The Thirst for Money - 金博宝网站,金博宝正规网址,金博宝更改账户

对非法或不当活动的调查
IN CONNECTION WITH 1996 FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS
政府事务委员会的最终报告
SENATE Rept. 105-167 - 105th Congress 2d Session - March 10, 1998

The Thirst for Money The 1994 election results were a major setback for Democrats. For the first time in 40 years, Republicans controlled both houses of Congress. The Democrats' loss of Congress, along with the President's concern that he might face a primary challenge, fueled an urgent need for political money. The President and his top advisors decided to raise money early for his re-election campaign. To accomplish their goal, the President and his top advisors took control of the DNC and designed a plan to engage in a historically aggressive fund- raising effort, utilizing the DNC as a vehicle for getting around federal election laws. The DNC ran television advertisements, created under the direct supervision of the President, which were specifically designed to promote the President's re-election. To fund this early advertising for the President's benefit, the DNC had to raise more than three times what it raised during the 1991-92 election cycle--and nearly three times what was raised during the 1993-94 cycle. The panoply of DNC fund-raising irregularities in the 1996 election derived, directly or indirectly, from the unprecedented need for money to finance this ambitious advertising strategy. The President's Precarious Political Position in Late 1994 In the wake of the 1994 congressional elections, the President was politically vulnerable. The President himself recognized as much when he was reduced to defending his ``relevance'' in the political process during an extraordinary prime-time news conference, which was covered by only one network.¹总统的亲密政治知己也敏锐地意识到了他的政治状况。------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \1\ See Todd S. Purdum, ``Undertones of Relevance,'' The New York Times, April 20, 1995, p. A18. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Terence R. McAuliffe, the DNC's National Finance Chairman from March 1994 to January 31, 1995, and later National Finance Chairman for Clinton-Gore '96, testified that ``for the Democrats, it was not a very optimistic time.''²麦考利夫（McAuliffe）处于独特的位置，可以评估民主党及其现任总统的情绪。正如DNC财务主席一样，麦考利夫作证说，他对捐助者的心情有更好的感觉。。。比该国其他任何人。''³------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \2\ Deposition of Terence R. McAuliffe, June 6, 1997, p. 13. \3\ Id. at pp. 13-14. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- During his deposition, McAuliffe offered a candid assessment of the President's political position in December 1994: I had just finished up as Finance Chairman of--told the President I was leaving the party, and we had just lost the House and the Senate for the first time in a long time. So there was a general mood out there that the President was in serious trouble. A lot of people wondered if the President was even going to run again. I can tell you the political mood at the time clearly was that he had no chance of winning again, clearly would not win re-election and would have a very tough time with a primary. And there was a lot of talk that people would run against him in a primary. It was a very tough political time.⁴-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 4 \ ID。在第11-12页。麦考利夫（McAuliffe）的关注是从1994年1月开始的总统副参谋长哈罗德·艾克斯（Harold Ickes），直到-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1996年选举：问：现在，随着我们的前进 - 您从1994年11月[1994年]前进到1995年初，您是否对总统再次当选第二任期的能力有一个重大关注发生在11月的选举中？答：如果您是民主党人，您一直在关注初选，并且在1980年的肯尼迪 - 嘉特尔初选中发挥了相当重要的作用，我感谢与现任总统有关的分裂初选，即使如果您要赢得初选，即赢得提名 - “将要赢得''是这样的速记，这可能会受到足够的损害，可以失去大选。所以答案是肯定的，那时我很担心，因为我认为这是 - 可以说党内有些人 - 现在派对范围广泛 - 民主党家庭是否质疑总统是否质疑总统可以在大选中赢得连任，而且肯定有一些关于有些人对阵他的人的讨论。因此，答案是 - 很长的答案，我很担心。⁵------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \5\ Deposition of Harold Ickes, June 26, 1997, pp. 21-22; see also infra, notes 28-29 and accompanying text. This was the bleak outlook for the President as he contemplated his re-election campaign. An Early Emphasis on Money to Stave off Primary Challengers Two days after Christmas 1994, the President and McAuliffe ate breakfast in the President's personal study on the second floor of the White House.⁶早餐持续了大约两个小时。⁷一般讨论涉及总统和麦考利夫需要做什么，以``准备'96大选''。⁸------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \6\ Deposition of Terence R. McAuliffe, June 6, 1997, pp. 10-11. \7\ Id. at p. 14. \8\ Id. at p. 12. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- When asked whether he and the President discussed the possibility of a primary challenge to the President, McAuliffe answered: You know, I can't recall if he talked about a primary challenge, but, I mean, just pick up the newspapers, I mean, I don't think we would have had to have talked about it. I mean, it was evident that the President was in a very precarious political situation. I think his poll numbers, he was in the low thirties.⁹------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \9\ Id. at p. 13. Nevertheless, McAuliffe, who by his own admission is ``not negative by nature,'' was ``optimistic and thought [the President] should be re-elected.''¹⁰麦考利夫作证说他是“愿意领导这场战斗”。¹¹-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 10 \ ID。在第12页，第13页。\ 11 \ id。在p。13. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Of course, the President would require money to wage that fight, a topic which he discussed with McAuliffe. In his deposition, McAuliffe tried to downplay the discussion of fund- raising at the breakfast, stating that ``the fund-raising discussion probably took 32 seconds.''¹²When they first sat down for breakfast, the President and McAuliffe talked about the mood of the donors. McAuliffe described them as ``depressed'' and ``demoralized.''¹³尽管如此，麦克劳利夫（McAuliffe）自愿``将这项行动放在一起''，告诉总统：``让我们不要在这里谈论筹款，先生，我会为您处理所有这些。''¹⁴McAuliffe继续：-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 12 \ id。\ 13 \ id。在p。14. \ 14 \ id。总统先生，您在捐助者社区中得到了广泛的支持，这是我代表该党的财务主席。我将能够为您进行此操作。人民的支持将为您服务。不用担心。我会处理的。他 - 我认为这给他的肩膀带来了巨大的负担。 I think he was worried. I think he was probably worried that I wouldn't be his Finance Chairman. I mean, they worry about--see, what you worried about at the time is a lot of the donors and political supporters would leak off and go to other candidates. That was a big concern. Q: And when you say other candidates, you mean other Democratic candidates? A: Yeah. You know, that potentially--you know, there was talk out there that Bradley was looking at it, that Gephardt was looking at it, that Jesse Jackson might look at it. You know, the names you normally hear, you hear them again today. Q: Did you commit to raise a specific amount of money for the President in that meeting? A: I said I'd take care of the money, it would be no problem: Don't you worry about it, sir, I'll take care of it. I don't think I knew at the time what the limits were.¹⁵--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 15 \ ID。在第15-16页。根据麦考利夫（McAuliffe）的说法，其余两个小时的大部分时间都用于讨论``问题''，例如``这个国家要去哪里。''。金博宝正规网址¹⁶-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 16 \ ID。在p。14. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- At the end of the breakfast, the topic of fund-raising arose again. The discussion centered on what the President needed to do to help raise funds. The conversation helped set the stage for, among other things, the White House coffees: Q: Did you discuss with the President what his involvement would be in the fund-raising operation? A: The only thing I discussed with him, I think at the end of the meeting he said, What do I need to do? And I said, Mr. President, you know, I need to get some time with you to meet with some of the key supporters who are demoralized out there so that you can get them re-energized and ready for the '96 election.¹⁷--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 17 \ ID。在p。16;另请参见有关白宫咖啡的报告的部分。麦考利夫（McAuliffe）离开会议，知道他将担任总统连任努力的财务主席。正如麦考利夫所说的那样，总统``从来没有说过，特里，你会成为我的财务主席吗？很明显，我要成为那个家伙。''¹⁸------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \18\ Deposition of Terence R. McAuliffe, June 6, 1997, p. 11. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- McAuliffe did go on to lead Clinton/Gore's fund-raising effort; however, Clinton/Gore was limited by law to raising funds in certain increments (no more than $1,000 from an individual),¹⁹总体支出限额。到1995年夏末，连任竞选活动已经在法律上筹集的所有资金中筹集了``一个好部分''。²⁰毫无疑问，迅速筹集这笔钱的强大动力是必须阻止潜在的主要挑战者。实际上，由于联邦限制，大选无法筹集任何额外的资金。²¹无论如何，所有连任竞选活动的资金预计将在1995年底筹集。²²-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 19 \ 2 U.S.C.秒441（a）（6）。\ 20 \ Terence R. McAuliffe的沉积，1997年6月6日，第1页。50. \ 21 \ 26 U.S.C.秒秒9003（b）（2）和9012（b）。\ 22 \ Terence R. McAuliffe的沉积，1997年6月6日，第50-51页。------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Dick Morris' Early Advertising Blitz--The Need for More Money Still, a formidable re-election treasury, by itself, would not resuscitate the President's moribund political position. After the devastating 1994 mid-term Congressional elections, the President reached out to his old friend and former political consultant, Dick Morris, for political advice. Morris, one of the President's closest political consultants,²³他向总统解释说，即使考虑了1996年连任的机会，他也必须从1995年开始一个广告活动，在范围，时机和成本方面是前所未有的。总统最终抓住了莫里斯的计划，从而产生了巨大的资金，以资助这一媒体十字军东征。²⁴------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \23\ After Morris graduated from Columbia College, he became involved in New York politics and worked for the Citizen's Budget Commission as a research analyst. Deposition of Richard Morris, August 20, 1997, p. 6. His first political consulting company was the Public Affairs Research Organization, which provided issue consulting for New York Democrats. Id. at pp. 6-7. In 1977, he began a new political consulting firm, Dresner, Morris, which later changed names to Dresner, Morris, Tortorello, and has remained a full time political consultant since that time. Id. at p. 7. In 1977, when President Clinton was the Attorney General of Arkansas, he first engaged Morris to perform a variety of political consulting tasks, including polling, advertisement design, and speech- writing. Id. at p. 8. Morris also assisted President Clinton with his failed 1980 re-election campaign for Governor of Arkansas and his successful 1982 bid for Governor. Id. at p. 13. Morris consistently performed consulting work for Governor Clinton from 1982 through January 1991. Id. at p. 14. In 1991, Morris terminated his consulting services for Governor Clinton and testified as follows: I had become more of a Republican at that point, and I had handled his 1990 campaign as the only Democrat that I was working for. And I told--I grandfathered him in, in a sense, because I had a long relationship with him, and he --------------------------------------------------------------------------- asked me to handle his 1990 campaign. Id. at p. 14. Morris did not conduct any professional consulting services for Governor Clinton throughout his 1992 Presidential campaign. Id. at p. 15. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \24\ Though familiar with the media blitz that gave rise to the White House's thirst for money, Morris had extremely limited knowledge of the DNC's and Clinton/Gore's fund-raising activity. He testified as follows: ``I had no involvement nor have I ever had with fund-raising for him [the President].'' Id. at p. 8. Morris also denied any knowledge of John Huang, Charlie Trie or James Riady other than what he had read in newspaper articles beginning in late 1996. Id. at pp. 8-9. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the spring of 1995, Morris explained to the President that he needed to advertise early to improve his approval ratings and give him a chance to win re-election.²⁵总统同意进行一些初步广告，以确定莫里斯的观点是否正确。1995年7月发布的第一批广告航班是由克林顿/戈尔（Clinton）/戈尔（Gore）'96连任委员会支付的（以下简称``Clinton/Gore''）。²⁶7月媒体的结果``对总统表现出非常重要的运动'的结果，莫里斯用来说服总统进行莫里斯提出的前所未有的广告活动。²⁷------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 25 \ id。在第97-98页，第271-72页。\ 26 \ id。在第130-31页。这些支出发生在有关``资助广告或运行特定广告或根据DNC标签下运行的广告文本的可能性的可能性''之前的讨论之前发生的。在p。131. \ 27 \ id。在p。132. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ As noted, Ickes, the White House deputy chief of staff in charge of the President's re-election campaign, was concerned that the President could face a primary contest.²⁸Ickes believed that the President needed to save Clinton/Gore funds (which Morris wanted to spend on advertising) in the event that they were needed for a primary fight.²⁹For precisely this reason, Ickes opposed Morris' early advertising campaign. When Ickes was asked whether he and Morris disagreed about spending money on advertising in 1995-- rather than closer to the election in 1996--Ickes testified: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \28\ Id. at p. 126; see also supra, text accompanying note 5 (quoting from Ickes' deposition before the Committee). \29\ Morris deposition, p. 126. There was a debate about that running over a period of months, and different people had different positions. My own position was that, depending upon what money you were talking about--there are different kinds of money, as I'm sure you know by now--that if it were going to be Clinton-Gore campaign money, that I was very reluctant to see that money spent that early.³⁰------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \30\ Deposition of Harold Ickes, June 26, 1997, p. 31. Morris, however, was convinced that without a massive advertising campaign prior to the primaries, the President would be so weak in the polls that he definitely would face a primary fight.³¹------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \31\ Morris deposition, p. 127. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Although Morris was initially unaware of the financial condition of Clinton/Gore and the DNC at the time he was pressing for significant advertising expenditures, he learned that the Clinton/Gore Primary Committee was limited to spending approximately $30 million.³²莫里斯（Morris）对伊克斯（Ickes）的担忧表示，媒体运动可能会超过克林顿 - 戈尔（Clinton-Gore）初级委员会的3000万美元限制。³³面对这些资金限制，莫里斯（Morris）寻找了替代方法来资助总统连任竞选活动。-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 32 \ id。在第129-30页。\ 33 \请参阅ID。在p。132. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Morris suggested that the President reject federal matching funds so as to increase the amount of contributions that could be legally accepted by Clinton/Gore (and provide the desperately needed additional funds for advertising).³⁴莫里斯（Morris）在3月2日至16日，以及1995年4月27日的每周议程上向总统及其顶级顾问提出了这一概念。³⁵In July 1995, Erskine Bowles, then Ickes' counterpart as White House deputy chief of staff, told Morris that the President had decided not to reject federal matching funds.³⁶Bowles told Morris to come up with a ``plan B,'' i.e., a method for accomplishing his advertising objectives within the limits of the federal matching funds expenditures.³⁷最初，莫里斯不知道他将如何为广告计划提供资金，因为克林顿/戈尔基金必须用于其他竞选支出。³⁸------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \34\ Id. at pp. 97-100, 262-63. A presidential candidate who accepts federal matching funds agrees in return to limit campaign expenditures in primaries and in the general election. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 441a(b)(1). \35\ Morris deposition, pp. 262-63; see March 2 and 16, and April 27, 1995 agendas (Exs. 1, 2 and 3). Morris produced portions of written agendas for the weekly strategy meetings beginning in February or March of 1995. See Morris deposition, p. 256. The meetings were chaired by Morris, and were regularly attended by the President, the Vice President, Chief of Staff Leon Panetta, Ickes, Bowles, and other top White House, Clinton/Gore, and DNC officials. Dick Morris, Behind the Oval Office, p. 26 (1997) (hereinafter ``Behind the Oval Office''). The weekly agendas were summaries of the advice Morris gave the President during those meetings. Morris deposition, p. 258. \36\ Id. at p. 133. \37\ Id. \38\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- hatching a scheme to evade federal election laws Ultimately, the White House found a ``Plan B'': running the advertisements through the DNC under the guise of issue advertising. Unlike Clinton/Gore, the DNC could raise unlimited amounts of non-federal, ``soft'' money, although such money can only be spent for ``party-building'' activities, such as voter registration and ``get out the vote'' efforts.³⁹During the 1996 federal election cycle, these restrictions on the use of ``soft'' money were ignored; the DNC became a shadow re-election campaign, allowing the President to spend more than the federal limits to which he had agreed in accepting partial public financing for his campaign. In short, the President used the DNC for an end-run around restrictive federal campaign laws. Both Morris and Ickes claimed credit for this idea in their testimony before this Committee. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \39\ Justice Breyer, writing for the Supreme Court, described the limited uses of ``soft money'': We recognize that FECA permits individuals to contribute more money ($20,000) to a party than to a candidate ($1,000) or to other political committees ($5,000). 2 U.S.C. Sec. 441a(a). We also recognize that FECA permits unregulated ``soft money'' contributions to a party for certain activities, such as electing candidates for state office, see Sec. 431(8)(A)(i), or for voter registration and ``get out the vote'' drives, see Sec. 431(8)(B)(xii). But the opportunity for corruption posed by these greater contributions is, at best, attenuated. Unregulated ``soft money'' contributions may not be used to influence a federal campaign, except when used in the limited, party- building activities specifically designated in the statute. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- See Sec. 431(8)(B). Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, ____ U.S. ____, 116 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1996). Morris testified that he first ``became aware of the existence of issue advocacy advertising'' in the spring or summer of 1995.⁴⁰Joseph Sandler, the DNC general counsel, and Lyn Utrecht, counsel for Clinton/Gore, provided Morris with his understanding of issue advocacy advertising.⁴¹他作证说：``他对您所能做的或不能做什么并且仍然有资格的所有印象。。。问题倡导广告来自他们的法律意见。''⁴²莫里斯（Morris）解释了他对有关问题倡导广告的法律准则的理解：-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 40 \ Morris沉积，p。134. \ 41 \ id。在第140-41页。莫里斯（Morris）不记得谁首先告诉他问题倡导广告，但他认为这是乌特雷希特（Utrecht），桑德勒（Sandler）或比尔·纳普（Bill Knapp），他是Squier Knapp＆Ochs公司的顾问。ID。在p。134. \ 42 \ id。在p。140.问题倡导广告必须与之相关。。 . a legislative issue that was pending before Congress, that was actively in play and in discussion before Congress. It had to express a point of view on that issue which was held by the President, the administration in general . . . and the leadership of the Democratic Party; that it had to be an issue position in which the Republican Party leadership took a generally different point of view, period. The advertisement had to be related to the substantive disagreements between the two camps and had to urge a substantive point of view in connection--calling for the adoption of the Presidential/Democratic views on those issues . . . [t]he advertisements . . . could not overly [sic] urge the re-election of the President or the defeat of any particular Republican candidate . . . that there were constraints on the extent to which the President's picture could be used in the advertisements or the picture of possible Republican opponents . . . that there were restrictions on the proximity to primary dates that such advertisements could be run in different states . . . that there was a cut-off date of Memorial Day '96 after which all advertising . . . had to come from the campaign.⁴³-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 43 \ id。在第142-43页。莫里斯没有进行任何独立的研究来确定桑德勒和乌得勒支的建议的准确性。⁴⁴的确，莫里斯（Morris）在很大程度上依赖桑德勒（Sandler）关于DNC和克林顿/戈尔广告的建议，这在所有媒体计划会议上的存在证明了这一点。⁴⁵------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 44 \ ID。在p。145. \ 45 \ id。在p。160.莫里斯（Morris）认为，他对RNC可能使用问题倡导广告的一种实例的理解为DNC创造了一个``先例''，以开展他的大规模媒体活动。ID。在p。298.他对RNC问题倡导广告的了解仅限于二手信息，二手信息在1983年``共和党在打击通货膨胀方面取得了广泛的广泛广告，与里根总统的连任无关。ID。在p。 296. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Morris provided the following examples of how he used DNC funded issue advocacy advertising to further his advertising plan. From January through April 1996, Morris testified that advertisements concerning family and medical leave had to be done by Clinton/Gore because the issue currently was not before Congress.⁴⁶但是，关于Medicare的广告可以由DNC（通过发行倡导广告）或克林顿/戈尔（Clinton/Gore）支付，因为``它在国会面前都在发挥作用。''。⁴⁷此外，从1995年8月到12月，所有广告资金均来自DNC，因为据称这些广告与国会面前的``预算斗争''有关。⁴⁸During the period of the Republican primaries (approximately January through April of 1996), however, the funds for advertising were split between the DNC and Clinton/Gore depending upon the issue.⁴⁹Indeed, once Morris understood the concept of issue advocacy advertising, he regretted ``having spent the $2.4 million of campaign money on the crime ads'' Clinton/Gore ran in the spring of 1995.⁵⁰但是，莫里斯承认，无论这些不同的广告的付款方式如何，他们的最终目标是总统连任。⁵¹-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 46 \ ID。在p。158. \ 47 \ id。在第158-59页。\ 48 \ id。在第152页，第154页。\ 49 \ id。在p。153. \ 50 \ id。在第134-35页。\ 51 \ id。 at p. 293. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ickes, however, also wished to claim credit for using DNC ``issue'' advertising to circumvent federal election laws. He testified that he conceived of financing Morris' advertising campaign with ``soft'' money to run so-called ``issue ads'' on which unlimited money could be spent.⁵²Ickes volunteered that, ``Basically, it was my idea.''⁵³------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \52\ See Deposition of Harold Ickes, June 26, 1997, p. 31. \53\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Regardless of whether Ickes or Morris deserves the ``credit'' for hatching a scheme to violate the laws, there is no doubt that this early spending of ``soft'' money was driven by the President's re-election. In testifying about the purpose of the early ``soft'' money advertising, Ickes offered another glimpse into a nervous President's thought process--a President bent on avoiding a repeat of the 1994 election debacle, deterring prospective primary challengers, and winning re- election: The idea was to try to--to use paid media, in addition to what the President was saying publicly, to used paid media to reinforce what he was saying publicly, and I think that the theory was that through well-placed, well-designed paid media, that you could get more--you could educate the public more on what the President had done and what he was trying to do in an unfiltered way so that you could have direct contact with potential voters as opposed to having it filtered through the media. I think a lesson had been learned-- well. . . . Q: And was part of the goal of this idea to successfully avoid a primary in '96, a primary challenge? A: I don't think there was a concern at that point, but it depends what point you're talking about. Where are we in terms of time frame? Q: In the '95, say from February through August, time period. A: The focus was more--was less on avoiding a primary, much more on the general election. Q: The 1996 general election? A: Yes. The use of--the use of paid media was focused much more on the '96 general election, but the basic focus was the President was concerned in '94, he had not been able to reach, get through, or break through, to use a campaign term, with the public about the issues that he had been prosecuting in his agenda in '93 and '94. He was very concerned about that, and I think early on the basic thought was that the use of paid money could help break through and you'd have direct communication with voters on particular issues, whether it be crime, welfare reform, or what have you.⁵⁴------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \54\ Id. at pp. 36-37 (emphasis added). To a President wishing to avoid repetition of the 1994 debacle, the strategy of using unregulated DNC ``soft'' money to ensure that his re-election message resonated with the voting public must have been welcome. The September 10, 1995 White House Meeting: Unveiling the Scheme The scheme for spending DNC ``soft'' money to run early advertising in support of the President's re-election under the control of the White House was unveiled to the DNC's National Chairman at a significant meeting at the White House. The meeting took place on Sunday, September 10, 1995, at 9:00 PM.⁵⁵在场的人包括：总统，副总统，白宫参谋长莱昂·帕内塔（Leon Panetta），伊克斯（Ickes），DNC国家主席唐·福勒（Don Fowler）和总统的一名民意测验者之一。⁵⁶此外，第一夫人可能出席了。⁵⁷DNC总董事长克里斯托弗·多德（Christopher Dodd）本来应该通过电话参加，但没有找到他的位置。⁵⁸------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \55\ Deposition of Donald L. Fowler, May 21, 1997, pp. 290-92. \56\ Id. at p. 292. \57\ Id. \58\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ickes ran the meeting.⁵⁹对话的第一个主题涉及通过广告活动来传达总统的成就的必要性。⁶⁰白宫的计划是买这个民主党全国委员会advertising. The advertising ``was to be funded by the party, but it would focus on the President's program for the party and what he had done.''⁶¹According to Fowler, ``there was a general consensus that this was a good idea.''⁶²-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 59 \ ID。在p。293. \ 60 \ id。\ 61 \ id。\ 62 \ id。在p。294. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The meeting then focused on whether there was enough money to pay for the proposed advertisements. As Fowler put it, ``The discussion was mostly could we raise enough money to do it, and the initial plan was 10 weeks at a million dollars a week or thereabouts, and the discussion was we could raise it.''⁶³房间里的每个人都讨论了这笔钱是否可以筹集。⁶⁴------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 63 \ id。\ 64 \ id。------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Although no ``serious doubts'' were expressed in the meeting about the ability to raise the money, ``a number of people said it was going to take a lot of work and stuff like that.''⁶⁵显然，会议的参与者还讨论了总统和副总统是否需要更多时间和精力来筹集资金，以实现计划。⁶⁶会议在晚上10:30或11:00左右结束。⁶⁷策略集。------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \65\ Id. at pp. 294-95. \66\ Id. at p. 295. \67\ Id. at pp. 295-96. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In His Own Words: The President's Knowing Subversion of Federal Election Law Clearly, the President and his aides devised a strategy to subvert the spending limits imposed by federal law on presidential candidates who agree to accept public financing. ``Soft'' money was used for the express purpose of promoting the President's re-election. As documented elsewhere in this report, the money was raised and spent under the supervision of White House officials.⁶⁸The money was spent on ads that were produced by the firm handling the re-election campaign's ads, ads that the President himself edited and revised. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \68\ See the section of this report on the White House's control of the DNC. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The President knew that he was using DNC ``soft'' money to support his re-election campaign. He told a group of major contributors to the DNC: [W]e even gave up one or two of our fundraisers at the end of the year to try to get more money to the Democratic Party rather than my campaigns. My original strategy had been to raise all the money for my campaign this year, so I could spend all my money next year being president, running for president, and raising money for the Senate and House Committee and for the Democratic Party. And then we realized that we could run these ads through the Democratic Party, which meant that we could raise money in twenty and fifty and hundred thousand dollar lots, and we didn't have to do it all in thousand dollars. And run down--you know what I can spend which is limited by law. So that's what we've done. But I have to tell you I'm very grateful to you. The contributions you have made in this have made a huge difference.⁶⁹------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \69\ Transcribed Statement of President Bill Clinton, White House Communications Agency Videotape, Dec. 7, 1995 (Hay-Adams Dinner). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- the ``bottom line'': pressure on the dnc to satisfy the campaign's need for money The President's massive media plan, combined with the DNC's operating costs, required Democrats to raise an unprecedented amount of money.⁷⁰莫里斯（Morris）作证说，媒体团队不断需要额外的钱来全额资助计划的每周媒体购买。例如，媒体团队将计划一周的付费广告120万美元，但DNC只有100万美元可用。⁷¹Consequently, Morris appealed to the President to hold additional fund-raising events on at least ten occasions, and to the Vice President on two or three occasions.⁷²When Morris learned from Doug Sosnik⁷³总统没有根据他的日程安排给予足够的优先考虑，他在每周的战略会议上公开上诉````花更多的时间用于安排筹款人。''。''⁷⁴------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \70\ Morris stated in his book that ``[n]o president had ever advertised even remotely this far in advance of an election. . . . Ten million dollars was about equal to what most president or candidates for the presidency spent on media ads for the entire primary season, from Iowa through the convention--yet here we were spending it on issue ads more than a year before the election began.'' See Behind the Oval Office, p. 150. \71\ Morris deposition, p. 241. \72\ Id. at pp. 241, 244. Either Marvin Rosen, Democratic Finance Chairman, or Terry McAuliffe once even asked Morris to meet with a potential donor. Id. at p. 249. \73\ Sosnik was the White House political affairs director. \74\ Id. at pp. 241-42. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In November and December 1995, the DNC ``spent a vast amount of money'' on advertising to boost the President's poll numbers during the government shutdown.⁷⁵伊克斯（Ickes）或鲍尔斯（Bowles）告知莫里斯（Morris），秋季的扩展广告``在功能上清理了DNC钱''，并且一月份没有足够的资金来宣传。⁷⁶在1995年12月7日的白宫政治战略会议的议程中，莫里斯告知参与者：````需要打个电话并筹集资金，以尽快在一月份尽快转向媒体 - 或在交易后不久，可能的。''⁷⁷莫里斯（Morris）作证说，在议程中，他要求DNC``Dealepure''其筹款努力，因为至关重要的是，代表总统的广告活动继续进行。⁷⁸Morris' concern over the lack of funding for advertising is emphasized in the agenda for the February 22, 1996 White House political strategy meeting, which warned participants that the ``[f]ailure to advertise is, once again catching up with us.''⁷⁹In the agenda for the March 6, 1996 meeting, Morris wrote that ``DNC fund raising is not now equipped to cope with the money needs. . . . We have had trouble getting this week's DNC money together. . . . Fund raising at DNC level must be improved.''⁸⁰-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 75 \ id。在p。324. \ 76 \ id。在第324-25页。\ 77 \参见1995年12月7日，第1页。2（例如4）。\ 78 \请参见莫里斯沉积，p。324. \ 79 \ 1996年2月22日议程，第1页。3（例如5）。\ 80 \ 1996年3月6日议程（Ex。6）; see Morris deposition, p. 347. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Morris testified that the Vice President ``tended to favor the advertising that we were doing and . . . worked fairly hard at trying to raise the money.''⁸¹然而，莫里斯在他的书中写道，总统``痛苦地抱怨''必须筹集经营广告所需的资金。⁸²筹款变得如此消耗，以至于总统告诉莫里斯：------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 81 \ ID。在p。245. \ 82 \请参阅椭圆形办公室后面，第2页。150.莫里斯作证说，他的书中的所有陈述在椭圆形办公室后面都是真实的。``据我所知，书中的所有内容都是真的。''请参阅莫里斯的证词，第28，36-37页。``我想不到。我不能采取行动。除了去找筹款人并握手，我什么也做不了。您要我发出执行命令；我不能专注于一个事情，而是下一个筹款活动。 Hillary can't, Al can't--we're all getting sick and crazy because of it.''⁸³------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \83\ Behind the Oval Office, p. 151. A recent study of the President's rigorous fund-raising schedule confirms that the President was severely taxed by these fund-raising demands. See Glenn F. Bunting, ``A Hard and Fast Ride on Donation Trail,'' Los Angeles Times, December 21, 1997, A1. The President's zeal for fund-raising placed a ``strain . . . on both the presidency and the operation of the White House.'' Id. The DNC also felt unprecedented pressure to raise money. As discussed at some length later in this report, Ickes took control of the DNC's Finance Division, and held weekly ``Wednesday Money Meetings'' beginning in 1995 to control the DNC's fund-raising and budgeting.⁸⁴在这些会议中，伊克斯对金钱的重视很明显。DNC国家财政总监理查德·沙利文（Richard Sullivan）记得伊克斯（Well Ickes）对筹款的关注。沙利文在讨论常规的货币会议时，回忆起艾克斯对DNC首席财务官布拉德·马歇尔（Brad Marshall）的质疑，甚至雇用了一些伊克斯（Ickes）的著名亵渎：``所有哈罗德都关心的都是底线。。。哈罗德（Harold）申请了布拉德（Marshall）的支出预测数量，只是在关心底线。他只是在乎您知道的，[]该死的，只需告诉我银行里的什么，布拉德。[']''⁸⁵伊克斯本人同意他对DNC的关注``底线''：``我的重点。。。正如他们喜欢在金融业务中所说的那样，这是最重要的。''⁸⁶------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \84\ See Deposition of Harold Ickes, June 26, 1997, p. 55; see also the section of this report on White House control of the DNC. \85\ Deposition of Richard Sullivan, June 4, 1997, p. 90. \86\ Deposition of Harold Ickes, June 26, 1997, p. 62. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ickes wrote memoranda summarizing what went on at these ``money meetings,'' and these memoranda prove the White House's intense involvement in all aspects of DNC fund-raising, and provide some glimpse into the pressure the DNC was under to raise funds.⁸⁷------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \87\ See the section of this report on White House control of the DNC. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In fact, the amount raised by the DNC during the 1996 election cycle vastly exceeded that raised in earlier years. McAuliffe characterized his 1994 DNC fund-raising effort as a much ``smaller operation'' when compared to the DNC's fund- raising during the 1996 election cycle.⁸⁸这些数字支持McAuliffe的描述。1994年，DNC筹集了约3,700万美元。⁸⁹By December 1995, a DNC draft budget for 1996 reflected a revenue projection of $110 million.⁹⁰Revenue from major donors alone in that draft budget was expected to total $80 million--more than twice the entire amount raised by the DNC during 1994.⁹¹------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \88\ Deposition of Terence R. McAuliffe, June 6, 1997, pp. 20-21. \89\ Id. See also Deposition of Richard Sullivan, June 5, 1997, p. 147 (estimating amount raised by the DNC in 1994 at $38 million). \90\ Democratic National Committee Proposed 1996 Budget, December 21, 1995, p. 9 (Ex. 7). When DNC National Chairman Don Fowler first told Sullivan to plan to raise $120 million, Sullivan told Fowler that he (Sullivan) ``was expecting a request for a plan of 90 to 100, and I thought 100 was kind of best case.'' Deposition of Richard Sullivan, June 5, 1997, p. 154. \91\ See Ex. 7 at p. 9. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- But even that ambitious draft budget was not enough. In a February 9, 1996, memorandum from Ickes to the President and the Vice President, Ickes reported that Marvin Rosen, the DNC's Finance Chairman, was ``confident that $125 million can be raised during the first 10 months of 1996.''⁹²到1996年7月5日，Ickes可以在另一份备忘录中向总统兼副总统报告，DNC的筹款活动是``Target''，并且DNC预计到1996年10月底，DNC预计收入为1.366亿美元。⁹³------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \92\ Memorandum to The President and The Vice President from Harold Ickes, February 9, 1996, p. 1 (Ex. 8). \93\ Memorandum to The President and The Vice President from Harold Ickes, July 5, 1996, p. 2 (Ex. 9). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The pressure to raise such enormous amounts of money was pervasive. DNC National Finance Director Richard Sullivan characterized the DNC in 1996 as engaged in ``an historic effort in terms of the aggressiveness of the fund-raising.''⁹⁴沙利文（Sullivan）告诉委员会，DNC``筹集了大量资金''，并补充说，在1995 - 96年期间，DNC``几乎是1991年至92个选举周期中筹集的数量的三倍。''。⁹⁵DNC国家董事长唐·福勒（Don Fowler）表示，在竞选期间，有``迫切需求筹集了大量资金。。。。'''⁹⁶------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \94\ Deposition of Richard Sullivan, June 25, 1997, p. 120. \95\ Testimony of Richard Sullivan, July 9, 1997, p. 8. \96\ Testimony of Donald L. Fowler, Sept. 9, 1997, p. 6. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- conclusion The many scandals that will be chronicled elsewhere in this report flow, directly or indirectly, from this ``historic effort in terms of the aggressiveness of the fund-raising.''⁹⁷广告活动提出协调问题d by Dick Morris, managed by the President, and funded by the DNC to promote the President's re-election, set the stage for the scandals that became the Committee's investigatory focus. To promote the President's re-election, Morris devised the issue advertising scheme. To pay for this project became the consuming passion of the President, his staff, and the DNC. Due to the DNC's need to feed the advertising beast, it dismantled its process for vetting contributions to ensure their legality. From the thirst for advertising dollars developed the DNC's search to tap new veins for money, such as emerging political groups. From the need for funds to pay for issue advertising arose the willingness to sell access to senior government officials and to use government property to raise funds. The White House and the Presidency were reduced to tools for fund-raising. In sum, Morris wrote the script. It was now up to the President and his cast of supporting actors to implement it. Tales from its implementation follow. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \97\ See Deposition of Richard Sullivan, June 25, 1997, p. 120.