

STROM THURMOND, SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN
 JOHN W. WARNER, VIRGINIA
 WILLIAM S. COHEN, MAINE
 JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA
 TRENT LOTT, MISSISSIPPI
 DAN COATS, INDIANA
 BOB SMITH, NEW HAMPSHIRE
 ORR KEMPTORNE, IDAHO
 KAY BAILEY HUTCHESON, TEXAS
 JAMES M. INHOFE, OKLAHOMA
 RICK SANTORUM, PENNSYLVANIA
 SAM NUNN, GEORGIA
 J. JAMES EXUM, MISSISSIPPI
 CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN
 EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASSACHUSETTS
 JIM BROWDER, NEW MEXICO
 JOHN GLENN, OHIO
 ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA
 CHARLES S. ROSS, VIRGINIA
 JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CONNECTICUT
 RICHARD M. BLUMENTHAL, CONNECTICUT
 RICHARD L. REYNARD, STAFF DIRECTOR
 ARNOLD L. PUMARD, STAFF DIRECTOR FOR THE MINORITY

United States Senate
 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

September 29, 1995

Memorandum For Senator Thurmond and Senator Nunn

From: Senator Warner and Senator Levin

Subject: Review of the Circumstances Surrounding the Ranger Raid on October 3-4, 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia

Pursuant to your letter of October 25, 1993, we have conducted a thorough review of the operations of Joint Task Force Ranger and other U.S. military units in Mogadishu, Somalia, that resulted in the death of 18 U.S. military personnel. Our work required the interview of literally hundreds of U.S. and foreign military personnel, officials of the State Department, the CIA, the U.N., and other participating government agencies. In addition, we met with the President of Ethiopia and the heads of the two principal Somali factions: Mohammed Farah Aidsed, head of the Somali National Alliance; and Ali Mahdi Mohammed, head of the United Somali Congress. These meetings were held in the United States, Somalia and Ethiopia. Section I, Scope of the Review, provides additional information regarding the interviews conducted for the purposes of this report.

At the outset, it is important to note that statements which are attributed to various military and civilian officials are based upon hand-written notes taken during interviews. We have made a bona fide effort to accurately report the facts and opinions related to us.

In addition, we must stress that our military commanders in the U.S., at CENTCOM, and those deployed in Somalia, had to make their decisions "real time" under the pressure of battle -- threatened and actual. In contrast, we reach our findings and opinions looking back over the entirety of the decision process and military operations.

Those reviewing this report should not lose sight of the incontrovertible fact that the combined efforts of the military and diplomatic personnel involved in UNITAF and UNOSOM II saved thousands of Somali lives and untold personal hardships. The valor, professionalism and extraordinary discipline of the U.S. troops that carried out the orders of superiors throughout


95-F-1762
 #778

Somalia -- and particularly those involved in the Task Force Ranger raids of September-October, 1993 -- places these Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors and Marines in history with our highest military traditions. Moreover, the willingness of allied forces to respond in assuming a role with the U.S. troops is commendable. Foremost in this regard were Malaysian and Pakistani forces involved in the rescue effort of U.S. forces following the tragic October 3-4, 1993 operation.

We recommend immediate release to the public of this report.



Carl Levin



John Warner

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Attached to this report are the commentaries of:

Senator John Warner (R-VA)	p. 1
Senator Carl Levin (D-MI)	p. 11
Section I. Scope of the Review	p. 13
Section II. Background	p. 13
Section III. Mandate for, transition to, and early stages of U.N. Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)	p. 16
Section IV. Decision to attempt to apprehend Aided	p. 22
Section V. Decision to deploy U.S. Special Operations Forces	p. 24
Section VI. Joint Task Force Ranger Package	p. 28
Section VII. Request for Armor	p. 32
Section VIII. Conduct of Joint Task Force Ranger Operations	p. 37
Section IX. Intelligence Support	p. 42
Section X. Policy Issues	p. 42
Section XI. Conclusions	p. 46
Section XII. Final comment	p. 51

Commentary by Senator John Warner (R-VA)

Any investigation into U.S. military operations in Somalia must be accompanied by an examination of the policies of the United States and the United Nations which led to the involvement of U.S. and foreign military forces in Somalia. Critical to this analysis is the impact, I find, of the shifting, uncoordinated, unclear and inconsistent policies of both the United Nations and the Clinton Administration on the missions assigned to these joint military forces. Involvement by the U.S. in UNOSOM II, the first U.N.-commanded Chapter VII operation; and, in particular, the mission to capture Aideed; was based, not on a careful assessment of vital U.S. national interests, but rather on the Clinton Administration's desire to see this U.N. operation succeed -- not simply in peacekeeping or peace enforcement -- but in a mission of nation-building.

When U.S. forces were first deployed to Somalia in December 1992 by President Bush, they were sent on a humanitarian mission, pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 794, which called on these troops to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. Initially, during this U.S.-led UNITAF operation, over 25,000 well-equipped and well-trained U.S. troops, together with 13,000 troops from over 20 other nations, were in Somalia to assist in feeding thousands of starving Somalis. The world applauded this expression of compassion. There were guidelines in the operations order as to how to deal with threats from hostile, armed Somalis, and when and where to seize arms.

But, with the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II and the U.N. taking over command of the operation from the United States in May 1993, the goals of the international effort in Somalia were greatly expanded to include: forcibly disarming the warring factions; political reconciliation; and nation-building. In many cases, orders were given to use military force to achieve these goals. Regrettably, this U.N. policy, which was supported by the Clinton Administration, was being implemented at the same time that the Administration was pursuing a second policy track, which directed U.S. military leaders to reduce the U.S. military presence in Somalia. This policy was being implemented through daily withdrawals down to a level of 4,000 troops (of which only 2,000 were combat-trained troops).

U.S. troops were caught in the crossfire of decisions made by policy makers.

Eventually UNOSOM II forces of other nations proved less than capable and, in some cases, unwilling to perform the risky missions required by the new policy. In almost every instance, U.S. troops were called upon to carry the added burdens. Following an ambush of Pakistani forces on June 5, Admiral Jonathan Howe, the United Nations Representative in Somalia,

ordered the arrest and detention of Aideed and offered a \$25,000 reward for information leading to his arrest. Further, Howe requested U.S. forces to capture him. The Clinton Administration allowed U.S. troops to embark on this mission which clearly put the U.S. on one side in a civil war.

U.S. troops were tasked to provide force protection, assist in forcible disarmament efforts, and assume the major risks by leading the effort to capture Aideed -- missions for which U.S. forces were inadequately sized and equipped. The accompanying risks for U.S. troops in Somalia were, therefore, much higher than anyone in the Congress or the nation had been led to believe.

Policy makers within the Clinton Administration were determined to ensure that the United Nations nation-building efforts in Somalia did not fail. They, along with the U.N. Representative in Somalia, Admiral Howe, pushed incessantly for the U.S. to provide Special Operations forces to capture Aideed. This was at the same time that these Administration officials were directing the U.S. military to reduce the overall level of U.S. troops in Somalia -- an inconsistent, two-track policy. General Bir, the Turkish General who served as Commander of UNCSOM II forces and his Deputy Commander, General Montgomery, who was also Commander of U.S. Forces in Somalia, supported the request.

Although General Powell and the Commander of Central Command, General Hoor, strongly opposed and advised against sending U.S. Special Operations Forces to Somalia to attempt to capture Aideed, they eventually complied with "civilian control" and reluctantly implemented a deployment of additional U.S. forces for this purpose. On August 24, 1993, approximately 440 U.S. Rangers and Special Operations personnel deployed to Somalia with the mission to capture Aideed and his principal lieutenants.

The Clinton Administration's policy of reducing the overall U.S. military presence in Somalia to a minimal level, while at the same time agreeing to U.N. requests to perform a variety of high risk military operations for the United Nations mission, stretched the capability of U.S. forces in Somalia. This policy also resulted in two crucial policy decisions: the decision to omit the AC-130's from the August 24 Ranger Task Force package; and the decision to deny the September 1993 request for armor from General Montgomery, the U.S. commander in Somalia. In my opinion, these decisions on equipment should have been based on military requirements, not policy considerations. The desire to continue "lowering the profile" of U.S. forces in Somalia appears to have been the determining factor in each of these decisions. Both of these requests should have been approved.

We will never know for sure the impact that this additional

equipment would have had on the tragic October 3-4 raid. While it is true that General Montgomery's request for heavy armor was not specifically requested for the Ranger operation, it is clear that the armor could have been used decisively in the rescue operation of October 3-4, and, if available, might have been integrated into the Ranger ground elements that were an essential part of the forces conducting the October 3 raid.

When a commander in the field requests equipment for the protection of his forces, and that request is properly reviewed and approved by the Combatant Theater Commander (CINCPAC), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the request should be approved by "civilian control." Only compelling military -- not diplomatic policy -- reasons should ever be used to deny an on-scene military commander such a request.

Secretary Aspin has said that Congressional concerns about U.S. military involvement in Somalia were a factor in his decision to deny General Montgomery's request for armor. This represents a misreading of the mood in the Congress at the time. Congressional concerns with the operation in Somalia centered on the Clinton Administration's decision to take sides in a civil war, to assume combat missions -- particularly the mission to capture Aideed -- without adequate Congressional consultation. This was a major transition of policy, from a more traditional U.N. peacekeeping operation, to nebulous attempts at "nation-building". The following statements are several examples of Congressional attitudes regarding U.S. military involvement in Somalia prior to the October, 1993 raid:

o July 15, 1993 statement by Senator Byrd (D-WV): "Mr. President, this Senator and this Senate did not vote to send American forces to Somalia to go from house to house to disarm the participants in internecine battles between Somali warlords....to chase down competing warlords...to confiscate weapons. I thought I voted to allow United States forces to go to Somalia and feed hungry people."

o August 2, 1993 statement by Senator McCain (R-AZ): "In the case of Somalia, the winds have blown us from a narrow well-defined humanitarian mission to taking sides in a prolonged hunt for a Somalia warlord. We have moved from a relief effort to peace enforcement to taking sides, and we now seem to be on the edge of moving towards nation building."

o September 27, 1993 statement by Rep. Hyde (R-IL): "Now, the mission has broadened dramatically. Instead of feeding the hungry, we are nation building."

o September 28, 1993 statement by Rep. Mazzoli (D-KY): "What began as a laudable humanitarian mission has become,

03 23 99 09:13 AM FROM: DAN BROWN, DU

in my judgement, a combination peacemaking, peacekeeping and nation-building exercise."

These Congressional concerns argued for abandoning the mission to capture Aideed, not for denying the US forces in Somalia the equipment requested by their military commanders on the scene.

The Clinton Administration should not, in my opinion, have agreed to send additional U.S. troops to Somalia for the specific mission of capturing Aideed. The overwhelming majority of the military leaders who were consulted regarding this mission advised against it, pointing out that this was a very high-risk mission with a very low probability of success. Unfortunately, the significant professional advice of our most senior U.S. military leaders was overruled. The arguments of senior U.S. civilian policy makers, in coordination with U.N. officials, prevailed.

Was there a vital U.S. national interest which justified putting U.S. military personnel in danger for the mission to capture Aideed? I think not. At the very time the decision was made to deploy the Ranger Task Force, it was the Administration's policy that there should be a greater emphasis on a political -- rather than military -- solution to the problems in Somalia. According to Secretary Aspin, "At the same time that we were deploying the Ranger Task Force, we were also pursuing a two-track approach. We had determined in Washington that there was too much emphasis, almost exclusively, on the military force track and not enough on the political track." This argues in favor of denying the U.N. request, advocated by Admiral Howe, for U.S. special operations forces to pursue and capture Aideed.

U.S. forces were conducting these raids against targets in "Aideed territory" -- a known, limited geographic sector of Mogadishu clearly under his control. To the extent possible, the Task Force used diversified tactics and "feints" to keep their adversaries off balance. But the nature of the mission, to capture a "warlord" in a congested area of ramshackle buildings, while trying to minimize collateral damage to multitudes of innocent civilians, put severe limitations on the range of military tactics that could be used.

Aideed had been trained by the French military; at one time he had held the rank of General in the Somali military. Senator Levin and I met him, talked at great length with him in Addis Ababa during our trip to the region. He is no stranger to military tactics; he is, and was, no fool.

Who was making a daily assessment of the increasing risk of these missions due to the repetition of tactics? Who was assessing such increased risk against the end value of a capture

of Aided? Who was assessing the consequences of a failed mission, with possible U.S. casualties, on support at home? Who was assessing the impact of the possibility of a highly visible failure on future U.S. foreign policy? Did a team in Washington look at these repetitive operations, based on questionable policy, with increasing risk to troops, and say, "hold it, let's re-evaluate?" I was not able to find evidence that those in Washington, civilian and military, with the responsibility of evaluating the operations being conducted by our forces, did so in a timely, effective manner. Oversight was not carried out with the thoroughness, or care, that was justified by the daily personal risks being experienced by the U.S. forces conducting these combat operations.

For example, certain U.S. military units participating in the raid of October 3-4, 1993, unlike other U.S. units, have as part of their creed, the following:

"...Secrecy protects their missions and conceals their personal deeds..."

The Special Operations forces which comprised Joint Task Force Ranger depend heavily on the element of "secrecy", of surprise, for successful operations. Clearly, as the operations of this unit in Somalia achieved, in many respects, a repetitive pattern, the crucial elements of "secrecy" and surprise were being diminished. Aided was not just a political figure, but a professional soldier as well. Wasn't it only a matter of time until he and his troops devised tactics to defend themselves? They mastered the use of relatively unsophisticated weapons, and cleverly massed them in critical locations. They effectively used Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPGs) -- weapons designed for use against ground armored vehicles -- as crude surface-to-air missiles, shooting down four U.S. helicopters during the October 3 battle. Just 9 days before, a U.S. helicopter was lost to such a weapon!

Although U.S. military commanders were doing their best with flawed, changing policies, and a level of review by civilian authority that fall short, there remains the question of whether the on-scene commanders should have recognized the increasing risk to their troops, of a likely failed mission, due to the repetition of the raids. The element of "secrecy" was severely diminished, the adversaries had to have been on a learning curve, and yet our commanders pressed on.

Both military and civilian officials in the chain of command, as well as those in an advisory role, should have been carefully and continually re-evaluating the Task Force's mission and tactics after each raid, with an eye toward recommending that the operation be terminated if the risks were deemed to have grown too high. This was not done with the depth and care

required in my opinion either in Washington or, to some extent, in Somalia.

The policies which drove the military operations, formulated in the Clinton Administration and U.N. headquarters, and conveyed through two chains of command -- 1) a CINC, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM); and 2) a U.N. command under a U.N. General. In addition, one U.S. General in Somalia wore two hats, one as the Deputy to the U.N. Commander and one as Commander of U.S. Forces in Somalia, subordinate to Commander, CENTCOM. This created difficult -- if not unprecedented -- command arrangements. There will, forever, remain legitimate questions regarding the adverse impact these command arrangements had on the eventual outcome in Somalia.

In general, the policies of the Clinton Administration -- and the U.N. -- regarding the crisis in Somalia appear to have been characterized by abrupt shifts, a lack of clarity, and inconsistencies that placed a difficult burden of interpretation upon the deployed military commanders. Task Force Ranger was sent to Somalia with the mission to capture Aideed, against professional military advice.

Military operations are never conducted without risk, and when military forces are committed, we must expect that casualties, including loss of life, may occur. We must be careful not to give our military commanders, our troops, the impression that we expect them to carry out high risk missions without ever suffering casualties. However, in return for their willingness to accept risk, our military is owed a duty of constant re-evaluation of their missions by "civilian control." Most importantly, it is incumbent on the President and the Congress to ensure that U.S. forces are put in harm's way only when our clear national interests are involved. This was not the case in Somalia.

This review raises questions regarding whether such Chapter VII operations -- which are entitled "Actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression" -- should be undertaken by the U.N., an organization which does not have adequate military expertise or infrastructure. The Clinton Administration has now indicated a change in its position on this issue. As Assistant Secretary of Defense Ted Warner testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 3, 1995, "... We have come to believe that the United Nations is not the best organization to direct the conduct of large-sized Chapter VII peace enforcement operations that may involve substantial risk of combat. We believe such operations are best carried out by coalitions or capable regional organizations."

Additionally, the Clinton Administration's policy of

reducing the U.S. military presence in Somalia while simultaneously tasking U.S. forces to engage in combat operations with high attendant personal risks was inconsistent. Those officials who advocated and approved this policy must bear the ultimate responsibility for the events that followed. As Under Secretary of Defense Wisner correctly observed: "the single most serious flaw in our policy was that we tried to accomplish political objectives solely by military means."

Those reviewing this report should not lose sight of the fact that the combined efforts of the military personnel involved in UNITAF and UNOSOM II saved many thousands of Somali lives. The valor, professionalism and extraordinary discipline of the U.S. troops that carried out the orders of superiors in Somalia - - and particularly those involved in the Task Force Ranger raids of September-October, 1993 -- places these Soldiers, Airman, Sailors and Marines in history with our highest military traditions. Our nation will not forget their sacrifices. We owe them our deepest gratitude.

Commentary by Senator Carl Levin (D-MI)

The attached report comprehensively addresses a host of issues relating to the circumstances surrounding the Ranger raid of October 3-4, 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia. What follows is not an attempt to summarize the contents of that report, but rather to express a few brief personal thoughts about some of the key issues involved.

Many different actions and inactions contributed to the position that U.S. forces found themselves in at the beginning of October, 1993 in Mogadishu, at the time of the Ranger raid which resulted in American casualties.

Chief among these was the unanimous June decision of the United Nations Security Council to try to arrest and detain for prosecution those responsible for the June 5, 1993 armed attacks on United Nations peacekeepers. The fifteen members of the Security Council voted [UNSCR #837] for the arrest effort on June 6, 1993. The decision on June 17 of the Secretary General's Special Representative, Ambassador Howe, to offer a reward for Aideed's capture and to commence a major hunt for him in Mogadishu, was strongly supported by the U.S. commander on the ground, General Montgomery, and by the UNOSOM II force commander, Turkish General Bir, both of whom actually favored offering a higher reward for Aideed's capture.

The decision to hunt for Aideed involved the U.N. member nations and U.S. forces in the internal politics and clan rivalries of Mogadishu in a new way, with attendant dangers that were not immediately appreciated.

The decision to hunt for Aideed was public and widely reported in the press, as were attacks by U.S. forces against Aideed strongholds in the following week and again in August and September. Most Members of Congress at the time supported these efforts, as reflected in Congressional approval of a supplemental appropriation for DOD costs in Somalia on June 23, 1993. In July, several Members of Congress publicly voiced support for continuing U.N. operations in Somalia and U.S. participation in them; on July 13, Senator Byrd alone suggested that the U.S. should withdraw from the Somalia mission, but Congress took no action to require withdrawal. The Senate did not vote on a Byrd amendment to end U.S. forces' activities in Somalia within 30 days, but on September 9, 1993, the Senate did pass a non-binding resolution calling for the President to seek specific Congressional authorization by November 15 for the continued deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia.

Previously there had been a change of mission from the U.S.-led UNITAF effort to provide immediate humanitarian relief, to

the UNOSOM II effort to address the root causes of the famine, including national reconciliation and disarming the warring factions, and to prevent the famine from recurring. Although this change was present in UNOSOM II's written mandate when it took over in May, 1993, its implementation was inconsistent and unclear, and as the months passed, political and diplomatic efforts were increasingly at cross purposes with the actions of the military forces. The motives behind the mission change were good, but the conflicting tactics used created dissent, not cooperation among the warring Somali factions, and resentment, not trust, toward UNOSOM and U.S. forces. The Clinton Administration was engaged in a major effort to force better coordination of political and military tactics with the U.N. just prior to the incidents of Oct 3-4.

While press reports have placed much emphasis on the impact that armor denied to U.S. forces might have had upon casualties in Mogadishu had it been present on Oct. 3-4, General Garrison, who directed that raid, has stated that he had all the equipment he needed for his operation and might not have used tanks even if he had them. He also said he did not consider using more tanks and APCs from allied nations as backups in the Ranger Ground Reaction force. While more armor, in place and ready for a rescue effort, might have allowed a faster rescue of injured Rangers, it is impossible to determine whether any lives would have been saved since the vast majority of casualties occurred during the movement of forces to the first helicopter crash site, and probably would not have been affected by earlier arrival of tanks and armored vehicles in a rescue force.

The United Nations has had some notable successes in conducting "peacekeeping" operations but it is clear that it does not now have the wherewithal to conduct a peace enforcement operation. The United States and the other members of the United Nations should continue to work to improve the ability of the United Nations to carry out such operations in the future.

Finally, a portion of the final comment contained in this report bears repeating:

"The valor, professionalism and extraordinary discipline of the U.S. troops that carried out the orders of superiors in Somalia -- and particularly those involved in the Task Force Ranger raids of September - October, 1993 places these Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors and Marines in history with our highest military traditions. Our nation owes them a debt of gratitude." Commentary by Senator Carl Levin (D-MI)

I. Scope of the Review - We started our assignment with a Secretary of Defense briefing on November 30, 1993. Major General William Garrison, the Commander Joint Task Force Ranger, was principal briefer. Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command, General Wayne Downing and a number of other civilian and military officials participated or were present. We received briefings in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and Mogadishu from December 11 to 13, 1993. Additionally, Committee staff conducted field visits to the headquarters of Central Command (CENTCOM), Special Operations Command (SOCOM), Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) (Senator Warner joined in a second of two visits to JSOC), and to the units that participated in the October 3-4 raid at Fort Campbell, Kentucky; Fort Drum, New York; Fort Benning, Georgia and Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

We conducted separate and extensive interviews of Major General Garrison, Commander of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC); General Downing, Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and General Hear, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). We also met with Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Frank Wisner, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin.

II. Background

1. In January 1991, Somalia's president, Siad Barre, was deposed and civil war and clan infighting ensued, leading to famine and lawlessness throughout portions of the country.

2. On April 24, 1992, the United Nations Security Council, after the signing of a cease-fire between the warring Somali factions, approved United Nations Operation in Somalia, which has come to be referred to as UNOSOM I. The UN agreed to deploy 50 unarmed United Nations military observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu.

3. On August 28, 1992, the Security Council, in the face of sporadic outbreaks of hostilities in several parts of Somalia, approved the deployment of an additional 3,000 peacekeepers to perform a traditional peacekeeping mission under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter to observe cease-fire agreements and provide security to humanitarian relief efforts. The United States participation in UNOSOM I, called Operation Provide Relief, involved the provision of transportation to Pakistani troops, humanitarian aid workers and supplies.

4. On December 3, 1992, as the security situation in Somalia continued to deteriorate, the Security Council, acting under

Chapter VII of the UN Charter and in response to an offer by the United States to take the lead in organizing and commanding such an operation, authorized the use of all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. That multilateral operation, known as Unified Task Force or UNITAF and as Operation Restore Hope, included about 25,000 U.S. troops and 13,000 troops from 20 other countries. UNITAF was successful in accomplishing its mission of establishing a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations. The United States-led operation, however, did not involve the disarmament of the various Somalia factions and did not extend throughout all of Somalia.

5. On March 26, 1993, the Security Council authorized the establishment of United Nations Operation in Somalia II or UNOSOM II, which is the subject of this review. UNOSOM II was also a Chapter VII operation and had an expanded mandate in that the Security Council specifically emphasized the "crucial importance of disarmament" and called for the Force Commander of UNOSOM II to "assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia ... in accordance with the recommendations contained in his (Secretary General's) report of 3 March 1993." The Secretary General's recommendations referred to by the Security Council included, *inter alia*, the following military tasks:

"(c) to maintain control of the heavy weapons of the organized factions which will have been brought under international control pending their eventual destruction or transfer to a newly-constituted army;

(d) to seize small arms of all unauthorized armed elements and to assist in the registration and security of such arms...."

The Security Council also requested the UN Secretary General, through his Special Representative, retired United States Admiral Jonathan Howe, to provide assistance to the Somali people in rehabilitating their political institutions and promoting national reconciliation.

6. On May 4, 1993, command of the operation was formally turned over from the United States to the United Nations Force Commander for UNOSOM II. The UN Force Commander was a Turkish general and the United States provided the Deputy Force Commander, Major General Thomas Montgomery. The United States also provided approximately 2,800 logisticians who were under the operational control of the UN Force Commander, Turkish Lieutenant General Bir, and approximately 1,300 combat troops in a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) who remained entirely under U.S. command and control, under Major General Montgomery in his role as Commander of U.S. Forces. The mission of the QRF was to act as an interim

force protection supplement to UN forces in emergencies.

7. On June 5, 1993, there was a scheduled inventory by UNOSOM II of five weapons-storage sites belonging to Aidaed's faction, one of which was collocated with the radio transmission relay facility north of the city, with another at the radio broadcast studio in the city itself. Prior written notice of the inspection had been given to the staff of General Aidaed. Pakistani units returning from the inventory sites encountered a three-sided ambush and sustained 25 killed, 53 wounded, and 10 missing in action.

8. On June 6th, the Security Council reaffirmed the authorization to take all necessary measures against those responsible for the armed attacks on UNOSOM II forces, including "to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment."

9. On June 17, 1993, Admiral Howe announced a \$25,000 reward for information that would lead to Aidaed's arrest. This action was supported by the UNOSOM II Force Commander, Turkish Lieutenant General Bir, and the Deputy UNOSOM II Force Commander and Commander of U.S. Forces, U.S. Major General Montgomery. Both of those officers thought the amount of the reward should have been much greater.

10. On August 24, 1993, the United States deployed approximately 440 troops as part of Joint Task Force Ranger, whose mission was to apprehend General Aidaed and his senior lieutenants. Joint Task Force Ranger was under the command of Major General William Garrison. General Garrison reported directly to General Joseph Hoar, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command. The Task Force was not under the operational control of the UN Force Commander and was not under the operational control of Commander U.S. Forces, Somalia. Task Force Ranger conducted seven raids during its deployment, three at night and four in the daytime. These missions yielded valuable contributions to the overall mission. On the seventh and last raid, which commenced in daylight on October 3rd and lasted through the 4th, the Ranger Task Force tragically sustained 16 killed in action and the relief force which went to the assistance of the Ranger Task Force sustained 2 killed in action. A total of 84 were wounded in the operation.

11. Shortly after October 4, 1993, the United States deployed 3,000 additional Army combat personnel, including heavy armor, a Marine Expeditionary Unit off shore with 3,600 Marines embarked, a Navy aircraft carrier, and Air Force AC-130 gunships based in a neighboring country.

III. Mandate for, transition to, and early stages of United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)

At the time of the commencement of the U.S.-led operation to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia, then President Bush stated that the United States would send a substantial force of troops to Somalia "with a limited objective: to open the supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a U.N. peacekeeping force to keep it moving."

U.S. troop levels reached a peak of 25,800 in mid-January 1993 in and around Somalia. The operation was known by its U.S. name as Operation Restore Hope and by its UN name as Unified Task Force or UNITAF. 20 other countries contributed more than 13,400 troops to UNITAF.

President Bush initially publicly stated that U.S. troops would be home within a couple of months. UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali urged the United States to disarm the Somali warring factions but the United States declined to do so. This difference in policy was reviewed by our committee during a hearing on January 29, 1993.

In his March 3, 1993 report to the UN Security Council, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali wrote that "(m)y firm view, as stated in my letter to President Bush of 8 December 1992, remains that the mandate of UNOSOM II must cover the whole territory of Somalia and include disarmament."

On March 26, 1993 the UN Security Council passed resolution 814 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter emphasizing "the crucial importance of disarmament" and requested the Force Commander of UNOSOM II "to assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia" and "to organize a prompt, smooth and phased transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II." As noted above in section II of this review, the military tasks for UNOSOM II included the maintenance of control of the heavy weapons of the organized factions and the seizure of small arms of all unauthorized elements.

During testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 25, 1993, Ambassador David Shimm, the State Department Coordinator for Somalia, stated that "(T)he military transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II has been slow because there has been, until recently, so few interlocutors in Somalia with whom to speak. This situation is changing now that the senior UNOSOM II leadership has arrived in Mogadishu." He further stated that Admiral Howe, the Secretary General's personal representative for Somalia was in Somalia and that the "UNOSOM II Force Commander, General Bir, and his Deputy, General Montgomery, have been in Somalia for the past 2 weeks working on transition plans, and are

rapidly bringing the UNOSOM command staff's structure up to full strength. A U.N. planning team arrives in Mogadishu this weekend to coordinate and advance the transition planning."

On May 4, 1993, UNOSOM II formally took over the mission from UNITAF. During UNOSOM II, U.S. troop strength had been reduced to about 4,000 (of which only about 2,000 were combat troops). U.S. combat forces were intended to be used only as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF), which would come to the aid of the forces of other nations if they became involved in situations that they were unable to handle. The plan was for the QRF to move off-shore as soon as possible and eventually to return to the United States. United States policy was to keep the U.S. force in Somalia as small as possible while at the same time not allow the UN operation to fail.

The QRF, however, became involved in force protection operations and disarming Somalis because the UNOSOM II forces were increasingly reluctant to leave their enclaves without U.S. forces participation, particularly after the June 5th ambush of Pakistani forces that resulted in 24 Pakistani deaths.

We met with Admiral Howe, LTGEN Bir and MGEN Montgomery in Mogadishu, Somalia and with the other witnesses in the United States.

ADM Howe - I argued against turning the operation over to UNOSOM on May 4th. Not only because the Pakistanis had just arrived but because they were not properly equipped (no flak jackets) to take over from the U.S. forces in Mogadishu. Aideed may have sensed a relatively weak force.

Nobody knows when Aideed decided to attack the UN. Did it start at Addis Ababa in March? Towards the end of UNITAF, Aideed's radio put out bad information about the United States and called the United Nations good. By mid-May, his propaganda had turned against the United Nations. For example, he said that "Governor" Howe would turn Somalia into a UN trusteeship. The selection of judges, the formation of district councils, and the establishment of other institutions sanctioned by the Addis conference, were opposed by Aideed as he perceived them as a threat.

The June 5th ambush of the Pakistani troops occurred during a pre-notified inspection. It is our view that this was so large an attack that it had to have been carefully planned.

LTGEN Bir - For the first operations under Chapter VII, there was not sufficient time to plan the takeover from UNITAF. -It was impossible to establish the UNOSOM headquarters with so few people. We never had a 5 brigade force, which is what was pledged and what we needed. We

were not given broad political guidance, so there was no military plan. We tried to lay down military guidance but the June 5th Pakistani massacre forced us to go after the militia. Nations were here for a humanitarian mission and when forces started to take casualties, they stopped cooperating with negative consequences.

If there are to be Chapter VII peace enforcement operations in the future, the responsibility to conduct the operation must be given to either a leading nation, like Operation Desert Storm, or at the most to two leading nations. But even in those cases, there must be specific agreements with the nations contributing forces. It could be conducted by a regional organization, but even NATO would have problems carrying out a Chapter VII operation.

MGEN Montgomery, Deputy Commander, UNOSOM II and Commander, U.S. Forces, Somalia - The mission changed from humanitarian relief as a result of the switch to UNOSOM II in May and the broad UN Security Council mandate. The mission also changed after the June 5th massacre of the Pakistanis. It changed to a hunt for Aided. My broad mission, however, hadn't changed.

The United Nations is not currently equipped to conduct Chapter VII peace enforcement operations. Desert Storm is the correct model for Chapter VII operations.

MG Fresman, Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command - We had two inconsistent policies: support the UN and don't let it fail in Somalia; and get U.S. forces out of Somalia as soon as possible.

GEN Hoar, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command - The Addis Ababa agreement was a good start. A lot of ground work was laid for the UN to take over. We were not having any real problems. My expectations for the UN were too high. I didn't think it would be as hard as it was.

In mid-June when the Malaysians and Italians blocked an area and the Pakistani troops went in on the ground, Aided and his henchmen broke through the Malaysians. The lesson I learned from the operation was that you need to be careful and state clearly that you are trying to disarm and not trying to get a particular person.

We had a continuing problem that grew over time, to use the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) for force protection. I didn't believe that the coalition forces would do the job to meet our force protection requirements. So we used the QRF to do some search-for-weapons sweeps and escort for convoys; work that we hadn't anticipated at first.

Over the summer, it became apparent that the allies couldn't be depended upon. As a result, over time we lost control of Mogadishu. Things certainly went down hill when the Pakistanis were ambushed. In September, Howe requested more U.S. troops. I said no! We lost control of Mogadishu absolutely in May. No one in the UNOSOM headquarters was in charge of Mogadishu. When the U.S. was in charge, the Marines ran Mogadishu. During UNITAF, MOEN Wilhelm met with Aideed and talked to all the allies, held their hand, and got them to take missions they could handle. I talked to Howe about setting up a Division headquarters (not the U.S.).

General Colin Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - I always said that disarming the factions was stupid. I was not involved in any way with the vote in the UN on the Security Council's March 26, 1993 resolution that called for disarming the factions. Disarmament is not possible in a country where everyone has a weapon and, while it might be successful for a while, would only serve to make money for arms dealers in neighboring states.

I went to Somalia on April 5th and asked all concerned when they could accomplish the hand-off. They were all confident that they could do so by the end of May. They beat that date. I wasn't being driven by the White House or Congress. No one ever said that it was done too fast.

Secretary Aspin: The decision concerning the Security Council's mandate for UNOSOM II was worked in interagency forums. There was no resistance in DoD to the mandate for UNOSOM II. We were in a jam as the original mandate for UNITAF was to feed the people and then leave. As long as we had 25,000 troops there was no problem. We did not believe there would be a problem once we left. General Powell was concerned about getting our forces out of Somalia and UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali was begging us to leave our forces there. The push to leave Somalia was not due to any Congressional pressure, rather it was due to the impact on our budget and the fact that the deployment was tying up 25,000 troops and its rotation base. The U.S. military was agitating to get us out.

At the time of the turnover to UNOSOM II, our assessment was that the UN forces would be able to handle the situation. In retrospect, we either underestimated the warlords or we overestimated the capability of the UN forces.

Report of the UN Secretary-General to the Security Council of July 1, 1993

"At 4 p.m. on June 4, 1993, UNOSOM II sent letters to the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (UNC/SNA)

faction informing the latter of its plan to conduct on the following day, weapons verification inspections of the authorized weapons storage sites in four locations in south Mogadishu and one site (Afgooy) on the outskirts of the city. The weapons sites had been established voluntarily by the armed factions after the arrival of UNITAF and were entirely under the control of the factions. The last inspection had been conducted by UNITAF in January and February 1993. The UNOSOM II officer who officially informed a UNC/SNA officer, who was one of Aideed's closest associates was advised that the inspections must not be performed and that, if they were, it would lead to 'war.'

"Despite the statement of the UNC/SNA officer, the inspection began on the morning of June 5. The inspection on the outskirts and two of the inspections within Mogadishu were conducted without incident. The inspection at the 'Mogadishu Radio (Aideed)' site went smoothly until it was near completion when several agitators arrived on scene and began to incite the crowd that had gathered. The inspectors at the Aideed radio transmission site were subjected to sniper fire throughout the day. At that site, a large number of weapons were found, including 62 tow missiles, 2 Milan missiles and 1 SA-7, which were later removed. Thirteen technical vehicles and a number of machine guns previously in storage at the site were no longer present."

"Later in the day, Pakistani units returning from incidents elsewhere in Mogadishu transitted 21 October Road, where they encountered a large, carefully prepared three-sided ambush that resulted in extensive casualties. Other attacks took place elsewhere in the city in the afternoon and the U.S. Quick Reaction Force was deployed to assist the Pakistani forces. As a result 25 Pakistani soldiers were killed, 10 listed as missing, and 53 Pakistani and 3 U.S. soldiers were wounded."

"UNOSOM II will continue its initial disarmament efforts until satisfied it has neutralized all known UNC/SNA weapons and ammunition storage sites and caches in and around Mogadishu and any others that threaten the city. After this is complete, UNOSOM II will undertake an orderly sector-by-sector disarmament of the city. However, this emphasis will shift to cooperative efforts involving Somalis and UNOSOM II as soon as feasible."

Congressional Testimony of October 14, 1993, of Professor Farar: - Professor Farar had served in the early 1960s as advisor to the head of the national police force of Somalia and he conducted the investigation into the June 5, 1993 ambush of the Pakistani troops as the legal consultant to UNOSOM II. Excerpts from his testimony follows:

"As the time for substituting a force under the policy direction of Boutros-Ghali for the U.S. force drew near, the Security Council adopted an enabling resolution which gave to the replacement force, a force both in form and fact much weaker than the one about to leave, gave to it a paradoxically broader mission. Rather than simply maintaining the security of humanitarian operations, it was to assist the Somalis in rebuilding a democratic state. This broad and vague mandate was, however, open to two quite different constructions. It could have been construed conservatively to authorize the UN to provide a security envelope for the existing power holders, while leaving largely to them the task of designing a new political structure and allocating among their clans and subclans the associated opportunities for power and gain. But with the enthusiastic backing, indeed apparently at the urging of U.S. diplomats in Mogadishu, Washington and New York, the main strategists and operational directors of the mission -- the Secretary-General himself, the Under Secretary for Peacekeeping, Mr. Kofi Anan, and Retired U.S. Admiral Jonathan Howe, the Secretary-General's man on the scene -- chose a far more ambitious interpretation. They chose to give to the UN operation the central role in guiding the evolution of Somali politics, they chose to make it the mentor and disciplinarian, the main creative force. They chose an active tutelary role, one in which they would hand out white and black hands respectively to favored and disfavored Somali politicians. Thus they made the UN a player rather than an honest broker in the country's unruly political life, and thus they set the stage for confrontation." (Underlining in original text)

"Aided may actually have believed, at the time of the first confrontation with UN forces, that he was acting in legitimate self-defense of his clan from seizure of the radio station it controlled and from the first stage of the clan's forced unilateral disarmament. Both the US Liaison Mission in Somalia and UNOSOM must accept a measure of responsibility for sending signals, however inadvertently, that could have produced such a belief."

Assistant Secretary of Defense Ted Warner, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 3, 1995: "...We have come to believe that the United Nations is not the best organization to direct the conduct of large-sized Chapter VII peace enforcement operations that may involve substantial risk of combat. We believe such operations are best carried out by coalitions or capable regional organizations."

Congressional action: The United States Senate passed S.J.Res. 45 on February 4, 1993 authorizing Operation Restore

Hope. The House of Representatives amended and adopted the resolution on May 25, 1993. The amended resolution also authorized U.S. forces to remain for one year to implement UN Security Council resolution 814 (UNOSOM II). The House version was never considered by the Senate.

IV. Decision to attempt to apprehend Aided

On June 6, 1993, one day after the Pakistani troops were ambushed and suffered 25 killed in action, the UN Security Council passed a resolution reemphasizing "the crucial importance of the early implementation of the disarmament of all Somali parties, including movements and factions . . . and of neutralizing radio broadcast systems that contribute to the violence and attacks directed against UNOSOM II" and reaffirmed the authorization "to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks . . . , including those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia, including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment." A UN investigation into the ambush commenced on June 12th.

On June 12th, newly arrived U.S. AC-130s attacked selected targets, including heavy weapons, ammunition depots, and a radio station, all associated with Aided in Mogadishu. On June 13th, Pakistani troops were attacked again and U.S. aircraft attacked additional targets associated with Aided. U.S. attacks continued on June 14th and 15th.

On June 17th, Admiral Jonathan Howe, the UN Secretary General's personal representative for Somalia, ordered the arrest and detention of Aided and offered a \$25,000 reward for information leading to his arrest. In his July 1, 1993 report to the UN Security Council, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali stated with respect to Admiral Howe's order that:

"General Aidid's militia continues to attack United Nations personnel with sniping, premeditated confrontations violating international humanitarian law, and provocative rhetoric. Moreover there is increasing evidence that General Aidid deliberately and personally directed the use of women and children for attacks on UNOSOM II soldiers; and that he directed his militia to shoot into the crowd on June 13 in order to create casualties and embarrass the Pakistani forces and UNOSOM II before the assembled world press. For these reasons, he is considered by UNOSOM II to be a menace to public safety. Therefore, his detention will ensure safety, including that of the Somali people. Others will be arrested if evidence is developed implicating them in the same or similar crimes or in related illegal activities

subsequent to the June 5 attacks."

The actual UN investigation, which was conducted by an independent expert, Professor Tom Farer of the American University, Washington D.C., was submitted on August 12, 1993. Professor Farer concluded that "(t)he claim that General Mohammed Farah Hassan Aidid authorized the 5 June attack on Pakistani forces serving under the United Nations flag and that the attack was executed by elements known as SNA is supported by clear and convincing evidence."

Admiral Howe, United Nations - Nobody knows why Aideed saw it in his interest to attack the UN. Did it start at Abbis Ababa? He has been antagonistic all along. Towards the end of UNITAF, Aideed's radio put out bad information about the U.S., and called the UN good. By mid-May, his propaganda had turned against the UN. For example, he said that "Governor" Howe would turn Somalia into a UN trusteeship. We had to say what it was - Aideed was a menace to society. The \$25,000 reward was cleared by New York. I said then and subsequently that Aideed would not be the focus.

LTCEN Bix - With respect to Howe's reward for Aideed's capture, all of the decisions were coordinated with me. My only problem with the reward related to the amount. (LTC Bix believed the amount of the reward should have been much greater.) It was important to arrest Aideed.

MGEN Montgomery - I agreed with the mission to get Aideed. He was the Somali National Army's (SNA) center of gravity. There are not a lot of strong contenders around him. It is hard to see how the SNA could be effective without him. If you're fighting the SNA, go after Aideed. I was not surprised when a reward was put on Aideed's head. I would have put a \$1 million price on his head. The Somalis in power are in it for greed and riches.

GEN. Hoar - The UN decision to go after Aideed was a dumb thing to do.

DoD Answer to a comprehensive series of questions submitted by the Senate Armed Services Committee - "With regard to UNSCR 837, an interagency meeting in which both the Joint Staff and OSD participated was held on June 5, in the wake of the attack on the Pakistani peacekeepers. At that meeting it was agreed that USUN would work towards a strong diplomatic response from both the U.S. government and the UN. UNSCR 837 was drafted at UN headquarters in New York on Sunday, June 6, and voted on that day."

Congressional action: On June 23, 1993, the Senate approved a \$1.2 billion supplemental appropriation for DoD, of which \$750

million was for Somalia. During a floor statement on the bill on June 17, 1993, Senator Byrd, one of the few members of Congress to comment on the floor on Somalia, after noting press reports that the United States was sending a Marine Expeditionary Unit to the area stated that "I would caution the administration to beware of enhancing U.S. participation in a mission which seems to be beyond that which was originally agreed to by this body." Senator Byrd also stated "the contribution of the United States to the UN-led operation in Somalia needs to be kept at a level which does not put the United States back into the position of shouldering a disproportionately large part of the costs and risks. Doubling U.S. forces over the weekend will add to both, and should be considered very carefully."

V. Decision to deploy U.S. Special Operations Forces

The day after the ambush of the Pakistani troops, Admiral Howe, Secretary General Boutros Ghali's personal representative for Somalia, commenced a persistent effort to obtain the deployment of U.S. special operations forces to attempt to seize Aided. At that time and for sometime thereafter, Aided was seen often in public. The civilian and military leadership of the Department of Defense resisted the effort to use U.S. special operations forces for this purpose. However, under continually increasing pressure from both the United Nations in New York and U.S. Administration officials, as well as from Major General Montgomery, who was both the Commander of U.S. Forces in Somalia and the Deputy United Nations Commander, the leadership in the Pentagon reluctantly yielded and recommended the deployment.

ADM Howe - On June 6th, the day after the Pakistani massacre, I submitted a list of things that were needed to the Secretary General. It included special forces, tanks for the Pakistanis, and more APCs. Montgomery and Bir agreed. That was the start of a long campaign to get what was needed. We ultimately got everything. Special forces were central.

MG Montgomery - I supported getting special forces for this operation; it didn't have to be our special operations forces, it could have been the British SAS.

GEN Hoar - Admiral Howe pushed hard for it in mid-June (June 17th) when the Malaysians and the Italians blocked an area and the Pakistanis went in on the ground. Aided and his henchmen broke through the Malaysians. The lesson I learned from that operation was that you need to be careful and state clearly that you are trying to disarm and not trying to get a particular person or faction. The U.S. role in that operation was helicopter gunship support.

I knew the mission to get Aided was heating up. On June 30th, when I was in D.C., I told the policy guys that it was a bad thing to do. I thought there was a 50% chance of getting the required intelligence, and, once gotten, only a 50% chance that we would get Aided. So it was a 25% chance of success and it would be high risk.

General Powell agreed with me and felt even more strongly than I did. I felt it was OK to get Aided as an incidental result of an operation with the forces on hand, but Montgomery felt that the QRF was not properly trained for such a mission.

In early July, I felt that we had killed the idea. There was continuing interest on the part of some people, but they were not carrying the day. But things heated up again and when I was in D.C. on August 9 to 11, I made the same points to the policy people.

On August 17th, the Chief of Station came back and said there was an ability to get actionable intelligence. What was needed, in his view, was a SWAT team to snatch Aided.

On August 18th, Ambassador Shinn's report was submitted. Shinn carried Howe's request that U.S. special operations forces were needed. During that week, I told Powell it was a bad idea. As long as everyone understands this is a high risk mission and there is a good chance it will not come off, I viewed it as a policy decision. Powell's dilemma was that with Boutros-Ghali, Montgomery, and Howe pressuring us to do it, how does he resist. The normal way I did business with General Powell was by telephone. We talked virtually every day. To the best of my knowledge, I got the call from Powell on August 21st that it was a go.

The policy group made the decision. I'm not sure how the decision was made. My conversations were with Aspin, Wisner, and the NSC. Powell told me that the people involved in the decision were Lake, Wisner, and Aspin. I believe that Powell was even more skeptical about the mission than I was.

It was a bad decision. We put the prestige of the U.S. and President Clinton on the line to take on a high risk operation. There is a whole new universe of unintended consequences. The policy of going after Aided was a flawed policy.

LTG Sheehan - (in response to a question for the record submitted by Senator Kempthorne after the testimony of LTG Sheehan and RADM Cramer on October 7, 1993 before the Senate Armed Services Committee) - "Throughout the summer of 1993,

many in the Department of Defense, including the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and USCINCCENT resisted deploying additional U.S. forces to apprehend and detain Aided. However, UNOSOM was unable to vigorously reenergize the political and humanitarian programs and efforts to de-emphasize the military confrontation became increasingly difficult as Aided increased his attacks on UNOSOM personnel and facilities."

Under Secretary Wisner - The Defense Department held out for some time against deploying U.S. special operations forces to arrest Aided. Finally in August, when 4 Americans were killed by a command detonated mine, we realized that unless Aided was neutralized, there would be more American deaths. Faced with a field recommendation that we deploy U.S. special operations forces and with the potential for additional American casualties, General Powell, Secretary Aspin and I concluded that we should deploy the forces as the least objectionable of a series of options. I thought General Hoar was in favor of the deployment or, at least, had acquiesced in it. I came to the conclusion in August that we needed a new direction in policy; that we needed to engage Aided politically. "The single most serious flaw in our policy was that we tried to accomplish political objectives solely by military means." Bob Oakley reached the same conclusion independently.

DoD Answer to a comprehensive series of questions submitted by the Senate Armed Services Committee - "The matter of how to deal with Aided and whether to use U.S. forces to capture him was the subject of extensive discussions both within DoD and in various interagency forums, especially after the June 5 attack. Interagency participants were almost certainly aware of a general reluctance on the part of the Department of Defense to use special operations forces to undertake this mission, but it is not known whether they were aware of the personal support or opposition of the combatant commander. It was generally known that MG Montgomery supported deployment of special operations forces for this purpose." "The final decision was made by the Secretary of Defense, upon the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Hoar, and other senior policy advisors."

GEN. Powell - We sent Task Force Ranger in with the greatest reluctance. We received a steady drum beat from Howe and Ambassador Gosande (who incidentally was a USIA, not State Department, officer), pushing us to perform the mission to get Aided. After the Shinn briefing, a push by my J-5 (McCaffrey - who had a rep on the Shinn team), and a push by SOCOM who wanted to do the job, Hoar and I talked. Hoar viewed it as a high risk, less than 50-50 chance of success

(I viewed it as even less than 50%). The agency said we have all these agents whom we can use to locate Aided. My view was that these agents, who were being paid for information, would not finger Aided because once they did and we snatched him, they would be out of a job. I also wanted the agency to demonstrate what their agents could do, but they said we can't endanger them for a test and will only use them if the Task Force is deployed. In the third week of August, I talked to Hoar and said, since Garrison, Montgomery, the UN and Shinn all are pushing us to do this, I will go along since as a general principle I believe in supporting the commander in the field.

Secretary Aspin: The split in opinion on this issue was between the people in Somalia and those of us in Washington. Admiral Howe made his original request on June 6th, the day after the ambush of the Pakistani troops. There were many discussions in Washington about the request. We were reluctant to support the effort to arrest Aided for two reasons. First, it would raise the visibility of Aided and make him a hero in Somalia. Second, there was the difficulty in acquiring intelligence to determine Aided's location. So we were reluctant to send in special operations forces.

The interagency group led by Ambassador Shinn returned to Washington in August. Meanwhile, we were being influenced by attacks on U.S. forces by command detonated mines. I was on vacation in Wisconsin and received a call from General Powell on Sunday, August 21st. He said that he had had a long discussion with General Hoar and thought that we ought to deploy special operations forces for this mission. I said OK. I thought that General Hoar had changed his mind. General Powell and I certainly did.

Congressional action: In a Senate floor speech on July 13, 1993, Senator Byrd talked about Somalia stating in part that:

"The time has come to remove United States forces from Somalia whether or not they are part of the UN operation. I know some people may not like what I am saying, but I do not see anywhere in our U.S. Constitution that this Senate is bound to go along with a UN operation that appears to be getting us deeper and deeper into a war in which we have no business. Getting food to starving people is one thing. But this is something else."

"The United States has been in Somalia for over 6 months. The duration of our stay was expected to be a short time at the beginning. Now, 7 months down the pike, we are introducing new combat forces and conducting gunship attacks on warlords' camps. We are going to lose some men."

"And the United Nations is talking about national reconciliation. What does that mean. Has the Senate bought onto that?"

"Further U.S. action and participation in the newly expanded mission should either be specifically endorsed by the Congress, or we should pack up and go home. My vote is for the latter."

On July 13, 14, and 16, 1993, however, Senators Kassebaum, Levin, Pell, and Simon spoke on behalf of the UN operation in Somalia and supported continued U.S. participation in the operation.

VI. Joint Task Force Ranger Force Packages

Three optional force packages for the composition of Joint Task Force Ranger were submitted up the chain of command. Each of these optional force packages included AC-130 gunships. The task force conducted training exercises several times in the United States prior to deployment and each time did so with the support of the gunships. None of the force packages included tanks or Bradley fighting vehicles.

GEN Hoar - The AC-130s were dropped in view of the number of capabilities available to the task force. That was my recommendation up the line. My position was to give them what they needed and no more. If we weren't careful, we would have had 1,000 troops over there. I was aware of the AC-130s psychological impact. I was concerned with collateral damage. We were hit in June and July (AC-130 strikes and arms sweeps) with allegations of causing collateral damage (some were true, some were false). Aided always exaggerated. This weapon system was never designed to fire into civilian populated areas. Its use against storage sites was Ok since the sites were walled off from the population. It had tremendous psychological impact.

In talking to Generals Powell and Downing, I was trying to give the Ranger task force the kind of capability it needed to do the job, while not deploying more people than they needed. There was a three way discussion among Downing, Powell and me about the deployment of little birds, troop carriers, etc. I felt and Downing agreed (he certainly told me he did) that we didn't need AC-130s or an extra platoon (for local security - a job I definitely would not allow them to do). Local security was outside our mission and was in the areas under allied responsibility. We talked in terms of 400 troops. 460 troops deployed, which was the subject of a long discussion. If you say the number is 400, why deploy 460. They said we forgot to add

this or that. My position was to give them what they needed and no more. If we weren't careful, we would have had 1,000 troops over there.

We had a continuing problem that grew over time, to use the QRF for force protection. I didn't believe that the coalition forces would do the job to meet our force protection requirements. So we used the QRF to do some sweeps and escort for convoys; work that we hadn't anticipated at first.

Over the summer, it became apparent that the allies couldn't be depended upon. As a result, over time we lost control of Mogadishu. Things certainly went down hill when the Pakistanis were ambushed. In September, Admiral Howe requested more U.S. troops. I said no! We lost control of Mogadishu absolutely in May.

GEN Downing - The AC-130s were part of every package we looked at. They would have had a great psychological impact - but they would have required another 250-300 people, although they would have been outside Somalia. We were under incredible pressure from JCS to keep the numbers down. I don't know of any good reason for that.

We talked about the force package. I advised that I would like to have the AC-130s. General Powell advised that we needed to keep the numbers down. The AC-130s would not have prevented October 3-4, but they would have been useful once the battle started. I said that I thought the AC-130s should be included and I so recommended since they were an integral part of the package. But I also advised that the force could do the mission without them. I had the option to say don't send the force without the AC-130s, but it was then and is now my professional judgment that they would have been useful but we could do the job without the AC-130 gunships as long as the helo gunships went with the force. I decided not to fall on my bayonet. I believe my voice was the most influential with respect to the force package. The force deployed with 450 people. We were told the force limit is 400 people and we had to get rid of 50 people. We finally got them to agree to 450 people. As a result we had to take numbers of people, not whole units. We had to break up units.

The numbers were driven by the aircraft load. We were to be deployed with 5 C-141s and 2 C-5s. There is some logic to that. We drove the Joint Staff nuts, seeking some middle ground. If the AC-130s were there, we absolutely would have used them.

My sense was that OSD and the NSC staff were fairly supportive and understanding. The problem was differences within the Joint Staff.

General Garrison wanted to get out and do active patrolling and do more for force protection. The JCS found out and went ballistic. They said that we were not there to do

that, do not send out patrols. That is the mission of UNOSOM and the ORF. Let me defend the Joint Staff. General Montgomery would say they had the situation in hand - the Egyptians had the force protection mission for the air field. It requires getting out there and patrolling. The Joint Staff was concerned that the Task Force would get away from its mission. Garrison wanted the Rangers to conduct ambushes and to patrol adjacent to the airfield. I agree that convoy escort is a force protection mission and the Task Force had to do that. Hoar and I talked about it. This provoked a firestorm - it was not a minor issue. It was not a negotiable issue. Powell was concerned about mission creep. People were very emotional during this time.

MG Garrison - I don't know why the AC-130s were disapproved. But I thought the mission was doable without them. It is highly debatable that the AC-130s would have made a difference. The following factors are relevant:

- (1) The Somalis were only petrified of one machine (the AC-130) so psychologically it would have been beneficial.
- (2) Its capability to see a lot of things would have been duplicative of other platforms. We would have had sensory overload.
- (3) As for its shooting capabilities, i.e. pouring lead on the target, I don't know how much more lead could have been applied. On October 3-4, we could have used the AC-130s to have pulverized the Olympic hotel, but don't know how much of an impact it would have had, except psychologically. I did not have an appreciation for the AC-130's psychological impact prior to deployment.

The AC-130s could have shot up obstacles placed on the streets of Mogadishu, but it could have created larger obstacles in the process. I did not submit a request for the AC-130s once we were over there - I don't believe I ever considered it.

I did not see the AC-130s as being essential to our mission, even in retrospect and even after seeing the psychological impact of the AC-130. If we had the AC-130s, we would have had an airspace problem with the little birds. If we had it, I am not sure the AC-130s would have gotten a shot off.

Brigadier General Giles, Asst Div Cdr, 10th Mtn Div: - The air threat had the Somalis petrified. AC-130s would have made a major contribution.

COL Boykin (Cdr, Special Operations Forces): - The single biggest void was the absence of AC-130s. They would have

made a big difference. They would have provided fire support, eyes, and psychological impact. They could have told us of any massing of forces. They could have levelled the Olympic hotel and could have broken the back of the SNA.

LTC McKnight, Cdr. 3d Bn. 75th Rangers - The AC-130's were critical, although they did not deploy. We had trained and rehearsed with them. In addition to their fire support capabilities, they can also "glint" (illuminate an area with an Infra-red searchlight). They would have been useful to get the QRF through roadblocks.

LTC David, Cdr. 2d Bn. 14th Inf (Cdr. U.S. Response Force) - AC-130s would have been very helpful. They had been withdrawn before the 10th Mountain Division arrived on August 1st.

Under Secretary Wisner stated that as a general matter, we did not want to have a large profile in Somalia and did not want to take on an increasing share of UNOSOM II's mission. We wanted Task Force Ranger to have as "sparing a number as possible." MGEN Garrison said that he had sufficient resources to perform the mission and at no time stated that the number of personnel or the type of equipment prevented them from carrying out their mission. As for the AC-130s, I was aware of and supported the Joint Staff's recommendation that AC-130s not be included in the force package because they were unnecessary and inappropriate for the mission, especially considering the extensive collateral damage they could be expected to cause in an urban environment. I still believe that they were inappropriate for the mission due to the risk of collateral damage. Additionally, I relied on the field commander's view that he had enough capability in hand to do the mission. I do not recall anyone ever raising the issue of the AC-130s' psychological impact. I do not believe the deployment of AC-130s after October 3rd was inconsistent with the earlier decision as we needed them after October 3rd to protect the force and to deter further attacks on U.S. troops. It is quite different to deploy the AC-130s to participate in an operational mission to arrest Aided than it is to deploy them to protect the force.

General Egnell: Admiral Howe never wanted to give up the AC-130s that we sent in in early June. They wrecked a few buildings and it wasn't the greatest imagery on CNN. I do not have any recollection of the AC-130s being a part of the Ranger Task Force package. If Under Secretary Wisner recalls reviewing it, I must have done so too. I do recall that we sent additional Cobras to augment the QRF, despite opposition from the policy shop. I can only speculate that it was a question of how much do you need.

Secretary Aspin: I was never aware that AC-130 gunships were ever in a Ranger Task Force package. They must have been pulled out before the request came to me.

LTG Sheehan: Director of Operations (J-3), Joint Staff, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on October 4, 1994 regarding the deployment of additional U.S. forces in the wake of the October 3-4 Ranger Task Force raid stated that "we are going to send two AC-130 night gunships because, frankly, to provide the type of firepower that is necessary when this thing occurs, had it been available, I don't think we would have taken the number of casualties in that kind of environment up at crash site number one."

VII. REQUEST FOR ARMOR

General Montgomery's request:

The request was submitted on September 14th and was occasioned by Montgomery's increasing concern "with timid behavior of the coalition with which our security rests."

It called for tanks "with blade devices for road blocks" and was characterized by General Montgomery as necessary to "provide a critical road block clearing capability." He also stated that "I believe that U.S. forces are at risk without it."

General Hoar's endorsement:

It was submitted on September 22nd and noted that the "capability to break through road blocks is not available in the coalition today."

General Hoar also noted the downside of enhancing Aideed's position; domestic political baggage of another plus-up in U.S. strength in Somalia; and the potential for increased collateral damage.

Hoar concluded, however, by stating "on the other hand, we need to give our soldiers every measure of protection feasible."

MGEN Montgomery essentially stated that I needed and didn't have armor and APCs since we have been here. It is needed for city fighting to get in and get out. The request for armor had no relationship to the special operations forces. I wanted to use armor to back-up the QRF if needed. I would have used it on Oct 3-4 for the rescue. If we had it, we would have gotten there faster. We would have taken fewer

casualties. I made a proposal for a mechanized tank force on August 22nd. The first command detonated mine incident occurred on August 8th. I became increasingly concerned about protection of Sword and Hunter bases. The QRF went by foot or 5-ton trucks.

It wasn't a formal request in August. On September 9th, General Hoar visited and we discussed it. We discussed the business of the political environment of downsizing the U.S. presence and he told me that the request would not be supported and I needed to design a minimum (smaller) force. I submitted that request by "personal for" message.

MORR Garrison essentially stated that I was aware of General Montgomery's request for armor but did not participate in it. I never considered it useful to integrate armor into a raid. My overriding concern was speed, surprise, and violence of action. I had what I needed to conduct the operation. As for using 5-tons (trucks) with sand bags for the October 3-4 raid, if Bradleys were available, of course they would have been better and I hope to hell I would have used them for the Ranger Ground Reaction force. But I did not consider them essential to the operation. You have to remember, I had sixteen killed in action that day. Eight were lost in helicopter crashes. Of the remaining eight, I don't know how many others would have been killed. I just don't know. I don't know what difference armor would have made in terms of casualties. If I had tanks, I don't know if I would have used them. I never thought of a contingency plan for backups of equipment like tanks and APCs.

Col Boykin essentially stated that tanks and armor would have been great. Their absence was clearly a bad mistake, but less of a factor than the absence of the AC-130s. If tanks and armor had been there, unless they were assigned to us and trained with our Rangers, their use would have required additional training. We needed tanks and armor that night - but in order to have saved a life, they would have to have been integrated into our force. We would have sent tanks and armor in as part of the Ranger Ground Reaction force.

Gen. Hoar essentially stated that General Montgomery and I talked about it. My concern was to do what was required - our mission was already creeping - I did not favor bringing armor to clear the city. In September, when a U.S. engineer company got in trouble, Montgomery said we need armor to push through roadblocks. I said give me a piece of paper, there is no stomach in D.C. for new forces, but I think I can get something. The prevailing mood in OSD was that we were trying to get the size of U.S. troops under control and to get the UN to do what they were supposed to do. It was clear that we did not want the mission of purging Mogadishu.

DoD Answer to comprehensive series of questions submitted by the Senate Armed Services Committee - "The request was first brought to the attention of Secretary Aspin by General Powell on September 23 and was the subject of later discussions between the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He made the Secretary of Defense aware that General Hoar had deleted the request for artillery. In accordance with Goldwater-Nichols, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the request be approved after receiving recommendations on both sides of the issue from appropriate members of the Joint Staff. As mentioned, General Powell also discussed the issue with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, especially General Sullivan, the Chief of Staff of the Army, who concurred."

"After consulting with General Powell, Secretary Aspin elected not to approve the request at that time. At the time, U.S. policy in Somalia was to reduce its military presence and its role in UNOSOM, not increase it. This particular request was characterized as providing additional troops and equipment primarily for force protection tasks such as escorting logistics traffic, relief convoys, and conducting road-block clearing."

"The presence of a 'pure' U.S. response force consisting of armor and mechanized infantry might have arrived to assist the Ranger Task Force in less time (U.S. units might have been more readily available and less planning time might have been needed than that which was necessary for coalition operations). However, much of the delay in getting the armor to the crash site was due to a command decision to have it first assemble at the new port area in order to complete planning and coordination so that it could be most effectively deployed in a careful and deliberate assault."

"Even if they had arrived earlier at the target, the tanks and armored vehicles would not have significantly affected the operation or reduced the number of casualties, since the vast majority of Ranger Task Force casualties occurred within the first half hour after the first helicopter was shot down."

"It is also not reasonable to assume that fewer U.S. casualties would have resulted if US armor and mechanized infantry were available. Since U.S. forces would have been responsible for all aspects of the operation, more U.S. casualties might have resulted."

GEN Powell essentially stated that Secretary Aspin did not want to increase our presence in Somalia, he was sensitive to Congressional pressure to get us out as soon as possible. In my talks with General Hoar, I kept asking for the justification. I didn't want MIA tanks to blast buildings in Mogadishu. General Montgomery felt strongly. The situation was becoming more tense in Mogadishu. Despite my

reservations, I took the request to Aspin and recommended we support the commander in the field. I gave it to Aspin and told him of Howe's support about September 20th and said for him to just reflect on it for a day or two. Two days later, I asked him about it and he told me he had given it to Under Secretary Wisner and company. I was upset since I thought the matter was just between he and I. The policy shop was a mess with all those assistant secretaries overlapping each other. Nothing happened. That Saturday at the White House, I raised the whole issue of reinforcing our forces or changing our policy. In my last week as Chairman, I went to Aspin and said we needed a decision. He said, this isn't going to happen. Aspin was looking at the broader implications of this decision and wasn't willing to approve it just because the commander wanted it. I took Aspin's decision as being not now rather than never. I don't know if armor would have made a difference on October 3rd. If the Bradley's had been there, they could have been part of the Ranger Ground Reaction force. There were plenty of APCs in Mogadishu - we had sent them in for the Malaysians. Neither the QRF nor the 3rd country forces would have been involved in the raid. The commander should have expected the swarming of Somalis if the raid took more than 20 minutes and he did.

Under Secretary Wisner essentially stated that he viewed the requested armor as the means for the QRF to break through the main supply routes that Aided's militia had blocked, which was the mission of UNOSOM II, not the mission of the QRF. He also was concerned about the use of tanks in an urban environment. In his view there was no need to increase the violence nor to increase the aggressiveness of the U.S. Quick Reaction Force. This request must also be viewed in the context of the attempt to shift the UN's focus to a greater degree of political engagement. There also was Congressional opposition at the time to increasing our military involvement in Somalia. It was in this context that he supported Secretary Aspin's decision to defer the request for armor.

Secretary Aspin - General Montgomery's armor request came to me in September - on the 23rd I believe. General Powell came to me and presented the request which he endorsed. I felt at the time, remember we were under pressure from Congress to get our forces out of Somalia, that the appearance of U.S. tanks in Mogadishu would be contradictory to our policy. The request was described to me as needed to protect convoys and knock down roadblocks. The Ranger raids were not mentioned to me in connection with the request for armor. General Powell thought that we should grant the request. I did not decide the issue that day, but I eventually told him that we couldn't do it. I didn't

consult with anyone outside the Pentagon. I don't recall General Powell telling me that there was any disagreement within the Joint Staff. General Hoar, in his forwarding endorsement recommending approval, listed both downsides and benefits for granting the request.

LTC Larry Joyce, USA (ret) (father of Sgt James Casey Joyce, killed in Somalia, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 12, 1994.): "Why were they denied armor, these forces?... and I am glad to hear General Garrison and General Montgomery's testimony that it was not just the Reaction Force that could have used the armor, but in fact the extraction force that was supposed to take the 22 people who were captured back. Had there been armor, had there been Bradleys there, I contend that my son would probably be alive today, because he, like the other casualties that were sustained in the early stages of the battle, were killed enroute from the target to the downed helicopter site, the first helicopter site. I believe that this was an inadequate force structure from the very beginning."

Congressional action: On September 8, 1993, Senator Byrd introduced an amendment to the Department of Defense Authorization bill for Fiscal Year 1994 that would have cut off funding for the support of operations of U.S. forces in Somalia 30 days after enactment of the Act unless the Congress so authorized. It also would have requested and urged the President to inform the United Nations that the U.S. would neither fund nor participate in UNOSOM II after October 31, 1993 unless the Congress so authorized. That amendment precipitated a Senate debate that resulted in the passage, by a vote of 90 to 7, of a compromise Sense of the Congress amendment to the Fiscal Year 1994 Department of Defense Authorization bill on September 9, 1993 that was sponsored by Senators Byrd, Mitchell, Dole, Nunn, McCain, Levin, Cohen, Warner, Cochran, and Kerry. That amendment, after expressing Congressional policy that the President should consult closely with the Congress regarding United States policy with respect to Somalia, including in particular the deployment of U.S. forces in that country and noting that the mission of U.S. forces in Somalia appears to be evolving from the establishment of a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations to one of internal security and nation building, included a statement of Congressional policy that called for the United States to facilitate the assumption of the functions of U.S. forces by the United Nations; called for the President to submit a report to the Congress by October 15, 1993 concerning a number of items relating to the U.S. forces' deployment to Somalia; and stated the Congress' belief that "the President should by November 15, 1993, seek and receive Congressional

authorization in order for the deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia to continue."

VIII. Conduct of Joint Task Force Ranger Operations:

Joint Task Force Ranger had conducted 6 operations previous to the raid of 3 October -- 3 at night and 3 in daylight. The raid on 3 October began in daylight. After the first raid, which was launched following a Somali mortar attack on the Ranger compound, the Task Force launched operations only on actionable intelligence and had to react to such intelligence whether day or night. Each report was carefully evaluated, corroboration sought; consequently, many missions were not undertaken. They received information 42 times on which they could have acted; 30 of these looked possible; they launched 7 operations. To the extent possible, operations were conducted differently to limit establishing a pattern. Helicopters flew frequent "signature flights" to confuse the Somalis as to when an actual operation was to be launched. No operation was launched for 2 weeks prior to the operation on 3 October.

The Task Force assault force launched at about 3:30 in the afternoon on October 3d. The suspects were apprehended about 30 minutes later and were being loaded on board five-ton trucks, which had been sandbagged to provide additional protection from incoming fire, for return to the airfield. An MH-60 Blackhawk helicopter, that was providing covering fire for the assault force, was shot down at about 4:20. The shootdown of the helicopter dramatically changed the course of the operation. A combat search and rescue (CSAR) helicopter, which was resupplying the forces that had moved to the scene of the downed Blackhawk, was also hit by fire at about 4:48 but was able to return to base. Shortly thereafter, a second MH-60 Blackhawk helicopter was shot down. Attempts by a Ranger Task Force reserve platoon and later by a quick reaction company of the Quick Reaction Force to reach the crash sites were aborted when they encountered significant fire and roadblocks. At about 7:30 the entire Quick Reaction Force, 2 Malaysian Mechanized Companies and a Pakistani Armor Platoon linked up at the New Port area. After mapping out plans and arranging the rescue convoy, the assembled force moved out enroute to the crash sites at about 11:20. The rescue force linked-up with the Ranger Task Force at the first crash site at about 2:00 a.m. on October 4th. The rescue force, after experiencing great difficulty in extracting the body of the pilot from the Blackhawk helicopter, finally began to return to base at 5:30 a.m.

MG Garrison (Commander JSOC) - I launched the first raid because the mortar attacks were the first time that the majority of our troops were ever in combat. I didn't want them to develop a "bunker mentality" and I knew how important it was to get my guys up and operating. So I went

to UNOSOM headquarters and said give me your number one target that Aideed has reportedly been at within the last 24 hours. It was the Lig Ligato house. We launched on that target.

After the first raid, General Hoar gave me specific guidance that I had to have current, actionable intelligence, i.e. I had to know the guy was actually at the target - it had to be verified. That is why we "spun up" (prepared to conduct the operation) more than 40 times but only conducted 7 raids. One time, we had intelligence that Aideed went into a building and wasn't seen coming out. We launched reconnaissance helos but there was nothing to be seen associated with Aideed, i.e. no extra guards. I was fairly confident he was there, but we did not launch because of our guidance.

As for the risks rising with each raid, I was concerned, but I had not arrived at the point where I felt we had to stop. The intelligence wasn't getting any better.

I knew that the closer we got to the Bakara market, the faster we had to get in and get out. The bad guys' reaction time was well known. When the helo was downed, we lost the initiative. Once the assault force reached the crash site, over the next 11 hours, they suffered 3 minor wounds. The little birds were constantly over the site and U.S. personnel were in a defensive position and were not under stress.

I always said that if we ever got into a firefight, we would win the battle but would lose the war.

Col. Boykin - Did our risks go up with each operation? Yes, I personally felt our risks were going up as the enemy was figuring out how to stop us, but we always achieved surprise on the target. It did become a matter of concern over time, but I did not believe that our chances of success were going down. I believe they were increasing because we were destroying Aideed's infrastructure, which should force him into the open.

LTC Matthews (Commander, 1st Bn, 160th SO Aviation) - We lost secrecy as to the force and the mission. The cover story of a Ranger deployment was no cover at all. But although we lost strategic surprise, we had not lost tactical surprise.

The National Command Authorities waited too long to decide on the mission. We could have taken him down in June. We were set up for disaster. We would have gotten him eventually if we stayed. But we might have sustained more casualties.

We planned to do it as we train. We got direction to make

it smaller. We resisted - we wanted to do it as we train.

MG Montgomery - (In response to a question for the record submitted by Senator Levin after the October 7, 1993 testimony of LTG Shashan and RADM Cramer before the Senate Armed Services Committee) - After notice of the execution of the raid and, after ensuring that the U.S. QRF was already posturing to support TF Ranger should they need help (which was standard procedure between USFORSON and TF Ranger), I monitored the raid through a liaison officer in my headquarters on a minute-to-minute basis. When I perceived that the U.S. QRF would be required, I began to ensure further backup would be available. First, a call was made to the UNOSOM QRF (first call for U.N. operations before any U.S. involvement), the Malaysian contingent. Its commander immediately agreed to move his unit to a staging area in the new seaport and was in position by approximately 1830 hrs. Next was a check on the availability of Pakistani tanks should we need them. There were eight in the city, four of which were operational. They were not part of any QRF since such valuable limited assets cannot be left sitting for emergencies only and normally are employed in pairs supporting strong points. The Pakistani commander immediately agreed and moved his tanks to the staging area to join the Malaysians arriving at about the same time. Both elements were available to the QRF commander if needed before the situation was clear with regard to TF Ranger's ability to extract its forces with the U.S. QRF.

GEN Downing - I kept telling General Garrison not to do anything crazy. I told him to wait Aided out, be careful, this is a tough mission, but we can do it, be patient, be careful, eventually you will get a shot at Aided. Going after Aided's lieutenants was designed to keep pressure on Aided, force him out of hiding, make him start taking chances.

I talked directly to Garrison. I was sensitive to not getting between General Hoar and the Task Force Ranger Commander. Hoar is a consummate gentleman. So is Garrison. Garrison would call me and we would talk. Hoar let me see all the message traffic. He didn't have to, but he did. I tried to keep a finger on the pulse. Garrison and I probably talked once or twice a day most days, then we would go 2 or 3 days without talking. We probably talked 5 or 6 times a week.

Hoar and I were not concerned about losing a helo. The folks in DC were - they wanted to avoid press coverage.

GEN Hoar - The risk I always thought of was the risk of failure, i.e. not capturing Aided alive. I thought we would kill him, which would be a failure, because he was a national hero. I never addressed in my own mind the October

3-4 result. I thought that it would turn out we would have a fleeting opportunity to catch Aided on the road, so I was not concerned about U.S. casualties. I assessed the risk to our forces later on. In the wake of Osman Atto raid, the post-mortem concluded that it was a near thing, i.e. it could have been a disaster. We killed 15 Somalis that day. So I talked to General Garrison about going into populated areas. I didn't think in terms of shutting the operation down. I wish now that I had.

The Lig Ligato raid was retaliation by Garrison in response to being mortared. I was a little unhappy with it. I didn't know about it beforehand. My guidance to Garrison was that he had authority to go without my approval before a specific operation. I want to say that in every case, I was in on it. But because there was no predictive intelligence, the intelligence he received had to be responded to quickly. I never disapproved of a raid. I decided that the decision needs to be made on the scene. To interpose myself would have required a faxing of papers, photos, etc. I did require that for QRF sweeps that were carried out in the guise of force protection, but I couldn't do so in the case of Ranger raids that required quick response. I'm not sure that I would do either any differently today.

After we had successfully captured Osman Atto, we discussed the risk of going into heavily populated areas. Garrison would send me a memo, copy to Downing, after a conversation that involved any substance. It was his record of what guidance he believed had been given to him. On this particular day, I told him that (1) he needed to be careful in populated areas, and (2) in certain circumstances not to go near the Bakara market. We talked about what went badly when they picked up the fellow whom they mistakenly thought was Aided (former police chief). I sent these memos to General Powell.

We had phased options; phase I - get settled; phase II - get Aided; phase III - get his tier II lieutenants. These phases were agreed to before the deployment. Garrison told me that he thought if we could get intelligence on Aided's lieutenants, we should go after them. I said that makes sense to me as long as you remember that Aided is still the first goal. And we might get Aided at a meeting with his lieutenants. I went to Powell and told him what I told Garrison and he agreed. In due course, I got back to Garrison and told him OK.

I also talked to Garrison on weekends. On October 3rd, I had just called him when he said it looks like we just got good intelligence. We talked only in the most general sense because the intelligence data was just beginning to come in. We had the best guys in the world to do the mission and the most knowledgeable guy to command the force. They were the right guys, but it was a high risk operation. I made seven trips to Somalia and had secure voice communications with

both Montgomery and Garrison. I did not feel that I had to put restraints on Garrison regarding any raid. He shared my view regarding not going into populated areas. The October 3 raid was a high risk operation. I had and still have absolute confidence in Garrison. Downing felt the same way. Garrison thought he was going to get Aidaed. I did not abdicate my responsibilities to Garrison. We talked every day; he knew my thoughts and had my guidance; and he was on the scene.

It was Garrison's decision to launch on October 3rd. I didn't want to interfere when I talked to him that day. I don't think surprise and concern was in my mind as we talked that day. I don't think I thought at the time that it was not somewhere he should have gone.

How many times can you go back to the wall? We had no illusions about that part of the city. Almost everyone was under arms. Resupply was going on all the time, from Ethiopia, Sudan, and the North. There were reinforcements from Galcaio. We did not have good intelligence about that part of the city. We didn't have any presence there or good human intelligence.

DoD Answer to comprehensive series of questions submitted by the Senate Armed Services Committee - "Based upon the previous successful completion of six similar missions, the operational commanders were confident that the operation could be completed successfully and any risk was considered to be manageable."

General Powell: The first raid was an embarrassment and I had to unscrew myself from the ceiling. I laid down the rule that they had to have actionable intelligence. They didn't do too badly. They got Atto. Aidaed saw how they worked. I kept talking to Generals Hoar, Downing, and Garrison. Helicopter operations always make me nervous. I believe that you have to do this type of operation at night and get out in 20 minutes. The first helicopter that we lost was not from the Task Force. If you want a perfect operation, then never go to war. You never have a 99% success rate for that kind of operation. I was not aware of what was going on on October 3rd. It was bad luck. The overall policy for Somalia should have been reviewed long before October 3rd. I was not involved in any way with the vote in the UN on the Security Council's June 6, 1993 resolution to arrest the perpetrators of the June 5th ambush of the Pakistanis.

Secretary Aspin: We were worried about the repetition of Ranger raids. It looked to us like each raid was a cookie cutter of every other raid. General Hoar assured us that each raid was different and that they were using feints (signature flights) on a daily basis. But we were worried.

General Powell was very upset with the first Ranger raid. He was angry that they had done it without good intelligence and had shown how they would operate.

IX. Intelligence Support

Intelligence resources in country and the assets that came with Task Force Ranger appear to have been effectively integrated, and the perception of those providing the intelligence was that it was more than adequate. At the user level, however, the intelligence was limited, specifically in the area of human intelligence (HUMINT). The users' views are mixed.

COL Peak (Deputy J-2, CENTCOM) - There were no intelligence failures and no intelligence surprises.

Col Boykin - Intelligence support was very poor. There was no U.S. or third country HUMINT. The Somalis who provided information were very untrustworthy. We don't have a good HUMINT program, certainly not for crisis or unanticipated situations.

MG Montgomery - the surprise was the intensity and the number of RPGs.

MG Garrison - I was totally satisfied with the intelligence effort - never saw anything better from the intelligence community or architecture. It was totally fused - we got everything we asked for. It was a superb intelligence effort and architecture. As for the results, HUMINT was extremely difficult. The results were sketchy at best.

Gen Downing, Commander in Chief, SOCOM - Technically, intelligence support was outstanding. The long pole was HUMINT. On October 3, it worked well.

Gen. Hear - You have real problems with HUMINT. - The people who provided information lacked credibility. I am not in a position to be critical of the HUMINT effort. I felt the possibility of getting predictive intelligence regarding Aideed was poor; it was. But we did everything favorable to produce the intelligence.

X. Changes in Policy Issues

In general, policies pursued in Somalia by the United Nations and the United States appear to have been characterized by a lack of clarity and inconsistency. When the U.S. had over 25,000 well-equipped and trained

troops in Somalia, policies and military strategy were primarily focused on maintaining open lines of communications to facilitate the principal objective of feeding the starving Somalis. Following the completion of UNITAF and the commencement of UNOSOM II when the U.N. took over responsibility for the operation, the U.N. policy was changed to include disarming the warring factions throughout all of Somalia. UNOSOM II forces were incapable and, in some cases, unwilling to perform the missions required to implement the military operations inherent in the new policy.

During UNOSOM II, U.S. troop strength had been reduced to about 4,000 (of which only about 2,000 were combat troops). U.S. forces, which were intended to be used only as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF), became involved in force protection operations, attempts to capture Aided, and disarming Somalis, because the UNOSOM II forces were increasingly reluctant to leave their enclaves. This was particularly true after the June 5th ambush of Pakistani forces where 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed.

U.S. commanders were coping with a dual policy which required that U.S. forces be kept small while at the same time conducting military operations to ensure that the U.N. would not appear to fail. This policy stretched the capabilities of U.S. forces and put stress on the limited number of U.S. combat troops.

Following the Task Force Ranger raid and battle of October 3-4, when U.S. commanders in Somalia believed that the casualties inflicted on Aided's forces (estimated upwards of 1,000) had significantly weakened him, the U.N. declared a ceasefire. Within weeks, Aided himself, was a passenger on a U.S. military plane which carried him to engage in negotiations in Addis Abba, Ethiopia.

While the U.S. significantly reinforced its forces in Somalia with armored forces following the battle of October 3-4, U.S. forces essentially followed thereafter a passive, "hunkered-down" policy, remaining primarily within their compounds.

In the August-September time frame, there were differences of views, both within the Administration and between the United States and the United Nations, as to whether there should be increased diplomatic effort or more aggressive military action. In fact, the administration began to follow a two-tracked approach--employing both diplomatic activity as well as military action. It does not appear, in retrospect, that the diplomatic activity and the military efforts were well-coordinated within the Administration nor between the U.S. and the U.N.

Major General Frazer Deputy Cdr. CENTCOM: - We had two inconsistent policies - support the U.N. and don't let it fail in Somalia; and get U.S. forces out of Somalia as soon as possible.

General Montgomery: The mission changed from humanitarian relief as a result of the switch to UNOSOM II in May resulting from the broad UN security council mandate. The

mission also changed after the June 5th massacre of the Paks. It changed to a hunt for Aideed. My broad mission hadn't changed.

October 3d was a bad day for Aideed. He sustained lots of casualties. I think that the U.S. gave Aideed a victory he didn't win.

General Garrison: As for the consideration of a change in U.S. policy prior to October 3rd, I had read everything that related to our policy. Ambassador Gosende was saying things like "I don't agree with this, and I think ..." His bottom line was that there should be a greater military effort. He wanted more security, more troops. I knew the policy was being debated, but I didn't know how the debate would come out. I also knew that General Hoar had written a letter.

LTC Sheehan: (Responding to a question for the record submitted by Senator Kampthorne after testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Somalia on October 7, 1993) - "As I stated in my testimony, the mission assigned to U.S. forces remained the same. It was the execution of the mission by the QRF that changed. Often the United States was the only country capable of undertaking a task within a reasonable timeframe. Our choice was to allow the mission to fail or to take on the job. We attempted to be as judicious as possible within our commitment to making UNOSOM II a success."

General Powell: We had a hard time getting clear guidance from the inter-agency process. We got messages from Ambassador Gosende, but nothing from State. There were many meetings, but no results. It took too long to get a policy review accomplished. In my last few weeks as Chairman, I pushed for it. I aggressively pushed Secretary Aspin for such a review and on Saturday, September 25th when we had a meeting at the White House on Bosnia, I said at the end of the meeting that we need to do something about Somalia - either reinforce our forces or change our policy. In my final meeting with President Clinton, I urged him to make sure a review was conducted. I didn't know about the policy paper that Secretary Christopher was taking to the UN.

Under Secretary Wisner: essentially stated that he had come to the conclusion in early September that the United States needed a new policy direction and had to shift our focus towards a greater degree of political engagement. The single flaw in our policy was that we tried to accomplish a political objective by military means. We needed to maintain an appropriate level of pressure on Aideed to induce him to cooperate. In September, we were pushing the UN to give priority to the political track.

Secretary Aspin: At the same time that we were deploying the Ranger Task Force, we were also pursuing a two-track approach. We had determined in Washington that there was too much emphasis, almost exclusively, on the military force track and not enough on the political track.

In my speech to the CSIS on August 27, 1993, I commented on this issue. I sent a copy of my speech to all Senators by letter dated September 3, 1993 in which I stated that "Our purpose now is to help restore to all of Somalia, including south Mogadishu, a foundation of stability and security upon which Somali's themselves -- with the help of the UN -- can turn to the tough work of political reconciliation and economic reconstruction." The speech included the following:

"The President's decision to deploy an additional 400 troops to Somalia has focussed renewed attention on the security aspect -- indeed on the U.S. military aspect -- of what is happening there. That focus is much too narrow. There is much more to what is happening in Somalia than the story of military conflict in Mogadishu. And if there is to be a solution to Somalia's problems, it must be more than a military solution."

"In South Mogadishu, the Aideed stronghold, we have a major challenge to the whole UN enterprise. I believe the current crisis there was initiated because Aideed's power base was being eroded politically and militarily by UNOSOM. It may be small comfort today, but our present difficulty is the result of previous success. The danger now is that unless we return security to south Mogadishu, political chaos will follow the UN withdrawal. Other warlords will follow Aideed's example. Fighting between the warlords will ensue, which is what brought the famine to massive proportions in the first place. The danger is that the situation will return to what existed before the United States sent in the troops."

"On economics and the political reconstitution of the country, some progress has been made but more work needs to be done."

"(W)e should continue removing heavy weapons from the militias and begin planning for implementation -- in conjunction with Somali police -- of a consistent weapons control policy. Such a policy will give those who cooperate some confidence that their enemies cannot rearm. The policy could begin in areas of the country where some disarmament success has been achieved."

"For U.S. combat troops, I think there are three items on

the checklist. First, the security issue in south Mogadishu must be settled. Second, we must make real progress toward taking the heavy weapons out of the hands of the warlords. Third, there must be credible police forces in major population centers. When these three conditions are met, I believe we can remove the U.S. Quick Reaction Force from Mogadishu."

Secretary Christopher took up the campaign at the beginning of the UN session. He lobbied with Secretary General Boutros-Ghali regarding our concern of too much emphasis on a military solution. It was a major effort. I believe Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff and Under Secretary of Defense Frank Wisner went to New York before Secretary Christopher to reemphasize the political effort. We did not want to let up on the military track. But we wanted to ensure that if the military effort succeeded, we needed something to carry on the political side and allow us to withdraw our forces. There was no discussion at my level to let up on the military track.

LTC Larry Joyce, USA (ret) (father of SGT James Casey Joyce, killed in Somalia, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 12, 1994): "I shared with President Clinton my dismay at the October 3 raid after he had already obviously embarked on a course of diplomacy. I asked him to confirm what I had heard and was pretty sure it was true that President Carter had met with Aided and had in fact reported back to the President that truly a diplomatic solution was the only solution, and he confirmed that. So I said, well, Mr. President, if that is the case, why the October 3 raid. And the President shared my dismay. He said when he got the reports of the casualties, that was his first question: What in the world are they doing conducting a raid? That is not the environment in which we should be operating today. We should in fact be seeking a diplomatic solution. So that was enlightening for me, that the President shared my dismay and basically said he thought that was the key question that had to be addressed."

XI. Conclusions

Before stating our conclusions, it is important to repeat the substance of an earlier caution - we are reaching these conclusions with the benefit of hindsight, with time for careful thought, and with knowledge of the facts, and the views of a number of individuals.

Mandate for transition to, and early stages of UNOSOM II

UNOSOM II was the first UN conducted peace enforcement operation, i.e. an operation that is authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to use all necessary means to accomplish its mandate, that was launched with high potential for combat. The assessment of the UN Security Council, including the United States, was that UNOSOM II could expand on the mission of the predecessor UNITAF operation by disarming the Somali factions, covering the entire country, and, in effect, embarking on a nation building effort. That assessment failed to consider the possibility that several nations would not meet their previously agreed upon troop levels in a timely fashion or to take into account the difficulty of achieving unity of command in a force from so many nations, including a number who were not willing to allow their commanders to obey orders without checking with higher national authorities.

During UNITAF, Ambassador Oakley properly realized that the warlords, who played such a significant role in toppling former President Siad Barre, had to be handled very carefully and had to be included in efforts toward heavy weapons disarmament and nation building. UNOSOM II decision makers apparently chose, instead, to marginalize the warlords, particularly in response to the early June attacks on Pakistani and U.S. forces.

We believe that the following conclusions can be logically drawn from the situation described above:

- a. The United Nations was not and is not now the best organization to direct the conduct of large-scale Chapter VII peace enforcement operations that may involve substantial risk of combat.
- b. Chapter VII peace operations with substantial risk of combat should be carried out by well-organized coalitions with clear agreements on contributions of forces, command arrangements, and limitations on commitment of forces by the contributing nations. United Nations commanders should have authority to ensure that leaders of national contingents who fail to comply with agreements are replaced.
- c. A greater effort should have been made to follow-up on the Addis Ababa agreements and to coordinate closely with the warlords in implementing those agreements. It was a mistake to seek to marginalize the warlords who had played such a key role in deposing Siad Barre. More emphasis should have been placed on political negotiations prior to deciding to use military force to carry out the UN mandate.
- d. The Security Council should have provided policy guidance to UNOSOM II once it was clear, as a result of the anti-UN

d. The Security Council should have provided policy guidance to UNOSOM II once it was clear, as a result of the anti-UN propaganda of Radio Aideed and the removal of Somali National Alliance (SNA) weapons from weapon cantonment sites, that Aideed was unwilling to cooperate with UNOSOM II. Such guidance was particularly important when Aideed's associate advised the UNOSOM II representative that inspections of the weapons cantonment sites would lead to "war."

e. The U.S. policy to keep the U.S. forces in Somalia as small as possible while at the same time not allowing the UN operation to fail should have been revisited when some national forces that were pledged to UNOSOM II did not arrive on time, some national contingents refused to follow General Bir's orders, Aideed refused to cooperate, and the U.S. Quick Reaction Force (QRF) had to be used for tasks outside their original mission.

f. The Administration should have been more forthcoming in advising the Congress on the implications of various UN resolutions and UNOSOM II decisions and policies on US military units. Congress should have been more aggressive in insisting on information relating to UNOSOM II and in acting on the information that was available to it to raise its concerns with "mission creep."

Decision on request for armor

The mood in the Congress at the time that the request for armor was being considered was one of dissatisfaction with the situation in Somalia and a desire to see the deployment of U.S. forces brought to an end as soon as possible. Nevertheless, the Secretary of Defense should have given more consideration to the requests from his military commanders and the recommendation from the Chairman, JCS and approved the request for armor.

If U.S. armor had been available in Mogadishu on October 3, 1993, it would have been available for inclusion in the Ranger Ground Reaction force that was positioned several blocks away from the assault site. Given the inclusion of 5-ton trucks with sandbags in the Ranger Ground Reaction force, it is likely that Bradley fighting vehicles, if present, would have been used instead. The inclusion of Bradley fighting vehicles in that force might have resulted in reduced U.S. casualties but it is impossible to reach an informed judgement on the extent of that reduction, if any. U.S. Bradley fighting vehicles and tanks definitely would have been used in the rescue effort, would have allowed a faster rescue, and possibly resulted in fewer casualties in the rescue force. It is impossible to quantify the number. It is important to note that once the forces at the site of the first downed helicopter had been resupplied, they sustained only three minor wounds. One of the Rangers who

downed helicopter and who subsequently died, might have survived if he had been rescued from that site quickly and received expert surgical care soon after rescue.

Decision on Joint Task Force Ranger force package

It is difficult to understand the decision to omit the AC-130 gunships from the Joint Task Force Ranger force package. The AC-130s were part of all of the force package options and were included in all of the training exercises. This decision is inconsistent with the principle that you fight as you train. Everyone interviewed in the course of this review stated that the AC-130s had a great psychological impact and were feared by the Somalis. The concern about collateral damage was appropriate but could have been met with carefully crafted rules of engagement that would have precluded use of the AC-130s in the city except in "in extremis" circumstances, such as occurred on October 3-4. The appearance of the AC-130s and the firing of its guns - even towards the horizon and away from the city - on that day might have served to discourage the massing of the Somali militia in view of the psychological impact of the AC-130s. On the other hand, it is not certain that the AC-130s would have been used given General Garrison's view that there would have been an airspace problem and since there was sufficient air power to put bullets on targets to protect the first helicopter crash site without the AC-130s.

Decision to deploy Joint Task Force Ranger and the conduct of raids

The failed attempt to use an element of the Marine Expeditionary Unit to apprehend Aideed on June 23rd, served to alert Aideed to the threat, allowed him to go into hiding, and made the task even more difficult. It is ironic that apprehending Aideed might have been much easier if attempted by properly equipped and trained special operations forces in June rather than in September.

It is difficult to understand the rationale for the first raid that General Garrison ordered. That raid, which he ordered in order to avoid the development of "a bunker mentality" by his troops, served to announce the presence and mission of his Task Force, if they were not already known, and to reveal some of the tactics that the Task Force would use. The lack of a valid rationale for launching the raid should have alerted superiors in the chain of command to the need to carefully reevaluate the Task Force's mission after each operation. One of the weaknesses of a unit like Task Force Ranger, whose combat capabilities are unparalleled, is the belief by the unit members and its commanders that they can accomplish any mission. Because of the supreme confidence of special operations forces, the chain of

command must provide more oversight to this type of unit than to conventional forces.

The continued use of Joint Task Force Ranger in a series of raids, which enabled Aided's forces to assess the Task Force's tactics and to develop counter-measures, is questionable.

There should have been greater awareness of the potential for the kind of military situation that resulted from the raid of October 3-4 and the reaction of the American people and the Congress to that situation. U.S. policies in the region were drastically altered as a result of the events surrounding that raid, especially the shock of the number of U.S. casualties and the abuse by Somalis of a U.S. soldier killed in action. U.S. foreign policy was and will be affected for years as a result of the raid of October 3-4.

It is clear that both civilian officials and military leaders should have been carefully and continually re-evaluating the Task Force Ranger mission and tactics after each raid, with an eye toward recommending that the operation be terminated if the risks were deemed to have risen too high. As secrecy and surprise were degraded and the risks of conducting these operations increased, the safety of our troops was a vitally important consideration and the effect of a military setback on our foreign policy was critical.

Moreover, the decision to continue the raids should have been better coordinated within the Administration with the concurrent U.S. effort to revitalize the political process to produce a two-track approach.

Intelligence support

The intelligence support to Joint Task Force Ranger was a major effort and demonstrated a high degree of cooperation and pooling of efforts by the several agencies involved. Human intelligence (HUMINT) was expected to be and proved to be the most difficult aspect of this effort. It did not succeed in locating Aided but it did locate his lieutenants. There were also difficulties in precisely assessing the strength of Aided's hard-core militia support.

Policy Issues

Both United Nations and United States policies in Somalia were uncoordinated and unclear. Military operations were difficult to plan and conduct as a result of such policies. Before U.S. forces are committed to combat, we must ensure that the policies under which they will operate and the military missions derived from these policies are appropriate, clear, supportable for a reasonable period of time, within the capabilities of the forces committed, and in the interests of the United States.

The change in policy that was being pushed by the United States in August-September, 1993 was intended to bring about a revitalization of the political process to produce a two-track approach. It was not intended, however, to end the other track, i.e. the military pressure track. In retrospect, it might have been wiser to have sought to suspend the attempt to apprehend Aided to give the political track an opportunity to work, such as was done in the aftermath of the October 3-4 raid.

The U.N.'s mandate was approved by the Security Council and many diplomatic and military actions in Mogadishu received press attention. However, there was apparently no formal attempt to inform the Congress of the policy differences between the United States and the UN Secretary General. Then Secretary of Defense Aspin's August 27, 1993 speech to the Center for Strategic and International Studies highlighted for the first time for many Members of Congress the breadth of UNOSOM II's mandate. As U.S. forces became increasingly involved in internal security, and stabilizing Somalia, these concepts came to be identified as elements of "mission creep" on the Senate floor during the debate on the Byrd amendment.

XII. Final comment

We would be remiss if we did not make a final comment concerning the performance of the U.S. forces, both Joint Task Force Ranger and the Quick Reaction Force, on October 3-4, 1993. We are unable in an unclassified report to describe in detail the events of those days as we would run a serious risk of divulging special operations forces' tactics and doctrine. For the same reason we are unable to report in appropriate detail the many acts of courage and heroism that we know were the standard of our forces. The fact that the rescue convoy could take the time to integrate the Malaysian and Pakistani forces and carefully plan the rescue operation because the forces at the first helicopter crash site were able to coolly and calmly defend their position and administer to their wounded comrades while suffering only three minor wounds during this period is a testament itself to the courage and professionalism of these forces.

We also should not lose sight of the fact that the combined efforts of the military personnel involved in UNITAF and UNOSOM II saved many thousands of Somali lives. The valor, professionalism and extraordinary discipline of the U.S. troops that carried out the orders of superiors in Somalia -- and particularly those involved in the Task Force Ranger raids of September - October, 1993 places these Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors and Marines in history with our highest military traditions. Our nation owes them a debt of gratitude.