1997 Congressional Hearings
Intelligence and Security

The time has come for the American legislative and foreign policy establishments to develop a new set of policy tools for dealing with the growing problem of terrorism. Unilateral economic and political sanctions have slowly eroded America's leadership role and relevancy in either containing or controlling the proliferation of terrorist activities. There is no point in imposing sanctions in cases where our unilateral actions have no impact, or worse, are flouted by our allies in a manner that sends a message of inconsistency and lack of common resolve. Holding the moral high ground is useless when our allies are repeatedly prepared to fill the very gaps we seek to create in the operational framework of terrorism's advocate governments.

Terrorism is used by its advocates because it is a cheap and effective form of expressing a challenge to what is perceived as western hegemony and imperialism. Yet, the governments that support terrorist activities need only enough resources to survive, and survive they have - in Iran, Iraq, Libya and other countries - despite our often unilateral actions aimed at containing them. What would happen if instead of containing, we engaged states that demonstrate some willingness to re-join the family of nations and possibly even use their moral suasion over other rogue states to bring them in line? What would happen if we flooded their markets with our western technologies and forced their systems to become ever more dependent on our form of capitalism and economic livelihood? Would potential young Iranian mullahs not become more willing Conoco oil and gas capitalists? Would Sudanese farmers now accused of harboring and training Hezbollah and Hamas terrorists not become the consummate employees of American food giant Archer-Daniels Midland?

让我缩小我剩下的言论的重点。在过去的一年中，我在六次访问了苏丹，以更好地了解其经济潜力是否超过了其作为伊斯兰激进主义提供者在该地区的作用。在我总体上担心美国在其外交政策范式上危险地妖魔化伊斯兰教的危险的驱动，我发现美国 - 苏丹双边关系是一个有趣的案例研究，对我们冷战后策略中固有的失败包含问题的失败我们几乎没有欲望更少的资源可以更好地理解。请允许我对苏丹进行以下观察：
机构治理。《华盛顿邮报》1996年大选government of President Omer El Bashir is dramatically different from previous Sudanese regimes in two important ways. First, virtually all critical posts are now held by young, western-educated minds who understand our fears and concerns regarding terrorism, democracy and the preservation of civil liberties. More importantly, they are prepared to take tangible steps to rectify the sins of previous regimes. Second, there is a much more institutionalized process of governance that did not exist in prior Sudanese governments. Decisions can no longer be made or implemented unilaterally or without due process. With permission of the Chairman, I attach as Exhibit A the recent letter sent by President Bashir to Representative Hamilton regarding Sudan's institutionally determined offer of full bilateral cooperation on the terrorism issue. Modernizing Islam. The political experiment to modernize Islam in a manner that places the highest degree of importance on citizenship rather than religious beliefs is now irreversibly developed in the Sudan. The recently signed Peace Agreement provides a federalist system of statehood for southern Sudan's Christian and Animist minorities and guarantees the right to self-determination along with basic civil liberties such as the freedom of religious practice - all based on citizenship, not religion. While not perfected yet, the agreement is a sign that Islam can be modernized without collaterally damaging others.

Regional Peace Efforts. One of America's key policy stipulations to improved US-Sudan relations has been the repair of Khartoum's relationship with its neighbors, particularly Ethiopia, Egypt and Uganda (due to the assassination attempt on President Mubarak in Ethiopia). Much progress has been made on the Ethiopian and Ugandan fronts in recent weeks, to the point where SPLA leader John Garang is now expected to attend the upcoming IGAD summit at Kenya's invitation to discuss how the recent Sudanese Peace Agreement can be extended to meet SPLA demands. In addition to this pan-African effort to achieve peace between Sudan and its African neighbors, efforts are simultaneously underway by Sheikh Zayed, president of the United Arab Emirates, to bring together the Arab-African constituents that have not yet reconciled their differences with the Khartoum regime. This effort is aimed at reconciling Egyptian concerns through former president Nimieri, and at lowering tensions with Eritrea through the inclusion of Sudanese opposition leader Sadiq Al Mahdi. American support of these external efforts would likely make them successful.

Resource Development. It is unlikely that further American sanctions will have anything more than psychological impact. There are no major American firms doing business in the Sudan at present. China and Malaysia have acquired, through their respective national oil companies, large stakes in the southern oil fields, with estimated reserves of some 3.5-4.5 billion barrels, and will build the 900 km pipeline to transport oil to Port Sudan on the Red Sea. Given China's growing oil needs for the 21st century, it is likely that any American effort at the United Nations to sanction Sudan over terrorism issues or to block oil sales will be met with a certain Chinese Security Council veto. It is my understanding that second stage oil field development will include Russian and French partners, further bolstering Sudan's UN position and ability to thwart unilateral US efforts to impose UN sanctions.

基督教的迫害。除了我为恐怖主义与区域和平问题提取具体工作职位的努力外，埃哈特基金会的托尼·沙利文（Tony Sullivan）和我呼吁苏丹领导人制止苏丹基督徒的迫害。金博宝正规网址为了建设教会和其他基督教敬拜的机构，禁止出售土地的政策正在审查中，从而对立法变更进行审查。与伊斯兰极端主义作斗争。参与苏丹伊斯兰运动的最重要方面之一是任务高级领导层要建立对哈马斯和真主党等群体的激进要素的内部控制机制的概念。苏丹的事实上的伊斯兰力量哈桑·图拉比（Hassan Turabi）博士在建设性地与激进的伊斯兰团体打交道方面表现出了有效性 - 美国和法国政府已承认的有效性。他切实干预的两个最重要的例子是1992年的阿尔及利亚大选，他说服了伊斯兰激进组织，他们的选举胜利被推翻，以阻止他们在巴黎的轰炸运动，以及他在哈马斯和Yasser Arafat之间的调解，达到了中期。当阿拉法特（Arafat）需要哈马斯（Hamas）的支持以推动这一进程前进时，东和平进程。显然，在与这些群体打交道时，图拉比很容易成为消极的力量，也许过去曾经是过去。但我相信他的政治本能是将苏丹伊斯兰运动远离激进力量，因为他确定现代化伊斯兰是唯一可行的过程。总而言之，我会注意到，美国没有涉及单方面制裁或结束所谓的漏洞的任何策略，几乎没有宝贵的杠杆作用来影响苏丹的事件。 While I do not advocate offering any carrots to the present regime until they demonstrate through actions what they have indicated in words over the past year, neither do I believe the use of America's considerable stick will have any impact if not employed more strategically. Principled neutrality is the best position at the moment.

苏丹案例研究对美国最糟糕的品质进行了打击：傲慢，欺凌，愤世嫉俗的误解，并相信我们想听的话，而不是看着艰难的事实。美国有选择；这个立法机构有选择。我们可以继续制裁并加大对我们几乎没有杠杆作用并冒着妖魔化伊斯兰作为一种宗教的风险的国家的压力。在这种情况下，我们可能还会担心美国穆斯林（American-Muslims）上升以使他们的声音听到杂技，并创造了一个环境，在这种环境中，激进的伊斯兰运动的资金将在我们自己的后院发生。或者，我们可以尝试一种更具吸引力的方法，这种方法不会损害我们的原则，而是试图从世界上复兴主义伊斯兰运动中真正想遏制激进伊斯兰的要素。苏丹是否代表这种潜力，还是它们是激进伊斯兰教的引擎，我没有资格判断。但是，经过一年的研究，我相信，如果我们有政治勇气打破单方面经济制裁的心态，这是美国唯一可部署的“棍子”，那么美国就可以设计一种更具创造性的政策方法。

Mr. Chairman, I make concrete proposals for constructive engagement in my full remarks and am prepared to discuss some of the issues I have outlined here in more detail with members in closed session, since some of the highly specific efforts the Sudanese government is making at my behest to address past problems are not appropriate for public dissemination. I would respectfully ask that the balance of my written statement be entered into the record in its entirety with appendices. I have attached a brief biographical sketch as Exhibit B. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

首先我来之前的小组委员会as a born American equally concerned about the proliferation of terrorism and extremism, regardless of its ideological form, throughout the world today. As an adherent of the Islamic faith, I am even more concerned about the potentially debilitating consequences for American-Muslims from America's increasingly hostile and standardized policy response of economic sanctions and containment towards problem areas in the Islamic world. We must take great care to avoid demonizing adherents of a religion which is the fastest growing geopolitical force in the world today, a religion that is also the faith of over 7 million Americans who are contributing greatly to the social, economic and political fabric of the United States. We must take great care not to stigmatize the children of American-Muslims whose heritage is Pakistani, Afghani, Syrian, Sudanese, Algerian, Palestinian, Iranian or Iraqi because of the actions of a few whose motives are born of hatred that has less to do with ideological differences than with their own internal failures and shortcomings.

Again and again, we have witnessed America's failure to cope with the many faces of Islam in the aftermath of the Cold War. Whether in Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, Somalia, the Sudan and perhaps in the future even oil powers such as Saudi Arabia, America's inability to effectively deal with Islam's many dimensions represents one of the most serious vacuums in our ability to provide for our own national security. In fact, my appearance here today is demonstrable evidence that Americans of the Islamic faith can play an integral role in defining solutions which might reduce rather than increase tensions with those in the Islamic world we see as a threat to our national interests.

在重新塑造美国的恐怖主义政策，尤其是在关注伊斯兰世界的国家的情况下，我们应该利用我们相当大的经济能力来提高沮丧的穆斯林，这样他们就不会那么迫切希望拆除我们。我们是一个由宗教迫害的移民而出生的国家，常常忘记恐怖主义是由被践踏的自负所诞生的。美国未能应付伊斯兰愤怒的原因是我们无法理解愤怒与伊斯兰的内部失败（暴政和腐败，二）一样，与外国压迫和西方蔑视伊斯兰教的传统和蔑视伊斯兰教的传统和方式相同。生活。此外，我们看不到伊斯兰极端主义者与美国极端主义者没有什么不同。两者都试图纠正他们正确或错误地看到的事物，因为社会偏离了他们对纯信息的经常误导的愿景。实际上，伊斯兰教的原教旨主义运动能够产生从阿富汗的中世纪实验到马来西亚的现代竞争状态，产生明显不同的结果。

伊斯兰主义者甚至尝试了民主。以阿尔及利亚为例。1992年，伊斯兰主义者合法地在公平举行的选举中获得了权力，只是看到他们从华盛顿眨眨眼后，世俗军事政权推翻了他们的胜利。如果伊斯兰主义者被允许夺取权力，那将是两个结果之一：他们对民主作为一种表达思想的合法机制的怀疑将是沉默的，而美国只有民主才能为经济和社会繁荣提供必要的框架，被加强；或者，他们可能已经失败了，就像伊朗革命一样，除了空无一人的言论之外，他们都会失败。Failure would have demonstrated that democracy as an organizing principle was not at fault. The fault lay in the quality of their ideas.In a secular western world where separation of church and state are the norm, it is logical to understand our mistrust of a religion that wants to deeply influence matters of state. More logical, however, would be for us to maintain a principled neutrality in all cases where Islamists are trying to use democracy, no matter how poorly, as a mechanism to express their ideas, not just those in which our mortgage interest rates are at stake and where democracy doesn't exist anyway. Failure to implement this policy change is to not see that the aberrant behavior of an Islamist spurned is as dangerous to our national security as the threat of $50/ bbl oil.

随着美国在冷战后倾向于从利益上定义世界的经济利益的倾向，请允许我在这些术语中对伊斯兰激进主义提供定义。世界上有大约一万亿桶可重新恢复的石油储量。这些储量中有72％由12个国家控制，这些国家主要的宗教信仰，政府或哲学倾向是伊斯兰的，而其余的28％则由非伊斯兰国家（例如美国，俄罗斯，委内瑞拉和中国）控制。但是，这种统计数据的关键在于，伊斯兰生产国控制的72％的人将以当前的生产率和消费率上升，其中伊朗，伊拉克和沙特阿拉伯代表的伊斯兰生产商所代表的72％将持续约100年。由非伊斯兰国家控制的28％最多有30年的时间。

For Islamic extremists, this is their trump card. Our failure to engage and modify their behavior results in a potential waiting game that could dramatically affect our entire economic system - one highly dependent on the cost of money - in little more than a generation. The mullahs and Islamic extremists whom we treat with disdain and contempt today are mocking our policies because they are prepared to live in economic straight-jackets, if need be, until such time as we are forced to come, oil cup in hand, to ask them for more reasonably priced energy resources in order to avoid the unfavorable consequences of inflation and rising interest rates to our economy. Even our most trusted oil allies, Saudi Arabia and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, cannot be counted on to resist the internal pressures of Islamists. One need only keep in mind Saudi Arabia's recent rapprochement with Iran - a reconciliation that in no small part had the silent hand of Sudan's enigmatic Islamic force, Dr. Hassan Al Turabi. I trust it is not necessary to elaborate on the ramifications for American economic interests of Saudi Arabia's sharp turn to the right of the Islamic spectrum - an eventuality that is now all but assured once Crown Prince Abdullah formally assumes the reigns of power.

我的首要担忧衍生物s of America's failure to deal effectively with the problem areas of Islam as background, permit me to narrow my remarks to the subcommittee's focus on the issue of Sudan's support for radical and extremist Islamic groups that has, until recently, characterized the Islamic movement there. My interest in the Sudan as a comprehensive case study for re-defining our anti-terrorism policies is consistent with my political activism on the issue of how America deals with situations where Islamic countries and their non-Islamic neighbors don't get along. Hence my interest in Kashmir, where Muslim Pakistan is pitted against Hindu India; Nagorno-Karabakh, which pits Muslim Azerbaijan against Christian Armenia; and the Sudan, where the fundamentalist Islamic regime is struggling with internal Christian and Animist minorities and surrounding Christian and Muslim neighbor relations are poor. It should be noted here for the record that while I strongly support American efforts to isolate and contain the regimes of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Muhammar Gadafi in Libya, two cases that amply demonstrate why America's apprehension of Muslim leaders with the "God complex" (i.e., those who use Islam's monotheism for inappropriate political motives) is justified, we must find more creative ways that do not also punish the people of Iraq and Libya for their frailty and inability to rise up against these dictatorial forces.

The Sudan, however, represents a case where in our zealousness to contain Islamic fanaticism, and its by-product of terrorism, we may have overplayed our hand. We have failed to see the potential benefits from engaging Sudan's Islamists on three different levels: first, the value of their efforts to modernize Islam; second, enlisting Sudan's Islamic movement to help us in our fight against global extremism, in particular where it relates to Islamic extremism and terrorism in countries vital to our geo-political interests; and third, the value of Sudan's relationships going forward with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Afghanistan and other countries that are now and will be in the not-so-distant future vital to our economic interests.

最令人不安的是，我们没有意识到，除了对苏丹的各种违法行为（或任何其他试图恢复伊斯兰热情的国家）宣布对苏丹的彻底战争，我们几乎无法做到停止在那里停止伊斯兰复兴。上个年代。中国和马来西亚在官方水平上提供帮助，以开发其石油储量（估计占阿拉斯加普鲁德霍湾的石油的40-50％），这将确保经济资源维持复兴主义运动。任何认为中国不会利用其联合国安理会否决的人来阻止美国为制止苏丹石油销售的努力，这并不完全意识到中国在21世纪的巨大能源需求，而苏丹油田每天每天有多200,000桶将提供服务。这些需求。任何不完全欣赏图拉比博士和沙特阿卜杜拉王子，阿联酋巴希尔总统和谢赫·扎耶德之间关系的性质，或苏丹与我们最稳定的中东和平盟友之间的越来越多的联系，未能看看苏丹伊斯兰运动的纯粹主义影响已经到达多远。

All this, of course, begs the question whether the present Sudanese regime is an innocent bunch of school boys constantly being accused of crimes they feign ignorance on. In my judgment, after many long meetings with Sudanese government and opposition leaders, independent assessments of controversial events and verification of the most disturbing aspects of the Bashir regime's record, I have come to the conclusion they clearly are not innocent school boys. I have read in great detail the terrorism reports produced by the House Republican Task Force on Terrorism and admire the tenacity with which Sudan's alleged terrorism activities are described. Much of what is described is accurate, some is overstated, some is over-dramatized beyond recognition of what is fact and what is fiction.

One of the key areas of past controversy has been the activities of Sudan's External Intelligence Department. The unbridled flow of Afghan Arabs and other undesirable characters into and out of the Sudan took place in large measure under the guidance of the External Intelligence Department - until its director was replaced in the wholesale house-cleaning of senior government ministers and technocrats that took place last year. In fact, there is now high-level cooperation between the Sudan and many Islamic countries to stop, or at least properly track, the movements of a significant number of radical and revivalist Muslims.

然而，西方的真正危险在于复兴主义者的伊斯兰运动瓦解成无引导的，真正激进的国家，将恐怖分子网络推向地下，只能在人行道上看到它们，炸弹绑在狂热者的身体上。这就是为什么任何提议将伊斯兰实验的成功现代化，以使伊斯兰教法（伊斯兰法）存在的框架现代化，因为这对于美国长期美国安全利益至关重要。此外，我们的东非盟友担心苏丹的伊斯兰模式以不必要的方式出口，应该设计一个更好的模型，以满足他们人民的需求，如果他们害怕诸如“ Turabism”之类的模式。

例如，穆斯林多数在厄立特里亚和埃塞俄比亚中存在代表性？沙特阿拉伯或埃及在哪里有合法的反对派？乌干达在哪里有民主？为什么美国在我们组织原则的最基本方面如此愿意采用双重标准，为什么双重标准的应用似乎具有反伊斯兰主义趋势？

Would it not be better for Islam as a governing principle to succeed or fail on the merit of its ideas than for America to demonize Islam and give her detractors ammunition to bring their unholy war to our shores?苏丹案例研究对美国最糟糕的品质进行了打击：傲慢，欺凌，愤世嫉俗的误解，并相信我们想听的话，而不是看着艰难的事实。美国有选择；this legislative body has a choice; we can continue to sanction and ratchet up pressure on countries where we have little leverage and run the risk of demonizing Islam as a religion. In that case, we may have more to worry about with American-Muslims rising up to have their voices heard en-masse and creating an environment in which the funding for radical Islamic movements will occur right in our own backyard. Or we can try a more engaging approach that does not compromise our principles but seeks to draw out elements that genuinely want to contain radical Islam from within the revivalist Islamic movements of the world. Whether the Sudan represents such potential, or whether they are the engine of radical Islam, I am not qualified to judge. But I am convinced after a year-long study of the situation that America can design a more creative policy approach if we have the political courage to break with the mentality of unilateral economic sanctions as the only deployable "stick".

我们应该让土耳其博士成为通往伊斯兰教激进边缘的桥梁，向他们解释，我们不是他们试图描绘我们的恶魔，因为这将显示美国的愿景。我们应该将联邦调查局团队派遣到喀土穆，邀请他们筛选并分析恐怖主义数据，然后向苏丹提供客观​​的建议，以了解如何最好地弥补过去的罪恶，这将表现出美国的公平性。我们应该派大使比尔·理查森（Bill Richardson）去看SPLA反对派领导人约翰·加朗（John Garang），并说服他使和平与分享该国的石油和谷物财富，如果美国把他带到餐桌上，喀土穆将愿意做的事情会好得多。不仅仅是无休止地进行内战，这将以唯一的方式证明美国的力量，为那些从未知道的人创造和平与繁荣。

CONFIDENTIAL

1997年4月5日，代表李·H·汉密尔顿（Lee H. Hamilton）排名民主党，众议院外交委员会美国众议院2314雷本建筑华盛顿特区20515

Dear Congressman Hamilton,

我很高兴收到您与我的助手Abubaker Shingiati博士的建设性会议的报告，1997年2月21日。众所周知，美国苏丹双边关系仍然严重紧张，我们欢迎任何沟通渠道这可以更好地使双方都能为我们两个国家的重要性问题制定解决方案。金博宝正规网址我们在苏丹的这里对您的政府继续努力与邻国合作，以在喀土穆在喀土穆进行“政变”，这一努力在我们正在做出最严重的努力来解决各种方面，以实现“政变”出色的双边问题。

也许美国人民不知道我政府不仅要改善与我们邻国的关系，而且最重要的是与我们自己苏丹人口的少数群体之间的关系。这些努力达到了一项全面的和平条约，该条约将于1997年4月21日在喀土穆签署，几乎所有来自苏丹南部省份的主要基督教和自命不凡的部落领导人，包括许多重要的SPLA成员。《和平条约》中涉及我们少数部门提出的每一个关键问题，包括自决权。我想抓住这个机会，提前道歉，以备案，正式向您邀请您参加我的特别嘉宾，在4月21日在喀土穆举行的和平条约的签署仪式，以便您可以亲眼目睹我们持续的和平的进步。在苏丹在这里做。

As I am sure you can appreciate, being the largest country by land mass in Africa with porous borders and a largely tribal community make-up, we face unique difficulties in formulating and implementing policies centrally. We concede that not everything which has taken place during the past seven years of rule under my government was desirable, but we ask that the American people also take into consideration the circumstances surrounding our difficulties. Nevertheless, in an effort to avoid the empty rhetoric that so often defines relations between African nations and the United States, we would like to suggest and offer the following confidence building measures as steps towards improving our bilateral relationship:

答:改善通信在工作层面,we would urge that future visits to Khartoum of your capable ambassador, Mr. Timothy Carney, include meetings with a wider array of people, including key policy-makers in my government, in order that he might make a more complete evaluation of the ground realities in Sudan. In the spirit of openness and cooperation, we will gladly provide him with access to our leadership at all levels, both political and societal, and facilitate whatever meetings or visits he may wish to conduct.

B. We extend an offer to the FBI's Counter-terrorism units and any other official delegations which your government may deem appropriate, to come to the Sudan and work with our External Intelligence Department in order to assess the data in our possession and help us counter the forces your government, and ours, seek to contain. For example, we would welcome academics specializing in counter-terrorism methods to give seminars in Khartoum. It is patently unfair for the United States to continue its policy of accusing the Sudan of various terrorism complicities, then answering our queries about what specifically the U.S. would like us to do to correct matters with ambiguous responses that hide behind the veil of "classified methods, sources, etc."

We are open to all constructive ideas for resolving once and for all the issue that Sudan continues to harbor terrorists and is acting as an agent for the Islamic Republic of Iran. These accusations are simply not true, and we are prepared to stand behind our words with concrete actions - but only if such actions are taken in the spirit of engagement and reconciliation, not as reason for further punishments in the international community.

C.我们邀请您和您的员工以及其他国会议员，他们可能希望客观地验证我们处境的现实，以便前往苏丹进行第一手会计。我们还敦促您访问政府政策最强烈的批评者，以确保最平衡的观点。找出已经有多少少数民族并将继续成为国民政府的一部分，国民议会内的权力分配与我们人口的分配没有什么不同，妇女受到同等对待，而伊斯兰伊斯兰教法仅是伊斯兰教法。适用于苏丹北部。快来看看侵犯人权的人。我们相信您会对答案感到惊讶。

D. We strongly urge appropriate authorities of the U.S. Government to help us bring those elements in our population who have not yet agreed to terms of peace and reconciliation to the negotiating table. Would it not be in the greater interests of peace and stability in the region for the United States to play a constructive role in supporting the Peace Treaty that we have reached recently, rather than the role of military aide supplier to rebel forces?

Congressman Hamilton, as a foreign policy expert, you inevitably understand the need for stability in a region that has Nile waters, billions of barrels of crude oil reserves and the potential to become a major agricultural center producing food for the Horn of Africa. We are committed to making stability and improved external relations with our neighbors, protection of basic rights and countering the forces of terrorism the cornerstones of our foreign policy in the region. We are grateful for your offer to take these serious issues to the appropriate levels of your government. Your sense of fairness is an example we can carry to the Sudanese people as the beacon of American ideals.

在我们进行此过程时，我可以建议与国务院外交部长Mustafa Osman Ismaeli博士定期沟通。我们在华盛顿的大使馆可以为您提供他的细节。当然，欢迎您随时与我直接与我沟通。我们期待着与美国对话的新时代，并期待您在喀土穆的访问。

真挚地，

Omer Hassan Ahmed El Bashir
President of the Republic of Sudan

Mansoor在Barron的货币圆桌会议上两次曾两次介绍，并出现在CNN的“ Inside Business”，“商业亚洲”和“华盛顿未包装”计划中，以提供有关对冲基金到美国 - 中国关系到关键要素再到关键要素的主题的见解。巴基斯坦对苏丹石油政治的经济政策。他为《华尔街日报》和《洛杉矶时报》的社论页面做出了贡献，他的专辑在1996年6月和1997年3月出现。认可他在波斯尼亚，南非，匈牙利和父亲的祖国巴基斯坦帮助贫穷和不满的人的努力。1996年10月，曼索尔（Mansoor）与李·巴特勒（Lee Butler），参议员艾伦·克兰斯顿（Alan Cranston），诺贝尔奖获得者约瑟夫·罗特布拉特（Joseph Rotblat）等人一起担任旧金山世界论坛核扩散的全体会议演讲者。

Much of Mansoor's time away from Crescent's daily affairs is spent in designing, funding and implementing projects for the people of third-world countries under the direction of his private foundation, The Ijaz Group. His current projects include structuring the asset management systems for the governments of the CIS and designing models for low-income housing in poor African countries. He derives much of his philanthropic motivation from his father and mother who emigrated to the United States in 1960. Mansoor's parents were both physicists. His father was one of the early contributors of the Pakistani nuclear program.

Mansoor has devoted much time to broadening the knowledge base and understanding of American policy-makers to reach more informed positions where the countries of South Asia, East Africa and the CIS are concerned. He has advised the Unity Government of President Nelson Mandela on low-income housing programs, President Sam Nujoma of Namibia on global investment programs for domestic pension plans, and President Haidar Aliev of Azerbaijan on investment of the revenues from Caspian oil reserves. He also meets regularly with the economic and political leaders of Russia, China, Israel, Pakistan, the Sudan and Persian Gulf states on economic and political issues related to his investment management business.

Mansoor is active in Democratic Party politics in the United States. He also earned All-American weightlifting status while attending the University of Virginia. Born in Florida in 1961 and raised in the Blue Ridge Mountains of Virginia, Mansoor divides his time between his homes in New York, Toronto and France today.