美国政策在中美洲：1980- 1991年：

当里根政府于1981年上任时，其首要任务之一是结束萨尔瓦多的游击战。第二个首要任务是帮助尼加拉瓜的桑达尼斯塔斯人对抗游击战。洪都拉斯（Honduras）是位于萨尔瓦多（El Salvador）和尼加拉瓜（Nicaragua）之间的一个小国，成为美国在中美洲努力的基地，将成为该报告的这一部分的重点。

1980年，古斯塔沃·阿尔瓦雷斯上校成为洪都拉斯警察的负责人。根据当时在洪都拉斯的一名美国顶级官员的说法，拒绝透露姓名，侵犯人权的模式在1981年2月之前如火如荼。美国对合法性和人权的坚持不会成功，并且应该遵循消除颠覆者的阿根廷模式。

1982年，阿尔瓦雷斯（Alvarez）被提升为将军，并被任命为陆军指挥官。同年，洪都拉斯的一个秘密陆军情报部门316营接受了中央情报局和支持的培训。316营因侵犯人权行为而臭名昭著。

前萨尔瓦多局局长詹姆斯·莱莫恩（James LemoyneThe New York Times, on June 5, 1988. In his article, LeMoyne told the story of Florencio Caballero, a self-confessed interrogator in a Honduran army death squad. Caballero says he was trained in Texas by the Central Intelligence Agency.

根据在加拿大寻求流放的卡巴洛罗（Caballero）的说法，他和24人在1979年至1980年间被带到德克萨斯州，接受了陆军和中央情报局的培训。卡巴塞罗（Caballero）说，在德克萨斯州，美国人教授

"interrogation in order to end physical torture in Honduras. They taught us psychological methods - to study the fears and weaknesses of a prisoner. Make him stand up, don't let him sleep, keep him naked and isolation, put rats and cockroaches in his cell, give him bad food, serve him dead animals, throw cold water on him, change the temperature."³

卡瓦列罗告诉莱莫恩，美国人已经训练了他不要谋杀和身体折磨的人。⁴Caballero claimed the interrogations had started out okay, i.e. they just involved psychological "coercion", but somehow everything had gone all wrong, and they began to physically torture and murder people.⁵卡瓦雷罗告诉莱莫恩，他折磨了约120名洪都拉斯和其他拉丁美洲人。他告诉勒莫因有关秘密监狱，谋杀和中央情报局在洪都拉斯的参与。⁶

Between 1980 and 1984, the Honduran army, with American support, uncovered and then systematically wiped out much of the small Honduran guerrilla movement.⁷当时，洪都拉斯不存在民事司法系统。没有审判法院或律师来捍卫被告。

Caballero told LeMoyne about the torture of 24 year old Ines Murillo in 1983, which LeMoyne was able to confirm. Murillo was a prisoner in a secret army jail in Honduras, and Caballero interrogated her and watched her get tortured. For 80 days, Murillo was beaten, electrically shocked, burned, starved, exposed, threatened, stripped naked, and sexually molested. To keep her from sleeping, her captors poured water on her head every ten minutes.

根据美国C.I.A.的Caballero的说法特工有时会参观他工作的秘密监狱，以及穆里洛（Murillo）遭受酷刑的地方。给代理商就那里的囚犯进行了编辑的审讯报告。ReportsReports卡巴洛罗（Caballero）不知道美国人对发生的身体酷刑有多了解。⁸

穆里洛（Murillo）确认，在她被秘密监狱中的几个月中，一名美国官员定期拜访了她。当她遭受酷刑时，他从不在场。但是，穆里洛“不相信中央情报局可能不知道发生了什么。”⁹

在入狱期间，卡瓦雷罗先生和其他审讯者给了她生死的鸟和老鼠吃晚饭，每半小时就会在裸露的身体上倒冷，持续了很长时间，并使她的几个小时不睡觉，而不允许小便。

穆里洛（Murillo）幸免于难，这主要是由于父亲的干预，后者以前曾在洪都拉斯军队服役。她的父亲贿赂一名士兵，告诉他他的女儿被关在哪里。士兵还透露了所谓的C.I.A.的名称和电话号码。操作员。在穆里洛（Murillo）的父亲威胁要发布此信息后，他的女儿被释放入洪都拉斯（Honduras）的常规监狱。13个月后，她被允许流放。

一位与Lemoyne交谈的美国官员告诉他"the CIA knew what was going on, and the Ambassador [John D. Negroponte] complained sometimes. But most of the time they'd look the other way."¹⁰Ambassador Jack R. Binns, who was stationed in Honduras before Negroponte, expressed the same sentiments.

Ambassador Binns made the point that torture practices in Latin America were used long before Battalion 316 came into existence. However, he also stressed that the United States was complicit in Battalion 316 activities, and complicit in training the individuals who made up Battalion 316, because the United States ignored the human rights violations that were taking place in Honduras. Ambassador Binns felt strongly that USSOUTHCOM should be closed down.¹¹

宾恩斯大使试图将局势引起华盛顿特区国务院的注意。根据本恩斯的说法，他报告了侵犯人权行为，并且是"begging for them to take some action."¹²国家不仅没有接受，而且还告诉Binns停止通过常规渠道举报侵犯人权的行为。他被告知使用后频道，并非常注意没有向国会泄露信息。否则，他被告知，很难获得国会对洪都拉斯的安全和经济援助的认可。¹³

This attitude undoubtedly sent the message that human rights abuses would not be punished by the United States. It was the same attitude that contributed to the development of training manuals that taught torture, execution and murder in Latin America in the 1980s.

Development of the Training Manuals

当下面概述的不同培训手册曝光时，建议采取一些后续行动。但是，显然，这些建议很少或根本没有随访。¹⁴此外，在所有情况下，没有人对美国正在教授违反美国陆军政策的培训技术的事实负责。直到今天，美国似乎不愿意建立对这些手册的开发的责任感，或者是在美洲美国陆军学校使用的手册（USARSA）的事实。

1983年审讯手册

In 1983, a manual known as the 1983 CIA Interrogation Manual was put together with material from notes from the Honduran training course, lesson plans used in the course, and the 1963 KUBARK manual.¹⁵1983年的手册正式命名为“人力资源开发培训手册”，于1988年6月16日首次在情报听证会的特定选择委员会上浮出水面。纽约时报文章“作证酷刑”，美国教授了使用酷刑的洪都拉斯军官。

该手册于1997年1月24日解密。它提供了有关1980年代针对拉丁美洲可疑颠覆者使用的培训方法的详细信息。316营在洪都拉斯中使用的方法以及审讯手册中教授的方法非常相似。¹⁶

The CIA confirmed at a hearing before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee in 1988 that it provided intelligence and counterintelligence training to Honduran military groups. At the hearing, Richard Stolz, Deputy Director for Operations at the CIA, testified that from February 8 to March 13, 1983, the CIA trained Caballero, Maro Turo Regalatta, and other Hondurans in interrogations.

根据斯托尔兹（Stolz）的说法，这些课程包括与实际囚犯的实际练习，以及在审讯期间的中央情报局教练的存在。该课程的课程计划或教学计划是基于教师在美国陆军，陆军野外手册（FM）的个人经验，尤其是FM 30-15以及个人经验。¹⁷

斯托尔兹还作证说，该课程强调了人道治疗的价值和质疑的心理方法。他声称，身体虐待或其他有退化的治疗被拒绝，不仅是因为它是错误的，而且还因为历史上被证明是无效的。¹⁸

Under questioning, however, Stolz acknowledged that the agency taught the Hondurans that in dealing with prisoners they should deny them sleep, make them stand up, keep them isolated. In terms of teaching to change the room temperature, or, as stated in the manual, to "manipulate the subject's environment, to create unpleasant or intolerable situations," Stolz asserts that "that's not impossible." He denied all other allegations raised by LeMoyne in his 1988纽约时报article. When asked if there were any corrective actions dealing with the person responsible for the manuals, Stolz responded, "Not to my knowledge."

The most graphic part of the Interrogation Manual is the section discussing "coercive techniques." This section recommends arresting suspects early in the morning by surprise, blindfolding them, and stripping them naked. Suspects should be held incommunicado and deprived of any kind of normal routine in eating and sleeping. Interrogation rooms should be windowless, soundproof, dark and without toilets.

手册建议折磨技术可以backfire, and that the threat of pain is often more effective than the pain itself. It notes that "while [the CIA] does not stress the use of coercive techniques, [they] do want to make you aware of them and the proper way to use them." It states that "illegal detention" and "coercive techniques"¹⁹always require prior headquarters approval.²⁰It justifies the use of coercive techniques for those subjects "who have been trained or who have developed the ability to resist non-coercive techniques.²¹

The Manual then goes on to recommend psychological techniques to break an individual's will to resist. The techniques include: prolonged constraint; prolonged exertion; extremes of heat, cold, or moisture; deprivation of food or sleep; disrupting routines; solitary confinement; threats of pain; deprivation of sensory stimuli; hypnosis; and use of drugs or placebos.

The U.S. military made a superficial attempt between 1984 and 1985 to correct the inappropriate material contained in the 1983 Interrogation Manual, primarily because of the strong public reaction following the disclosure of the Contra Training Manual, discussed below, which was made public in October, 1994. A page advising against using coercive techniques and discouraging torture was inserted into the Interrogation Manual.

此外，在整个文本中，手写笔记和更改都是随意写的。例如，“感觉刺激的剥夺会引起压力和焦虑。剥夺越完整，对受试者的影响越快，更深刻地受到影响”，以阅读：“对感觉刺激的极端剥夺会引起难以忍受的压力和焦虑，并且是一种形式，是一种形式酷刑。它的使用构成了严重的不当行为，违反了政策。”²²尽管进行了手写的更改，但读取原始文本仍然很容易，这简直就是弄清楚。

1985年手册中出现的改动和新指示都表明，早期版本中教授的酷刑方法与美国陆军政策相矛盾。克兰斯顿参议员在1988年的精选情报听证会上提出了这一点，当时他指出1983年手册中的措辞指示读者“使用强制性方法”。²³

The Contra Training Manual

A CIA document instructing Nicaraguan rebels in the techniques of political assassination and guerrilla warfare was leaked to the House Intelligence Committee in October, 1984. The manual, "Psychological Operations in Guerilla Warfare," instructs how to organize a guerrilla movement and lead it to power by winning popular support and using violence.

该手册是由Contra Rebels的CIA顾问John Kirkpatrick于1983年底编写的。这份长达90页的文件建议雇用专业犯罪分子从事“选择性工作”，通过安排暴力示威来创造“烈士”，从而导致叛军支持者死亡，并迫使尼加拉瓜人违背他们的意愿进行任务。

The document also states that unpopular government officials can be "neutralized" with the "selective use of violence." These terms are not defined in the text. And according to President Reagan, being "neutralized" simply means being fired from one's position. According to almost everyone else, however, it means something entirely different.

1984年10月，当《反对手册》公开发布时，该文件的内容受到了普遍的强烈抗议。众议院情报委员会举行了有关其披露的听证会，高级官员对该文件进行了强烈的讲话，并呼吁当时的中央情报局导演威廉·凯西（William Casey）辞职。然而，最终结果并没有什么戏剧性或决定性的。一些美国官员在手腕上拍了一巴掌。

1988年，中央情报局清楚地说明了美国对外国军队的培训情报和反情报的政策。根据中央情报局的说法：

该政策不是直接参与，也不是鼓励审讯，从而导致武力，精神或身体酷刑，贬低侮辱或暴露于任何形式的不人道待遇来帮助审讯。该政策是在审讯过程中积极劝阻这些方法的使用。人员应在影响外国联络人以尊重人权方面发挥积极作用。²⁴

因此，在1980年代至少两次，美国陆军在拉丁美洲使用的培训材料受到了严格的审查。²⁵As a result of that scrutiny, the Pentagon issued a policy brief which stated that the U.S. would not participate in interrogation techniques that violated U.S. policy, and would actively discourage the use of those methods. It also stated that U.S. personnel should play a positive role in promoting human rights.²⁶

尽管进行了审查和以前的政策声明，但²⁷1987年制作了一系列培训手册，其中包含令人反感的材料。然后，这些手册被用来在拉丁美洲训练MTT的MTT，以及USARSA教室中的外国军事人员。USARSA手册出现的事实表明，由于披露1983年《审讯手册》和1984年的Contra手册的披露而建立的陆军控制或审查程序一定不足或不存在。

USARSA培训手册

Contra手册公开几年后，在1987年，在巴拿马Ussouthcom的第470 Mibde从Usarsa取回了一系列文件，其中包括教授谋杀，勒索和酷刑的培训材料。尽管上述中央情报局对美国陆军政策发表了有关美国陆军政策的声明，但这些培训材料还是在拉丁美洲和USARSA分发。USARSA培训手册的历史始于项目X。

X计划：

Project X, part of the U.S. Army's Foreign Intelligence Assistance Program, was the basis for the training materials taught at the U.S. Army School of the Americas in the 1980s. The program was developed from 1965-66 by the Office of the Assistant of Staff for Intelligence to assist select foreign countries in organizing and developing military intelligence operations.

项目X,对外援助的类型之一available through the Foreign Intelligence Assistance Program, provided U.S. Army Intelligence Publications and Training Materials. It was developed and executed by the U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird, Maryland. Virtually no official documentation of the origin or scope of the project exists today.²⁸

在1970年代中期，在搬到亚利桑那州的瓦丘卡堡后，美国陆军情报中心和学校（USAICS）开始应要求向参加美国友好国家 /地区的美国咨询培训工作的美国军事机构项目X材料。此外，USAICS的讲师还将项目X材料作为参考材料，用于为外国军官课程准备课程。

在1975年至1981年之间的某个时候，USAIC将所有项目X材料的控制权转移到了储备事务办公室。1983年，对X项目的责任被转移到培训和学说局单位培训部的非居民培训部门。1990年，责任转移到个人和集体培训部门。

美洲美国陆军学校的培训材料：

1982年，助理情报参谋长办公室（OACSI）任务USAIC为佐治亚州本宁堡的美洲学校提供未分类的课程计划。USAIC组成了一个工作组，以满足这一要求。工作组决定使用X项目材料，因为它们以前已被清除以进行外国披露。

The working group asked the OACSI whether Project X material was still releasable to foreign students. The OACSI replied that USAICS could release all unclassified Project X material to the School of the Americas after reviewing it to ensure that it was current. The material was reviewed and released for use at the School of the Americas. All Project X material was in English.

Victor Tise中校是USAICS军事课程的年轻队长。1982年2月下旬，他被任命更新美国陆军库里克堡，巴拿马运河地区的美国陆军学院的全源情报课程。Tise与也在瓦丘卡堡的约翰·辛达上尉合作。

由于对侵犯人权的报道不断升级，卡特总统对这两个人的理解都停止了在拉丁美洲的情报培训。ReportsReports据报道，卡特担心培训和虐待是联系的。他们也了解到，里根总统立即在拉丁美洲恢复情报培训是重中之重。²⁹

蒂斯（Tise）和辛达（Zindar）直到9月底才能在SOA设计和实施情报培训³⁰and to update Project X material for use at USARSA.³¹他们是由理查德·L·蒙哥马利少校在瓦丘卡堡监督的，并给出了SOA的拟议教学计划，其中概述了Tise和Zindar要发展的课程。

根据Tise的说法，该项目X材料得到了蒙哥马利少校的批准，也得到了J.W.的批准。泰勒，瓦丘卡堡人类情报部。这些材料还必须由“华盛顿”清除，并通过副参谋长进行清理运营（DCSOPS）派遣。Tise回忆说，该材料从华盛顿批准但没有改变。³²

Tise表示，他没有注意到项目X文件中包含的不适当的培训材料。Tise还指出，尽管所有项目X材料均未分类，但其中很大一部分来自FM 30-18，这是一本有关智能策略的机密现场手册。³³Zindar, on the other hand, does recall the inappropriate material, and says that most of it dated back to the Vietnam era, and needed major revisions.³⁴Tise和Zindar都致力于修改材料，以便可以在SOA进行教授。

Major Ralph Heinrichs was in the Department of Training Development at SOA during the period that these training manuals were being updated and transferred to SOA. Heinrichs confirmed that Project X material was in use at the School prior to 1982.³⁵根据海因里希（Heinrichs）的说法，直到1970年代中期，学校都使用了X项目的材料。³⁶

海因里希（Heinrichs）表示，他的老板拉蒙·奎贾诺（Ramon Quijano）和Usarsa的指挥官Nicholas A. Andreacchio上校前往华盛顿特区，在从Huachuca堡转移并通过Tise and Zindar进行了更新后，获得了批准来教培训材料。据海因里希斯（Heinrichs）称，Quijano和Andreacchio与五角大楼情报助理参谋长有分歧，五角大楼最终批准了X材料将重新引入SOA的材料。³⁷It was Heinrichs' understanding that a few changes in the training material were needed. For example: the SOA should not use the term insurgent, insurgency, or counter insurgency. Rather, they should use the term guerilla.

此外，对一些人类情报术语和代理处理技术进行了消毒。SOA的立场是，这些材料已经为全世界成千上万的学员教了10年或更长时间，而无需更改。最终，五角大楼批准了材料。³⁸

根据蒂斯（Tise）的说法，1982年在SOA教授人类情报的人玛格丽托·克鲁兹（Margarito Cruz）认识到1970年代从1970年代教授的材料，当时他也是SOA的讲师。据报道，克鲁兹建议在DC获得批准后对一些材料进行修改，而Tise认为删除了令人反感的措辞。³⁹It is unclear, however, how much of the objectionable material was removed from the training material before the intelligence classes were reinstated at USARSA in the fall of 1982.

辛达（Zindar）和蒂斯（Tise）都说，他们个人没有在Usarsa教任何令人反感的材料。他们无法确认或否认其他人是否教这些材料。Tise于1982年11月离开SOA，并从1986 - 89年返回。辛达一直呆在SOA到1983年中。从1983 - 1986年开始在学校任教的人没有人接受采访。五角大楼声称，在此期间，Usarsa没有教过令人反感的材料。

Development of USARSA Training Manuals:

There is broad consensus as to how the existing training manuals were developed. In 1984, the SOA moved to Fort Benning, Georgia. In 1987, the 470th Military Intelligence Brigade (470th MIBDE) of the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), stationed in Panama, asked SOA for help putting together instruction materials for Mobile Training Teams (MTT's) in Latin America.

MTT在世界各地被用来加强永久分配顾问的努力，通过进行专业的情报培训，超出了当地咨询和情报人员的能力。可以组织MTT，以满足几乎任何类型的情报和安全培训和协助的请求。

第470军事情报旅获得的培训材料包括克鲁兹（Cruz）在1982年标记的原始培训材料，并带有令人反感的措辞。⁴⁰Apparently this material was not subjected to an independent review by the 470th MIBDE or USSOUTHCOM when it was brought into Panama from USARSA.

In 1987 USSOUTHCOM began issuing the training manuals, with the objectionable material, to students and military intelligence schools in Latin America. In 1989, a former member of the 470th Military Intelligence Brigade assumed instructor duties at the USARSA, and used these manuals as student handouts.⁴¹这些手册是向十个国家 /地区的学生发行的：玻利维亚，哥伦比亚，哥斯达黎加，多米尼加共和国，厄瓜多尔，危地马拉，洪都拉斯，墨西哥，秘鲁和委内瑞拉。

In March 1991, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) discovered the objectionable materials while planning for Mobile Training Team unit to be sent to Columbia to provide training in counterintelligence and foreign intelligence. DIA requested a copy of the proposed Program of Instruction and training manuals from USARSA. The Spanish language manuals that were to be used were translated into English, and DIA discovered the objectionable material.⁴³

The CIA reviewed the manuals, and noted some policy and classification discrepancies. The documents contained several passages which provided training regarding use of truth serum in interrogation, abduction of adversary family members to influence the adversary, prioritization of adversary personalities for abduction, exile, physical beatings and executions.

在1991年夏天，切尼部长被警告，注意手册和令人反感的材料的存在。进行了对文件的独立调查，并告知国会武装服务和情报委员会错误。根据五角大楼的说法，检索了手册的副本。但是，监察长在其1997年的评论中指出，所有流通手册的总检索被认为是令人怀疑的。⁴⁴

During the first week of August 1991, the Assistant Secretary of Defense notified the Congressional Committees on this matter, and the Assistant to the Secretary for Defense reported the incident to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board.

8月9日，在向陆军部长的秘密备忘录中，美国首席指挥官南部指挥官（USCINCSO）和国防部长的助理，国防部长宣布，它完成了一项手册的研究有问题的是“ Manejo de Fuentes”（或“来源的处理”）。研究得出的结论是，手动提倡与美国陆军政策相矛盾的方法和活动。

As a result of these findings, a number of offices were tasked to review U.S. training material and training procedures. USCINSCO was responsible for reviewing all intelligence and counterintelligence training material. It was also responsible for recovering the objectionable materials and educating foreign military groups on acceptable U.S. material. USCINSCO also informed military groups that the recovered manuals were not U.S. policy, and that an error was made by including the objectionable material in the manuals.

The Assistant to the Secretary for Defense was responsible for launching a full investigation into the use of the manuals, submitting a report, together with recommendations, to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of the Army was tasked to collect all Project X related and training material at USARSA and Fort Huachuca related to the objectionable material, and to put the materials under secret level and wait for instructions for disposal. The ATSD was also tasked with reviewing all intelligence and counterintelligence training material.

On June 28, 1996 the Intelligence Oversight Board issued a Report on the Guatemala Review. In that report, there was a short reference to training materials that were used at USARSA which violated U.S. army policy. Rep. Joseph P. Kennedy launched an effort to have the manuals released to the public. On September 20, 1996, the Department of Defense made the manuals public.

1997年监察长报告

在1991年夏天，切尼国防部长在USARSA使用的培训手册通知后，他指示国防部长 - 情报监督（ATSD -IO）的助手调查使用西班牙语情报培训手册的使用，该手册使用该手册，该手册的使用包含被认为与美国和国防部政策不一致的材料。ATSD-IO于1992年3月10日发布了报告。

1996年9月30日，国防部副部长要求国防部监察长审查1992年的ATSD-IO报告，以确定它是否足以评估个人责任。还要求监察长确定是否令人满意地实施了1992年3月报告的纠正措施。1997年2月21日，监察长完成了此审查，并将其发布给公众。

The Inspector General report has a number of inaccuracies. First, the Report claims that army personnel did not realize that the USARSA manuals violated standard army policy. However, this office has spoken with several individuals who indicated that they raised the issue of the content of the manuals to their superiors, and were still told to teach the training materials.

其次,根据搞笑,无论是军队element at the USSOUTHCOM nor the faculty at USARSA followed army policy for doctrinal approval of the manuals. Yet before the material was transferred to USARSA, it was approved by at least two different people at Fort Huachuca and in Washington, D.C.,⁴⁵以及乌萨尔（Usarsa）。尽管在亚利桑那州瓦丘卡堡的五角大楼，前USARSA教练和美国官员打来了无数电话，但该办公室仍无法确定哪些构成官方陆军的教义批准政策。但是，所有接受采访的人都指出，这些手册似乎在在Usarsa教授之前进行了广泛的审查。

根据Tise上校的说法，巴拿马的USARSA落在了五角大楼的陆军总部的一部分的副参谋长（DCSOPS）的指挥下。Tise回忆说，该材料是由USAIC通过DSCOPS发送的，以进行通关，并获得批准但没有改变。⁴⁶

尽管Tise不记得Usarsa在培训和学说的监督下（Tradoc）属于他，但他声称在Huachuca堡获得的批准将构成Tradoc批准。海因里希（Heinrichs）的少校在Usarsa回忆说，该材料是由Usarsa发送给华盛顿特区的，在那里五角大楼的情报副秘书批准了该材料。

即使材料没有通过整个批准过程，我们的消息来源也得到了瓦丘卡堡和华盛顿特区的至少两个办事​​处的批准，以及在Usarsa的至少一个办公室。因此，无论是否故意违反国防部政策，都应该建立责任以将材料重新引入USARSA。⁴⁷无论如何，严重的疏忽肯定在起作用。

第三，IG报告指出，该手册没有英语语言版本。但是，手册中使用的所有材料源自英文，并在被翻译成西班牙语之前在Usarsa中被批准在Usarsa中使用。因此，暗示批准在USARSA使用的英语培训材料与培训手册中的西班牙语材料不同是一种误导。

The IG report released February 21, 1997 does analyze whether corrective actions recommended by the March 1992 report were satisfactorily implemented. The IG report concludes that they were not, that the report had only a minimal impact, and that ultimately it was unsuccessful.⁴⁸

The IG report summarizes why the 1992 investigation and recommendations were unsuccessful. It states that:

陆军和国防情报局是唯一发布文件以支持备忘录的文件；其他行动收件人没有收据记录，也无需采取任何行动。[国防助理秘书（ASD（C3I）]没有适当的机制来监视对备忘录的遵守。结果，国防部关于非美国的情报和反情报培训政策的问题。(emphasis added.)⁴⁹

我们知道，以前的调查和随后的随访也无效。

The United States Army School of the Americas - also known as the School of Assassins - has graduated many of Latin America's most notorious foes of democracy and human right violators. In El Salvador, 48 officers cited for human rights violations in a U.N. Truth Commission were trained at the school.

其中包括埃琳娜·富恩特斯上校，该国是该国最臭名昭著的硬线官员之一。埃琳娜·富恩特斯（Elena Fuentes）在房间里，当时萨尔瓦多军事领导人于1989年下令谋杀谋杀耶稣会士神父。他于1985年和1996年担任学校的讲师。参与耶稣会的谋杀和掩盖是SOA毕业生。

而且有无数的受害者 - 那些在我们政府内部被教导折磨和谋杀的人遭受了巨大苦难的人。

Archbishop Oscar Romero was gunned down in cold blood by SOA graduates because he stood up for the powerless against the powerful. Four Ursuline nuns were ravaged and mutilated and thrown into a ditch for the crime of teaching children to read. The children of El Mozote were machine gunned by SOA alumni for the sin of living in the wrong place at the wrong time.

克林顿政府将促进民主和人权的促进​​成为美国外交政策的中心。鉴于其历史和传统，美洲学校的继续运作以加强平民民主制度的基础，建立了与拉丁美洲的新关系。

五十年前，美洲美国陆军学校在巴拿马开门，向一类拉丁美洲和加勒比军事军官开设了大门，接受了战争艺术的培训。

Half a century later, it is time to shut the School down.

尾注（这些以＃3为＃1和＃2开始Executive Summarywhich was released as part of the whole report).

3.詹姆斯·莱莫恩（Lemoyne）引用的卡瓦洛罗（Caballero），“作证折磨”，在《纽约时报》，1988年6月5日，第6节，第6节。45。

4.卡巴雷若不包括心理的方法s under the heading of torture. According to LeMoyne, Caballero did not include psychological "coercion" in the same category as physical torture.

5. 1997年3月5日与Lemoyne的对话。

6. Lemoyne，James，“作证酷刑”，《纽约时报》，1988年6月5日，第6节，第6页。45，第1列。

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9.同上。

10.同上。

11. Conversation with Ambassador Binns, Jan. 27, 1997.

12. Ibid.

13.同上。

14.唯一的事实是，在公开揭示了Contra培训手册并编辑了洪都拉斯审讯手册后，USARSA手册在1980年代后期出现了，这一事实证明了这一事实。

15.库巴克手册于1963年撰写，供美国特工反对共产主义颠覆。它不是为培训外国军事服务而撰写的。

16. Cohn, Gary et al, "Torture was Taught by CIA; Declassified manual details the methods used in Honduras; Agency denials refuted," The Baltimore Sun, January 27, 1997, p. 1A.

17.参议院情报听证会特定委员会，1988年6月16日。

18.同上。

19.人力资源剥削手册 - 1983年，第1页。A2。

20.同上，p。B-2。

21. Ibid., p. L-4.

22.人力资源剥削手册 - 1983年，第1页。K-7。

23.参议院选定委员会听证会，1988年。

24. Senate Select Committee Hearing, 1988.

25. Those materials, discussed previously, include: (1) the "1983 Interrogation Manual"; and (2) the "Psychological Operations in Guerilla Warfare" Manual, also known as the Contra Manual.

26. See page 10 of this report.

27. In December, 1981, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12333, which clarified the authorities, responsibilities, and limitations concerning U.S. intelligence.

28. Department of the Army Memorandum to ATSD-IO, Nov. 4, 1991.

29.基于与Tise的对话Zindar。

30.因此，Tise和Zindar大约有6个月的时间完成了一项任务，根据SOA的拉尔夫·海因里希（Ralph Heinrichs）的说法，通常将花费12-18个月。

31. Both men remember that when they arrived in Panama, they found some Project X material already there.

32. 1991年8月1日，Victor Tise和OASD之间的对话，由OASD于1996年11月22日解密。

33.同上。Tise无法解释为什么X材料未分类，而培训手册FM 30-18仍被分类。

34. Tise和Zindar都回想起X项目的大部分材料都没有分类，但其中一部分是最高机密。

35.当项目X文件包含令人反感的材料时，该材料在1982年之前在Usarsa发行的事实表明，美国在1960年代和1970年代正在教授这些策略。Heinrichs，Tise和Zindar不记得是否从USARSA档案中获取了某些项目X材料，或者仅使用Tise和Zindar修订的Project X材料。

36.可以假定材料是在1970年代后期出现的，卡特总统呼吁在拉丁美洲进行情报培训。

37. Heinrichs could not recall the nature of the disagreement.

38. Tise和Zindar都指出，有很大的紧迫性将情报培训的材料汇总在一起。他们清楚地表明，里根总统希望立即完成。辛达（Zindar）认为军队对限制有灵活，并且采取了许多捷径。

39. This office was not able to locate Margarito Cruz.

40. According to Tise, objectionable material that was removed by Cruz in 1982 remained in SOA archive files, per SOA policy. Tise believes that material obtained by the 470th MIBDE at USARSA was from current lesson plans as well as archive materials.

41.没有人接受采访能够和/或愿意识别此人的名字。

42.五角大楼声称这些手册从来没有用英语存在。尽管手册中配有西班牙语材料，但所有使用的材料都以英语为单位，并在Usarsa将英语翻译成西班牙语。

43. Point Paper - USSOUTHCOM.

44. Policy and Oversight Report, February 21, 1997, p. 7.

45。It was approved by at least one, and maybe two, offices: DCSOPS and Deputy Secretary for Intelligence.

46. Tise conversation with OASD, August 1, 1991.

47. It is our conclusion that there was no deliberate attempt to violate Department of Defense policies. However, we do believe that there was an unspoken policy coming from the top that the rules could be ignored.

48. Policy and Oversight Report, Feb. 21, 1997, pp. 13-14.

49. Ibid., p. 14.

本报告中的信息基于文档和访谈。工作人员对以前和/或现任军事人员进行了采访瓦丘卡（Huachuca），美洲美国陆军学校，本宁堡和第470次军事旅。美国前大使以及国家安全档案，军事档案馆和新闻界的代表接受了采访。

所有接受采访并同意在本报告中确定的人。即使没有可用或无法联系以进行置评，也可以确定所有由消息来源确定并由第二来源确认的个人。本报告中未命名任何要求不被识别的人。