IC21: 21世纪的情报界

员工学习
常设情报特别委员会
众议院
第一百四次国会

十、情报系统“激增”能力

内容提要情报界（IC）21世纪将面临的世界，呈现出不同的，更多样化的国家安全比在冷战期间提出了挑战。与此同时，众多的冷战中催生的问题和情报问题依然存在，而IC有金博宝正规网址望解决新的资源，因为冷战结束以来显著降低了旧的挑战。大使罗伯特·金米特，前副国务卿负责政治事务的证词委员会建议，无论是IC仍然是相关的和有效的可能取决于它在一切的“英寸深”的能力，以有能力“英里值得深度的”关于在片刻通知一个特定的主题。创建这样一个敏感IC将需要提高内部运营效率;对资源的利用更加集体，企业方针;而构成的，提供持续的资源增加和“飙升”功能的程序。这种“激增”的能力需要灵活的，动态的，有计划的 - 一个可以在白天到白天和危机的依据。“浪涌”可以定义非常广泛，包括以下功能：移动资源迅速地址立竿见影，通常临时，需求;扩充现有从IC外部资源; and, improve responsiveness of resources by building in more flexible options for collection and analysis. Taken together, these capabilities should provide for the development and maintenance of some level of knowledge on all countries/issues -- an intelligence "base." This "base" of knowledge is critical for providing predictive, timely and relevant analytical support to policy makers, particularly prior to and during fast-breaking crisis situations. As Representative Dicks, the Committee's Ranking Minority Member, has stated, "intelligence must provide early warning of potential crises or assist in developing sound policy responses to national security threats." In order to provide crisis warning and aid in policy formulation, the IC's ability to maintain an intelligence "base" cannot be sacrificed in order to focus entirely on other, more immediate concerns. Maintaining its "base" will be an ongoing challenge for the IC as it faces increasingly diverse intelligence requirements based on policy makers' immediate national security concerns and a voracious military customer that sees intelligence becoming even a more integral part of the modern battlefield. To address the need for "surge" capability, we make the following recommendations: The development of more flexible collection capabilities that not only include moving to smaller satellites but also to developing and incorporating "tactical" satellites and other assets, such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, that would allow for a "surge" in collection capability for a specific crisis. Such capabilities should respond to both tactical and national requirements. Provide the DCI with the ability to transfer personnel and resources rapidly throughout the IC, and to have the capability to bring "surge" resources into the IC from other areas. The DCI must have the ability to establish IC Centers and Task Forces quickly and with full Community participation. An IC-wide Civilian Reserve Program should be established that can be utilized to provide both "trends" and "warning" information and can be used to "surge," thus augmenting existing IC assets, especially during crisis. Better utilization of existing military intelligence reserve units is also required. This should include more focused, corporate management and tasking of these assets during peacetime, with oversight responsibilities by the Director of Military Intelligence. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY "SURGE" CAPABILITY Scope Throughout the review of the Intelligence Community (IC) during the 104th Congress, a wide spectrum of intelligence producers and consumers have consistently voiced concerns about the need for a change in the skills mix of the analytical population and the need for additional analysts. Those in the intelligence collection areas would argue that, based on problems identified in DESERT STORM and on the potential demands for intelligence support to military operations (SMO), a similar problem exists for collection assets. Yet, the IC is continuing to undertake significant, Congressionally-directed reductions in personnel as a response to the end of the Cold War. Indeed, given the amount of intelligence resources devoted to the Soviet Union, it seemed logical that without this threat the IC would only need a fraction of the resources it had during the Cold War. Most would argue that the "downsizing" was necessary and will be good for the IC in the long run. Many who have to deal with the IC, especially from the "outside," would agree that the bureaucracy tends to impede the efficiency of intelligence operations. Under the current system, evaluations of the success of national-level collection is primarily left up to those who operate the collectors and base their judgements on the amount of information collected by a particular system and in what time period the information was collected, rather than on whether the intelligence questions were answered. Since the end of the Cold War, the IC has had to deal with increasingly diverse policy maker requirements. At the same time, its resources have shrunk considerably. Unfortunately for the IC, it cannot take the position that it "can't do everything," because policy makers simply expect the IC to be able to respond to a variety of requirements regardless of resource constraints. The dilemma facing the IC was summed up well during an IC21 hearing by Ambassador Robert Kimmitt, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Ambassador Kimmitt testified that the challenge for the IC in the future is that it has to be an "inch deep" in a thousand things all the time while also being able, when a particular issue arises, to have a "mile's worth of depth" on that subject. If true, and apparently borne out since 1989, the ability to build extensive data bases and conduct more "predictive" and "warning" analysis for all areas of the world will be key to IC effectiveness in the future, as will be the ability to redirect assets -- collectors and analysts -- very quickly to new and in some cases, unanticipated problem areas. A principal reason for this study, then, is to examine the dichotomy between growing requirements (i.e., increasing requests for IC involvement in military operations and in the policy process) and the reduction of IC resources. If the IC is to continue to be relevant, its ability to "surge" resources to meet demands must be improved. Such "surge" capability can be defined very broadly, including the ability to: move resources quickly to address immediate, usually ad hoc, needs; augment existing resources from outside the IC; and, improve responsiveness of resources by building in more flexible options for collection. As important, improving the efficiency of the existing IC by restructuring or reorganizing resources can also have a significant effect on the ability of the IC to meet future challenges. The importance of having or developing "surge" capabilities is quite clear -- the IC will likely never be as large as it was in the 1980s even though the demands on the IC will continue to grow. Approach The "Surge" Study Team approached this study by looking at the breadth that the IC must acquire in order to be effective in the future. The Team conducted panels and interviews that included individuals both inside and outside of the IC. Several questions were asked of those interviewed, including: What are the core capabilities that are "generic" to collection, analysis and dissemination resources that would form a "21st Century baseline" for the IC? What are ways that the IC could "surge" to meet unexpected challenges? Does the DCI have the necessary authorities to quickly move resources -- collectors, analysts and funds -- within the IC to fully address ad hoc "surge" requirements. What administrative hurdles must be addressed in order to achieve "portability" of intelligence resources (i.e., resources that can be moved and utilized throughout the IC)? Because of developments in areas such as information technologies and communications, can some "portability" be achieved without physically moving resources? Should the IC consider "specialty nodes" whose expertise can be "tapped" when needed for certain specialties? Does this benefit either tactical or strategic analysis? In the present day IC, managers tend to feel threatened by the loss of personnel dedicated exclusively to their workload. How can supervisory fiefdoms be made more "Community" in outlook? How can contributions to "Community" needs become a positive factor in the overall assessment of employee and unit performance? What type of substantive "surge" capability should exist? How does the IC "tap" into resources within academia or industry? Is this sufficient? Is a Civilian Intelligence Reserve Program a viable option? Should portions of the current or future IC function be privatized in order to utilize scarce resources in other areas? What areas might be subject to privatization? What effect, if any, does DoD's focus on being able to respond to two Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs) have on how the IC should be structured, particularly in terms of its ability to "surge?" In order to assess likely "surge" requirements for the future, the study also examined recent events where some "surge" capability was required for support to "other military operations" (OMO). Meeting Challenges Today Showing responsiveness to civilian and defense policy makers' concerns is clearly a desire of any intelligence organization. As a result, today's IC tends to respond (either in actions or in budgetary requests) by lurching to the issue du jour or crisis of the moment. This suggests that, in the future, without a dedicated effort to develop and maintain an intelligence "base," a growing imbalance in knowledge can develop in lower-priority areas. Consequently, without a dedicated effort to develop and maintain some sort of "surge" capability, the IC may have difficulty meeting near-term challenges and may not be able to meet military and policy maker needs in the future. We have already seen some evidence to justify this concern. For example, the IC has responded to Presidential Decision Directive-35 (PDD-35), by focusing resources on the highest priority issues at the expense of maintaining basic coverage on "lower" tier issues. PDD-35 is an important document in that it presents the Administration's highest national security policy priorities, thereby providing the IC guidance for resource allocations. In a recent IC study of the capabilities of existing resources to meet PDD-35 requirements, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence directed that the study, "Review the Community's core capabilities mapped against the highest policy priorities in order to determine the most cost effective allocation of resources." Although this effort is laudable, the Study Team is concerned that in the rush to fulfill top PDD-35 requirements, the IC may be creating intelligence gaps in other areas. Indeed, the IC is responding to PDD-35 in a predictable fashion eager to show the Administration that it is responsive to these priorities. However, the IC over-emphasis on the "top-Tier" issues could be harmful to the IC's future capabilities. For example, when considering that four of the last five deployments of U.S. military forces for OMO were to countries/regions that were, at best, "lower-Tier," the ability of the IC to provide intelligence support to OMO in the future is called into question if the preponderance of resources is almost entirely on "top-Tier" issues. Likewise, emphasis on "higher-Tier" issues focuses attention (and resources) to areas that already have been identified as being national security "threats." But what about those "threats" and situations that have not yet been identified? As Assistant Secretary of State Toby Gati recently told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Intelligence can play a vital role in identifying opportunities for diplomatic intervention and provide critical support to our Nation's policy makers as they seek to resolve problems before they endanger U.S. citizens, soldiers or interests, and as they negotiate solutions to festering problems. This is the essence of 'intelligence in support of diplomacy,' an often ignored but vital component of our national security." Again, issues such as those described by Assistant Secretary Gati are likely not to be at the highest "tier" on a day-to-day basis. The PDD-35 priority structure has had an effect on intelligence requirements for "lower-Tier" countries. For example, SMO, which is PDD-35's top national intelligence priority, is a top collection priority for many "lower-Tier" countries. SMO-related intelligence requirements would include information on the size, capabilities and locations of a country's military forces, and physical details about a country's topography. This information is deemed necessary based on the possibility that U.S. forces may have to operate in a particular country in the future. Other "non-military" requirements for these "lower-Tier" countries, however, such as a country's political climate, economic structure and internal stability, are of much lower priority or not reflected as having any priority. Moreover, the growing number of SMO requirements threaten to consume resources that could be used to address non-military requirements. As a result, the Community may spend more time gathering intelligence for potential SMO than for monitoring other developments that might aid in supporting diplomatic efforts to prevent a situation where deployment of forces would be necessary. Ironically, several of the Commanders-in- Chief (CINCs), expressed the desire to have the type of non-military information that was traditionally important only to civilian policy makers. Changes in world events and in the demands being placed on the military for OMO are making the need for this type of information as important as the need for the more traditional military-related information -- a situation that many of the CINCs believe will continue to increase in importance. Yet another concern regarding reliance on the "tier" structure is the assumption by many that other government resources, especially diplomatic resources, will supply the necessary intelligence for the "lower-tier" countries. Unfortunately, U.S. diplomatic resources are undergoing the same downsizing and concurrent reduction in diplomatic reporting capabilities as is the IC, and in the same areas. (See the Intelligence Requirements Process staff study for additional information regarding PDD-35 and the Tier structure.) As stated above, the IC recently conducted an assessment of the effectiveness of its current capabilities when mapped against the Administration's highest policy priorities. This study proved interesting to the Study Team in terms of how the IC can address today's issues, and whether it is suited to meet the challenges of the future effectively. We believe that this study, which was well done, suggests that even with recent resource reductions, the IC can respond to many tasks levied by the policy makers. The study also highlights, however, several points that should be disconcerting to those concerned about the IC's future ability to address national security challenges. An important area is what the parameters do not include, which tends to portray a utopian national security "environment." The fact that the study did not account for tasking conflicts bases the analysis on a premise that there is only one primary issue of national security at a time, or that multiple areas of focus are geographically separated so that there is no competition for resources. An environment in which there is only one high-level policy concern at a time does not exist today and seems highly unlikely in the future, given the track record that the world has witnessed since the end of the Cold War. By not including warfighting needs, the assessment side-steps what is one of the major priorities of current IC leadership: SMO. The amount of resources used in DESERT STORM were significant; the vast majority of intelligence effort, in fact, was redirected to that region. The tendency of the IC to focus on the crisis of the moment, though understandable, can diminish effort in other areas. The parameters state that the study may not represent "current daily performance." Thus, the ability of the IC to "surge" to meet requirements was of extreme importance. A logical extension of this is that, on any given day, a question may be difficult to respond to without "surging" resources. Finally, by not including a survey of customer satisfaction, the IC has deliberately studied a point in time, somewhat ignoring the likelihood that requirements will grow. So, legitimately, this study reflects where we are today, not how the IC is prepared for the future. As a result, the overall effectiveness of the IC in terms of meeting future needs and challenges appears somewhat fragile, thus warranting the development of a stable, reliable, dynamic "surge" capability for crisis and non-crisis periods. The IC has begun to realize that there is a flaw in the PDD-35 philosophy, or certainly in how the Community is responding. A Strategic Resources Planning Task Force has been established and is working to address the philosophic and resource shortfalls that PDD-35 is creating. "Surge" in Today's IC There are many recent examples where a "surge" capability has been used by the IC. Clearly, the military intelligence organizations have practical experience at "surging" resources between theaters to support specific crisis situations. There are also other, more technical examples where "surge" has been successful. The development and use in Bosnia of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and the emergence of IC Centers are both variations on the "surge" theme. But today, the concept of "surge" tends to be viewed more as an emergency stop-gap measure for crises in places like Rwanda and Somalia, than as a well-planned capability to be consistently relied upon. Given the frequency in which the U.S. is engaging, and likely will continue to engage in OMO, a continued reliance on ad hoc measures seems inadequate. The concept of "surge" has applications in the areas of collection, exploitation and analysis and production. Collection U.S. involvement in Bosnia and other places, has indicated that "national" collection assets that were the bedrock of our collection efforts against the Soviet Union may not readily answer the needs of the future. In Bosnia, the IC has "surged" to meet some additional requirements by employing UAVs. These vehicles have proven to be flexible in terms of tasking and in operating under difficult weather and terrain conditions. Although not a replacement for "national" assets in terms of the overall collection requirements, UAVs are proving to be viable "surge" assets, especially for tactical situations. The use of UAVs on a high priority national issue like Bosnia, however, has raised complications about handling ostensibly tactical collection and keeping national-level leaders informed. As information technologies and "surge" capabilities continue to evolve, the policy issue of theater-to-national dissemination of intelligence will become extremely important to the effectiveness of the IC, especially in the all-source area. Tasking/Exploitation Various examples of surge capability are available in this area. One example is the deployment of National Intelligence Support Teams (NIST) to "forward" areas in order to augment military capabilities, as well as to assist theater commanders in understanding what "national" systems can provide and how they can be tasked. The response to NIST deployments has been overwhelmingly positive. That NIST in essence provides a type of synergistic, horizontal approach to collection, suggests that such an approach could be beneficial on a larger, Community scale. Analysis and Production Providing "surge" capability in the area of analysis is currently not as dynamic a process as it is in other areas. The National Intelligence Council (NIC) has made an effort to hire individuals working outside of the IC as National Intelligence Officers (NIOs). Not only can these NIOs bring differing perspectives to an area of concern, they can also utilize their contacts, usually in academia, to "tap" into noted expert resources that the IC does not have internally. In many cases, it can be useful for the IC to have access to noted non-IC experts from academia and industry because of their access to various forums and other experts who would not ordinarily avail themselves to government employees. Another example of "surge" capability can be found in a small program within the CIA called "when actually employed" or WAE. WAE, which is more of an employment status than a program, is utilized by individuals who are former employees or spouses of Agency employees. WAEs are asked to maintain a level of expertise in a specific area, sometimes by utilizing open source research, so that if a crisis develops, he or she can bring his or her expertise to CIA Headquarters to augment an office or task force throughout the crisis period. To a point, current IC Centers represent a longer-term "surge" capability in which the IC has brought together its assets to focus on a specific issue or area. It is possible that such a structure may prove the most effective mechanism for concentrating IC efforts against specific issues. See the separate staff study on Intelligence Centers for more details. Clearly another area of "surge" is found within DoD in the military services' reserve programs. This structured program has provided invaluable force augmentation to active duty units and, although the results vary with various units and areas of expertise, the program may serve as a model for developing similar capabilities in the area of civilian intelligence. Unfortunately, military intelligence reserve units continue to be thought of in terms of "mobilization" resources only, without much consideration or desire to more actively engage these resources in day-to-day activities. There are signs of changing attitudes, however, that could have significant pay-off for the military and the IC in the future, although these efforts are the exception rather than the rule. One example is found at the Joint Intelligence Center in the Pacific Command (JICPAC). In this case, the JICPAC J-2 has involved military reserve resources within his theater to assist in JICPAC's delegated production responsibilities. This effort has provided the J-2 with additional resources to combat shortfalls, and has added theater-specific expertise to the DoD production operation -- expertise that is likely not found readily at DIA or CIA. Another example is the use of the Joint Intelligence Reserve Unit to support operations in the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) at the Pentagon. This reserve unit takes over the weekend operations of the NMJIC and has the capability to augment the NMJIC during crisis periods. Such activity not only greatly benefits the active duty military by relieving them of staffing responsibilities on weekends, it also greatly enhances the military's augmentation capabilities by having individuals who are trained, up to date substantively, and can be relied upon at a moment's notice. Advances in information technologies and communications capabilities are forecasting an era by which "surge" capability will also be enhanced through collaborative analytical efforts within existing IC assets. Efforts such as INTELINK, that provides more advanced, multi-media dissemination capabilities for the recipient to utilize in his or her timeframe, go a long way in recognizing what technology is bringing to the intelligence analyst. Additional efforts are underway throughout the Community to construct systems tailored to the analyst's or recipient's environment. A "white board" capability on INTELINK will undoubtedly prove useful in asking questions and working through answers in a "virtual" environment. The Study Team found these efforts most encouraging, although there are some reservations regarding infrastructure standards and information/production management. Standards are extremely important in a "virtual analytic environment," and they need to be set and enforced at a Community level to be successful. (See the Intelligence Community Management study regarding an Infrastructure Support Office.) Management of information is a more difficult issue. As the Committee stated in the FY96 Authorization Bill, there is concern about competition developing within the Community in terms of publication of products. It would indeed be unfortunate and, ultimately damaging for the IC should a "competition for market share" develop. This is one reason why the DDCI heading the CIA must have management authorities for all-source analysis and production, with close cooperation of the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI), to assure "lanes of the road" are being heeded. The Study Team believes that the direction taken by DIA in developing a Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture (JIVA) is correct in terms of standards and development of a "virtual analytic environment." The Team believes that this effort should be not only strongly supported but also used as a basis for a Community-wide program. Surge Capabilities for the Future: Conclusions and Recommendations Unpredictability is one of the facts of life affecting all intelligence systems. No requirements process will be able to predict all of the issues that are likely to be of paramount interest to policy makers in the course of any given year. Indeed, flexibility of all resources -- technical and personnel -- are necessary in order to respond quickly to new events. During an IC21 hearing, Representative Dicks, the Committee's Ranking Minority Member, explained the uncertainty of future intelligence challenges by stating that: intelligence must provide early warning of potential crises or assist in developing sound policy responses to national security threats; it may not be as important for the IC to be able to identify, with specificity, future intelligence targets as it is for the IC to ensure that it has the flexibility necessary to respond quickly and competently to those targets, whatever they may be; and, now and in the future, events will unfold quickly and unpredictably, and the IC will have to figure out how it can make information more readily available to those who can help U.S. interests, while still protecting sources and methods. The problem of requirements and resources has been made increasingly difficult in the post-Cold War world. The end of the Cold War not only removed the single overwhelming focus of the IC, but also contributed to a breakdown of international order in specific regions, which contributed to the growth of ethnic warfare and exacerbated a number of transnational issues. A rapid succession of disparate but not wholly dissimilar issues -- Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda -- have put added stress on the IC. Before these crises arose, most of these were areas of little, if any, interest to policy makers and, thus, to the IC. Consequently, the ability of the IC to "surge" resources -- i.e., to focus collection and analysis, and sometimes operational capabilities -- on these suddenly important areas, is of increasing importance. As stated earlier, one of the witnesses at an IC21 hearing, Ambassador Robert Kimmitt, put it succinctly when he said that IC coverage must be an "inch deep" and a "mile wide," with the ability to go a "mile deep" on any given issue. FINDING: The IC must be able to surge. As Ambassador Robert Kimmitt put it succinctly, IC coverage must be an "inch deep" and a "mile wide," with the ability to go a "mile deep" on any given issue. As long as we are a nation with global interests and global commitments, we will need some level of global knowledge -- an intelligence "base." However, in a nation as rich as the United States is in information and experts, it is not necessary that this knowledge base be contained only in the IC. FINDING: The IC will be required to maintain some level of knowledge on all nations/issues at some level of detail -- an intelligence base. The capability to support this base or to "go a mile deep" need not be self-contained within the IC. The ability to surge means, in effect, the ability to marshal and move resources flexibly and quickly, without undue concerns about who "owns" the assets. As the IC moves to a more corporate approach, all components and all personnel must focus on performing the tasks at hand and not battle over which component gets the most resources or credit. Internecine competition undercuts efforts to meet intelligence needs. The ability to surge also requires planning in advance of the need. FINDING: The ability to meet future challenges effectively will require: increased internal operating efficiencies; a more collective, corporate approach toward utilization of resources; and structured programs that provide continuous force augmentation and "surge" capability. If done correctly, a surge capability should serve both the day-to-day needs of the IC, as resources are constantly readjusted to meet international conditions and shifts in policy maker needs, and allow for making larger reallocations of resources during crises. FINDING: A flexible, dynamic and well-planned surge capability must be developed that can be relied upon both day-to-day and during crises. Reorganization of Existing Collection Resources Some specific changes should be adopted to increase efficiency for the IC and the customer in the area of collection. Fully adopting a more synergistic approach to collection resources in terms of requirements and tasking management as well as operations will likely improve IC capabilities to solve the diverse intelligence problems of the future. For example, consideration should be given to a single "Technical Collection Agency" that consolidates IMINT, SIGINT and MASINT resources in order to realize the substantive advantages of synergistic collection in solving intelligence issues. Such an organization should eliminate the administrative and substantive barriers of existing "stovepipes," allow for easier, more effective tasking mechanisms for the customer, reduce some of the redundancy in collection between "INTs" and allow for better planning mechanisms for future systems by placing emphasis on intelligence needs, not the ability of program managers to "sell" their programs. Developing the capability to "surge" national collection assets should go beyond the requirements and tasking mechanism. Further development of other collection assets for use in augmenting national resources, such as UAVs, will prove to be useful in closing some collection gaps efficiently and effectively, but only if considered as part of an overall architecture of collection resources. To address these areas further, consideration of a more consolidated IC approach for development of collectors such as UAVs is warranted. Such an approach should not overlook the uses of these collectors for other IC requirements not necessarily associated with the military. As noted in the Collection Synergy study, the ability to do "all source" collection and analysis is a key to U.S. intelligence philosophy. There is an ongoing debate within the technical collection community and the Congress about future directions for satellites, revolving around the issues of size, capabilities and numbers. Although the smaller satellites that some are advocating -- including the House and Senate Intelligence Committees on an exploratory basis -- might not match the current large satellites in terms of the number of tasks that could be carried out, they do offer a number of advantages that might be of tremendous importance to our ability to "surge" collection assets. They would be cheaper to build and to launch and could provide an extremely useful "on the shelf" reserve to increase collection during a specific crisis. RECOMMENDATION: Development of more flexible collection capabilities should not only include moving to smaller satellites, but also to developing and incorporating "tactical" satellites that would allow for a "surge" in collection capability for specific crises. IC Centers and Task Forces The utility of Centers include the capability to pull together quickly the disparate resources of the IC into a concentrated, synergistic effort on a specific issue or area. Because this structure can benefit the IC overall, a better ability to develop and operate Centers at a Community level should be developed. Centers will never be fully considered as "Community" assets as long as individual agencies believe that Centers are just a means of sacrificing resources with little or no specific benefit to the agency itself. Thus, a means of allowing the DCI to address personnel, budget and management issues for Centers, and shift resources accordingly, would benefit the Centers' effectiveness. The enhanced IC-wide personnel authorities given to the DCI (see Intelligence Community Management study) should increase the ability of the senior IC managers to use their personnel better to meet unexpected needs. This enhanced authority should be expanded so that he can go outside of the IC when necessary and should be used in conjunction with the DCI's authority to establish IC Centers and Task Forces quickly as a means of coordinating IC-wide resources for these needs. RECOMMENDATION: The DCI's ability to establish IC Centers and Task Forces quickly (including the rapid transfer of personnel and resources throughout the IC) must be enhanced and should include the ability to bring "surge" resources into the IC from other areas. As important, the DCI must have the ability to quickly disestablish a Center or Task Force when its existence is no longer warranted and to guarantee that the contributing offices recover their assets. A review and evaluation process is needed to periodically assess whether a Center or Task Force is still a viable component. Analytic Tools The means for improving analytic capabilities will come with continued development of computer and information technologies and communications capabilities that foster better, more accessible relations among analysts. The ability to "surge" analytic resources through "virtual" means will be critical. FINDING: Current efforts to create a Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture (JIVA) within DoD show potential, and should be fully pursued and expanded upon to create a "virtual analytic environment" within the IC. Civilian Reserve Program The development of a Civilian Reserve Program may be the most important aspect of preparing the IC for the future, especially in terms of linguistic and analytic capabilities. Fully developing a relationship with linguists, especially those in "exotic" languages, could fill significant gaps that are developing in the SIGINT and all-source areas of the IC. The CIA already has in place procedures whereby it can increase its capabilities by using former employees on a temporary basis. This capability should be augmented into an IC civilian reserve program, to include experts not in the IC (in academia, business, etc.) who can be kept on retainer both to provide ongoing information on warning and trends and to be utilized during crises to augment IC assets. Such a program has several advantages. First, it allows the IC to concentrate on the current areas of concern while knowing that someone who is attuned to IC needs is also keeping an eye on areas that are quiescent. Second, the ability to bring in experts who understand local politics and players in a region is especially important during the early phase of a crisis, when the IC is often scrambling to come up to speed. Many of these experts can be kept on retainer and be asked to do unclassified work, which, in effect, will provide the IC with more knowledgeable access to the open sources. If the "reservists" are asked to work within the IC for extended periods, then some thought has to be given to the issue of clearances and polygraph requirements. A flexible approach to these issues would best serve the overall interests of the IC and the nation. There are many ways a civilian reserve program could be run. To be successful, however, such a program would probably have to be developed and managed at the Community level, so as to properly address administrative concerns (security, pay, etc.) as well as substantive concerns -- assuring that duplicative expertise is minimized and agencies do not compete for resources to support individual reserve programs. Some developmental work on a reserve program is being done at this time in the National Intelligence Council (NIC). This work should continue and a pilot program should be enacted in the near term. RECOMMENDATION: An IC-wide civilian reserve program should be established, whose participants can provide ongoing trends and warning information and can be utilized to "surge" as part of the IC, thus augmenting existing IC assets, especially during crises. Military Intelligence Reserve Resources Similarly, better use should be made of military intelligence reserve components. Currently, reserve units are under the control of military service reserve chiefs who are responsible for ensuring necessary units are available for mobilization. By treating intelligence units strictly as mobilization assets, these units have been subjected to resource cuts and constraints as are any other reserve units. Additionally, any consideration of utilizing intelligence reserve units during non-crisis periods has evoked cries of Title 10 authorities and endangerment of military readiness. But intelligence is most effective for national security when it can deliver predictive analysis and warning well ahead of a crisis. Thus, it seems somewhat short-sighted to hoard capability that might be used to both prevent a crisis and certainly to prepare for a crisis, for the sake of ownership or control. Consequently, the Study Team believes that the SECDEF should capitalize on those efforts that are mentioned in this paper to craft an arrangement between the service reserve chiefs and the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) to better utilize military intelligence reserve resources. This would result in allowing the DMI and DoD to make better use of intelligence reserves in non-crisis situations, thus adding an additional "surge" capability to the Intelligence Community. RECOMMENDATION: Better utilization of existing military reserve components is also required. Consideration should be given to placing some of these components under the DMI for better utilization during time of need.