对非法或不当活动的调查 与1996年联邦选举活动有关 政府事务委员会的最后报告 参议院雷丁。105-167 - 105日大会2D会议 - 1998年3月10日

   

    白宫吐出人士的个人介绍，自1996年秋季首次展开其竞选金融的故事以来，克林顿政府一再被迫再次承认，这是不适合特殊令人讨厌的人进入白人的承认房子或参加了涉及总统或副总统的政治职能。1在他们的到来之前，白宫失败的白宫失败的反复情况表明，至少存在白宫审查过程中的根本缺陷的存在。委员会已经确定了这个问题，其实更严重。熟悉白宫创造和评估其访客名单的个人证词透露，审查拟议与会者的过程基本不存在。白宫官员作证说，他们依靠美国秘密服务和DNC在政治事件中邀请邀请或与会者。DNC官员同样作证，他们过于主要依赖于秘密服务来识别和删除不受欢迎的个人。然而，秘密服务仅被指控识别给总统的潜在身体威胁，并没有其他决心邀请的整体适用性。无论是通过疏忽或有意识的设计，缺乏有组织的审查系统的结果都是一样的：允许太多的令人讨厌的人被允许到白宫的入口，并获得克林顿总统。----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ See, e.g., Deposition of Nancy Hernreich, June 20, 1997, pp. 67-68 (conveying President Clinton's opinion that the attendance with Johnny Chung of a delegation of Chinese businessmen at a March 11, 1995 White House radio address was ``inappropriate'' and that the White House ``shouldn't have done that''); Kevin Sack, ``From Restaurateur to Intimate at the White House,'' New York Times, Jan 4. 1997, p. A8 (``Mr. Trie escorted a leading Chinese arms dealer [Wang Jun] to a small gathering with Mr. Clinton. The President has since described the arms dealer's presence as `clearly inappropriate.' ''; Glenn F. Bunting & Ralph Frammolino, ``Cash-for-Coffee Events at White House Detailed; Politics: Zeal to Raise Funds Transformed Once-modest Sessions into Major Money-makers, Accounts Indicate,'' Los Angeles Times, Feb. 24, 1997, p. A1 (``White House spokesman Davis also has conceded that it `was not appropriate' for the president to sip coffee with Eric Wynn just a few months after his second conviction for penny-stock fraud.''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- White House Vetting Procedures During the 1996 Election Cycle The White House Political Affairs Office was the designated recipient of the DNC's proposed guest lists for White House fundraising coffees and other politically motivated events attended by the President or Vice President.2政治事务办公室还应该作为白宫系统的联系人，为政治事件审查客人，以确保他们的“适宜性”。3.前副副局长Karen Hancox作证说，她收到了DNC选定的客人名单，了解了DNC的国家财务总监Richard Sullivan的传真即将到来的白宫活动。4.汉考克斯的典型做法是绝对不审查沙利文的建议。5.事实上，她作证说，她“很少看(ed)苏利文提交的名单”，而是直接将名单转发到适当的办公室，插入总统的简报簿，并得到特勤局的批准。6.哈康奇才采取了进一步的步骤，只有在Sullivan专门要求她检查DNC列表上的特定名称的适用性时才采取了进一步的步骤。7.在这样的事件中，汉克克将联系相应的当局来确定暂定拟议的个人是否可以留在客人名单上。在外国国家的邀请出现问题的情况下，适当的权威是国家安全委员会（“NSC”）。8.如果国家安全委员会反对提议的个人出席，汉考克斯的回应是联系沙利文，让他取消邀请。9.---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 2 \ 2 \ 2 \白宫社会办公室播放了主要，但基本上是“功能”在嘉宾创造的角色白宫活动清单。请参阅1997年6月12日的Ann股，p的沉积。21.领导社会办公室的Ann股，解释说，白色房屋内的政治事务和其他办事处的代表经常提交给股票的办公室，他们向未经指定的未来白宫活动和每个特定事件的最终邀请函Guest List是从提交名称的正在运行的名单编译的。ID。股票作证说，她的办公室没有在审查潜在的客人或决定谁来或者谁来或谁来来的地方发挥作用。她说，她认为，提交客人姓名的办公室审视了潜在的客人，但她“不得不关心”禁忌的方式。ID。 at pp. 131-32. She testified that it is her understanding that an invited guest's criminal background would be caught by the Secret Service, which does a final review of an event's guest list before any guests are admitted to the White House. Id. at pp. 133-34; see also discussion of the role of the Secret Service, infra, footnotes 18-21 and accompanying text. \3\ See Deposition of Karen Hancox, June 10, 1997, pp. 55-56. \4\ Deposition of Karen Hancox, June 9, 1997, pp. 52 (coffees); see also id. at p. 109 (overnights); id. at p. 113 (movie events at the White House); id. at p. 115 (state dinners). \5\ Id., p. 53. \6\ Id. at pp. 53-54. \7\ See, e.g., id. at p. 70 (``Q: When would you call the NSC regarding attendees to coffees or other events. A: If Richard would call me up and ask me about a name. Q: Was there ever a time that you took it upon yourself to call the NSC regarding any attendees to any of the coffee events or any events that Richard Sullivan sent you lists for? A: Not that I ever remember, no.'' (emphasis added)); see also Deposition of Doug Sosnik, June 20, 1997, pp. 167-68. \8\ See Deposition of Karen Hancox, June 9, 1997, p. 101. Hancox could remember only one instance in which she received a question about a prospective guest that was not prompted by that individual's foreign nationality. On that occasion, Sullivan asked Hancox to determine whether a particular individual was supportive of the President's health care policies. Hancox recalls contacting the White House's Office of Public Liaison to address Sullivan's concerns. See id at pp. 101-02. \9\ See id. at pp. 104-05; see also Deposition of Doug Sosnik, June 20, 1997, p. 176. Hancox also testified that the responsibility rested entirely with Sullivan and the DNC to ensure that suspect individuals who had been identified and removed from an event on one occasion did not accidentally reappear on a subsequent list. Deposition of Karen Hancox, June 10, 1997, pp. 50-53, 62-63. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Because the White House never raised ``red flags'' about his proposals unless he ``proactively asked about'' particular guests, Sullivan understood that the White House ``did not conduct background checks'' of his proposed guests, and that the obligation to weed out unsuitable individuals rested primarily with the DNC.10.然而，沙利文在DNC自己的审查中承认了一个粗心的脾气暴躁，因为他作证了他在“假的意义”下运作。。。真正糟糕的事情会被拿起。。。通过秘密服务。''11.因此，Sullivan建议他觉得他认为需要与汉克克养殖的唯一潜在嘉宾是“外国人”。12.---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 10 \参见Richard L. Sullivan，1997年6月4日，PP。104-05. \ 11 \沉积Richard L. Sullivan，1997年6月25日，p。85. \ 12 \见Richard L. Sullivan的沉积，1997年6月4日，p。109. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------它很清楚，即使是外国国民也不一定在白宫的审查中得到适当的审查进程。“汉克奇作证，沙利文提出了少于十二个人的担忧，13.她没有回顾与沙利文或NSC讨论白宫出现的委员会调查的几个突出的外国人，包括Arief Wiadinata和泰国商人代表团陪同Pauline Kanchanalak至1996年6月18日咖啡。14.此外，总统国家安全事务助理塞缪尔·桑迪·伯杰向委员会承认，显然在某些情况下，外国个人……被邀请参加总统的会议，而NSC并没有对此做出判断。”15.----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 13 \ in of Karen Hancox，1997年6月9日，第78-79页;另见塞缪尔R.（Sandy）Berger的证词，1997年9月11日，p。48（这里是一个数字，但不是大量的人，其中NSC被问到其判断。''）。Karen Hancox沉积，1997年6月9日，第72-74页;另见本报告关于商务部约翰黄的活动的一部分，以及咖啡，隔夜和其他筹款活动的一部分，尤其是对保罗·己纳拉克和1996年6月18日咖啡的讨论。\ 15 \ Berger证词，p。48. Berger还注意到总统的决心现有的审查程序不足，ID。在p。47，并解释说，NSC已采用通过要求NSC人员每次被邀请到白宫时纠正这些不足的程序。 Id. at pp. 72-73; see also Memorandum from Samuel R. Berger to ``All NSC Staff'', June 13, 1997, pp. 1-3 (Ex. 1). After receiving significant criticism for acceding to a DNC request for a photograph with Eric Hotung, a Hong Kong businessman, British citizen and husband of a prominent DNC contributor, Berger, in Ex. 1, also clarified NSC policy with respect to meetings between NSC staff and individuals from outside of the U.S. government. After promising in September 1995 to contribute $100,000 to the DNC, Hotung was granted a meeting with Robert Suettinger of the NSC, and a photo opportunity with Berger. See Memorandum from David Mercer to DNC Chairman Don Fowler, stating that ``the Hotungs . . . will be contributing $100,000" and that ``[w]e will be helping to set up a meeting with the Hotungs at the [NSC]'', Sept. 14, 1995 (Ex. 2); Schedule of Robert L. Suettinger indicating a September 19, 1995 meeting with Eric Hotung (Ex. 3); electronic mail message from Stanley Roth to Sandy Berger indicating that Fowler requested a photo opportunity for the ``fabulously wealthy'' Hotung with Berger, Oct. 3, 1995 (Ex. 4). Berger testified that he was not aware at the time of the photograph that the Hotungs were contributors or even that the request was related to the Hotungs' contacts with the DNC. Berger testimony, p. 24. Berger did acknowledge, however, that he knew that the request originated with Fowler. Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- It is also clear that Sullivan was correct when he described as a ``false sense'' his ultimate reliance upon the Secret Service to catch the unsavory individuals who fell through the cracks in the White House's porous vetting system. As an initial matter, even the limited vetting conducted by the Secret Service occurs only with respect to events held in the White House. Hancox testified that with respect to events attended by the President that were held outside of the White House, she would not even provide attendee lists to the Secret Service.16.在这些情况下，Sullivan对客人名单的不可靠检查，以包含外国人作为独家屏幕。17.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 16 \沉积Karen Hancox，1997年6月10日，第9-10页。\ 17 \见ID。-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------科学，秘密服务白宫师的特别代理商，也涉及向委员会提交的宣誓书秘密服务在确定白宫入场的人的“适用性”中没有作用。18.相反，秘密服务，负责White House Complex和秘密服务保护者的物理安全性，“''19.通过在国家犯罪信息中心维护的数据库中寻找每个Invitee的名字，旨在发现所邀请进入白宫的人的刑事史。20.犯罪历史并不一定使个人入学的个人取消资格。只有在数据库搜索的信息中发现的信息（建议[S]那个潜在访客可能是暴力的，危险或以其他方式对保护者或白宫复杂的秘密服务限制或拒绝白人构成身体或安全威胁房屋访问。21.换句话说，虽然在白宫在非暴力中的存在，但没有忽视的罪犯肯定是不合适的，这不是个人秘密服务将排除的人的类型。------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 18 \ \ 18 Colleen B. Callahan，9月9日，1997年9月9日。1（前5）。\ 19 \见ID。\ 20 \见ID。在p。3. \ 21 \见ID。在pp.3-4。----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Lack of Proper Vetting Permitted a Series of Unsavory Individuals Access to the President As a result of the White House's admitted failure to properly vet its guest lists, several unsavory individuals were allowed to enter the White House and to attend events with President Clinton. The President's meetings with Ted Sioeng, Yogesh Ghandi, Roger Tamraz, and a delegation of Chinese businessmen led by Johnny Chung are described in detail in other sections of this report.22.以下是额外的令人讨厌的个人摘要，其白宫访问被允许畅通无阻。----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ \ 22 \参阅TED Sioeng，Yogesh Gandhi，Roger Tamraz和Johnny Chung的部分。----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Jorge Cabrera In November 1995, Jorge Cabrera, a Cuban-born U.S. citizen, made a $20,000 contribution to the DNC and attended a fundraising dinner in honor of Vice President Gore in Miami.23.一个月后，Cabrera参加了白宫的圣诞派对，并用第一夫人拍了他的照片。24.在Cabrera的白宫访问时，他已经被判犯有两项重罪，并且在监狱近五年服务。Cabrera在1983年抵押诉诸贿赂贿赂陪审团见证人的司法，并于1988年再次提交了虚假的所得税申报表。25.这两项指控都源于因毒品指控被捕。26.1996年1月，卡布雷拉被捕，并被控向美国进口6 000磅可卡因。27.他目前正在服刑19年。28.----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \23\ See Don Van Natta, Jr., ``An R.S.V.P. to the President: Deep Regrets. I`m in Custody.'' New York Times, March 22, 1997, p. A1. \24\ See id. \25\ See Anne Farris, ``Secret Service Didn't Tell White House of Guest's Criminal Background,'' Washington Post, Oct. 26, 1996, p. A14. \26\ See id. \27\ See Stanley Meisler, ``Democrats Return Drug Smuggler's Check,'' Los Angeles Times, Oct. 20, 1996, p. A25. \28\ See id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Wang Jun On February 6, 1996, Charlie Trie escorted a group of individuals including Wang Jun to a White House coffee with President Clinton.29.王军的出席主要是由雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)华盛顿特区办公室董事总经理欧内斯特•格林(Ernest Green)安排的，他也是民主党全国委员会(DNC)的著名筹款人。30.王军是中国国际信托投资公司(“中信”)的董事长。据报道，中信是一家由中国政府控制的金融和工业集团公司。31.他也是聚卫技术主席，这是一家处理中国大部分共产党的武器出口的公司。32.1996年，王军和多卫生技术官员涉及一项方案，以将数千名制造机枪和突击步枪脱落到美国的犯罪分子。33.--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 29 \看到客人名单在1996年2月6日,咖啡与总统在“咖啡与民主党全国委员会的支持者,”1996年2月5日,2页(6例)。30 \ \虽然绿色断然否认王军出席2月6日的咖啡,参见欧内斯特·格林的证词，1997年6月18日，第269-70页(“我根本没有参与王军和白宫的咖啡. . . .我完全没有参与王军和咖啡的事。”)，DNC提交给委员会的王军简历的复印件显示，它是从雷曼兄弟的传真机传送到DNC的。王军的简历(例7)Sullivan也证实DNC将王军加入了喝咖啡的客人名单，是为了帮Green的忙。《理查德·l·沙利文的证词》，1997年7月9日，第124页。最后，尽管格林没有出席2月6日的咖啡活动，但民主党全国委员会将格林在1996年2月6日的5万美元捐款归功于当天白宫举行的咖啡活动。参见“DNC财务执行摘要”，1996年10月17日(Ex 8)。\31\参见Steven Mufson，“中国公司对白宫的详细访问;《阿肯色被引用为中介》，《华盛顿邮报》，1997年3月18日，A4页。32 \ \看到id。见Howard Blum，《龙之踪迹》，《名利场》，1997年12月，226-44页(讨论美国财政部特工发现的中国武器走私团伙)。 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Eric Wynn Eric Wynn attended a December 21, 1995 coffee at the White House with President Clinton.34.当时，永利在1995年7月21日被判13项共谋、证券欺诈和电信欺诈罪名成立，他还在保释期等待上诉。35.恒生于1996年就克林顿总统参加了四个额外的筹款人，尽管遭到犯罪，如袭击一名警察，抵抗逮捕，令人生气，令人陶醉时驾驶，并戒毒。36.----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 34 \ See Bob Woodward＆Charles R. Babcock，“股上的机械手参加了克林顿的咖啡”华盛顿邮政，1997年2月1日，p。A1。\ 35 \请参阅ID。36 \参见Bob Woodward，``Felon也参加了4个DNC活动，“华盛顿邮政，1997年2月20日，”。A4。------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------结论是否凭借筹集款项的疏忽或有意识的设计，该过程在白宫的审查中的个人审查授予总统的机会无法遵守未经忽视的罪犯，不恰当的外国公民和白色房屋中的其他名人，远离总统。没有白宫员工被特别指控评估DNC提交的访客列表，因为这一事实上，后来出现在白宫咖啡和其他与总统和副总统的其他活动中。 Instead, the White House left the responsibility with the DNC, which took inappropriate comfort in the background checks performed by the Secret Service, and therefore only haphazardly reviewed its lists for the appearance of foreign nationals. As the Secret Service sought to weed out only those criminals who posed a physical threat to the White House or the Secret Service's ``protectees,'' convicted criminals that the Secret Service deemed to be nonviolent or unthreatening were permitted to pass the White House gate without comment. This was a system designed to fail, and it operated precisely as designed.