scenario? Mr. Walpole. Yes, and somebody says, ``Well flight test it, no.'' Senator Levin. All right. Mr. Walpole. Put some coordinates in. Senator Levin. All right. So you are talking about the suicide scenario. Mr. Walpole. Yes. Senator Levin. All right. I got you. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Levin. The unclassified summary of the NIE states that, ``Iran is the next most likely country after North Korea to pose a threat to the United States.'' The report lists several possible dates for when Iran could first flight-test an ICBM. What is your assessment as the National Intelligence Officer of when Iran will be capable of testing an ICBM? Mr. Walpole. Capable of testing, the Intelligence Community basically agrees in the next few years. Likely to test, as I said in an earlier answer, my view falls with the some that say also sometime in the next few years they'll test one that could reach the United States. Senator Cochran. Do you think Iran has made the decision to build an ICBM? Mr. Walpole. I do. Yes, but there is not agreement on that. Senator Cochran. Well, how will we know if Iran has made such a decision? Mr. Walpole. Sometimes you just won't know until you either see the item, or it is flown. Senator Cochran. What is your level of confidence that we will know when a decision has been made? Mr. Walpole. As I said earlier in my testimony, I think we do a pretty good job of projecting countries efforts and what they are striving for, but the specific performance and configuration we have some more difficulty. So, I'd say we are pretty good at laying our programs of concern. Senator Cochran. Given the transfer of technology between North Korea and Iran, should we expect North Korea to transfer an ICBM such as the three-stage Taepo Dong-1 missile to Iran? Mr. Walpole. I guess we could see that. I guess I wouldn't be surprised if I were to see that happen. I think if Iran were going to do a Taepo Dong-1 type system, that it would probably try to do it itself. Senator Cochran. What components does Iran need to build a three-stage Taepo Dong-1? Mr. Walpole. Well, a Taepo Dong-1 is basically the No Dong for the first stage, which they have got the Shahab-3. A SCUD for the second stage, and then they would need a third stage and they have got the technology to put one together. Senator Cochran. Could North Korea also transfer the more capable Taepo Dong-2 to Iran? Mr. Walpole. They could. Senator Cochran. Your report says, and I am going to quote, ``Some countries that have traditionally been recipients of foreign missile technology are now sharing more among themselves and are pursuing cooperative missile ventures.'' Do rogue states have technology that would be useful for them to proliferate to other nations? Mr. Walpole. Yes. Senator Cochran. What are the consequences of this trade, this proliferation? Mr. Walpole. It makes it harder to have the kind of impact you want export-control laws to have. Now you are using countries that didn't care about the export-control laws in the first place, and now you are trying to convince them, don't share with others. It was one thing to convince Russia and China to back off. It is totally different to tell North Korea and Iran to back off. Senator Cochran. Will this trade accelerate the ability of rogue states to develop or acquire ballistic missiles that threaten the United States? Mr. Walpole. I believe it will. Senator Cochran. What incentives are there for the rogue states to trade among themselves? Mr. Walpole. Well, I think there are the financial incentives; I think there is the prestige incentive; there is the cooperative adventure incentive, where one country works on one aspect of the weapons program and another works on another. Senator Cochran. Will the ballistic missile trade between rogue states make it more difficult for the Intelligence Community to monitor and gauge the extent of proliferation? Mr. Walpole. Yes, because it is just going to be many more targets to go after. Senator Cochran. Is it fair to say that missile proliferation to and among rogue states is not abating? Mr. Walpole. That is a pretty bold statement. Proliferation is continuing but we haven't seen the complete sale of a missile in a number of years. We had the M- 11 from China to Pakistan, we haven't seen that. We had CSS-2s from China to Saudi Arabia, we haven't seen that. So in that sense, we have seen things drop down some, but we are continuing to see trade. Senator Cochran. This is the first National Intelligence Estimate on the ballistic missile threat since 1995. Does this NIE place greater emphasis on the contribution of foreign assistance to a country's ballistic missile program than the 1995 NIE did? If so, why? Mr. Walpole. The 1995 NIE, I think, gave some credit to MTCR that then didn't come to fruition, it didn't stop things the way that perhaps the 1995 Estimate thought that it would. So, yes, foreign assistance is a big player. Senator Cochran. This assessment of the capabilities of rogue states greatly contrasts with the assessment presented by the Intelligence Community in the 1995 NIE. For example, the 1995 NIE stated that Iran would not be able to develop an ICBM before 2010 because it lacked the economic resources and technological infrastructure, yet the unclassified summary of the 1999 NIE states that Iran could flight-test a Taepo Dong style missile with ICBM ranges in the next few years. These two Estimates were written only 4 years apart. What has caused such a dramatic change in the Estimates of when these countries could develop long-range ballistic missiles? Mr. Walpole. The 1995 Estimate didn't talk about when the countries could develop these missiles. If you look at the 1995 Estimate and compare that to the 1999 Estimate, then you are not going to see as stark a difference, so the ``could'' standard changed that a little bit. Now on top of that, I think that the idea of a copy-cat Taepo Dong-1 ICBM had not been contemplated in the 1995 NIE. So there are two differences. Senator Cochran. A non-proliferation brief released by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace criticized the NIE for not taking into account the political factors that could change the nature of the threat. This brief suggests the threat from Iran, Iraq, and North Korea could disappear due to future changes in the political nature of these countries. In the NIE what assumptions did you make regarding U.S. relations with those states that are pursuing ballistic missiles? Mr. Walpole. First off, I take deference with the earlier comment. We did take into account political and economic factors. What we say in the unclassified paper is that we did it independent of significant political or economic change. That is, we projected what North Korea could do over 15 years, but if something changes, if there is a unification or whatever, that could change all of that. We didn't assume a major change like that in making our projection. And you could do the same thing with Iran, if Iran all of a sudden became a friend, and decided, ``Oh, gee we are not going to do this; we are only going to do a space launch program.'' Well, what we did was project what they could do technologically, economically, and given the current political situation in the country what is expected to extend. Senator Cochran. Do you think it is likely or realistic to expect that all of the ballistic missile threats to the United States will disappear before 2015? Mr. Walpole. Well, I wish, but I don't think it is likely. Senator Cochran. Without regard to specific countries, do you think the United States will face an ICBM threat from rogue states? Mr. Walpole. When? Senator Cochran. By before 2015. Mr. Walpole. Oh, before 2015? I don't like the term rogue states, but those are the states, yes. Senator Cochran. How could we better describe that? What would be more politically in fashion? Mr. Walpole. I tried to come up with emerging threats and so on, but I just decided to say North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. It takes me a little longer but I can live with it. Senator Cochran. Well, I was curious just for my own benefit. I feel bad calling them rogue states, it has serious outlaw kind of connotations, doesn't it? Mr. Walpole. It has a lot of connotations that just don't necessarily apply. Senator Cochran. Yes. Mr. Walpole. I just stopped using it. Senator Cochran. We will try to find another word. Maybe just naming the countries would be the best thing to do. The NIE states that nations like North Korea and Iran would develop countermeasures and penetration aids by the time they flight-test their long-range ballistic missiles. Are the countermeasure you listed as sophisticated as we would expect to see in a Russian ballistic missile? Mr. Walpole. No. Senator Cochran. If countermeasures were present, would they be rudimentary at first and then become more sophisticated over time or would these nations be able to deploy the more sophisticated countermeasures and penetration aids from the start? Mr. Walpole. Now, you are talking in terms of a different spectrum. Rudimentary has a lot of connotations too. They'll be able to deploy what is available out there in technology today, which I think is a little better than rudimentary and certainly not as sophisticated as what we, the Russians or the Chinese have. Senator Cochran. The NIE does not say that these nations will deploy these countermeasures and penetration aids on their ballistic missiles. Do you think they are likely to deploy these systems? Mr. Walpole. That was the discussion that we had earlier in terms of their countermeasures, so it is hard to put ``likely'' to all of that. Senator Cochran. In testimony last week, the Director of Central Intelligence said, ``Iran's emergence as a secondary supplier of this technology''--missile technology--``to other countries is the trend that worries me the most.'' I used that in my opening statement and quoted it. Why is that threat so worrisome in your opinion? Mr. Walpole. As I said a bit ago, now you are getting the ones that we don't have as much influence over. It was one thing with our western allies, then with Russia and China, now we are moving to a group that we even have less influence over to try to get them not to share or leak. Senator Cochran. In addition to Iran's ballistic missile force, I am concerned about Iran's development of nuclear weapons. Recent press reports claim that the CIA cannot rule out the possibility that Iran has the ability to build nuclear weapons. Does Iran have the ability to build nuclear weapons? Mr. Walpole. There is another example of a leak that I would just as soon have not had occur. Iran has had a nuclear weapons program for some time, and I guess, I will make one other comment. There is a lot of information available in the open on how to put together a nuclear device. Let's just leave my unclassified answer there. Senator Cochran. When was the last time you conducted an NIE on Iran's nuclear weapons program? Mr. Walpole. Several years ago. Senator Cochran. Are you working on a new or updated NIE based on this new information? Mr. Walpole. We are, actually we have been for a little while, but when we end up with leaks like have had occurred it makes it harder to pursue. Senator Cochran. Senator Thompson, do you have any other questions? Senator Thompson. No, no further questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. One observation, perhaps. In listening to you it reminds me of the policy decisions that the Congress is going to have to address, in addition to questions of missile defense. It seems to me that three things are going on: One, continuing accelerating threat. Two, continuing aid and comfort by Russia and China. And third, our continuing to embrace and assist Russia and China without imposing any cost to them whatsoever for what they are doing. We are spending hundreds of millions of dollars in Russia now to help protect the nuclear stockpile and their scientists and so forth. We don't want to shoot ourselves in the foot by cutting that off. On the other hand, do we know where that money is really going? Most people, especially those of us who are free traders, we have got to consider the WTO and normal trade relations with China now. We call them our strategic partners while they continue; and we continue to catch them, and they continue to deny or deny and promise that they won't do it again, sign a new piece of paper. That M-11 missile situation--the administration says we only can see the missile canisters in Pakistan. We are not sure that missiles are in the canisters and the hoops the administration has jumped through in order to keep from applying sanctions that our law requires. So, it is a very complex situation--our relationship with Russia and China right now. But how in the world can we justify continuing down the road that we are going with them as much as we want normal relations with them in every respect, while they continue to arm people who are direct threats to this country? Those are the things that we have got on our plate. Senator Cochran. Thank you. Senator Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Senator Cochran. Senator Levin, any other questions? Senator Levin. Just a couple more. On page 10 of your report you indicate that there is a difference among analysts as to the likely timing of Iran's first flight test. Mr. Walpole. Yes. Senator Levin. You have got some analysts who are saying it is likely before 2010 and very likely before 2015. You have another group saying, no more than an even chance by 2010 and a better than even chance by 2015. And a third group says less than an even chance by 2015. I think you fall in the first group, personally, do you? Mr. Walpole. I do. Senator Levin. Which is the dominant or the majority view among the analysts because those are three different assessments? Mr. Walpole. There isn't a dominant. At least the first two have most analysts in it, and to be fair, all three are defensible, justifiable positions. The first one, the one that I am, in looking at what Iran could do, and in fact with that--now we've been surprised by third stages, we've been surprised by people deploying things after only a few flight-tests--so, we will take what they could do and add a few years for problems and that is what we are going to put down. The second group said, wait a minute, this is still rocket science. Surprises or not, this is rocket science. It isn't all that easy so the problems are going to be more than you think they are going to be, so they added a little bit more. The third group said, on top of being rocket science and real hard, there are a lot of political factors that could just dissuade them from going down this path. Now given what I have said about projecting 15 years and being wrong, I can't tell you which one of those is right. I have chosen one because I think it is the most likely but they are all three defensible positions. Senator Levin. And when you talk about would do, could do, you are always talking here about development and deployment. You are not talking about likelihoods of use. In all cases you are not saying that---- Mr. Walpole. There is element in flight-tests. Senator Levin. In flight testing, in all cases you are not saying that there is a likelihood of use by any of these countries, is that correct? Mr. Walpole. No. Senator Levin. And finally would you give us a list of countries that have assisted in the technical support and provision of technical information or of things to the missile program of any of these three countries, I will call them rogue states, I don't mind, including any of our allies that have provided technology, technical assistance, or pieces or parts? Would you give us that for the record? It is not just China or Russia. We have got allies who have supported technology transfer of information which has assisted in the development of missile programs on the part of countries that we are worried about. So we ought to see a much more complete list than just China and Russia, although they have obviously been involved. So would you give us that list of countries? Mr. Walpole. You want that classified? Senator Levin. Either way. Mr. Walpole. Either way, OK. Senator Levin. Thanks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Levin. Mr. Walpole, thank you so much for being here today and presenting the unclassified summary for us to discuss. We appreciate your cooperation and assistance to our Subcommittee very much. Thank you. We now have a panel of two witnesses, Dr. William Schneider, Jr., of the Hudson Institute, and Joseph Cirincione, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, to discuss the assessment of the ballistic missile threat. We have copies of statements that have been furnished to the Subcommittee by both witnesses which we appreciate very much and we will print them in the record of our hearing in full, and encourage you to make whatever summary comments you think would be helpful to our understanding of your views on this assessment of the National Intelligence Estimate. Dr. Schneider, you may proceed. TESTIMONY OF DR. WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, JR.,\1\ Ph.D., ADJUNCT FELLOW, HUDSON INSTITUTE Dr. Schneider. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the privilege to appear before this Subcommittee. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Dr. Schneider with attachments appear in the Appendix on page 54. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- I will truncate my remarks and as you suggest, submit the copy of my remarks for the record. I would like to emphasize a couple of points. First, I think the NIE as published is an excellent document and adds materially to our understanding of the phenomenon of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Second, I think the most enduring contribution of this NIE has been the reflection the Intelligence Community has undertaken about the methodology by which they assess the evidence that they have acquired and the fact that the Intelligence Community has done such a thorough review, I think, will benefit many other areas of national security concern to the United States, and not merely the question of foreign missiles. Much of my information about this subject has been derived from my service on the Rumsfeld Commission, and the conclusions that were obtained during that deliberation and the findings associated with it, I believe, still obtain and I have included a copy of the Executive Summary of that report if the Subcommittee cares to publish it I will submit it.\2\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ The Executive Summary of the Rumsfeld Commission Report appears in the Appendix on page 107. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Finally, just a few brief observations on some of the points in the Commission's Report. First, on the question of motivation for the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Given the character of the effort that has been undertaken by North Korea and Iran in particular, while both countries are friendly to the use of terrorism and have done rather spectacular things through the use of terrorist techniques, I believe the scale of the effort that has been undertaken suggests that these are intended for coercive purposes for purposes of advancing their agenda as part of keeping the United States and other parties from intervening in the regions of concern. One other factor that I believe is stimulating the trend towards the development of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that may not stop with Iran and North Korea is the enormous gains that the United States is making in advanced conventional weapons. These gains have the point where the traditional conventional military power is rapidly moving toward obsolescence and this is pushing a lot of the poorer countries such as North Korea and Iran towards weapons of mass destruction. They have always used the ballistic missiles because SCUDS have been available for many years; they were developed by the Soviet Union based on German V-2 rocket technology, but the idea of moving to ranges where they can directly threaten the homeland of the nations that might intervene in regional disputes in which they have an interest tips the scales in favor of a sustained interest in pursuing long-range missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Finally, on the question of foreign assistance, it is a question that deserves a good deal of understanding and study simply because the problem has changed radically since the liberalization of access to advanced technology since the end of the Cold War. One of the most prominent sources of information on nuclear weapon design comes from the United States because of the vast amount of material that has been declassified in recent years. Some of it is available on the websites of various organizations and it does provide material assistance on the design, manufacture, support, and deployment of weapons of mass destruction. This new NIE is a valuable contribution to our understanding of the scope and maturity of the missile threat. In the past 2 days we have seen press reports or leaks that suggest that there is still a substantial amount of energy left in the proliferation problem. The situation now, is that the Executive Branch and the Congress need to move decisively to find a way of devaluing the investment that is now being made in weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, so that we can contain this curse and try and diminish the likelihood that these weapons will be used. Thank you. Senator Cochran. Thank you very much for your statement. Mr. Cirincione. TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH CIRINCIONE,\1\ DIRECTOR, NON-PROLIFERATION PROJECT, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE Mr. Cirincione. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I greatly appreciate the hard work that you, the other Members of the Subcommittee, and the staff have done in tracking and documenting the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the single greatest national security threat that we face today. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Cirincione with attachments appear in the Appendix on page 71. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- It is an honor to be here and testify before you. I appreciate the hard work that Mr. Walpole and others have put into this assessment and I strongly agree with many parts of his assessment, particularly his often overlooked remarks that are in here that Senator Levin referred to, that they project in the coming years that U.S. territories probably are more likely to be attacked by a weapon of mass destruction from a non-missile delivery system than from a missile, a very important finding, one that most experts share. He also emphasizes in the report that the Russian threat, though significantly reduced, will continue to be the most robust and lethal, considerably more than China's and orders of magnitude more than the potential posed by the other states that are mentioned in this report. Unfortunately, the report doesn't spend too much time on either the ballistic missile threat from Russia or China, and that is one of several methodological flaws that I think reduces the value of this assessment for policy makers. If I could just briefly summarize knowing that my testimony will be entered into the record, I will just briefly summarize my comments on the methodological shortcomings of this report. I believe the 1999 unclassified NIE portrays known missile programs in several developing countries as more immediate threats than previous assessments have in the past. While there have been several significant tests of medium-range ballistic missiles over the past 2 years, this new assessment is more the function of a lowered evaluative criteria than of major changes in long-range missile capabilities. The change from the previously established Intelligence Agency criteria should be more clearly established in this report, so policy makers can understand why this assessment is different from all other assessments. In particular, the three assessments that I am talking about is the one that Mr. Walpole alluded to, they changed the criteria from when a country was likely to deploy a system to when it could first test its system. This represents a time change of about 5 years. In addition they changed the targets set. All previous assessments looked at attacks on the 48 continental States. This now looks at all 50 States and all territories of those 50 States. That represents a geographical shift of about 5,000 kilometers, that is the difference from Seattle, for example, to the tip of the Aleutian Island chain. Finally, and most important, is the adoption of the ``could'' standard. This, I think, is the deepest methodological flaw in the report because it makes the report very mushy. It is very hard to find here what analysts really believe is likely to happen. So, when Senator Levin, for example, is asking, ``Is it likely that Iran will have an ICBM within the next 5 or 10 years? '', what you get is a range of opinions. There is no coherent Intelligence Community assessment. Everybody agrees that anything is possible, certainly in the next 10 years Iran could have an ICBM; many things could occur in the next 5 years, but what is most likely, what is most probable? Previous assessments have tried to have that predictive value, I think it is a shame that that predictive value has been obfuscated, obfuscated in this report. Finally, sir, let me suggest that there are several other things one might consider here. The assessments of these projected changes take place independent of significant political and economic changes. That results, I believe, in the overestimation of potential ballistic missile threats from Iraq, Iran, and North Korea and underestimates the dangers from existing arsenals. They assume that Russia and China will maintain status quo paths. If in fact, the international non- proliferation regime collapses, if the international security regime is fundamentally altered by poor relations between the United States and Russia, poor relations between the United States and China, we could be facing a much more dangerous threat from those existing arsenals than we are likely to encounter from the potential arsenals of these three small states. And by focusing on developments in a small number of missile programs in these developing states, the NIE neglects a dramatic decline in global ballistic missile totals. That is, it simply isn't true that globally the ballistic missile threat is increasing. When you look at the global ballistic missile situation, I have tried to detail this on page 10 of my report, there has been over the last 15 years, a significant decrease in many important criteria of the ballistic missile threat. For example, the numbers of ICBMs in the world have been cut almost in half in the past 15 years. The number of intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the world have been all but eliminated--a 99 percent decrease in the last 15 years. The short-range ballistic missile programs are largely consisting of short- range SCUDS, that is 1950's technology which is aging and declining in military utility. Even the number of nations with ballistic missile programs has decreased over the last 15 years. There are eight countries we were worried about primarily 8 years ago; there are only seven now. They are different countries and they are poorer, less technologically advanced than the countries we were worried about 15 years ago. And finally, most importantly, the level of damage that could occur to the United States as a result of ballistic missiles is vastly decreased from what it was 15 years ago when we were worried about global thermonuclear war. We were worried about an attack that would destroy the Nation. There are still significant threats, we should be worried about a possible ballistic missile attack on the United States over the next 15 years, but it would be one of terrible but still limited damage to what occurred over the past 15 years. So, I think if we look at the global context of this, we can see that the threat from ballistic missiles is serious, deserves our urgent consideration, but is much less dramatic than is sometimes portrayed by advocates of deploying a national ballistic missile system and I will end by urging the Congress to conduct a review, an outside review of this assessment to see whether in fact there are methodological flaws that I have identified and whether they could be corrected, and to consider an objective assessment of the technologies that exist for ballistic missile defense to filter out political agendas, contractor influences, and other considerations from this critical national security decision to see whether in fact the technology exists to provide an effective defense for the United States against ballistic missile attack. Thank you, sir. Senator Cochran. Thank you very much. We appreciate both of your attendance at today's hearing and your participation in and assistance to our understanding of your views on this, the Estimate, and an assessment of the National Intelligence Estimate. There seems to be still, a disconnect between what Mr. Walpole said was the goal of this 1999 Estimate as compared with the 1995 one and that is not only to suggest what is likely or expected to happen in the future years, but what could happen in the future years. And that he put in italics the fact that they were also going to include what their expectation was for the future, what would be likely to happen. And now we hear Mr. Cirincione repeating the same criticism saying that this Estimate includes only what is possible, what could happen in the future. So there seems to be the continued disconnect between what the NIE says it says, and what Mr. Cirincione says it says. Beyond that, I guess my question is, what are your views, each member of this panel, about the effect of vulnerability of the United States in the absence of a missile defense system? What is the effect of the vulnerability of the United States at this time on the likelihood that foreign nations like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq would develop long-range missile systems to threaten the United States? Would it be more likely that they would develop these systems if we had a national missile defense system or less likely? Dr. Schneider, would you go first? Dr. Schneider. My view of the vulnerability is a factor that stimulates the development of the various means of delivering weapons of mass destruction. The one area for which we have no defense at this stage is defenses against ballistic missile attack. We do have some defenses against cruise missile attack and we have a $10 billion counter terrorism budget, so in terms of where the effort gets allocated by those who seek to impose a threat to the United States for purposes of coercive diplomacy, they are likely to follow the path of least resistance, which is to date in ballistic missiles. I suspect if we deploy a national missile defense that they will try and shift efforts to some of the other areas where we already have undertaken some defensive effort such as cruise missiles or the terrorist delivery of WMD. Senator Cochran. Mr. Cirincione. Mr. Cirincione. Yes sir, I don't believe that this ``could'' issue, by the way is a disconnect; it is in the body of the assessment itself. It notes that some of the analysts involved in the assessment objected to the adoption of this standard. It is the standard that was introduced by the Rumsfeld Commission and one that I think is detrimental to good predictive analysis. Particularly on the question that you ask, however, I believe that countries will continue to pursue ballistic missile programs independent of whether the United States attempts to build a ballistic missile shield or not. Remember we had a ballistic missile shield for some time. It didn't seem to affect ballistic missile programs at that time. Senator Cochran. Senator Akaka. Senator Akaka. Mr. Cirincione, you mentioned in your testimony where you disagree with the Rumsfeld Commission report. Are there conclusions which you agree with? Mr. Cirincione. Well, there are lots of words in the Rumsfeld Commission report, I am sure I could find some that I agree with. But the basic thrust, you see, is that they concluded--and this is what made the headlines--that a country could field a ballistic missile that could strike the United States with little or no warning, that is tomorrow we could wake up and find that Argentina had a missile that could attack the United States. I just believe that isn't true. It is fundamentally untrue and has resulted in a certain hysteria about the ballistic missile threat. So fundamentally and at its core, I disagree with the Commission's assessment. Senator Akaka. How would you like to see the Intelligence Community address developing threats in the future? Is there a need for a new alternative such as Team B approach which would look at other factors affecting likely threats? Mr. Cirincione. Well, this current assessment is the result of exactly a Team B approach so I wouldn't recommend that approach. We have this 1999 assessment because Congress strongly disagreed with the 1995 National Intelligence Estimate, and so it convened a special panel, the Gates Panel, headed up by the former Director of the CIA, and that panel reviewed the 1995 assessment and in 1996, found out that it completely agreed with the assessment. Former Director Gates testified here in the Senate in December 1996, agreeing with the 1995 assessment, and thought the case was even stronger than had been presented publicly. Certain Members of Congress didn't like that finding so they convened another review. This was the Rumsfeld Commission which finally gave them the answer that many Members wanted, which is that the ballistic missile threat was more robust than had been found by the Intelligence Community. The National Intelligence Community has responded by basically adopting the Rumsfeld Commission standards and finally presenting to the Congress an assessment that they agree with. Senator Akaka. Dr. Schneider, before the House Armed Services Committee on October 13, 1999, one of your colleagues on the Rumsfeld Commission, Dr. William Graham, criticized the NIE for placing, ``Too much weight on the intentions without trying to evaluate how they might change.'' He said, ``It is particularly important to be cautious of Intelligence Community Estimates that on the one hand focus on capacities and then on the other state that they do not consider major changes in a government policy.'' Would you agree with this statement? Dr. Schneider. It is difficult when making a 15-year assessment to manage, as Mr. Walpole suggested, the vagaries of international politics and how that might affect it. So I am sympathetic with the point of view that suggests that somehow this, while a very important factor, is difficult to incorporate. That being said, I do think that the Intelligence Community has got the right balance in the way they have come to assess this. The issue of the methodology about how it is assessed was one of the more detailed efforts of the Rumsfeld Commission. Three of our members are particularly well identified with a position that is skeptical of ballistic missile defenses and have a powerful advocacy position with respect to arms control. Dr. Richard Garwin, for example, now Secretary Albright's advisor on Arms Control and Counter- Proliferation. General Lee Butler has advocated abandoning nuclear weapons entirely; Dr. Barry Bleckman is a well known arms control expert. All of these specialists look very carefully at the methodology about the most constructive way to get a grip on the threat. They shared the perspective that is reflected in the Rumsfeld Commission Report. I believe that the approach in the Rumsfeld Commission Report is a good way to do it. Senator Akaka. In your testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 20, 1999, you stated that, ``The use of surface ship launch missiles may be especially attractive to Iran in attacking the weapons of mass destruction.'' How useful would an NMD be against such an attack? Dr. Schneider. Well, it would depend on the range of the missile used from a shipboard attack. If they used a short- range missile with less than 2,000 nautical mile range, the National Missile Defense System is constrained from being effective at those ranges under the terms of the AVM treaty so it would not have any effect on those. You would have to depend on a theater type system such as THAAD or a Patriot PAC-3 as a way of engaging missiles that were delivered that had a shorter range than could not be engaged by the National Missile Defense System. Senator Akaka. The administration has talks underway with the North Koreans to restrain their missile exports and development. If the administration is successful, how do you think the progress should affect our National Missile Defense Program? Dr. Schneider. First, North Korea is not the only country that poses a potential threat to the United States so that if the negotiations are successful and relations improve with North Korea that it should be addressed as a bilateral matter rather than a question of worldwide policy. However, if the news story in the Washington Times today about the shipment of No Dong engines to Iran turns out to be correct, then I think the effectiveness of the efforts with North Korea are clearly in doubt. Senator Akaka. My last question, Mr. Chairman. What if we were to convince the Iranians to suspend their ICBM program, how should that affect our NMD program? Dr. Schneider. Again, the question of missile defense is most recently driven by developments in Iran and North Korea, however those are not the only countries that are getting this technology and those that do have it such as for example, Pakistan has expressed readiness to export their missiles to other countries so the missile threat is not resolved solely by improved bilateral relations with either Iran or North Korea. Our vulnerability to ballistic missiles needs to be addressed in the same way we deal with other security vulnerabilities though our defense establishment. Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Akaka. Senator Levin. Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me ask both of you whether you agree with the statement of Mr. Walpole and the finding of the National Intelligence Council relative to non-missile delivery means and the statement is this, ``We project that in the coming years U.S. territories are probably more likely to be attacked with weapons of mass destruction from non-missile delivery means (most likely from non-state entities) than by missiles, primarily because non-missile delivery means are less costly and more reliable and accurate. They can also be used without attribution.'' I am wondering Mr. Cirincione, do you agree with that? Mr. Cirincione. Yes, sir I do, I strongly agree with that. Senator Levin. Dr. Schneider, do you agree with that? Dr. Schneider. Yes, I do because there are three hundred crank calls a week on anthrax scares, so yes, if you score them that way. But I think if you disaggregated the number into state actors, that is if you are considering only states as players that would manipulate or actually engage in the use of weapons of mass destruction, then I think missile delivery is probably a more likely scenario in the short-term. This would be so unless the phenomenon I described earlier, where missile defenses were deployed, proliferators would try and follow the path of least resistance and use ballistic missiles. Senator Levin. So that in terms of states, you do not agree with that finding? Mr. Cirincione. Correct. Senator Levin. So, you both disagree with parts of this Intelligence Estimate. Dr. Schneider, would you agree that the Rumsfeld panel made no finding relative to the deployment of missile defenses? Dr. Schneider. No, it was not in our charter. Senator Levin. That has really been so misunderstood. I am looking at an editorial in a highly respected newspaper, the Washington Post, it says the following: A well respected Congressional advisory panel in 1998, urged the deployment. That is not accurate? Dr. Schneider. That is not correct. Senator Levin. And I think it is really important that those of you who were on the panel continue to do what was done when the panel report was presented, which is to indicate that on that issue whether or not deployment of a national missile defense system should occur, that the panel itself took no position--even though they found that the North Korean threat was closer than had previously been expected. Dr. Schneider. That is correct and I had proposed to the Chairman, that I include the Executive Summary of the Rumsfeld Commission Report in my testimony. I think this will make that clear.\1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The Executive Summary of the Rumsfeld Commission Report appears in the Appendix on page 107. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Senator Levin. I think it is very important that everybody on that panel, whatever side of the deployment issue that they are on, make it clear that the panel did not address the issue, and reached no conclusion on the issue relative to deployment of missile defenses. There is some misunderstanding about what the panel found and what they didn't find and that misunderstanding can have an effect on the debate. So, thank you for that clarification. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Senator Levin. Let me ask both of you this question. The NIE says acquiring long-range ballistic missiles armed with WMD will enable weaker countries to do three things that they otherwise might not be able to do: Deter, constrain, and harm the United States. Do you think there is utility for rogue states to merely possess ICBMs, even if they are not used, Mr. Cirincione? Mr. Cirincione. Actually, sir, I disagree specifically with that statement. I think this confuses weapons of mass destruction with delivery vehicles. That is a nation, and I do believe that it is more likely that a nation state that wanted to threaten the United States with a weapon of mass destruction would do so, not with a missile but by finding another delivery means. So a nation that had secreted a nuclear weapon in Washington or Fairbanks and said that it was there and would detonate it unless so-and-so, would be just as able to deter, constrain, and harm the United States as a country that claimed to have a nuclear warhead on top of a ballistic missile. So, I don't believe the possession of ballistic missiles is a unique capability to deter, constrain, or harm. Senator Cochran. Dr. Schneider. Dr. Schneider. I believe that a long-range missile delivery is a much more persuasive way of dealing with it than the notion of an attempted terrorist delivery. We had a recent example over the Christmas holiday and immediately thereafter of a terrorist group that was trying to infiltrate the United States through a very clever scheme involving multiple points of entry. They were apprehended by law enforcement organizations and the case is now being investigated. The probability of detection of terrorist organizations is one of the successful results of the $10 billion counter terrorism program we have in the Federal budget. The risks that would be taken by a state in trying to sneak a WMD device into the United States where culpability could be ascertained, is extremely high. On the other hand, the manipulation of WMD and long range missile threat could be very powerful and I call your attention to a colloquy that took place between Secretary Rumsfeld and Senator John Kerry in a testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the Rumsfeld Commission Report. Secretary Rumsfeld has the rare perspective of being both the White House Chief of Staff and a Secretary of Defense. He went through a very interesting thought process that is derived from that experience about the impact that an Iraqi possession of long-range ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction might have had on the White House in 1991 if they were contemplating intervention in a Gulf region security crisis. I can't reproduce the colloquies as effectively as I would like, but it was a very compelling one suggesting that the possession of this could have a very powerful impact on opportunities for coercive diplomacy in these kinds of scenarios. Senator Cochran. Mr. Cirincione, though the NIE discusses the value of ICBMs to rogue states, some have suggested that ICBMs are actually of little value for rogue states. Do you agree with that? Mr. Cirincione. Oh no, I think they are of some value. If I was a rogue state I would like to have an ICBM. The trouble is that it is not easy to do. If it was easy, everybody would do it. It is technoloillion to deal with terrorist threats with and demanding technology to master, so I expect it is going to take a very long time before any other country has an ICBM capable of delivering a nuclear warhead on the United States. Senator Cochran. Dr. Schneider, what do nations like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq gain by developing missiles like ICBMs or longer-range missiles? Dr. Schneider. Take the case, first of North Korea, I think they gain several things, one is they are the largest U.S. aid recipient in Asia, which is a testimony to their management skills in the manipulation of their WMD program and ballistic missiles. But also they have been able to equalize their status with South Korea despite the fact that South Korea is a much richer state, it is a democratic state, it is a state which whom we have had good relations, largely as a consequence of the WMD and missile threat they are able to manipulate. I think this is replicated in Iran as well. Their ability to deploy weapons of mass destruction and deliver them at great ranges with ballistic missiles has made them the most powerful and influential state in the Gulf region. In the security arena it has obliged the United States to revisit its policies concerning how it would deploy forces in the future in a Gulf region security crisis. As a result there are powerful incentives for them to go down this path. Since North Korea and Iran are moving incrementally to an ICBM capability, it is clear that they wish to have this ace-in-the-hole of an ability to threaten the territory of the United States. Senator Cochran. Dr. Schneider, you brought to our attention the fact that we have this $10 billion effort underway to deal with threats such as terrorist attacks on the United States, but some claim that we are paying too much attention and spending too much money on ballistic missile threats and defending against them. Do you think we are paying too much attention to the ballistic missile threat over the other threats? Dr. Schneider. No, I think it is important to look at these threats posed by weapons of mass destruction in a holistic way; there are several ways in which they can be delivered. Terrorism is one means, cruise missiles and manned aircraft are another means. Ballistic missiles are yet another means. We need to be able to engage all of these. I strongly support the effort that the President has proposed for this $10 billion counter terrorist effort. I think we will probably need to do more in the way of cruise missile defense, especially national cruise missile defense in the future and I think the Congress initiated such a program just last year. But, ballistic missile defense is the area where for a variety of reasons, we have not engaged and as a result, the path of least resistance has been taken by those for whom it is important to maintain a threat against the United States. I think the effort that we make to invest in a national missile defense program--and this is a personal view, not the view of the Rumsfeld Commission--would contribute to devaluing the investment in ballistic missiles. It would do so by making it worth less simply because ballistic missiles are much less likely to have the desired effect either in terms of coercive diplomacy or in actual use. Senator Cochran. Mr. Cirincione, in a recent Los Angeles Times article you criticized NIE as being less useful to policy makers because it avoided the issue of whether threats might actually disappear. In this article you said that under some scenarios, North Korea may collapse before the fielding of a national missile defense system. Do you believe that all of the threats described in this NIE will probably disappear before the fielding of a national defense system? Mr. Cirincione. It depends when you think we are going to field this system. Well, sir I base that comment on testimony given to the Congress by the Director of the DIA, General Patrick Hughes, who testified that North Korea was probably terminal. This was 2 years ago and I think many analysts believe that it is probable that North Korea is going to collapse in the short term, that is, over the next 5 to 10 years. And I think that is just as important a ``could'' possibility that should be considered as a possibility that North Korea could, or Iran could, field an ICBM. And that is why it is so urgent when you make these kinds of assessments, to the greatest extent possible, to bring in the political, economic, and diplomatic factors, so that you have a net assessment. We do that all the time, we don't worry about Japan for example, in this assessment because we judge that even though Japan could develop an ICBM, they are unlikely to do that. That actually could change dramatically if the situation in Asia spiraled out of control; if relations with China deteriorated; if India fielded large numbers of ballistic missiles, Japan may decide that they actually should deploy a ballistic missile, that they should become a nuclear nation. That is the kind of political variable that is very important for the intelligence agencies to bring into their assessments and that is lacking here, and I would hope that the Congress would help encourage the intelligence agencies, to the greatest extent possible, to integrate their assessment so they really give Congress the kind of predictive tool that they need. That was the basis of my statement to the Los Angeles Times. Senator Cochran. Dr. William Perry, who as you know is our former Secretary of Defense and is now serving as the Coordinator for U.S.-North Korea Policy, said in his review of U.S. policy, that the United States needs to deal with the North Korean Government as it is because, ``there is no evidence that change is imminent.'' So my follow up is, should the United States deal with North Korea's long-range missile programs as if no change is imminent? Is he right or is he wrong? Mr. Cirincione. Well, frankly, I believe he is wrong. I think all indications are that change is fairly imminent, that is 5 to 10 years in North Korea. I do not believe that that regime can survive. Senator Cochran. Dr. Schneider, looking at the August 1998 Taepo Dong-1 launch by North Korea, what technologies for developing ICBMs did North Korea demonstrate by that launch? Dr. Schneider. The most important feature was the ability to have successful stage separation. That is, when the first stage of the missile carried aloft the second stage it was able to separate the two stages without damaging the other stage or otherwise inhibiting its ability to perform permitting the third stage also separated successfully. This is the core capability necessary to develop an ICBM. Ultimately if you can put a payload in orbit, you have an ICBM capability. Senator Cochran. But we have seen a clear pattern in rogue state programs where they begin their programs with SCUD-type technology. Do we need to be concerned about, not only North Korea, but other countries leveraging this SCUD technology to develop longer-range ballistic missiles? Dr. Schneider. Yes I think it is a source of concern for a number of reasons. One, is that it is a highly mature technology. Several thousand launches have been undertaken using this technology. This contributes to a need for less testing because of the maturity of the technology. Second, the technology is very cheap to manufacture and hence North Korea is able to have as one of its core competencies the ability to cheaply manufacture liquid fuel technology based on relatively simple evolutions of the underlying SCUD technology. I believe it is a source for concern because it does create a direct path to an ICBM. Senator Cochran. Let me ask both of you about the NIE assessment of the likelihood of an unauthorized or accidental launch of ballistic missiles from Russia or China. It describes this as highly unlikely. Mr. Cirincione, do you agree with the NIE on that point? Mr. Cirincione. I don't believe it is highly unlikely. I do believe it is unlikely, but I also agree with the 1995 NIE, which cautioned when it made a similar prediction, ``We are less confident about the future in view of the fluid political situation in both countries, Russia and China. If there were severe political crisis in either country, control of the nuclear command structure could become less certain, increasing the possibility of an authorized launch.'' I think the political situation in both of those nations remains very fluid. I am deeply pessimistic about the future of Russia which is why I tried to stress in my testimony that much more of our attention has to be focused on the here and now; on the five thousand nuclear warheads that sit atop ballistic missiles in Russia. That is the ballistic missile threat we really should be worried about and I am afraid that situation is going to become less stable in the next 5 to 10 years, increasing the probability not just of an accidental launch, but the possibility for fragmentation of Russia where we see new nuclear-armed nations emerging and the possibility of transfer or sale of those assets to third parties. That is the real danger. That is the real threat that we would face from a third Nation getting a ballistic missile, they would simply buy it. Senator Cochran. Dr. Schneider. Dr. Schneider. There was an important caveat in the NIE that suggested that unauthorized launch was highly unlikely if existing procedural safeguards remained in place. The Russians have inherited the command and control system of the former Soviet Union and I am persuaded that that is a good system. However, if there is deterioration in the state control of the assets, that is the nuclear weapon delivery systems, and it causes a breakdown in the procedural safeguards then, of course it would be possible for an accidental or an unauthorized launch to take place. Similarly a source of concern is the degradation in the effectiveness of the warning systems where they may mistake a phenomenon that they see for a launch and try to respond. We have some concerns about an incident 5 years ago and I think those concerns remain. Senator Cochran. Mr. Cirincione, in your opening statement which we put in the record in full, you characterize the Rumsfeld Commission's conclusions as hysterical. What do you mean by that? Mr. Cirincione. Well, sir, my exact phrase was ``somewhat hysterical.'' Senator Cochran. Oh, I am sorry. Mr. Cirincione. That is quite all right. I believe that it is somewhat hysterical to assert that the United States could have little or no warning of a new ICBM in the world. I simply don't believe that is true. I think that is an extreme view that we could wake up tomorrow--and I heard Members of Congress take to the floor and say things like this after the Rumsfeld Commission Report--that we could wake up tomorrow and find that Libya had deployed an ICBM. I simply don't think our Intelligence capabilities are that poor. I don't think building an ICBM is that easy. I don't believe missiles pop in and out of existence like virtual particles. There is a trail; there is a way to ascertain this. I think we have a very good grasp on who has what kind of missile program. I don't think we are in for those kinds of gigantic surprises that Vanuatu suddenly fields an ICBM, even though by consistently applying the ``could'' standard of the Rumsfeld Commission that is a ``could'' possibility. Senator Cochran. Dr. Schneider, do you agree with the conclusions of the Rumsfeld Commission, that they were somewhat hysterical or---- [Laughter.] Dr. Schneider. No, I think they were very restrained and offered with the sobriety that the subject requires. I think part of the confusion is to equate a threat to the United States with an ICBM capability. There are a number of ways, including some mentioned in the NIE, in which a ballistic missile can be delivered to the United States without it being an ICBM. One example is a launch from a surface ship. This technology is not at all new. The Germans demonstrated it during World War II. The Russians have frequently launched ballistic missiles from surface ships. We launched a Polaris missile from a merchant ship in the early 1960's. This is not rocket science. This is navigation and as a consequence, the possibility that a ballistic missile threat could be posed to the United States without warning is a very real one. A SCUD missile on a transporter erector launcher (TEL) which is similar to an off-road logging vehicle, can be put in the hold of a merchant ship and the merchant ship sail the first 9,500 km. of the voyage needed to get to the United States. The last 500 or so are managed by the short-range ballistic missile launched from the ship. The usual problems that have been referred to in the past of command, control, and navigation. These have largely been dispensed with because of the availability of high-quality commercial communications such as INMARSAT and modern commercial navigation such as that available from the global positioning system (GPS). So this is practical; it has been widely demonstrated, and it should be counted as a part of the portfolio of ballistic missile threats that can threaten the United States. Mr. Cirincione. But sir, if you are going to have a merchant ship, why bother with a ballistic missile? Why don't you continue sailing those last hundred miles into the harbor and detonate the device then? That is way before Customs is going to be able to get you. You don't need the ballistic missile to make that kind of threat. Dr. Schneider. I guess you blow yourself up. That is the answer. Mr. Cirincione. Well, we have a lot of evidence that people are willing to do that. Dr. Schneider. Yes, but there probably would be a low volunteer rate for that duty. [Laughter.] Mr. Cirincione. Some nations have a very high volunteer rate for exactly those kinds of things. Senator Cochran. Let me ask both of you this question. How much warning time, for example, do you think the Intelligence Community would be able to provide if Iran decided to develop an ICBM like the three-stage Taepo Dong-1? Dr. Schneider. Dr. Schneider. Well, it could be done by the weekend if the missiles were put on a 747 and flown to Iran where they would just set them up. We had a circumstance in the 1980's when China delivered the CSS-2 missiles to Saudi Arabia. We didn't know about it until after the transaction was implemented, so it is quite possible that we could be surprised because there are a number of ways in which an adversary-state can acquire ballistic missiles other than going to engineering school and starting to mine the aluminum and steel out of the ground. It is possible to simply buy these things off the shelf. Senator Cochran. Mr. Cirincione. Mr. Cirincione. If they tried to build it themselves-- years. If they smuggled it in piece by piece and assembled it-- very little warning time. Senator Cochran. Well, I think this has been a very helpful hearing. I appreciate very much your both being here to help us understand this National Intelligence Estimate and Mr. Walpole's participation in the hearing and his presentation of the unclassified summary for our review, and the participation of Senators. I think this has been an excellent afternoon, interesting and informative as well. So thank you very, very much. Dr. Schneider. It was an honor to be here. Senator Cochran. This concludes our hearing. We stand in recess. 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