IC21：21世纪的情报界

员工学习
情报常设特别委员会
众议院
第一百零四届国会

席。军事行动情报支持

对军事行动的执行摘要支持（SMO）是情报部门的主要职责之一。有人认为这是智力的主要作用。克林顿政府——政策制定者和高级情报管理人员——已经表示，SMO是情报工作的重中之重。批评人士质疑，鉴于情报界的许多努力一直围绕着这一特定的情报角色，而且在冷战后的世界里，实际上，美国国家安全受到的威胁比1940年以来的任何时候都要小。这场有关SMO的辩论非常重要，因为它涉及到需求和资源的核心。智力不是一种容易扩展的资源。正如在关于IC激增能力的讨论中所指出的（见情报界“激增”能力工作人员研究），涵盖当前需求并采取措施解决意外需求充其量是困难的。投入到任何一个领域的资源越多，留给其他领域的资源就越少。问题不在于IC是否应该为SMO投入资源，而在于考虑到对财政受限的IC的其他竞争性需求，SMO的合理程度。SMO在某种程度上是一种偶然的需要。至少在冷战期间，美国的国防政策是围绕着威慑战斗、使用武力作为最后手段的理念制定的。其他非SMO政策需求是当前的——外交、毒品、恐怖主义、扩散。因此，需要取得平衡。敦促加强对SMO的重视，而不全面考虑所有IC要求，有可能使许多其他正在进行的政策需求部分或完全得不到满足。在大多数情况下，IC在SMO方面的表现令人钦佩。但是我们国家安全“威胁”的变化和我们对这些威胁的反应的重要性，国家如何使用军队，信息处理技术的进步，军事战略中可能出现的新范例，等等，现在或即将出现，这表明，为了满足包括SMO在内的整个国家安全需要，IC将需要进行广泛的规划、操作、结构和管理变革。本研究和其他IC21研究中的一些发现和建议正朝着这一目标发展，如果IC21要为21世纪做好准备，就需要尽快加以解决。军事行动的情报支持范围在IC21进程开始时，研究小组对军事行动支持问题的强调让他们不知所措。这一情报团体的“呼吁武力”有些令人不安，因为所表达的激烈程度表明，危机马上就要发生了——鉴于我们国家的威胁比过去50年中任何时候都要小，至少从军事角度来看，这是很难理解的。如果IC之外的人听到对SMO的强调，他们可能会得出以下三个结论之一：SMO是情报的首要问题，但IC已经偏离了太远的领域，现在需要重新聚焦；IC在支持军队方面经历了严重的失败，需要额外的努力来解决问题；或者，在一个威胁较小的环境中，军方对情报的需求以某种方式急剧增加。由于至少有边缘证据表明上述任何结论都是正确的，因此我们决定在IC21中特别关注当前和未来的SMO，作为一项单独的研究。然而，主要的焦点不是具体或详细的SMO需求，而是这些需求如何与21世纪集成电路的角色和功能的总体问题相适应。因此，本研究在宏观层面上围绕以下几个问题展开：SMO是否应该成为当前和未来IC资源的首要问题？IC今天是否正确处理SMO？是否有迹象表明SMO要求已经或将在未来发生变化？如果是这样，这会在多大程度上影响SMO在IC操作中的优先级？因此，这项研究并没有集中于评估特定的项目或评估特定的剧院收藏家是否是有价值的投资。然而，我们确实打算讨论军队内部各级情报资产与国家情报资产之间的一些关系，以及这种关系如何随着时间的推移而改变。这项研究着眼于21世纪中小企业集成电路面临的一系列问题。SMO研究小组与退休和现役情报专业人员和军官进行了几次访谈和小组讨论。其中包括“操作员”、一些美国作战司令部的总司令（CINC）和一些军事“理论家”，如前海军上将威廉·欧文斯金博宝正规网址Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who foresee very different types of military tactics and strategies than those that maintain our nation's defense posture today. Along with the issues and questions raised above, the effect of the trends coming out of Desert Storm and the historical evolution of SMO, especially in terms of budgets, programs, operations and service equities, were studied as we assessed the IC's future challenges in this area. What is SMO? One of the questions from the beginning of the study was the definition of SMO. The role of SMO and, thus, defense intelligence is defined with variance, depending upon the forum. For some, it is solely an issue of support for the operational commander in a tactical wartime setting. Certainly, most of the discussions related to SMO since DESERT STORM (and, arguably, most of the emphasis) are aimed at improving our capabilities to support a similar effort in the future. In fact, some believe that the priority for reorganization of our intelligence capabilities should be to plan for capabilities that would support the military requirement to be able to engage in two, near-simultaneous "major regional contingencies" (MRCs). However, the continued growth of so-called "other military operations" (OMO) -- peacekeeping, peacemaking, humanitarian efforts, etc. -- that are putting U.S. personnel into harms way much as if they were in combat, call for different intelligence priorities overall and clearly indicates that the two MRCs concept is not an adequate planning tool for the IC. Analytic and production elements of the military intelligence complex define their responsibilities by discussing the three "pillars" of support: support to the defense policy maker; support to force modernization and planning; and support to the warfighter. The individuals that make up these "pillars" would be, respectively: the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and other Department of Defense (DoD) policy makers; the Secretaries and staffs of the military departments charged with organizing, training and equipping the armed forces; and military commanders, planners and operators planning for or engaged in military operations. Although much broader than some definitions, this approach to the needs of the military by the IC is probably the most valid. Regarding support to the Secretary of Defense, since the end of the Cold War, the DoD clearly has become more prominent in U.S. foreign policy initiatives, even over the Department of State in some cases. From implementation of Nunn-Lugar programs to promote Russian defense conversion to the deployment of troops into Bosnia to implement the Dayton Agreement, the DoD is the active arm of policy development and implementation. In part, this is due to changes in the stability of many regions and relationships that tend to involve armed entities and are a byproduct of a less polarized but more unstable world. For this reason, it is easy to see why much of the emphasis within the IC on SMO and "support to the warfighter" currently carries the day in terms of resource priority and focus. However, although DoD may be the active arm of many of the Nation's policy initiatives today, most if not all of these initiatives began with some level of diplomatic effort, calling into question whether "support to the diplomat" might be a more critical pursuit. Support to force modernization and planning is also critical. Although some argue that this is less significant now that the Soviet Union no longer exists and strategic nuclear systems are being produced and deployed at a rate less than at the height of the Cold War, the facts are that Russia (and China) continue to produce strategic nuclear weapons and, most importantly, advanced conventional weaponry and defensive systems that will have an effect on U.S. force planning for years to come. Moreover, the sales of such systems to countries throughout the world by many countries, including Russia, underscore the importance of this type of intelligence to our weapon designers for protection of U.S. forces in the future. Another reason for emphasis on this type of intelligence area is opportunity -- more and more systems and technologies are available for purchase at arms sales throughout the world. Consequently, dedicated efforts by U.S. intelligence and defense to acquire previously hard to get equipment are especially important for the next 10-15 years. The Study Team believes that today's efforts in the Foreign Materials Acquisition and Exploitation (FMA/FME) areas -- currently managed under Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) -- are not as effective as they could be in order to assure that we capitalize on upcoming opportunities. The current FMA and FME programs tend to be piecemeal -- especially in terms of funding -- an issue that the Committee will continue to monitor with the FY97 budget submission. "Support to the warfighter" is the area of main interest for DoD and the IC at present, and tends to be used interchangeably or as synonymous with SMO. The use of the term "support to the warfighter" is extremely problematic. It is misused to self-justify programs and budgets, and misunderstood, or defined so broadly as to encompass everything that the military does. It is also self-limiting, in that it promotes the immediate needs of a soldier, sailor, airman, marine or weapons system, making intelligence only a reactive function rather than a predictive one -- at a time when predictive analysis is becoming increasingly significant for the military commander as well as the policy maker. Moreover, the term suggests that the primary focus of intelligence should be on the actual need to use force (i.e., "fight a war"), when we continue to believe that successful foreign and national security policy is designed to preclude such an event if at all possible. This is not to say that the IC and the military should not prepare for military conflict. But this cannot be the sole focus, to the detriment of diplomacy, deterrence and force preponderance -- all of which also require IC support. Additionally, the current emphasis on "support to the warfighter" is primarily technologically oriented. In this burgeoning age of information, there seems to be a growing belief that technology will fix everything. "System compatibility," "interoperability" and "it's all bandwidth" appear to be the approaches that have become the focus for a majority of those -- including the services themselves -- who are bent on solving the "intelligence" problems for the military. Although clearly very important, having the ability to transmit volumes of data in near-real time has greatly overshadowed (in terms of interest and expenditures) the importance of the utility and availability of the information being passed. While striving to attain technical solutions, we must also address the intelligence data/analysis itself, as it, too, is critical to a commander's success. The current trends in priorities, however, suggest that the IC, and the military services, could go down the path, once again, that results in significant technological capabilities -- especially in collection assets -- with limited utility based on a lack of attention to processing, analysis and production capabilities. There is also the issue of the IC's ability to ensure that its information can be received by operational units and other intelligence entities. Dissemination, especially within a military theater, was a key intelligence issue in DESERT STORM. Whether this is a legitimate responsibility of the IC or of the military is a topic of discussion in a separate IC21 Intelligence Communications staff study. This study, then, focuses on SMO mostly in terms that are associated with the third of the three "pillars." The Study Team believes that the issues of supporting the defense policy makers and force modernization and planning are as important as "support to the warfighter." This last "pillar," however, is likely to have the most dramatic effect in the future in terms of budgets, personnel, organization and priorities. In this study, given the limitations and misuse of the term "support to the warfighter," the issue of SMO is defined as those intelligence needs that support deployed forces. The Study Team believes that this support clearly should begin well before actual deployment and is not limited to traditional combat -- taking into account OMO and recognizing that a new paradigm in combat engagement is beginning to be realized. Likewise, as we need to consider new situations for the use of military forces, we must also review the "traditional" aspects of the intelligence information that is required for SMO. Traditional SMO-related intelligence requirements -- that are still in use -- would include information on the size, capabilities and locations of a country's military forces, and physical details about a country's topography. This information is deemed necessary based on the possibility that U.S. forces may have to operate in a particular country in the future. Given the increased use of the military in OMO since the end of the Cold War, however, the needs of the operational commander appear to be changing in a way that tends to blur the distinction between SMO and "support to diplomacy." As Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, Director, DIA, testified to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), "Threat ... is no longer a self-evident term. The defense intelligence community has traditionally focused on a primary element of the threat -- enemy forces and weapons systems; clearly that aspect remains. But as military activity extends to missions involving the use of military forces in non-traditional roles, we must adapt our intelligence focus to meet new requirements." SMO vs. Support to the Policy Maker As stated earlier, SMO is one of the major roles of intelligence. Some argue that it is the major role of intelligence. The Clinton Administration -- both policy makers and senior intelligence managers -- has stated that SMO is a top priority for intelligence. Critics question why this statement is necessary, given that much of the IC's effort has always been shaped around this specific intelligence role and that, in the post-Cold War world, U.S. national security is actually less threatened than at any time since 1940. This debate over SMO is important as it goes to the heart of both requirements and resources. Intelligence is not an easily expanded resource. As noted in the discussion on the IC's ability to surge (see the Intelligence Community Surge Capability staff study), covering current requirements and taking steps to address unexpected ones is difficult at best. The more resources devoted to any one area, the fewer there are left to address others. The issue is not whether the IC should devote resources to SMO, but rather how much SMO is reasonable given other, competing demands. Therefore, it is difficult to rationalize comments from senior IC officials (who also believe that a two MRCs defense strategy is sufficient for intelligence planning) who state that, "If you solve all of the military's requirements for intelligence, you will have solved 80 percent of overall intelligence requirements," as an acceptable blueprint for the IC today, let alone in the 21st century. Indeed, it is becoming obvious that, on any given day, the remaining 20 percent of the requirements could be more vital to the President and his policy advisors in areas that directly go to this Administration's stated principals of its national security strategy of enhancing security, promoting prosperity at home and promoting democracy. Much of today's emphasis on SMO is directly related to supporting tactical combat situations. If one assumes that, on any given day, all of the other issues requiring intelligence support are more likely to be active than is the probability that U.S. forces will be in combat, then many aspects of SMO become an insurance capability. Like all insurance, intelligence support for warfighting is something you do not wish to be without, but is something you also work very hard never to have to use. When viewed in this light, there is a greater desire to put some sort of limit on the degree to which the warfighting function calls unremittingly upon intelligence resources. Again, the insurance analogy is apt: how do you decide how much insurance is enough without short-changing other needs, all of which place real demands on resources. Further complicating the issue is the fact that military commanders are now becoming more aware and interested in thoroughly understanding the issues within their theater in terms that go beyond preparing for combat engagement. The continued use of the military as an active participant of U.S. peacetime foreign policy by engaging in OMO, has bolstered this interest. Again, as Lt. Gen. Hughes explained to the SSCI, "'Warning,' traditionally focused on Clausewitzian warning of attack, is becoming an increasingly complicated process. We must build and employ a flexible and adaptive military intelligence support system in order to meet the needs of large-scale military threats, while at the same time meeting the military requirements of non-traditional warfare and the new missions the U.S. military has assumed." Consequently, it can be argued that in the near future, the requirements that encompassed the "other 20 percent" will be as critical to the commander as it is to the policy maker, in order for the commander to identify the key "centers of gravity" within each country's infrastructure as they develop. There are already examples whereby commanders' interests conflict with SMO requirements -- the IC reaction to Presidential Decision Directive - 35 (PDD-35). PDD-35 is designed to present the Administration's highest national security priorities, thereby providing the IC guidance for resource allocations, by establishing a "tier" structure. Unfortunately, but predictably, the IC is using PDD-35 to ensure that resources are being placed on the highest-tier issues, in many cases having little or no resources left for lower-tier issues. One example of the effect is, in fact, in the area of SMO. In many cases, SMO is the top collection priority (and in many cases the only collection priority) for lower-tier countries, based on the possibility that U.S. forces could, some day, deploy to that area. Other non-military requirements for these lower-tier countries, however, such as a country's political climate, economic structure and internal stability, are of much lower priority or not reflected as having priority. Moreover, the growing number of SMO requirements threaten to consume resources that could be used to address non- military requirements. (Additional discussion of requirements can be found in the IC21 staff study entitled Intelligence Requirements Process.) As a result, the Community may spend more time gathering intelligence for potential SMO than for monitoring other developments that might aid in supporting diplomatic efforts to prevent a situation where deployment of forces would be necessary. Ironically, several of the CINCs expressed the desire to have the type of non-military information that was traditionally important only to civilian policy makers. SMO -- certainly in the traditional sense -- is, to some extent, a contingent need. At least through the Cold War, U.S. defense policy had been shaped around the idea of deterring combat, or using force as a last resort. Other, non-SMO, policy needs are current -- diplomacy, narcotics, terrorism, proliferation. Thus, a balance needs to be struck. Urging an increased emphasis on SMO without looking across the board at all IC requirements runs the risk of leaving many other ongoing policy needs partially or completely unfulfilled. The extent to which intelligence priorities must be balanced was suggested by Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, Ms. Toby T. Gati, again to the SSCI. In describing what she called a second kind of threat to our national security -- the first kind being made up of issues such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, drug trafficking ethnic and religious hatred, the behavior of rogue nations and environmental degradation -- she stated that, "Such threats [the second kind] derive from missed or unexploited opportunities to advance our national agenda. If we fail to recognize such opportunities, or pursue them with ill-founded and misguided strategies, we can exacerbate existing dangers or create new ones. Intelligence can play a vital role in identifying opportunities for diplomatic intervention and provide critical support to our nation's policy makers as they seek to resolve problems before they endanger U.S. citizens, soldiers, or interests, and as they negotiate solutions to festering problems. This is the essence of 'intelligence in support of diplomacy,' an often ignored but vital component of our national security." Clearly, then, striking the balance between SMO and other requirements is critical. Understanding how an administration views the use of the military and of the IC becomes a significant factor in the equation. In this Administration's national security strategy documentation (A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement), several points relating to these issues are addressed. On the issue of the use of military forces, the strategy begins by pointing out that, "Our strategy calls for the preparation and deployment of American military forces in the United States and abroad to support U.S. diplomacy in responding to key dangers -- those posed by weapons of mass destruction, regional aggression and threats to the stability of states." There is also a description of three basic categories of national interests that can merit the use of our armed forces: "The first involves America's vital interests, that is, interests that are of broad, overriding importance to the survival, security and vitality of our national entity -- the defense of U.S. territory, citizens, allies and our economic well-being." "The second category includes cases in which important, but not vital, U.S. interests are threatened. That is, the interests at stake do not affect our national survival, but they do affect importantly our national well-being and the character of the world in which we live." "The third category involves primarily humanitarian interests. Here, our decisions focus on the resources we can bring to bear by using unique capabilities of our military rather than on the combat power of military force." Such guidance provides a broad flexibility in the use of military forces -- each requiring both varied and specific types of intelligence support. Providing a view toward the importance and needs for intelligence, this same strategy calls for strong intelligence capabilities that protect our national security by "providing warning of threats to U.S. national security, by providing support to the policy and military communities to prevail over these threats and by identifying opportunities for advancing our national interests through support to diplomacy." Additional comments from this strategy include: "Because of the change in the security environment since the end of the Cold War, intelligence must address a wider range of threats and policy needs." "... its [the IC's] analytic effort must provide a coherent framework to help senior U.S. officials manage a complex range of military, political and economic issues." "U.S. intelligence must not only monitor traditional threats but also assist the policy community to forestall new and emerging threats..." "The collection and analysis of economic intelligence will play an increasingly important role in helping policy makers understand economic trends." "In order to forecast adequately dangers to democracy abroad, the intelligence community and policy departments must track political, economic, social and military developments..." "Finally, to enhance the study and support of worldwide environmental, humanitarian and disaster relief activities, technical intelligence assets -- especially imagery -- must be directed to a greater degree toward collection of data on these subjects." Although no one will disagree with the concept, also in the strategy, that "Whenever U.S. forces are deployed, the highest priority is to ensure that our military commanders receive the timely information required to execute successfully their mission...," some balance needs to be considered. With the proliferation of military deployment throughout the world, mostly for OMO, a sole emphasis on SMO threatens to consume entirely IC resources to the point that the IC is only accomplishing SMO, thus, leading to a foreign policy that is almost totally reactive, with its primary response being the deployment of troops. This is a direction that the Study Team believes is ill-conceived, short-sighted and not necessarily a path that this, or any, President should go down. Clearly it is envisioned that the focus of the IC today needs to be on predictive analysis on a wide variety of issues of importance to the policy maker. As President Clinton stated when visiting the CIA in July 1995, "Unique intelligence makes it less likely that our forces will be sent into battle, less likely that American lives will have to be put at risk. It gives us the chance to prevent crises rather than forcing us to manage them." We would argue therefore that, although there will always be changes on the margins regarding details and descriptions of "threats," the premise that the IC needs to focus on the ability to provide "warning" on a variety of issues to the policy maker is an enduring top priority into the 21st century, one that must be addressed regardless of an immediate crisis, including military deployments. To accomplish the task of providing such warning, the IC will need to develop and maintain an extensive intelligence "base" of knowledge that is worldwide. Such an intelligence "base" should cover all aspects of a country, issue, or entity, with an eye toward being able to supply trends and warning data to the policy maker before a crisis occurs. (An intelligence "base" is also discussed in the IC21 staff study on Intelligence Community "Surge" Capability.) Finally, although the debate is often framed in terms of competing requirements -- SMO vs. support to the policy maker -- the trends indicate that priority toward the policy makers' needs is complementary to the needs of the operational commander in the 21st century. Again, evoking the words of Lt. Gen. Hughes, "Understanding military threat is a direct function of intelligence of all types: economic, political, environmental and, specifically, military, brought together in a dynamic all-source portrayal of overall conditions and circumstances. Understanding the military threat paradigm of the future will include not only traditional intelligence practices, but also a new approach to the threat including a recognition of the changing nature of the operational environment." To the extent that the "operational environment" is more than just the battlefield, and given the uses of the military for OMO since 1989, we would suggest that it is, we would concur with Lt. Gen. Hughes' outlook. FINDING: The current demands being placed on the IC to support military operations will make it difficult for the IC to meet the broader national security challenges of the 21st century. FINDING: Currently, SMO demands are being satisfied at the expense of maintaining the necessary intelligence "base" that will be critical to the IC in addressing future national security needs. FINDING: Maintaining both the "base" and SMO represent valid concerns. SMO requirements must not stand alone, apart from other intelligence requirements. FINDING: The IC must develop and maintain a balanced approach in satisfying these concerns. The IC must ensure that the "base" is maintained even during periods of crisis, when IC resources can easily be overwhelmed by all consuming SMO requirements. Is the IC Properly Addressing SMO Today? Assessing whether the IC is properly responding to the military's needs is a difficult question to answer, as there are varying levels of support that can be addressed. As the previous section of this study pointed out, the Study Team does not believe that the current direction of intelligence priorities, and the resulting management of IC resources, will adequately support the policy maker nor the military commander in the future. Other areas to consider would include whether the structure and operations of the IC, especially within Defense, properly support the military's needs in peacetime, during OMO and during combat operations. Intelligence activities by the United States have a history that is closely linked to the military, sometimes exclusively. Indeed, the reasoning behind the founding of the CIA was to collate the disparate pieces of information that the individual military services, primarily, and other agencies (such as the Department of State) collected, and guarded zealously, so that the information could be useful to the policy makers as well as the government as a whole. But, guarding service equities has always been a key component of defense intelligence -- a component that has not changed even with internal military moves toward "joint" operations brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Although the Study Team did not intend to evaluate existing IC agencies regarding how they were performing, we could not help but notice that continued protection of individual services' equities and the lack of a strong defense intelligence focal point for policy and execution is causing the creation of a myriad of task forces, working groups, boards and committees that tend to try and attack new challenges while defending the structural status quo. Moreover, in order to make the existing rigid, vertical bureaucracy of the IC more responsive to the military, legions of representatives from intelligence agencies and program offices, and intelligence support teams now deploy to the theaters to provide SMO while, in essence, protecting structures. We certainly believe that, at the lowest operational level, a thorough understanding of and experience with the requirements of an individual service unit in the field must be part of the process of assessing needs, and, in some cases, having tactical intelligence assets controlled and operated in support of military operations is a requirement. This should not, however, be translated into "ownership" of assets in every case, and the "band-aid" structure that has been developed does not allow for the type of end-to-end, "corporate" approach that we believe will be needed. This is not to say that improvements have not been made or that intelligence cannot support current military operations. Clearly, the overall status of SMO since DESERT STORM has improved in many areas. The successful management of delegated intelligence production by DIA, the establishment and operations of Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs), especially in the Pacific Command, to consolidate collection and analysis for the theater, the successful deployment and integration of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) into theater operations to compensate for limitations of national collectors, the myriad of types of products produced by DIA specifically in response to operational needs and the establishment of the INTELINK system and the ability to access products on INTELINK via the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) and the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), are but a few examples where the IC, especially in defense, are responding to the call of new challenges in SMO. The old specter of redundancy and duplication have also been significantly reduced, and, although there may be additional areas where further attention to this issue is warranted, the redundancy that remains appears to be valid and healthy, as one all-source product cannot always serve all of the customer needs and requires some tailoring. But the fact that the IC is coping with the challenges of Somalia, for example, and, now, Bosnia, does not indicate that current operations and structures are adequate for future SMO requirements. Several points in this regard were obtained through the research for this paper and can be further expanded upon. The significance of military deployments for OMO, such as in Somalia, is that, in many ways, this type of support is more difficult and demanding than the traditional force-on-force analysis. This is because the military's requirements in this setting often call for more information on the immediate "environment" to which U.S. forces are engaged. Issues such as a population's dialects, religion, ethnicity and physical environment quickly become important for completion of the mission and for protection of our forces -- especially smaller ones. The types of arms and militia structure, if any, involved, that often do not conform to traditional force structures, are also vitally important. Likewise, understanding the more traditional military capabilities and operations of lower-priority countries continues to be important -- especially given the proliferation of weapons of all types -- and requires analysis before a crisis emerges. This was made painfully clear during DESERT STORM when assessing the IC's inability to locate and target Iraqi SCUD missiles and launchers -- an issue that was generally listed as an "intelligence failure." The truth is, however, that prior to DESERT STORM, the IC and the U.S. government did not consider the indigenous production of SCUD missiles to be a priority issue -- certainly not of enough priority to focus the required amount of attention and resources that would have provided a full understanding of SCUD operational deployment strategies. These factors specifically point to the growing importance of developing and maintaining an worldwide intelligence "base" of knowledge. This type of information is best supplied as the U.S. is approaching the decision to deploy troops -- indeed, it should be factored into the decision-making process. As stated in the previous section, maintaining this "base" of knowledge must continue regardless of a crisis at hand. This "base" of knowledge need not be in the Defense intelligence area -- many of the types of information may be better analyzed in CIA, for example -- as long as Defense has ready access when needed. (Also see the discussion of the intelligence "base" in the Intelligence Community "Surge" Capability staff study.) The establishment of JICs addressed the realization that the operational commander did not understand, nor had the time to deal with tasking national collectors. One of the often heard comments to the Study Team was that the collection "stovepipes" forced a commander to place multiple requests for information, each uniquely structured so as to fit into the specific collection discipline. Moreover, the development and employment of National Intelligence Support Teams (of which there are at least four supporting Bosnian SMO), JICs and Joint Analysis Centers (JACs) and the Defense Collection Coordination Center (DCCC), further indicate that better "horizontal" and synergistic management and operations of national collection assets is required. (See the Intelligence Community Management staff study and the Collection Synergy staff study for further discussion and for recommendation to create a Tactical Collection Agency.) A growing concern about the concept of "sensor-to-shooter" was also expressed. Although some types of information need to be sent directly to a weapons system, inundating and overwhelming the "warrior" is a decided possibility. Some saw the eventual solution to this data overload problem in enhancing the capabilities and responsibilities of the JICs and JACs for data/analysis fusion. Others were still concerned that the prospect of turning the "warrior" into an analyst, and, thus, reducing his operational effectiveness, were real and not necessarily good. FINDING: Emphasis on concepts such as "sensor-to-shooter" have promoted the dissemination of intelligence data and products to the lowest level of military operations, without full consideration of the effect on the "warfighter." The issue of interoperability of information systems between the IC and the military and between individual services is still an issue. A comment from a study of Bosnian operations last year by the Defense Science Board summarized the issue, "The multitude of separate, stovepipe, stand alone systems has proliferated in the theater by well meaning providers." This has caused, "unnecessary overlap and has overcomplicated fusion." (See the Intelligence Community Management staff study for a recommendation to establish an Infrastructure Support Office.) The concept of Command, Control, Communication, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) is, at best, an artificial construct. Intelligence is a user of communications and is, in fact, becoming more closely integrated with operations. Tasking, collecting, analyzing, fusing and disseminating intelligence useful to the commander and the "warrior," and providing the mechanisms (communications), especially within theater, that allows for the necessary dissemination in the time required are two different and daunting tasks. Realization that the integration of national and tactical collectors will also be key to future SMO has caused the military to add emphasis on integration of collectors for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) to enhance battlefield information. The difficulty in developing inter-theater and cross-service compatibility with enough available bandwidth to support operations is a difficult task; one that has been the primary focus of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for C4I. Integration of ISR components and ISR with operations is, in many respects, no less difficult, requiring more focused senior- level attention than it is currently given by the ASD (C4I). (See the Intelligence Community Management staff study and the Intelligence Communications staff study for a recommendation for an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.) The advent of information technologies is having an impact on intelligence reporting and dissemination that bring about significant management challenges. Although DIA has taken great strides in managing analytical and production responsibilities within DoD, technology that allows for more collaborative production will further blur the "lanes of the road," and will likely result in significant challenges ahead. Some of these challenges from a system perspective are being addressed in the development of INTELINK and the Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture (JIVA). From an intelligence analysis and production perspective, however, there is a growing concern that single-source (collection discipline) publications are increasingly using collateral information to help put their information into context, thus, appearing more like all-source publications. As a result, users may well incorporate a piece of analysis into a tailored report for the commander that is believed to be a product of all-source analysis when it is not. As technology allows for easier publication possibilities by more and more users of INTELINK, the problem can be exacerbated. The IC as a whole, but, specifically, DIA will need to take a more prominent management role. Finally, given the disparate responsibilities and activities of intelligence throughout the defense establishment and the fact that intelligence can take only a small portion of the SECDEF's time, there needs to be a senior military officer responsible for military intelligence management; someone who can look at defense intelligence from "end-to-end," and also allow the DCI to obtain the "corporate" view of the IC that will be required. (See the Intelligence Community Management staff study for a recommendation of establishment of a Director of Military Intelligence.) Future Requirements for SMO Perhaps one of the more interesting dynamics that will significantly affect SMO for the future is the explosion of new technologies across a wide range of disciplines and the emergence of truer "joint" warfighting resulting from the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The culmination of these points, observable in some limited fashion during DESERT STORM, has some within the military discussing new concepts in warfighting that could redefine SMO 10-15 years from now. Such concepts envision an information-reliant battlefield environment in which intelligence plays not only a significant role, but a dominant and directive one. An example of this is the concept of providing a commander with "Dominant Battlespace Awareness (DBA)." As defined in the Annual Strategic Intelligence Review on SMO, this concept is: "... the capability to achieve real-time, all-weather, continuous surveillance in and over a large geographical area. This capability should be sufficient to determine the presence of most objects, emissions, activities or events of military interest. The awareness portion of the concept is not limited to enemy activities -- it includes awareness of friendly forces, weather, terrain and the electromagnetic spectrum. The battlespace over which the Joint Force Commander establishes DBA includes the geographical area (surface, subsurface, atmosphere, and space above it) where the most intense conflict will take place. DBA is not solely an intelligence function." Such goals, combined with the new challenges being contemplated in the area of Information Warfare, pose daunting challenges for the IC -- from both a technological and analytical standpoint -- and there are only few who likely fully understand the ramification for the IC and for the military. Moreover, the excitement associated with these concepts could easily overwhelm the intelligence planning and support process so that development is concentrated in these areas to the detriment of other national security needs. Some would argue that this "militarization" of intelligence is already underway with the current leadership in the IC. What is true, however, is that in DESERT STORM, the introduction of advanced, precision strike weaponry, the identification of critical "centers of gravity" within the Iraqi infrastructure and the tactical requirements for information throughout the conflict pointed to a shift from intelligence as a contributor to intelligence as a participant. Lt. Gen. Kenneth Minihan describes this shift as akin to the roles of a chicken and a hog in a ham and eggs breakfast. In such a meal, the chicken is a contributor, while the hog is a participant. Although mired in traditional force-on-force strategies and operations, DESERT STORM represented the beginning of a shift for the military in how future wars will be fought. It also deftly portrayed the all-consuming nature of conflict on intelligence, especially as a participant. To effectively provide SMO in the 21st Century, the IC will likely have to develop a concept of "Dominant Awareness." The ability to be active in collection and analysis -- ahead of immediate requirements -- will make the IC our first line of defense. The ability to maintain a knowledge "base" on an extremely diverse set of countries and issues will not only help protect broad national security objectives, but in OMO, it could well save lives. In tactical, combat situations, taken to the logical extremes projected by concepts such as DBA, intelligence must somewhat take the lead rather than only providing a more traditional supporting function that is often reactive. To the extent that the military moves in the direction of DBA, specific cultural changes must be made, by the military and by the IC, in how intelligence is collected, analyzed, disseminated and used. Support for the type of battlefield, or battlespace, that the military is planning to operate within will take significant steps, especially in automation, to achieve. Put simply, a capability must be developed that provides continuous, near-real-time, sensor-to- shooter data on all targets and all weapons. Such a capability begins with collection capabilities. The ability to operate "national" and "tactical" collectors in near-real-time and in a synergistic fashion that does not waste resources, based on redundancy or system limitations, is critical. The speed at which these systems must react suggests that not only an integrated tasking mechanism must be developed, but that at least some significant portions of such a system needs to automated -- operating without the burden of human intervention. Likewise, the experience already gained from Bosnia, indicates that extensive, quick-reaction theater collectors and innovative "national" collection capabilities must be developed to meet many of our future needs. Finally, a robust HUMINT and clandestine SIGINT program is also of key importance. Having the "person on the ground" will continue to be the best way to assess an enemy's intentions. This type of collection support must begin well before troops are deployed and the battle begins. Waiting until the U.S. establishes military "presence" will not provide the information and advantages needed. Analysis and dissemination in this type of SMO environment must provide the capability to identify the "centers of gravity" of an enemy's infrastructure, and to have a thorough understanding of the enemy's "environment" prior to the beginning of a conflict. The ability to fuse intelligence data -- not only the "raw" data from collectors, but also disparate analysis from theater and "national" entities becomes especially important so that the tactical field commanders are not inundated to the point where their efficiency and effectiveness are diminished. On the battlefield, the ability to fuse intelligence data and provide a real-time picture of legitimate targets is a necessity. Such a capability may not be obtainable without significant advances in automation to assist in areas such as bomb damage assessment. Today, systems development in the areas of ISR are primarily in the hands of collection program managers in the NRO and the acquisition components of each individual service and OSD. If the IC is to meet the needs of the military in the future, a more "corporate," end-to-end outlook and management structure for the IC as a whole will be needed. In the 21st Century, the IC must attain a "dominant awareness" of worldwide activities, without waiting to be asked, if it is to provide the predictive and proactive type of intelligence that will make it relevant to the policy maker and the military commander. FINDING: The new operational strategy, Dominant Battlefield Awareness, will require significant advances in technology, development of consolidated requirements, coherent tasking management and synergistic intelligence collection capabilities. It is necessary to give serious thought to the amount of IC resources likely to be available to support such strategies. The Study Team firmly believes that SMO is a vital part of the intelligence role and mission. The IC has, in most cases, performed admirably in this regard. But the significance of the changes in our nation's national security "threats" and our responses to them, in how the nation employs its military forces, in the advances of technology on information processing, in the possible new paradigm in military strategies for combat, etc., that are either here or are on the horizon, suggests that extensive planning and operational, structural and management changes will be required for the IC to meet its overall national security needs, including SMO. Some of the findings and recommendations in this and other IC21 studies go toward this end and need to be addressed soon if the IC is to be ready for the 21st century.