美国联邦UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU6月6日，1996年——1996年——下令印刷1996年——1996年——下令下令印刷1996年——1996年——1996年——1996年——下令下令印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印ReportsReports刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷印刷条例草案（第1718条）经考虑后，报告对此表示赞同，并建议修正后的法案通过。第1718号法案的目的是授权在1997财政年度为美国政府的情报和情报相关活动拨款，包括参议院军事委员会（SASC）管辖范围内的某些国防部情报相关活动。参议院情报特别委员会（SSCI）于1996年4月30日报告了该法案，并根据参议院第94届国会第400号决议第3（b）节，于1996年5月2日将该法案提交给武装部队委员会。委员会审查的范围委员会对1997财政年度的情报界授权请求进行了详细审查。委员会举行了听证会，并会见了SSCI主席和副主席，讨论了两个委员会关注的预算事项和立法规定。该委员会还进行了漫长而详细的谈判，试图解决国资委和SSCI之间的分歧问题。委员会仔细审查了SSCI的报告（Sen.Rep.104-258），并将SSCI的相关预算决定纳入S.1745《1997财年国防授权法案》，该法案于1996年5月13日向参议院报告。以下解释了SSCI报告的委员会对法案的拟议修正案，以及委员会对SSCI发布的报告的澄清。根据SSCI的报告，概述S.1718包含了一些有争议的条款，国资委反对，行政部门不支持这些条款。1996年4月15日，国资委主席兼首席少数民族成员致函SSCI主席和副主席，对这些问题表示关注，并敦促SSCI不要将这些规定纳入1997财年的情报授权法案。总的来说，这些规定试图将很大程度的权力从国防部长转移到中央情报局局长（DCI），特别是在预算制定和执行方面。该法案还包含了一些条款，共同为创建“智商部门”奠定了基础。“SASC支持一个强有力的DCI，但仍坚持DCI的职能不是充当一个准部门负责人，但协调各部门的情报活动，并担任总统和国家安全委员会的首席情报顾问。向DCI提供SSCI建议的权限将严重损害国防部长管理国防部的能力。委员会注意到，国防部长强烈反对这种权力转移，而DCI并未寻求此类授权。如果S.1718以目前的形式通过，它几乎肯定会被否决。然而，SSCI在S.1718中包含了许多有争议的条款，从而在国资委和SSC金博宝正规网址I之间产生了重大分歧。一旦S.1718被依次提交给国资委（因为每年都会有情报授权法案），国资委主席和排名靠前的少数派成员同意与SSCI进行谈判，试图解决这些分歧。尽管如此，SSCI的主席和副主席还是采取了前所未有的步骤，要求依次提交国防授权法案。经过三周的谈判以及委员会之间的四项提案和反提案，国资委得出结论，鉴于SSCI坚持保留s.1718中许多有争议的内容，委员会之间的分歧无法通过谈判解决。因此，国资委决定向参议院报告第1718号法案，并提出修正案以解决该法案的主要缺陷。SSCI保留遵循与S.1745相关的类似程序的权利。这种方法将让参议院来解决委员会之间在第1718条和第1745条问题上的分歧。委员会注意到，其拟议修正案仅涉及国资委管辖范围内的问题，第1718条还包含其他一些有争议的条款ons that fall within the jurisdiction of other committees. The committee has not taken a position on these matters, per se, but individual members of the committee, or other members of the Senate, may offer amendments to S. 1718 to address these issues. The committee recommends the following specific amendments to S. 1718. Section 707--Enhancement of authority of Director of Central Intelligence to manage budget, personnel, and activities of intelligence community Section 707, as reported by the SSCI, would significantly expand the DCI's authority over the DOD elements of the intelligence community. It would: (1) require the Secretary of Defense to get DCI concurrence on the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) budget, and consult with the DCI on the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) budget; (2) give the DCI authority to manage all the national collection activities of the intelligence community (including Defense human intelligence); (3) require that any reprogramming within the JMIP receive DCI approval; (4) give the DCI authority to reprogram funds and transfer personnel among National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) elements after consultation with (in lieu of concurrence by) agency heads; (5) give the DCI authority to allocate and expend all NFIP funds for the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) (giving the DCI authority he now only has for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)). The proposed SASC amendment would enhance the DCI's participation in the management of Defense intelligence activities, but would not alter the authority of the Secretary of Defense over such activities. Specifically, the amendment would: (1) provide for the participation of the DCI in the development of budgets for JMIP and TIARA, while leaving the final authority on these matters with the Secretary; (2) give the DCI the peacetime authority to approve national collection requirements, determine national collection priorities, and resolve conflicts in collection priorities levied on national collection assets; (3) require the Secretary of Defense to consult with the DCI on JMIP reprogramming actions; (4) strike SSCI language allowing the DCI to transfer NFIP funds over the objection of the affected Defense Agency head; (5) strike the SSCI language giving the DCI authority to manage and expend funds for Defense Department elements of the NFIP, and substitute language establishing a database on intelligence funding to give the DCI greater insight into the overall intelligence budget; (6) strike SSCI language giving the DCI authority to rotate personnel in the absence of coordination with agency heads. Section 708--Reallocation of responsibilities of Director of Central Intelligence and Secretary of Defense for intelligence activities under National Foreign Intelligence Program Section 708, as reported by the SSCI, would give the DCI joint management authority with the Secretary of Defense over the NFIP elements in the Department of Defense, including NRO, NSA, and NIMA. The proposed SASC amendment would strike the SSCI's language and substitute a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to consult with the DCI in fulfilling his responsibilities pertaining to the NFIP (as provided in Section 105 of Title 50, U.S.C.). The SASC amendment would also require the DCI to submit an annual evaluation to Congress and the National Security Council on the performance of the NRO, NSA, and NIMA in meeting their national missions. Section 709--Improvement of intelligence collection Section 709, as reported by the SSCI, would establish the position of Assistant DCI for Collection, to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Section 709 would also transfer the responsibilities and authorities of the Secretary of Defense for the clandestine elements of the Defense Human Intelligence Service to the DCI. The proposed SASC amendment would modify the authorities of the Assistant DCI for Collection, limiting them to general responsibilities in assisting the DCI in carrying out existing collection authorities. The proposed SASC amendment would also strike the SSCI language regarding the transfer of authorities over the Defense Human Intelligence Services, and substitute language requiring a report by the DCI and the Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding on-going activities of those officials to achieve commonality, interoperability, and, where practicable, consolidation between the clandestine human intelligence activities of the Defense Human Intelligence Service and the CIA. Section 711--Improvement of administration of intelligence activities Section 711, as reported by the SSCI, would establish the position of Assistant DCI for Administration to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The proposed SASC amendment would modify the SSCI language specifying the duties of the Assistant DCI for Administration by dropping a detailed listing of areas for administration. Section 714--Office of Congressional Affairs Section 714, as reported by the SSCI, would establish an office of congressional affairs for the intelligence community. The proposed SASC amendment would change the designation of this new office to ``Office of Congressional Affairs for the Director of Central Intelligence'' to reflect that this new office would not manage the activities of the various congressional affairs offices in the Department of Defense. Section 715--Assistance for law enforcement agencies by intelligence community Section 715, as reported by the SSCI, would authorize U.S. intelligence agencies, on the request of a U.S. law enforcement agency, to collect information on non-U.S. citizens outside the U.S. for law enforcement or counter-intelligence purposes. The proposed SASC amendment would (1) limit this authority to NRO, NSA, and NIMA; (2) preclude direct participation of military personnel in arrests; (3) prohibit assistance if it would adversely affect military preparedness; and (4) require the Secretary of Defense to prescribe such regulations as necessary to implement this authority and to protect sources and methods. Section 716--Appointment and evaluation of officials responsible for intelligence-related activities Section 716, as reported by the SSCI, would require the Secretary of Defense to seek the concurrence of the DCI before making a recommendation to the President on heads of NRO and NSA. The SSCI provision would also require the DCI to provide annual performance evaluations for the heads of NRO and NSA to the Secretary of Defense. The proposed SASC amendment would modify the SSCI language requiring DCI concurrence on appointments to provide that the Secretary, after seeking concurrence, may make the recommendation to the President without the DCI's concurrence if the Secretary notes that the DCI does not concur. This modification is consistent with the SASC's intention to extend this recommendation process to the director of NIMA (a matter to be taken up on the Defense Authorization bill). The amendment would also strike the SSCI language requiring the DCI to provide annual performance evaluation. But the committee intends to include language in the Defense Authorization bill that would allow for DCI input on performance evaluations for the directors of NSA, NRO, and NIMA for consideration by the Secretary of Defense in the preparation of the Secretary's own performances evaluations of these directors. Section 717--Intelligence community senior executive service Section 717, as reported by the SSCI, would establish an intelligence community Senior Executive Service. The proposed SASC amendment would strike this provision. The committee notes that the Department of Defense strongly opposes the establishment of a DCI-managed Senior Executive Service that would include a large number of Department of Defense personnel. The SSCI provision contradicts a proposal made by the Executive Branch to improve DOD intelligence civilian personnel management, which the DCI has characterized as one of his top priorities, and which the Secretary of Defense strongly supports. The committee is considering options for including a version of the Executive Branch DOD intelligence personnel proposal in the Defense Authorization bill. Title VIII--National Imagery and Mapping Agency Title VIII of S. 1718, as reported by the SSCI, establishes the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) in Title 50, U.S.C., not as a Combat Support Agency. The Executive Branch had requested that NIMA be established in Title 10, U.S.C., and be designated in law as a Combat Support Agency. The SASC- reported Defense Authorization Bill contains a comprehensive legislative charter for NIMA, which, with a few minor exceptions, is consistent with the Executive Branch proposal. The proposed SASC amendment would strike the SSCI language regarding NIMA and would substitute language regarding NIMA's national mission and clarifying the peacetime status of the DCI's national imagery collection tasking authority. The proposed SASC amendment would also provide that the Secretary of Defense and the DCI, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would jointly identify deficiencies in the capabilities of NIMA to accomplish assigned national missions and develop policies and programs to review and correct such deficiencies. The committee expects that disagreements between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense relating to the identification of NIMA's deficiencies in performing its national mission would be settled according to normal inter-agency procedures, with the President having the ultimate authority to resolve differences. These provisions would be included in title 50, U.S.C. The SASC intends to include identical language in the Defense Authorization bill in addition to language specifying that the Secretary of Defense shall implement actions to correct deficiencies jointly identified by the Secretary and the DCI. committee action In accordance with the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, the committee approved a motion to report favorably S. 1718 with an amendment. fiscal data The committee will publish in the Congressional Record information on five-year cost projections when such information is received from the Congressional Budget Office. regulatory impact Paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires that a report on the regulatory impact of a bill be included in the report on the bill. The committee finds that there is no regulatory impact in the cost of S. 1718. changes in existing law Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the changes in existing law made by certain portions of the bill have not been shown in this section of the report because, in the opinion of the committee, it is not necessary to dispense with showing such changes in order to expedite the business of the Senate and reduce the expenditure of funds.