图像智能(IMINT) will be a mainstay of the Intelligence Community (IC) in the 21st century. The IMINT community (IMC) today is, made up of a diverse set of users including military, national, and civilian. We anticipate that the numbers and types of, imagery users will continue to grow dramatically in the future, perhaps into other areas not yet imagined. Thus, it is extremely important that our imagery system be flexible to support these changing needs.
剥削将成为图像界的扼杀点。鉴于当前的趋势，收集的图像数量将继续超过我们分析它们的能力。收款成本继续上涨，以处理和剥削为代价。图像分析师正在使用古工具，而当前的采集过程并不能促进及时注入新技术。这部分是由于图像界的分裂，基础设施和研发是由几乎没有协调的众多组织追求的。商业图像需要被视为国家系统的辅助手段，必须制定计划以促进其使用。IC继续在图像要求方面转化为二分法：用户需要在近实时的时间内图像，但也需要详细的分析。图像界。尚未协调如何同时满足这些矛盾的要求。向军队I级别以下的军队传播图像仍然是一个问题，最后，外国否认和欺骗活动仍然是一个问题，必须在未来的计划中考虑到。
情报will see a great transformation in the next century. Commercial systems will allow everyone, including our foes, to have access to high 'resolution imagery. At the same time, classification of national imagery must provide the required access to allies while continuing to protect collection/processing capabilities. - More cost effective collection systems are required to free up funding to support the "downstream" activities of processing and exploitation. The explosion of available imagery requires that new technologies and exploitation/production tools such as automated/assisted target recognition algorithms and digital softcopy search tools must be aggressively developed to help streamline the exploitation process. The IC must move to all-digital exploitation of imagery, with access to cross-INT databases, while progressing to a. ".virtual" analytic environment, and funding must be increased to accelerate the procurement of softcopy (digital) workstations for imagery analysts. Support for the National Technology Alliance should be increased to provide more flexibility in rapidly fielding new technologies and exploiting commercially available technologies. Finally, increased emphasis should be placed on spectroradiometric collection, processing and exploitation.
Thus, there is much in store for the IMC; however, it will not come for free. Funding must be increased to set up the central infrastructure needed to support the diversity of analysts, to bring those analysts the tools they need to help alleviate the exploitation chokepoint, and to increase and focus the R&D efforts to bring new technology to bear in a more rapid manner. Collection costs must be reduced so next generation systems and exploitation advances can occur. If these things do not occur, the IMC will not be able to satisfy 21st century requirements.
概述
图像智能(IMINT)将是情报界的支柱(IC)in the 21st century. The情报community (IMC) today is made up of a diverse set of users including military, national, and civilian. We anticipate that the numbers and types of imagery users will continue to grow dramatically in the future, perhaps into other areas not yet imagined. Thus, it is extremely important that our imagery system be flexible to support these changing needs.
这needs of the military will continue to expand, as their mission spreads into ,new, uncharted areas. Across all levels (strategic, theater, and tactical) we will see this new scope, in areas such as coalition operations; highly mobile, detached operations; enhanced C41 (Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence); and peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, along with further "operations other than war." These increased areas of responsibility bring with them a greater need for imagery support. Advanced, precision guided munitions will also demand-a new level of sustained, highly accurate, imagery products.
平民和国家图像要求也将继续增长。我们已经看到，国家图像的使用传播到环境监测和评估中，并帮助国家和国际救灾。然而，这种特殊的情报来源对于支持执法，顾问和反恐，监测条约和武器的扩散以及战略和经济情报的主要重要性将是至关重要的。不过，同样，今天可能会有一些强烈的，未来的平民使用的领域，因为商业图像的未来可用性以及最近降级国家图像的推动力可能会带来以前无法访问此类数据的新用户和不同的用户。因此，我们的未来系统必须易于适应，以满足这些截然不同的要求。
IMC面临几个挑战，必须适应以维持当今客户在未来不断变化的环境中提供和预期的支持水平。这些挑战几乎在每个功能领域都出现：组织，需求管理，收集，任务，处理，剥削和
dissemination. Other issues include classification levels, denial and deception, and interaction with commercial systems. Each of these areas will be addressed separately in this study.
情报will see a great transformation in the next century. Commercial systems will allow everyone, including our foes, to have access to high resolution imagery. At the same time, classification of national imagery must provide the required access to allies while continuing to protect collection/processing capabilities. The number of users and requirements will grow. Exploitation will be the chokepoint in the imagery process. The explosion of available imagery will overwhelm the imagery analyst unless automated/assisted target recognition algorithms or other exploitation/production tools can be developed. Spectroradiometric collection will become more important, with major impacts on the collection, processing, dissemination and exploitation arenas.
Thus, there is much in store for the IMC; however, it will not come for free. Funding must be increased to set up the central infrastructure needed to support the diversity of analysts, to bring those analysts the tools they need to help alleviate the exploitation chokepoint, and to increase and focus the R&D efforts to bring new technology to bear in a more rapid manner. Collection costs must be reduced so next generation systems and exploitation advances can occur. If these things do not occur, the IMC will not be able to satisfy 21st century requirements.
Organization
近几个月来，对IMC的组织已引起了很多关注。但是，必须格外小心不要打破那些效果很好的部分，以解决其他感知的问题。显然，当前的中央图像办公室（CIO）没有监督多样化的图像社区所需的权限。但是，在我们急于进入新的组织结构之前，我们必须确保这个新组织在解决直接问题的同时，将足够灵活地应对下一世纪的“虚拟”情报环境。
We are most concerned about a lack of CIO's authority to oversee an imagery strategic plan. Current imagery organizations are not tied together nor beholden to such a strategic plan. This results in disparate, uncoordinated allocation of funds and resources in collection, R&D, and exploitation and dissemination infrastructure. Dissemination within theater is another area that needs drastic improvement. Those areas that work well, though, are mainly within the exploitation community.
对决策者的剥削支持非常好。在战略迹象和警告和应急计划的领域，对军队的支持也非常出色。但是，为正在进行的操作提供足够的图像支持仍然是一个挑战，将来只会更加困难。因此，对于任何新组织而言，重要的是要查看这张照片并展示在保持以前组织的优势的同时如何改善缺陷。同时，必须在IC的更广泛背景下考虑这个新组织。
Some have suggested that a new organization be fashioned after the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) model. Though it appears to be a convenient organizational structure, we do not believe this will solve the IMC's problems because the analogy of the National Security Agency (NSA) is not directly applicable to imagery due to major technological and operational differences in the two disciplines. We are also concerned that a major monolithic agency will be LESS responsive rather than more responsive to the customer. Finally, the risk that future imagery systems will be driven solely by technology rather than users' needs increases under these proposals (though this danger does exist with today's organizations). Some also claim that another major布里森·德特雷for this new organization is to solve the dissemination problems of DESERT STORM. We overwhelmingly agree that dissemination is a problem; however, it is hard to comprehend how an organization that has no control over theater/Joint Task Force (JTF)/Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) level forces and lower echelons will be able to solve this problem. Thus, we must again gravitate to the real problems within the IMC and focus on an organization that will be able to provide solutions to these problems.
我们看到的主要问题与当前structure are imagery program management/planning, research and development (R&D), collection, processing, dissemination, and standards. A single, strong policy arm is needed for coherent end-to-end planning. Several key functions should be centralized: standards, protocols, and communications interfaces. A strong R&D oversight structure must be included to ensure that new technologies are responsive to customer requirements and that R&D funds are spent efficiently, according to an overall plan instead of each organization funding bits and pieces as is done today. TheIC21 IntelligenceCommunity Managementstaff study presents an IC that will solve these deficiencies through the needed centralization of certain functions while preserving those areas that work well.
We believe the exploitation community is one of those areas. This is an area where IMINT differs greatly from SIGINT. In the SIGINT arena, a signal is collected and analyzed by NSA, producing information which is then distributed to a variety of customers and agencies. IMINT, on the other hand, produces an image which is then sent to a variety of organizations and exploited in many diverse ways within those organizations. Hence, imagery exploiters are, in many ways, discrete customers/users of the imagery in and of themselves and, thus, the SIGINT analogy is really not applicable in this case.
Keeping imagery analysts close to their customers will become increasingly important but too great a dispersion of capabilities may lead to an erosion of imagery analysis expertise. Thus, a balance must be struck between decentralization and centralization of imagery analysis capability. Another balance that must be struck is the level of segregation between military analysts, analysts who support national and civilian customers, and cartographers. Recent recommendations have been to combine these forces into one exploitation cadre. Again, we go back to our argument that the different exploitation elements should be treated as discrete customers. There is danger in too much centralization because of the diverse sets of skills these analysts bring to the table. We fear that combining these personnel into one homogenous unit will dilute these skills into one set of "accepted" skills, which will not completely satisfy any customer's requirements. In order to preserve the diverse set of analytical skills we have today, we recommend keeping the disparate imagery analysts with their originating parent organizations, while centralizing the infrastructure that supports them; however, we also recommend better integration of the imagery analysts into those organizations for better support to the "all-source" analysts.
We must look to the future, not the past, for a new organizational model. Legacy stovepipe organizations are a product of the past and will not-.provide the needed flexibility required to support a "virtual" intelligence community in the future. Our model of IMINT in the 21st century is based on centralization of vital functions (end-to-end planning/management, R&D, collection, processing, archiving, and infrastructure) while sustaining a diverse customer/exploitation base. Needs of the users must drive the organization and those users' needs are met mainly by imagery derived information and products prepared by professional imagery analysts, not the raw image. These decentralized production strengths equate to increased responsiveness to local needs/missions and the ability to tailor and/or focus efforts quickly to respond to changing priorities. This flexibility in exploitation, combined with
consolidation of programmatic and tasking oversight, and a standards based infrastructure, will truly allow the IMC to be responsive in the 21st century.
Requirements
要求更大的规模和syn集合ergy are discussed in separate IC21 studies. However, in the context of imagery, requirements and collection management must be discussed. The new Requirements Management System (RMS) for imagery is due to reach initial operating capability (IOC) in June. 1996 (eighteen months behind schedule). It is unclear at this time whether RMS will be able to perform comparably to its predecessor, CAMS (COMIREX Automated Management System). In all fairness, the RMS goal was admirable: to allow the user
遵循他的图像请求并确切知道需求过程中的位置。但是，RMS将永远无法实现完整的操作能力。这是在StovePipe系统上花费大量资金的一个很好的例子。当然，预计该系统现在将启动和运行，并且我们将在设计未来的收集管理工具上。由于这不是在短期内，我们必须确保RMS在允许CAM被关闭之前提供等效能力。（两个系统都不能同时运行。）如果RMS无法达到预期性能水平，则必须保留CAM，直到下一代系统可用。
下一代系统,我们想象一个tegrated requirements process where all types of intelligence collection are tasked (e.g., SIGINT, IMINT, MASINT, etc.) Ideally, this translates into one requirements tasking system. The military's Joint Collection Management Tool, which was supposed to interface with RMS, is a small step in the right direction and provides only one interface to the process. However, this is not absolutely necessary. What is required, though, is consolidated resource planning. We must be able to do cross-platform, cross-sensor tasking, with dynamic and flexible planning, scheduling, and management. Managing which users get to steer which collection assets will be difficult. Rapid exploitation feedback will allow more optimized planning and scheduling. This all-source requirements system must be compatible with theater/tactical assets and should look to meet the goals set out by RMS, mainly that the customer would know the status of his request, for all INTS, throughout the entire process. This is discussed in much further detail in the other staff studies mentioned above.
Validation of imagery requirements also needs an overhaul. The current Community Imagery Needs Forecast (CINF) does not currently include all requirements. It also appears that requirements are based upon what collection systems are/will be available instead of what information is required. It appears that the "Seal of
批准“过程不能解决成本效益或满足要求的能力。
我们需要一个不受特殊利益的要求系统。我们提出了一个中央需求组织，该组织将跨越所有INT，以确定收集所需信息的最具成本效益和有能力的方法。我们需要一个展望未来的组织，以确定当今哪些技术需要增加的投资。我们希望看到IC研究和反应，而不是研究和报告。在IC跳入解决方案之前，必须对问题有透彻的了解。但这应该需要几个月，而不是几年。
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只有一个解决方案已经提供了到目前为止,商店ws major promise in reducing costs while maintaining capabilities: small satellites (smallsats) acquired through streamlined acquisition practices. A distributed architecture made of smaller, single function satellites, will provide the flexibility and responsiveness required for the customers of the next century. Technology is now available that would allow the IC to shrink its satellite size, thus reducing costs, both for the satellite and the launch vehicle, but also from an organization infrastructure point of view. Also, by using streamlined acquisition, this approach allows new technology to get on-orbit more quickly. Multispectral sensing satellites can be added to supplement this architecture. Best commercial practices must be incorporated.
Smallsats have also been proposed for point targets that need high resolution collection. These Narrow Field of View（NFOV）satellites, while more complex than
the Wide Field of View (WFOV), offer an exciting opportunity to maintain capability but at much reduced cost. Unfortunately, because many people believe smallsats are only capable of fulfilling narrow, niche missions, these types of satellites will never be considered seriously until this technology is proven on-orbit. (It appears that it is more widely accepted that the WFOV mission can be done than the NFOV mission). Therefore, we must build andflyAnfov小型成像师说服怀疑论者，我们不需要每颗卫星花费数十亿美元就具有同等的能力。因此，我们现在必须采取行动。如前所述，除非有轨道示威表明其价值，否则Smallsats不会被视为可行的替代方案。必须尽快建造小型NFOV卫星，以使该技术成为认真的竞争者。
Another idea that should be reviewed, especially if the cost per satellite can be contained, is to reverse the trend of increasing Mean Mission Duration (MMD) and build satellites that will last only three to four years. Costs would be further reduced, both per launch vehicle and satellite, because larger block buys of both systems would allow a cheaper unit price. Limiting the lifetime of satellites would also allow advanced technology to be incorporated more quickly and missions to be altered to adapt to new situations because satellites would be replaced at a relatively fast pace. Industrial base concerns would be alleviated and launch crews would always be current on their procedures. The recent push to increase MMD seems to be a survival tactic to counter the large growth in satellite cost; because the IC's satellites have grown so expensive, we can buy only a few, spaced out over several years. Thus, these satellites must last longer so the IC can stretch out its costly acquisitions. This approach should be given closer scrutiny.
沿着这些线路，应将剥削者视为客户，因此应该在审议新系统的价值时投入，因为他们是必须使用该产品的系统。他们应该直接参与对新型系统类型的实用性研究，这不是当前的情况。如今，国家剥削实验室（NEL）仅在被要求参加时才参与这些类型的研究。他们与所有其他主要用户一起，应有权要求参与任何新图像系统的评估。
这same "clean sheet" argument can be made for the command and control and ground processing segments for imagery. New commercial satellite architectures will be required to control on the order of hundreds of satellites. Can we leverage off of the work they are doing? New processing advancements are being made in the commercial sector that should be incorporated quickly. This appears to be only one of many examples where contractors have conveniently made themselves indispensable, at the expense of the government.
Commercial companies are developing ground stations at much less cost. It gets back to the principle of deleting unnecessary layers and overlapping influences, wiping the slate clean and starting over. The IMC should look at using the "clean sheet" approach for its ground functions. It is especially important that this method be implemented now while the "lessons learned" expertise still resides within the NRO. Thus, they would have the advantage of quickly infusing new technology and simplifying operations while ensuring that mistakes of the past are not repeated.
NRO需要与聪明的人一起返回精简的计划办公室，从而减少了依靠众多SETA和支持承包商的需求。这也将减少采购卫星所需的成本。
On the airborne side, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and airborne collection will continue to be important assets to support the theater and tactical commander. However, their collection capability is limited to only those areas where they can fly with impunity. However, for all airborne collection that remains, the imagery must be collected digitally in order to ensure its compatibility with future imagery databases and exploitation workstations. The tasking of these systems should be integrated with the tasking of overhead systems in order to maximize efficiency and delete duplication of collection.
剥削/信息处理
剥削将是未来图像过程中的扼杀点。在减少图像分析师数量的时候，收集的图像量将大大增加。如何解释新型图像（例如多光谱收藏）必须在不可能的时候学习
除非分析师的招聘趋势逆转，否则拉分析师脱机。软拷贝工作站是至关重要的需求，应加速所有图像分析师的购买。这些工作站应兼容或能够升级到与所有类型的智能及其相关数据库一起工作。软拷贝搜索工具的研发应该是第一要务。必须大大增加分析师的数量，或者必须开发技术，以使分析师的劳动力提高效率并取消一些剥削准备工作。我们会冒险必须两者都会发生：必须以更好的工作站和更好的工具的形式增加分析师的数量，并且必须开发技术的数量。为了更好地为图像社区服务，必须合并研发资金；但是，每个组织都必须控制一些资金，以保留专业工具。
发现：图像分析师正在使用古工具；当前的采集过程并不能促进及时注入新技术。
这number of analysts needs to increase now. Also, we are facing a severe deficit down the road because of a reduction in the number of imagery analysts. The longer we wait to begin rehiring, the greater the danger we will face a gap in knowledgeable imagery. exploitation. Fifty percent of DIA's imagery workforce will be eligible to retire within the next five years. This is a problem that cannot be ignored because it takes several years to train an imagery analyst to be self-sufficient.
Another problem that has occurred because of downsizing is the "in-box" mentality. This is not just a problem within the IMC but is occurring everywhere within the IC. Analysts are too busy dealing with the crises of today to have the time to think creatively and look long range. DIA, in the past, apportioned part of their personnel to look at long-term issues but they no longer have this capability. History shows that there will be problems that may take interdisciplinary teams years to solve. With the current emphasis on immediate information, there is a danger that refined, thoroughly analyzed intelligence will become a thing of the past. We must balance real-time information needs while protecting long-term research.
另一个问题是用于测试新工具，产品等测试的分析师。目前，为此目的将分析师脱机非常困难，因为分析师的数量没有剩余的时间。所有这些问题都取决于可用分析师的数量。因此，我们必须迅速采取行动，以增加国家和军事的图像分析师的数量。这
optimum number of analysts will depend greatly on the exact mission the IMC is asked to perform and on how well we apply technology to streamlining the exploitation process for those analysts. Regardless, the number we have today is inadequate and, due to the long timelines of training, hiring of new imagery analysts should commence at once.
未来的影像分析师将面临更加困难的任务s. They will be required to look at and evaluate diverse types of imagery and use more sophisticated tools. They will also work daily with a paradox: producing thoroughly analyzed, contextually based products while meeting demanding timeliness requirements of less than 24 hours (in some cases, 12 hours). This is an impossible task in today's environment, yet will become increasingly more important in the future as other countries gain access to similar imagery. Strategic advantage will become a matter of whose collection, exploitation and dissemination timelines are the shortest. Intelligence must be there swiftly so as to be relevant to decreasing planning and execution timeliness and packaged in such a way that can be consumed by the user. The lower echelons of the military present the real crux of the problem: extremely short timelines must be met yet great detail is still required. This would appear to be a push toward automated exploitation; this however, implies that the time-dominant reporting will not have analyst derived information and will merely report what, where and when, not who, from where and why. In some instances, this may be all that is required but it is our belief that a human will always be needed, at least during the timeframe dictated for this study, to provide the cognitive processes of exploitation. Nevertheless, R&D should be increased and focused on providing these analysts the new tools and efficient processing capability required to help them come closer to meeting these demanding timeliness
这些新工具将涵盖广泛的功能。在此期间，重点应该放在提供工具上，这些工具将极大地加快分析师访问和集成信息的能力，分析师需要软拷贝工作站，以允许及时检索当前和存档的图像，而质量没有质量降解。软拷贝的剥削将导致明显的效率。它将简化图像的传播，存储和检索，并将增强分析师利用可用数据范围的能力。它将促进分类，商业和戏剧图像的整合，并允许分析师快速获取目标的“最佳”图像（假设开发了所需的选择算法）。从单个工作站上从多个传感器获得的图像进行测量的能力将是一个显着的增强。
对大土地区域的软拷贝搜索是至关重要的，但是该工具仍然很难实施。因此，目前，它仍然必须在光桌上完成。必须开发软件搜索工具以有效地搜索大量数据。必须容纳该地区研发的足够资金。
对未来,最好的知识工具商店uld be made available: online access to integrated databases from the analysts' desktops; numerous data sources available on-line (maps and intell reporting) at different security levels; simplified product lines in a limited number of formats; and the ability to receive requests on-line and distribute responses that way. A major investment is required to allow analysts to query, browse and exploit from large, digital image product libraries which use supercomputing and massive data storage technology. Providing this kind of access could greatly increase the amount of time an analyst spends on analysis. Direct interface of imagery with global geospatial information based on a standard coordinate system is required. Automated image examination technology must be pursued. Softcopy exploitation will be the norm; yet softcopy search will require highspeed computing, data storage and management capabilities in the gigaflop range of speed. Tools are needed to accomplish tonal dynamic range manipulation and sharpening, geometric processing for warping or imagery perspective manipulation, and registering images to maps. Data compression, management and display technologies are needed simultaneously. Adaptive image compression schemes will be needed to allow imagery analysts to quickly assimilate information without waiting for the full-resolution image. Greater screen brightness and higher resolution are n.eeded for search. Flat screens with great resolution are needed for tactical situations. Three-dimensional technology will be important (e.g., autostereoscopic, holographic, and lenticular) but screen displays will be needed that do not require special viewing goggles. As imagery analysts search, locate, ID and analyze pertinent imagery the results will be documented in real-time upon a registered geographic, information-based, vectored layer. Analytic and presentation aids such as map overlays, terrain displays and 3-D perspectives will be routine. We must capitalize on commonalities among digital imagery and mapping technologies. Superimposition techniques on up-to-date baseline images, maps, and graphics will be able to show changes in force and target dispositions. Such symbolic information overlaid on baseline displays could provide tactical users readily accessible information in a format required for his command and control function. Hardcopy to softcopy conversion must also be a priority due to the vast quantities of historical documents containing text, graphics and pictures that are stored in paper and film form. Conversion
technologies are needed that provide basic indices automatically, preserve formats, and permit full text searches.
One area that remains quite controversial is automated target recognition (ATR) systems. There are many analysts who view ATR systems as direct competition with their jobs. Then, there are others who doubt whether these systems will ever be able to replace the imagery analyst. We have taken a moderate approach to ATR. As stated earlier, we believe that a human will be required in the loop, at least for the next 10-15 years. At that time, it may be possible that technology will have advanced far enough to allow cognitive aspects (i.e., assessing meaning, separating significant from irrelevant data, integrating all available data to form analytical context, making sense of imagery-derived data in the current situation, and judging the significance of the findings) of the exploitation process to be performed by computers. In the interim, we need technology to help analysts be more efficient, not to replace them. Thus, because ATR and artificial intelligence (Al) are a long way from performing these cognitive functions, we recommend increased attention to assisted target recognition (ASTR) systems while continuing low level exploration of ATR systems. R&D must be focused and pursued diligently in these areas for both imaging and spectroradiometric sensing, as ASTR/ATR offer the only major advancement in imagery analysis productivity on the horizon.
ASTR/ATR have the potential to help resolve one of the IMC's biggest problems. In recent years, imagery analysts have been forced to be selective in the imagery they exploit. With the amount of imagery collected increasingly greatly in the near future, this priority-based exploitation will be the norm. The remainder of the imagery will be "binned" into libraries for ready access, if needed at a later date. If no one looks at this imagery at all, nothing will be found. Thus, if assisted "alerting mechanisms" can be developed with low enough false alarm rates to search this excess imagery, then the efficiency of our human analysts is greatly enhanced. There are algorithms of significant value available today that could be used as alert mechanisms. For the future, reliable, totally automated aids to help filter large volumes of data and accurately cue imagery analysts to likely points of intelligence interest will be essential. We should look to architect a system where tasks are efficiently divided between people and machines, parceling out to each the jobs that they do best. Some tasks for computers might be to screen non-literal imagery so an imagery analyst does not have to look at it (as mentioned above). Total automation will depend on what kind of false alarm rate can be tolerated. This will depend on the mission to be supported. Hence, algorithms need to be very specific to the job. We should take the ATR problem and break it up into bins, depending on the problem we are trying to solve. Then we should consolidate the bins and ask ourselves what the value is of doing this automatically. An assessment of that value should be traded against the cost. Computers are persistent but not very cognitive. They can be very
good at search, can find bright spots, can look at certain parts of the spectrum, etc. On the other hand, because computers are much better at certain jobs than are people, in the near-term, we should concentrate on those areas where computers outperform humans and perhaps aim for 50-70 percent automation over the next 10 years. For other processes, we should proceed at a much slower rate and aim for 1020 percent automation. Early success in automated aids are more likely to occur in filtering large volumes of imagery data to the analysts. High performance image screening and semi-automatic image region cueing also show promise. For the future, ATR needs to move to context-based recognition, not just for single objects for single vehicles, but for units in the field and activity types within fixed facilities. We also need to look at automating exploitation of moving target indicator imagery. If ATR algorithms can be developed that provide a very high level of confidence, then perhaps this processing can be transferred to the collector to allow screening before the data is downlinked. Some enabling technologies that should be investigated include domain mediators (which will help to quickly modify ATR algorithms to different but similar targets) and knowledge engineering tools (automating identification cues, context cues).
Technology integration for exploitation has not progressed further or more rapidly in the IMC primarily because there exists no single focal point within the imagery community with sufficient influence to foster change. Funding constraints have forced the IMC to focus on procuring only a small part of the full array of needed technologies. No exploitation R&D roadmap exists and different programs seek different technological solutions to similar needs in dissemination, exploitation databases and softcopy. Establishing a funding line specifically for exploitation system development and supporting R&D would assist greatly in addressing exploitation shortfalls.
Requiring that such a funding line be tied to each new collection system would ensure adequate "downstream" resources are addressed. Required critical technologies that surfaced during interviews include softcopy exploitation, automated or assisted exploitation, spectral phenomenology, imagery training, multimedia reporting and information infrastructure, surge retrieval visualization and synthesis schools, automated downgrading declassification, and hardcopy-to-softcopy conversion. Exploitation systems must evolve to acquisition timelines of months not years to keep pace with technology changes. For acquisition, we have to accept a 90 or 95 percent solution and not hold out for 100 percent if a commercial capability is available. Recapitalization is another area of concern. What is the optimum recapitalization timeline when what you take off the shelf is obsolete in a year? Other areas that need to be pursued include efficient means of data entry
（例如将报告转移到Intelink）以ReportsReports及精确对齐或“融合”同一目标的两个或多个图像的能力，但已从不同的态度，传感器和/或平台收集。就其类型及其用于开发的任务而言，较新的图像类型（例如多光谱传感）更难。在这一领域，正在零散地追求大量技术，但是在这些领域执行任务没有真正的优先级。
在研发社区中，我们花费大量资金和时间来构建用于测试算法的数据库。我们需要一个社区，常见，受控的测试数据集和指标社区标准，因此可以通过共同的基线相互测量新的算法。这将可以快速，平稳地过渡到分析师的工作环境。
分析师的工作站必须灵活且用户友好。通过电子邮件连接至少能够通过个人录像带在单个工作站上通过个人录像带进行工作，作为目标，必须在国家和军事的所有图像分析师之间实施。IMC应定义图像开发标准，但允许分散执行。因此，尽管未来的全源图像分析师将需要比今天所要求的更多的固有分析能力，但如果战术成像分析师可以以连贯的方式与其他分析师进行实时对应。从本质上讲，我们必须努力追求“虚拟”图像界。（我们还将冒险，所有分析师，不仅是图像分析师都可以访问这种连接性，从而创建了“虚拟” IC。）因此，分析师必须具有可用用户的和可过滤的剧院/国家SIGINT-IMINT-HUMINT-HUMINT-HUMINT-HUMINT-HUMINT-HUMINT-HUMINT-HUMINT-HUMINT-HUMINT-HUMINT-HUMINT-HUMINT-HUMINT-HUMINT-DATABASE查询，提示和收集要求的能力，以促进目标和其他临近流程（Nrt-Real and nrt-Real and-nrtrtrtt）。从IMINT的角度来看，将需要中央数字图像库，并且还应在线访问可用剧院图像的清单。应该创建与现有国家数据库集成的可访问分布式数据库网络。这个全面的数据库应具有超出当前目标系统的功能，并允许图像分析师和客户访问不同级别的信息以满足特定需求。在未来的战场上，满足那些NRT收藏，剥削和传播需求将是[电子邮件保护]。确保我们的时间表比对手的时间表更快，尤其是当这些对手本身可以使用军事级图像时，将需要实施所有这些建议。这些问题必须金博宝正规网址在不久的将来解决，以便下个世纪的图像劳动力足够。尽管某些竞争性分析是健康的，但是当今大多数孤立的和/或冗余的图像生产都会出现，因为我们无法共享站点之间的数据，分析和产品。还需要采取安全措施，以防止未经授权的访问，无论是故意的还是无意中的，而无需扼杀系统绩效。
这product of the future will be one of merged data from every-INT.它们将变得越来越少，文字越来越少。具有标准化符号的地理空间引用的图形报告将成为规范。这还将提供一种可接受的方法来帮助保护来源和能力。但是，客户必须在危机时期与这些分析师合作，以便客户相信符号是准确的。也许这样，我们可以减少认为需要原始图像的客户数量，而实际上，他们真正需要的只是图像衍生的数据。
This issue, though, may become a moot point, if the "virtual" connectivity discussed above becomes reality. If the new IMC infrastructure is done correctly, users will be able to pull the raw image if he needs it or pull the imagery derived information, all the while retaining email/videoteleconferencing connectivity with analysts within the community. Our perception of CIO's archival plan is that it does not include the raw imagery. This is a mistake. All information should be accessible. If this occurs, the biggest issue, will be ensuring that the user who pulls the raw image also takes advantage of the imagery derived data. A common misconception is that the significant intelligence contained in an image is readily apparent to the average observer. While it is true that a consumer, using an identification key, could find on electro-optical imagery an SA-2 site because of its distinctive pattern, the user would not be able to tell if the site were real, dummy, or decoy. Imagery analysis has come a long way from the days of photointerpretation. A comprehensive, analytical, multisource approach to imagery exploitation is now the standard within the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), though generally not at the force application levels of the military. The IMC must be able to serve both types of customers (force planners and force application end users) and provide support in both types of situations -- where the immediate transmission of raw imagery is enough and where imagery derived information is essential. The "virtual" connectivity mentioned earlier will erase the need to limit the number of raw images required by the user, rendering this contentious issue irrelevant.
信息处理设备的采购是并且将继续是为工业时代建造的采购系统的一个令人难以置信的挑战。行业正在花费数万亿美元用于信息技术。新产品每六个月出版一次，新一代产品每18个月生产一次。我们的信息处理需求无法幸免于收购系统
that takes five to 10 years to field . new systems (6.1, 6.2, 6.3 type funding is unacceptable for information processing systems -- it mandates a long development cycle). We need to modernize our procedures to take advantage of current technology. Our adversaries certainly will. Along these lines, we need to take advantage of commercial advancements and determine whether a commercial product that fulfills 90 percent of our requirements is adequate compared to the cost to customize that product for the extra 10 percent. We need to make maximum use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products which requires someone to inform, encourage, influence and pay vendors to encompass our specialized needs in their technology advancement efforts. Standards are also required so the "guy in the foxhole" can receive imagery data, but government standards need to follow commercial standards if we are to truly benefit from COTS products.
需要一座政府商业桥梁，幸运的是，已经存在。国家信息联盟（NTA）与国家信息展示实验室和国家媒体实验室是桥梁，应鼓励和扩展。NTA尝试（并成功地）影响了商业能力以涵盖政府要求。它提供了一套政府要求，商业公司可以应对并将商业标准提供给政府以影响政府的决定。我们必须练习在COTS系统进入市场之前影响COTS系统的方法，以便它们对政府有用。这NTA在节省多个政府计划的同时，同时影响商业标准以更好地支持政府要求。他们应该是任何新收购信息处理设备的强制参与者。应该为他们提供立法和预算自由，以实行ACTD型实验，直到商业公司可以得到支持为止。国防部（DOD）可能会从类似联盟的非智能事项中受益，以帮助加速商业系统的野外。
One approach to setting up the imagery processing (data storage, retrieval, etc.) and communications infrastructure, which merits closer scrutiny, is to hire a systems integrator to run this process. Systems integrators (SI) can cut across organizational boundaries (when given that authority) and have the flexibility to recapitalize quickly in areas where technology turns over frequently. These Sis are commercial companies that provide this type of service for a broad array of users.
这ir ability to consolidate, delete duplication, quickly upgrade capability and reduce costs provides a model the IMC community should strive to achieve.
Classification
One of the biggest controversies today is the sharing of imagery with our allies in the Balkans. Intelligence data sharing will continue to dominate foreign relations issues for many years. Every day we hear about a new request in ever more divergent areas: environmental, law enforcement, disaster relief, etc. Questions arise: How do we provide the same level of battlefield knowledge to our allies and coalition partners, how do we provide information on disasters, how do we provide data to support U.S. policy decision, all while continuing to protect sources and methods? During the majority of our panels, the customer reiterated that in most cases, he does not require the raw image, only the imagery-derived information. These consumers can be served with graphical overlays which provide the imagery derived information without giving away technical capability. This has worked very well in the support NPIC gives to FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency). FEMA provides the LANDSAT or SPOT image and the NPIC analysts overlay those images with a graphical representation using standardized symbology. It is a very efficient process. However, again, in order for the customer to trust the information provided in these graphical overlays, he must train with them.
当然，在21世纪，任何人都可以在商业上购买军事级图像（一米）或实际卫星本身作为交钥匙系统。但是，再次，我们应该将图形叠加层和图像派生信息视为我们用于共享数据的媒介。我们应该尽可能地保护我们投资于这些能力的数十亿美元；一旦知道了能力，对手将采取对策以击败/降级其收集能力。在此期间，图形覆盖层必须足够。
We should also move to protect any future technology breakthroughs. Are we no longer concerned with maintaining a U.S.-only capability and protecting our investments? We need to put back into the psyche of the community that secrecy is a requirement, not an option, especially before we invest dollars in next generation systems. We must move to new collection that is not understood by our adversaries. Along these lines, we should move to develop dissemination systems that can handle multiple levels of classification. Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) technology will allow numerous levels of classification to be passed over the same communications lines. We need to develop the capability to have multiple levels of information accessible from the same workstation.
传播
在沙漠风暴期间，宣传情报信息的传播是IC最大的失败。尽管今天仍然是一个挑战，但在国家一级已经做了很多挑战来定义界面和标准。沟通将在另一项IC21研究中讨论，但是今天的最重要的是，图像数据可以及时传播到剧院。在剧院下方是问题所在的地方，没有国家组织能够解决问题。国防部必须采取挑战 - 要求每个剧院的国家，商业和剧院形象的独特组合RY需求和系统符合常见的传播标准和界面。
CIO的A31（加速架构采集计划）是正确的愿景：虚拟图像档案在各个层面上都可以访问。但是，这是一个程序，该程序将从系统集成商（SI）中受益匪浅。如前所述，这些是商业SI，他们简化和减少了众多商业和政府企业的开销，为总体成本节省提供了“基础设施”类型的功能。A31必须为所有数字图像和图像产品建立虚拟图像档案，该档案易于访问用户。用户将“拉”他们需要的任何图像和产品。从本质上讲，正如C41概念中所设想的那样，这是对战士的总战斗空间信息的图像组成部分。但是，它实际上只是数据存储，归档和检索，而且 - 我们设想的未来将拥有来自所有 - INTS的数据的虚拟数据库。因此，我们必须确保A31在将来与虚拟的多INT数据检索和档案系统兼容，而不是设置另一个stove填充系统。我们不相信这是发生的事情，实际上，由于资金资源不足，A31已被降级。同样，军方对A31非常持怀疑态度，因为它不能解决CINC级别以下的通信网络的改进。 Though this is not the imagery community's responsibility, an SI might be better equipped to cross organizational lines to implement the infrastructure to support everyone Is requirements. In the near term, though, A31 should not be criticized for things out of its purview. An SI might be able to ensure that the communications community is looking at A31 to provide the necessary bandwidth and that, with the advent of global broadcast and direct broadcast service, connectivity via these systems will- be easily and quickly incorporated.
Denial and Deception
Commercial Systems
商业系统应被视为我们国家收藏家的兼职。有些人认为，小型卫星计划和国家图像的解密将使商业公司失去业务。但是，商业图像公司以飞机图像市场为主要消费者开发了他们的系统，而不仅仅是美国政府（USG）。我们的预测是，商业图像对明天的USG和今天一样重要。它将是国家/战术系统的宝贵增强器，多光谱传感将提供独特的数据。应该追求的一个领域是，商业系统是否可以提供“激增”能力，该功能将允许在危机期间进行更多的实时收集/接收图像（类似于美国空军当前对巴尔干剧院内现场收集码头的所有权）。一个非常需要的改进是USG用户购买商业数据的新过程。当前的过程将需要几个月的时间，将国防图机构（DMA）作为中间人，而客户被迫带上自己的钱。我们设想，作为我们的图像组织概念的一部分，它将根据中央资金的中心货物获得商业图像，为此目的授权和拨款。这些购买将代表USG进行，以便USG中的任何人都可以使用图像。 This imagery would be archived within the main national imagery library where any user could access it. The imagery organization would maintain the index of what imagery had been procured. Of course, the disadvantage to this is that the imagery organization could ecome the bottleneck for these purchases, pushing the customers to go out and make their own agreements with the commercial companies. This should be allowed as long as the imagery purchased gets incorporated into the national, not just the regional, library, that a consolidated list of imagery purchased is passed to the central repository for indexing, and if a common USG license is issued. This allows flexibility across the board.
有一些建议正在考虑在the IC that would encourage and allow our allies to buy a medium resolution version of our imagery satellite system. These systems would be exempt from the current "shutter control" mandated by Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-23). The rationale for this proposal stems from
一个美国能够保持其担忧lead in this technology area because of reduced USG funding. Through these sales, we would have more funding available to invest in future systems while getting increased coverage from these additional systems. This proposal seems to contradict itself; on the one hand, promoting commercial systems is a priority while on the other hand, it advocates building a USG system for foreign military sales (FMS) that would directly compete with those same commercial systems. We are also concerned about giving away our technological advantage in this area. We believe that the shutter control policy is a necessity today. However, we must assume that eventually systems will be proliferated with no such encumbrances and should look to reassess the policy at that time. We also believe that our WFOV small satellite program will not compete with commercial programs or give any more unfair advantage to one program over another. The four licensed programs have all made the decision to go ahead and develop these systems without government funding. Further, the commercial systems would be complementary. By applying adequate collection management, offloading requirements to the commercial systems is a smart move on our part. This would free up our systems to collect other priorities. The biggest difference between our WFOV and the one discussed earlier is that ours would not be made available for government-to-government sales. We would encourage sales of available commercial systems.