I. INTRODUCTION

It is my privilege to appear before you today to discuss the efforts of the Department of Justice, working together with other agencies throughout government, to address the threat of terrorist attacks within the United States utilizing chemical or biological weapons.

保护我们的国家及其人民免受恐怖主义行为是本届政府面临的最大挑战之一，是司法部的最高优先事项之一。显然，美国公民和利益可能是恐怖分子的目标。

无论特定恐怖分子或恐怖组织的起源或误导动机如何，恐怖行为的潜在后果都可能是巨大的。例如，从世界贸易中心，穆拉大楼，霍巴尔塔和巴塔姆航班103的爆炸中流动的人类苦难的大小是不可估量的。

Yet, each of those terrorist tragedies was carried out using conventional explosives technology. As chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction become more accessible, we face the potential of even more catastrophic acts of terrorism. Such weapons are relatively inexpensive to produce and have the capability of causing widespread death if released on an unsuspecting populace. The nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway by members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult was a grim warning of this potential.

在我们自由和开放的社会的背景下，化学和生物学武器构成的威胁提出了一个特别的挑战。我们必须积极努力保护这个国家及其人民免受这种恐怖行为的祸害。同时，我们的努力必须充分尊重这个国家所拥有的个人权利和自由。

自1995年6月21日发布总统决策指令39（PDD-39）以来，已经采取了重大步骤来开发有效的能力来应对化学和生物恐怖主义构成的威胁。目的是尽一切可能阻止和防止这种恐怖行为。但是，与此同时，我们正在努力确保对这种行为做出响应的必要能力和程序，以便我们可以有效地管理危机并减轻其后果。为了实现这些目标，我正在与总统的国家安全顾问密切协调，他为总统进一步的总统决策指令发展并重申PDD-39，同时进一步增强了我们在这个重要领域的能力。

我们根据PDD-39的努力的一个关键方面是吸引所有具有相关专业知识的联邦机构的参与，并开发了这些机构之间有效协调的机制。同样，我们正在与州和地方当局联系，以确保其资源和能力有效地纳入整体危机响应以及后果管理计划和准备工作。机构之间的这种紧密互动至关重要，因为它产生了洞察力和优势，没有代理机构单独行动将拥有并允许我们利用我们的资源来获得最大的影响。

The focus of my testimony today will include a discussion of the coordination mechanisms that have been developed and an illustration of how they are utilized in deploying resources in response to a threat or act of chemical or biological terrorism.

Although we have made substantial progress over the past three years in developing capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat and manage the consequences of terrorist acts involving the use of chemical and biological weapons, much work remains to be done. This form of terrorism presents extraordinary challenges, which require that we engage in further concerted efforts within government and that we enlist the assistance of the private sector. I will address some of the areas which require additional attention or the development of new solutions.

当我们专注于这些新解决方案的开发时，重要的是要注意，化学物质与生物病原体面临一些不同的挑战。由于其直接影响暴露的人的健康，通常可以迅速检测到危险的化学物质的存在。但是，必须立即进行解毒和给药以完全有效。相反，由于其对公共卫生的影响延迟，因此很难检测到生物病原体的存在。尽管这种延迟提供了更大的时间进行补救程序，但它也带来了在检测到问题之前广泛传播传染性药物的风险。

The Conference Committee Report accompanying the 1998 Appropriations Act for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies directs me to develop a Five-Year Counterterrorism and Technology Plan by December 31, 1998, to serve as a baseline for coordination of national policy and operational capabilities to combat terrorism. The plan is to be representative of all agencies involved in the government�s counterterrorism effort and to draw upon the expertise of academia, the private sector, and state and local law enforcement.

在与政府的同事密切合作，我打算将司法部的全部资源用于制定和实施该计划。这项努力的任何方面都比它与涉及大规模杀伤性武器（例如化学和生物武器）构成的威胁有关的工作更重要。为此，我建立了一个机构间资源和审查小组，该组织由关键联邦机构的代表组成，具有反恐责任。该核心代理集团最近监督了一项雄心勃勃的调查，该调查收集了有关其当前和拟议计划的机构的信息和见解，以及对未来五年需要采取的行动的建议，以提高美国的反恐能力。

下一步发展的五年Plan is the convening of interagency working groups which will meet during May and June to address seven major categories of issues. One of these groups will focus exclusively on terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, such as biological and chemical weapons. This working group will identify the direction the government�s counterterrorism strategy should take in the next five years to deter the unlawful dissemination and use of chemical and biological weapons; to prevent terrorist acquisition of such agents and their precursors; to improve federal, state, and local capabilities to respond to terrorist incidents involving biological and chemical weapons; and to ensure that we are adequately prepared to respond to a terrorist incident involving biological or chemical agents that threaten U.S. citizens and property overseas. Another interagency working group will focus its attention on research and development and technology issues, including those implicated by chemical or biological terrorist incidents. Among its concerns will be the development and enhancement of equipment for the early detection and identification of chemical or biological substances as well as the enhancement of health and medical services systems capable of responding quickly and effectively to such incidents.

ii。联邦政府的组织以防止和应对恐怖主义

我想首先关注联邦政府如何组织其资源和决策过程，以应对恐怖主义威胁和事件。联邦政府的部门和机构越来越多地与州和地方当局共同努力，以实施和推进政府的反恐策略。这些机构间机制和资源是我们正在制定国会规定的五年计划以进一步增强我们现有流程的基线。

A. Intelligence Collection and Assessment

最重要的目标是在发生之前预防恐怖行为。当然，这在计划中涉及使用大规模杀伤性武器（例如化学或生物武器）的武器时，这一点尤其重要。

Intelligence is the lifeblood of prevention, as it provides timely information about the identity, motives, movements, plans, resources, and possible allies of the perpetrators. The CIA is responsible for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of foreign intelligence regarding terrorist groups. Its efforts are coordinated by its Counterterrorist Center (CTC). Whenever information is developed concerning a possible terrorist attack within the United States, it is furnished to the FBI.

The FBI collects, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence on the activities of international terrorists targeting interests within the United States and terrorist groups operating in this country. The resulting information, whether derived from the CIA or developed by the FBI, is used to assist in the development of on-going investigations or in the initiation of new ones. Further, the information is used to disseminate early warnings to all pertinent federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and, where appropriate, to potential targets of terrorist activity.

Through the effective development and use of intelligence information, the FBI endeavors to initiate investigations as early in the chain of conspiratorial events as possible. This maximizes the potential of making arrests prior to the execution of terrorist acts. For example, Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and numerous co-defendants were arrested in 1993, and subsequently convicted for their roles in conspiring to wage a war of urban terrorism against the United States which, had it been successful, would have involved bombings of buildings, tunnels, and a bridge in Manhattan.

B. Senior Level Interagency Coordination

关于在美国迫在眉睫的恐怖袭击可能性的信息可能是由任何多个联邦机构中的任何一个开发的。开发可靠的信息时，政府会采用特定的程序来促进迅速，协调的机构间响应。

当威胁涉及国际恐怖分子的一项法案时，通过代表委员会的协调子组（CSG）来处理需要高级机构间审查的问题的协调。金博宝正规网址该委员会由涉及反恐的内阁机构的副秘书或等价委员会组成。其目的是确保在首席运营官一级确保机构间的协调，合作和决策，并向内阁秘书和总统提供协调的建议。

该机构拥有与国际恐怖主义威胁有关的可靠信息，立即通知了NSC官员的办公室，该官员主席CSG，该办公室有能力在几分钟之内通过电话会议召集该小组的紧急会议。对于不具有国际性质的美国恐怖主义行为的潜在行为，可以使用相同的迅速协调机制，除了司法部通过联邦调查局（FBI）是召集和主持会议的组织。

The regular CSG members include the NSC, State Department, Defense Department, CIA, the Department of Justice and the FBI. The CSG is also able to notify and involve established points of contact in a variety of other federal agencies when the circumstances of the particular terrorist threat warrant the inclusion of one or more of those agencies. They include the Departments of Energy, Transportation, Treasury, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture, as well as FEMA, EPA, and the NRC. For a threatened terrorist act involving a chemical or biological weapon, the CSG meeting would include, in addition to the regular members of the CSG, representatives of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the EPA, and FEMA.

Among the actions which the CSG can recommend to the Deputies Committee is deployment of a Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST). A specialized module of this team is available as needed to address chemical and biological threats or acts of terrorism.

激活后，DEST团队可以在几个小时内将其组件和设备组装，以便空运到事件区域。一旦进入现场，DEST团队就可以提供有关对恐怖主义威胁或事件的最合适反应的专家，高度专业化的建议和指导。反过来，此现场信息为有关部署其他联邦资源的进一步决策提供了知情的基础。

C.操作协调机制

PDD-39 sets forth lead agency responsibilities for combating terrorism. The Department of Justice, acting through the FBI, has lead responsibility for responding to terrorist threats and incidents occurring within the United States.

如PDD-39中所述，联邦对恐怖主义的反应包括两个组成部分：

- The crisis management component is led by the Department of Justice through the FBI, and includes measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and resolve a threat or act of terrorism. It is primarily a law enforcement response.

- 后果管理组成部分由FEMA协调，支持州和地方政府，包括保护公共卫生和安全，恢复基本政府服务的措施，并为受到政府，企业和个人的紧急救济提供了紧急救济。恐怖主义行为。

1. Crisis Management

The Department of Justice, in conjunction with other pertinent agencies, has drafted �Guidelines for the Mobilization, Deployment, and Employment of U.S. Government Agencies in Response to a Domestic Threat or Incident in Accordance With PDD-39,� which provide a detailed delineation of operational responsibilities and coordination mechanisms. Although these Guidelines, which are referred to as the �Domestic Guidelines,� have not been formally approved, they are in the final stages of interagency coordination and are utilized when a domestic terrorist event arises.

国内准则通过提供有关联邦调查局在打击国内恐怖主义方面的领导作用来促进机构间协调，例如：

- 联邦机构在应对恐怖事件中的作用和责任，包括涉及大规模杀伤性的核，化学或生物武器的事件；

- use of the Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST);

- 命令责任，包括现场指挥官和DEST团队负责人的责任；

- structure of the DEST and the Joint Operations Center (JOC);

- circumstances under which military resources can, consistent with federal law, be used for technical assistance or law enforcement support;

- 寻求军事资产的程序，并在利用军队与联邦调查局之间的相互关系。

让我简要地讨论使用军事人员作为政府对化学或生物恐怖主义的威胁或事件的回应的一部分，因为它似乎是实质性误解的主题。

The �posse comitatus� restriction on the use of U.S. military forces to enforce laws within the United States is not contained in the Constitution but rather in a post-reconstruction era Act of Congress. See 18 U.S.C. � 1385. That Act expressly recognizes that Congress can enact statutes authorizing military involvement in law enforcement. Further, its provisions have been construed by the courts to be limited to activities that involve the direct execution of laws, e.g., making arrests. In contrast, the Posse Comitatus Act has not been construed to preclude the military from providing logistical, technical, and other forms of assistance to law enforcement. For example, the military has traditionally provided assistance to law enforcement in explosive ordnance disposal.

作为Nunn-Lugar II的一部分，国会颁布了法规，专门针对军方的使用，以应对涉及化学和生物杀害的化学和生物武器的恐怖事件。10 U.S.C.�382;18 U.S.C.175a和2332e。此外，更多的一般法规授权总统利用军队解决国内紧急情况。10 U.S.C.331-333。我完全期望联邦调查局与其他联邦执法机构及其州和地方同事共同合作，将能够解决大多数恐怖事件的执法方面。但是，在军方在解除化学或生物设备的解除和处置方面具有较高的能力，我会毫不犹豫地要求科恩秘书提供帮助。 Such assistance comports fully with applicable law, and the protection of the American public demands nothing less than the Government�s best efforts.

Consistent with the Domestic Guidelines, additional mechanisms for coordination have been created relating to incidents involving the actual or threatened use of chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction. For example, the FBI has created a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Operations Unit, which includes detailees from other federal agencies, and DOD has created a National Response Center emergency hotline, which operates in conjunction with the FBI.

尽管联邦调查局的WMD操作部门在协调对化学或生物恐怖事件的国家反应方面广泛发挥作用，但它在对WMD威胁的初步评估中起着特别关键的作用。威胁分析过程包括从三个角度评估威胁的评估：

- Technical Feasibility: this involves an assessment of the capacity of the threatening individual or organization to obtain or produce the biological or chemical substance at issue; it utilizes the expertise of HHS and, when needed, DOD.

- 操作实用性：这涉及对以威胁方式交付或使用该物质的可行性的评估；这也利用了HHS和DOD的专业知识。

- 行为决心：这涉及FBI的行为科学单位的心理评估，即主题将执行威胁的可能性，并包括行为科学家对主题或主题的任何书面或口头陈述的审查。

根据1997年《国防授权法》，国防部建立了电话热线，向州和地方官员提供相关数据和专家建议，以应对涉及大规模杀伤性武器的紧急情况。指定的DOD组件是陆军化学与生物防御司令部（CBDCOM），与联邦调查局密切合作，以确保有效的协调。所有详细介绍WMD版本的传入电话都连接到相关的DOD专家以及适当的FBI现场办公室。所有FBI现场办事处都既有与热线人员交往的程序。

2. Consequence Management

联邦应急管理局分配领域中的领导角色f consequence management and exercises its responsibilities through the structure established under the Federal Response Plan (FRP). The FRP defines the relationships and roles of 28 federal departments and agencies and the American Red Cross in the consequence management of any disaster or emergency in which FEMA is called on to respond. Further, pursuant to its responsibilities under PDD-39, FEMA has developed a Terrorist Incident Annex to the Federal Response Plan in coordination with DOD, HHS, DOE, FBI, and EPA. Among other things, the Annex defines policies and structures to coordinate consequence management with crisis management during a nuclear, chemical, or biological terrorist incident.

D.回应美国境内的化学或生物事件

1.危机部署策略

当我们面对美国在美国境内的主要恐怖威胁或行动时，几乎总是地方当局必须解决最初的回应。在恐怖行为之后的几分钟中，我们依靠他们的努力来挽救生命，遏制危机的范围，并逮捕可能逃离现场的恐怖分子。出于这个原因，为地方当局提供培训和支持的计划，例如1996年《防御武器大规模杀伤性武器法案》（Nunn-Lugar II）提供的计划非常重要。

作为既定的实践，地方当局迅速将当地联邦调查局办公室通知恐怖主义威胁或事件。FBI现场办公室接受了培训，可以立即启动，同时遇到一项重大恐怖事件，包括通知FBI总部和当地美国检察官办公室。

In the event of a threatened terrorist act utilizing a chemical or biological weapon, the field office would contact the FBI�s WMD Operations Unit for an assessment of the threat. That Unit would activate an interagency team which would collaborate by conference call and prepare an aggregate assessment of the credibility of the threat using the three criteria discussed above. Assuming that the threat is deemed to be one which must be taken seriously, the FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC), would undertake coordination of the federal response.

作为现场联邦指挥官，SAC将承担三个并发责任：（1）防止受到威胁行为的执行或现有的恐怖行为被扩大或加重；（2）确保正在计划解决潜在后果；（3）确定并逮捕威胁或行为的肇事者，并针对他制定刑事案件。但是，最初的最初问题是公众的安全。

为了实现目标，SAC将采取许多行动，包括以下各项：

- 与当地的紧急响应者协调，并与HHS和DOD的要素相应，以确保最佳的努力来挽救生命并防止额外的生活风险，同时避免任何不必要的破坏证据，这对后来的起诉可能很重要。

- Initiate an assessment of the scene of the incident to evaluate the presence of a continuing danger and to develop preliminary information on the relevant forensic aspects of the crime.

- 组成联合运营中心（JOC），将所有相关联邦，州和地方机构的代表汇集在一起​​，并作为协调响应的焦点。

- Establish a Joint Information Center (JIC), comprised of federal, state, and local authorities, to serve as the central point of contact for dissemination of information to the public.

- Consult with the FBI�s Hazardous Materials Response Unit to assess the capabilities of local and state authorities to identify, package, transport and analyze a sample of the chemical or biological substance.

-配合联邦应急管理局,以确保它是appropriately represented in the JOC and the JIC and that it is carrying out its consequence management responsi-bilities in a way that is fully integrated with the Bureau�s overall management of the crisis.

尽管这些活动正在现场开展，但司法部和联邦调查局总部立即法案将相关总部支持机构汇集在一起​​。联邦调查局的战略信息和运营中心（SIOC）立即与具有恐怖主义经验的代理商和检察官一起24小时内被激活和人员。反恐中心结合了18个联邦机构代表的资源和专业知识，支持这一努力，并将相关机构的代表集成到SIOC运营中。

此外，总部通过SIOC进行协调的官员与联邦调查局的车队指挥官和当地的美国律师进行了评估，将其他专业资源部署到现场。这些资源包括：

- DEST的化学/生物模块结合了FBI，DOD，HHS，EPA和FEMA的代表的专业知识，可以参与JOC并为现场指挥官提供指导。

- The FBI Hazardous Materials Response Unit.

- Experts in crime scene reconstruction and evidence preservation.

- Evidence response teams.

- Rapid Start computer database team.

- Laboratory personnel and behavioral scientists.

- 周围联邦调查现场办事处具有相关技能的代理商。

- FBI SACs with specialized training in crisis response so that ample management and leadership skills are available on a 24-hour basis; when multiple SACs are sent in to augment the local SAC, one is selected as the overall on-scene commander.

- 由一个经过特殊培训的律师批判事件响应小组组成的检察官，为当地的美国律师提供建议和协助。

如果恐怖主义事件的化学或生物学方面超出了联邦调查局危险材料响应单位和其他可用的平民组件的人员或能力，则法规授权总检察长要求国防部长国防部长向国防部长供应军事资产向处理大规模杀伤性武器的停用和运输。

通过利用这些程序和其他程序，司法部和联邦调查局与许多其他机构合作，有可能迅速对恐怖主义威胁或行为进行回应。该响应旨在整合通过JOC在现场进行所有联邦，州和地方人员的努力，同时利用SIOC确保全国范围内（如果有效的话）支持所有适当的联邦机构的支持以迅速和协调的方式。JOC和SIOC几乎是恒定的接触。在特别关键的时期，两个设施之间保持了开放的通信线路。

These efforts, coordinated through the JOC and SIOC, would continue until the crisis has abated, all primary investigative work has been completed, and, if possible, the perpetrators have been apprehended. During that period, FEMA�s consequence management efforts, in coordination with state and local authorities, would continue.

While we believe that the crisis response plan under the Domestic Guidelines is fundamentally sound, we recognize that the threat posed by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction presents tremendous challenges that require that capabilities and coordination be enhanced at all levels of government. Training exercises are conducted frequently to evaluate progress. For example, exercises sponsored by the FBI often involve personnel from FBI Headquarters and multiple field offices as well as personnel from other pertinent federal, state, and local agencies. Similarly, consistent with Nunn-Lugar II, DOD sponsors multiagency field training exercises involving weapons of mass destruction scenarios.

今年2月，在拉斯维加斯的一次事件中测试了危机反应协调，其中开发了大量信息，表明两名受试者具有炭疽病，一种是一种高度危险的生物学剂。该信息的可信度得到了以下事实的支持：其中一名受试者因其欺诈欺诈而被定罪，因为他在1995年欺骗性地获得了造成泡沫瘟疫的生物剂。尽管两名受试者随后被证明并不危险的物质，但在事件发生时，FBI危机反应机制的测试是非常真实的。

The interagency response in that incident proved to be prompt and efficient. In addition to the FBI, the participating federal agencies included: DOD, HHS, and FEMA. The legal issues were coordinated among the two pertinent U.S. Attorney�s Offices and the Criminal Division�s Terrorism and Violent Crime Section.

- 联邦调查局的WMD运营部门对FBI的拉斯维加斯办公室和其他相关办公室，联邦调查局实验室的危险响应单位以及Quantico的FBI炸弹中心之间的运营响应进行了协调。

- 联邦调查局的拉斯维加斯办公室迅速与当地警察，火灾和具有危险材料响应能力的当地军事部门协调了综合的危机管理反应。鉴于威胁的紧急性质，国防部批准了该单元的使用，直到联邦调查局和其他国防部响应者到达。

- The suspected substance was seized by FBI Las Vegas SWAT and safely removed by properly trained and equipped officials of the Hazardous Materials Response Unit and the Technical Escort Unit of the U.S. Army with no danger to the public.

- The substance was safely transported to a DOD facility capable of analyzing its potential as a hazard.

- The substance was identified as quickly as possible, permitting authorities to assure the public that anthrax was not present and that the substance had not posed a danger.

在这件事上表现证明了去vernment�s ability to deal with a situation involving a substance which is seized before it has been released. Had the substance at issue in this instance proven to be real anthrax, it would have been safely removed and the perpetrators arrested, all without danger to the public. In contrast, had anthrax been released, the responding authorities would have been faced with a far more difficult challenge. We are continuing to prepare and train to address more far-reaching challenges involving chemical and biological weapons.

2. Consequence Management

PDD-39指定联邦紧急事务管理局（FEMA）为协调恐怖主义行为的后果管理的主要机构，包括使用大规模杀伤性武器。FEMA负责为恐怖袭击的后果做准备，协调和回应。FEMA负责与州和地方政府合作恢复秩序并提供紧急援助。在美国境内的恐怖主义危机期间，FEMA采取行动支持联邦调查局，直到总检察长确信解决该法案的后果应在应对直接危机局势方面占主导地位。``统一指南''解决了转移此类责任的程序。

当总检察长批准将联邦领先机构角色从FBI转移到FEMA的决定时，FEMA指定的联邦协调官（FCO）将协调联邦行动，以支持州和地方政府提供适合该事件的有效后果管理的行动。根据联邦响应计划，FEMA将根据需要借鉴其他联邦机构，包括HHS，EPA和能源部。

3. Prosecution of Terrorists

预防恐怖主义还要求我们有能力绳之以法，那些计划或犯下恐怖主义行为的人。尽管不幸的是，我们可能无法防止所有恐怖行为，但我们将大力调查和起诉恐怖主义案件。如果发生了一项家庭恐怖主义行为，联邦检察官将与联邦调查局以及州和地方执法部门卷入，以共同努力制定证据并确定和逮捕那些负责的人。

我们创建了一个由华盛顿和全国各地的联邦律师组成的律师关键事件响应小组或ACIRG，其工作是为部门的领导人提供改善的管理事件的能力，有时会支持支持美国检察官对危机的反应。Acirg概念本质上是灵活的。它打算组建任务范围的团队，以适应特定的危机。在某些情况下，团队将参与监视事件并为高级部门官员提供定期更新。在其他情况下，团队将在联邦调查局的SIOC提供全职职位，以提供现场法律建议。最后，当危机是一个特别严重的危机时，团队成员将部署到该领域，向当地的美国检察官提供专家建议，协调多区事务，在极少数情况下，承担现场责任。

在此类紧急情况下，刑事部门的恐怖主义和暴力犯罪部门（TVC），其中一些成员是ACIRG的一部分，将根据需要提供法律建议并执行联络功能。此外，司法部还为ACIRG成员和每个被指定为危机管理协调员（CMC）的检察官开发并进行了培训。此外，作为总检察长的“关键事件响应计划”的一部分，``美国检察官办公室的CMC被任命为制定危机响应计划，其中包括与地方，州和联邦响应者的协调。

iii。提高我们预防和应对涉及化学或生物武器的恐怖主义的能力

A. Recent Programs and Initiatives

1. Nunn-Lugar II及相关的努力，以建立国家和地方合作伙伴关系

尽管在准备可能的化学或生物恐怖袭击方面取得了很多进展，但仍有许多工作要做。与国会合作，我们必须继续前进，以提高对抗恐怖主义的能力。作为这项努力的基石，五年的反恐计划将为参与反恐的所有机构绘制前进的范围。现在，让我重点介绍一些新计划和计划的一些例子。

防御大规模杀伤性武器的交流t of 1996, enacted as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Amendment (Nunn-Lugar II) to the DOD Appropriations Act for FY97, mandates that the Executive Branch undertake a number of requirements relating to preparedness to respond to the terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons within the U.S. Among other things, the legislation requires the Executive Branch to assess its capabilities to assist state and local governments in preventing and responding to terrorist incidents involving such weapons. It mandates that DOD, in coordination with other relevant federal agencies, establish programs to advise and train civilian emergency preparedness personnel at all levels of government in planning for and responding to WMD incidents. Additionally, it directs DOD to establish rapid terrorism response teams for the purpose of assisting such authorities in the detection, neutralization, containment, dismantlement and disposal of weapons of mass destruction.

The FBI and other federal agencies such as FEMA, the Department of Justice�s Office of Justice Programs (OJP), the Department of Energy, EPA, and HHS, are supporting the Department of Defense in this initiative to provide WMD training to state and local �emergency responders.� These consist of state and local law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical personnel who would likely provide the initial response to a WMD incident. This initiative, which commenced in late FY 97, will eventually train emergency responders in 120 cities throughout the United States. To date, officials from 19 cities have received training; an additional 31 cities are due to be introduced to the training in FY 98; and 35 more will be visited during FY 99. Through these efforts, State and local governments will not only be better able to deal with threats of terrorism through effective planning and increased response capability, but as a related benefit we are also improving the overall ability of the community to protect citizens from chemical accidents from industrial facilities or transportation.

In addition to the Nunn-Lugar II initiatives, the FBI pursues continuous crisis management planning in conjunction with other Federal agencies, as well as with local police, fire, and emergency medical personnel. For example, to further enhance the federal-state-local approach to combating terrorism, the FBI has, to date, established 16 Joint Terrorism Task Forces in field locations. The objective is to ensure that all entities that would respond to an act of terrorism, involving either a WMD or a conventional weapon, are coordinated at the state and local, as well as the national, level.

2.反恐基金

1998年，国会提供了5270万美元的反恐基金。已经分配了21百万，二十万美元，以确保州和地方急救人员拥有基本的设备和培训，以应对化学或生物事件以及涉及即兴爆炸装置的事件。

提供了520万美元的联邦调查局�年代Hazardous Devices School at Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama. These funds will be used for the expansion and renovation of the Hazardous Devices School to increase the number of bomb technicians trained each year on response to improvised explosive devices as well as nuclear, biological, and chemical incident matters. The funding will also provide certain items and articles of equipment for bomb squad use.

此外，授权为州和地方机构提供运营响应设备和培训授权，以增强其对涉及大规模杀伤性武器的事件的能力。司法计划办公室（OJP）将按照以下方式管理这些资金。

Working with the FBI, OJP is developing a $12.0 million grant program to provide equipment to state and local authorities who would be called upon to respond to an incident involving weapons of mass destruction. Such categories of equipment include items necessary for personal protection, detection, decontamination, and communication during an actual response. The FBI and OJP will coordinate with Nunn-Lugar and other efforts that also provide equipment to first responders to insure that overlap does not occur.

In addition, $2.0 million is provided for OJP to establish and administer a training center for state and local first responder personnel at Fort McClellan, Alabama. This Center will provide first responder personnel with state-of-the-art training, including �hands-on� field and laboratory exercises to improve their capabilities to respond to and manage terrorist incidents, including those involving chemical agents and explosive devices. This Center will work in cooperation with a consortium of universities and other specialized facilities which offer resources and expertise critical to first responder training.

OJP将与联邦调查局协调其培训和课程的管理程序。还提供了200万美元，用于与新墨西哥州索科罗市新墨西哥州矿业技术研究所的高能材料研究和测试中心一起运营类似的培训中心。OJP也将管理该计划，与联邦调查局和研究所合作，以不复制其他可用设施和资源的方式来定义和开发适合研究所的能力和专业知识的课程和培训。

B. Possible Additional Improvements

As previously discussed, I have directed that the study group currently involved in developing the Five-Year Counterterrorism Plan give priority to the development of proposals which would improve the government�s ability to prevent and respond to terrorist acts involving weapons of mass destruction. While a number of ideas are currently being evaluated on a priority basis within the Department and the Administration, let me share with you a few of our areas of focus.

The widespread use of strong encryption by terrorists and other criminals, unless it provides for lawful access to plaintext by law enforcement authorities, would have catastrophic implications for our ability to detect, prevent, and investigate incidents of chemical or biological terrorism. Unbreakable encryption allows terrorists to communicate about their criminal plans with impunity.

Developing a balanced approach to robust encryption is an extremely serious public policy issue that urgently needs to be resolved, and requires attention from federal, state, and local government officials and from the private sector. To this end, the Administration has launched a focused initiative to work closely with the information technology industry to develop technical and policy solutions that represent balanced approaches to strong encryption. To facilitate that effort, we have requested a legislative moratorium on encryption matters while we attempt to develop these solutions.

Another area that requires further scrutiny relates to existing federal criminal statutes pertinent to chemical and biological terrorism. Currently, those statutes require a close nexus between the possession of a biological agent or chemical substance and its use as a weapon. 18 U.S.C. �� 175, 2332a, and 2332c. Mere possession of such an agent or substance, without proof of its intended use as a weapon, is not a crime under federal law, notwithstanding the existence of factors -- such as lack of scientific training, felony record, or mental instability -- which raise significant questions concerning the individuals� ultimate reason for possessing the substance.

We recognize that any criminal statutes which might be enacted to address this concern will require a careful balance between public safety and the requirements of legitimate scientific researchers on whom we are dependent for medical and technological advances. However, when a person who lacks the requisite scientific training or has a demonstrated record of irresponsible conduct possesses a highly lethal substance for which he has no legitimate use, there is a clear public safety concern. In the area of toxic chemicals, the implementing legislation for the chemical weapons convention (S.610), currently pending in Congress, would prohibit the possession of such chemicals, and their precursors, unless they are held for legitimate purposes as prescribed under the convention. We are examining the potential for developing a comparable legislative proposal relating to the possession of biological pathogens.

Another area which is currently being considered within the Administration concerns the availability of medication and medical supplies needed in the treatment of persons exposed to potentially lethal chemical substances or biological agents.

A major chemical or biological terrorist incident could require the prompt availability of massive quantities of medication. This may require that the government procure vaccines, antidotes, and antibiotics for stockpiling for civilian use. Further, even if the stockpiles were adequate, it would be critical that we be able to obtain and deliver the required items to the affected area on an immediate basis.

为了解决这一问题，总统已下令审查是否购买大量疫苗，解毒剂和抗生素，以治疗暴露于已知的化学或生物学剂的人，这对公共安全构成了潜在威胁。这些药物将在全国范围内战略性地放置在一项可以维持库存的保质期的程序下，并在发生重大化学或生物学事件的情况下促进其及时可用性。随着政府进一步考虑这样的计划，我们将就其详细信息和资金要求咨询国会。

Since biological pathogens can be altered in composition, it is also imperative that we prepare ourselves for the potential use of a genetically altered pathogen. To this end, the Administration is evaluating the potential for undertaking a research and development program designed to ensure that the nation is in the best possible position to respond quickly to the presence of an altered pathogen.

Similarly, it is critical that improved detection devices be developed, and made available to federal, state, and local authorities throughout the nation, to facilitate the earliest possible detection of the presence of a hostile biological or chemical agent or substance and the accurate identification of it. Further, we are considering the need for decentralized laboratory capabilities, located strategically throughout the country, to authoritatively confirm the field identification. Finally, we must ensure that the requisite training and expertise is available for the prompt analysis of the resulting data, thereby ensuring that no time is lost in targeting a multi-disciplinary response to the event.

随着我们继续研究这些和其他潜在计划，政府与能源国家实验室，学术界和私营企业合作工作很重要。这将确保我们始终能够获得对有效计划至关重要的尖端技术发展，以应对化学和生物恐怖主义的威胁。新的生物/技术进步为政府提供了机会和挑战。我们必须与私营部门联系以利用这些机会。

Further, we may need to develop an approach which will permit the government to accelerate the normal procurement procedures to quickly identify and deploy new technologies and substances needed to thwart terrorist threats and respond to terrorist acts. These procedures would be used not only to purchase medications and other needed tools, but also, in some instances, to borrow medications or tools from, or to enter into effective partnerships with, both academia and industry.

As we strengthen our capabilities to prevent, respond to, and manage the consequences of emerging terrorist threats such as chemical and biological weapons, we must achieve even greater coordination of the counterterrorism plans, resources, and programs of the many departments and agencies that have counterterrorism responsibilities. It is also important for us to focus on coordinating government efforts in partnership with the private sector to protect our critical infrastructures against these and other threats. To achieve these objectives, I am working closely with the President�s National Security Adviser as he develops for the President Presidential Decision Directives that build upon and reaffirm PDD-39 while further enhancing our efforts to achieve greater coordination and focus on these vital issues.

I look forward to continuing to work with Congress as we pursue the critically important effort of preparing our nation to prevent and respond to potential acts of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction.