对非法或不正当活动的调查 与1996年联邦竞选活动有关 政府事务委员会的最后报告 参议院报告105-167 -第105届国会2d会议- 1998年3月10日

   

    黄光裕在DNC的非法集资本章涵盖了黄光裕在DNC任职期间发生的一系列事件。它并没有试图全面描绘黄在民主党全国委员会的活动;相反，它阐明了一些重要的观点。首先，正如之前所讨论的，DNC财务官员非常担心黄光雄可能非法集资，他们坚持让他接受DNC总法律顾问乔·桑德勒(Joe Sandler)的个人培训。尽管理查德·沙利文声称他被告知有这样的培训，桑德勒声称没有人要求他提供这样的培训，他也没有这样做。这些相互矛盾的说法是DNC筹资运作中混乱和缺乏责任或问责的典型表现。第二，对黄光裕的关注不仅仅是理论上的，早在1996年2月他的第一次筹款活动中，人们就开始关注他了。当时，民主党全国委员会财务主管斯科特·派崔克(Scott patrick)对出席活动的外国人感到担忧，并要求桑德勒审查来自他们的支票。随后，民主党全国委员会于1996年3月从该事件中退回了两张支票。在DNC的联邦选举委员会(Federal Election Commission)相关时期的报告中，这些结果引人注目。DNC官员应该注意到，他们对黄光雄的早期担忧很快就变成了现实。 Not only did the DNC ignore this warning sign, but DNC officials also did not volunteer any information about these early returns in this investigation. It was not until a few days before the opening of the Committee's hearings in July 1997--and months after the Committee had served the DNC with its subpoena--that the Committee received documentary evidence of the return of funds that Huang had raised in February 1996. Until July 1997, none of the DNC officials who had been deposed--such as Richard Sullivan, Marvin Rosen, or Joe Sandler--had mentioned anything about these returns. Third, Huang's solicitation and collection of a $250,000 contribution from Cheong Am America in April 1996 should have provided even more warning signs for DNC officials. It was clear to anyone who cared enough to look that this contribution was illegal. Nevertheless, DNC officials were so obsessed with raising money that, at a minimum, they failed to ask obvious questions about the source of the money collected. The story of the Cheong Am contribution shows the unprofessional manner in which Huang operated. It also demonstrates the shameless selling of the President--as the DNC arranged a five minute photo-op in exchange for a quarter million dollar contribution. Fourth, DNC officials were uncomfortable with the guest list for a July 30, 1996 event organized by Huang. The guest list consisted of a small group of foreign nationals and the President. Nevertheless, DNC officials allowed the event to go forward. Only afterwards did they make the decision not to allow Huang to organize any more fund-raising events attended by the President. Fifth, Huang attempted to launder political contributions to the DNC. In August 1996, a time when there was significant pressure on Huang to perform, Huang approached a Washington area businessman and asked to use his organization to launder contributions, the source of which was not disclosed. Although Huang was rebuffed, and the deal was never consummated, the incident demonstrates how far Huang would go to raise money for the DNC. Finally, even at the conclusion of this investigation, there is still little known about what Huang did on a day-to- day basis. The Committee deposed numerous people at the DNC, including Huang's supervisors, co-workers, and office-mates. These individuals claimed to have little or no interaction with Huang, and in any event, shed little light on what he did every day. Huang did not have an assistant or a secretary, nor did he leave many documents at the DNC.1正如所讨论的，黄光裕本人拒绝向委员会发言。因此，委员会仍然不可能全面描绘黄在DNC的活动。--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 1 \山姆·纽曼DNC筹款人共享一个办公室与黄几个月,黄作证说,坐在一张桌子,但没有使用任何的抽屉,或任何其他在办公室空间,保持文件或文档。纽曼说，黄把他所有的笔记和会议都记录在他随身携带的一个装订好的写字板上。纽曼说，黄每天离开办公室时，没有留下任何便条、文件或任何财产。塞缪尔·纽曼的证词，1997年7月17日，第111-122页。--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 矛盾的证词是否桑德勒训练黄如前所述,DNC财务总监理查德•沙利文,够关心他是约翰·黄黄坚持个体之间的训练和DNC总法律顾问约瑟夫·桑德勒。沙利文还作证说，黄和桑德勒都告诉他，在黄开始在民主党全国委员会工作后不久，就举行了这样一次会议。然而，桑德勒坚称，这样的会议从未发生过。据沙利文说，1995年11月，沙利文和罗森第一次采访黄之后，罗森立即要求桑德勒去罗森的办公室。2沙利文和罗森告诉桑德勒，在唐·福勒的批准之前，黄可能会来到民主党全国委员会。他们向桑德勒解释说，他们已经告诉黄，他们想让他做的第一件事就是和桑德勒进行一次广泛的培训，这样黄就能学会管理筹款的规则。3.沙利文解释说:“我们要求乔(桑德勒)确保这一点，并表达了我们的愿望。乔说肯定。”4--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 2 \沉积的理查德·沙利文,6月5日,1997年,p . 24。3 \ \ Id。在24 - 25日页。4 \ \ Id。在25页。--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 几天后黄开始在民主党全国委员会,沙利文去桑德勒的办公室,询问是否桑德勒,事实上,坐下来和黄和讨论筹款规则。据沙利文说，桑德勒的回答是肯定的，并表示他和黄呆了一两个小时。5沙利文作证说:“他(桑德勒)说，他与约翰进行了长时间的交谈;他对自己掌握的规则感到满意;他描述自己未来行为的方式，以及他对筹款规则和规定的一般知识感到满意。”6问是否桑德勒提供更多细节关于他与黄的会话,沙利文回答说,“我相信他(Sandler)提到,他显然强调了他,你必须小心,外国子公司的规则,只是确保你不是来自美国。公民或绿卡持有者。”7--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 5 \标识。在页。27. \ 6 \同上。在页。26. \ 7 \同上。在第26-27页。---------------------------------------------------------------------------沙利文听到从黄以及来自桑德勒这堂训练课。Within a week after Huang started working at the DNC in December 1995, Sullivan asked Huang if he had already sat down with Sandler, whether Huang felt comfortable with the rules as they related to foreign subsidiaries and non- U.S. citizens, and whether Huang was comfortable in taking any questionable contributions to the counsel's office for review.\8\ Sullivan testified that Huang responded ``[v]ery positively. He said, absolutely I had a great session. We got along well. I feel very comfortable. I mean, John was not a man of great words, but--I feel comfortable and I see no problem with working closely with Joe to answer any questions that may arise.'' \9\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ Id. at pp. 27-28. \9\ Id. at p. 28. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The uncommon nature of the individual training session further enhanced Sullivan's memory about this issue. After explaining that Huang was the only ``student'' in the training session with Sandler, Sullivan remarked that it was ``very uncommon'' for a fund-raiser to have a private training session with the general counsel.\10\ Sullivan testified, ``I don't remember anyone else ever having a private session with the general counsel.\11\ Rosen also confirmed Huang's private session with Sandler. Rosen testified, ``I knew that early on, Mr. Huang had met with Mr. Sandler about the rules of getting money from foreign owned corporations in the United States or resident aliens or whatever.'' \12\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\ Id. at p. 29. \11\ Id. \12\ Deposition of Marvin Rosen, May 19, 1997, p. 268. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Sullivan testified that in the ensuing months, both Sandler and Huang confirmed that they were following up on their initial session. Sullivan testified that on ``random times'' in the ``first couple months of [Huang's] employment,'' he asked Sandler if Huang was vetting his checks with him, and Sandler responded ``yes.'' \13\ Sullivan also stated that during that same time period, he asked Huang on numerous occasions if he was working with Sandler to vet all checks that were of questionable legality. Huang responded affirmatively.\14\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\ Deposition of Richard Sullivan, June 5, 1997, p. 37. \14\ Id. at p. 33. The issue of vetting at the DNC is fully discussed in another chapter of this report. See the section of this report on the DNC's dismantling of its vetting procedures. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Sandler told the Committee a completely different story. During his deposition, Sandler was asked in seriatim whether Richard Sullivan, Marvin Rosen, Don Fowler, or ``anyone else in the world'' asked him to give Huang specialized or individualized training at the time that Huang came to the DNC. Sandler responded, ``no'' to each query.\15\ Sandler then testified that regardless of whether anyone asked him to give such training, he did not, in fact, conduct any specialized training for Huang in the beginning of December 1995.\16\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\ Deposition of Joseph E. Sandler, August 21, 1997, pp. 13-14. \16\ Id. at pp. 14-15. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- When confronted with Sullivan's conflicting testimony, Sandler's only explanation was that in February 1996 he met with Huang and reviewed checks collected in connection with Huang's first event, an Asian-American fund-raiser at the Hay- Adams Hotel in Washington, D.C.\17\ Sandler explained that he may have had a conversation with Sullivan following this meeting with Huang. Sandler testified that he ``probably would have referred to my feeling that Mr. Huang . . . seemed to understand the rules applicable to fund-raising for the DNC, in particular, in connection with issues of citizenship and legality on contributions from U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations or foreign-owned corporations.'' \18\ This explanation, however, cannot resolve the discrepancy between Sullivan and Sandler's accounts, as this February 1996 meeting occurred nearly three months after Sullivan alleged that the individual training session took place. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \17\ Id. at p. 15. \18\ Id. at p. 17. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Not only is there a dispute about whether Huang received any private training from Sandler, but the DNC general counsel's office cannot even confirm that Huang received any group training about fund-raising regulations and guidelines. Neil Reiff, DNC deputy general counsel and the person who organized group training for Finance Division employees, testified, ``I can't recall ever being involved in a training session with Mr. Huang. I couldn't even tell you whether he attended one of our training sessions. I cannot tell you right here I know that he ever participated in any training that I was involved in.'' \19\ Sandler pointed to a copy of DNC fund- raising guidelines found in Huang's files, but otherwise could not confirm any training of Huang. He testified that he was not aware of any particular training that Huang received.\20\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \19\ Deposition of Neil Paul Reiff, June 20, 1997, pp. 111-112. \20\ Deposition of Joseph E. Sandler, May 30, 1997, p. 129. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Concerns about Huang Materialize: DNC Returns Checks from His First Event As mentioned above, Huang's first event was an Asian- American fund-raiser at the Hay-Adams Hotel in Washington, D.C. on February 19, 1996. The event raised a significant amount of money (over $700,000, though budgeted for $500,000) and was considered a success. Nevertheless, the event also raised early warning signs which should have put DNC officials on notice that their initial concerns about Huang were not misplaced. First, a top DNC official not only noticed, but also expressed concern about, this event's potential for producing illegal contributions from foreign nationals to the DNC. Second, two checks raised in connection with the event were returned a month later, apparently because the checks were from foreign sources and thus violated campaign laws. Following this February event, DNC Treasurer Scott Pastrick approached Sandler and requested that Sandler meet with Huang to review checks from the event. Asked why Pastrick recommended this meeting, Sandler testified, ``I think that he had some concern to make about the foreign national--potential foreign national issues in this group because it had not been well known to the DNC.'' \21\ In his deposition, Pastrick never mentioned anything about this conversation with Sandler or about any concerns that he had about Huang. Asked if he participated in or overheard any conversations regarding concerns about Huang, Pastrick pointed to an ``odd'' comment by Rosen in mid to late October 1996 that Huang's activities were being checked by the DNC General Counsel's office.\22\ Otherwise, Pastrick testified, he had no other such conversations.\23\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \21\ Id. at p. 101. \22\ Deposition of Robert Scott Pastrick, May 7, 1997, pp. 97-98. \23\ Id. at p. 98. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As for the actual meeting, Sandler explained that he sat down with Huang for about 45 minutes and systematically discussed the checks that Huang had brought with him. Sandler stated that Huang had ``firsthand knowledge'' of the donors, and so Sandler felt that there was no need to do any additional review of the particular checks.\24\ Sandler said that he relied on Huang's explanation about the citizenship status of individuals or the ownership of a corporation.\25\ According to Sandler, there was no request at that time for him to go over general fund-raising gudelines with Huang, nor did he do so.\26\ Sandler admitted that he took some notes of his meeting with Huang, but stated that he had looked for the notes and could not find them.\27\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \24\ Deposition of Joseph E. Sandler, May 30, 1997, pp. 102-103. \25\ Id. at p. 103. \26\ Deposition of Joseph E. Sandler, August 21, 1997, p. 19. \27\ Deposition of Joseph E. Sandler, May 30, 1997, pp. 133-134. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Sandler testified that ``he could not recall any other occasion where he [Huang] came to me with a group of checks.'' \28\ Sandler's testimony differs from the testimony of his deputy, Neil Reiff, who explained that he passed by Sandler's office ``on a couple of occasions'' in the spring of 1996, and saw Huang meeting with Sandler.\29\ While Reiff did not participate in these meetings, he understood them to be for the purpose of reviewing specific contributions, ``because I saw John with checks in his hands when I walked by Joe's office. You could see him holding checks.'' \30\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \28\ Id. at p. 127. \29\ Reiff deposition, p. 113. \30\ Id. at p. 114. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In fact, the DNC soon returned checks that Huang raised from the Hay-Adams event. A few days before the start of the Committee's public hearings in July 1997, the Committee received documents showing that some of the Huang-solicited contributions had been returned as early as March 1996. The documents received reflected that, in connection with the Hay- Adams event, Huang had collected two separate $12,500 checks made payable to the Democratic National Committee. Both checks were dated February 26, 1996, and were written on an account at General Bank in California. According to DNC check tracking forms, which appear to have been filled out by Huang, one contribution is attributed to Shu-Lan Liu and one is attributable to Yun-Liang Ren. The address and telephone number is the same for both: 410 S. San Gabriel Blvd. Suite 10, San Gabriel, CA 91776 and (818) 821-5338.\31\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \31\ DNC check tracking forms for Shu-Lan Liu for $12,500 and Yun- Liang Ren for $12,500 (Ex. 1). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- About one month later, on March 26, someone at the DNC filled out two expenditure request forms to have the DNC issue checks refunding these contributions.\32\ While it is unclear who actually filled out the forms, they indicate that the two separate $12,500 expenditures were requested by Huang. On the line for ``purpose of expenditure,'' the same description is written for both--``Contribution Refund (see attached).'' \33\ It is unclear, however, what may have been attached to these requests. Photocopies of the checks and check tracking forms are numbered consecutively, but there also may have been a written internal note or other document explaining why the contributions were to be refunded.\34\ Nothing of the sort was produced to the Committee. On the expenditure request for Ren, there is a handwritten notation ``Neil'' which likely refers to DNC deputy general counsel Neil Reiff. It is unknown who made that notation, and, because the documents had not been produced before Reiff's deposition, he was not asked about the forms. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \32\ DNC Expenditure Request Forms, March 26, 1996 (Ex. 2). \33\ Id. \34\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Committee also obtained the relevant DNC report to the Federal Election Commission. On the Itemized Disbursements Schedule B page of the report, which was for the first quarter of 1996, the DNC listed both of these returned contributions.\35\ ``Contribution refund'' is listed as ``purpose of disbursement.'' However, there is no further explanation. The DNC also listed seven other contribution refunds on the Schedule. These two $12,500 refunds clearly stand out from the seven other entries. One of the seven was for $2,000 and the remaining were all for under $500.\36\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \35\ FEC Schedule B (Ex. 3). \36\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Committee learned that Ren and Liu are a married couple, and that they run an international trading group based in China. According to a family member in California, both Ren and Liu are currently living in China. Attempts to reach them by telephone in California and China were unsuccessful. Until July 1997, the Committee was under the impression that the first check raised by Huang and returned by the DNC was the Cheong Am contribution, which was solicited in April 1996 and returned in September 1996. In its public statements, the DNC had never made reference to any Huang-solicited contributions that were returned earlier. Moreover, in all the interviews and depositions conducted by the Committee until the Committee's receipt of the documents--and these depositions included almost all of the major DNC officials--no witness had made any reference whatsoever to any Huang-solicited contributions that were returned before the widely reported return of the Cheong Am contribution. During the first two sessions of Sandler's deposition in May 1997, for instance, he described the meeting that he had with Huang after Huang's first event. In his testimony, Sandler explained that Huang had firsthand knowledge of the donors, and Sandler did not ask Huang to return any of the checks that they discussed. During those sessions of his deposition, Sandler did not identify any contributions from the event that the DNC returned before the Debevoise & Plimpton review of all DNC contributions in the fall of 1996.\37\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \37\ Debevoise & Plimpton was the principal outside law firm retained by the DNC to defend it in this investigation. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Committee deposed Reiff on June 20, 1997, before the Committee had received the Ren and Liu documents, so Reiff was not asked directly about them; however, Reiff was asked numerous questions about his interaction with Huang, and all of his answers suggested that he had no involvement in the Ren and Liu contributions. Reiff testified, ``Other than passing him [Huang] in the hall politely, I had pretty much no interaction with Mr. Huang direct [sic],'' and ``[o]ther than the social interaction, I never provided any legal advice to Mr. Huang.'' \38\ Reiff also stated that he never participated in any meetings with Huang, nor could he recall ever being involved in a training session with Huang.\39\ Moreover, Reiff acknowledged in his deposition that he had primary responsibility for the final preparation of FEC reports.\40\ The fact that these two contributions stand out on the FEC report and that Reiff's name (``Neil'') is listed on the documents leave the Committee to wonder what Rieff may have known about these returned contributions. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \38\ Reiff deposition, p. 111. \39\ Id. \40\ Id. at p. 12. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- During the third session of his deposition, which took place on August 21, 1997, and thus after the Committee received the documents, Sandler was confronted with the Ren and Liu returned contributions. After acknowledging that he had reviewed these particular documents in preparation for this session of his deposition, Sandler testified, ``I don't know much about the circumstances surrounding these, but it is apparent that from the face of the documents that they were checks that Mr. Huang attributed to the Hay-Adams event; that they were initially deposited, but then within a month, maybe three weeks, Mr. Huang requested that the checks be refunded.'' \41\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \41\ Deposition of Joseph E. Sandler, August 21, 1997, p. 23. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Asked whether the Ren and Liu checks were among the checks that Sandler reviewed after the Hay-Adams event, Sandler responded, ``I don't specifically recall. It's possible, but I don't specifically recall. It's very possible that it was.'' \42\ Sandler also said that he did not remember whether Huang had consulted with him in March 1996 about the Ren and Liu contributions.\43\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \42\ Id. at p. 24. \43\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- While no one at the DNC admitted to having contemporaneous knowledge of these returned contributions, the fact remains that these Huang-solicited contributions were returned by the DNC in March 1996, only a few months after Huang had arrived at the DNC, and within a month of Huang's first fund-raising event. Nevertheless, DNC officials did not institute any closer monitoring of Huang's fund-raising, allowing him to continue to raise money unabated until the fall of 1996. Because of the intense pressure emanating from the White House to raise money, the DNC ignored these early indications and failed to screen subsequent Huang-solicited contributions until it was too late. In fact, within weeks of the return of these contributions, Huang solicited another illegal contribution--$250,000 from Korean citizen John K.H. Lee, a topic that will be discussed next. Additionally, these Ren and Liu contributions tie into another aspect of the Committee's investigation--the coordination between the DNC and various nonprofit groups.\44\ The Committee subpoenaed bank records for Ren and Liu, which show that on May 13, 1996, they jointly wrote a $25,000 check to a non-profit group, Vote '96.\45\ It seems more than just coincidental that the check is not only for $25,000, which is the total of the two returned contributions, but it is dated May 13, which is the date of Huang's second major fund-raiser-- an event at the Sheraton Carlton Hotel. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \44\ See the section of this report on misuse of nonprofit organizations. \45\ Check to Vote '96 from Shu-Lan Liu and Yun-Liang Ren, May 13, 1996 (Ex. 4). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Return of the Cheong Am Contribution On April 8, 1996, Huang collected for the DNC a $250,000 contribution from John K.H. Lee, a South Korean businessman. The contribution technically came from Lee's newly incorporated U.S. company, Cheong Am America, Inc. The intermediary between Huang and Lee was Michael Mitoma, an international business consultant and, at the time of the contribution, the mayor of Carson, California. After the Los Angeles Times inquired about the legality of the Cheong Am contribution in September 1996, the DNC acknowledged that it was illegal, and returned it. The return of this contribution led to additional press attention, and is generally noted as the beginning of the 1996 campaign finance scandal that triggered the Committee's investigation. The DNC has pointed to the return of this contribution as an example of how it swiftly reacted to any indicia of illegal contributions. At the time of the return, a DNC spokesperson also explained the illegal contribution by commenting, ``Our fund-raiser understood that the company had been in existence in the U.S. for some time, and was led to believe that the company's principals, including its chairman, were U.S. citizens or permanent residents.'' \46\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \46\ Alan C. Miller, ``Democrats Return Illegal Contribution,'' Los Angeles Times, September 21, 1996, p. A16. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The actual facts reveal a much different story. It was obvious to anyone who cared to look that Cheong Am America, Inc. was a newly-formed U.S. company with no current operations. It was also obvious that the company's chairman, John K.H. Lee, was a Korean citizen. Nevertheless, the acceptance of this contribution, and the way the DNC both solicited and vetted it, reveals the DNC's standard operating procedure. In their zeal to raise money, DNC officials at best neglected to ask the obvious questions, and at worst deliberately looked the other way. Furthermore, the Cheong Am contribution provides a good overview of the selling of the President, as John Huang and his colleagues at the DNC shamelessly arranged a photo-op with the President in exchange for a $250,000 contribution from a foreign national. This contribution had its genesis in the desire of an elected official to provide economic development for his community. In March 1996, Michael Mitoma heard from a friend about a South Korean businessman who was thinking about opening an electronics factory in California. As the mayor of Carson, California, a small city located adjacent to Los Angeles, Mitoma saw an opportunity to bring much needed jobs to his city. Mitoma traveled to South Korea and met with the Korean businessman, John K.H. Lee. According to Mitoma, Lee ``constantly talked about meeting the President, asked if I knew the President personally, and if I could assist in arranging a meeting between he and President Clinton.'' \47\ Mitoma needed an interpreter to speak to Lee, as Mitoma did not speak Korean and Lee did not speak English. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \47\ Testimony of Michael Mitoma, September 5, 1997, p. 126. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mitoma realized that successfully arranging a meeting with President Clinton would enhance the chances of convincing Lee to locate a factory in Carson. Accordingly, upon his return to the U.S., Mitoma tried the direct approach. He called the White House three times, but never received a return call.\48\ Faced with this lack of response, Mitoma began to explore other avenues. Mitoma explained, ``One of the suggestions was why don't you talk to the DNC because there's a series of fund- raisers that are being held, and that might be a way to meet the President. So I did call the DNC to see about that possibility.'' \49\ Mitoma was referred to Huang. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \48\ Id. at pp. 126-127. \49\ Id. at p. 127. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mitoma explained to Huang that he had a South Korean businessman who was interested in meeting the President. Huang responded by listing a ``menu'' of events, from large dinners of several hundred people at $5,000 per person to ``exclusive'' dinners at ``$50,000 a plate.'' \50\ When Mitoma relayed this information to Lee, Lee stated that he wanted to buy all the seats, even at $50,000 each, so that he could have a one-on-one dinner with the President.\51\ Huang rejected this proposal, telling Mitoma that others would need to attend the dinner.\52\ At that time, Huang also explained that he was working on setting up a small dinner and that there were five seats remaining. After checking with Lee, Mitoma confirmed to Huang that Lee would pay $250,000 for the five seats.\53\ Eventually, Huang informed Mitoma that the date of the dinner would be April 8, 1996. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \50\ Id. at p. 128. \51\ Id. at p. 129. \52\ Id. \53\ Id. at pp. 129-130. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In early April, Huang asked for, and Mitoma sent him, information on the five attendees.\54\ Besides Lee and Mitoma, the other three attendees were Won Ham, Lucy Ham and Young Chull Chung. Lucy Ham was the friend who had put Mitoma in touch with Lee. She and her husband, Won, were both U.S. citizens living in Los Angeles. Chung was Lee's partner and lived in South Korea. Mitoma explained that he was concerned at that time because he had received no written materials for this event, and had also not been informed about the time, place, or dress code.\55\ Since Lee was flying from Korea to Washington, D.C. for the sole purpose of meeting the President, Mitoma wanted to make sure that the event was actually going to happen.\56\ Even without the final details or confirmation, Lee, Chung, the Hams, and Mitoma all met in Washington, D.C. on April 7, 1996. Mitoma finally succeeded in contacting Huang during the morning of April 8, 1996, which was the same day as the planned dinner. After telling Mitoma to be at the Sheraton Carlton Hotel at 6:00 p.m., Huang began ``hedging on the dinner'' and suggested that instead of dinner, Lee may just have a private meeting with the President.\57\ In any event, Mitoma, Lee, and the others arrived at the Sheraton Carlton at about 5:45 p.m. There was no one there to greet them, nor were there any signs announcing the event. Lee's group waited in the lobby for over an hour, unclear about what was happening, before Huang arrived to greet them.\58\ After some brief pleasantries, Huang collected the $250,000 check and said that he would return. About 15 minutes later, Huang brought over Fowler, Sullivan, and Peter Knight to meet Lee.\59\ Lucy Ham translated, as Lee spoke no English. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \54\ Faxes to John Huang from Michael Mitoma, April 3, 1996 (Ex. 5). \55\ Mitoma testimony, p. 132. \56\ See Fax to John Huang from Mike Mitoma, April 4, 1996 (Ex. 6). \57\ Mitoma testimony, p. 134. \58\ Id. at p. 137. \59\ Id. at p. 138. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- After another 15 minute wait, Lee's group was ushered into a smaller room, and then, all of a sudden, the President appeared.\60\ Mitoma testified, ``[The President] was being briefed by John Huang and several other people. And then he came over to our group and we chatted briefly with the President. You know, I explained to him the same thing, you know, that Chairman Lee is going to establish a factory . . . in Carson.'' \61\ A photographer then took a series of pictures.\62\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \60\ Id. at p. 139. \61\ Id. \62\ Id. at p. 140. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- After the President moved along, Huang told Mitoma that they had just had their private meeting with the President and that there would be no dinner. As Mitoma explained, he was able to convince Lee that ``it was not such a great idea to eat American food and sit with a bunch of stuffy people for 45 minutes in a conversation that he would not understand.'' \63\ Mitoma, Lee, and the others left the hotel and went out for dinner by themselves. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \63\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- While Lee seemed content with his brief conversation and picture with the President, Mitoma was deeply disappointed by the way that he had been treated. He described the experience to the Committee as ``the most unprofessional thing I've ever seen,'' and added that he felt that Huang had been ``unscrupulous'' and had strung him along simply to get Lee's $250,000 check.\64\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \64\ Interview of Michael Mitoma, September 4, 1997. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A review of relevant documents confirms Mitoma's view of the haphazard nature of the Lee event. On April 8, the day of the scheduled dinner, Huang faxed Sullivan two pages of handwritten notes about Lee, Cheong Am, and the other participants.\65\ Sullivan then wrote a memo from himself and Huang to Doug Sosnik and Karen Hancox at the White House. Sullivan wrote, ``Mayor Michael Mitoma, Mayor of Carson, California, and the following would like to meet with POTUS this evening before our first dinner.'' After identifying the others and explaining that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the possibility of Cheong Am establishing a factory in Carson, Sullivan concluded, ``Mayor Mitoma has requested five minutes.'' \66\ In addition to demonstrating that the DNC was aware that Cheong Am was merely considering establishing a factory in the U.S., Sullivan's memorandum also shows that as of the day of the ``dinner,'' the DNC had not even cleared any meeting with the White House. Moreover, there is no mention of an exclusive dinner with the President--there is just a request for ``five minutes.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \65\ Fax from John Huang to Richard Sullivan, April 8, 1996 (Ex. 7). \66\ Memorandum to Doug Sosnik and Karen Hancox from Richard Sullivan and John Huang, April 8, 1996 (Ex. 8). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- It is also clear that the DNC simply tried to fit the Lee meeting into a evening already crowded by two fund-raising dinners. According to Fowler's schedule for April 8, 1996, there were two scheduled dinners at the Sheraton Carlton that night--an earlier Presidential dinner for Gala co-chairs and vice chairs, and a later Presidential dinner with a smaller group of contributors.\67\ The schedule allotted a ten minute travel break, from 7:40 to 7:50 p.m., between the two dinners.\68\ While Sullivan's memo asked for a meeting before the first dinner, it appears that Mitoma and Lee were shoe- horned into this ten minute period between the two dinners. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \67\ April 8, 1996 schedule of Donald L. Fowler, p. 3 (Ex. 9). \68\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cheong Am contribution also demonstrates that Huang and others at the DNC never raised any questions about the contribution's foreign origin. Mitoma had explained to Huang that Lee was a Korean businessman who was considering starting a business in Carson. Mitoma explained further that his efforts to arrange for a meeting between Lee and the President were directly connected to his larger endeavor to secure Lee's investment in Carson. Mitoma told the Committee that he was certain that Huang understood that Lee was both a foreign national and had not yet begun to conduct business in the United States.\69\ Moreover, the information that Mitoma sent to Huang on April 4, 1996, also should have cast doubt on the legality of the contribution. While the information on Won and Lucy Ham specifically indicates that they are American citizens, Lee's resume gives a Korean address and makes no mention of citizenship or U.S. immigration status.\70\ Huang, however, raised no questions at the time. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \69\ Mitoma interview, September 4, 1997. \70\ Ex. 5. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Huang's knowledge of Lees citizenship, and therefore his inability to contribute legally to the DNC, is further demonstrated by Huang's record keeping on the contribution. In filling out the DNC's check tracking form for the $250,000 contribution, Huang does not include any reference to Lee, despite the fact that Lee was clearly the principal of Cheong Am, and signed the check to the DNC.\71\ Instead, Huang listed Won Ham--someone he knew was an American citizen--as the contributor.\72\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \71\ Copy of check and check tracking form for donation by Cheong Am America to DNC, April 8, 1996, (Ex. 10). \72\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Besides these indications, a simple check of the California incorporation records would have shown that Cheong Am was incorporated at the end of February 1996.\73\ Thus, even without the bank records showing that the Cheong Am America bank account was funded by a transfer of $1.3 million from Korea on March 26, 1996,\74\ it was obvious that Cheong Am America had not been in operation long enough to generate the U.S. income needed to make a U.S. political contribution. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \73\ State of California Certificate of Incorporation for Cheong Am America, February 28, 1996 (Ex. 11). \74\ Assorted bank records of Cheong Am America. (Ex. 12). Bank records reflect the following money trail: On March 26, 1996, Cho Hung Bank in Seoul, South Korea wired $1.3 million to the California Cho Hung Bank. On April 4 & 5, it appears that the $1.3 million was deposited into a newly opened Cheong Am America, Inc. account at California Cho Hung Bank. On April 5, $300,000 (minus a $3 service fee) was wired into a new Cheong Am America, Inc. account at Hanmi Bank in Los Angeles. The $250,000 contribution to the DNC, as well as other related checks such as payment for the group's stay at the Four Seasons and for photos, came from this account. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A few days after the April 8 event, Huang showed the $250,000 Cheong Am check to Sullivan. Sullivan was surprised, since he had been expecting personal contributions from the Hams, who were American citizens, and not a corporate check.\75\ Sullivan testified: ``I remember looking at it with him [Huang] and saying, are you okay with this and have you vetted this with Sandler and he responded, yes.'' \76\ In the fall of 1996, after the news accounts of the Cheong Am contribution broke, Sullivan called Huang again and asked him the same question. According to Sullivan, Huang reiterated that he had vetted the check with Sandler immediately after receiving it in April 1996.\77\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \75\ Deposition of Richard Sullivan, June 5, 1997, p. 52. \76\ Id. \77\ Id. at p. 53. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Sullivan testified that he did not speak to Sandler about the Cheong Am check in April 1996. It was not until November 1996 that Sullivan and Sandler discussed it. At that time, Sullivan asked Sandler if he had vetted the Cheong Am check, and Sandler responded no. Moreover, in something that Sullivan ``found odd,'' Sandler told Sullivan that he was not even aware of the Cheong Am check.\78\ When Sullivan asked Sandler whether he had seen the check on the FEC report, Sandler, in Sullivan's words, ``just shorted it off. He [Sandler] said, you know, I just don't recall ever knowing about Cheong Am . . . John never brought it to my attention and I was never aware of Cheong Am America, Inc.'' \79\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \78\ Id. at p. 54. \79\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Asked whether he believed Sandler or Huang was telling the truth, Sullivan was reluctant to accuse either one of lying. ``I'd rather not have to answer that question directly. . . .'' \80\ Without being direct, however, Sullivan did made it clear which person he believed. He stated, ``I guess I want to think about why John would lie at the time, given the concerns that had been expressed earlier in the year. Let me state that. I can't think of--I am also perplexed by why John would have lied at the time. Let me also state that, I am perplexed why Joe would not acknowledge the existence of this contribution, given the fact that it was reported on the Federal Election Committee report.'' \81\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \80\ Id. at p. 58-59. \81\ Id. at p. 55. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- July 1996--Even More Warning Signals As with all DNC fund-raisers, there was constant pressure on Huang to raise additional money. On July 4, 1996, Fowler wrote a handwritten note to Huang, stating, ``John, We're making progress, but we have to do better. Thank you for your good work. Best Wishes, Don.'' \82\ In his deposition, Fowler stated that he could not recall why he wrote this note to Huang, and that the phrase ``we're making progress but we have to do better'' was ``just a general admonition.'' \83\ Fowler also maintained that it was not unusual for him to write this type of note, and that at the time, he still believed that Huang ``was better than an average fund-raiser for the DNC.'' \84\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \82\ Handwritten note from Don Fowler to John Huang dated July 4, 1996 (Ex. 13) (emphasis added). \83\ Deposition of Don Fowler, May 21, 1997, p. 207. \84\ Id. at p. 208; see also id. at p. 198. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- During the month of July 1996, Huang was responsible for organizing two different DNC fund-raising events--a July 22 event at the Century City Hotel in Los Angeles and a July 30 dinner at the Jefferson Hotel in Washington D.C. Neither of these events turned out the way DNC officials had hoped. In fact, DNC officials were so troubled by the latter event-- including the list of guests at the event--that they made a decision not to give Huang any more events with the President. The July 22 event was designed to be a large fund-raising event with Vice President Gore as the featured guest. The ticket price was approximately $500 or $1,000. Many of the attendees were the same people who attended the Hsi Lai Temple fund-raiser in April 1996.85黄光裕曾预测该活动将筹集约100万美元。事实上，6月底，哈罗德·伊克斯(Harold Ickes)曾问，7月份的筹款情况如何，沙利文回答说:“我们正在做几件事。其中一个是大的。约翰·黄表示，他很高兴能通过洛杉矶的一个大型亚洲社区活动筹集到100万美元。”86--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 85年的另一章\这份报告提供了一个西来寺事件的详细讨论。理查德·沙利文的证词，1997年6月5日，第88页。--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 尽管黄光裕的预测,世纪城事件是不太成功的。据沙利文说，截至7月底，民主党全国委员会仅从该委员会获得了20万至30万美元。87--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 87年\ Id。在70页。--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 黄也同意组织另一个筹款人定于7月30日。沙利文回忆说，白宫的凯伦·汉克斯(Karen Hancox)打来电话，说要和总统一起参加筹款晚宴，沙利文和罗森找到了黄。他们问他:“你想不想再吃一顿饭?”你看你能再凑4到50万美元吗?”88黄回答说他可以“再做一顿饭”。89--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 88年\ Id。在66页。89年\ \ Id。在67页。--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 根据他跟黄,沙利文预计晚餐' '的(黄)之前的,大约5,10000美元一对。"90然而，事实并非如此。在7月30日晚宴的前几天，黄把邀请名单给了苏利文。沙利文失望地发现名单上只有一小部分人，而且很多人似乎都是外国人，于是他把名单拿给罗森看。据沙利文说，罗森看了看清单，然后说:“没关系。现在做其他事都太晚了。一定要把名单送到白宫。”91很明显，尽管民主党全国委员会官员担心潜在的非法行为，他们还是选择继续杰斐逊酒店的晚宴，显然是相信筹集一些资金总比没有好。沙利文回忆说，没有足够的时间取消黄的活动，并组织另一个活动。92显然，白宫官员也有同感。沙利文回忆说，事实上，他确实把与会者名单发给了白宫。93然后汉考克斯又给沙利文打了电话，说名单没有问题。94--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 90年\ Id。91年\ \ Id。92年\ \ Id。在72页。93年\ \ Id。在68页。94年\ \ Id。在83页。---------------------------------------------------------------------------委员会尚未收到白宫和民主党全国委员会就此次活动的任何通信副本，但民主党全国委员会已提供了出席此次活动的人员名单。95除了克林顿总统和民主党全国委员会官员福勒、沙利文、罗森和黄(以及黄夫人)，还有四名商人和他们的家人参加了会议。他们是许肯先生，以及他的妻子贝蒂和女儿多萝西;林毅夫博士及其妻子祖英和儿子托马斯;詹姆斯·里亚迪(James Riady)和妻子艾琳(Aileen);Eugene Tung-Chin Wu先生和他的妻子Shirley。96--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 95 \ DNC的与会者列表7月30日活动在杰佛逊酒店(14例)。96年\ \ Id。--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 沙利文晚餐和罗森都短暂地露了一下脸。沙利文说，他去了大约五分钟，跟黄打了个招呼，确保一切正常。沙利文认为他可能也在活动中见过詹姆斯·里亚迪。97罗森回忆说，在这次活动中，他也被介绍给了里亚迪。98--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 理查德•沙利文97 \沉积的6月5日,1997年,p . 69。\98\罗森庭外取证，第97页。--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 第二天,或者几天之内的事件,沙利文黄和罗森讨论了他们的不满。首先，他们感到不安，因为晚餐没有''有成效'。"99杰斐逊饭店没有举办一场每对夫妇5万美元的大型晚宴，而是举行了一次私人聚会，无法满足民主党对联邦资金的需求。苏利文解释说:“我们只吃了一小顿饭，这就意味着我们觉得约翰不会拿出很多钱来。我不认为仅仅凭在场的人的性质就能从那次活动中赚到很多钱。”这并不是我们在1996年7月和8月时真正想要的路线。”One hundred.更令他们苦恼的是，杰斐逊事件根本不会带来足够的钱，罗森和沙利文觉得黄让他们失望了。据沙利文说，这两个人都认为，“约翰没有达到他自愿来找我们并说他能做到的程度。”101沙利文详细地说，“黄光裕在他说要在洛杉矶做的事情上少了大约70万美元……随着事件发生后的日子一天天过去，资金并没有像往常一样到位，我越来越怀疑这是否会达到他所说的水平。”102--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 理查德•沙利文99 \沉积的6月5日,1997年,p . 70。100年\ \ Id。在60页。101年\ \ Id。在73页。102年\ \ Id。在72页。--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 第二,苏利文和罗森关注实际的与会者晚餐。正如沙利文解释的那样，“我们对他让几个外国人吃一顿总统的小晚餐并不是很满意……我们对此并不满意，因为可能会有这样的看法。 The press has made a big deal about, oh, you know, why did you have them in when you knew you weren't going to get money from them. Well, we knew that too, but we were just worried about the perception.''103这已经不是罗森和沙利文第一次这样讨论了。沙利文作证说，1996年5月13日，黄光裕在华盛顿特区喜来登卡尔顿酒店举行的筹款晚宴上，104罗森和他讨论了一个事实，‘房间里可能有一些外国人’。”105据沙利文说，“我认为五月的晚餐有点让人担心，但我们说……如果人们要做出贡献，他们有权带着客人一起吃饭。重要的是约翰正在和乔核对他的支票。”106--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 103年\ Id。在73页。请看这份关于约格什·甘地的报告。105\理查德·沙利文的证词，1997年6月5日，第62页。106年\ \ Id。在63页。--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 针对这些担忧,沙利文说,罗森决定在7月30日杰佛逊酒店事件黄不给任何额外的事件与总统。107在沙利文面前作证的罗森，向委员会提供的关于杰斐逊酒店事件的谈话细节要少得多。虽然罗森回忆起晚餐后与沙利文的一次谈话，但他没有提到任何对外国人的担忧，也没有提到任何决定不再用总统为黄举办活动。例如，当被问及他是否记得在晚餐前表达过任何担忧时，罗森说没有。当被问及在活动结束后是否有任何担忧时，罗森表示，媒体的报道往往会“遮蔽”他的记忆。他接着作证”、“我记得讨论这一事实让我吃惊,有许多——两个或三个小孩,和跟理查德事件后,我们需要接触更多,获得更多的参与不同的人,我记得讨论。这就是全部内容。”108罗森同意这个比喻，即民主党全国委员会希望总统参加的筹款活动“更划算”。109--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 107年\ Id。在70页。\108\罗森庭外取证，第98页109年\ \ Id。在99页。--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 黄寻求槽DNC贡献黄尚不清楚知道他被限制处理更总统的事件。不过，黄很可能至少知道，他的世纪城和杰斐逊酒店活动并没有产生预期的收入。因此，黄要么知道，要么很容易猜到，他的DNC上司对他最近的表现不满意。此外，在这个时期，DNC的筹款人筹集硬通货的压力越来越大。在不讨论选举融资细节的情况下，随着选举日的临近，硬通货比软通货更有价值。 DNC staffers certainly knew about that priority. As Sullivan explained, Huang was as ``aware as anybody on the staff about our federal dollars, about our federal dollar push. Marvin and I had held staff meetings and talked about it.''110--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 理查德•沙利文110 \沉积的6月5日,1997年,p . 67。--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 在这种环境下,黄共进午餐Rawlein君主白兰地酒,在华盛顿特区的一个商人和亚洲的美国商业圆桌会议(“AABR”),一组在华盛顿协助亚裔美国人在与联邦政府采购合同。在1996年7月底或8月初的一次午餐会上，黄要求索伯拉诺通过他的协会(及其成员)洗钱，以换取15%的回扣。如果成功洗钱，这些捐款可以转化为迫切需要的硬通货或联邦捐款。无论如何，索伯拉诺很快结束了谈话，也没有接受黄的提议。索伯拉诺在向委员会作证时提供了背景资料。他说，在1996年之前，他见过黄光裕几次。111后来，在1996年6月下旬，在旧金山举行的华裔美国人组织会议上，索伯拉诺见到了黄，并得知黄已从商务部调到了民主党全国委员会。1121996年夏天，索伯拉诺正在设法确定即将举行的AABR年度活动的赞助者或能够提供潜在赞助者姓名的人。113与此相关，索伯拉诺打电话给黄，约他在华盛顿特区的五月花酒店共进午餐。索伯拉诺无法确定午餐的确切日期，但他回忆说，那是1996年7月的最后一周或8月初。黄的行程安排支持这个日期范围。民主党全国委员会的记录显示，黄从7月10日到7月23日在加州，8月10日到8月19日在纽约。114在这段时间里，黄光裕很可能在华盛顿特区，特别是在他计划并参加了1996年7月30日杰斐逊酒店的活动之后。--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 111 \证词Rawlein君主白兰地酒,9月16日,1997年,p . 199。112年\ \ Id。在200页。113年\ \ Id。在201页。114 DNC费用报告和收据(Ex.ReportsReports 15)。--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 君主白兰地酒作证说,谈话围绕AABR共进午餐。在回答黄的问题时，索伯拉诺描述了该组织的宗旨和成员，当时大约有360名成员。115黄光裕随后问到AABR的预算，索贝拉诺回答说，你不会相信的。我们的预算很紧张。”116例如，索伯拉诺向黄解释说:“我们实际上没有预算，因为我们都依靠会员的志愿者工作。事实上，组织的位置取决于成员是否慷慨地为其提供空间。”117--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 115年\君主白兰地酒的证词,202 & 225页。\116\罗林·索伯拉诺的证词，1997年5月13日，第33页。117\索伯拉诺证词，第203页。--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 附近的结束午餐,黄了洗钱的建议。索伯拉诺作证说:“我记得他是在讨论预算的时候提到的——我记得这件事就像昨天发生的一样。他说，‘也许我们能帮你，’然后我看着他说，‘怎么帮?’他直截了当地说，‘我们可以给你30万美元，你以后可以还给我们，你可以给我们的组织15%，’但那是我告诉他的，‘约翰，这个对话从来没有发生过。’118--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 118年\ Id。--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 首先,君主白兰地酒作证说,他认为黄是在开玩笑。但随着黄的继续，当索伯拉诺告诉他，对话从未发生，索伯拉诺看到黄的“脸掉下来”，知道黄是认真的。119索伯拉诺向委员会解释说:“在亚洲文化中，我们有我们所说的非语言交流，有时我们非常担心人们会丢面子。我拒绝了他，让他很丢脸。”120索伯拉诺和黄没有进一步讨论黄的提议，几分钟后他们尴尬地结束了午餐。自从他们共进午餐后，索伯拉诺就没有和黄说过话。121--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 119年\ Id。在204页。120年\ \ Id。121年\ \ Id。在205页。--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 君主白兰地酒立即切断对话,因此他从未要求黄详细说明他的提议。在他的证词和听证会证词中，索伯拉诺拒绝对黄提到的“我们”做任何假设，尤其是因为黄从未明确提到DNC或民主党。122然而，与此同时，索贝拉诺也承认了一个显而易见的事实。他作证说，‘但你看一下，我的意思是，我知道他的意思，但我不想把这些话强加给他。’”123索伯拉诺承认，他知道在午餐的时候，黄正在民主党全国委员会担任“主要的筹款人”。124--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 122 \君主白兰地酒沉积,p . 116。123年\ \ Id。\124\索伯拉诺证词，页200 & 225。--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 黄的君主白兰地酒共进午餐由杰瑞·帕克,证实PrinVest公司的副总裁在相关的时期,君主白兰地酒PrinVest咨询,在其办公室工作,五月花酒店附近。在与委员会工作人员的采访中，帕克表示，毫无疑问，索伯拉诺有一天经过他的办公室，提到了他与黄约翰的会面。Parker不太确定Soberano的评论是在和Huang会面之前还是之后，但他认为是在之前，而且Soberano说他要去和Huang会面。索伯拉诺的话一直留在帕克的记忆中，因为帕克认识黄，上世纪70年代，他曾在华盛顿特区的一家银行接受过培训。125--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 125 \采访杰瑞·帕克,1997年7月1日。--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 结论黄君主白兰地酒的方法不应该被意外——这是他筹款奥德赛的逻辑结果。黄在奇怪的情况下来到了民主党全国委员会，他在民主党全国委员会的任期充满了警告信号——这些信号被发现了，但随后被忽视了。这些迹象都被忽视了，因为民主党全国委员会官员在白宫的压力下筹集了前所未有的资金。证据显示，在美国总统唆使DNC官员雇佣黄光裕的同时，黄光裕已经违反了《哈奇法案》(Hatch Act)筹集资金。DNC官员显然意识到这是非法的，并采取措施掩盖书面记录，在DNC检查跟踪表格上用黄简的名字代替了黄约翰的名字。126此外，DNC官员从一开始就表达了对黄光裕的担忧。他们担心黄不理解，也不会遵守各种筹款法律。因此，他们坚持让他与民主党全国委员会总顾问乔·桑德勒进行私人培训。不过，他们也为黄光裕提供了一项融资激励安排。--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \ 黄126 \见本报告的部分在商务部的筹款。--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 一旦黄抵达民主党全国委员会,DNC官员继续精神分裂症行为。一方面，他们担心黄的活动中会有大量的外国人。另一方面，他们意识到黄筹集了大量的捐款，所以他们不愿意采取任何行动，直到为时已晚。清岩捐款就是一个很好的例子，说明了民主党全国委员会是如何知道捐款来自外国，因此是非法的，但仍然接受它，因为它太容易拒绝——25万美元与总统拍照5分钟。最后，委员会对民主党全国委员会官员证词的不一致感到不安。 Senior DNC officials directly contradict each other on such important points as whether Huang ever received individualized training. Moreover, there are various examples, including the return of Huang-solicited contributions in March 1996, where DNC officials did not provide the Committee with highly relevant information in a timely manner. Even recognizing that memories fade over time, it would seem that DNC officials who were closely involved in the events the Committee was investigating should have a greater command of detail than they claim to have. Huang's assertion of his fifth amendment privilege against self- incrimination made the Committee's investigation of his activities difficult, and this difficulty was magnified by DNC officials' conflicting accounts and alleged failures of memory.