1996 Congressional Hearings
Intelligence and Security

今天早上，我们在我们面前有一个非常杰出的中央情报局局长约翰·迪奇（John Deutch）博士，他将在参议院情报委员会之前上次露面。我们的目的是审查大量未偿还物品，以获得最终报告。

And at the outset, I know that I speak for all members of the committee, and really for the whole Senate and Congress, in thanking you for an extraordinary job, Dr. Deutch. You took on this responsibility at a time of real turmoil and left a position where you, I know, would have preferred to have stayed, to take on the responsibility in this department, and you have done an outstanding job. The only outstanding issue is the relatively short tenure, but it is understandable, all factors considered, that you feel your work ought to be brought to a close at this time, and that is something which I and the committee certainly understand.

The issues which you faced were monumental; candidly, they still are monumental. But you took on matters of discipline within the Central Intelligence Agency which were unparalleled and unprecedented and certainly needed. When the disclosures were made as to Guatemala, you took disciplinary action. And when the matters came to light about CIA failures in the wake of the Aldrich Ames case with the extraordinary, really incredible forwarding of tainted materials of the highest echelons of the government, including the president, you took disciplinary action. And there again, it was very needed, very important. Always a difficult balance as to what you can do in the Central Intelligence Agency and get the job down and maintain morale and maintain the appropriate line of discipline.

今天早上，我们想和您一起介绍很多主题。

And I'd like to yield at this time to our distinguished vice chairman, Senator Kerrey.

森BOB KERREY (D-NE): Mr. Chairman, first of all, thank you very much. And I welcome our distinguished witness this morning, and I look forward to hearing his testimony on security issues which are important to the country and which you -- he and we have worked on for the past two years.

你来电话时,主席先生,这简讯hearing, I don't think any of us expected this to be the final hearing for Director Deutch. It marks the end, unfortunately, of a rather distinguished career. And I want to say to Director Deutch that I'm frankly disappointed that you're leaving. I mean no disrespect at all to Mr. Lake. I look forward to working with him as well. But you've brought a tremendous amount of intelligence to the job, understand the technical issues. You've brought a tremendous amount of organizational ability to the job in a culture, frankly, that's difficult for me to imagine much people doing a better job. But more importantly for me, you've brought a tremendous amount of courage to the job, willing to come before this committee and tell us what you think is the case, what's the truth, what does intelligence cause you to conclude, even though that might produce some discomfort for those of us who are trying to make policy decisions (and might ?) disrupt the status quo. And I think you have elevated the work of gathering intelligence, and you've made it more likely that your successor will be able to get the job done as well.

我希望你留下来。我很喜欢和你一起工作。正如我所说，我很喜欢您的智慧，坦率，组织能力，勇气，您在很难的时期与中央情报局的员工接触，从一开始就被非常怀念，但会非常怀念在这个委员会中，我们所有人以及美利坚合众国的每个人都受到赞赏，他们了解对我们的政策制定者获得良好情报的至关重要，至关重要的重要性。

为了记录，我也可以说这可能是 - 我不知道这是否会，但这可能是主席先生主持该委员会的最后一次听证会。我不确定这是真的。但是，如果不是，我期待第二次这样做。但是在这段时间里，我说与您合作是一种荣幸。你一直很顽强。您将巨大的精力和智慧带给担任主席的工作。您一直将该国的利息放在首位。您以两党的方式操作。

我们通过了良好的立法。我们已经完成了我认为历史将标志着的事情，因为它会提高美利坚合众国的安全性。主席先生向您交给了您的狮子份额，很高兴与您合作。

森SPECTER: Senator Kerrey, I thank you very, very much for those very generous remarks. And I have said publicly and privately and will repeat today that it's been a first-rate partnership. I think we've circumvented some very, very difficult political waters and have kept the committee on the straight and narrow for the national interest.

Senator Lugar, would you care to make an opening comment?

森理查德·G·卢加尔（Richard G. Lugar）（R-in）：主席先生，我没想到要做一个，但我会利用它来称赞您的主席，而克里参议员克里（Kerrey）伙伴关系，你们俩都表现为非常温暖和建设性，而且已经如此。作为委员会的成员，我很荣幸能与你们一起服务，并至少欣赏您所取得的成就。与本尼特·约翰斯顿（Bennett Johnston）一起在这个委员会中又与贝内特·约翰斯顿（Bennett Johnston）在一起真是太好了，因为他在美国参议院和该委员会中统治了杰出的职业生涯。

And for John Deutch I have the same warmth that has always been expressed by our chairman and our vice chairman. I think you have done a wonderful job. I wish you were continuing. I wish the hearing today was, in fact, a bold statement about all that you were going to do for the next four years. But we will all take advantage of your wisdom, of the extraordinary achievements you have had not only in Defense but with the CIA and with the intelligence community in recent months. And we really look forward to hearing that wisdom. That is at least the joy of this hearing, that we may make some progress that will be helpful to the successors of all this.

谢谢您，主席先生。

森幽灵：谢谢你，卢加尔参议员。

This, too, I believe will be Senator Bennett Johnston's last Senate speech. Twenty-four years of extraordinary service. Senator Johnston?

森J. Bennett Johnston（D-LA）：主席先生，非常感谢您，并感谢您在委员会和参议员Kerrey的领导下的领导。我喜欢这个委员会的所有工作。

Mr. Chairman, this is my last committee hearing, my last Senate utterance. And I think it's appropriate that I'm here with John Deutch, who I've known very closely for over 20 years. He was the assistant secretary of energy for science and technology, I guess was the title, under Jimmy Carter and brought an expertise to that department that it did not have before, and I must say has not had since.

他和我学习的，我们在国家实验室和其他地方有很多科学事物，我们很开心。作为国防部副部长，他带来了该部门以前或此后从未有过的武器和技术的知识，我认为他真正牺牲了离开国防部的牺牲，因为他在扮演这样的事情关键角色；他之所以这样做，是因为中央情报机构确实需要他的巧妙之手来解决艾姆斯争议之后留下的士气和其他问题。

我认为他尽可能地做得很好，这是最高级的称赞，我认为您可以给任何人，以恢复对中央情报局的信仰和使士气重新恢复的信念恢复国会对中央情报局的信心。我想说的是，至少在我看来，他一直是中央情报的最杰出总监，而且我认为，许多人认为。

这是真正的成就感I look at his record, and a real sense of gratitude, I think, of all of those -- certainly of myself, and, I think, of the country, to someone who I think is an extraordinary public servant. So I'd like to say -- as I say bon voyage, I'd like to say bon voyage to John Deutch, who has really achieved for this country and for his country and for all of us.

森幽灵：非常感谢约翰斯顿参议员。

Senator Glenn?

森GLENN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

我想我只是想在这里与以前的话联系在一起，以免今天早上的唤醒，安息或类似的东西。但是我认为以前的所有陈述 - （脱离迈克） - 约翰，我们在您的任期期间非常紧密地合作，我只是在今天与以前的所有评论联系在一起。我非常担心高离职率（（Off Mike））做到这一点，因为我认为这是我看到的最大问题之一，营业额太多。

谢谢您，主席先生。

森幽灵：非常感谢，格伦参议员。并可能记录说明Deutch夫人在场时听到有关她丈夫的评论，这都不是一个惊喜或新的。

Director Deutch, the floor is yours.

先生。DEUTCH: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much, all of you, for these very kind words.

这是我在这个委员会担任中央情报主任的最后一次露面。我在华盛顿的这次巡回演出中度过了四年，担任三个不同的职位。国防和技术的国防部副部长，国防部副部长，在过去的20个月中担任中央情报部长。我感谢克林顿总统提供服务的机会，以及我在这些工作中尽我所能做到的满足感，我尽我所能诚实地做到了这一点。

This morning I want to make five points to the committee. The first point, which several of you recognized, is that progress in improving the performance of the intelligence community requires longer tenure by directors of Central Intelligence. Progress does not come only from leadership or from new ideas; it comes from sustained management attention and work to implement change.

It should come not as a surprise, given the cumulative four years of service that I have spent both in Defense and in the intelligence community, that I am leaving as director of Central Intelligence after a little less than two years at the end of President Clinton's first term. However, I am confident that Tony Lake, the individual who President Clinton has nominated to succeed me, will be an excellent director of Central Intelligence, and he has my complete support. Moreover, the continued presence of my excellent and beloved deputy, George Tenet, will ensure continuity for the agency and for all parts of the intelligence community. I hope that Tony Lake does not take it as an unfriendly sentiment that my confidence is that he will, when confirmed, stay in this job for the entire second term for a four-year period.

我要提出的第二点是我想强调情报界在过去20个月中取得的巨大进步。我不想详细介绍；我只想简要地总结您的一些成就，这些成就是通过我担任导演的整个社区和我本人的工作而实现的。

First, we have improved the quality and timeliness of the intelligence product for the senior policy customers in the government. Examples include in Bosnia, the Taiwan Straits Task Force, reporting on a variety of important nonproliferation subjects.

Second, intelligence support for military operations has never been stronger. We are able now, for example, in support for IFOR, intelligence support for all the coalition partners in IFOR, in Bosnia, to know how to provide intelligence responsibly to peacekeeping forces.

其次，通过利用新技术 - 例如，正在进行的新图像架构，卫星建筑 - 我们能够保证，将来，美军将具有主要的战场意识，这是必需的。他们在冲突情况下可能会发现自己的完全军事优势。

第三，我们大大加强了与执法机构，尤其是联邦调查局的合作。如果我们要应对国际犯罪，国际毒品贩运以及国际恐怖主义的日益增长和至关重要的威胁，这绝对至关重要。

Fourth, our counterintelligence capability has become a great deal stronger as a result of the reforms that were made after the Ames case. The CIA and FBI are working seamlessly for the first time on counter-intelligence cases.

更普遍的是，在我担任DCI期间，我强调了需要更大的社区合作。改进的CIA-FBI合作就是一个例子。但是，在中央情报副主任乔治·瑟特（George Tenet）的领导下，我们还赋予了对硬情报目标的关注，该目标汇集了所有情报机构的能力，不仅分析师和收藏家共同努力，以确保我们获得为我们的领先决策者回答问题所需的重要信息。

Our emphasis on strengthening the intelligence community relationships is exemplified by the strong centers that have been built and strengthened over the past two years in counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and counterintelligence, and, I hope soon, a new director of Central Intelligence Center for Counterproliferation.

We've improved our cooperation with the Department of Defense in program and resource planning across the intelligence community. It is absolutely important to assure, for the efficient use of taxpayer dollars, that we take maximum advantage of new technology over the

long term and plan for it in a systematic way over a five-year period, program the resources required to have these systems put into place, budget the required dollars, and, most importantly, have the financial controls put into place that will assure that excesses do not take place.

One of the matters that I am very proud of is that during the 20 months that I have been director we have strengthened our financial management capability in the community.

第三,我想说一些关于坏蛋rent status of our human intelligence effort, a subject which in my view frankly there is a great deal of misinformation. In the post-cold war world, human intelligence is needed more than ever before to collect information on the intentions and capabilities of terrorists, of rogue regimes like Iran and Iraq, and countries or groups that are trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction whether they are chemical, biological, or nuclear.

我们以重要方式加强了中央情报局的运营局。首先，通过涉及情报分析师局计划运营计划的目标有所改善，以确保我们从事的运营将带回情报，这对国家利益至关重要。我们非常关注与友好的情报服务合作，他们可以帮助我们在世界各地。我们加强了中央情报局运营局与国防局部机构之间的合作。我们合作地改变了与经营，态度，实践和习惯高级管理局合作的态度，实践和习惯，并习惯了我过去称为“做文化”的态度和习惯。

我们做了什么？我们强调的是，我们的案件官员的招聘过程不应是代理人的数量，而是招募可以为国家提供质量和准确智力的招聘代理商。我们强调有必要改善案件官员的交易。我们强调需要保护我们的案件官员，这些案件官员通过制定明确的规则来承担这些官员的责任，这些案件官员将承担责任。简而言之，我们为运营案官员设定了高标准，这些案件官员适合我们面临的严重威胁以及我们提出的挑战。

In my judgment the directorate of operations is thriving in an environment which has set high standards very explicitly. Case officers know their work is important and appreciated. As a result their morale is high as I have personally observed in my visits to 33 stations around the world over the past 20 months.

I have been tremendously impressed with the skill and dedication of these case officers in those operations that I have become personally involved.

我想引用 - 阅读上周日《纽约时报》社论中有关中央情报局的一句话。让我读一篇关于本社论结束的报价：“自CIA成立以来，该机构的运营局保留了一种孤立的，自大的文化，繁殖了对民主原则和问责制的危险。”

根据我的判断，我可能会说，在原本出色的社论中，这一说法是令人发指的。这个声明是令人发指的。它不知道行动局的组成，除了很少的例外，敬业的，有能力的人是值得信赖的人，他们正在帮助捍卫该国免受恐怖主义和扩散等冷战后的威胁。问题不是运营局是否失控；问题是如何在最高水平上进行管理，要求行动案官员局长最高的专业行为。这就是他们想要的。这就是文化想要的是高专业标准，但要求遵循和设定它们。这是一个苛刻的管理挑战。

我要提出的第四点是人们在情报界的重要性。最终，情报界所有情报机构的成功取决于优秀的人，我们必须竭尽所能继续跟踪和留住杰出的个人。因此，我为过去两年的成就感到特别自豪。

First, personnel reform legislation was passed this year that provides better tools for career management of our people and, importantly, increases the mobility of people between intelligence community agencies. Under the leadership of Executive Director Nora Slatkin, chair of the CIA's Human Resources Council, a new program has been put into place covering all career aspects of CIA employees -- recruitment, training, assignment, promotion, career development, compensation and retirement.

它是中央情报局各地未来的最重要计划 - 行动局，情报局，科学技术局和行政局。该计划需要您的所有支持。

我要提出的第五点也是最后一点是我对这个委员会的感激之情，我必须特别对主席和参议员Kerrey说。现在，这可能并不令人惊讶，但我爱参议员克里（Kerrey），但我爱参议员幽灵同样是事实。我的意思是，我学会了真正重视该委员会主席和副主席。他们和这个委员会的所有成员一样，对我来说都是巨大的。但是自从我完成这项工作以来，这个委员会为我提供了绝对的支持。

It is not possible to do the job of director of central intelligence unless it has the support of the oversight committees and this committee in particular. I believe that during my tenure I've kept you fully and currently informed of intelligence activities as it is the duty of the directorate of central intelligence. This committee has supported me and helped me, and I could not have done my job without you. I've known several of you, especially Bennett Johnston, for many, many years, and I have the highest regard, the highest respect and the greatest personal gratitude for your support during my time as director of central intelligence. A strong relationship between this committee and its chairman and its vice- chairman and the director of central intelligence is vital to an effective and successful intelligence community operation in the future.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'll look forward to answering your questions.

森Specter：非常感谢Deutch导演。我们感谢您的免费陈述，我认为它们是完全准确的，董事与该委员会以及董事长兼副主席之间的沟通方式非常非常重要。这是一条非常开放的双向街道，您目前已经保留了该委员会并充分了解这一点，这是过去尚未发生的事情。这就是我们要进入的东西。

We will begin with five-minute rounds of questioning. And my first question -- I hadn't intended to ask this, but Director Deutch, why give added publicity to outrageous statements?

先生。Deutch：为什么要对令人毛骨悚然的陈述进行更多的宣传？因为我认为尝试保持纪录是非常重要的，那些批评运营局的人必须了解已完成的工作，必须了解它的重要性。我想清楚地表明，这类陈述不应忍受。

森Specter：我在自己的脑海中一直有一个问题，即对无根据的批评的重新出版是否对反驳有所帮助或伤害。我总是感觉到最大的报应是忽略。但是我对您的评论很感兴趣，因此我从一条不同的行开始。

Director Deutch, on the subject of the alleged CIA role in crack sales in Los Angeles as a method of supporting the contras, I compliment you on going to Los Angeles and in standing up and in making available the top man in the Central Intelligence Agency to respond to questions. That is totally impressive and it's something that we senators do with some frequency in open house town meetings, and I think that was very, very important.

This committee has held two open hearings on the issue, on the allegations from the series of articles in the San Jose Mercury News about raising the question as to CIA involvement and either condoning or in some way being involved in the sale of crack cocaine. And we intend to pursue the matter further. We're now trying to find a way to question Mr. Menendez, who is in a Nicaraguan jail. And I know that your inspector general is proceeding with that investigation, as is the inspector general of the Department of Justice. Neither has the kind of subpoena power which is necessary, but I know that your agency will pursue it, and so will this committee.

Is there any updating that you would like to comment on at this time on that matter?

先生。DEUTCH: No, sir. It's just that I want to reemphasize that the inspector general's report will be thorough. As you know, the inspector general's efforts are independent, completely independent from the director, and that these results will be reviewed by congressional committees and that the report will be made public.

森Specter：Deutch导演，我现在想和您一起提出一个问题，该委员会过去详细介绍了该委员会，这与今年6月25日对Dhahran的恐怖袭击的潜在回应有关被杀，数百人在一次非凡的恐怖袭击中受伤。我们已经在多个方向上研究了此事，并继续这样做，因为谁负责恐怖主义，国防部采取了什么预防措施，还可以做了什么，还可以做些什么智力活动的方式。我将参加听证会的后期。

But the point I want to take up with you at this moment -- and I had intended to so before the major story appeared on the front page of the Washington Post today, which recapitulates what has been beyond the rumor mill as to possible involvement by Iran, and possible training in Lebanon, in the Bekaa Valley, and the implications as to what that might mean with Syria.

我上个月在叙利亚时，我亲自与阿萨德总统讨论了这一主题。叙利亚人否认任何责任，但这是持续进行调查的事情。

问题 - 我们已经有许多专家作证，但是我想考虑您的思考 - 依靠响应范围。而且我认为以公共方式和公共论坛的方式谈论这一主题还为时过早。

我们拥有 - 我们在恐怖主义和回应方面有很多经验，也许没有一个像对利比亚的反应那样戏剧性的证据，证明利比亚参与了在德国迪斯科舞厅中谋杀两名美国军人，并且然后是1986年在利比亚发生的爆炸案，然后在1991年11月15日由国务院提出的发现 - 这一发现尚不广为人知。1988年12月21日的103航班。”现在，最肯定的是回应我们对利比亚的轰炸。

我们做什么？可能的制裁范围是什么？外交制裁，禁运，经济制裁，军事报复？

I think one thing is plain, and that is that in response to whoever is responsible for the attack at Dhahran, doing nothing is not an option. Something must be done. And as a man who has been in the top level of the Defense Department and CIA, I would be interested -- and I'm sure the country would be interested -- in your thinking on the subject.

先生。Deutch：嗯，非常感谢您，主席先生。我敢肯定，您知道我在公开会议上无法详细讨论任何特定事件。

I will say that the issue you place before me in your question, I think, regrettably, is going to be progressively in front of the government in times to come.

也就是说，您如何应对针对美国或美国利益的国际恐怖行动做出什么？因此，这是一个问题 - 不幸的是，我预测我们会更频繁地与我们在一起。

我要说的是，正确的人 - 做出回应类型的合适个人实际上是政策委员会，当然最终是总统。情报界正在装备自己的工作 - 我认为以一种非常有能力和好的方式 - 在这些事件之一发生时，尽可能快地确定谁是负责任的，什么是什么导致恐怖事件的行动 - 事件，以便决策者可以对哪种类型的回应做出判断，而且我们还保持了秘密行动能力阻止将来更多的恐怖活动，或破坏全球恐怖组织的活动和行动。

森Specter：我将在下一轮中回到这一点，但是我的时间已经好了，现在我屈服于参议员Kerrey。

森Kerrey：谢谢您，主席先生。

导演Deutch，我想以Khobar Towers调查的例子为讨论点。在调查中将联邦调查局成为领先的领先机构的决定是与美国法律有关的，或者是行政决定，或者是由于沙特人所做的决定，这是“这是我们更喜欢领导者”？

先生。DEUTCH: I really think that I'm going to -- we were not going to be able to successfully pursue this in open question. I think it's a -- in open session. I think it's a very good question. I might say that the cooperation between the FBI and the CIA throughout the investigation has been extremely good, but I really think it's not possible for me to pursue this in open session. My first answer will lead to another question, and we --

森Kerrey：是 - 在一个公开会议中，您当然可以说是否有美国法律说 -

先生。Deutch：据我所知。据我所知。

我觉得 -

森KERREY: Do you think that -- is there any credibility to the concern that the leaks that have become repetitious now at the CIA contribute to people's unwillingness to work with your agency?

先生。DEUTCH: I don't believe -- the leaks that occur from the CIA -- remember, I represent the intelligence community, which includes the national security division of the FBI, and I would say to you that it is not noticeable to me by any means that the leaks are greater from the CIA than other places. So I wouldn't accept that. I do think that philosophically you can ask -- the question can be raised is it sensible to have a law enforcement agency as being the lead agency in a foreign country in such an important matter. I could accept that question.

森KERREY: Particularly in a military operation. I mean, this is in response to an attack on military personnel.

先生。DEUTCH: Especially when military forces are involved, that's correct.

森克里：这是对军事人员的攻击。十九位美国人在霍巴尔塔中被杀。

先生。DEUTCH: That's correct.

森KERREY: I mean, it seems unusual to have the FBI take the lead. I think they've -- they've apparently done a good job thus far, I have no criticism of that, but it's an unusual situation. I'm trying to determine whether that's in response to U.S. law or in response --

先生。Deutch：我不认为这是对美国法律的必要回应，我认为我完全了解它引起的问题。我想强调的是，情报界和联邦调查局之间在此问题上的合作非常出色。但是我确实认为，总的来说，在如此关键的外交政策（外国事务）中，执法机构总体上是一个问题。

森克里（Kerrey）：您是否期望在接下来的60天内发生德国起诉 - 我知道他们正在为伊朗的情报负责人提起诉讼，以杀害德国内部的库尔德人，而意大利人可能正在寻找可能这样做一样的东西。

Is this going to make it more difficult, is it going to make it less difficult for us to fashion a correct response in this case? I mean --

先生。Deutch：嗯，作为一个单独的事情，让我说 - 情报问题，我认为看到德国人采取这样的行动反映了欧洲日益认识的，伊朗不仅对美国，而且对美国没有良好的意图西欧总体上一般。因此，我认为德国的行动是对伊朗在赞助世界各地非法活动和恐怖活动中的意图和活动更加欣赏的证据。

森KERREY: I just -- it seems to me that we've got a very, very difficult task to fashion an appropriate response in this case. And it's my belief it could very easily get away from us and be more difficult to fashion a response. And I'm personally concerned when I read that our number one intelligence person -- you -- are giving a briefing of some of the details or all the details of what went on. And I -- let me -- if you want to do that in closed session, I'd be pleased to do that.

Let me ask you if you -- I presume you read Jeff Smith's -- some of the things that he has said about personnel changes in the DO?

先生。Deutch：是的。

森克里：您是否同意试图带出来的人的想法 - 给他们与我们在战争学院中所做的军队中类似的机会，让他们有机会与整个世界重新建立联系？

先生。Deutch：您会看到，您面前的情报人员改革计划的一部分是需要任何一个情报机构中的专业人士，尤其是中央情报局，尤其是DO，在CIA筹集之前进行游览在很高的水平上，在他们获得高级情报服务等级之前，以确保他们拥有更广泛的经验，并且对工作价值及其贡献的价值更加广泛地欣赏。

Very similar to the requirement in Goldwater-Nichols legislation that before you reach flag rank, you must have a joint tour, we believe that encouraging these kinds of tours are important.

其次，在由人力资源委员会制定的中央情报局计划中，在执行董事的领导下，它强烈敦促并鼓励更多的初级官员，无论他们是情报局还是在其领域之外的旅行，还是操作。从我的判断中，这只能使系统从长远来看变得更好。

森KERREY: Thank you.

森SPECTER: Thank you very much, Senator Kerrey.

Senator Lugar?

森理查德·卢加（Richard Lugar）（R-IN）：Deutch主任，本着这是关于安全问题的总结，让我要求这些问题的状态：情报委员会对该问题的询问的地位是什么金博宝正规网址在波斯湾战争期间或之后，美国军事人员可能会暴露于化学武器或生物武器上？根据您的经验，情报界在监视此类武器中的局限性是什么？

先生。DEUTCH: Well, Senator, the issue of potential exposure or exposure of Gulf -- individuals who served in the Gulf to chemical agents has been a matter which has been of tremendous concern to me since I was undersecretary of defense, when Les Aspin was secretary and asked me to pay -- devote particular attention to this.

我的一个在我四年的各种后悔positions that I have had is that we have not been able to resolve these issues, publicly and convincingly, early enough. And I hold myself -- I regret very much that I was not able to bring forward all information that has, in time, come -- become available and be convincing enough to give especially Gulf War veterans a sense that we are doing everything we can to treat their medical illnesses and also to do everything we can to uncover all issues that have come up about how such chemical agents were used.

Let me just say that the intelligence community, in my judgement -- and I now speak relative to my own case -- has done a particularly good job of following up all intelligence information that was available on this. Where we have had trouble is making prompt use and understanding what information was available in the Department of Defense on U.S. forces' exploding of chemical munitions in the gulf.

因此，我认为我们必须继续关注这个问题。情报界正在做很多事情，以便将来能够拥有所需的技术，可用于检测世界上任何地区的化学武器和 - 生物武器的早期敌对使用。但这是一个（n）不幸的经历，因为美国人民不满意，应该满足他们的满足，一切都知道，需要在墨西哥湾在墨西哥湾服役的个人接触化学代理商中所知道的一切。我们应该继续解决这个问题。

森LUGAR: But at least in your judgment everything is known that should be known at this point about this?

先生。Deutch：参议员，我不愿意说，一切都是已知的，因为在1993年，当我非常仔细地看着这一点时，我以为一切都知道了，但是Al-Kamisiyah后来在1996年出现，在1996年出现，偶然地发现一位将其组合在一起的中央情报局分析师实际上已经摧毁了海湾中的化学药品。因此，我会说出我所知道的一切，我的代理商所知道的一切，据我所知，现在是公开的。我们继续看，我们将继续关注这个问题。

森卢加（Lugar）：在另一个领域，实施新程序的标记中央情报局资产的实施状况是什么，这些中央情报局资产可能犯有侵犯人权和其他犯罪活动，以及这些新程序在多大程度上是招募资产的障碍有不愉快的背景，可以为美国提供独特而有价值的信息吗？

先生。Deutch：我会彻底扭转这件事。我要说的是，通过澄清这里的标准，我们正在保护为我们国家冒险的案件官员。

We've made it very clear to case officers that when an agent is recruited -- and many of them, most of them, the majority of them are going to have very unsavory backgrounds -- that by documenting with headquarters, complying with the laws that we have to about informing the Justice Department about any criminal activity that is known or suspected by us, that we are protecting the case officers and helping them take risks, and that this is a measure, when properly understood as it is now in the field, it helps us to take risks and it helps us manage risks so that we know that we're getting worthwhile information back.

我可以明确的说,没有娱乐ruitment that has been denied because of the unsavory character or the criminal character of a potential agent. The issue is only we want to know about it and make the judgment and take the required action. But this is exactly the reverse. This is a way of strengthening morale, of appointing case officers in the field, not of reducing their flexibility; it is a way of helping them and protecting them. All the management of the Directorate of Operations agrees with that point; that's just not my point. This is what I mean by requiring the highest professional standards of conduct for our case officers. It helps them. It makes them stronger. And I think it's in very good shape.

森卢加尔（Lugar）：您和前任导演伍尔西（Woolsey）先生曾担任情报界的负责人，在进行此之前，曾在情报领域没有明显的经验。回想起来，您认为这是一个优势还是劣势？当莱克先生承担情报界的ins绳时，您会给莱克先生的建议吗？

先生。DEUTCH: Senator, I believe that I had tremendous background in intelligence. And I don't understand the question, sir. I mean, where did I not have -- if the question is had I been a clandestine HUMINT collection person, the answer is no, but as I recall -- I mean, I ran the intelligence part of the Defense Department for two years. I was a member of President Bush's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Panel. I was a member for unknown number of decades of the Defense Science Board, of the NSA Science Advisory Board, of thousands of advisory committees.

我认为 - 我不明白 - 我的意思是，我无法想象有人推荐这个职位时具有更大的智力背景，除了专业人士一生都在智力上度过一生的人 -

森卢加（Lugar）：我的问题是从中央情报局或情报服务中的专业人士的角度提出的 - 我说实际上拥有一个我们自己的问题会更好吗？从本质上讲，这就是提出问题的精神，是您或国家对某人的优势 -

先生。Deutch：参议员，如果您谈论的是技术情报，我声称他们确实有自己的一员。如果您说的是人类秘密智慧，有时也许。我的意思是，有一些伟大的导演在那里有背景，例如理查德·赫尔姆斯（Richard Helms）。但是，让我告诉您，您不会仅通过查看人类的情报收藏来在这个国家获得智力。

So I don't mean to be too defensive about the question, but I would say to you, sir, I have a background in intelligence; it happens not to be human intelligence collection. And some day there will be a director, as there frequently have been in the past which have that background. The most important thing is that you have an individual that has the confidence of the president, that will be honest and say what they think, and can get along with the Department of Defense. Those are the three criteria.

森LUGAR: I think your answer has overwhelmed the question. (Laughter.)

森幽灵：非常感谢，卢加尔参议员。谢谢。

Senator Johnston?

森Bennett Johnston（D-LA）：Deutch博士，您的预算中有多少比例用于人类，而不是技术情报？

先生。DEUTCH: Somewhat less than 10 percent.

森JOHNSTON: So that most of really what you do, most of your big decisions are that about which the press prints very little, and is highly important, which is satellites and electronic intelligence; is it not?

先生。Deutch：是的。Yes, sir.

森JOHNSTON: And should the job be divided between human on the one hand and technical intelligence on the other?

先生。DEUTCH: No, I think the argument is overwhelming that the cooperation between human intelligence and -- first of all, intelligence analysis is critical for the targeting. We don't want to have collection go on for things that don't matter. On the one hand, that connection is tremendously important.

And secondly, quite frankly, in the future -- and I've tried to encourage this during my time -- technical collection and human collection can come together in very interesting ways, especially against terrorist targets and proliferation targets.

So I see a very important synergy there, and I think it's very important to manage these together.

森约翰斯顿：Deutch博士，我看到了您 - 我认为是洛杉矶 - 出现在非裔美国人社区的一个团体面前，向他们保证中央情报局没有参与裂缝可卡因业务 - 提醒我一个我参加过的一些城镇会议很少 - 您所说的话似乎并没有完全让人感到放心。您是否满意您需要做出的所有信息来做出明确的判断，即中央情报局实际上从未参与美国的可卡因业务？

先生。DEUTCH: I have no information that leads me to believe that the intelligence community in the past -- remember, this is an allegation about the early and mid-80s -- I have no information to suggest any CIA involvement at that time whatsoever.

另一方面，我还清楚地指出，在监察长完成独立报告并由该委员会，众议院委员会，司法部审查并公开审查之前，我不相信可以做出最终的判断，即完全没有参与。我会相信我们应该等待该报告的完成。

森JOHNSTON: But you have no reason to suspect that there was that involvement?

先生。Deutch：这是完全正确的，参议员。我没有理由怀疑，也没有信息使我怀疑这种参与。

森约翰斯顿：据您所知，从未有过关于这种参与的真正指控吗？

先生。Deutch：到目前为止，我没有听到我认为可信的指控。

森JOHNSTON: And the inspector general is in the process of making that investigation (now ?)?

先生。DEUTCH: Yes, sir.

森JOHNSTON: And you're satisfied he will have all the information he will need; he will not need subpoena power or any ability that he does not now have?

先生。Deutch：如果他遇到一个认为自己需要传票权力的情况，他应该挺身而出，我敢肯定，我们会找到一种让他获得他所需的访问权限的方法。因此，他会 - 他会 - 他负责挺身而出，说他是否 - 如果他处于需要传票权力的情况下，他会让我们知道。

他会通知导演。

森约翰斯顿（？）：谢谢主席先生。

森幽灵：非常感谢约翰斯顿参议员。

Senator Glenn?

森GLENN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

我记得不久前在您的婚礼当天回想起 - 我相信据说您有婚礼并重新出任，并在当天下午开展业务。我希望在这一点上，Deutch夫人可以在您的新化身中获得一个不错的蜜月。

先生。Deutch：每天都和我妻子一起度蜜月。

森格伦：啊，这是一个正确的答案。就在情人节即将到来。非常好。

让我跟进Humint。十％的人进入了这一点。我一直在担心这个领域，您和我不时谈论过这一点。评估核扩散是一回事，因为我们可以用开销，卫星等做很多事情，因为它需要一个相当大的工业综合体才能做到这一点。但是CW和BW是另一回事。他们在很大程度上取决于我们在开发这种状态时的张开，但这是最难发展的事情。开发一个或多个来源，有时需要几年和几年的时间，并确保它们可靠，以及我们所知道的所有内容。

DIA发布了一份报告。或者他们于5月6日通知该委员会 - 这是对委员会查询的无分类回应。他们说以下内容：

“从现在起15年后，朝鲜将继续存在的可能性是低到中度的。除非发现朝鲜的经济问题解决方案，否则该政权将无法生存。它必须适应其改编滑入无关紧要或崩溃/内爆。这导致许多分析家认为，政治自我毁灭的过程已经开始，三年内有可能在系统崩溃中崩溃。”

您同意该声明吗？您是否认为情报界的其余部分同意该声明？这是给委员会的未分类声明。

先生。Deutch：我认为朝鲜政府是 - 朝鲜确实有三条道路，在接下来的几年中，它将倒闭。它要么要成为自己 - 在一个或另一个问题上入侵南方，要么会破裂，要么由于该国面临的令人难以置信的经济问题而在内部崩溃，要么会崩溃。或第三，随着时间的流逝，它将导致一些和平的解决方案和与南方的统一。

这些道路中的哪一条将出现 - 实际上会跨越不确定。

我自己的估计是 - 参议员我不会将其作为绝对声明 - 在未来两三年之间将解决这三个方向之间的发展。几十年来，这不是会持续的事情。

我对您说，我相信有关于朝鲜未来的情报估算，我们可以为您提供给您一个社区范围内的情报 - 不仅在DIA上，而且在社区范围就像在朝鲜一样。他们将大致按照我向您提到的台词。因此，我对DIA言论并不同情。我的描述方式将不那么分类。

森格伦（Glenn）：我们在这个委员会和参议院中进行了很多讨论由于朝鲜或中国的威胁，应捍卫，依此类推。您是否认为 - 对美国弹道导弹威胁的情报估计是否应该包括对这些国家的内部发展的评估，例如我刚才提到的国家？

先生。DEUTCH: Yes, they should. I think that the national intelligence estimate, which was done on the ballistic missile threat to the United States, which has been reviewed by an independent panel headed by former deputy -- former Director of Central Intelligence Gates, confirms the essential correctness of the National Intelligence estimate, number one; it says that it wasn't politicized, number two; and it points out very constructively ways that (that estimate ?) could have been strengthened. But fundamentally I think that the internal political developments are an integral part of making estimates about intentions rather than capabilities.

森GLENN: The North Korean threat is mainly a threat yet to be developed. The Chinese actually have a -- the PRC has an intercontinental capability. The figures on the numbers of ICBMs they have, have those figures been released?

先生。Deutch：我不能 - 我不知道 - 我只是在这里不知道是否有未分类 - 我敢肯定，对导弹的数量有未分类的估计。我不知道它们有多准确。

森格伦：我以为我已经在公众出版社读了一个数字，但是我不会使用它，因为它可能是仍被分类的人。我担心那些特定领域。

我还想让您有机会回答有关办公室任期的问题。这是整个政府的问题。总统面临的所有问题中最糟糕的问题之一是 - 我一段时间以前在政府事务委员会上遇到的数字，但我记得，大概30％的任命人在18个月内消失了，就像50％在27个月内消失了，或类似的东西。您不能这样运行这样的程序。您不能 - 在中央情报局（CIA），在过去的五年中，我们已经有四位董事。

Do you think that should be a certain term out there? You're appointed for five years, whatever happens, or three years? Or should it be at the pleasure of the president, as it is now? Or should we change that?

先生。DEUTCH: Well, first of all, senator, I want to again say that when I came to Washington, I was prepared to spend four years. Then my expectation was that I would return. It's not -- I can't be blamed for having been pushed toward a post!

森GLENN: I wasn't blaming you. (Chuckles.) No, no.

先生。DEUTCH: But I certainly do not believe the director of Central Intelligence should have a fixed term. I think that it is a very serious misunderstanding of the relationship of the director of Central Intelligence to the president of the United States.

成为成功的中央情报主任的最重要的事情，在您和我之间的力量很少 - 我记得我的朋友参议员Cohen坐在这里说，Deutch先生，他们不应该称您为“导演”，因为您不喜欢t指导任何东西。有很多事实。

中央情报主任有能力做出贡献，因为那个人有美国总统的信心。您不想将美国总统与他没有信心的个人联系。它与具有固定期限的联邦调查局（FBI）这样的执法机构大不相同。

我不认为应该有一个固定的任期，而且我相信总统应该在任何时候都可以改变董事的能力，他认为该董事没有执行。因此，我非常认为，中央情报局长应该在总统的乐趣下为总统工作，如果您改变了这一点，您基本上将成为中央情报局局长，并且很大程度上是中央情报局的控制力少得多，而且相关性差得多。

森GLENN: My time is up, but I have just a comment. I've -- there's got to be some better way of doing it than we're doing it now --

先生。Deutch：是的。

森格伦： - 我知道。如果不是固定的术语，那么我们该怎么做？

先生。Deutch：是的 -

森格伦：我 - 好吧，我想我会把它保存在下一轮中。但是四年中的四个 - 五年来的四名导演不能那样经营一家商店。

先生。Deutch：参议员，我开始 - 我提出的第一点是 -

森格伦：是的 -

先生。Deutch： - 您绝对是对的；必须有更长的任期。

坦率地说，如果我在那里更长的时间，它将有助于实施正在进行的变化。但这并不是我对我的看法。但是我同意你的观点。我只是不认为 - 我认为将固定期限的解决方案比该疾病要差得多。

森GLENN: Thank you.

森Specter：Deutch主任，现在转向根据制定的安排将伊朗武器转移到波斯尼亚的问题 - 由国务院和国家安全委员会组成，在那里他们根据“无指示”进行了问题。“政策，由加尔布雷思大使和雷德曼大使给克罗地亚总统图杰曼，由加尔布雷思大使确定为副秘书塔尔博特将其确定为“绿灯”或“可感知的绿灯”，这些武器可供波斯尼亚人提供，这是可提供的，波斯尼亚人可以使用。违反了联合国的武器禁运，是在国会在非常激烈的辩论中考虑是否要改变武器的时候，以及有关“无指示”政策或“感知绿灯”的信息，正如我所说的那样它告诉国防部长佩里（Perry）或参谋长Shalikashvili联席会议主席，后者向参议员Kerrey和我传达了这些信息。

此事可能没有在其他情况下受到这种高级关注，因为包括这位参议员在内的许多人认为我们应该没有武器禁运。关于局势的严重性以及武器流动以使波斯尼亚保持脚步的重要性，尽管国防部表示确实如此。

但核心问题,除了一些非常broad policy ramifications of not telling Congress, involved the executive branch policy of not informing the CIA director. My first question to you is, do you agree with former Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey that the Central Intelligence Agency should have been told by Mr. Talbott and Mr. Lake that the United States had given this perceived green light that Iranian arms could be transmitted to Bosnia through Croatia?

先生。Deutch：主席先生，我认为我已经在许多情况下作证，我认为在这种情况下，应告知中央情报局局长和国防部长。因此，我认为没有一个问题，我认为在这样的事情中，国防部长和中央情报局长应该得到告知。

在这种特殊情况下，我不知道所有不同的观点是什么，但我了解到中央情报局长是否真的被告知是有区别的，当他被告知时，吉姆·伍尔西（Jim Woolsey）当时，当时。副部长塔尔伯特。但是，让我清楚地表明，在我看来，在此处，在这里的一般情况下，中央情报局主任和国务卿，应告知国防部长。

森Specter：嗯，伍尔西先生很强调他没有被告知。塔尔伯特先生作证说发生了沟通不畅。但是很明显，情报委员会没有得到通知。而且很明显，国会没有被告知。当我说情报委员会没有被告知时，情报委员会没有告知美国对Galbraith和Redman，Galbraith大使和Redman大使对Tudjman总统的沟通制定的无教学政策，该政策是一件感知到的绿灯，这​​是一个感知到的绿灯，情报委员会也没有告知，加尔布雷思大使与中央情报局有联系，试图让中央情报局执行一些政策。

现在，我注意到您 - 脸上有奇怪的表情。您想对此发表评论吗？

先生。DEUTCH: Well, I'm trying -- what is worrying me is we've had this discussion before. I've forgotten whether we did it in open session or in closed session. But I want to make a point --

森SPECTER: We have not had this discussion in open session.

先生。Deutch：好的。好吧，让 -

森SPECTER: We had a number of witnesses in. But since this was not on your watch, we have not put this on the record with you.

先生。Deutch：对。但是让我清楚一些事情。我的判断是 - 这个事件不是情报问题。这是外交问题。因此，我去过那里吗？如果国会被告知，问题是，这是外交问题，如果 - 哪个是适当的委员会？我确实认为，加尔布雷思大使和副秘书塔尔伯特之间的交流是外交问题，而不是情报问题。因此，我认为这不是智力问题。

森Specter：嗯，情报委员会得出的结论是，这不是传统的外交，这是应该将其传输给情报委员会的问题。但是，它是完全没有传输给国会的。如果这是外交问题，那就去外交关系委员会了，这也没有完成。

好吧，我的红灯刚刚继续，但是我想在下一轮中与您一起追求。而且我相信它确实有 - 您已将您的认可给了莱克先生，我可以理解。但是，我想提出一个问题，即莱克先生对他目前保留该委员会并充分了解的敏感性的参与，这不是在波斯尼亚问题上，也没有得到国会的通知。正如我们杰出的副主席曾多次说过的那样，我们不必从《华盛顿时报》获得信息。也许我对新闻来源进行了宣传，我对我提出了一个问题。

Senator --

先生。Deutch：我认为您会发现Tony Lake充分了解需要完全保留该委员会并目前了解情报活动。在我看来，您将毫无困难。

森Kerrey：Deutch导演 -

森SPECTER: Well, I'm going to pursue that with you in some depth.

先生。DEUTCH: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

森幽灵：克里参议员？

森Kerrey：谢谢您，主席先生。

导演Deutch，也许在60天或六个月内，您和我可以就参议员格伦的要求进行对话。我只是 - 我只想 - 为了您的信息，我真的很有 - 我不知道我是否会圈出圈子，但这肯定改变了我对您的陈述的看法董事是永久的 - 一个永久性的期限，您说他们将能够减少控制权，并且它们的相关性将变得越来越少。

I respect very much your view on it.

但是，当您在四年任职韦伯斯特（Webster）和18个月的盖茨（Gates）董事盖茨（Gates）和伍尔西（Woolsey）董事28个月中，现在您在20个月中 - 如果我们与美国国税局（IRS）专员与社会保障管理员的失误，几乎是任何其他 - 我的意思是，国务院的人们，辩方 - 人们会说：“我的上帝，你知道，这太多了。”我的意思是，要使您的方位需要一段时间。需要一段时间才能弄清组织。它需要 - 我的意思是，无论您是管理参议院办公室还是管理中央情报局，在任何管理结构中；我的意思是，我真的不是 - 我的意思是，这是我认为您现在非常接近的东西。而且我还没有对此形成明确的意见。我只是告诉你，我的信心一直在我们继续由总统遗嘱的政治任命的能力上动摇。我的意思是，这些问题太重金博宝正规网址要了。

And it leads, actually, into my next question, which I alert you might be uncharacteristically unfair for me to be asking this question of you. But in your confirmation hearing, you were asked a question that was a very hot issue then as to whether or not the director should be a Cabinet secretary. And in your answer, you stated that the DCI must understand, quote, "how to provide unvarnished objective assessments and not permit himself or herself to get involved in formulating policy, nor to permit policy-makers to influence the formulation of the best objective assessments about foreign events."

现在，如果该标准仍然达到，那么一个人像安东尼·莱克（Anthony Lake）这样的国家安全顾问，他在过去四年中参与了美国政策的制定 - 他将如何能够建立或做客观分析？

先生。DEUTCH: Senator Kerrey, let me go back first to the first point. I really do look forward to reflecting on this and coming back in 60 days.

But my concern is that if you appoint somebody for a finite term and halfway through that term the president or the senior foreign- policy leaders in the country lose confidence in that director, you then have a real problem; that it's better to make the change than to go through the whole term. That's where I'm coming from. But I will reflect on it, and I promise you that I will come back in 60 days and work with you; because if you have a situation where the secretary staying, and the president, the vice president, the secretary of

国防确实对那个中央情报总监没有信心，没有办法带来关键的情报功能 -

森克里（Kerrey）： - 我认为，有了四年，18个月零28个月零20个月的这种模式，您可以继续前进，而长长的托尼湖（Tony Lake）在那儿幸存下来。

我的意思是，我只是认为您无法继续这种模式。这是一个重要的组织，具有至关重要的任务。再说一次，我的意思是，我 - 分开问问自己，如果您正在管理任何操作，需要一段时间才能使您的海腿达到一个地步 -

先生。DEUTCH: But Senator, that's -- I started off by agreeing -- I agree with that.

森Kerrey：无论如何，我们可以在以后谈论这一点。我不想 -

先生。DEUTCH: Yeah, but I don't think you can -- I mean -- and I also want to -- I don't want to apologize, but I want to say --

森KERREY: I'm much more interested in your view about --

先生。DEUTCH: I do think --

森KERREY: I know and I like Tony Lake a great deal, and I think he's got the capacity to come in and do an excellent job, but I'd like to have you square what you said, which I think is correct, I think the person who's DCI has to be able to come in and give the unvarnished truth even if the unvarnished truth is that Iraq is stronger today than they were before the Gulf War. I mean, whatever the unvarnished truth is --

多伊奇先生:谁会这样做?谁会这样做?(Laughter.)

森克里：他们必须能够做到这一点。我遇到的问题是，已经制定了四年政策的人如何来说：“我不再是政策制定者，我只会介绍事实和情报我看到了”？

先生。Deutch：嗯，我认为一个人可以做到这一点。我认为一个人可以做到这一点，我很有信心，托尼湖（Tony Lake）是一个非常有能力的人 -

森KERREY: I don't disagree.

先生。Deutch： - 他能够做出这种区别，就像我能够对从国防部副部长到中央情报局局长的政策做出区分。我在确认听证会上表示您刚刚阅读的标准是正确的标准。如果您允许中央情报局局长允许政策制定者影响情报判断或开始成为政策的倡导者，那么您会有一个真正的问题。但是我相信标准是正确的，我相信您可以从一个职位转移到另一个职位，并了解您承担的不同职责。

森KERREY: I'm sure Mr. Lake's going to be given plenty of opportunity to answer that question when he comes through for confirmation. But let me just briefly -- and in the second round perhaps we can get into the detail of the answer of it -- one of the concerns that I've got with intelligence gathering is the way it's disseminated, and I'd like you specifically to address the concern that we've talked about, and that is the concern of getting intelligence in the right form in a timely fashion to diplomats at the State Department.

与军队中的人不同 - 我会问这个问题，您可以考虑一下并在第二轮回答，这样我们就不会把它拖出。但是，正如我所看到的，我们将国防部和国务院视为客户所面临的问题之一，这两个组织之间的差异 - 人们经常会归因于权力 -饥饿的国防部似乎是他们似乎主导着智力的传递，但我实际上认为这不是对权力的渴望，而是军队中人民的本质。

Number one, they learn how to plan and how to specify their needs, particularly technical needs. And there is no comparable situation, I think, in the State Department, and it's a real problem. You know, we hope that the State Department, through diplomacy, prevents the need for the Department of Defense to send people into combat in the first place.

其次，这对我来说非常重要，与军队不同，如果我负责某件事并把它搞砸了，那就是我的后端将为它付出代价。我了解我不能委派这一责任。我可以组织并给人们各个方面并赋予他们权威，但是归根结底，如果我的手表上发生了什么事，我为此付出了代价。您知道，在平民方面，我们通常必须有几天和几天的听证会才能弄清楚谁负责。

因此，您没有这两个要素。因此，在我看来，您必须 - 当我看照片时，我认为您在向国务院客户交付情报方面确实有弱点，我对此感到担忧。正如我所说，我们可以 - 我们现在有第三轮。我不想挖掘主席的时间。我们可以在我的第三轮比赛中谈论这一点。

先生。DEUTCH: Mr. Chairman, can I answer this, or do you want me to wait?

森SPECTER: Of course.

先生。DEUTCH: What you have said is tremendously important. All of our efforts to plan for new collection systems shows that the key issue is dissemination and not more raw collection. So processing and dissemination in all these areas is absolutely key. That's the first point. You ask the CINCs, even they in the military side will tell you processing and dissemination is key.

Secondly, I would like to say that your own personal interest in how this is done via information technology is having an effect on certainly the CIA and the DOD.

第三，我相信国家图像和地图机构的出现将有助于传播，无论是量身定制的图像产品的国家和军事客户。

但是，在国务院最重要的一点是，您绝对是正确的，需要更多地关注技术产品的分布（图片等），从近乎实时的意义上讲，无论是使馆和总部关于关键情报问题。金博宝正规网址

That takes two things. It takes a little bit of money -- which is difficult to fund in the State Department budget, where typically the distribution pieces are funded -- and it takes some technical expertise, either within the department or provided by the community, to have happen.

但这是您做出的绝对正确的观察结果，我认为在这一点上可以取得更大的进步，在更有效的 - 电子（尤其是电子）向国务院分发产品。

森幽灵：导演Deutch-您完成了吗？

森Kerrey（？）：我完成了。我受够了。谢谢。

森SPECTER: Director Deutch, returning to the issue of the sale of arms to Bosnia, and reviewing the hard facts, Ambassador Redman asked National Security Councilor Anthony Lake if he should file a written report on what Ambassador Redman had done on this "no instructions" to President Tudjman of Croatia, which was the perceived green light, and Mr. Lake said no written report. And Ambassador Galbraith said to Undersecretary -- or Deputy -- number-two man in the State Department Strobe Talbott, "Shall I file a written report as to what we did with President Tudjman?" And Mr. Talbott said, "File one after you have the affirmation" -- and he identified two State Department officials -- "after they call you." And neither of them called, so the effective instruction from Mr. Talbott or Mr. Galbraith was "no written report."

And the Intelligence Committee has had one tough time finding out what happened, and I'm not sure we know what happened to this day. We were aided materially by the fact that Ambassador Galbraith prepared a personal memorandum at the recommendation of one of his subordinates, which he signed and, I believe, the subordinate signed. So we have some information as to what went on.

But when you talk about the sensitivity of Mr. Lake to be the director of Central Intelligence, the agency, I have grave reservations about Mr. Lake and about his sensitivity, given what went on in this matter and given the special sensitivity of what has happened historically with other directors of the Central Intelligence Agency, with the big issue Iran-contra.

现在它没有发生在这里，因为至少到目前为止，尽管我们不知道今天伊朗在波斯尼亚的影响力的全部程度。有报道说这可能非常重ReportsReports要。在某种程度上，它可以通过伊朗的武器去波斯尼亚来增强。

问题出现,我们在这里——Congress is debating getting out of the arms embargo line. The United Nations has this resolution for an embargo. And the Congress is debating it and taking votes on it, and the Congress does not know that this arrangement was made with a green light for the United States to acquiesce, agree to the sale of arms to Bosnia.

Now, Director Deutch, isn't that something that the Congress should have known when it was debating whether the Congress should take action to stop the arms embargo to Bosnia?

先生。DEUTCH: Mr. Chairman, I cannot answer for Ambassador Redman, for Strobe Talbott, or for Tony Lake on the particular --

森幽灵：不要指望你。

先生。Deutch：好的。但是我想让您非常清楚，我已经与托尼湖密切合作了四年。在过去的20个月中，我与他会面，并就非常微妙的事情与他交谈了一千次。我个人完全有信心，他了解中央情报局的责任导演，以保持国会的全面和目前了解情报活动的了解，并且他充分了解了在收集情报和对情报和影响力或影响力的不变估计之间的分裂是什么受政策制定者的影响。

所以我认识那个男人。而且我知道他有正确地完成这项工作的诚信。

森SPECTER: Well, Director Deutch, I'm interested in your knowledge of the man and I'm interested in your conclusions. But I'm a lot more interested in the facts as to what he did in this matter. And he was a party to a secret transaction where the United States acquiesced in the sale of arms to Bosnia that the Congress didn't know about when the Congress was debating whether we ought to lift the arms embargo. And my question to you, is that sort of information which the CIA director ought to tell the Congress about?

先生。Deutch：直言不讳，这些信息是外交信息，应该向国会提供。我无法回答。这不是我的能力领域，或者 - 我什至没有对此进行反思。但是我会告诉你，如果他知道这一点，我认为如果他知道这一点，就不是中央情报局长的法律义务或责任。

森Specter：好吧，如果那是莱克先生的观点，那么我毫不怀疑至少我自己的结论是，他不会成为中央情报局局长的合适人选。如果有人坐在这里的确认程序中 - 莱克先生将在中央情报机构（SIC）面前 - 他说他是中央情报部门的主管，并且知道没有指示和绿灯的政策，一个感知到的绿灯和美国在向波斯尼亚出售伊朗武器时默认了，国会正在辩论是否应该举起武器禁运，他说：“这不是我作为中央情报局董事告诉情报的那种信息委员会“并了解国会已被告知，这将使我对他的确认投票给我一个简单的问题。

先生。Deutch：主席先生，这并不是我所说的。我说他没有 -

森SPECTER: Pretty close.

先生。Deutch：不，有区别。让我还提醒您什么 - 当时谁是董事长。这与今天的情况不同。

森幽灵：现在，这是什么意思？

先生。Deutch：让我回去说我要提出的要点是 - 我想对此非常确切地说 - 如果这是一项情报活动，那么中央情报局局长就有绝对的法律义务通知委员会。

如果这是外交问题，那么个人是否应该（或不会）会有更多的酌处权。我来与您和副主席谈谈很多事情。他们没有强制性。所有 - 我试图在这里提出的观点不是这不是 - 我的判断是这不是智力活动。因此，他们告诉委员会并不是必须的。很可能他应该这样做，应该这样做。也许我会这样做；这是一个假设。但是我在我看来告诉你，这样做不是义务。这就是我要提出的重点。

I might have well have done it. I don't know. I might well have come up and talked to you about it.

森SPECTER: Well, I am going to get into the issue of the obligation in terms of the statute, which is very important. But I would say to you that when you deal with the executive branch and the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Committee, we really ought not to be parsing semicolons as to what ought to be done.

先生。Deutch：是的。

森幽灵：确实有一个开放性和真诚的问题，而不是将头发切成薄片，以便在法制之后，尽管我说我要去法律主义。我认为有法律义务。

但是，在国会辩论我们是否应该举起武器禁运的时候，您进行了这项非常重要的行政部门活动，在这种活动中，有默许和违反联合国武器禁运的行为以及向波斯尼亚出售武器- 尤其是出售伊朗武器 - 在我看来，中央情报局局长将告诉主席和副主席，行政部门的任何人都会看到国会有一个关于事实是什么，国会正在就在这里做什么制定公共政策。

但是请记住 - 这段时间被忽略了 - 国会是该政府的最终力量。国会可以覆盖总统并否决否决权，并在国会做出决定的情况下做出决定。我们的确认当局是我们政府体系中存在的真正重要的制衡之一。

We make a lot of requests of the executive branch, and a lot of requests that the committee has made during my tenure have been ignored by the executive branch because they have a different view.

And our authority lies in the appropriations process and also in the confirmation process. And there are many people in America today who aspire to key posts in the United States government where they have to be confirmed, and Anthony Lake is one of them and there are many others. And one of the real checks and balances we have is to evaluate their work, which we can't touch as long as they are in the executive branch; they can ignore us if they chose to do so. We can withhold appropriations. But when they come before the Senate for confirmation, that's an important check and balance, and that's why I'm pursuing this matter in some detail with you.

As to matter of good faith and fair operation, let me ask you once more; when we're debating in the Senate altering the arms embargo, don't you think we're entitled to know what Ambassador Redman and Ambassador Galbraith said to Croatian President Tudjman?

先生。DEUTCH: Actually, Mr. Chairman, we emerge from this not that far apart. First of all, I agree with you; while I was stressing the legal obligation here, I agree with you that that is not really the key issue. The key issue is the open communication between the executive branch and Congress or the DCI and this committee, on key foreign policy issues which come up. That is the key issue, the openness and the ease of exchange and the trust that exists between them when these come up, and that is the right issue.

在这个特定的情况下 - 使用这些标准，实际发生的事情以及是否应该告知国会是一个不同的问题 - 合理的人有不同的看法。我要强调的是，DCI必须遵守该委员会必须告知的义务，必须是任何中央情报局局长的第一个标准；这些义务必须首先履行。

森SPECTER: Well, I hear you about reasonable people on different views. I think this is not within that category.

But the Constitution talks about advice. I've given a little advice here. And on the consent function, that's the prerogative of the senators in the Senate.

我想稍后来到法制，但我现在想屈服于克里参议员。

森KERREY: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

继续这样做，实际上，我会将问题与主席构成不同，但出于相同的目的。这是关于我们之前谈论的主题，这是独立性，由于永久术语，董事的独立性更大，实际上，该任期甚至可能会延伸到政府中，在该政府中，该人实际上可能不会在该政府中服役在这种环境中的愉悦。

我的意思是,这个问题我在这种情况下,because I quite agree with the chairman I do not believe this was normal diplomatic -- traditional diplomatic activity, and the committee should have been informed. But equally of concern to me is that Director Woolsey at the time, suspecting there might actually be a covert operation in place -- and he suspected there might be something going on here at the time and was concerned about what was going on -- should he, then, have come to the committee and said, "Look, something's going on here, I don't know what it is," even though that might put him at risk of getting his rear end chewed out by the executive branch, by the president? You follow what I'm saying. I mean --

先生。Deutch：绝对。

森克里：我的意思是，就是这样 -

先生。Deutch：绝对。

森凯里（Kerrey）：我不应该把这个特定事件付诸实践，因为它的充电太高了。我想再次强调，我认为获得这种独立性是真正的价值。我实际上认为情报的库存可能会增加，随着人们开始看到并认为它是独立的，情报的价值可能会上升担心总统可能喜欢或不喜欢它的结果。顺便说一句，无论谁是谁。你知道，我不是指着手指。我只是说我们现在的关系，在我看来，我们现在的营业额使人们对组织充满信心的地步似乎很难。

But let me ask you --

先生。Deutch：我的意思是，我会在六个月内回到你身边 -

森KERREY: Yeah. I look forward to it.

让我询问您有关您已经制定的资产验证程序。我的意思是，有一些报道称，资产验证降低了企业家精神，使人们更加厌恶风险。让我在这里扮演一个小角色。让我们假设我是您的代理商之一，尽管想像一下，坐在这里桌旁的一群人涉及麻醉品或毒品或增殖或 --

先生。DEUTCH: We could sort that out --

森KERREY: -- or terrorism. Let's just say that this group over here is involved with terrorism, this two tables over here to my right, your left. All right?

你呢 -

先生。Deutch：合理。

森KERREY: And you want me organize -- you want me to penetrate them. Now, they've already indicated they're going to violate the law. There's a law -- we have a law against terrorism, against narcotics, against proliferation. So they don't care about the law. We've already established that they're either convicted criminals or they're people that ought to be convicted as criminals. So we're already established that that's the case. Now --

先生。DEUTCH: We're still in agreement, senator.

森克里：对。现在，我如何 - 我可以接近他的规则？

多伊奇先生:你可以接近他们。你可以应用roach them all, although I'd hope you'd come to me for advice about which ones to go to first. You could approach them all, and then you can come back and say to your -- as a case officer, you'd come back and say "I have 12 candidates to report on terrorism, to be agents on terrorism." And then someone can say "Look, we're not giving you -- your professional competence is not being evaluated solely by whether you recruit 12 or six. What we're interested in is knowing that you have done enough work to select among those the six which will provide the best information," or the four, or whatever it is. And we understand that they are going to have -- they're not going to be lovely people. You'd better tell us about what you know about their background, because it may be necessary for us to inform the Justice Department that one of those individuals that you have recruited has committed a crime against an American. But all we are saying is when you've done that, you go out, you get your approval to do it, and we will stand behind you no matter what happens because you followed the rules and you did it exactly right. And that's the way the process is supposed to function.

森KERREY: Let me take -- I don't want to -- we need to wrap this here and get out. I know the chairman's got other things to push on to as well. Let me say that -- put that on -- add this to the list.

I think it would be helpful -- presuming that Tony Lake is confirmed, I think it'd be helpful for me, at least, to do my oversight job better to have a conversation about this issue, about this asset validation issue. That was a response to Guatemala, a good response to -- I think to Guatemala, but I emphasize "I think". I don't know. And we certainly don't want to tie the hands of people that are out there trying to get information and then ask them in a follow-on when we have a disaster "How come you didn't know?" So for me, for my purpose, it would be helpful to do that.

就这样，我认为自危地马拉以来，实际上自从您加入船上以来，您与监督委员会之间的活动大大增加。我的意思是，您在这里带了一个消防员，以告知我们您认为是问题或失败的事情。我认为那很好。

It's made it -- in some ways it's made our job more difficult, but it really has increased the confidence of us when we do our oversight. And I would add that to the list of things because I think -- again, presuming that Tony Lake is confirmed, whoever is confirmed, they need to continue that and they need to continue to evaluate this asset issue and how we validate those assets.

先生。DEUTCH: Senator, I think it's absolutely tremendous that you have the interest to understand that asset validation program. Its alternate purpose is to assure that those case officers don't take risks which aren't going to yield relevant intelligence, number one; and number two, that the record is there so we can stand behind them no matter what happens, for their protection. And let me tell you --

森克里：但是我们不希望他们变得厌恶风险。

先生。DEUTCH: No. No. And they like it. They see this as raising the bar of performance, that when they make it, they're even more relevant and more producing what this country needs to defend it. And that's true not only -- that's true all up and down the line. And you should satisfy yourself that that's the case. It's very important in this case.

森KERREY: Thank you.

森Specter：Deutch主任，掌握了法规本身和中央情报局局长的义务，就此而言，包括国家安全委员在内的行政部门的所有人主任将伊朗武器出售给波斯尼亚的时间，这是1947年《国家安全法》第501（a）（1）条的时间：“总统应确保情报界充分保留，并目前了解到目前了解的情报活动美国。”然后是第502节 - 注意，这是总统的责任。“中央情报局局长兼美国政府所有部门，机构和其他参与情报活动的实体的负责人应使情报委员会充分及时了解所有情报活动。”因此，他们在这里谈论实体。国家安全议员当然是一个实体。

And then the question is, what is an intelligence activity? And Section 14(a) provides, quote, "As used in this resolution, the term `intelligence activities' includes the collection, analysis, production, dissemination or use of information which relates to any foreign country or any government, political group, party, military force, movement or other association in such foreign country and which relations to the defense, foreign policy, national security or related policies of the United States, and other activity which is in support of such activities." Close quote.

Now, that is about as broad a formulation as legislators can make to try to throw an all-inclusive net over intelligence activities. And it makes it the responsibility of the president -- so the whole executive branch. But then it goes beyond that and delineates heads of all departments, agencies and other entities, and that would include Mr. Lake. And then, as it defines intelligence activities, it has as broad a brush as you can paint with.

Now, as Senator Kerrey said, he concluded that this was not traditional diplomatic activity. That's an exception on covert action. It is not an exception, however, on informing of intelligence activities. Even if it is traditional diplomatic activity, it does not exempt someone from reporting on intelligence activities.

Now, someone may say that this is not intelligence. I mean, anybody can say anything about anything. But it seems to me it's very hard within the broad sweep of these provisions to exclude Mr. Anthony Lake from a duty to inform the Intelligence Committees, which is really a duty to inform Congress.

现在，我不知道如何更严格地绘制法规。而且我认为我们无法运作 - 这可以追溯到一个以前的问题 - 如果我们要在法规中解析半殖民地。

But let me come back to the technical definition. Doesn't that comprehend Mr. Lake, and doesn't that comprehend matters like this transaction with Bosnia to tell the Intelligence Committee, and tell the Congress, especially when the Congress is debating the arms embargo?

先生。DEUTCH: Mr. Chairman, I've noted before you that I'm not a lawyer; I haven't read that particular definition carefully recent.

但是我想发表意见。如果您要担任中央情报局主任，我本人或其他任何人，我们必须了解我们必须意识到的标准，并报告国家副秘书或国家和大使的副秘书之间正在发生的事情，这可能属于您在这个非常广泛的定义下阅读，因为它们是情报活动，因此您将中央情报部长置于不可能的情况下。

森SPECTER: I don't want to do that, I really don't. It's only if you know about it and if it comes within a fair interpretation of what the Intelligence Committee ought to know and what the Congress ought to know. You can't write a statute and say, "Please tell the Intelligence Committee what it ought to know" --

先生。Deutch：但是，主席先生 -

森幽灵： - “请告诉国会应该知道什么。”但是在这里 - 我并不是在中央情报局的主任伍尔西（Woolsey）的主任；他不知道。但是问题是，莱克先生是否要对此有所指责，还是莱克先生是否处于中央情报局局长的职位，他将具有足够的敏感性来告诉情报委员会。当他没有告诉伍尔西时，我认为他没有足够的敏感性 - 当他没有看到国会知道的情况下。莱克知道国会正在辩论武器禁运，莱克先生知道国会不知道这一秘密交易。

先生。Deutch：主席先生，对于国家安全顾问来说，这是一个完全合理的问题：“您不认为国会应该被告知这是外交政策事项吗？”

我和我在不同的地方，我和我在哪里有不同的地方是他在这方面是否有责任。我说这很重要，因为这是DCI必须关注的基本标准之一。

森SPECTER: Well, are you saying, then, that Mr. Anthony Lake had a duty to see to it that the Foreign Relations Committee knew about this secret deal?

先生。Deutch：先生，我并不是说他有职责。我不知道外交关系法规是什么。但是我当然认为这是一个合理的问题。

森Specter：好吧，在那个事件中，导演Deutch，我们将向他提出这个问题，而不再向您提出问题。

先生。Deutch：我可以在这里有最后一句话吗？

森SPECTER: I doubt it, but try.

先生。Deutch：我想再次说谢谢。你有 -

森SPECTER: Well this -- we're not finished with the hearing now!

先生。DEUTCH: You got me again!

森Spectre：碰巧对波斯尼亚以外的委员会以及我们谈论过的问题有很多非常重要的主题。金博宝正规网址但是，您可以拥有最后一句话，因为我看到您在驾驶的东西。

让我在我们之前谈论过的一些问题上谈论有关中国的制裁问题，但有一些更新。金博宝正规网址我们已经在委员会面前遇到了关于中国将5,000枚环形磁铁转移到巴基斯坦的严重问题，这在用作浓缩铀的核设施中具有非常重要的作用。

政府得出的结论是，中国政府不知道这一点，因为这是中国国家核公司，以某种方式不属于中国政府的责任，这对许多人来说都是很难的我们要理解。政府说，没有证据表明中国政府已故意支持或教bakistan的核武器计划，这很难遵循。

But then on -- in early October, there were reports that China had secretly sold more nuclear-weapon-related activity; a specialized industrial furnace and highly sophisticated diagnostic equipment to Pakistan in September, which would violate the pledge, which China made to the United States in May of this year, where we had excused them on the ring-magnet operation.

What is your view as to what ought to be done with respect to sanctions as to China, where we come to these very major matters of nuclear proliferation?

先生。Deutch：我看不到。

森SPECTER: Has there been a violation? Or should we go into closed session to talk about it -- of the May 1996 Chinese pledge?

先生。Deutch：我相信做出决心是国务卿的责任。我很高兴能在您希望的任何详细范围内就此主题进行封闭的会议。

森SPECTER: All right. Well, we may have to -- we may have to proceed in that direction.

关于反情报的充分性，Deutch导演 - 我对尼科尔森先生的担忧表示赞赏 - 我们的代理机构和联邦调查局（FBI）是否能够充分处理反情报，而艾姆斯（Ames）和尼科尔森（Nicholson）等监视？

先生。Deutch：根据我的判断，我们能够应付诸如俄罗斯等敌对的外国情报服务，他们试图渗透到美国国家安全组织，而不是两年前。我对中央情报局和联邦调查局之间的加强反智能系统具有极大的信心和满足感。因此，您的答案就是 - 您总是可以做得更好，但是我对您的回答将在这里肯定。

森Specter：稍作稍作介绍战争罪行法庭的活动 - 我再次赞扬中央情报局和您在那里所做的事情 - 美国对战争罪行法庭的支持的现状是什么？有助于使被起诉的人（Karadzic，Mladic，其他人）更有可行，以了解战争罪行法庭能够执行其指定职能吗？

先生。DEUTCH: The answer to that is yes. I cannot -- should not go into the details in open session. But both the intelligence community -- many different parts of the intelligence community are addressing this question of supporting the War Crimes Tribunal. It's a very strong interest of the president and of the secretary of State, and we are working this problem, as you know. And I'd be delighted to go into details in closed session.

森SPECTER: You made a brief reference to the legislation which we passed this year in response to the Aspin and Brown Commission on reform. And while we did not achieve all that we had sought, with this committee taking the position that the director of Central Intelligence needed more of an input on the appointment of key officials and more control over fiscal matters, considering the fact that the Department of Defense has 85 percent of the budget, how would you characterize the success in the legislation which we did enact in moving along toward a necessary reform of the intelligence community?

先生。Deutch：首先，我感谢您在此问题上的努力。我认为取得的进步虽然不如以前那么多 - 并非所有措施都通过了阿斯平棕色委员会提倡的所有措施，但取得了重大进展，我对结果非常非常满意。而且我认为其中很大一部分与您和参议员Kerrey对此有关，我认为取得了重大进展。

森SPECTER: Do you --

先生。DEUTCH: Be assured directors of Central Intelligence will be in better shape to carry out their responsibilities because of that legislation.

森Spectre：我刚刚递给您有关您的笔记 - 您需要离开的需要，我将在另一个分钟内将其包装好。

关于DCI的改革和足够的影响力的问题，并回顾了6月25日在达兰发生的事情以及存在的警告类型，我们是否应该进行任何重组，我们应该寻找第105届国会中央情报局的主任是关键人物足够的影响力，能够使笼子嘎嘎作响，当有与卡车炸弹，封闭栅栏和周边的问题一样多的指标时，确实会发出警报的声音吗？我们还能做些什么来加强中央情报主任的权威？

先生。Deutch：先生，我将在接下来的六个月中对此进行反思。我确实认为 - 您知道我已经是一个或多或少是现状的中心。在接下来的六个月中，我认为我会认真考虑是否要坚持这一点，或者我是否认为可能提出了更多雄心勃勃的建议。

森SPECTER: All right, there are other subjects, but I'm going to ask you just one more, and that is you commented about the CIA nuclear proliferation force. And -- where do we head on reorganization of the government? And let me show you, as I did Director -- former Director Gates last week, the chart which shows the vast, complex, obviously ineffective bureaucracy dealing to combat proliferation: 96 separate agencies. And the legislation which came out of this committee and which was passed calls for the appointment of a commission to deal with this. Without unduly burdening you for a response, what is your net assessment as to where we ought to be going on reorganization of the government to combat nuclear proliferation?

先生。Deutch：先生，有两个问题。金博宝正规网址一个问题是关于 - 在政策制定方面的复杂性，这是该图表所解决的问题。我确实认为有空间，就像我在能源部以来我所说的那样，那里有重大改善的空间。

第二个是，情报界组织得当吗？正如我在声明中所暗示的那样，我相信是时候对整个情报界的非增殖情报进行更多集中化了。我将敦促我的继任者采取具体步骤来创建中央情报中心主任，以便在社区范围内解决非扩散事项。

森SPECTER: Well, as usual, we can't cover everything, but we've made a good start. We thank you for being here today. We thank you for the service which you have given to CIA, to the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy, and we look forward to your future service to the country. And in an unusual department (sic) from precedent, you may have the very last word.

先生。DEUTCH: Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you for letting me have the last word. I want to thank you personally for your support. And I leave here having satisfaction in my job because of the support you've given me, Senator Kerrey and this committee. But most of all, I leave with real affection and respect for Arlen Specter, and I want you to know that's not going to vanish. I really treasure what has grown between us in the last 20 months. It's been good, and I appreciate it very much, sir.